13th Army 1941. Army commanders in the Great Patriotic War

IN Lately In the Khomutovsky district, so-called “black diggers” are increasingly appearing. And, judging by rumors, they are looking for nothing less than... the gold of the 13th Army. According to the same rumors, breaking through enemy barriers in October 1941 to the east, the fighters of the 13th allegedly left significant reserves of the Ukrainian Bank in currency and jewelry on Khomutov land. It is unknown under what circumstances these riches came to be at the disposal of the military. But talk about this has not ceased for several decades.

Probably, not a single military formation had to experience as many truly tragic moments as the 13th suffered.
The army was surrounded more than once. For the first time, its main forces fell into the enemy semi-ring at the end of June 1941 near Minsk. On July 10, a new real threat arose to find itself in the enemy's pincers - several of its corps fell into a trap near Mogilev. However, a full-scale blockade awaited the army on the Bryansk Front in early October 1941. Recently, an interesting article by historians A. Gavrenkov and Yu. Trifankov appeared on the Internet " 13th Army of the Bryansk Front: stop the enemy and not die", where the vicissitudes of the army's breakthrough through the enemy-occupied settlements of the Khomutovsky region are examined in sufficient detail. The publication does not directly talk about the precious cargo. And yet, you must agree, there is no smoke without fire. We will return to the “smoke” in the Internet article. But First, we will try to ask witnesses to the outcome of the 13th Army about the subject of our conversation.
Kalinovka resident Sergei Fedorovich Biryukov, a teenager during the war, is sure:
- I believe that the values of the 13th are reality, not fiction. Conversations that our retreating units were carrying some treasures, and then either burned or buried them, both then and after the war, never stopped.
Even to me, a boy, it was striking that our fighters were breaking through, to put it mildly, without being directed by anyone. In any case, many of them entered the huts without fear, and in fact almost all of them were inhabited by Germans.
I remember once two lieutenants loudly knocked on our door.
“Mistress,” they turned to their mother, “give me something to change clothes, we’re completely frayed and wet...
- What can I give you? “We don’t have anything ourselves,” the mother grumbled, but she still found some of her father’s clothes.
When leaving, the soldiers said that they had left their duffel bags near the village, and if we wanted, we could take them as a reward for the service. I immediately went to the specified “address”. I had barely descended into the forest-covered valley when he called out to me. male voice:
- Who it? Where are you going?
A Red Army soldier with a rifle at the ready came out from behind a tree to meet me. Now I don’t remember what I answered, but the fighter continued the interrogation:
- What's your last name? Where is mother, father? Do the Nazis offend?
Having figured out what was needed, he gently nudged me forward. After a few steps, as if out of the ground, another soldier appeared in front of me. Questions followed again. This fighter handed me over to the third, and finally I saw in the thicket a group of officers led by a general. The first thing the military did was find out whether there were Germans in the village and how many there were.
When I appeared at my yard in the evening, the German who was lodging with us, either suspecting something, or just like that, “as a precaution,” rolled his eyes:
- Serga, where did you go? Partisan, bang bang! - and put the carbine to my chest, with which he had shot two of our geese for himself the day before.
And Sergei Fedorovich also remembered how thirty years ago his relative, still alive and well, assured that he knew exactly the place where the “precious cargo” was buried by the soldiers of the 13th Army - on the territory of the former Petrovsky village council.
Elena Fedorovna Ragulina, an eighty-year-old resident of the village of Maleevka, also believes that the 13th Army was carrying some valuables.
“I can say that I almost saw everything myself,” says the old woman. “I was nine years old that fall. I lived with my mother in the village of Krasnaya Polosa, now it is no longer there, it was three or four kilometers from Maleevka. I will never forget how they attacked the village german planes, began dropping bombs. My mother, I, and some other neighbors took refuge in a deep hole. Surprisingly, the German attack did not cause any damage: no one was killed, all the huts stood intact. And just outside the outskirts, clouds of black smoke rose to the sky.
“Probably a bomb exploded and set something on fire,” I thought. But I was wrong. A young villager, Shura Ragulina, who appeared from the side where it was burning, brought clarity: it turns out that it was our soldiers who set fire to two covered trucks... with money.
Noticing our distrust, Shura even got offended: " So they also gave me a suitcase with rubles. You're young, they say you'll still need them". And with these words the neighbor showed a ballet shoe stuffed with banknotes.
“To be honest,” Elena Fedorovna continues, “Shura didn’t convince us very much.” You never know where she could get money. We kids even ran outside the outskirts to examine the fire. Of course, nothing was found except the skeletons of burnt cars...
And now, I think, there is a reason to take a closer look at the article posted on the Internet.
“Continuous attacks by the Germans, extreme fatigue and heavy losses of units (307th and 298th rifle divisions) guarding the transport,” the authors emphasize, “forced the command of the 13th Army (in violation of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 43610 on the preservation of materiel ) make “the decision to destroy vehicles and other property so that the enemy does not use it. Car engines were shot through with armor-piercing bullets, and the cars themselves were derailed into a deep ravine. The gunners of the howitzer artillery regiment, having fired all the shells at the enemy concentration, with the last shot rendered the guns unusable (sand was poured into the barrel bore). All this was done with pain in my heart. There was only one consolation: the enemy would not take advantage of anything." Isn't this an indirect confirmation of the story of our interlocutor? But that's not all. The article also contains a direct reference to the village where Elena Fedorovna Ragulina lived during the war: "The material and convoy located in area of the Red Stripe under the protection of the 307th Infantry Division, destroyed by order of the army commander." Note: by order of the army commander himself, General Avksentiy Gorodnyansky. Agree, it means that something very important was in the convoy, if an order from the commander to take radical measures was required. Otherwise What is called a gold and foreign exchange resource?
Of course, no one destroyed gold and precious stones; such things could easily be hidden and buried in the ground. But with paper banknotes, most likely, they did not stand on ceremony. They were not supposed to fall to the enemy under any circumstances. Elena Fedorovna, consider herself a witness to how the “paper half” of the banking fund was set on fire...
Nikolay SHATOKHIN,
Khomutovka village

Dedicated to the 13th Combined Arms Red Banner ARMY, which was part of the Western, Central, Bryansk, Southwestern Voronezh, and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. Formed in the Western Special Military District in May 1941, it completed its victorious path in the Berlin and Prague operations. But before the Victory there were operations: VORONEZH-VOROSHILOVGRAD defensive operation - June-July 1941; VORONEZH-KASTORNE offensive operation - early 1943; KURSK ARCT - summer 1943; CHERNIGOV-POLTAVSK operation - September 1943; battles near the Dnieper; liberation of right-bank Ukraine and Poland; capture of the Sandomierz bridgehead; in 1945 BERLIN and PRAGUE operations. At the end of the war, the 13th ARMY captured General A.A. Vlasov. ETERNAL GLORY TO THE WWII WARRIORS AND COMMON SOLDIERS OF TIMOFEY TROFIMOVICH SUNDUKOV of the 8th Infantry Yampol Red Banner Division, first 229, and later 310 Order of the Kutuzov Regiment./Why are videos about Semipalatinsk included in the album? The 8th Infantry Division was formed in the city of Semipalatinsk, and the word “Semipalatinsk” always appeared before the word “Yampolskaya”. I invite Semipalatinsk, Zhanasemey, Ayagoz residents to open albums about the 13th Army and in particular about our division and collect bit by bit information about battle path our defenders. My album is a draft. I will be glad to become a friend of such associates. Let's pay due memory and perpetuate their names./(July 7, 1942. Headquarters, in order to better lead the troops, divided the Bryansk Front into 2: Bryansk, which included 3, 48, and the 13th Army, the 5th Tank Army and the 1st, 16th Tank Corps of the 8th Cavalry Corps, front aviation, which became the 15th Air Army at the end of July, and Voronezh consisting of the 40th, 60th and 6th combined arms armies, 4th, 17th 18.24 tank corps and the 2nd Guards Air Army)... (The Bryansk Front was commanded by General N.E. Chibisov; Voronezh - Golikov F.I.... In July 1042, 13 armies and others were in the south on the west bank of the river. Don in the direction of Khokhol, the task was: to intercept the supply and rear routes of the enemy tank group that had broken through to the Don near Voronezh. Fedorenko, Vatutin, Stepanov were sent from Headquarters to provide assistance) On July 14, N.F. Votutin was appointed commander of the Voronezh Front troops)

13TH ARMYformed in May 1941 on the basis of a directive of the General Staff of April 24, 1941 in the Western Special Military District. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, its field control united the troops of the Western Front located in the Minsk region (21st Rifle Corps, 50th Rifle Division, 8th Artillery Brigade and some individual units).
At the end of June 1941, the army, relying on the structures of the Minsk fortified region, fought heavy defensive battles with formations of the enemy’s 3rd tank group. Under the blows of his superior forces, she was forced to retreat beyond the Berezina to the Borisov region and to the south, and then beyond the Dnieper, where she secured a foothold at the Kopys-Novy Bykhov line.
From July 10, 1941, army troops took part in the Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10). From July 24, the army was included in the Central Front, and from August 15, the Bryansk Front. As part of these fronts, the army fought defensive battles on the Sozh, Sudost and Desna rivers.
From September 30, 1941, army troops took part in the Oryol-Bryansk defensive operation (September 30 - October 23). By the beginning of November, they reached the Maslovo-Tim line and covered the direction of Livny and Yelets.
From November 11, 1941, the army as part of the Southwestern Front fought defensive battles in the Voronezh direction and by December 5 retreated to the line southeast of Efremov - east of Yelets - Volovo.
With the start of the counteroffensive near Moscow, the 13th Army participated in the Yelets operation (December 6-16, 1941). On December 24, the army entered the Bryansk Front of the 2nd formation and, continuing the offensive in the Oryol direction, liberated the city of Livny ( December 25).
By the end of 1941, army troops reached the Skorodnoye-Kolpny line, which they held until mid-1942.
From June 28, 1942, they participated in the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad strategic defensive (June 28 - July 24), and at the beginning of 1943 - in the Voronezh-Kastornenskaya (January 24 - February 2) offensive operations. By the end of February, the army reached the line Maloarkhangelsk - Rozhdestvenskoye and consisted of Central Front The 2nd formation (from March 13) held this line, conducting offensive battles in order to improve its position.
In the Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943), army troops, defending as part of the main group of the Central Front, in cooperation with troops of the 70th Army, thwarted the plan of the German command to break through the defense on Oryol-Kursk direction. With the transition of the Soviet troops to the counter-offensive, they participated in the Oryol strategic offensive operation (July 12 - August 18, 1943), and then in the Chernigov-Pripyat offensive operation (August 26 - September 30).
On October 6, 1943, the army became part of the Voronezh Front, and from October 20 - the 1st Ukrainian Front.
From the end of 1943 until September 1944, the army fought to liberate Right Bank Ukraine and the southeastern regions of Poland. During the Kiev strategic (November 3-13, 1943), Zhitomir-Berdichev (December 24, 1943 - January 14, 1944), Rivne-Lutsk (January 27-February 11, 1944), Proskurov-Chernivtsi (4 March - April 17) and Lvov-Sandomierz (July 13 - August 29, 1944) strategic offensive operations, its troops fought over 750 km. They liberated the city of Ovruch on November 18, 1943 (in cooperation with partisan detachments), Korosten (December 29, 1943), Novograd-Volynsky (January 3, 1944), Sarny (January 11), Lutsk (February 2) and many others.
In 1945, army units took part in the last offensive operations 1st Ukrainian Front: in the Sandomierz-Silesian (January 12 - February 3), Berlin (April 16 - May 8) and Prague (May 6-11) strategic operations. During these operations, they liberated the cities of Zana and Essen (April 22), Wittenberg (April 27) and, in cooperation with other troops, the cities of Brandenburg (May 1) and Prague (May 9).
The army completed its fighting west of Prague.
Army commanders: Lieutenant General P. M. Filatov (May - July 1941); Lieutenant General Remezov F.N. (July 1941); Lieutenant General Gera-simenko V.F. (July 1941); Major General Golubev K.D. (July - August 1941); Major General Gorodnyansky A. M. (August 1941 - January 1942); Major General, from February 1943 - Lieutenant General, from August 1944 - Colonel General N.P. Pukhov (January 1942 - until the end of the war).
Members of the Army Military Council: brigade commissar Furtenko (Furt) P.S. (June - September 1941); Brigade Commissar, from December 1942 - Major General, from June 1945 - Lieutenant General M. A. Kozlov (September 1941 - until the end of the war).
Chiefs of Army Staff: Major General, from September 1943 - Lieutenant General Petrushevsky A.V. (May 1941 - December 1943); Lieutenant General Malandin G.K. (December 1943 - until the end of the war).

A.A. Gavrenkov
historian

Yu.T. Trifankov
Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor

13th Army of the Bryansk Front: Stop the enemy and not die

To the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow.

Dedicated to the Bryansk Front

By the beginning of the offensive of the Nazi troops in the Moscow direction, three Soviet fronts were defending on the distant approaches to Moscow: Western (commander Colonel General I.S. Konev), Reserve (commander Marshal Soviet Union CM. Budyonny) and Bryansky (commander Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko).

The Bryansk Front was formed by order of Headquarters on September 16, 1941. It included the 13th and 50th armies, and from August 25 - the 3rd and 21st armies of the Central Front. At the beginning of September, front troops launched a flank attack on the enemy’s 2nd Tank Group, which was advancing south, but were unable to prevent this group from reaching the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front. Hitler changed the direction of the attack from Moscow to the south with the goal of defeating Soviet troops in Ukraine and achieved his goal, then again turned his units to the main direction, to Moscow. However, he missed the time for a direct attack on Moscow. The Bryansk Front was faced with the task, together with neighboring fronts, of stopping German troops advancing in the Moscow direction.

A.M. Vasilevsky, who at that time was the head of the operational department and deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, assessed the situation that had developed by October 1941 after the war. in the Moscow direction: “The General Staff, unfortunately, did not exactly predict the enemy’s plan of action in the Moscow direction. Hitler's military leadership planned to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops with attacks from three powerful tank groups from the areas of Dukhovshchina, Roslavl and Shostka. Encircle the main forces of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts near Vyazma and Bryansk, and then, without any pause, attack Moscow with infantry formations from the west, and with tank and motorized units strike bypassing the city from the north and south. At a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group Center in the fall of 1941. Hitler said that Moscow must be surrounded during this operation so that “not a single Russian soldier, not a single resident - be it a man, a woman or a child - could leave it. Any attempt to suppress by force’’...

The number of infantry divisions of Army Group Center by the end of September was increased to 15 thousand each. Against our three fronts - Western, Reserve and Bryansk - the enemy concentrated 77 divisions numbering more than a million people, 1,700 tanks and assault guns, over 14 thousand guns and mortars, 950 combat aircraft.”

By that time, the three Soviet fronts included “about 800 thousand people, 6,808 guns and mortars, 782 tanks and 545 aircraft. The lack of ready strategic reserves at the General Headquarters did not allow us to take more decisive steps,” writes the Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff.

According to G.K. Zhukov, “in total, the combat troops of these fronts at the end of September numbered 1 million 250 thousand people, 990 tanks, 7,600 guns and mortars, 677 aircraft. Largest quantity forces and means were part of the Western Front.

The enemy, having regrouped his forces in the Moscow direction, outnumbered all three of our fronts taken together in the number of troops - by 1.4 times, in tanks - by 1.7 times, in guns and mortars - by 1.8 times, and in aircraft - 2 times."

From September 30 to October 2, the enemy launched strong attacks on Soviet troops covering the Moscow direction. The great Moscow battle began.

G.K. Zhukov writes: “The offensive of the German troops according to the plan of operation code-named “Typhoon” began on September 30 with a strike by Guderian’s tank group and the 2nd German Army against the troops of the Bryansk Front in the Zhukovka-Shostka sector. On October 2, the enemy launched powerful attacks on the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts. Particularly strong blows came from areas north of Dukhovshchina and east of Roslavl. The enemy managed to break through the defenses of our troops. The enemy's strike groups were rapidly moving forward, covering the entire Vyazma grouping of troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts from the south and north.

An extremely difficult situation also developed south of Bryansk, where the 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front were under threat of encirclement. Without encountering serious resistance, Guderian’s troops rushed to Orel, where we did not have the strength to repel the attack.”

After the war A.M. Vasilevsky will write that the failure that befell the three Soviet fronts “was largely a consequence of not only the enemy’s superiority in forces and means, the lack of necessary reserves, but also the incorrect determination of the enemy’s main attack by the Headquarters and the General Staff, and therefore, the incorrect construction of the defense.” . And further: “Even as a result of a well-organized defense in the directions of the enemy’s main attacks... the troops... as a whole did not have superiority.”

At G.K. Zhukov has a slightly different point of view: “From a conversation at the headquarters of the Western Front and an analysis of the situation, I got the impression that the disaster in the Vyazma area could have been prevented. Based on intelligence data, on September 27, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command warned the front commanders with a special directive about the possibility of an offensive by large enemy forces in the Moscow direction in the coming days. Consequently, there was no surprise of the offensive in the sense that it was at the beginning of the war. Despite the enemy's superiority in manpower and equipment, our troops could avoid encirclement. To do this, it was necessary to more correctly determine in a timely manner the direction of the enemy’s main attacks and concentrate the main forces and means against them through passive sectors. This was not done, and the defense of our fronts could not withstand concentrated enemy attacks. Gaping gaps formed that there was nothing to close, since there were no reserves left in the hands of the command.”

The Bryansk Front and its armies operated under such conditions. But no one has ever had such an analysis of the state of affairs. Understanding what is happening will not come soon.

“The situation on the Bryansk Front sector is extremely unfortunate. On September 30, the enemy’s 2nd Tank Group from the Shostki-Glukhov area delivered a strong blow to Sevsk to the rear of the 13th Army. 2nd german army, having broken through the defenses of the 50th Army, moved to Bryansk and to the rear of the Third Army. The front troops found themselves in a difficult situation. Troop control was lost. The connection between the Headquarters and the front command was temporarily disrupted, and the Headquarters was forced, without a clear idea of the events taking place in the Bryansk region, to take control of some of the front armies directly,” reports A.M. Vasilevsky.

The Bryansk Front was commanded by Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko, the 13th Army was commanded by Lieutenant General A.M. Gorodnyansky.

As noted by the German General Guderian, who at that time commanded the enemy’s tank strike group, on October 1, “The 24th German Tank Corps took Sevsk... On the side of the road lay shot Russian vehicles of all types - another confirmation of the surprise of our attack... Traces of fierce fighting were visible on the field . There were dead and wounded Russians lying around... my companions and I found fourteen healthy Russian soldiers hiding in the tall grass and took them prisoner. Among them was one officer whom we found talking on the phone with someone from Sevsk... During this day, the tank wedge of the 24th Tank Corps covered a distance of 130 kilometers.”

According to the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, on the night of October 2, Vasilevsky “gave instructions to the commander of the Red Army Air Force
P.F. Zhigarev, commander of the Bryansk Front A.I. Eremenko and some other persons immediately create an aviation group for the Bryansk Front, headed by Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Colonel I.N. Rukhle (four long-range air divisions and one special-purpose air division). From October 2, the group was supposed to take part in the defeat of an enemy tank group that had broken through to the Sevsk area. The group's combat work was ordered to be covered by fighters. The commander of the Bryansk Front Air Force, Major General F.P., was responsible for this. Polynin."

“On October 2,” writes Guderian, “the furious offensive continued. The Russian front was finally broken through. And the 13th Russian Army was thrown back to the northeast... Our losses during these days were, fortunately, small... Army Group Center advanced successfully along the entire front from early morning, and received great help good weather. Our neighbor on the left, the 2nd Army, made its way through the enemy positions on Sudost and Desna, despite stubborn Russian resistance."

“On October 3, the 4th Armored Division arrived in Orel,” Guderian continues, “…. We reached good roads and captured an important road and railway junction, which was to become the base of our future operations. We captured the city so suddenly that when our tanks appeared, trams were still running around the city. The evacuation of industrial facilities, which the Russians had so carefully prepared, failed. Along the streets leading from the factories to the station lay uncovered machines and loaders filled with raw materials and tools.”

G.K. Zhukov reports this as follows: “Developing the offensive, Guderian’s units captured Orel, unprepared for defense, on October 3, reaching the rear of the Bryansk Front with the 24th Motorized Corps. The 1st Guards Rifle Corps, deployed in the Mtsensk area, entered into battle with a motorized and tank group of the enemy. Enemy troops were detained here for several days and suffered heavy losses in manpower and military equipment. Tankers of the 4th and 11th brigades were the first to use a method of destroying enemy tanks from an ambush. Using the success of the 1st Guards Corps, the troops of the Bryansk Front retreated to the lines indicated by them.”

A.M. Vasilevsky writes: “On October 3, motorized formations of the 2nd Tank Group of the Nazis broke into Orel and tried to develop an offensive along the Orel-Tula highway. To cover the Oryol-Tula direction, the Headquarters hastily promoted the 1st Guards Rifle Corps from its reserve, reinforcing it with two tank brigades, an aviation group, an RS regiment and several others. special units. The command of this corps was entrusted to the deputy head of the main armored department, Major General D.D. Lelyushenko. He reported directly to Headquarters. The corps was ordered to concentrate in the area of Mtsensk, Otrada, Chern no later than October 5.”

G.K. Zhukov writes about this: “On October 2, at the direction of Headquarters, the reinforced 1st Guards Rifle Corps was created under the command of Major General D.D. Lelyushenko. The task of the corps was to delay the advance of enemy troops and ensure the withdrawal of troops from the Bryansk Front.”

Guderian gave orders to his tank corps move to Bryansk. On October 4, the 3rd and 18th German armored divisions advanced on Karachev. The 17th Armored Division was building a bridgehead at Nerussa to enable further German advances to the north. Guderian's neighbors on the left crossed Bolva and reached the Sukhinichi-Yelnya railway. The 3rd German Panzer Group captured Bely. Guderian writes that on October 4, “in the rear of the army group, the activities of the partisans began to attract attention for the first time.”

On October 5, Guderian ordered the 17th Armored Division to immediately capture Bryansk. The 18th German division went north, crossing the Orel - Bryansk road. On this day, he “witnessed the activity of Russian aviation. As soon as I landed at the airfield in Sevsk, where twenty German fighters had already landed, the Russians launched a bomb attack on it, followed by a bombing of the corps headquarters. I immediately followed the route of advance of the 3rd Armored Division. And here we were periodically subjected to raids by small groups of Russian bombers from three to six aircraft. However, they flew at high altitude, and these bombings were not very accurate... On this day, my 2nd Tank Group was renamed the 2nd Tank Army.”

A.M. Vasilevsky writes: “...On October 6, the defense line of the Bryansk Front was broken through in three places. The withdrawal of his troops began under extremely difficult conditions.” Thus, the Bryansk Front suffered defeat under enemy attacks.

G.K. Zhukov writes: “The Bryansk front turned out to be dissected. His troops, suffering losses, fought back to the east. A threatening situation has also arisen in the Tula direction.

By order of the commander of the Western Front, Colonel General I.S. Konev launched a counterattack north of Vyazma against the northern group of enemy troops that was outflanking our troops. Unfortunately, this counterattack was not successful. By the end of October 6, a significant part of the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts was surrounded west of Vyazma.”

On this day, October 6 at 11.45, as follows from operational report No. 211 of the Soviet General Staff, commander of the Bryansk Front A.I. Eremenko set the task of the 13th Army, holding the occupied lines, with the main forces to continue the offensive on Suzemka, Seredina-Buda and further on Sevsk for a strike together with units of the 3rd Army... and Ermakov’s group in the rear of the main enemy grouping - the group tank troops General Guderian. But after the breakthrough of enemy tank units and motorized mechanized groups in the Glukhov - Yampol - Shatrishche area last days September and its entry into the Orel and Karachev area, it became clear to the Soviet command that the 13th Army was surrounded.

“After a series of battles, the army units managed to stop the enemy’s advance at the line of the mouth of the Znobovka, Znob Novgorodskaya, Lesnoye, Gavrilova Sloboda rivers. In this sector, the action of the 29th Infantry Division and the 293rd Infantry Division (510, 511, 512th Infantry Regiments) was stopped,” says the 13th Army’s combat log.

As it becomes clear from the analysis, at this time the enemy tank forces broke through and went far to the east. The actions of the Bryansk Front command turned out to be late. Communication with the troops turned out to be ineffective. They acted separately. The help of the Headquarters was not effective enough.

However, the battles continued.

On this day, the enemy’s 4th Armored Division south of Mtsensk “survived the attack of Russian tanks for several terrible hours. For the first time, the superiority of the Russian T-34s over our tanks was clearly demonstrated,” writes Guderian. “The division suffered heavy losses. Our planned attack on Tula had to be postponed.” Thus, in this direction, Headquarters managed to achieve a temporary result and stop the enemy rushing towards the capital.

On October 6, the 17th German Armored Division entered Bryansk, captured bridges over the Desna and established close contact with the 2nd German Army, which was advancing west of the Desna. The encirclement of Soviet troops operating between the Desna and Sudost rivers was ending. North of Borshchev on the Navla River, the Germans installed a bridgehead. Supply German troops V to a large extent depended on control over the highway and by railway Orel - Bryansk, writes Guderian.

On the night of October 6–7, the first snow fell. Guderian sent to Germany “a request regarding winter uniforms - for the second time, but in response they told us ... not to bother us with such requests.”

“The Russian counterattack on Bryansk was repulsed. The 29th Motorized Infantry Division reached the northern part of the Revna River... The 53rd Army Corps was approaching Bryansk from the west... We hoped in this way... to clear the Roslavl-Bryansk-Orel road for the supply of food and ammunition to us. Even further north, the 2nd Army captured Sukhinichi and Mishchevsk. In the Vyazma area, the forces of the 4th and 9th armies managed to encircle about forty-five Russian divisions.”

On this day, the German high command came to the conclusion that “all these successes indicate the readiness” of the German troops “to continue the attack on Moscow. Now it was important not to let the Russians have time to create a new defensive line west of Moscow.”

On October 7 at 11.45, the headquarters of the 13th Army received a copy of the Directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (telegram No. 002716 in the combat log). It ordered all three armies of the Bryansk Front (13th, 3rd, 50th) to fight their way east beyond the line of the Voroshilovo, Ponyri, Lgov stations.

“The 13th Army,” the Directive prescribed, “covered by strong rearguards, retreat and strike in the direction of Igritskoye, Dmitriev-Lgovsky, Kostina, and have one division back to ensure a retreat from the south.”

G.K. Zhukov notes: “By the end of October 7, all roads to Moscow were essentially open. At 2:30 a.m. on October 8, I called I.V. Stalin. He was still working."

The armies of the Bryansk Front continued to retreat, already from complete or partial encirclement.

The formations of Lieutenant General A.M. From the very beginning of the retreat, Gorodnyansky had to fight his way to the southeast through several successive barriers of German troops.

“Several days,” recalled Marshal of the Soviet Union S.S. after the war. Biryuzov, (at that time Major General commander of the 132nd Infantry Division of the 13th Army), - we fought heavy battles, trying to break through to the southeast, but the enemy tenaciously held on to the roads to Orel, which now fed Guderian’s entire strike force. Our attempts to cut these routes ended in failure. Having repulsed all attacks, the Nazis increased pressure on us.” He further wrote: “An order was received from army headquarters to prepare a breakthrough in another direction - to Sevsk. But the enemy managed to transfer quite sufficient fresh forces here too. The 13th Army suffered heavy losses in these battles, and every day the hope for a successful breakthrough diminished.”

The Military Council of the 13th Army decided to launch the main attack in the direction of Negino-Khomutovka with the forces of the 132nd and 143rd rifle divisions and the 141st tank brigade. The 6th Rifle Division advanced on Suzemka in the direction Stepnoye - Khinel. The 307th Rifle Division, together with the 886th Rifle Regiment of the 298th Rifle Division, the 155th Rifle Division with the 38th NKVD Border Regiment and the 275th Engineer Battalion formed the rearguard of the army.

On the afternoon of October 8, General Guderian flew an airplane over the road from Sevsk to Orel. The highway, according to the German general, looked terrible, “it was full of bomb craters.” Soviet aviation was working. The general’s great concern was also caused by “the technical capabilities and, even worse, the new tactical use of Russian T-34 tanks.” The anti-tank weapons available to us at that time turned out to be effective against the T-34 only if we were very lucky. The short-barreled 75-mm guns of our T-4s could only hit the T-34 from behind, and even then with an accurate hit on the shutters above the engine - this was the only way to disable it. ... The Russians attacked frontally with infantry, and tanks were launched en masse on the flanks. They studied,” notes the general.

On the night of October 8, the Military Council of the 13th Army held a meeting with the commanders and military commissars of the divisions, coordinated their actions and gave instructions to the units for a breakthrough, the plan of which was simple: at 2 a.m. on October 9, the 6th Infantry Division attacked the enemy with forward battalions in Suzemka in order to divert his attention from Negin, and at dawn divisions attack Negino, delivering the main blow. The vanguard will be divisions reinforced with tanks and artillery. At the same time, the 307th Infantry Division will also go on the offensive.

Guderian, in his memoirs about the battles in the Suzemka area, wrote: “On the evening of October 8, 1941, a report was received from the 35th Corps that the enemy was putting strong pressure on our troops located north of Suzemka (west of Sevsk). From this it could be concluded that the Russian troops surrounded south of Bryansk are trying to break through to the east... On October 9, the Russians continued their attempts to break through in the area settlement Suzemki. The Russians quickly attacked the right flank of the 293rd Infantry Division, pushing the division back to Suzemka and Shilenka."

The main blow of the 13th Army was delivered by the 132nd and 143rd Rifle Divisions and the 141st Tank Brigade. The main force of the strike group was the 132nd Infantry Division under Major General S.S. Biryuzova. The division secretly withdrew the main forces from the occupied line of defense and, having made a march, arrived in the concentration area. In order to misinform the enemy, Biryuzov transmitted in clear text over the radio a false combat order for the division to go on the offensive in the direction of Uralovo, Khilchichi. The order was also repeated over the phone. The idea was a success.

Member of the Military Council of the 13th Army M.A. tells the story. Kozlov: “Early in the morning of October 9, breakthrough detachments of the 132nd and 143rd rifle divisions with attached tanks of the 141st tank brigade went on the attack in the Negino area. At the same time, all the tractors standing in this area on the edge of the forest started their engines and imitated the movement of tanks with their noise. Divisional artillery rained fire on enemy positions. The attack was unexpected and successful. In Negino we destroyed up to a regiment of infantry, captured the regimental headquarters, and destroyed 15 anti-tank guns. The 132nd and 143rd rifle divisions and the first echelon of the army headquarters passed through Negino.”

However, the army troops, including units of the 132nd Infantry Division, had to fight more than one fierce battle before breaking out of the encirclement. Having defeated the enemy garrison in the area of the Henel timber processing plant, by October 10 the division concentrated in front of enemy strongholds in Poznyatovka and Veselaya Kalina. The main forces of the 13th Army also arrived here. Bloody battles broke out again. The combined detachment of the division was headed personally by S.S. Biryuzov. The detachment was advancing on Veselaya Kalina from the front. The 605th and 712th rifle regiments of the division, having defeated the enemy garrison in Poznyatovka, reached the flank of Veselaya Kalina. The current situation prompted the division commander to make a new decision: to transfer the attack of the combined detachment to the left flank of the Nazi stronghold. Meanwhile, 712th rifle regiment pressed the Germans from the right flank, and the 605th went to the rear of the strong point. The enemy garrison was surrounded.

The division began the assault on Vesela Kalina. “I raised the fighters to attack,” S.S. wrote about this. Biryuzov,” and rushed off with them. I had a machine gun in my hands and grenades in my pockets. Towards - a whole swarm of bullets. One of them burned my side, but I didn’t stop; the pain seemed insignificant then.”

About the combat operations of the division and the personal courage of division commander S.S. Biryuzov in the Sevsk region was told by Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General S.P. Ivanov: “Together with the 132nd Division I had to leave the encirclement. On the night of October 17, 1941, the head regiment near the village of Veselaya Kalina was met by strong enemy mortar and machine gun fire. Our chains are stuck. And then Biryuzov himself led the regiment into the attack.”

Another Soviet military leader also pointed out this event: “And now I see the division commander, General Biryuzov,” recalls the former commissar of the 182nd division, Major General N.P. Petrov, - raised the fighters to attack and himself went in the front ranks. He has a machine gun in his hands... He had already reached the first houses from where the Nazis were firing, threw a grenade and fell there. When we rushed towards him... blood was flowing from both legs. We immediately put the general on a cape and carried him to a safe place.” The division commander was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield. The fate of Veselaya Kalina was decided, her garrison was destroyed. Only then Colonel S.S. Biryuzov, by order of a member of the military council of the army, brigade commissar M.A. Kozlova was sent to the hospital.

A very difficult situation developed for the 155th and 6th Rifle Divisions. The enemy recaptured Negino, closing the exit for these formations. The 6th Infantry Division broke through on the night of October 10. The 155th Infantry Division, the 275th Engineer Battalion, and part of the army's rear units remained behind enemy lines. They fought their way out of encirclement in separate groups. Former political instructor of the 219th communications battalion of the 155th rifle division S.S. Varchuk recalled: “The fate of the 155th division was tragic. Only in November 1941 did we cross the front line near Aleksin Tula region. 167 of us came out. Almost all of the rest died in battle."

The second group of soldiers of the 155th division emerged from encirclement in the area of Kashira, Moscow region. Some of the soldiers, 3-4 people each, went out to other areas. In mid-December 1941 Due to irreparable losses, the 155th Infantry Division was disbanded.

On October 14, 1941, continuing the offensive in the direction of Teplovka - Nizhnee Pesochnoe, units of the 6th Infantry Division, supported by units of the 462nd Artillery Regiment of the Reserve of the Main Command of Major I.I. Sobkalov, at dawn they attacked Khomutovka, where the enemy garrison was located (a cavalry detachment of up to 500 people). The attack on the enemy garrison was led by the head of the political department of the 6th division, regimental commissar G.S. Pimenov. At the village of Kolyachek, soldiers of the 84th Infantry Regiment threw back the enemy barrier, opening the way for the 6th Division to Khomutovka. Taking advantage of the snowstorm, soldiers of the 125th Infantry Regiment, Major M.I. Markin burst into Khomutovka. The 6th Rifle Division occupied Zlobino and cut the Rylsk-Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky highway. During a fierce battle south of Khomutovka, the commissar of the 462nd howitzer artillery regiment, regimental commissar G.E., was killed. Krasnevsky.

Recalls the former commander of the 6th Infantry Division, Colonel M.D. Grishin: “We were given the task of leaving the encirclement in the direction of the Svapa River towards the city of Fatezh. We immediately came across an enemy ring, although the day before here, near the village of Negino, the 137th Infantry Division of the 3rd Army had broken through. But within a day the enemy closed the gap, and the ring had to be broken again. We managed to loosen it. The division began to retreat in the direction of Orlya, Khomutovka, Nizh. Sand. Moreover, the withdrawal took place only at night, and during the day, located in the forests, we occupied a perimeter defense.”

The formations of the 13th Army that made their way to the Khomutovka area (50 km northwest of Lgov) were again surrounded by the forces of the enemy’s 34th Army and 48th Mechanized Corps. The Nazis blocked all roads to the river. Svapa (a tributary of the Seim River), pushing back in a number of areas the units of the Ermakov group defending on the eastern bank. An exceptionally difficult situation was created. Commander of the 13th Army A.M. Gorodyansky made a decision: on the night of October 17, with a blow to Skovorodnevo, Nizhneye Pesochnoe (on the Svapa River) to break through to the east.

A significant role in ensuring the escape of the encirclement of the main units of the 13th Army was played by soldiers of the 860th regiment of the 283rd Infantry Division, reinforced by a division of the 848th Artillery Regiment and three tanks of the 150th Tank Brigade. The breakthrough to Nizhne-Pesochny of the 13th Army was scheduled for 2 a.m. on October 18.

It was decided to use the success of the 6th Infantry Division, which by this time occupied the Semenovsky forest, which was closest to the crossings on the river. Swapa. The division's soldiers launched a bayonet attack, which was supported by the rest of the forces. By the morning of October 18, the main forces of the army reached the river in the Nizhneye Pesochnoye area and began to cross. Continuous attacks by the Germans, extreme fatigue and heavy losses of units (307th and 298th rifle divisions) guarding the transport forced the command of the 13th Army (in violation of the Supreme High Command Headquarters Directive No. 43610 on the preservation of materiel) to make “the decision to destroy vehicles and other property so that the enemy does not use it. Car engines were shot through with armor-piercing bullets, and the cars themselves were derailed into a deep ravine. The gunners of the howitzer artillery regiment, having fired all the shells at the enemy concentration, with the last shot rendered the guns unusable (sand was poured into the barrel bore). All this was done with pain in my heart. There was only one consolation: the enemy would not take advantage of anything.”

To provide assistance to the 13th Army and withdraw its equipment to the eastern bank of the river. The front command immediately ordered Major General Ermakov to launch a counter-attack with the forces of the 2nd Guards Division in the northern direction towards Bobylevka with the aim of destroying the enemy in this area. In addition, a cavalry group (21st and 52nd cavalry divisions), reinforced by an infantry detachment, artillery and a detachment from units of the 6th Infantry Division that had emerged from the encirclement, advanced in the direction of Skovorodnevo, Safronovo. In this group there were 48 carts with fuel to supply the 13th Army.

2nd guards division with a detachment of fighters from the 121st Infantry Division advanced in the direction of Bobylevka.

According to operational report No. 236 of the General Staff of the Red Army at 8.00 of October 20, 1941, “The 13th Army, with stubborn battles, has basically completed reaching the eastern bank of the river. Svapa and concentrated all rifle divisions in the Belyaevo - Malakhov-Vandarets - Chernichen area. The material and convoy located in the Red Stripe area under the protection of the 307th Infantry Division were destroyed by order of the army commander."

The 13th Army, dying, generally completed its assigned task - a battle with an inverted front and a retreat to the line indicated to it. As of September 20, 1941, the 13th Army included: 6th, 121st, 132nd, 143rd, 155th, 298th, 307th rifle divisions; 55th Cavalry Division; 207th, 462nd, 50th, 387th artillery regiments; 12th Artillery Battalion; 141st Tank Brigade, 43rd Separate Tank Battalion; 11th, 60th, 61st aviation divisions; 275th and 50th battalions of engineering troops. Total 47,250 people. The enemy was driven back and the following divisions of the 13th Army emerged in battle: 6th, 132nd, 143rd, 307th, 298th, 155th and 121st Rifle and 55th Cavalry, as well as 141 - I tank brigade.

In general, as evidenced by the documents of this army stored in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, on October 23, 1941, 6,189 people emerged from encirclement. The average strength of a division of this army (if you do not take into account the 298th Infantry Division as newly arrived and having 9,787 people) was 4,105 people before leaving the encirclement. The average number of personnel of the divisions that emerged from encirclement on October 23 and November 1, 1941 was only 723 people. The losses thus amounted to 84% of the personnel, although according to the operational report No. 236 of the General Staff of the Red Army at 8.00 of 10.20.41, the losses of the 13th Army amounted to up to 50% of the personnel and materiel. The damage to the 298th Infantry Division, which was the largest at the time of encirclement, amounted to 8860 people, i.e. 91%

According to the authors of the book “Through the Whole War,” about 10 thousand people with weapons, 32 with tanks and 34 with light machine guns, with 130 PPSh assault rifles and 11 cannons. All were saved battle flags. Some rifle divisions (143, 121) were later included in the 50th Army, whose commander was Major General A.N. Ermakov.
By October 22, they took up defensive positions on a front up to 45 km wide northwest of Kursk. Although the 50th Army suffered heavy losses, most divisions had 1,500-2,000 bayonets.

During the battles, the 13th Army inflicted serious damage on the Nazis, destroying over 3 thousand soldiers and officers, 30 tanks and armored vehicles, 650 cars, 11 aircraft, 70 guns, 15 mortars, and about 100 machine guns. However, its losses compared to the enemy's losses are disproportionately greater. This is the price of tragedy and sacrifice. The whole war lay ahead.

Rice. 1. Exit of the 132nd Rifle Division from encirclement in the Bryansk forests in October 1941.

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