This tank is the most recognizable symbol of the Great Patriotic War. The best tank of the Second World War in its class. One of the most massive tanks in the world. The machine that forms the basis of the armored armies of the USSR that have passed through all of Europe.
What kind of people were leading the thirty-fours into battle? How and where was it taught? What did the battle look like "from the inside" and what were the front-line everyday life of Soviet tank crews?
Training of tankers up to ...
Before the war, a career tank commander trained for two years. He studied all types of tanks that were in the Red Army. He was taught to drive a tank, to shoot from his cannon and machine guns, was given knowledge on the tactics of tank battle. A specialist with a wide profile left the school. He was not only the commander of a combat vehicle, but also knew how to perform the duties of any crew member.
In the thirties, the military enjoyed immense popularity in the USSR. First, the Red Army, its soldiers and officers, symbolized the power of the relatively young Soviet state, which, in just a few years, turned from a war-torn, impoverished, agrarian country into an industrial power capable of standing up for itself. Secondly, the officers were one of the wealthiest strata of the population.
For example, an instructor of an aviation school, in addition to full maintenance (uniforms, meals in the canteen, transport, hostel or money for renting housing), received a very high salary - about 700 rubles (a bottle of vodka cost about two rubles). In addition, service in the army gave people from a peasant environment a chance to improve their education, to master a new, prestigious specialty.
Alexander Burtsev, the tank commander, says: “I remember that after three years of service they returned from the army with other people. The village burdock was leaving, and a literate, cultured person returned, well-dressed, in a tunic, in trousers, boots, physically stronger. He could work with technology, lead. When a serviceman came from the army, as they were called, the whole village gathered. The family was proud that he served in the army, that he became such a person. "
The coming new war - the war of motors - also created new propaganda images. If in the twenties, every boy dreamed of sabers and cavalry attacks, then by the end of the thirties this romantic image was forever supplanted by fighter pilots and tankers. Piloting a fighter plane or shooting the enemy with a tank cannon - this is what thousands of Soviet guys now dreamed of. “Guys, let's go to the tankers! It's honorable! You go, the whole country is under you! And you are on an iron horse! " - phrases describing the mood of those years, recalls the platoon commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Yakovlevich Zheleznov.
... and during the war
However, during the heavy defeats in 1941, the Red Army lost almost all the tanks it had in the western districts. Most of the regular tankers were also killed. The shortage is acute tank crews became apparent in the summer of 1942, when the industry evacuated to the Urals began to produce tanks in the same volumes.
The country's leadership, realizing that it was the tankers who would play a decisive role in the 1943 campaign, ordered the fronts to send at least 5,000 of the best privates and sergeants to tank schools every month with the education of at least seven classes. In the training tank regiments, where the rank and file were trained - radio gunners, driver mechanics and loaders, 8000 best soldiers with an education of at least three classes came from the front every month. In addition to the front-line soldiers, yesterday's high school graduates, tractor drivers and combine operators sat on the school bench.
The course was reduced to six months and the program was cut to a minimum. But I still had to study 12 hours a day. Basically, they studied the material part of the T-34 tank - a chassis, a transmission, a cannon and machine guns, a radio station.
All this, as well as the ability to repair a tank, was learned both in class and in practical training. But time was sorely lacking. The platoon commander Vasily Bryukhov recalls: “After graduating from college, I fired three shells and a machine-gun disk. Is this preparation? They taught us a little driving on the BT-5. They gave the basics - to get under way, drive in a straight line. There were tactics classes, but mostly on foot in a tank way. And only at the end there was an ostentatious lesson "a tank platoon on the offensive." Everything! Our preparation was very weak. When we were let out, the head of the school said: “Well, then, sons, we understand that you quickly skipped the program. You don’t have solid knowledge, but finish your studies in battle ”.
From school to the front
Freshly baked lieutenants were sent to tank factories in Gorky, Nizhny Tagil, Chelyabinsk and Omsk. A battalion of T-34 tanks rolled off the conveyors of each of these factories every day. The young commander filled out the tank acceptance form. After that, he received a penknife, a silk kerchief for filtering fuel, a revolver and a fist-sized tank clock, which were installed on the dashboard. However, tankers often carried them with them. Not everyone had a wrist or pocket watch at that time.
Ordinary crew members were trained in three-month courses in reserve tank regiments located at the factories. The commander quickly got to know the crew and made a fifty-kilometer march, which ended with live fire.
After that, the tanks were loaded onto platforms, and the echelon rushed them westward towards their fate.
Inside the T-34
The legendary medium tank, which entered service in 1940, was in many ways a revolutionary design. But, like any transitional model, it combined novelties and forced decisions. The first tanks had an outdated gearbox. The roar in the tank was incredible, and the tank intercom worked disgustingly. Therefore, the tank commander simply put his feet on the driver's shoulders and controlled him using predetermined signals.
The T-34 turret was only for two. Therefore, the tank commander performed the duties of both the commander and the gunner. By the way, the commander and loader somehow, but could talk, but most often their communication also took place with gestures. The commander thrust his fist under the loader's nose, and he already knows that he needs to load with armor-piercing, and his spread palm - with fragmentation.
Gunner-radio operator Pyotr Kirichenko recalls: “Switching gear required enormous efforts. The driver will bring the lever to the desired position and begin to pull it, and I pick up and pull with it. The transmission will live for a while and only then it turns on. The tank march consisted entirely of such exercises. During the long march, the driver lost two or three kilograms in weight: he was all exhausted. In addition, since his hands were busy, I took paper, poured samosad or makhorka into it, sealed it, lit it and put it in his mouth. This was also my responsibility. "
Battle on the T-34 (reconstruction)
There are a few minutes left before the attack starts. The commander's hands begin to shake, his teeth chatter: “How will the battle turn out? What's behind the hillock? What are the forces of the Germans? Will I live to see the evening? " The gunner-radio operator nervously gnaws a piece of sugar - he always pulls it before an attack on food. The charger smokes, inhaling deeply with smoke. The cigarette in his hand is trembling. But the signal to attack sounds in the headphones of the commander's tank helmet. The commander switches to intercom, but the crackling sound is such that nothing can be heard. Therefore, he just lightly hits the driver on the head with his boot, who is sitting directly under him - this is a conditional signal “Forward!”. The car, roaring with its engine, clanking its tracks, starts to move. The commander looks through the periscope - the entire battalion has moved to the attack.
The fear is gone. There was only a cold calculation.
The mechanic drives the car at a speed of 25-30 kilometers in a zigzag fashion, changing direction every 50 meters. The life of the crew depends on his experience. It is the mechanic who must correctly assess the terrain, find shelter, and not substitute the side under the enemy's guns. The radio operator tuned the radio to receive. He has a machine gun, but he can only aim through a hole with a diameter of the index finger, in which the earth and sky flash alternately - you can only scare the Fritzes with such shooting, there is little real sense from it. The loader in the panorama is watching the right sector. His task is not only to throw shells into the breech, but also to indicate to the commander the target on the right along the course of the tank.
The commander looks forward and to the left, looking for targets. The right shoulder rested against the breech of the cannon, the left against the turret armor. Closely. The arms are folded in a cross on a cross: the left one is on the gun lifting mechanism, the right one is on the turret swing handle. Here he caught an enemy tank in a panorama. Kicked the driver in the back - "Stop!" and just in case he shouted into the intercom: "Short!" Loader: "Armor-piercing!"
The driver selects a flat area of the terrain, stops the car, shouts: "Track!" The loader sends the projectile. Trying to shout down the roar of the engine and the clang of the bolt, he reports: "The armor-piercing is ready!"
The tank, stopping abruptly, sways for some time. Now everything depends on the commander, on his skills and just on luck. A stationary tank is a tasty target for the enemy! The back was damp from the tension. The right hand rotates the turret turning mechanism, aligning the reticle with the target in the direction. The left hand turns the gun lifting mechanism, aligning the mark in range.
"Shot!" - the commander shouts and presses the gun trigger. His voice is drowned out by the roar of the shot and the clang of the shutter. The fighting compartment is filled with powder gases that corrode the eyes. The fan, installed in the turret, does not have time to blow them out of the tank. The loader grabs the hot smoking sleeve and throws it out through the hatch. Without waiting for a command, the mechanic pulls the car off the spot.
The enemy manages to make a return shot. But the shell only ricochets, leaving a furrow on the armor, like a hot spoon in oil. From hitting the tank ringing in the ears. The scale, flying off from the armor, bites into the face, grinds on his teeth. But the fight continues!
T-34 against "Tigers"
The T-34 was superior to German medium tanks in all respects. It was a maneuverable and fast medium tank equipped with a 76 mm long cannon and a diesel engine. The tankers were especially proud of the T-34's distinctive feature - sloping armor. The effectiveness of sloped armor was confirmed by the practice of battles. Most of the German anti-tank and tank guns of 1941-42 did not penetrate the frontal armor of the T-34 tank. By 1943, the T-34 had become the main combat vehicle of the Soviet tank armies, replacing the outdated T-26 and BT.
However, by 1943, the Germans had modernized the old medium tanks T-IV and began production of heavy tanks T-V "Panther" and T-VI "Tiger". The long-barreled guns of 75 and 88 mm caliber installed on the new machines could hit the T-34 at a distance of 1.5-2 thousand meters, while the 76 mm gun of our medium tank could hit the Tiger only from 500 m, and the Panther from 800 meters. Using the advantage of the T-34 in maneuverability and tactical tricks, our tankers often emerged victorious from battles with a technically superior enemy. But it happened the other way around ...
If the tank is hit ...
It's good if the shell hit the engine compartment - the tank simply went deaf and the crew managed to jump out. If the projectile pierced the armor of the tower or the sides of the fighting compartment, then the fragments of the armor most often wounded one of the crew members. The spreading fuel flared up - and all the tankers' hope remained only for themselves, for their reaction, strength, dexterity, because each had only two or three seconds in reserve to escape.
It was even worse for those whose tank was simply immobilized, but did not burn. Ion Degen, a tanker, says: “In a battle, an order from the commander to leave the burning tank was not required, especially since the commander could have already been killed. We jumped out of the tank intuitively. But, for example, it was impossible to leave the tank if you only killed the caterpillar. The crew was obliged to fire from the spot until they were killed. "
And it also happened that some trifle, sometimes even uncomfortable clothes, did not allow the tanker to leave the burning car. Tankman Konstantin Shits recalls: “Our commander of one of the companies was Senior Lieutenant Sirik, such a prominent man. Somehow they captured rich trophies at the station, and he began to wear a good, long Romanian coat, but when they were knocked out, the crew managed to jump out, and because of this coat he hesitated and burned ... "
But when they were lucky, the tankers jumped out of the burning tank, crawled into the craters and immediately tried to retreat to the rear.
Having survived the battle, the "horseless" tankers entered the battalion's reserve. But it was impossible to rest for a long time. The repairmen quickly restored the unburnt tanks. In addition, the factories were constantly replenishing parts with new equipment. So literally two or three days later, the tanker was included in a new, unfamiliar crew and on a new tank they went into battle again.
It's always harder for commanders
It was even harder for the company and battalion commanders. They fought to the last tank of their unit. This means that the commanders changed from one damaged vehicle to a new one several times during one operation, or even one day.
Tank brigades "ground to zero" in two or three weeks of offensive battles. After that, they were assigned to be reorganized. There, the tankers first of all put in order the remaining equipment and only then themselves. The crew, regardless of the ranks, refueled the car with fuel, loaded it with ammunition, cleaned the gun and adjusted the sight, checked the equipment and mechanisms of the tank.
The loader cleaned the projectiles from grease - washed them in diesel fuel, and then wiped them dry with a rag. The driver-mechanic adjusted the mechanisms of the tank, filled the buckets with fuel, oil and water. The radio operator and the commander helped them - no one disdained dirty work. The fate of the tank depended on the crew, but the life of the crew was also directly related to the condition and combat effectiveness of the tank.
We prepared the car for the upcoming battle or march - now you can wash, shave, eat and, most importantly, sleep. After all, the tank was not only a combat vehicle for the crew, but often also a home.
Life of tankers
A 10-by-10-meter tank tarpaulin was attached to the tank's turret. The crew covered the tank with them on the way to the front. Simple food was laid out on it. The same tarpaulin served tankers and a roof over their heads when it was not possible to stay overnight in houses.
In winter conditions, the tank froze through and became a real "refrigerator". Then the crew dug out a trench, drove a tank on top of it. A "tank stove" was suspended under the bottom of the tank, which was heated with wood. It was not very comfortable in such a dugout, but much warmer than in the tank itself or on the street.
The habitability and comfort of the thirty-fours themselves were at the minimum required level. The seats of the tankers were made rigid and, unlike American tanks, there were no armrests on them. Nevertheless, tankers sometimes had to sleep right in the tank - half-sitting. Senior Sergeant Pyotr Kirichenko, a T-34 radio operator-gunner, recalls:
“Although I was long and thin, I still got used to sleeping in my seat. I even liked it: you fold your back, lower your felt boots so that your legs do not freeze against the armor, and you sleep. And after the march it is good to sleep on a warm transmission, covered with a tarpaulin. "
The tankers were forced to live in Spartan style. In the offensive, they did not even have the opportunity to wash or change their clothes. Tanker Grigory Shishkin says:
“Sometimes you don’t wash for a whole month. And sometimes it's okay, you wash yourself once every 10 days. The bath was done like this. They built a hut in the forest, covered it with spruce branches. Spruce branches are also on the floor. Several crews gathered. One drowns, another chops wood, the third carries water ”.
During the period of intense battles, even food was often delivered to tankers only at the end of the day - breakfast, lunch, and dinner at once. But at the same time, the tankers were supplied with dry rations. In addition, the crew never neglected the opportunity to carry a supply of food in the tank. In the offensive, this stock became practically the only source of food, which was replenished with trophies or thanks to the help of the civilian population. “The tankers' supplies have always been good. And, of course, food trophies were an additional ration for us ... And tank NZs were always eaten even before battles - what if we burn out, so why would any good be lost? " - says tanker Mikhail Shister.
In the evening after the battle it was possible to drink the "People's Commissar's hundred grams." But before the battle, a good commander always forbade his crew to drink alcohol. The commander of the crew Grigory Shishkin about this feature of the tankers: “The main thing is that everyone is drinking around. Sappers begin: "Hey you, black-bellied, what do they not give you ?!" At first, the guys were offended, and then they realized that I was trying for them. Drink as much as you want after the battle, but never before the battle! Because every minute, every second is precious. He blundered - he died! "
We rested, threw off the fatigue of the past battles - and now, the tankers are ready for new battles with the enemy! And how many more of these fights were ahead on the way to Berlin ...
Germany, 1945. In the American occupation zone, the interrogation of the Wehrmacht prisoners of war proceeded sluggishly. Suddenly, the attention of the interrogators was attracted by a long, eerie story about an insane Russian tank that killed everything in its path. The events of that fateful day from the summer of 1941 were so strongly imprinted in the memory of the German officer that they could not be erased over the next four years of the terrible war. He remembered that Russian tank forever.
June 28, 1941, Belarus. German troops rush into Minsk. The Soviet units are retreating along the Mogilev highway, one of the columns is closed by the only remaining T-28 tank, led by Senior Sergeant Dmitry Malko. The tank has a problem with the engine, but a full supply of fuel and lubricants and ammunition.
During an air raid in the area of n. p. Berezino, from close explosions of bombs T-28 hopelessly stalls. Malko is ordered to blow up the tank and continue to follow to the city of Mogilev in the back of one of the trucks with other soldiers of the mixed composition. Malko asks for permission under his responsibility to postpone the execution of the order - he will try to repair the T-28, the tank is completely new and did not receive significant damage in hostilities. Permission received, the column leaves. Within a day, Malko really manages to bring the engine into working condition.
Shielding of the T-28 tank, 1940
Further, an element of randomness is included in the plot. A major and four cadets unexpectedly come out to the tank's parking area. Major - tanker, cadets, artillerymen. This is how the full crew of the T-28 tank is suddenly formed. All night long, they ponder a plan to get out of the encirclement. The Mogilev highway was probably cut by the Germans, we need to look for another way.
... The original proposal to change the route is expressed aloud by cadet Nikolai Pedan. The daring design is unanimously supported by the newly formed crew. Instead of following to the location of the assembly point of the retreating units, the tank will rush in the opposite direction - to the West. They will break through the captured Minsk and leave the encirclement along the Moscow highway to the location of their troops. The unique combat capabilities of the T-28 will help them implement such a plan.
The fuel tanks are almost full to the caps, the ammunition load - although not full, but Senior Sergeant Malko knows the location of the abandoned ammunition depot. The radio does not work in the tank, the commander, the gunners and the driver mechanic stipulate in advance a set of conditional signals: the commander's leg on the driver's right shoulder - right turn, on the left - left; one push in the back - first gear, two - second; foot on the head - stop. The three-tower bulk of the T-28 is moving along a new route in order to severely punish the Nazis.
The layout of the ammunition in the T-28 tank
In an abandoned warehouse, they replenish ammunition in excess of the norm. When all the cassettes are full, the soldiers heap the shells directly onto the floor of the fighting compartment. Here our amateurs make a small mistake - about twenty shells did not fit the 76 mm short-barreled L-10 tank gun: despite the coincidence of calibers, these ammunition was intended for divisional artillery. 7000 cartridges for machine guns in the side machine gun turrets were loaded into the chase. After a hearty breakfast, the invincible army moved towards the capital of the Byelorussian SSR, where the Fritzes had been in charge for several days.
2 hours before immortality
On a free track, the T-28 rushes to Minsk at full speed. Ahead, in the gray haze, the outlines of the city appeared, the chimneys of the thermal power station, factory buildings towered, a little further the silhouette of the Government House and the dome of the cathedral could be seen. Closer, closer and more irreversible ... The soldiers looked ahead, anxiously awaiting the main battle of their lives.
Not stopped by anyone, the "Trojan horse" passed the first German cordons and entered the city limits - as expected, the Nazis took the T-28 for captured armored vehicles and did not pay any attention to the lone tank.
Although we agreed to keep secrecy to the last opportunity, they still could not resist. The first unwitting victim of the raid was a German cyclist, who cheerfully pedaled in front of the tank. His flickering figure in the viewing slot took out the driver. The tank roared with its engine and rolled the hapless cyclist into the asphalt.
The tankers passed the railway crossing, the paths of the tram ring and ended up on Voroshilov Street. Here, at the distillery, a group of Germans met on the way of the tank: Wehrmacht soldiers were carefully loading boxes with bottles of alcohol into the truck. When Alcoholics Anonymous was about fifty meters away, the right turret of the tank started working. The Nazis, like pins, fell from the car. A couple of seconds later, the tank pushed the truck, turning it upside down with its wheels. From the broken body, the savory smell of celebration began to spread around the area.
Not meeting resistance and alarms from the panic-scattered enemy, the Soviet in "stealth" mode went deep into the city boundaries. In the area of the city market, the tank turned onto the street. Lenin, where he met a column of motorcyclists.
The first car with a sidecar drove under the tank's armor on its own, where it was crushed along with the crew. The deadly ride has begun. Only for a moment, the faces of the Germans, twisted with horror, showed up in the driver's viewing slot, then disappearing under the tracks of the steel monster. Motorcycles in the tail of the column tried to turn around and escape from the approaching death, alas, came under fire from tower machine guns.
Having reeled on the tracks of the hapless bikers, the tank moved on, driving along the street. Soviet, tankers planted a fragmentation shell at a group of German soldiers standing at the theater. And then there was a slight hitch - when turning to Proletarskaya Street, the tankers unexpectedly discovered that the main street of the city was packed with enemy manpower and equipment. Opening fire from all the barrels, practically without aiming, the three-turret monster rushed forward, sweeping away all obstacles into a bloody vinaigrette.
Panic began among the Germans, which arose in connection with the emergency situation on the road created by the tank, as well as the general effect of the unexpected and illogical appearance of heavy armored vehicles of the Red Army in the rear German troops where nothing foreshadowed such an attack ...
The front of the T-28 tank is equipped with three 7.62 DT machine guns (two turret, one course) and a short-barreled 76.2mm gun. The rate of fire of the latter is up to four rounds per minute. The rate of fire of machine guns is 600v / min.
Leaving traces of a military disaster behind it, the car drove all the way to the park, where it was greeted by a shot from the PaK 35/36 anti-tank 37-mm cannon.
It seems that this part of the city the Soviet tank first encountered more or less serious resistance. The shell carved sparks from the frontal armor. The Fritzes did not have time to fire the second time - the tankers noticed an openly standing cannon in time and immediately reacted to the threat - a flurry of fire fell on the Pak 35/36, turning the gun and crew into a shapeless heap of scrap metal.
As a result of an unprecedented raid, the Nazis suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, but the main striking effect was to raise the resistance spirit of the inhabitants of Minsk, which contributed to maintaining the authority of the Red Army at the proper level. This factor was especially important in that initial period of the war, during serious defeats. among the surrounding population.
And our T-28 tank was leaving the lair of the Fritzes along Moskovsky Prospekt. However, the disciplined Germans came out of a state of shock, overcame fear and tried to provide organized resistance to the Soviet tank that had broken through to their rear. In the area of the old cemetery, the T-28 came under flanking fire from an artillery battery. The first salvo broke through the 20 mm side armor in the area of the engine compartment. Someone screamed in pain, someone swore angrily. The burning tank continued to move until the last opportunity, all the while receiving new portions of German shells. The major ordered to leave the dying combat vehicle.
Senior Sergeant Malko climbed out through the driver's hatch in front of the tank and saw a wounded major emerge from the commander's hatch, firing from a service pistol. The sergeant managed to crawl to the fence when the remaining ammunition in the tank detonated. The turret of the tank was thrown into the air and it fell to its original place. In the ensuing confusion and taking advantage of the significant smoke, Senior Sergeant Dmitry Malko managed to hide in the gardens.
Malko in the fall of the same year managed to return to the cadre formation of the combat units of the Red Army in his former military specialty. He managed to survive and go through the entire war. Surprisingly, in 1944, he drove into the liberated Minsk on a T-34 along the same Moskovsky Prospekt, along which he tried to escape from it in 41. Surprisingly, he saw his first tank, which he refused to abandon and destroy near Berezin, and which then with such difficulty the Wehrmacht soldiers were able to destroy. The tank stood in the same place where it was hit, neat and orderly Germans for some reason did not begin to remove it from the road. They were good soldiers and knew how to value military prowess.
T-34: tank and tankers
Against the T-34, the German cars were shit.
Captain A. V. Maryevsky
“I could. I held out. Destroyed five buried tanks. They could not do anything because they were T-III, T-IV tanks, and I was in a T-34, whose frontal armor could not be penetrated by their shells. "
Few tankers of the countries participating in the Second World War could repeat these words of the commander of the T-34 tank, Lieutenant Alexander Vasilyevich Bodnar, regarding their combat vehicles. The Soviet T-34 tank became a legend primarily because those people who sat down at the levers and to sighting devices his cannons and machine guns. In the memoirs of the tankers, one can trace the thought expressed by the famous Russian military theorist A. A. Svechin: "If the importance of material resources in a war is very relative, then faith in them is of great importance."
Svechin went through the Great War of 1914-1918 as an infantry officer, saw the debut on the battlefield of heavy artillery, airplanes and armored vehicles, and he knew what he was talking about. If soldiers and officers have faith in the equipment entrusted to them, then they will act bolder and more decisively, paving their way to victory. On the contrary, distrust, the willingness to give up mentally or a really weak sample of weapons will lead to defeat. Of course it comes not blind faith based on propaganda or speculation. Confidence in people was inspired by the design features, which strikingly distinguished the T-34 from a number of combat vehicles of that time: the inclined arrangement of armor plates and diesel engine AT 2.
The principle of increasing the effectiveness of the tank's protection due to the inclined arrangement of the armor sheets was understandable to anyone who studied geometry at school. “The T-34 had thinner armor than the Panthers and Tigers. Total thickness approx. 45 mm. But since it was located at an angle, the leg was about 90 mm, which made it difficult to break through, ”recalls the tank commander, Lieutenant Alexander Sergeevich Burtsev. The use of geometric constructions in the defense system instead of the brute force of a simple increase in the thickness of the armor plates gave in the eyes of the crews of the thirty-fours an indisputable advantage to their tank over the enemy. “The arrangement of the armor plates for the Germans was worse, mostly vertically. This is, of course, a big minus. Our tanks had them at an angle, ”recalls the battalion commander, Captain Vasily Pavlovich Bryukhov.
Of course, all these theses had not only theoretical but also practical substantiation. German anti-tank and tank guns with a caliber of up to 50 mm in most cases did not penetrate the upper frontal part of the T-34 tank. Moreover, even the subcaliber shells of the 50-mm PAK-38 anti-tank gun and the 50-mm T-III tank gun with a barrel length of 60 calibers, which, according to trigonometric calculations, should have pierced the T-34's forehead, in reality ricocheted from the sloped armor of high hardness without causing any damage to the tank. Conducted in September-October 1942 by the Research Institute-48, a statistical study of combat damage to T-34 tanks, which were being repaired at repair bases No. 1 and 2 in Moscow, showed that out of 109 hits in the upper frontal part of the tank, 89% were safe, and dangerous damage accounted for guns with a caliber of 75 mm and above. Of course, with the advent of the Germans a large number of 75-mm anti-tank and tank guns, the situation became more complicated. The 75-mm shells were normalized (deployed at right angles to the armor upon impact), piercing the sloped frontal armor of the T-34 hull already at a distance of 1200 m.The 88-mm shells were just as insensitive to the slope of the armor anti-aircraft guns and cumulative ammunition. However, the share of 50-mm guns in the Wehrmacht until the battle at the Kursk Bulge was significant, and the belief in the sloped armor of the "thirty-four" was largely justified.
Any noticeable advantages over the T-34 armor were noted by tankers only in the armor protection of British tanks, “... if the blank penetrated the turret, then the commander of the British tank and the gunner could remain alive, since practically no fragments were formed, and in the T-34 the armor crumbled, and those in the tower had little chance of surviving, ”recalls VP Bryukhov.
This was due to the exceptionally high nickel content in the armor of the British Matilda and Valentine tanks. If the Soviet 45-mm high-hardness armor contained 1.0 - 1.5% nickel, then the medium-hard armor of British tanks contained 3.0 - 3.5% nickel, which provided a slightly higher viscosity of the latter. At the same time, no modifications were made to the protection of T-34 tanks by the crews in the units. Just before the Berlin operation, according to Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Petrovich Schwebig, the former deputy brigade commander of the 12th Guards tank corps on the technical side, screens made of metal bed nets were welded onto the tanks to protect them from faust cartridges. The well-known cases of shielding "thirty-fours" are the fruit of the creativity of repair shops and manufacturing plants. The same can be said for the painting of tanks. The tanks came from the factory painted green inside and out. When preparing the tank for winter, the task of the deputy commanders of tank units for the technical part included painting the tanks with whitewash. The exception was the winter of 1944/45, when the war was raging across Europe. None of the veterans remembers wearing camouflage on tanks.
An even more obvious and inspiring design detail for the T-34 was the diesel engine. Most of those who were trained as a driver, radio operator or even a commander of a T-34 tank in civilian life in one way or another faced with fuel, at least with gasoline. They knew well from personal experience gasoline is volatile, flammable and burns with a bright flame. Quite obvious experiments with gasoline were used by the engineers who created the T-34. “In the midst of the dispute, the designer Nikolai Kucherenko used not the most scientific, but a clear example of the advantages of the new fuel at the factory yard. He took a lighted torch and brought it to a bucket of gasoline - the bucket instantly engulfed the flame. Then the same torch was lowered into a bucket of diesel fuel - the flame was extinguished, like in water ... ”This experiment was projected on the effect of a shell hitting a tank that could set fire to fuel or even its vapors inside the car. Accordingly, the crew members of the T-34 were somewhat condescending to enemy tanks. “They were with a gasoline engine. It's also a big drawback, ”recalls senior sergeant-gunner Pyotr Ilyich Kirichenko. The same attitude was towards tanks supplied under Lend-Lease (“A lot of people died because a bullet hit him, and there was a petrol engine and nonsense armor there,” recalls the tank commander, junior lieutenant Yuri Maksovich Polyanovsky), and Soviet tanks and a self-propelled gun equipped with a carburetor engine (“Once the SU-76 came to our battalion. They were with gasoline engines - a real lighter… They all burned out in the very first battles…” - VP Bryukhov recalls). The presence of a diesel engine in the engine compartment of the tank instilled in the crews the confidence that they had much less chances of accepting a terrible death from fire than the enemy, whose tanks were fueled with hundreds of liters of volatile and flammable gasoline. The neighborhood with large volumes of fuel (the number of buckets of which the tankers had to estimate every time the tank was refueled) was concealed by the thought that it would be more difficult for anti-tank cannon shells to set it on fire, and in the event of a fire, the tankers would have enough time to jump out of the tank.
However, in this case, the direct projection of the experiments with the bucket onto the tanks was not entirely justified. Moreover, statistically, tanks with diesel engines did not have advantages in fire safety in relation to cars with carburetor engines. According to statistics from October 1942, diesel T-34s burned even slightly more often than T-70 tanks fueled with aviation gasoline (23% versus 19%). Engineers of the NIIBT test site in Kubinka in 1943 came to a conclusion that is exactly the opposite of a household assessment of the possibilities of ignition of various types of fuel. “The use by the Germans on the new tank, released in 1942, of a carburetor engine, rather than a diesel engine, can be explained by: [...] a very significant percentage of tank fires with diesel engines in combat conditions and their lack of significant advantages over carburetor engines in this respect, especially with the competent design of the latter and the availability of reliable automatic fire extinguishers. " Bringing the torch to a bucket of gasoline, the designer Kucherenko set fire to a vapor of volatile fuel. There were no vapors in the bucket over the diesel oil layer that were favorable for ignition by the torch. But this fact did not mean that diesel fuel would not flare up from a much more powerful means of ignition - a projectile hit. Therefore, the placement of fuel tanks in the fighting compartment of the T-34 tank did not at all increase the fire safety of the thirty-four in comparison with their peers, whose tanks were located in the rear of the hull and were hit much less frequently. VP Bryukhov confirms what has been said: “When does the tank catch fire? When a projectile hits the fuel tank. And it burns when there is a lot of fuel. And by the end of the fighting there is no fuel, and the tank hardly burns. "
The only advantage of German tank engines over the T-34 engine was considered by the tankers to be less noisy. “The petrol engine is flammable on the one hand and quiet on the other. T-34, it not only roars, but also clicks its tracks, ”recalls the tank commander, junior lieutenant Arsentiy Konstantinovich Rodkin.
The power plant of the T-34 tank did not initially provide for the installation of mufflers on the exhaust pipes. They were brought out to the stern of the tank without any sound-absorbing devices, roaring with the exhaust of a 12-cylinder engine. In addition to the noise, the powerful engine of the tank raised dust with its exhaust, devoid of a muffler. “The T-34 raises a terrible dust because the exhaust pipes are directed downward,” recalls A. K. Rodkin.
The designers of the T-34 tank gave their brainchild two features that set it apart from the combat vehicles of allies and opponents. These features of the tank added confidence to the crew in their weapons. People went into battle with pride for the equipment entrusted to them. This was much more important than the actual effect of the slope of the armor or the real fire hazard of a tank with a diesel engine.
Tanks appeared as a means of protecting crews of machine guns and guns from enemy fire. The balance between tank protection and anti-tank artillery capabilities is rather shaky, artillery is constantly being improved, and the newest tank cannot feel safe on the battlefield. The powerful anti-aircraft and hull guns make this balance even more precarious. Therefore, sooner or later a situation arises when a shell hitting a tank penetrates the armor and turns the steel box into hell.
Good tanks solved this problem even after death, having received one or several hits, opening the way to salvation for people inside themselves. Unusual for tanks in other countries, the driver's hatch in the upper frontal part of the T-34 hull turned out to be quite convenient in practice for leaving the vehicle in critical situations. The driver-mechanic Sergeant Semyon Lvovich Aria recalls:
“The hatch was smooth, with rounded edges, and it was not difficult to get in and out of it. Moreover, when you got up from the driver's seat, you were already leaning out almost waist-deep. " Another advantage of the driver's hatch of the T-34 tank was the ability to fix it in several intermediate relatively "open" and "closed" positions. The hatch mechanism was quite simple. To facilitate opening, the heavy cast hatch (60 mm thick) was supported by a spring, the rod of which was a toothed rack. By moving the stopper from a tooth to a rack tooth, it was possible to rigidly fix the hatch without fear of breaking it on bumps in the road or battlefield. The driver-mechanics used this mechanism willingly and preferred to keep the hatch ajar. “When possible, it is always better with an open hatch,” recalls V. P. Bryukhov. His words are confirmed by the company commander, senior lieutenant Arkady Vasilyevich Maryevsky: "The mechanic's hatch is always open on the palm, firstly, everything is visible, and secondly, the air flow when the upper hatch is open ventilates the fighting compartment." Thus, a good overview was provided and the ability to quickly leave the car when a shell hit it. On the whole, the mechanic was, according to the tankers, in the most advantageous position. “The mechanic had the greatest chance of surviving. He sat low, there was sloping armor in front of him, ”recalls the platoon commander, Lieutenant Alexander Vasilyevich Bodnar; according to PI Kirichenko: “The lower part of the building, as a rule, is hidden behind the folds of the terrain, it is difficult to get into it. And this one rises above the ground. Mostly they got into it. And more people died who were sitting in the tower than those who were below. " It should be noted here that we are talking about hits that are dangerous for the tank. Statistically, in the initial period of the war, most of the hits fell on the hull of the tank. According to the NII-48 report mentioned above, the hull accounted for 81% of the hits, and the turret 19%. However, more than half of the total number of hits were safe (blind): 89% of hits on the upper frontal part, 66% of hits on the lower frontal part and about 40% of hits on the side did not lead to through holes. Moreover, of the hits on the side, 42% of their total number fell on the engine and transmission compartments, the defeat of which was safe for the crew. The tower, on the other hand, was relatively easy to break through. The less durable cast armor of the turret weakly resisted even 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft cannon shells. The situation was worsened by the fact that the T-34's turret was hit by heavy guns with a high line of fire, for example, 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as hits from long-barreled 75-mm and 50-mm guns of German tanks. The terrain screen, which the tankman was talking about, in the European theater of operations was about one meter. Half of this meter falls on the ground clearance, the rest covers about a third of the height of the T-34 tank hull. Most of the upper frontal part of the case is no longer covered by the terrain screen.
If the driver's hatch is unanimously assessed by veterans as comfortable, then tankers are equally unanimous in their negative assessment of the turret hatch of early T-34 tanks with an oval turret, nicknamed the "pie" for its characteristic shape. VP Bryukhov says about him: “The big hatch is bad. It is very heavy, and it is difficult to open it. If it gets stuck, then that's it, no one will jump out. " The tank commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Evdokimovich Glukhov, echoes him: “The large hatch is very inconvenient. Very heavy". Combining hatches into one for two crew members sitting side by side, the gunner and the loader, was uncharacteristic for the world of tank building. Its appearance on the T-34 was caused not by tactical, but by technological considerations associated with the installation of a powerful gun in the tank. The tower of the predecessor of the T-34 on the conveyor of the Kharkov plant - the BT-7 tank - was equipped with two hatches, one for each of the crew members located in the tower. For a characteristic appearance with the hatches open, the BT-7 was nicknamed "Mickey Mouse" by the Germans. "Thirty-fours" inherited a lot from BT, but instead of a 45-mm cannon, the tank received a 76-mm gun, and the design of the tanks in the fighting compartment of the hull was changed. The need to dismantle the tanks and the massive cradle of the 76-mm gun during repairs forced the designers to combine the two turret hatches into one. The body of the T-34 gun with recoil devices was removed through a bolt-on lid in the turret aft niche, and the cradle with a toothed vertical guidance sector was retrieved through the turret hatch. Through the same hatch, the fuel tanks were also taken out, fixed in the fenders of the T-34 tank hull. All these difficulties were caused by the side walls of the turret sloped to the cannon mask. The cradle of the T-34 gun was wider and higher than the embrasure in the frontal part of the turret and could only be pulled back. The Germans removed the guns of their tanks along with his mask (in width almost equal to the width of the tower) forward. It must be said here that the designers of the T-34 paid much attention to the possibility of repairing the tank by the crew. Even ... ports for firing personal weapons on the sides and stern of the tower were adapted for this task. The port plugs were removed, and a small assembly crane was installed in the holes in the 45-mm armor to dismantle the engine or transmission. The Germans had devices on the tower for mounting such a "pocket" crane - "pilze" - appeared only in the final period of the war.
One should not think that, when installing the large hatch, the designers of the T-34 did not take into account the needs of the crew at all. In the USSR, before the war, it was believed that a large hatch would facilitate the evacuation of wounded crew members from a tank. However, combat experience, complaints from tankers about the heavy turret hatch forced the team of A.A. Morozov to switch to two turret hatches during the next modernization of the tank. The hexagonal tower, nicknamed the "nut", again received "Mickey Mouse ears" - two round hatches. Such towers were installed on T-34 tanks produced in the Urals (ChTZ in Chelyabinsk, UZTM in Sverdlovsk and UVZ in Nizhny Tagil) since the fall of 1942. The Krasnoye Sormovo plant in Gorky continued to produce tanks with a “pie” until the spring of 1943. The task of extracting tanks on tanks with a "nut" was solved using a removable armored bulkhead between the hatches of the commander and gunner. The gun began to be removed according to the method proposed in order to simplify the production of the cast turret back in 1942 at the plant number 112 "Krasnoe Sormovo" - the rear part of the turret was lifted with hoists from the shoulder strap, and the gun was pushed into the gap formed between the hull and the turret.
The tankers, in order not to get into the situation "I was looking for the latch with my hands without skin," preferred not to lock the hatch, securing it with ... a trouser belt. A. V. Bodnar recalls: “When I went into the attack, the hatch was closed, but not with the latch. I hooked one end of the trouser belt to the latch of the hatch, and the other - a couple of times wrapped around the hook that held the ammunition on the tower, so that if you hit your head, the belt will come off and you will jump out. " The same techniques were used by the commanders of the T-34 tanks with the commander's cupola. “On the commander's cupola there was a double-leaf hatch, which was locked with two latches on springs. Even a healthy person could hardly open them, but a wounded one would definitely not be able to. We removed these springs, leaving the latches. In general, we tried to keep the hatch open - it’s easier to jump out, ”recalls A. S. Burtsev. Note that not a single design bureau, either before or after the war, used the achievements of the soldier's ingenuity in one form or another. Tanks were still equipped with hatch latches in the turret and hull, which crews preferred to keep open in battle.
The day-to-day service of the thirty-four crew abounded in situations when the same load fell on the crew members and each of them performed simple, but monotonous operations, not much different from the actions of a neighbor, such as opening a trench or refueling a tank with fuel and shells. However, the battle and the march were immediately distinguished from those under construction in front of the tank on the command "To the car!" people in overalls of two crew members, who had the main responsibility for the tank. The first was the vehicle commander, who, in addition to controlling the battle on the early T-34s, acted as the gunner of the gun: “If you are the commander of a T-34-76 tank, then you shoot yourself, command the radio yourself, do everything yourself” (V.P. Bryukhov).
The second person in the crew, on whom the lion's share of the responsibility for the tank, and therefore for the lives of his comrades in battle, fell, was the driver. The commanders of tanks and tank subunits rated the driver very highly in battle. “… An experienced driver-mechanic is half the success,” recalls N. Ye. Glukhov.
There were no exceptions to this rule. “The driver-mechanic Grigory Ivanovich Kryukov was 10 years older than me. Before the war he worked as a driver and had already managed to fight near Leningrad. Was injured. He felt the tank perfectly. I believe that only thanks to him we survived in the first battles, ”recalls the tank commander, Lieutenant Georgy Nikolaevich Krivov.
The special position of the driver-mechanic in the "thirty-four" was due to the relatively complex control, requiring experience and physical strength. To the greatest extent, this applied to the T-34 tanks of the first half of the war, on which there was a four-speed gearbox, which required the gears to move relative to each other with the engagement of the required pair of gears of the drive and driven shafts. Changing speeds in such a box was very difficult and required great physical strength. A. V. Maryevsky recalls: "You cannot turn on the gearshift lever with one hand, you had to help yourself with your knee." To facilitate gear shifting, gearboxes have been developed with permanently meshed gears. The change in the gear ratio was no longer carried out by moving the gears, but by moving the small cam couplings sitting on the shafts. They moved along the shaft on splines and coupled with it the required pair of gears that were already in engagement from the moment the gearbox was assembled. For example, the pre-war Soviet motorcycles L-300 and AM-600, as well as the M-72 motorcycle produced since 1941, a licensed copy of the German BMW R71, had a gearbox of this type. The next step in the direction of improving the transmission was the introduction of synchronizers into the gearbox. These are devices that equalize the speeds of the cam clutches and gears with which they meshed when a particular gear was engaged. Shortly before engaging a low or high gear, the clutch entered into a friction clutch with a gear. So it gradually began to rotate at the same speed with the selected gear, and when the gear was switched on, the clutch between them was carried out silently and without impacts. An example of a gearbox with synchronizers is the Maybach-type gearbox of the German T-III and T-IV tanks. Even more advanced were the so-called planetary gearboxes of Czech-made tanks and Matilda tanks. It is not surprising that Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, on November 6, 1940, based on the results of tests of the first T-34s, sent a letter to the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars, which, to prepare for serial production the planetary transmission for the T-34 and KV. This will increase the average speed of the tanks and facilitate control. " They did not manage to do anything of this before the war, and in the first years of the war, the T-34 fought with the least perfect gearbox that existed at that time. "Thirty-fours" with a four-speed gearbox required very good training of driver mechanics. “If the driver is not trained, then instead of the first gear he can stick the fourth, because it is also back, or instead of the second - the third, which will lead to a breakdown of the gearbox. It is necessary to bring the switching skill to automatism so that he can switch with his eyes closed, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar. In addition to the difficulties in shifting gears, the four-speed gearbox was characterized as weak and unreliable, often failing. The teeth of the gears that collided during switching broke, even breaks in the crankcase were noted. The engineers of the NIIBT test site in Kubinka, in a lengthy 1942 report on joint tests of domestic, captured and lend-leased equipment, gave the T-34 gearbox of the early series simply a pejorative assessment: fully satisfy the requirements for modern combat vehicles, yielding to gearboxes of both allied tanks and enemy tanks, and are at least several years behind the development of tank building technology. " As a result of these and other reports on the shortcomings of the "thirty-four", the State Defense Committee issued a decree of June 5, 1942 "On improving the quality of T-34 tanks." As part of the implementation of this decree, by the beginning of 1943, the design department of plant No. 183 (the Kharkov plant evacuated to the Urals) developed a five-speed gearbox with constant gearing, which the tankers who fought on the T-34 spoke about with such respect.
The constant engagement of the gears and the introduction of another gear greatly facilitated the control of the tank, and the radio operator no longer had to pick up and pull the lever together with the driver to change gear.
Another element of the T-34 transmission, which made the combat vehicle dependent on the training of the driver, was the main clutch, which connected the gearbox to the engine. This is how A.V. Bodnar describes the situation, after being wounded who trained driver-mechanics on the T-34: starts to move. The last third of the pedal must be released slowly, so as not to tear, because if it tears, the car will slip and the friction clutch will warp. " The main part of the main dry friction clutch of the T-34 tank was a package of 8 driving and 10 driven discs (later, as part of improving the tank's transmission, it received 11 driving and 11 driven discs), pressed against each other by springs. Incorrect shutdown of the clutch with the friction of the discs against each other, their heating and warping could lead to the failure of the tank. Such a breakdown was called "burn the clutch", although formally there were no flammable objects in it. Being ahead of other countries in the implementation in practice of such solutions as a 76-mm long-barreled gun and an inclined arrangement of armor, the T-34 tank still lagged noticeably behind Germany and other countries in the design of the transmission and turning mechanisms. On German tanks, which were the same age as the T-34, the main clutch was equipped with discs running in oil. This made it possible to more efficiently remove heat from the rubbing discs and greatly facilitated turning on and off the clutch. The situation was somewhat improved by the servo mechanism, which was equipped with the deactivation pedal of the main clutch according to experience combat use T-34 in the initial period of the war. The design of the mechanism, despite the servo prefix that inspires some degree of reverence, was quite simple. The clutch pedal was held by a spring, which, in the process of pressing the pedal, passed the dead center and changed the direction of the force. When the tanker just pressed the pedal, the spring resisted pressing. At a certain moment, on the contrary, she began to help and pulled the pedal towards herself, ensuring the required speed of the wings. Before the introduction of these simple, but necessary elements, the work of the second in the hierarchy of the crew of the tanker was very difficult. “The driver-mechanic lost two or three kilograms in weight during the long march. He was all exhausted. It was, of course, very difficult, ”recalls PI Kirichenko. If on the march the driver's mistakes could lead to a delay on the way due to repairs of one duration or another, in extreme cases to the abandonment of the tank by the crew, then in battle the failure of the T-34 transmission due to driver errors could lead to fatal consequences. On the contrary, the skill of the driver and vigorous maneuvering could ensure the survival of the crew under heavy fire.
The development of the design of the T-34 tank during the war went primarily in the direction of improving the transmission. In the above-cited report of the engineers of the NIIBT test site in Kubinka in 1942, there were the following words: “Recently, due to the strengthening of anti-tank equipment, maneuverability is at least no less a guarantee of the invulnerability of the machine than powerful armor. The combination of good armor on the vehicle and the speed of its maneuver is the main means of protecting a modern combat vehicle from anti-tank artillery fire. " The advantage in armor protection, lost by the final period of the war, was compensated by the improvement of the thirty-four's driving performance. The tank began to move faster both on the march and on the battlefield, it was better to maneuver. To the two features that the tankers believed in (the slope of the armor and the diesel engine), a third was added - speed. A.K. Rodkin, who fought on a T-34-85 tank at the end of the war, put it this way: “The tankers had this saying: 'Armor is bullshit, but our tanks are fast.' We had an advantage in speed. The Germans had petrol tanks, but their speed was not very high. "
The first task of the 76.2-mm F-34 tank gun was "the destruction of tanks and other motorized means of the enemy." Veteran tankers unanimously call german tanks the main and most serious enemy. In the initial period of the war, the crews of the T-34 confidently went to a duel with any German tanks, rightly believing that a powerful cannon and reliable armor protection would ensure success in battle. The appearance on the battlefield of "Tigers" and "Panthers" changed the situation to the opposite. Now the German tanks received " long arm", Allowing you to fight without worrying about camouflage. “Taking advantage of the fact that we have 76-mm cannons, which can take their armor in the forehead only from 500 meters, they stood in an open place,” recalls the platoon commander, Lieutenant Nikolai Yakovlevich Zheleznoe. Even sabot shells for the 76-mm cannon did not give advantages in a duel of this kind, since they pierced only 90 mm. homogeneous armor at a distance of 500 meters, while the frontal armor of the T-VIH "Tiger" had a thickness of 102 mm. The transition to the 85-mm cannon immediately changed the situation, allowing Soviet tankers to fight new German tanks at distances of over a kilometer. “Well, when the T-34-85 appeared, it was already possible to go one-on-one here,” recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov. The powerful 85-mm gun allowed the T-34 crews to fight their old acquaintances T-IV at a distance of 1200 - 1300 m. An example of such a battle on the Sandomierz bridgehead in the summer of 1944 can be found in the memoirs of N. Ya. Zheleznov. The first T-34 tanks with the 85mm D-5T cannon left the assembly line at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant # 112 in January 1944. The start of mass production of the T-34-85 already with the 85-mm ZIS-S-53 cannon was laid in March 1944, when tanks of a new type were built on the flagship of the Soviet tank building during the war, factory # 183 in Nizhny Tagil. Despite a certain haste in re-equipping the tank with an 85-mm gun, the 85-mm gun that entered the mass production was considered reliable by the crews and did not cause any complaints.
Vertical guidance of the T-34 gun was carried out manually, and an electric drive was introduced to rotate the turret from the very beginning of the tank's production. However, tankers in battle preferred to rotate the turret manually. “Hands lie with a cross on the mechanisms for turning the turret and aiming the gun. The tower could be turned by an electric motor, but in battle you forget about it. You twist it with the handle, ”recalls G. N. Krivov. This is easy to explain. On the T-34-85, which G. N. Krivov talks about, the handle for turning the turret manually simultaneously served as a lever for the electric drive. To switch from manual to electric drive, it was necessary to turn the turret rotation handle vertically and move it back and forth, forcing the engine to rotate the turret in the desired direction. In the heat of battle, this was forgotten, and the handle was used only for manual rotation. In addition, as VP Bryukhov recalls: “You have to be able to use the electric turn, otherwise you will jerk off, and then you have to turn it over”.
The only inconvenience that caused the introduction of the 85-mm cannon was the need to carefully monitor so that the long barrel did not touch the ground on bumps in the road or battlefield. “The T-34-85 has a barrel length of four meters or more. In the slightest ditch, the tank can peck and grab the ground with its barrel. If you shoot after that, the trunk opens with petals in different directions, like a flower, ”recalls A. K. Rodkin. The full barrel length of the 85-mm tank gun of the 1944 model was more than four meters, 4645 mm. The appearance of the 85-mm gun and new shots to it also led to the fact that the tank stopped exploding with the breakdown of the turret, “... they (shells. -A.M.) do not detonate, but explode in turn. On the T-34-76, if one shell explodes, then the entire ammunition rack detonates, ”says A. K. Rodkin. This to some extent increased the chances of the T-34's crew members for survival, and from the photos and newsreels of the war, the picture, sometimes flickering in the frames of 1941-1943, disappeared from the T-34 with the turret lying next to the tank or inverted after falling back onto the tank. ...
If German tanks were the most dangerous enemy of the T-34s, then the T-34s themselves were an effective means of defeating not only armored vehicles, but also the enemy's guns and manpower, interfering with the advance of their infantry. Most of the tankers, whose memories are given in the book, have, at best, several units of enemy armored vehicles to their credit, but at the same time the number of enemy infantrymen shot from a cannon and machine gun is estimated at tens and hundreds of people. The ammunition load of the T-34 tanks consisted mainly of high-explosive fragmentation shells. Standard ammunition "thirty-four" with a turret-"nut" in 1942 - 1944. consisted of 100 shots, including 75 high-explosive fragmentation and 25 armor-piercing (of which 4 subcaliber ones since 1943). The standard ammunition load of the T-34-85 tank included 36 high-explosive fragmentation rounds, 14 armor-piercing and 5 subcaliber rounds. The balance between armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation projectiles largely reflects the conditions in which the T-34 fought during the attack. Under heavy artillery fire, tankers in most cases had little time for aimed fire and fired on the move and short stops, counting on suppressing the enemy with a mass of shots or hitting the target with several shells. G. N. Krivov recalls: “Experienced guys who have already been in battles tell us: 'Never stop. Hit on the move. Heaven and earth, where the projectile is flying - hit, press. " You asked how many shells I fired in the first battle? Half of the ammunition. Beat, beat ... "
As is often the case, practice suggested techniques that were not provided for by any statutes and methodological manuals. A typical example is the use of the clanking of a closing bolt as an internal alarm in a tank. VP Bryukhov says: “When the crew is well-coordinated, the mechanic is strong, he hears himself which projectile is driven, the click of the bolt wedge, which is also heavy, more than two poods ...” The guns installed on the T-34 tank were equipped with semi-automatic opening shutter. This system worked as follows. When fired, the gun rolled back, after absorbing the recoil energy, the recoil pad returned the body of the gun to its original position. Just before returning, the shutter mechanism lever ran onto the copier on the gun carriage, and the wedge went down, the ejector legs associated with it knocked out an empty shell case from the breech. The loader sent the next projectile, knocking down with its mass the bolt wedge held on the legs of the ejector. A heavy part, under the influence of powerful springs, abruptly returning to its original position, produced a rather harsh sound that overlapped the roar of the engine, the clanking of the chassis and the sounds of battle. Hearing the clang of the closing bolt, the driver-mechanic, without waiting for the command "Short!" The location of the ammunition in the tank did not cause any inconvenience to the loaders. The shells could be taken both from the stowage in the turret and from the "suitcases" on the floor of the fighting compartment.
The target that did not always appear in the crosshair of the sight was worthy of a shot from a gun. The commander of the T-34-76 or the gunner of the T-34-85 fired at the German infantrymen who were running or found themselves in the open space from a machine gun paired with a cannon. The course machine gun installed in the hull could only be effectively used in close combat, when the tank immobilized for one reason or another was surrounded by enemy infantrymen with grenades and Molotov cocktails. “This is a melee weapon when the tank was hit and it stopped. The Germans come up, and you can mow them, be healthy, ”- recalls VP Bryukhov. On the move, it was almost impossible to shoot from a course machine gun, since the telescopic sight of the machine gun gave negligible opportunities for observation and aiming. “Actually, I didn't have any scope. I have such a hole there, you can't see a damn thing in it, ”recalls PI Kirichenko. Perhaps the most effective course machine gun was used when removed from a ball mount and used for firing from a bipod outside the tank. “And it began. They pulled out a frontal machine gun - they came at us from the rear. The tower was deployed. The submachine gunner is with me. We put a machine gun on the parapet, we are firing, ”recalls Nikolai Nikolaevich Kuzmichev. In fact, the tank received a machine gun, which could be used by the crew as the most effective personal weapon.
The installation of the radio on the T-34-85 tank in the tower next to the tank commander was supposed to finally turn the radio operator into the most useless member of the tank's crew, the "passenger". The ammunition load of the machine guns of the T-34-85 tank has more than halved compared to the earlier production tanks, to 31 discs. However, the realities of the final period of the war, when the German infantry had faust cartridges, on the contrary, increased the usefulness of the gunner of the course machine gun. “By the end of the war, he became needed, protecting from the 'faustics', clearing the way. So what, what is hard to see, sometimes the mechanic prompted him. If you want to see, you will see, ”recalls A. K. Rodkin.
In such a situation, the space freed up after moving the radio into the tower was used to accommodate the ammunition. Most (27 out of 31) disks for the DT machine gun in the T-34-85 were placed in the control compartment, next to the shooter, who became the main consumer of machine gun cartridges.
In general, the appearance of faustpatrons increased the role of small arms"Thirty-fours". Even shooting at the "faustniki" from a pistol with an open hatch began to be practiced. The regular personal weapons of the crews were TT pistols, revolvers, captured pistols and one PPSh submachine gun, for which a place was provided for stowing equipment in the tank. The submachine gun was used by crews when leaving the tank and in battle in the city, when the angle of elevation of the cannon and machine guns was not enough.
As the German anti-tank artillery strengthened, visibility became an increasingly important component of a tank's survivability. The difficulties that the commander and driver of the T-34 tank experienced in their combat work were largely associated with the meager capabilities of monitoring the battlefield. The first "thirty-fours" had mirrored periscopes at the driver and in the turret of the tank. Such a device was a box with mirrors installed at an angle at the top and bottom, and the mirrors were not glass (they could crack from the impact of shells), but made of polished steel. The image quality in such a periscope is not hard to imagine. The same mirrors were in the periscopes on the sides of the tower, which were one of the main means of observing the battlefield for the tank commander. In the letter from SK Timoshenko, cited above, dated November 6, 1940, there are the following words: "The observation devices of the driver and radio operator should be replaced with more modern ones." The first year of the war, the tankers fought with mirrors, later instead of mirrors they installed prismatic observation devices, that is, a solid glass prism went to the entire height of the periscope. At the same time, the limited visibility, despite the improvement in the characteristics of the periscopes themselves, often forced the driver-mechanics of the T-34 to drive with open hatches. “The triplexes on the driver's hatch were completely ugly. They were made of hideous yellow or green plexiglass, which gave a completely distorted, wavy picture. It was impossible to disassemble anything through such a triplex, especially in a jumping tank. Therefore, the war was fought with hatches ajar on the palm, ”recalls S. L. Aria. AV Marievsky also agrees with him, who also points out that the driver's triplexes were easily splashed with mud.
Specialists of NII-48 in the fall of 1942, based on the results of the analysis of damage to armor protection, made next output: “A significant percentage of dangerous defeats of T-34 tanks were on the side parts, and not on the frontal ones (out of 432 hits in the hull of the examined tanks, 270 accounted for its sides. - A. I.) can be explained either by the poor acquaintance of the tank teams with the tactical characteristics of their armor protection, or by poor visibility from them, due to which the crew cannot detect the firing point in time and turn the tank into a position that is least dangerous for penetrating its armor.
It is necessary to improve the acquaintance of tank crews with the tactical characteristics of the armoring of their vehicles and provide the best overview of them(highlighted by me - A. I.) ".
The task of providing a better view was solved in several stages. Polished steel mirrors were also removed from the commander's and loader's observation devices. The periscopes on the cheekbones of the T-34 turret were replaced by slits with glass blocks to protect against shrapnel. This happened during the transition to the "nut" tower in the fall of 1942. New devices allowed the crew to organize all-round observation of the situation: “The driver is watching forward and to the left. You, commander, try to observe around. And the radio operator and the loader are more on the right ”(VP Bryukhov). On the T-34-85, MK-4 observation devices were installed at the gunner and loader. Simultaneous observation of several directions made it possible to notice the danger in a timely manner and adequately respond to it with fire or maneuver.
The problem of providing a good view for the tank commander was solved the longest. The clause on the introduction of the commander's cupola on the T-34, which was present in the letter to S.K. Timoshenko in 1940, was completed almost two years after the start of the war. After long experiments with attempts to squeeze the freed tank commander into the “nut” turret, turrets on the T-34 began to be installed only in the summer of 1943. The commander retained the function of the gunner, but now he could raise his head from the sight eyepiece and look around. The main advantage of the turret was the possibility of a circular view. “The commander's cupola revolved around, the commander saw everything and, without firing, could control the fire of his tank and maintain communication with others,” recalls A. V. Bodnar. To be precise, it was not the turret itself that rotated, but its roof with a periscope observation device. Prior to that, in 1941 - 1942, the tank commander, in addition to a "mirror" on the side of the turret, had a periscope, formally called a periscope sight. By rotating his vernier, the commander could provide himself with a view of the battlefield, but very limited. “In the spring of 1942, there was a commander's panorama on KB and on the thirty-fours. I could rotate it and see everything around, but still it is a very small sector, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar. The commander of the T-34-85 tank with the ZIS-S-53 cannon, freed from the gunner's duties, received, in addition to the commander's cupola with slots around the perimeter, his own prismatic periscope rotating in the hatch - MK-4, which made it possible to look even backwards. But among tankers there is also such an opinion: “I did not use the commander's cupola. I always kept the hatch open. Because those who closed them burned down. We didn’t have time to jump out, ”recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov.
Without exception, all interviewed tankers admire the sights of German tank guns. As an example, we will cite the memoirs of VP Bryukhov: “We have always noted the high-quality Zeiss optics of sights. And until the end of the war, it was of high quality. We didn't have such optics. The sights themselves were more convenient than ours. We have a reticle in the form of a triangle, and there are risks from it to the right and left. They had these divisions, corrections for the wind, for range, something else. " It must be said here that in terms of information, there was no fundamental difference between the Soviet and German telescopic sights of the gun. The gunner could see the aiming mark and on either side of it "fences" of corrections for the angular velocity. In the Soviet and German sights there was a correction for the range, only it was introduced in various ways. In the German sight, the gunner rotated the pointer, placing it opposite the radially located distance scale. Each type of projectile had its own sector. Soviet tank builders went through this stage in the 1930s; the sight of the three-turret T-28 tank had a similar design. In "thirty-four" the distance was set by the sight thread moving along the vertically located range scales. So functionally the Soviet and German sights did not differ. The difference was in the quality of the optics itself, especially deteriorated in 1942 due to the evacuation of the Izium Optical Glass Factory. The real drawbacks of telescopic sights of the early "thirty-fours" can be attributed to their alignment with the bore of the gun. Aiming the gun vertically, the tanker was forced to rise or fall in his place, keeping his eyes at the eyepiece of the sight moving with the gun. Later, on the T-34-85, a "breaking" sight, characteristic of German tanks, was introduced, the eyepiece of which was fixed, and the lens followed the gun barrel due to a hinge on the same axis with the cannon trunnions.
Deficiencies in the design of observation devices adversely affected the habitability of the tank. The need to keep the driver's hatch open forced the latter to sit at the levers, “taking, moreover, on his chest a stream of chilling wind sucked in by the fan turbine roaring behind him” (S. L. Aria). In this case, a "turbine" is a fan on the engine shaft that sucks in air from the crew compartment through a flimsy engine baffle.
A typical complaint to Soviet-made military equipment from both foreign and domestic specialists was the Spartan situation inside the vehicle. “As a disadvantage, one can single out the complete lack of comfort for the crew. I climbed into American and British tanks. There the crew was in more comfortable conditions: the inside of the tanks were painted with light paint, the seats were semi-soft with armrests. There was nothing of this on the T-34, ”recalls S. L. Aria.
There were really no armrests on the crew seats in the T-34-76 and T-34-85 turrets. They were only on the seats of the driver and the gunner-radio operator. However, the armrests themselves on the crew seats were a detail characteristic mainly of American technology. Neither British nor German tanks (with the exception of the "Tiger") had no armrests in the turret.
But there were also real design flaws. One of the problems faced by the tank builders of the 1940s was the penetration of gunpowder gases from guns of ever increasing power into the tank. After the shot, the bolt opened, ejected the sleeve, and gases from the barrel of the gun and the discarded sleeve went into the fighting compartment of the vehicle. “... You shout:“ armor-piercing! ”,“ Fragmentation! ”You look, and he (the loader. -A.M.) lies on the ammo rack. I was burned with gunpowder gases and lost consciousness. When a tough fight, rarely did anyone endure it. All the same, you get drunk, "recalls V. P. Bryukhov.
Electric exhaust fans were used to remove powder gases and ventilate the fighting compartment. The first T-34s inherited one fan in the front of the turret from the BT tank. In the turret with a 45-mm gun, it looked appropriate, since it was located almost above the breech of the gun. In the T-34 turret, the fan was not above the breech, smoking after the shot, but above the gun barrel. Its effectiveness in this regard was questionable. But in 1942, at the peak of the shortage of components, the tank lost even that - T-34s left factories with empty turrets, there were simply no fans.
During the modernization of the tank with the installation of the "nut" tower, the fan moved to the rear of the tower, closer to the area where the powder gases accumulated. The T-34-85 tank had already received two fans in the rear of the turret; the larger caliber of the gun required intensive ventilation of the fighting compartment. But during the tense battle, the fans did not help. Partially the problem of protecting the crew from powder gases was solved by blowing the barrel with compressed air ("Panther"), but it was impossible to blow through the sleeve that spreads suffocating smoke. According to the memoirs of G.N.Krivov, experienced tankers advised to immediately throw the cartridge case through the loader's hatch. The problem was radically resolved only after the war, when an ejector was introduced into the design of the guns, which “pumped out” gases from the barrel of the gun after the shot, even before the shutter was opened by automatic controls.
The T-34 tank was in many ways a revolutionary design, and like any transitional model, it combined novelties and forced, soon outdated, solutions. One of these solutions was the introduction of a radio operator into the crew. The main function of the tanker sitting at the ineffective course machine gun was to service the tank radio station. On the early "thirty-fours" the radio station was installed on the right side of the control compartment, next to the radio operator gunner. The need to keep a person in the crew engaged in setting up and maintaining the performance of the radio was a consequence of the imperfection of communication technology in the first half of the war. The point was not that it was necessary to work with a key: the Soviet tank radio stations on the T-34 did not have a telegraph operating mode, they could not transmit dashes and dots in Morse code. The radio operator was introduced because the main consumer of information from neighboring vehicles and from higher levels of control, the tank commander, was simply not able to maintain the radio. “The station was unreliable. The radio operator is a specialist, and the commander is not such a great specialist. In addition, when hitting the armor, a wave was lost, lamps were out of order, ”recalls V. P. Bryukhov. It should be added that the commander of the T-34 with a 76-mm cannon combined the functions of a tank commander and gunner, and was too heavily loaded to deal with even a simple and convenient radio station. The allocation of a separate person to work with a walkie-talkie was typical for other countries participating in the Second World War. For example, on the French Somua S-35 tank, the commander performed the functions of a gunner, loader and tank commander, but there was a radio operator, even freed from machine gun maintenance.
In the initial period of the war, "thirty-fours" were equipped with radio stations 71-TK-Z, and even then not all machines. The last fact should not be embarrassing, such a situation was common in the Wehrmacht, the radio frequency of which is usually greatly exaggerated. In reality, the commanders of the subunits from the platoon and above had transceivers. In February 1941, in a light tank company, Fu. 5 were installed on three T-IVs and five T-IIIs, and on two T-IVs and twelve T-IIIs, only Fu receivers were installed. 2. In the company of medium tanks, the transceivers had five T-IV and three T-III, and two T-II and nine T-IV - only receivers. On T-I Fu transceivers. 5 were not installed at all, with the exception of special command kIT-Bef. Wg. l. In the Red Army, there was essentially a similar concept of "radium" and "linear" tanks. The crews of "line" tanks had to act, observing the commander's maneuvers, or receive orders from flags. The space for the radio station on the "linear" tanks was filled with disks for the DT machine gun shops, 77 disks with a capacity of 63 rounds each instead of 46 on the "radio" one. On June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 671 "line" T-34 tanks and 221 "radio" ones.
But the main problem of communication means of T-34 tanks in 1941 - 1942. it was not so much their quantity as the quality of the 71-TK-Z stations themselves. Tankers assessed its capabilities as very moderate. “On the move, she took about 6 kilometers” (PI Kirichenko). The same opinion is expressed by other tankers. “Radio station 71-TK-Z, as I remember now, is a complex, unstable radio station. She very often broke down, and it was very difficult to put her in order, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar. At the same time, the radio station to some extent compensated for the information vacuum, since it made it possible to listen to reports broadcast from Moscow, the famous "From the Soviet Information Bureau ..." in the voice of Levitan. A serious deterioration in the situation was observed during the evacuation of radio equipment factories, when from August 1941 the production of tank radio stations was practically stopped until mid-1942.
As the evacuated enterprises returned to service by the middle of the war, there was a tendency towards 100% radioification of tank forces. The crews of the T-34 tanks received a new radio station, developed on the basis of the aircraft RSI-4, -9R, and later its modernized versions, 9RS and 9RM. It was much more stable in operation due to the use of quartz frequency generators in it. The radio station was of English origin and was produced for a long time using components supplied under Lend-Lease. On the T-34-85, the radio station migrated from the control compartment to the fighting compartment, to the left wall of the tower, where the commander, freed from the gunner's duties, now began to maintain it. Nevertheless, the concepts of "linear" and "radio" tank remained.
In addition to communicating with the outside world, each tank had intercom equipment. The reliability of the intercom of the early T-34s was low, the main means of signaling between the commander and the driver were boots mounted on the shoulders. “The intercom worked disgustingly. Therefore, communication was carried out with my feet, that is, I had the boots of the tank commander on my shoulders, he pressed on my left or right shoulder, respectively, I turned the tank left or right, ”recalls S. L. Aria. The commander and the loader could talk, although more often the communication took place with gestures: "He stuck his fist under the loader's nose, and he already knows that it is necessary to load with armor-piercing, and the splayed palm - with fragmentation." The intercom TPU-Zbis installed on the later T-34 series worked much better. “The internal tank intercom was mediocre on the T-34-76. There I had to command my boots and hands, but on the T-34-85 it was already excellent, ”recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov. Therefore, the commander began to give the driver-mechanic orders by voice over the intercom - the T-34-85 commander no longer had the technical ability to put his boots on his shoulders - the gunner separated him from the control compartment.
Speaking about the communication facilities of the T-34 tank, the following should also be noted. From films to books and back travels the story of the call by the commander of a German tank of our tanker to a duel in broken Russian. This is completely untrue. Since 1937, all Wehrmacht tanks used the 27 - 32 MHz range, none of which overlapped with the radio range of Soviet tank radio stations - 3.75 - 6.0 MHz. Only the command tanks were equipped with a second shortwave radio station. It had a range of 1 - 3 MHz, again incompatible with the range of our tank radio stations.
The commander of a German tank battalion, as a rule, had something to do other than challenges to a duel. In addition, tanks of outdated types were often commanders, and in the initial period of the war - without weapons at all, with mock-ups of guns in a fixed turret.
The engine and its systems practically did not cause any complaints from the crews, in contrast to the transmission. “I'll tell you frankly, the T-34 is the most reliable tank. Sometimes, he stopped, something like that is not in order. The oil struck. Hose is loose. For this, a thorough inspection of the tanks was always carried out before the march, ”recalls A. S. Burtsev. A massive fan mounted in one block with the main clutch required caution in engine control. Errors of the driver could lead to the destruction of the fan and the failure of the tank.
Also, some difficulties were caused by the initial period of operation of the resulting tank, getting used to the characteristics of a particular instance of the T-34 tank. “Each vehicle, each tank, each tank gun, each engine had its own unique characteristics. They cannot be recognized in advance, they can only be identified in the course of everyday use. At the front, we ended up in unfamiliar cars. The commander does not know what kind of battle his cannon has. The mechanic does not know what his diesel can and cannot. Of course, at the factories, the guns of the tanks were shot at and a 50-kilometer run was carried out, but this was completely insufficient. Of course, we tried to get to know our vehicles better before the battle, and for this we used every opportunity, ”recalls N. Ya. Zheleznov.
Tankers faced significant technical difficulties when doing the engine and gearbox docking with the power plant during the repair of the tank in the field. It was. In addition to replacing or repairing the gearbox itself and the engine, the gearbox had to be removed from the tank when dismantling the side clutches. After returning to the site or replacing the engine and gearbox, it was required to install in the tank relative to each other with high accuracy. According to the repair manual for the T-34 tank, the accuracy of the installation was supposed to be 0.8 mm. For the installation of the units, which were moved with the help of 0.75 ton hoists, this precision required an investment of time and effort.
Of the entire complex of components and assemblies of the power plant, only the engine air filter had design flaws that required serious revision. The old type filter, installed on T-34 tanks in 1941-1942, poorly cleaned the air and prevented the normal operation of the engine, which led to rapid wear of the V-2. “The old air filters were ineffective, took up a lot of space in the engine compartment, and had a large turbine. They often had to be cleaned, even when not walking on a dusty road. And “Cyclone” was very good, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar. Filters "Cyclone" showed themselves perfectly in 1944-1945, when Soviet tank crews fought hundreds of kilometers. “If the air cleaner was cleaned according to the regulations, the engine was working well. But during battles, it is not always possible to do everything right. If the air cleaner does not clean enough, the oil changes at the wrong time, the gimp is not washed out and allows dust to pass through, then the engine wears out quickly, ”recalls A. K. Rodkin. "Cyclones" made it possible, even in the absence of time for maintenance, to undergo a whole operation until the engine failed.
The tankers are invariably positive about the duplicated engine starting system. In addition to the traditional electric starter, the tank had two 10-liter compressed air cylinders. The air start system made it possible to start the engine even if the electric starter failed, which often occurred in battle from the impact of shells.
Track chains were the most frequently repaired element of the T-34 tank. The trucks were a spare part with which the tank even went into battle. The caterpillars were sometimes torn on the march, broken by shell hits. “The caterpillars were torn, even without bullets, without shells. When soil gets between the rollers, the caterpillar, especially when turning, is stretched to such an extent that the fingers and the tracks themselves cannot withstand, ”recalls A. V. Maryevsky. Repair and tensioning of the tracks were inevitable companions of the combat work of the machine. In this case, the caterpillars were a serious unmasking factor. “Thirty-four, it not only roars with a diesel engine, it also clicks with caterpillars. If the T-34 is approaching, you will hear the clatter of the tracks first, and then the engine. The fact is that the teeth of the working tracks must exactly fall between the rollers on the driving wheel, which, while rotating, captures them. And when the caterpillar stretched, developed, became longer, the distance between the teeth increased, and the teeth hit the roller, causing a characteristic sound, ”recalls A. K. Rodkin. The forced technical solutions wartime, primarily rollers without rubber bands around the perimeter. “… Unfortunately, the Stalingrad T-34s came, which had road wheels without bandages. They rumbled terribly, ”recalls A. V. Bodnar. These were the so-called rollers with internal shock absorption. The first rollers of this type, sometimes called "locomotive", began to produce the Stalingrad plant (STZ), and even before the really serious interruptions in the supply of rubber began. The early onset of cold weather in the fall of 1941 led to downtime on ice-bound rivers of barges with rollers, which were sent along the Volga from Stalingrad to the Yaroslavl Tire Plant. The technology provided for the manufacture of a bandage on special equipment already at the finished rink. Large batches of finished rollers from Yaroslavl got stuck on the way, which forced STZ engineers to look for a replacement for them, which was a solid cast roller with a small shock-absorbing ring inside it, closer to the hub. When the interruptions in the supply of rubber began, other factories took advantage of this experience, and from the winter of 1941 - 1942 until the fall of 1943, T-34 tanks rolled off the assembly lines, the undercarriage of which consisted entirely or mostly of rollers with internal depreciation. Since the fall of 1943, the problem of the lack of rubber has finally become a thing of the past, and the T-34-76 tanks have completely returned to rollers with rubber tires.
All T-34-85 tanks were produced with rollers with rubber tires. This significantly reduced the noise of the tank, providing relative comfort for the crew and making it difficult for the enemy to detect the T-34s.
It is especially worth mentioning that over the years of the war, the role of the T-34 tank in the Red Army has changed. At the beginning of the war, thirty-fours with an imperfect transmission, unable to withstand long marches, but well armored, were ideal tanks for direct support of the infantry. During the war, the tank lost its armor advantage at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. By the fall of 1943 - early 1944, the T-34 tank was a relatively easy target for 75-mm tank and anti-tank guns; it was unambiguously fatal for it to be hit by shells from 88-mm Tigers guns, anti-aircraft guns and PAK-43 anti-tank guns.
But elements that were not given due importance before the war or simply did not have time to bring to an acceptable level were steadily improved and even completely replaced. First of all, this is the power plant and transmission of the tank, from which they have achieved stable and trouble-free operation. At the same time, all these elements of the tank retained good maintainability and ease of use. All this allowed the T-34 to do things that were unrealistic for the T-34s of the first year of the war. “For example, from near Jelgava, moving through East Prussia, we covered more than 500 km in three days. The T-34 could withstand such marches normally, ”recalls A. K. Rodkin. For T-34 tanks in 1941, a 500-kilometer march would have been almost fatal. In June 1941, the 8th Mechanized Corps under the command of D.I. A. V. Bodnar, who fought in 1941-1942, assesses the T-34 in comparison with German tanks: “From the point of view of operation, German armored vehicles were more perfect, they were out of order less often. For the Germans, it cost nothing to walk 200 km; in the thirty-four, you will definitely lose something, something will break. Technological equipment their machines were stronger, and their combat ones were worse. "
By the fall of 1943, the Thirty-fours became an ideal tank for independent mechanized formations designed for deep penetrations and detours. They became the main fighting vehicle of tank armies - the main tools for offensive operations colossal proportions. In these operations, the main type of action of the T-34 was marches with open hatches of driver mechanics, and often with lighted headlights. The tanks traveled hundreds of kilometers, intercepting the escape routes of the encircled German divisions and corps.
In fact, in 1944 - 1945 the situation of the "blitzkrieg" of 1941 was mirrored, when the Wehrmacht reached Moscow and Leningrad on tanks with not the best at that time characteristics of armor and weapons, but mechanically very reliable. In the same way, in the final period of the war, the T-34-85 covered hundreds of kilometers with deep sweeps and detours, and the Tigers and Panthers trying to stop them massively failed due to breakdowns and were thrown by their crews due to lack of fuel. The symmetry of the picture was broken, perhaps, only by the weapons. In contrast to the German tankers of the "blitzkrieg" period, the crews of the "thirty-fours" had an adequate means of dealing with enemy tanks superior in armor protection - an 85-mm cannon. Moreover, each commander of the T-34-85 tank received a reliable radio station, which was quite perfect for that time, which made it possible to play against German "cats" as a team.
The T-34s, which entered the battle in the early days of the war near the border, and the T-34s, which burst into the streets of Berlin in April 1945, although they had the same name, were significantly different both externally and internally. But both in the initial period of the war and at its final stage, the tankers saw in the "thirty-four" a machine in which they could believe. At first, these were the slope of the armor that reflected enemy shells, a diesel engine that was resistant to fire, and an all-crushing weapon. In the period of victories, this is high speed, reliability, stable communication and a cannon that allows itself to stand up for itself.
The crew of the T-34, the most massive medium tank of World War II, consisted of four people: a tank commander, a driver mechanic, a tower commander and a radio telegraph machine gunner. The commander of the T-34 also performed the duties of a gunner (that is, he shot himself), which actually deprived the crew of the commander. The situation changed only with the appearance of the T-34-85 in 1943.
In the Red Army, driver-mechanics were trained for 3 months, radio operators and loaders - for a month. The formation of the crew took place directly at the plant, after receiving the tank. The soldiers went to the factory training ground and fired 3-4 shells and 2-3 machine-gun disks, after which they made a march to the railway station, where the cars were loaded onto platforms. Arriving at the front, such crews often disintegrated without ever entering the battle. Then they were replaced by experienced tankers, who lost their vehicles in battles and, according to the charter, were sent to serve in the infantry.
The crew of the tank was not constant: leaving the hospital, the wounded tankers rarely returned to their crew and even to their regiment. The record of personal victories in the Soviet tank forces was practically not kept, and the data that is available, in most cases, is not complete: the number of victories could have been large.
The figures were often underestimated due to the existence of the payment system. For each destroyed German tank, the commander, gunner and driver received 500 rubles, the loader and radio operator - 200 rubles. As for collective tank victories, only a few cases are known when the crews of Soviet tanks destroyed a certain number of German tanks and guns.
In Soviet military historiography, there is no complete list of aces tankers (similar to the one that existed in the German tank forces). The most reliable data are available only for specific tank battles.
The newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda was inclined to overestimate the data: judging solely by them, the Red Army should have destroyed all Wehrmacht tanks in the fall of 1941.
- Dmitry LAVRINENKO - lieutenant, fought on a T-34 tank, destroyed 52 tanks and assault guns.
- Zinovy KOLOBANOV - senior lieutenant, KV tank; 22 tanks.
- Semyon KONOVALOV - Lieutenant, KV tank; 16 tanks and 2 armored vehicles.
- Alexey SILACHEV - lieutenant, 11 tanks.
- Maxim DMITRIEV - lieutenant, 11 tanks.
- Pavel GUDZ - Lieutenant, KV tank; 10 tanks and 4 anti-tank guns.
- Vladimir Khazov - senior lieutenant, 10 tanks.
- Ivan DEPUTATOV - lieutenant, 9 tanks, 2 assault guns.
- Ivan LYUBUSHKIN - senior sergeant, T-34 tank; 9 tanks.
- Dmitry SHOLOKHOV - senior lieutenant, 8 tanks.
The most productive Soviet ace of tank forces is Dmitry Lavrinenko. Participated in 28 battles. On October 6-10, 1941, in the battles near Orel and Mtsensk, his crew destroyed 16 German tanks. Later, Colonel General Heinz Guderian wrote: “South of Mtsensk, the 4th Panzer Division was attacked by Russian tanks, and it had to endure a difficult moment. For the first time, the superiority of the Russian T-34 tanks manifested itself in a sharp form. The division suffered heavy casualties. The planned rapid attack on Tula had to be postponed. " In November 1941, during the defense held by Lavrinenko's platoon, 8 German tanks moved into battle. The lieutenant knocked out the tank in front with one shot, after which the remaining 6 shots also hit the target. The tanker was killed in November 1941 during the defense of Moscow.
Zinovy Kolobanov is the second in the line of aces-tankers. On August 19, 1941, his KV-1 destroyed 22 German tanks in the Leningrad Region. Four KV-1 tanks led by Kolobanov ambushed the German column. From the first two shots, the two leading German vehicles caught fire, which stopped those that followed. The machines that were at the end of the column continued to move forward, squeezing it. In this situation, Senior Lieutenant Kolobanov hit the German car at the very end. The column was trapped. The KV tank, in which Kolobanov was located, withstood 135 hits from German shells and did not fail.
Separately, they talk about the aces-tankers who destroyed the heavy German tanks T-VI N "Tigers". Here, the first are the crews of T-34 tanks from the 1st Tank Army of General Mikhail Yefimovich Katukov.
On July 7, 1943, 8 T-34 vehicles of Guards Lieutenant Vladimir Bochkovsky from the Katukov army fought a defensive battle, first with seven Tigers, and later with three more tank columns that approached, led by T-VI N. Soviet tanks fought from shelters, which gave the Nazis reason to think that a much larger number of tanks were holding the defense. In this battle, Guard Lieutenant Georgy Bessarabov burned three T-VI N.
Only by the end of the day did the German tankers realize that only a few vehicles were fighting against them and renewed their attacks. Bochkovsky's tank was knocked out when he tried to take another vehicle, which had been knocked out earlier, in tow. The crews of the destroyed tanks and 4 more motorized riflemen continued to defend themselves. As a result, Bessarabov's tank managed to escape. The next morning, a company of 5 vehicles again appeared in front of German tanks.
For two days of fighting, the tankers destroyed 23 enemy tanks, including several "Tigers".
THE LARGEST TANK BATTLE IN THE HISTORY OF WARS OF THE XX CENTURY
In the Great Patriotic War, which took place on the territory of a state that occupied 1/6 of the land, tank battles became decisive. During battles with the participation of armored forces, opponents found themselves in equally difficult conditions, and in addition to opportunities military equipment, were forced to demonstrate the endurance of the personnel.
The largest military clash involving armored forces has long been considered the battle in the area of the Prokhorovka station ( Belgorod region) July 12, 1943. It took place during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk under the command of Lieutenant General of the Red Army Panzer Troops Pavel Rotmistrov and SS Gruppenfuehrer Paul Hausser from the enemy side. According to Soviet military historians, 1,500 tanks participated in the battle: 800 from the Soviet side, and 700 from the German side. In some cases, the total figure is indicated - 1200. According to the latest data, only about 800 armored vehicles participated in this battle on both sides.
Meanwhile, modern historians argue that the largest tank battle in the history of World War II and in the entire history of wars of the 20th century was the battle near the Belarusian town of Senno, 50 kilometers south-west of Vitebsk. This battle took place at the very beginning of the war - on July 6, 1941, 2,000 units of armored vehicles were involved in it: the 7th and 5th mechanized corps of the Red Army (under the command of Major Generals Vinogradov and Alekseenko) had about 1,000 tanks of old types , also about 1 000 tanks were at the disposal of the German troops. The Soviet army suffered the greatest losses in this battle: all Soviet tanks were destroyed, personnel losses amounted to about 5,000 dead soldiers and officers - it is for this reason that the scale of the battle near Senno was not covered by Soviet historiography. True, the writer Ivan Stadnyuk in his novel "War" writes that our corps had 700 tanks, that they were tasked with delivering a counterattack to a depth of 140 km from the region southwest of Vitebsk. in the direction of Senno and Lepel and destroy the enemy's Lepel grouping - the 57th mechanized corps.
PROGRESS OF BATTLE
The battle of Senno was preceded by battles in the Vitebsk direction, as a result of which, according to the plans of the Wehrmacht command, the road to Moscow was to become completely open. The basis for such a conclusion was the fact that by the beginning of July 1941 Minsk was taken and the main forces of the Soviet Western Front were practically defeated. On July 3, the chief of the German General Staff Franz Halder wrote in his diary: “In general, we can already say that the task of defeating the main forces of the Russian ground army in front of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper has been completed ... Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won during 14 days ... "However, on July 5, on the way to Vitebsk, the German units were stopped - the famous" Barbarossa "plan was disrupted. The battles in the Vitebsk direction, which ended with the Battle of Senno, played an important role in this disruption, paralyzing the movement of German troops for a whole week.
As a result of the July battles north and west of Orsha, the Red Army tankers of the 20th Army under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Alekseevich Kurochkin inflicted a tangible blow on the German units, throwing them 30-40 kilometers away from the city of Lepel. German troops unexpectedly found themselves in a difficult situation, from the offensive went into defense, which was broken through by two Soviet tank wedges.
According to military theory, a tank wedge could be stopped with the same tank wedge: therefore, in the counteroffensive, the German command was forced to use the approaching 47th Motorized Corps and other tank formations. A large German airborne assault was sent to the Senno area. At this time, units of the 20th Army under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Alekseevich Kurochkin were moving forward, confident in the successful completion of the operation.
Here is an excerpt from the memoirs of a participant in that battle: “Soon, tanks appeared ahead. There were many, very many. An ominous mass of armored monsters with black crosses on their sides moved towards us. It is difficult to convey the state of mind that gripped the young, untrained fighters ... ”It was difficult to keep Senno: the next day the city passed from hand to hand three times, but by the end of the day it was still under the control of Soviet troops. The tankers had to withstand 15 German attacks a day: according to the recollections of the participants in the battle, it was "a real total hell!"
After the first, most difficult day of the battle, the Red Army tank corps were surrounded. The reserves of fuel and ammunition dried up, the T-26, BT-5, BT-7 tanks, which were in service with the Red Army, could not withstand the impact of shells of any of the calibers, and the tank that stopped on the battlefield turned into a heap of metal in a few minutes. Due to outdated gasoline engines, Soviet tanks literally burned out "like candles."
The delivery of fuel and ammunition to the tanks was not organized in the required volume, and the tankers had to drain fuel from the tanks of vehicles that were almost no longer capable, into those that were carrying out the offensive.
On July 8, the German command decided to use all forces located in the Senno area, and considered reserve, in a battle with the defenders of the city.
As a result, the Soviet units had to leave the city and retreat to the Vitebsk-Smolensk highway, where they occupied the next line of defense. Some of the Soviet tanks still continued to advance on Lepel, hoping to successfully complete the operation, but on July 9, the German corps captured Vitebsk. Thus, even before the start of the crossing of the Dnieper, the road to Smolensk and Moscow was open for the Wehrmacht. The continuation of the counterattack of the Red Army troops did not make sense. On July 10, the Soviet command gave the order to blow up the tanks left without crews and fuel, and to get out of the encirclement.
They retreated at night, many did not manage to escape. Those who survived later took part in the Smolensk battle. It was during the Smolensk battle that the most famous participant in the battle of Senno, the son of Joseph Stalin, Yakov Dzhugashvili, a junior officer of the 14th howitzer artillery regiment, was captured. The son of the General Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, Lieutenant Ruben Ruiz Ibarruri, also fought in the same corps.
RESULTS OF THE BATTLE
The largest battle in the history of wars in the 20th century ended with the defeat of the Red Army for a number of reasons. The main among them, according to historians, is poor preparation for the operation: lack of time to obtain intelligence data and poor communication, as a result of which the soldiers had to act intuitively. In addition, most of the Soviet tankers entered this battle without preparation. The order to conduct a counterstrike came unexpectedly: at that time, many units were on the railroad to the Kiev military district, and some echelons even managed to unload.
For most of the Red Army tankers who did not yet have combat experience, the battle of Senno became a "baptism of fire". German tankers, on the other hand, by that time had been hardened in European battles.
Among the reasons that determined the outcome of the battle, an important one is the lack of support for Soviet tanks from aviation, while the German Air Force inflicted sufficient damage on them. In his report, Major General of Tank Forces Arseny Vasilyevich Borzikov wrote: “The 5th and 7th mechanized corps are fighting well, the only bad thing is that their losses are very large. Moreover, the most serious ones are from enemy aircraft, which uses incendiary watering ... " and the retreat of Soviet tanks.
But the German troops also suffered significant losses in the largest tank battle. This is evidenced by the captured memorandum of the commander of the German 18th Panzer Division, Major General Nering: “The losses of equipment, weapons and vehicles are unusually great and significantly exceed the captured trophies. This situation is intolerable, we can be defeated to our own death ... "
25 soldiers of the Red Army - participants in the battle at Senno were nominated for state awards.
Soviet tankers fought heroically in the tank battle of 1941 at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War near Dubno, Lutsk and Rovno as part of the 6th mechanized corps with the first tank group of German fascist troops.
It is well known that the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the last war was the result of joint heroic efforts and high military skill of all branches and branches of the armed forces. Soviet tank forces, which were the main striking and maneuverable force of the ground forces of the Red Army, also made a great contribution to the cause of the overall victory over the enemy.
Looking back at the battles of the Great Patriotic War, one cannot help but notice that none of them was carried out without the participation of tank troops. In addition, the number of tanks participating in battles increased continuously throughout the war. If in the counteroffensive near Moscow, only 670 tanks operated as part of the Soviet troops, and in total in the Moscow battle (1941/1942) - 780 tanks, then in Stalingrad battle were involved - 979 tanks. In the Belorussian operation there were already 5,200, in the Vistula - Oder - 6,500, in the Berlin operation 6,250 tanks and self-propelled guns took part.
The decisive role was played by tank forces in the Battle of Stalingradjf942 - 1943, the Battle of Kursk in 1943, in the liberation of Kiev in 1943, in the Byelorussian operation in 1944, the Yassko-Kishinev operation in 1944, the Vistula-Oder operation in 1945. , the Berlin operation in 1945 and many others. dr.
The massive use of tanks in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces and aviation led to an exceptionally high dynamism, decisiveness and maneuverability of combat operations, and gave the operations of the last war a spatial scale.
“The second half of the war,” said General of the Army A.I. Antonov, in his report at the XII session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on June 22, 1945, was held under the sign of the predominance of our tanks and self-propelled artillery on the battlefields. This allowed us to carry out operational maneuvers on a huge scale, to surround large enemy groups, to pursue them until they are completely destroyed)
As you know, according to their main combat mission, tanks must always act in front of other types of troops. During the war, our tank troops. brilliantly performed the role of the armored vanguard of the Red Army. Using great striking power and high mobility, tank units and formations rapidly burst into the depths of the enemy's defense, dissected, surrounded and smashed on the ego of the group, forced water barriers, disrupted enemy communications, captured important objects in its rear
Attacking at high rates and at great depths, tank troops were most often the first to break into cities and villages temporarily occupied by the German fascist invaders. It is not for nothing that people today say that during the war years, the rumble of tank tracks and the thunder of their cannon shots sounded like a liberation anthem for millions of people in Nazi captivity. Perhaps there is no such large settlement in the former theater of war, the name of which would not have been written on the battle omen of the tank brigade or corps that took part in its liberation. Monuments of tanks in many cities of our country and abroad stand today as eternal symbols of popular love and gratitude for the courage and heroism of Soviet tankmen.
During the Great Patriotic War, 68 tank brigades received the ranks of the Guards for military merits, 112 were given honorary titles, and 114 were fenced with orders. The brigades that received five and six orders include the 1st, 40th, 44th, 47th, 50th, 52nd, 65th and 68th Guards Tank Brigades.
During the Great Patriotic War, 1,142 tankmen were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 17 of them - twice, hundreds of thousands were awarded orders and medals.
Separately, I would like to dwell on the work of the country's tank industry. As a result of the measures taken by the Soviet government to organize the production of tanks and the heroic efforts of the home front workers, the number of tanks in the active army increased rapidly.If on December 1, 1941 there were only 1730 units, then by May 1, 1942 it became 4065, and by November - 6014 tanks, that already in the spring of 1942 it became possible to start forming tank and later mechanized corps. Two mixed tank armies were also created, which included tank, mechanized and rifle formations.
On the basis of combat experience in 1942, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order dated November 16, which required the use of tank brigades and regiments for direct support of the infantry, and tank and mechanized corps as echelons of success development in order to separate and encircle large enemy groups. In 1943, the formation of tank armies of a uniform composition began; in the tank and mechanized corps, the number of tanks was increased, self-propelled artillery, mortar and anti-aircraft units were included. By the summer of 1943, there were already 5 tank armies, which, as a rule, had 2 tank and 1 mechanized corps. In addition, there were a large number of separate mechanized tank corps. At the end of World War II, the Red Army consisted of 6 tank armies.
During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the tank industry of the USSR produced more than 100 thousand tanks. The losses of tank forces during this period amounted to 96.5 thousand combat vehicles.
By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 1, 1946, a professional holiday, Day of the Tankman, was established to commemorate the great merits of armored and mechanized troops in defeating the enemy during the Great Patriotic War, as well as for the merits of tank builders in equipping the Armed Forces of the country with armored vehicles.
The holiday is celebrated on the second Sunday of September.
Immediately after the end of World War II, tank troops stationed in Eastern Europe were one of the most important factors in deterring the ruling circles of Great Britain and the United States from conducting a military operation against the USSR.
According to the country's defense plan for 1947, the Armed Forces were tasked with ensuring the integrity of the borders in the West and East, established international treaties after the Second World War, to be ready to repel the possible aggression of the enemy. In connection with the creation of NATO, a gradual increase in the number of the Soviet Armed Forces began in 1949: the country was drawn into an arms race. In the fifties, the Soviet army was in service until
60 OOO tanks of the T-54/55 type. They formed the backbone of the Soviet army. Tank troops were part of the armored strategy.
As a result of the arms race, by the beginning of the 1960s, 8 tank armies were deployed only in the western theater of operations (4 of them were GSVG). Tanks of new series entered service: T-64 (1967), T-72 (1973), T-80 (1976), which became the main battle tanks of the Soviet Army. They had different configurations for the type of engines and other important components, which greatly complicated their operation and repair in the army.
According to information from the USSR Ministry of Defense, as of January 1, 1990, there were 63,900 tanks, 76,520 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers in service. In the period 1955 - 1991. Soviet tank forces were the strongest in the world.
In accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 Soviet Union pledged to reduce conventional weapons in European territory to the level of 13,300 tanks, 20,000 armored vehicles, 13,700 artillery pieces. The treaty finally put an end to the possibility of a Soviet throw, marking the end of the era of tank confrontation.
In its modern form, tank troops are "the main striking force Ground forces a powerful weapon of warfare designed to solve the most important tasks in various types of combat operations. " ... Thus, the importance of the tank forces as one of the main branches of the Ground Forces and their main striking force remains in the foreseeable future. At the same time, the tank will retain its role as the leading unique combat means Ground Forces.
By Decree of the President of Russia No. 435F of April 16, 2005 and Order of the Minister of Defense of Russia No. 043 of May 27, 2005, upgraded tanks of the T-72BA, T-80BA, T-80 U-E1 and T-90A types were adopted. During the period 2001 - 2010, 280 tanks were produced. In 2008 - 2010, one of the priority tasks of the development of the Ground Forces was to equip them - first of all, formations and units of constant readiness - with modern T-90 tanks. The main problems of the tank forces are in the significant variability of the tank fleet, the need to increase the firepower of the tanks. Their security and mobility.
In 2010-2011, a decision was made to stop the procurement of T-90, BTR-90, BTR-80, BMD-4, BMP-3 and any other domestic armored vehicles for a period of 5 years, until the Armata platform is created. Since 2012, the purchase of any domestically produced armored vehicles has been frozen for 5 years. At present, the tank forces of the Ground Forces of the Russian Armed Forces outnumber the tank forces of the United States, whose tank fleet includes about 6250 Ml Abrams tanks.
The Russian Federation is armed with more than 20,000 tanks.
2 November 1943. At 20.00, the commanders of tanks, platoons and companies were summoned to the dugout of the battalion commander, Captain Chumachenko, Dmitry Alexandrovich. In the dugout, the commanders were greeted cordially, greeted everyone by the hand. The head of the political department of the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Vasilyevich Molokanov, said that the whole world is currently looking at us. Then he congratulated us on the upcoming assault and wished us success. Then the battalion commander Chumachenko also briefly set the task. At the end of his speech, he announced the start time of the assault and asked to check the clocks - the time turned out to be the same for everyone (we had a tank clock - commander's, and they went with high accuracy). With the beginning of the artillery preparation, we had to start the engines and warm them up, and then withdraw the tanks from the trenches and line up in a battle line. At the signal of three green missiles, we had to slowly, moving forward, approach the front edge of our infantry forces in the first trench, and then - at the signal of three red missiles - together with the arrows, attack the front edge of the enemy's defenses. Destroying the fascists in the forest, by the end of the day to go to the southern edge, that is, to the state farm "Bolshevik", and begin a direct assault on Kiev. The head of the political department told us that the communists and Komsomol members, the soldiers of our entire 5th Guards Stalingrad Tank Corps, at their short meetings and in letters, swear: "On November 7, the Red Banner - the symbol of October, will fly over Kiev!"
Excited, they dispersed, discussing the details of interaction in battle and methods of destroying the "tigers" by group fire of platoons and self-propelled guns, if they find themselves in our way.
Arriving at my dugout, I brought to the attention of the crew the task assigned to us.
I must say that the crew of the tank, which I received a few days before the offensive, greeted me coldly - unshaven, with cigarettes in their hands. And this was understandable: an unknown youth, an eighteen-year-old lieutenant, and also an employee of the brigade headquarters, was sent to them.
- Lieutenant Fadin! - putting my hand to the cap, I introduced myself. - I have heard a lot of good things about your commander who died, but the crew is somewhat different from him.
My decisive look and confidence worked: I see, the grin left my faces.
I ask:
- Is the car working properly?
- Yes! - answered the driver-mechanic Vasily Semiletov. - But the electric motor for turning the tower is knocking.
- We will fight on this one, since you, an experienced driver-mechanic, took a faulty tank out of repair. Our failures will be on your conscience. You probably have a family, and we have relatives, - I added.
- I have no one! If there is anyone left, then in Odessa, - the radio operator Fedor Voznyuk said.
- By cars! - I give the command.
It was fulfilled. Climbing into the tank, he said that we were going to our place, to the battle formation, to the company of senior lieutenant Avetisyan.
Taking out the map and orienting myself on it, I clearly began to give commands, directing the tank to the village of Valki. And then I discovered that my experience of two months of work at the headquarters of our 22nd Guards Tank Brigade gave me a lot. I confidently navigated the map both in the forest and in the open.
When we reached the northern outskirts of Novi Petrivtsi, the enemy, hearing the noise of the engine of our tank, began to fire artillery, sending two or three shells forward and then in pursuit. I ordered the mechanic to put the tank behind a stone wall of a building that was dilapidated from the bombing and wait for some kind of distracting bombing or darkness.
When the tank got behind the wall and the engine was turned off, I explained to the crew where we should arrive and the purpose of my maneuver. And here the loader Golubenko remarked:
- Yes, you know your way around the map, Lieutenant!
“Apparently, he understands tactics,” said Fyodor Voznyuk.
Only Vasily Semiletov was silent. But I realized that the cold reception was left behind. They believed in me.
As soon as it began to darken, we moved again and soon, pursued by enemy artillery and mortar fire, arrived at the scene.
The tank had to be placed in the garden of one of the outer houses in the expectation that the trees would be some kind of protection from a direct hit from an artillery shell. Here I was received by friends: platoon commanders Lieutenants Vanyusha Abashin and Kostya Grozdev. A little later, the company commander himself, senior lieutenant Avetisyan, approached.
He showed me the place of my tank in order of battle companies. I will never forget this place. It was chosen under a large apple tree a hundred meters southwest of the last house in the village of Valki. To my left, two hundred meters away, there was a sharp bend in the highway leading from the village to Vyshgorod. And surprisingly, during our preparation for the assault on Kiev, which lasted two weeks, this house, despite the enemy's artillery raids, was almost not damaged, except for the fact that one of the shells recaptured a corner near the side wall. The owner - a man of 65-70 years old - did not leave his house and after each raid he got out from somewhere, looked around the house with a master's gaze, shook his head reproachfully, looking towards the enemy.
This place — it was closest to the enemy — was the edge of the corner of the company’s order of battle. We needed to equip a trench for the tank, and such that it would allow the car to be fully accommodated, at the same time it made it possible to fire at the enemy from a cannon and a machine gun.
Throughout the entire October night, we dug such a trench in pairs, replacing each other, with two shovels. However, it turned out to be not so easy to put a tank in it. Apparently, the Nazis very closely followed the preparation of our troops for decisive actions and kept their fire weapons on duty at the ready. As soon as the driver-mechanic Semiletov started the engine and began to lead the tank to our trench, heavy artillery fire fell on us. And only the darkness that had not yet cleared did not allow them to conduct aimed fire ...
The preparation of our troops for the storming of Kiev these days was in full swing. Much was said about the imminent offensive. And the fact that for two days people were taken to the rear of the brigade, where they washed in equipped baths, received new winter uniforms. And the issuance of fresh food safety stock in tanks. And we were reinforced with a battery of 152 mm self-propelled artillery mounts. We knew that a shell fired from such a self-propelled gun tore off the turret even of a T-6 "typhus" tank. Therefore, their appearance in our battle formation made us very happy.
The time for great events was approaching. Apparently, the Nazis also felt this, for they periodically carried out powerful fire raids on our positions.
On the night of November 3, everyone, with the exception of the observers on duty, slept soundly. At 6:30 we were called to get breakfast. And here, as happens sometimes, our crew made a mistake. Having received breakfast, we decided to eat it not in the dugout, but in the fresh air. We settled down not far from our battalion kitchen, over which thick steam rose in the cold air. This, apparently, could not fail to notice the enemy.
As soon as we raised the spoons to our mouths, the enemy opened artillery fire at our position. I only managed to shout: "Lie down!" I think that this was the only case during the war when one of the shells fell behind us about seven to ten meters away and did not touch any of us with its fragments. Another shell struck about ten meters from us to our right and, without exploding, tumbling like a wheel, swept away a gaping soldier in its path, then, hitting the wheel of the kitchen, tore it off, knocked over the kitchen along with the cook, who was distributing food.
Throwing off our daze, we rushed into the dugout. Firing several more shells, the enemy calmed down. Then we had no time for breakfast. Having collected our belongings, we got over to the tank in anticipation of the assault.
And soon the powerful artillery and then aviation cannonade merged into a continuous roar. I gave the command. "Start". For some reason, the tank did not start right away. It did not start the second time. I got nervous and shouted an insulting word to the mechanic Semiletov, fortunately, he did not hear him, because I did not have an intercom. Apparently, the shock received at breakfast also affected. When we drove out of the trench, I saw that other tanks had long since emerged from their hiding places. Three green rockets soared into the air. I give the command:
- Forward!
- Where to go? - shouts in response the driver Vasily Semiletov.
I realized that due to poor visibility I would have to control the tank, observing from an open hatch, otherwise we would lose our infantry, and you could crash into a neighboring tank. The state is uncertain, in front of a kilometer there is continuous smoke and flashes from artillery shells. Explosions are also visible from the return fire of the fascists.
Tanks from our battle line have already begun to fire. I understood: my nerves could not stand it, because this is a fire going nowhere. Then I saw the trench and the faces of the shooters who were waiting for our approach. The tank jerked violently, and I felt that I was coming to my senses, we passed the first trench. Suddenly I found our fighters to the right and to the left of me shooting on the move. I looked up, no red rockets were visible. Apparently I looked through them. Tanks moving to the right and left are firing on the move. I go down to the sight, I do not see any enemy, except for the piled trees. I give the command to the loader:
- Load the shrapnel!
- There are shrapnel, - Golubenko answered clearly.
I make the first shot at the piled logs, guessing that this is the first trench of the enemy. I watch my gap, I calm down completely: like on a training ground, when you shoot at targets. And here are the running mouse figures, firing a cannon at the Nazis. I am fond of fire, I give the command:
- Increase your speed!
Here is the forest. Semiletov sharply slowed down.
- Don't stop! I shout.
- Where to go? Semiletov asks.
I answer:
- Forward, and only forward!
We crush one tree, another ... The old engine wheezes, but the tank goes. I looked around - to my right is the tank of Vanyusha Abashin, my platoon commander, he also breaks a tree, moves forward. I looked out of the hatch: in front of me was a small clearing, going into the depths of the forest. I direct the tank over it. Ahead, on the left, heavy fire from tank guns and the return yapping fire of the fascist anti-tank guns can be heard.
On the right, only the noise of tank engines is heard, but the tanks themselves are not visible. I think, do not yawn, and give alternately along the clearing fire from a cannon and a machine gun. In the forest it becomes brighter, and suddenly - a clearing, and on it the rushing Nazis. I give a shot. And then I see that at the edge of the clearing there is a strong machine-gun and submachine gun fire. A group of people flashed between the hills - and a flash. Got it: it's an anti-tank gun. He fired a long burst from a machine gun and shouted to the loader:
- Load the shrapnel!
And then he felt a blow, and the tank, as if bumping into a serious obstacle, stopped for a moment and went forward again, sharply surrendering to the left. And here I again, as at a training ground, found a group of fascists scurrying around the gun, now they were all clearly visible, and fired a shot at them. I heard the loud voice of Fedya Voznyuk, a radio operator-gunner:
- There is a direct hit, and the weapon and its servants were scattered to pieces.
- Commander, we have killed the left track, - reports the mechanic Semiletov.
- Get out of the tank with Voznyuk through the hatch in the bottom! I ordered. “Golubenka and I will cover you with cannon and machine gun fire.
At that moment I saw several tanks of our battalion, they were walking along other clearings. Our arrows jumped out to the edge and went forward in a chain.
It took about an hour to repair the track. But, as they say, trouble does not come alone: when the tank rotated on one track, it was sucked into the swampy soil, and in front of about ten meters there was a minefield set up by the Nazis on a large dry section of the clearing. Therefore, the tank had to get out only back. And it took a lot of time. In the future, I had to catch up with my own on the trail of our tanks, and at the same time destroy the retreating Nazis.
They managed to get to their battalion only after dark. The Nazis, using forest debris and mine-explosive barriers, stopped our units in front of the second defensive line. During the night from 3 to 4 November, we refueled the vehicles with fuel and lubricants, ammunition and had a little rest. At dawn on November 4, the battalion commander, having gathered us, the commanders of tanks, platoons, companies and self-propelled officers, led us to the first line of our riflemen. And he showed:
- You see, in front of us, three hundred meters away, are solid forest heaps of logs? The enemy sits behind these rubble, he does not allow our riflemen to rise.
I am still surprised why the Nazis did not fire at us then, because we were standing at full height, dressed in tank uniforms ...
I looked back at my comrades and then only noticed that there were 9 out of 13 commanders of us left, from those who were gathering on November 2 in the battalion commander's dugout before the offensive. This means that there are 9 tanks left. But there were still three self-propelled guns.
Chumachenko continued:
- Now move to this clearing, turn around in a line and attack the enemy.
This formulation of tasks during the war years was often practiced, and it often justified itself, we clearly saw the enemy and mastered the task well.
We went to the edge, the Nazis let us turn around calmly, and then opened frantic fire from behind the logs. We, on the other hand, began to shoot at the blockage with armor-piercing and fragmentation shells with fire from a place, with short stops. Of course, we, the tank commanders, had to orient ourselves in this situation of the forest battle, protruding from the commander's hatch. At one of these moments, in front of my eyes, my comrade from the 2nd Gorky Tank School, Lieutenant Vasily Smirnov, was seriously wounded in the head from the rupture of an enemy shell.
In the cadet company, and not only in the company, but throughout the entire school, I was the youngest in age. Vasily Smirnov already worked as a director for two years before the war. high school... Therefore, I have always listened carefully to his advice. In the heat of the battle, I did not see how he was taken out of the tank and how he was taken away, but we considered him dead.
To my great joy, in January 1952, at the Yaroslavl station, in the military hall, I saw an elderly officer of the Interior Ministry troops very familiar to me. He stopped, peered, recognized and called out to him: "Vasya!" He turned to me and we kissed ...
And on that day, we still managed to scatter the logs in the defense of the Nazis and, pursuing them through glades and forest thickets, still before dark went to the edge of the forest to the "Vinogradar" state farm. And then things got worse. The enemy unleashed heavy artillery fire on our battle formation and, under its cover, deploying up to 30-35 tanks into battle formation, threw them into a counterattack. The forces were unequal. Having carried out an intense forest battle and having escaped first to the edge of the forest, from where we could see the northern outskirts of Kiev - Priorka, we, firing back, using the advantageous terrain and woodland, retreated into the depths of the forest and organized a perimeter defense.
The enemy, approaching the forest, pushed forward security units, consisting of three medium tanks, and with the main forces, lining up in two marching columns, moved into the forest.
I was ordered to block off the central clearing with my tank. On the right and slightly behind the tank of Vanyusha Abashin stood up, and on the left I was already covered by an ISU-152 self-propelled gun. It began to darken quickly. The main forces of the Nazis were approaching. From the noise of the engines it was clear that a heavy Tiger tank was ahead.
I heard the voice of the company commander, Senior Lieutenant Avetisyan: "Fire on enemy tanks!" I order Semiletov:
- Vasya, give it a little ahead at low revs, otherwise the tree bothers me.
- There is a little forward on small! - answered Semiletov.
During the day of the battle, the crew and I finally worked together, and he understood me perfectly. Having improved my position, I immediately saw the enemy column advancing on me. This time, the Nazis changed their principle and moved without light, making backlights from the rear cars.
Without waiting for the driver to finally install the tank, I fired the first shot at the head tank, which was already fifty meters away from me. An instant flash on the frontal part of the fascist tank: it caught fire, illuminating the entire column.
- The sub-caliber is ready! - reports the loader Golubenko without my command for this.
With the second shot at point-blank range, we shot the second one coming out from behind the first burning tank. He also flared up. The forest became as bright as day. And at this time I hear the shots of Vanyusha Abashin's tank. On the left is a deaf and long shot of our self-propelled gun. And we already have several sheaves of burning tanks in sight. I shout to the mechanic Semiletov to come closer. The Nazis began to retreat, backing away. Coming almost close to the first burning tank, I see the next live target behind its starboard side (as it turned out later, it was the enemy's large-caliber self-propelled cannon "Ferdinand"). I take aim and give a shot - and at once a burning torch. We pursue the enemy and take possession of the "Vinogradar" state farm. It was getting light quickly. The enemy increased fire from positions set up north of the Priorka area.
We needed to put ourselves in order and prepare directly for the assault on the city. We have already seen its outskirts and the domes of churches in the center. Captain Ivan Gerasimovich Eliseev, acting political commander of the battalion, who drove up after us, told us that in the night battle we destroyed seven Nazi tanks and three self-propelled guns... And he added that the fascists, seized by panic, left many killed and also wounded on the forest roads ...
Here, at the state farm, we refueled in preparation for the decisive assault. I could see in the scope how our infantry riflemen were slowly but persistently advancing towards the northern outskirts of the city. Here I saw for the first time the volunteer soldiers of the Czechoslovak brigade with their commander, then Lieutenant Colonel Svoboda, who had come out on the right. They went on three T-34 tanks and two light T-70s.
At 11:00 on November 5, 1943, the brigade commander, Colonel Nikolai Vasilyevich Koshelev, and the head of the political department, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Vasilyevich Molokanov, arrived at our location. We were quickly assembled. I missed two more tank commanders. All self-propelled guns were still with us.
And now thirty minutes later, having lined up in a battle line, our tankers rushed to the attack. We very quickly captured the southern outskirts of Pushcha-Voditsa, immediately crossed the railway going from Kiev to Korosten, and then the Kiev-Zhitomir highway. Here on the highway I saw a billboard on which was written in large letters in German - Kiev. My heart ached involuntarily. It was evident that our rifle units had already started fighting on the outskirts of the city from the west. The enemy responded from the suburbs with heavy artillery fire.
Short stop. The battalion commander is arranging us into a marching column. On the lead tank, he puts a group of scouts, among whom I remember sergeants Georges Ivanovsky, Mugalim Tarubaev and the recently appointed (instead of the deceased junior lieutenant Sebyanin) reconnaissance platoon commander Petty Officer Nikifor Nikitovich Sholudenko. The scouts were followed by the tank of Lieutenant Ivan Abashin, then the crew of the company commander Senior Lieutenant Avetisyan, we continued in the sequence of platoons. I remember that in the convoy behind us were the tanks of Lieutenants Grozdev, Pankin, Golubev ... We understood that we were bypassing the city from the west. We crossed the big ditch. But my tank got stuck in it. To increase the tractive effort, I ordered the mechanic Semiletov to overcome the ditch in reverse. And so it happened. The battalion commander, Captain Dmitry Chumachenko, ran up to me and asked: "What's the matter?" And having figured it out, he said: “Well done, right! Don't lag behind. " Soon, having overtaken our infantry riflemen, we burst into Borschagovskaya Street. The city was on fire, and especially its center. The Nazis fired indiscriminately from behind houses, from courtyards. Leaning out of the commander's hatch, I fired, periodically lowering myself to the drive pedal of a tank gun or machine gun. And here is the T-junction. I see how the lead tank, walking with the scouts in front of us two hundred meters, reached this intersection and suddenly, enveloped in a burst of flame, turned to the right and crashed into one of the corner houses. The scouts on it were dropped from the tank. Lieutenant Abashin and I opened fire on the rapidly fleeing enemy SPG.
Darkness deepened. The battalion commander who ran up to us appoints Lieutenant Abashin's head tank, the rest of the column remained in the same order. Abashin, Avetisyan and me, as the first, he gave one person each, a guide who knew the city, and ordered, with the headlights on, turning on the sirens, with maximum fire, to quickly go to the city center and take possession of the square (now the square named after M.I. Kalinin ).
At the signal, we moved decisively, turned into Krasnoarmeyskaya Street and, on a swift march, firing at the retreating Nazis in disorder, went to Khreshchatyk. This street made me feel bitter. Not a single surviving building. Solid ruins and debris. Moreover, these ruins did not even burn. The nearby streets were on fire. It was they who illuminated the dead wreckage of Khreshchatyk. Soon a small square opened in front of us with a dilapidated old building in the center. Seven straight streets diverged from it, like radii. The tank of the company commander, Avetisyan, stopped in the square, and we each with our tank left to occupy these streets.
The share of our crew went to Kalinin Street. Stopping at the beginning of the alignment of the street, we looked around. The enemy is not visible. I open my hatch. I see, timidly peering at us, two women come out of the entrances, go to our tank. Others followed them, and soon many people surrounded us. A car approached, from which the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Captain Ivan Gerasimovich Eliseev, got out (by the way, he still lives in Kiev). He congratulated us and all the gathered people of Kiev on the victory. And then Eliseev told us that Sergeant Major Nikifor Sholudenko, who was with a group of scouts on the lead tank, died heroically when turning to Krasnoarmeyskaya Street. Later we learned that he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
The tanks of our Guards Corps, rifle units of the 38th Army gradually approached ...
In the morning we received the order to leave the city and go towards a large enemy tank group.
Alexander Fadin, participant in the liberation of Kiev, colonel, candidate of military sciences
