Defense of Odessa. 73 Days of the heroic defense of the city of Savchenko Viktor Anatolyevich

Chapter 15 Battle for Odessa. RESULTS

Battle for Odessa. RESULTS

There are various estimates of the outcome of the battle for Odessa. Recently, a number of studies on this topic have emerged in Romanian historiography, which gives a detailed overview of the combat operations of the Romanian parts and the assessment (although quite preconceived) actions of the Romanian command. From the Soviet side, the first assessment of the defense of Odessa was made back during the war. As an example, a brochure A. Borisova "Defense of Odessa. Brief operational and tactical essay ", having seen the light in 1943

In subsequent publications, much less attention was paid to the analysis of the actual actions of the Romanian and Soviet command during the fighting. The exception is only the work on the Soviet Military Art during the Great Patriotic War, where only certain aspects of the city defense were considered. In no way, without questioning the decisive role that the courage of Soviet soldiers played, it should be noted that the mistakes of the Romanian command, an insufficient level of preparation and weapons of the Romanian troops played in Romanian "confulas".

Between June 22, 1941 to January 1, 1942, according to the statistics of the General Staff, Romania mobilized and used on the Eastern Front: 418,760 people in Bessarabia and North Bukovina, 426 440 in transnistria and in Odessa, 78 240 in Crimea, 75 040 At the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov, 64 120 in Kharkov. To participate in the battle for Odessa, the Germans sent 7 heavy artillery batteries (of which four coastal artillery), 2 assault battalions, 1 squadron bombers.

In the battles for Odessa, the Romanian army lost 875 officers killed, 308 Unter-Officers, 16,708 soldiers, wounded 2470 officers, 1035 Unter-Officers, 59,775 soldiers, missing 90 officers, 42 Unter-Officer, 8717 soldiers (28.50 % of the entire officer, 14.6% of sergeants and ensigns, 26.76% of soldiers); Thus, under Odessa, the Romanian army lost 3435 officers, 1385 Unter-Officers, 85,200 soldiers (killed, wounded, missing). Total about 100 thousand people (without taking into account the losses of the Wehrmacht near Odessa, which make up several thousand people).

Soviet losses amounted to 41,268 people (16,578 killed and missing and 24,690 wounded). The ratio of combat losses between the defended Soviet and coming Romanian forces was 1: 2.3. In addition, Romanian sources say that during the period between July 2 and October 6, Romanians captured 60 thousand prisoners and another 6 thousand people from October 15-16. According to Romanian data, 58 aircraft, 19 combat vehicles, 90 guns, 115 mortars, 956 automata, 336 machine guns, were destroyed by Soviet troops under Odessa Soviet troops.

Soviet sources call more significant numbers. For example, the number of Romanian losses is estimated at 160 thousand people. As much as a big difference in estimates of shot down aircraft and baked tanks. In the sketch of A. Borisov, a figure of 99 aircraft was named, in the book "73 heroic days" they are already becoming already 167, in some Soviet articles already appears the figure of more than 200.

Romanian sources lead to the losses of Soviet aircraft in general fantastic figures. In the report of the Chef Section of the Aviation Defense of the General Staff of the Romanian Royal Fleet of Major Pailness, the following data are given: for the period from August 1 to October 16, 1941, Romanian aviation, which participated in the battle for Odessa, has numbered 650 aircraft grouped into a squadron in accordance with the specialization : 17 fighter squadrons (12-14 aircraft in each), 14 squadrons of bombers (8-10 aircraft), 13 squadrons of observers and seapshamoles (10 aircraft), 3 squader squadrons (8 aircraft), 8 Squadrics of transport and sanitary aviation (10-15 aircraft).

Anti-aircraft artillery numbered 52 batteries, of which 20 batteries of 75-mm cannons, 22 batteries of 37-mm guns, 6 batteries of machine guns by caliber 13.2-mm, 3 projector batteries.

The number of Soviet aircraft participating in the battles near Odessa is estimated by Romanians in 1 thousand units, and the anti-aircraft artillery has no little 150 batteries that have been in service with 900-1000 guns. Truly, the fear of the eyes are great.

The data on Romanian losses look as amazing. The quoted document provides the following data: 58 aircraft were destroyed, of which 20 fighters, 12 bombers, 5 scouts, 10 observers, 1 seaplane, 9 support aircraft, 1 transport aircraft. The Soviet losses of Romanians were assessed in 397 (!) Airplanes, of which 249 fighters and 45 bombers. Accordingly, the ratio of Romanian and Soviet losses was estimated as 1: 6.84.

The losses in the staff of the Romanian aviation amounted to 59 people killed (21 officer, 15 non-commissioned officers, 23 ordinary), 81 wounded (22 officers, 30 Unter-Officers, 29 ordinary), 32 missing (15 officers, 10 Unter-Officers, 7 ordinary). Only 172 people. Soviet losses of personnel, according to Major Pewnesca, seven times (!) Overheed Romanian.

From June 22 to October 16, Romanian aviation performed 30 thousand hours of flights, 18 thousand tasks, using 3 million bombs and 630 thousand artillery shells, destroying 600 terrestrial purposes and already mentioned 397 air targets. German bombers who operated at the site of the 5th Army Corps over September 1941, damaged 18 Soviet ships. Were also captured by: 4 fighters, 50 fighters in disassembled state, 70 aircraft engines, 1214 aviation shells, 49 anti-aircraft guns Caliber 76.5, 85 and 12.7 mm, 6 spotlights with a diameter of 120 mm, 16 thousand artillery shells, 582,896 machine-gun cartridges of 12.7 mm caliber.

There are detailed data on the participation of the aircraft of the ChF (without the 69th IAP). Chernomori pilots during the battles for Odessa made 4641 flights-departures (from them 624 nights), they scattered up to 10 infantry regiments, destroyed 168 tanks, 135 cars, 14 armored vehicles, 25 tanks with fuel and lubricants, 7 guns and up to 2000 soldiers and officers. In air battles and at the airfields of the enemy, the Aviation ChF destroyed 80 opponent aircraft, while the Chernomorets themselves lost 47 cars.

Apparently, as usual, the parties are quite accurately called their own losses, but significantly increase the losses of the enemy. In this case, the Soviet data on the enemy's loss are closer to the truth, since not only Romanian fought against the Soviet troops (the figure of 58 lost Romanian aircraft fits here), but also German aviation.

The numbers of the destroyed Romanian tanks are also called equally strong doubts - a figure of 168 tanks, which were allegedly chopped only by aircraft pilots. In the sketch of A. Borisov, it is indicated that 55 tanks were brought by artillery and fighters of tanks. In aggregate, it turns out that all the armored forces of Romanians were fully destroyed jointly with aircraft and land forces, with the exception, except that the platoon of FT-17, who was in the rear. But the baked and destroyed tank is not the same. The destroyed is a tank that is not subject to recovery, while the batted after the fight may well be restored. It is very likely that the Romanian side, calling the figure in 19 combat vehicles, meant irretrievable losses in tanks. But these figures seem to be understated.

There are practically nothing about the losses of Soviet tanks near Odessa in Soviet sources. Nevertheless, in the memoirs of the city of Penzhko, it is mentioned at least about the irrevocable loss of 6 BT-7 tanks: 3 tank drowned in the lake during surgery in the village of Yaski, three more were lost in the area of \u200b\u200bthe 25th Rifle Division under the 20s The numbers of August, 1 - during the liberation of the Lamzin battalion, which was surrounded, and 2 - during the offensive October 2. Romanian sources indicate that in the period of the General Romanian offensive, 5 Soviet tanks were beaten, and during the Soviet offensive on October 2, another 12 tanks. In general, the Soviet losses of combat vehicles for the entire period of battles can be estimated at 10-15 units.

In addition, during evacuation in Odessa, all the armored meters "January" - "nor" were left, which were subsequently used by Romanians as training vehicles, as well as three acting armored trains and two inactive.

With the end of the battle for Odessa, the command of the Romanian army was disbanded: On November 1, 1941, the 4th Army was returned to Romania (Iasi) and reorganized.

On November 4, 1941, the 3rd Army received an order to ensure the safety of the territory between the Dniester and Dnipro. For this, on the territory between the Dniester and the Bug of the 3rd Army, the 2nd and 6th Army Corses held, consisting of six infantry divisions, one engineering team and two cavalry divisions were allocated.

The success of Defense Odessa was largely provided with the fact that the enemy failed to achieve superiority in the air. Initially, in the first days of the war, Soviet aviation, based in the Odessa Military District, suffered much less losses than on other sites. The wider possibilities of using Soviet aviation during the defense of Odessa, especially before leaving the Soviet troops of Ochakov and Nikolaev, were explained by the fact that under Odessa and in Tavria there were 11 land and 4 sea airfield.

The relative proximity of the airfields to which Soviet bombers and assault aviation could be based, in the initial period of defense Odessa favored the use of them in the interests of the defense troops. After leaving Nikolayev and the obstacle's difficulties in the use of shock aviation increased. The separate basing of bomber aviation (at the airfields of the Crimean node) and covered its fighters made it difficult to organize tactical interaction, caused the voltage of a minor number of fighters who were in Odessa.

In the battles near Odessa, Soviet fighters I-16, which made up the main fleet of aviation of the Primorsk army, had to face not only with the Romanian PZL PZL R-24E, but with the superior ME-109. The successes of Soviet fighter aviation in battles with the fighters of the enemy contributed to the development of a new tactics by the commander of the 69th Fighter Aviamaker L. Shestakov. In battles with ME-109, the combat order of the group was located several tiers in height. The upper tier was where the ME-109 was usually completed a set of height after the attack and from the combat reversal again dicked on I-16. Aircraft of the upper tier, using the superiority at a speed at a decrease, could pursue enemy fighters, as well as Middle Tarus machines. The lower I-16 at a low height was forced to calculate only maneuverability on horizontal towards the enemy. In the fights with more maneuverable Romanian fighters PZL P-24, the German battle manner was used - more speed and-16 attacked them from above and immediately went back up.

Considering the lack of attack aircraft, the series I-16 was converted to carrying lungs of air bombs and jet shells, which made it possible to use them for hitting ground forces.

In addition to the support of ground divisions, the Romanian and German aviation in the conditions of weakness of the Romanian fleet rests like a much more important task - to prevent military and freight transport in Odessa. However, with this task, neither Romanian nor German aviation coped, despite the fact that it was extremely favorable conditions for its implementation: an insufficient number of Soviet fighters, the absence, at first, a reliable cover from transporting from Sevastopol to Odessa.

According to the authors of the book "Soviet naval art during the Great Patriotic War", the reasons for this "lie and in the usual to command German aviation attempt to simultaneously solve several problems with the forces, which seemed to be enough to fulfill only one of them. German aviation acted almost all the time against the devices in small, consistently attacked groups of aircraft. In some cases, these groups applied shocks again after recharging. Only sometimes strikes were carried out by larger groups. "

From the second half of August 1941, German bombers and torpedoes translated from the Mediterranean Sea Theater began to operate on communications that bind to Odessa with other Soviet naval marines. The activation of German aviation forced the ChF to strengthen the hiking hiking, which played mainly the role of anti-aircraft.

In just the entire period of the defense of Odessa on the highway Sevastopol - Odessa - Sevastopol from Aviation Action killed 12 ships, including on the mines set by it, 2 vessels (17%), from avia bombs - 7 ships (38%), from Torpeda - 3 Ship (25%). Of these vessels, only three walked with security, and two of them were guarded with one watchman each. Cover from air These ships did not have.

The German and Romanian aviation forces acted not only against convictions in the sea, but also against the Odessa port, trying to break the loading and unloading work. When races on the port, shock groups usually consisted of 5-12 bombers under the cover of fighters. However, the strengthening of the Soviet air defense system both on transitions and in the port required from Romanian and German aviation as a massive use of shock aviation and a more definite selection of an object: or convoys in the sea, or port.

Romanian aviation raids on the Odessa port created additional stress for Soviet fighter aircraft, which also provided the entrance and exit of coneds and single transports, covered them when moving in the daytime. This task was solved by patrolling in the air with one or two pairs of fighters. In the latter case, the first pair patrolled at an altitude of 500-600 m, the second - at an altitude of 1000-1500 m. Therefore, such a number of fighters was obviously not enough to ensure medium-sized convoy. In this situation, pilots - fighters were ordered not to get involved in the pursuit of the outgoing opponent aircraft, which could specifically distract soviet fighters. The tension on Soviet fighters has become particularly increased, after in September 1941, the opponent began using Me-109 fighters in the version of bombers.

Along with aviation against the Odessa port, both Romanian long-range artillery was used. To reduce damage from artillery fire and bombardments, responses were taken by defenders of Odessa: the organization of the parking lots and the approach of ships and ships to Odessa, smoking the port, was rebuilt. The actions of the Romanian and German bombardment aircraft were drawn by the actions of the Soviet forces of the air defense (73rd zenith artillery regiment, the 16th and 53rd anti-aircraft divisions, machine-gun and projector battalions).

Romanian military evaluated the action of the Soviet air defense system as follows: "The air defense of Odessa was well organized and equipped with a large number of anti-aircraft artillery, as a result of which the Sky of Odessa was not available to ours, nor German aviation, except at high height."

Attempts to block the Odessa harbor with the help of German aviation were equally unsuccessful. The retardation of the Luftwaffe with the accumulation of a sufficient reserve of non-contact mines has also affected. As a result, the attempt of German aviation to mined the Odessa port was unsuccessful. In general, the unsuccessful actions of Romanian and German aviation contributed to the successful defense of Odessa.

Based on the archival documents, Romanian historians revealed the main reasons that led to the "incomplete" military success under Odessa. First of all, he played his role that the Romanian General Staff in his analyzes underestimated the Red Army as a decent opponent, well armed and trained, with professional commanders and with an exceptional desire to fight.

On November 4, 1941, soon after the capture of Odessa, the 2nd (intelligence) department of the 4th Romanian army prepared a certificate entitled "Data on the actions of the Soviet troops opposing the 4th Army in Bessarabia and Transnistria during the conduct of hostilities 22 June - October 16, 1941, "intended for studying and taking into account future experience in conducting hostilities with soviet army. In the section "The work of commanders and headquarters of parts and compounds of Soviet troops" is noted:

"one. Commanders of the Soviet troops of all levels showed adequate determination, energy and perseverance to perform the tasks.

The highest command of the Soviet troops was well aware of the composition of the grouping of our troops and the tasks set by our troops (which is confirmed by operations on the river. Prut in the n. P. Epuren - n. N. Gypsy and during operations in the city of Odessa).

It should also be indicated for good training of commanders and headquarters of smaller units to the battalion inclusive. In this case, the fighting of the 2nd battalion of the 161th Rifle Regiment on the Large Dalnitsky site is indicative - a new range in September 1941, when Soviet troops showed an exceptional skill in defense and counterattacks.

2. Commander's combat orders were brief and included such main items:

- information about the opponent;

- tasks of parts and units;

- Paths of completing the tasks.

All orders were approved by the commander of the appropriate level, as well as signed by the head of the headquarters and the Political Commissioner, who was familiarized with all the staff documents. At the same time, despite the focus of the headquarters, political commissioners and political officers canceled only a small part of the documents, and to an even lesser extent it concerned combat orders.

3. Organization of transferring orders to the lower parts and units, during which a duplicate wired communication tools, radio programs, communication delegates were used quickly and efficiently.

4. The Soviet command during the conduct of hostilities showed the ability to act even in situations of the explicit advantage in the lively strength and technique of the Romanian troops. "

In the organization of defense of the Soviet troops near Odessa were certain disadvantages. So, they were not always provided with joints of parts, which repeatedly used the advancing Romanian parts, which, spinning them, were wedged between the divisions.

Soviet infantry received and skillfully used wide spectrum Weapons: semi-automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars. True, on initial stage The defense of Odessa weapons were not rapidly lacked, as a result of which the individual units went into battle armed with one grenades. The battalions were supported by mortar divisions of caliber from 50 to 80 mm, and the shelves - one or two artillery batteries of 76.2 mm.

Mortarmen put forward on the first line and as a result of the shelling led to difficult losses and demoralization of the Romanian troops. Tactical aviation, heavy artillery and armored vehicles actively supported the infantry. The troops constantly applied the counterparts, used military tricks and fought just as good as during the day and night.

Soviet rifle units skillfully used the terrain to place fire facilities and the organization of the fire system, which contributes to the opening of unexpected dweller fire with short distances, when our infantry was submitted at a distance of 200-300 m, and sometimes less. The widespread flank fire was also widely used.

During the conduct of hostilities for weapons masking, both regular and improvised means of disguise are widely used. One of the important factors contributing to the success of the Soviet defense was a well-organized work of the intelligence service, which was noted by Romanian stabbers.

As indicated in the already quoted note of the 2nd Department:

"Soviet rifle units, often acting as part of military personnel from different parts in conditions of surroundings, have a stubborn resistance, reaching hand-to-hand fights, which is explained by devotion to political leadership and the youth of ordinary soldiers.

The enemy infantry showed the ability to act in night conditions, leak through the front edge of our troops, and also use breaks in the joints of our parts and units. It should be noted a good preparation of the enemy snipers, which, using armament with optical sights, seek to hit first of all the commanders of our troops.

At the same time, during the maintenance of offensive hostilities, Soviet infantry is valid without a special initiative and ingenuity.

The frontal counterattacks of Soviet rifle parts and units, even supported by a large number of artillery and assault aviation, mortars and machine-gun fire, were not successful and always disappeared with our artillery. "

Romanian infantry did not fully mastered the mortar of the caliber of 60 and 80 mm, did not always receive support for aviation and not fully supported with its artillery.

In the Romanian army, there was a lack of experience in using tank units. Having at the Odessa direction more than 100 tanks, Romanian troops used them predominantly small groups, although there were also cases of use at the same time up to 70 tanks on a narrow section of the front, as it was in battle when Karpov. The interaction between tanks and infantry was not properly debugged, which led to the fact that the tanks often remained without covering the infantry. On the other hand, lack anti-tank artillery It became one of the reasons for the successful actions of minor Soviet armored forces, including armored-actors "January" - "ne."

The Soviet Army at the initial stage used a few renovated tanks (in an amount of from 3 to 10 units) on the most dangerous areas of the front, throwing them from place to place. At the initial stage of the battle for Odessa soviet tanks Rather, played the role of a mobile reserve. In some cases, as in the battles under the jarry in the 20th of August, it led to losses. In this battle, the commander of the tank platoon did not lead his division, as a result of the tanks who act alone were shot down. Subsequently, with an increase in the number of repaired tanks and the arrival of the 157th rifle division, tanks began to be used massively as a drum force of the breakthrough.

The lack of tanks at the Soviet side was partially compensated by the use of armored trains. Three acting armored trains were used mainly as a mobile reserve providing artillery support. However, the small caliber of their guns (76 and 45 mm) do not allow us to talk about them as a significant fire force. In addition, attachment to the railway limited their use and made vulnerable to enemy aviation. At the initial stage, successful raids of armored trains were carried out twice through the front line. It should be noted that the Romanian army of armored traders did not have.

Speaking about other mobile units, it is worth mentioning the cavalry, which by that time was already an archaic genus of troops. Nevertheless, the Cavalry divisions were used with the Soviet and from the Romanian side. At the beginning of the battles near Odessa, the Soviet command, cavalry divisions were kept as a mobile reserve. Then the cavalry was hurried and fought together with infantry. Romanian command was trying to enter into battle, in certain sections of the front, its cavalry, using the joints of Soviet units, such as, for example, in Shotley. But all attempts by horse Romanian breakthroughs ended in failure. Romanian cavalry carried huge losses.

Serious complaints caused the team composition of the Romanian troops. The number of personnel officers in the Romanian army was insufficient (50% of officers were called from the reserve). At the end of the battle for Odessa, only 20 personnel officers from 43 remained in some shelves, of which only five participated in the battles from the beginning of the war. The number of personnel non-commissioned officers was also insufficient, many of them were replaced by contract service sergeants who did not have the experience of the command of the units.

As the authors of the book "Romania in World War II 1941-1945", a negative impact had a large number of changes in the structure of divisions and unsatisfactory organization and provision of parts: in particular, the lack of a general command of artillery brigades designed to coordinate and direct the fire of artillery units, Lack of own vehicleThat created an obstacle to the rapid movement of troops, in accordance with the requirements of the development of combat, insufficient provision of communications and trained personnel for supplying, lack of anti-aircraft agents, as well as machine-gun mouth and the mouth of heavy mortars in infantry shelves.

Another factor preventing the development of hostilities was weak preparation of the Romanian troops, due to reducing the training period, the time required for mastering modern types of weapons, which appeared shortly before Romania entry into the war. In many cases, the skills already in battle. Therefore, it is not surprising that "fear of combat vehicles" manifested itself, "the inability of use of mortars", "the limited application of manual grenade", "unsatisfactory use of the area".

Erich von Manstein gave next characteristic Romanian army and the Romanian soldier: "Romanian soldier, in most of the peasants, by itself, unaffected by, hardying and dare (by the way, the Russian generals in the first world war were also given the same qualities of the Romanian soldier, they also gave a negative characteristic officer Corps of the Romanian army of the time. - Auto). but low level General education, and only in a very limited volume, did not allow to prepare an initiative solitary fighter from him, not to mention the younger commander ... outdated orders, as, for example, the presence of corporal punishment, also could not help increase the combat capability of the troops ...

Decisive disadvantage determined inner structure Romanian troops, was the lack of a non-commissioned officer corps in our understanding of this word ... there was an important meaning, then, then, a significant part of officers, especially the highest and middle link, did not meet the requirements. First of all, there was no close connection between the officer and the soldier, which we had a granted business. As for the concerns of officers about the soldiers, there is clearly lack of "Prussian school". Combat preparation due to the lack of experience in wars did not comply with the requirements of the modern war. It led to unreasonably high losses, which, in turn, adversely affected the moral condition of the troops. The control of the troops, which was from 1918 under the French influence, remained at the ideas of the First World War. "

Social bundle between the Romanian officers and soldiers affected the quality of the supply of troops. As Manstein writes, "Although the supply of Romanian troops and was provided with us (that is, the Germans, we are talking about fights in the Crimea. - Auto) It was still difficult to have a constant influence on the distribution of food. The Romanian officer stood on the point of view that the Romanian soldier - in his origin, the peasant was used to the most coarse food, so the officer calmly could increase his pieces at his expense. First of all, it belonged to the goods sold in cash, primarily to tobacco products and chocolate, the supply of which was carried out in accordance with the number of satisfied. The officers argued that the soldiers are still unable to acquire these goods, so they all stuck in the officer's canteens. Even my protest, declared Marshal Antonessk, did not lead to anything. " Manstein celebrates another moment, which limited the possibility of using the Romanian troops in the War in the East, "a great respect that Romanians feed to the Russians. In a difficult atmosphere, it melted the danger of panic. "

According to the estimates of modern Romanian historians, the military-political leadership of Romania surfaced to the real state of affairs at the front near Odessa, the ratio of forces between the 4th Army and the Soviet group and neglected the acquisition of military assistance from the allies. I. Antonescu recognized: "We were not prudent enough. It is true that relatively weak resistance that we met between the Prut and Dniester was misleading. "

As directed by Marshal, who received from Hitler the right to make an independent decision on the Black Sea coast between the Dniester and Dnipro, the 4th Army received an order to "take from Odessa". Later, despite the fact that the city was taken to the ring from Sushi, nevertheless did not have a classic siege or the "land blockade", due to the fact that the Soviet troops had an advantage of the sea. The version of Romanian historians about the superiority of the Soviet troops in the air have to set out, because at the very beginning of the battle, the cover carried out only 69th fighter airlock And only later, Odessans received active support for the part of the sea aviation, based in the Crimea. Obviously, it should be recognized that it should be not about the superiority of Soviet aviation, but that Romanian aviation failed to achieve domination in the sky, which significantly complicated the fulfillment of the task.

The onset of the Romanian troops on a specific template has also affected. Initially, the Romanian artillery did several targeted shots before artephite preparation. Such tactic was solved by the Soviet command. After the start of the shooting, the commanders took the soldiers to the second trench, leaving observers. After the end of art preparation, the Soviet units returned to the first trench and were ready to reflect the attack. Soviet commanders noted the inability of Romanian soldiers to adequately respond to flank strikes.

The centralization of the command of artillery was played by the centralization of the command of artillery, which before this partially obeyed the ChF, and partly land command. As noted in his memoirs, the head of the artillery of the seaside army N. Ryzh, "To our regret, in peacetime, this issue (that is, coordination of artillery actions. - Auto) Did not deal with, because by mistaken views of our military strategy, the possibility of an enemy attack on Odessa from Sushi was completely excluded. In this regard, the coastal defense artillery was intended solely to fight the maritime opponent. "

For example, in "Inserting for the battle on the Minno-Artillery Position" of the Odessa naval base indicated that the "task of forces and means of the base is a concentrated attack and independent blows torpedo boats, air force and coastal batteries prevent the shelling of the coast of the Odessa naval base by the ships of the enemy, performing active mine barriers from the coast of the base, breakthrough to the database of the enemy's forces and attacks of ships on the domestic raid. All coastal batteries submitted exclusively to the commander of the Odessa Naval Base. The management of artillery during the battle, including the distribution of goals between artillery divisions and individual batteries, has been inflicted.

The centralization of fire management in the hands of the OOP artillery commander has made it possible to increase the efficiency of using available funds. The commander was led by ship artillery through the flagship artillery officer base, coastal - through commanders of the artillery divisions of coastal defense, and land - through the heads of artillery of the defense sectors. Ship and especially coastal artillery was used in the defense of Odessa as a long-range artillery.

The success of the firing of the coastal artillery OOP promoted well-organized observation and adjustment. In addition to constant adjustment posts, each battery had a movable adjustment post, which was needed at a particular direction. The overwhelming majority of the shooting was carried out with adjustment, by observing the discontinuities.

In the future, the arc-shaped front and the concentration of combat orders closer to the center, especially in the last days The defense of the city, the creation of groups of support for infantry and long-range groups gave the opportunity to maneuver fire and create a large density of fire in threatening areas. A large range and shooting accuracy made it possible to widely use maritime artillery for a monitoring struggle. Thus, the coastal artillery about 35% of his shooting spent on the artillery batteries of the enemy, and from the total number of shooting of ship artillery 15% accounted for a counter-follower struggle. Artillery support for ships and Batteries of the ChF forced an enemy to increase the number of long-range guns at the front near Odessa to thirty eight.

The actions on the internal operating lines of the Odessa defensive region were given the opportunity to the Soviet command, if necessary, for one night will transfer artillery reserves at any point of the front, while the Romanian command was required for this purpose three-four days.

"Soviet artillery basically did not use fire with long-term positions, preferring frequent movements to new firing positions, which contributed to its good equipment by automotive and caterpillar transport.

The technical condition of artillery and personnel preparation is good, in connection with which almost all artillery raids were held in a timely manner for purposes.

The interaction of artillery, infantry and aviation is organized effectively.

At the same time, Soviet artillery is often used not assembled together, but stretched over the front. Batteries, and sometimes separate implements are on a high distance from each other, which significantly reduces the efficiency of fire.

Fire positions like light and heavy artillery are located on a high distance from the positions of the rifle parts, sometimes quite greater than it is necessary in defense. The artillery ammunition of Soviet production operate normally, without a large number of failures. In some cases, the use of shrapnel shells was noted by the Soviet troops. "

Romanian command clearly overestimated its own strength and underestimated or did not even know the strength of the Soviet troops. The General Staff, even by the beginning of September 1941, did not know the number of defense mines and the front line of defense of the Soviets with the main line of defense. The removal from the post of commander of the 4th Army of General N. Chuperke did not lead to a change in the situation, and his successor was forced to continue working on strategic plans, which was offered by N. Chuperke.

In early August 1941, the German allies noted that the only correct solution of the operation was to occupy the positions of northeastern Odessa, from which you can strike on the airfields and the port of the city. General Staff, on the contrary, concentrated the main forces of the west of the city in open locality and, exhausting troops in the exhausting general offensive, did not receive decisive results.

In his response of October 11, 1941, on the letter of Hitler (from October 5), I. Antonescu protects the position, why the troops did not come from the northern side of Odessa: "The need for an offensive to develop from the north-eastern side of Odessa was obvious to From the very beginning of the fighting ... But we could not realize this plan due to the fact that the enemy had superiority to the sea ... Our offensive from the West to the East had a goal to get the opportunity to strike at the southern coast of the city and represented us an operational initiative " . The 4th army was forced to step in two main directions, north and west of the goal, against a well-fortified opponent who has superiority in the air and the sea.

In general, about the strategy of the Romanian command, it was necessary to note that it was the desire to "take from the go" Odessa led to the fact that at the initial stage, the preference was given to the frontal blow along the separation line - Odessa, which led to unjustified losses and exhausting the upcoming troops. As A. Borisov noted in his essay, the direction along the separation line - Odessa "was the shortest and withdrawn the troops coming directly to the city. The terrain in this direction contributed to the widespread use of tanks. However, it was still a frontal and therefore the enemy was used only as the direction of auxiliary strike. "

Some success began to accompany the Romanian army only after she moved to flanking strikes in the south-west direction (in the sector between Kuyalnitsky and great Advytsky Limans) and in southeast (along the Dnestrovsky Limana). Despite the fact that both general offensive, August 28 and September 12, did not led to the seizure of the city, the Romanian parts were able to create a critical situation for defenders of the city, organize the shelling of portal artillery ports from two directions, which could significantly affect the delivery of replenishment and ammunition in Odessa .

As for the dispute between the Romanian Generals Chuperke and Ionitsa as to whether it is worth it to carry out a concentrated impact on one site or apply dispersed blows in different parts of the front, the success of Soviet offensive on September 22 and October 2 more proves the right point I. Antonescu and General Staff.

The position of the 4th Romanian Army influenced the position of the 4th Romanian army: the concept of the General Staff and the Supreme Commands ("Taking Odessa with the Go", "general offensive"); strategic position at the front (open area, without any shelter, fragmentation of the theater of hostilities due to Limanov and the closure of "casting lines"); Powerful defensive fortifications and combat capability of Soviet troops (three lines of defense, superiority at the sea). Romanian sources note that freedom of action in decision-making by the command of the 4th Romanian army was very limited by the General Staff and the Supreme Command.

After the defeat of the 5th Army Corps as a result of the Grigorievsky landing, the 4th Army moved to defense. I. Antonescu Oblitsa: "One Army Corps was put in a shameful position, was discarded back by 10 km, because one regiment was out of order ... One enemy regiment made this shameful catastrophe."

Odessa operation has become the first large-scale operation, which was conducted by the Romanian army against such a serious enemy as the Red Army. Romanian troops only learned to occur with modern methods and modern weapons.

The command of the Odessa defensive area managed to properly use the benefits of terrain and organize defense. Although the misunderstanding and lack of interaction between the fleet and the army command was originally affected. There was no and experience in the defense of naval databases from sushi.

The presence of mobile reserves in the seaside army, first in the face of the cavalry division, and then motorcycles, tanks and armored train, ensured the speed of maneuver. The command of the army took care of reserves, and in the case of the introduction of the reserve, a new one was always created, at least a small reserve by allocating a part of forces from the attacked front sections.

Y. Losvnev noted: "To the Great Patriotic War, our operational documents underestimated the importance of defensive actions in the seaside direction. In the field charter of the Red Army (projects 1939-1940) said only about the defense of seaside flanks ground Forces And the main problems of the joint actions of the army and the fleet were planned when refilling the landing of the enemy's marine assault. The issues of organizing and conducting the defense of the sea coast, naval databases and major seaside cities with sushi were not considered.

In the "Warfare of the Marine Forces of the Red Army - 1937" in a special section, the special danger of the seizure of naval databases from sushi was emphasized. Therefore, it was recommended to have a land front capable and reflect a sudden attack, and to withstand a long siege. He had to consist of a long-term fortifications of the defensive band with a long-term fortification of a defensive strip with the requirements of the Economic of the BCC, special maneuverable groups of land units intended for the fight in a given fortified area, self-defense of shore batteries from air and marine assaults and Equipment of threatened sections of the shore with means of anti-defense defense, self-defense of ships in ice conditions, command points of the land front with all means of combat management. The BMS-37 emphasized that the defense plan of the landfront base should include the use of artillery fire of coastal batteries and ships for action on land. For this purpose, coastal batteries should have been provided by means of communication and a network of remote posts to adjust the fire in advance of the most important borders and areas of the land front.

In these, in general, the correct recommendations were absent, the most important provisions were absent: the organization of the command forces by the base during its defense from land, the remoteness of the defense mines and the nature of their engineering equipment, the interaction of the army and the fleet, etc. Responsibility for the defense of naval bases from Sushi was liable to Military districts, however, documents governing the joint actions of the army and the fleet did not have. "

The joint teachings of the seaside districts and the BAZ conducted in the pre-war years, as well as the special exercises on the contradiction and anti-airflow defense of the bases showed insufficient preparedness of their defense from the air and land. But for some reason, the results of these teachings did not stimulate the development of specific activities that ensured the organization of the interaction of the ground forces and the fleet during the defense of the bases.

Military political leadership of Romania, after leaving the Soviet parts of Odessa, conflicted feelings were experiencing: on the one hand, "victory" near Odessa, even if incomplete, proved that the Romanian army is a serious opponent on the Eastern Front; But, on the other hand, Marshal I. Antonescu did not miss the opportunity to openly express his discontent about how martialctionsmainly due to big losses.

"The results of errors made over the course of two decades cannot be recognized otherwise as catastrophic. Unprepared officers caused unprepared soldiers and nonsense officers. It all starts with the manual. State and, as a result, political leadership could not not be the reason for being: disasters. But now the question arises: what should we do? Take it on the note and squeeze your teeth? We must start first and work intensely.

1. A new atmosphere of energetic, conscious, intense, coordinating, professional, well-ledged activity should renovate in the General Staff.

2. The command of large divisions, army corps and divisions should be entrusted only to commanders who have not only have brains, but also enthusiasm and vitality, diligent and fair, which can not only serve as an example, but also inspire and stimulate others to fulfill a reasonable, well-organized, well-prepared and inspired work.

3. Preparation of UNTER officers and officers should be carried out in such a way as to develop their swiftness, strengthen their skills, as well as the consciousness they had at the beginning of their careers and which they have lost due to lack of system, bad examples, injustice, Because the worst were not punished, the problems that were discovered in the divisions at the very beginning of their career.

4. Finally, we need to improve the preparation of soldiers and provide a complete complete set of units. Without this, weapons can not be used, it does not matter how serious efforts they were applied for this - and this was done - on the battlefield to avoid disasters that entail a peacetime mistakes.

5. And above all, we need continuity in our organization, manual, preparation, measures, actions, etc. ... "

The headquarters and cultivation of the 4th Romanian army were removed from the battle for Odessa the following lessons, which was reflected in the appropriate note:

"- a massive fire of artillery aimed against the enemy infantry is the most effective method its destruction;

- the use of the properties of the area in combination with the skillful use of weapons and technology is the main key of success;

- training with firing preparation, disguise on the ground, the supply of troops by means of communication must be carried out without any considerations of savings;

- work on the engineering equipment of the area are one of the main means of preserving the live strength and technology;

It is necessary to remember that only a person is in battle, only a person is based on the force of the Romanian army.

- In the modern war, an attacking infantry, without which even severe artillery will not have success, solves the outcome of the battle;

- Mortarians are effective tool Beneficiation of the enemy due to the possibility of hitting the enemy on small distances and behind shelters, which is impossible when using ordinary artillery, besides, they have a small weight and can be used by infantry in any area conditions;

- Caliber artillery 75 mm and 76.2 mm does not meet the requirements modern Foy As assault guns, to maintain assault actions, weapons of caliber of 100 mm or 105 mm are needed;

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Link to Odessa on June 2, 1946, Zhukov was appointed for him too low for him - commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District. But after the humiliating meeting of the Supreme Military Council, this punishment turned out to be relatively soft. It arrived in the port city 13

The defense of Odessa during the Great Patriotic War began on August 5, 1941, when the bid of the Supreme Command in connection with the unfavorable situation, which established on the Right-Bank Ukraine and in Moldova, ordered the troops of the southern front on the line of Chigirin, Voznesensk, Dniester Liman, and Odessa to defend to the last capabilities. The defense of the city was entrusted to a separate seaside army under the command of General Georgy Sofronov (from October 5 - Major General Ivan Petrov) and the Black Sea Fleet.

Against the Primorsk army, which had two rifle and cavalry divisions in its composition, had five infantry, two cavalry divisions and a motorized brigade of the Fourth Romanian army.

Residents of Odessa rose to protect their city. More than 100 thousand people participated in defensive work. In a short time, three defensive turns were built, about 250 barricades were built on Odessa Streets. Covering the city from the sea and the firing support for the troops carried out a detachment of ships and coastal artillery. The city was formed by the 421th Infantry Division, two regiments of marines and several seafarers with a total number of eight thousand people.

By August 10, 1941, the troops of the seaside army held back the enemy on distant approaches to Odessa, and then moved to the forefront. Having a five-time superiority in the power of Soviet troops, the enemy took an attack throughout the front. On August 13, the Romanian-German troops came to the Black Sea Eastern Odessa and completely blocked the city from Sushi, cutting it off from the troops of the South Front.

At the end of August, the enemy's troops broke through to the Dnieper on a plot from Kremenchug to Kherson. Odessa was in a deep enemy rear. On August 19, the Supreme Commanding rate formed the Odessa defensive area, which included the Primorsk army and the Odessa naval base with the ships bred.

The commander of the Odessa defensive district was appointed commander of the Odessa naval base Council Admiral Gabriel Zhukov. The district consisted of three sectors (southern, western and oriental) and included four divisions and a number of individual parts.

On August 20, the strengthened Romanian troops resumed the storm in the city. During the month, Soviet troops reflected attacks. The enemy was stopped on the main border.

On September 19, the ships of the Escade Council Admiral Lev Vladimirsky took the 157th Rifle Division in Odessa from Novorossiysk and part of the amplification.

On September 22, on the grouping of the Romanian troops, advanced in the eastern direction, a well-organized combined blow was applied, as a result of which two Romanian divisions were defeated.

The enemy was discarded at five to eight kilometers and lost the opportunity to lead the city and port shelling. The population of Odessa courageously tolerated the siege and danger of the siege, the work of factories and factories did not stop.

By the end of September, the situation of the southern front troops had sharply deteriorated. The German group of Army "South" threatened a breakthrough to Donbass and Crimea.

On September 30, the Supreme Commanding rate decided to use the troops of the Odessa defensive area to enhance the defense of the Crimea.

In the period from October 1 to October 16, the ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet in the situation of strictest secrecy from the city were taken out of the existing troops (about 86 thousand people), a part of the civilian population (more than 15 thousand people), a significant amount of weapons and military equipment.

The defenders of the city more than 73 days fed at the walls of Odessa, the fourth Romanian army, the enemy lost over 160 thousand soldiers and officers, about 200 aircraft, up to 100 tanks.

About 40 thousand inhabitants of the city went to the catacombs and continued to resist until the city's full release of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, April 10, 1944.

On December 22, 1942, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the medal "For the defense of Odessa". She received more than 30 thousand people. Hero and labor collectives were also awarded.

For the heroic defense from August 5 to October 16, 1941, Odessa became one of the first four cities-heroes (along with Stalingrad, Leningrad and Sevastopol).

Material prepared on the basis of open sources information

Odessa Defense 1941

Odessa Defense of 1941, the heroic defense of Odesses on August 5, October 16, the troops of a separate seaside army and part of the Black Sea Fleet forces in the active support of the city's population in the Great Fatherland, War.

In connection with the unfavorable situation that established on the Right-Bank Ukraine and in Moldova, the rate of VGC 5 Aug. ordered to take the southern troops. Front on the front of Chigirin, Voznesensk, Dniester Liman, and Odessa defend to the last opportunity. The defense of the city was placed on the deployment. Primorsk army (teams, gen.-l. G. P. Sofronov, from 5 Oct, - Gen.-m. I. E. Petrov) and the Black Sea Fleet. Against the Primorsk army, which had 2 shooters in its composition. and 1 kav. Division, 5 pekhs occurred., 2 kav. Division and 1 motoriz. Brigade 4th Rum. Army.

On the defense of the city, the Odessa party organization mobilized all his strength. According to her appeal in defensive work, SV participated 100 thousand people In a short time, 3 will be built, turn, turning: advanced - 20-25 km from the city, the main - 10-14 km and the front cover - 6-10 km; On the streets of Odessa was built OK. 250 barricades. The city was obscured by the structures of the overall length of St. 250 km. Covering the city from the sea and firing support for the troops carried out a detachment of ships (the cruiser "Comintern", 2 destroyers, 4 canoner. Boats, 6 trapes, torpedo and guard boats, 2 min mine bar) and coastal art.

Pr-K tried to take the city with the go. 8 Aug. He went to Dniester, sowing. The tip of the Hadzhibey and Tiligul Limanam. On this day, Odessa was declared on a siege position. In the city, the 421th arrows were formed. Division, 2 mi shelf. Infantry and several. Sailors of sailors total numbers. 8 thousand people 90% of Odessa Communists struck the ranks of the city. Up to 10 Aug. The troops of the seaside army were held back on the distant approaches to Odessa, and then moved to the forefront. By 10 Aug. Forces 4th Rum. The army amounted to 12 divisions and 7 brigades. Having 5-fold superiority in the forces above the owls. Forces, PR-K took an attack throughout the front. 13 Aug; He managed to exit Vost. Tiligul Limana to Mor. Coast and fully block Odessa from sushi. However, it could not achieve more prn. After 15 Aug. The troops of the pr-ka crossed from the offensive throughout the front to apply strikes by concentrated forces on the flankach- with S.-V. and S.-Z. But these attempts to master Odessa were torn to the resistant defense. troops and population of the city. With the waste of troops southern. Front to the Dnieper Odessa remained far away in the rear of the pr-ka. 19 Aug. The TGC rate formed Odessa will definitely, Rn (OOR), subdued by his Black Seaner, a fleet of teams, vice-adm. F. S. Oktyabrsky). The composition of OOR included the seaside army and the Odessa VBM with ships led by it.

The commander of Oor was appointed comr-rto Odessa VBM counter-adm. G. V. Zhukov, his deputy for sunshift. Defense Gene. G. P. Sofronov. CHL Military. The Council was the Brigadd Commissioner I. I. Azarov and Division Commissioner F. N. Voronin, and later the first secretary of the Odessa Regional Committee of the party A. G. Kolybanov. Oor consisted of three sectors (southern, western and eastern) and included 4 divisions and a row. Parts.

By this time, the 4th Room. The army was strengthened by another 5 pekh. Divisions had only 17 divisions and 7 brigades. 20 Aug. Pr-to resumed the storm in the city. Military. The OR Council in his appeal urged the defenders of the city by all means to keep Odessa and the Black Sea coast. In response to this treatment of the warriors gave an oath to beat with the enemy to the last drop of blood. During the month of owls. The troops stable reflected the fierce attacks of the enemy, showing invisible heroism and dedication. Pr-K was stopped on ch. turn. In firing support, dried up. The troops actively accepted the ship art I, Avza. Parts of the seaside army and the Black Seaner, Fleet. Especially strong Natisk Ave took place in the east. Defense sector. Coming out on the experiencies between the Kuyalnitsky Liman and the sea coast, Sev.-Vost. Odessa, he began to systematich. Shelling of the city, as well as ships passed near the shore. Despite this, 19 Saint. Ships escorders counter-adm. L. A. Vladimirsky delivered to Odessa from Novorossiysk 157th Rifle Division and part of the gain.

22 Saint. By grouping rooms. Troops who advanced to the vehicle The direction, a well-organized combined strike was applied: the warships landed the landing in the district of Grigorevka as part of the shelf of Mor. infantry; At the same time, a parachute landing was thrown into the enemy's rear; To meet the paratroopers on the plot of Fontanka, Guillandorf fell part of two shooters. divisions.

As a result, 2 rooms. Divisions were defeated. Pr-k was discarded 5-8 km and lost opportunities to lead art. Shelling of the city and port. The population of Odessa courageously tolerated the hazard of the siege, systematic. Aviation and ART raids. Shelling, lack of water and food. None of the day did not stop the work of factories and factories.

Odessa defenders were determined to continue the struggle. But by the end of September, the situation of the southern troops has sharply deteriorated. Front. Nem. Fish. The group;, the army "South" threatened the breakthrough to the Donbaes and Crimea. 30 Saint. The TGC rate decided to use the OER troops to enhance the defense of the Crimea.

From 1 to 16 oct. The Black Sea Fleet conducted an operation on the evacuation of OOR troops on the Crimean Person. On transports and warships, all the troops were transported almost without loss (approx. 86 thousand people), 15 thousand people. chase population, 19 tanks and armored vehicles, approx. 500 OP., More than 1 thousand cars, sv. 3.5 thousand horses, 163 tractor, approx. 25 thousand tons of different. cargo. Departure of the last units of the Troops of the OER for landing on the Mor. Transport covered partisans. Only in the evening of October 16. The advanced parts of the prockey broke into Odessa.

The 73-day defense of Odessa was one of the vivid examples of the durability and heroism of owls. Forces, unity of the army and the people. Owls. Warriors who defended the city, workers' Odessa, headed by the regional and urban party, organizations, were fighting shoulder: to shoulder. Defenders of the city more than two months fed, at the walls of Odessa, the 4th ru. The army and caused her heavy losses. It was disabled with St. 160 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, approx. 200 aircraft, up to 100 tanks.

The defense of Odessa was characterized by high activity. Its success in meaning, degree was determined by the creation of deeply echelonir on the approaches to the city. Inzh. Constructions and good organs. Interaction to land. Forces with forces Chernomor, Fleet.

Instructive was an operation on evacuation of troops by the sea to another direction.

An important role in the heroic. Defense Odessa played an active part. - Polit, work, providing persistence and persistence of troops in defense.

A. S. Galitan.

The materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in the 8th volumes are used, t. 8.

Literature:

History of World War II. 1939-1945. T. 4. M., 1975, p. 86-88;

Azarov I. I. Sended Odessa. Ed. 3rd Odessa, 1975;

Immortal glory. Odessa, 1975; 73 heroic days. Chronicle of Defense Odessa in 1941 ed. 2nd. Odessa, 1978;

Soldiers are homeland. Odessa, 1976;

Aleshchenko N.M. They defended Odessa. Ed. 2nd. M., 1970;

The Godlevsky G. F., Grechanyuk N. M., Kononenko V. M. Camping Combat. Squadre Chernomorsky
Fleet in the Great Patriotic War. M., 1966;

Pennya K. V. Chernomorsky fleet in the defense of Odessa (1941). M., 1956.

Read:

World War II 1939-1945 (chronological table).

The defense of Odessa lasted from August 8 to October 16, 1941 at the early stage of the Barbarossa operation - the invasion of the "axis" in the Soviet Union during World War II.

Start

Thanks to the strong resistance to the Soviet 9th independent army and the rapidly created separate coast army, supported by the Black Sea Fleet, 73 siege days and four attacks for the capture of the city by the "axis" by the Forces of the Axis were required, it was as long as the defense of Odessa. The date of June 22, 1941 marks the invasion of the "axis" forces in the Soviet Union. In August, Odessa became the target of the 4th Romanian army and part of the 11th German army. Romanian forces suffered 93,000 victims, while the losses of the Red Army were estimated at 41,000-60,000 people.

Preparation

On July 27, 1941, Hitler sent a letter to General Ion Antonescu, in which he recognized the Romanian territory control between the Dniester rivers and the Bug. July 17, the Romanian third army has already crossed the Dniester. The fourth army of Lieutenant General Nikolai Chupaker has advanced along the river on August 3, and the fifth corps consisting of the 15th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, joined the 1st armored division. On August 8, the Romanian General Staff issued an operational directive No. 31, ordering the 4th army to occupy Odessa. It was believed that the city garrison, which had a quantitative advantage, will quickly surrender.

Red Army

The city was well fortified by three defensive borders and thanks to the presence of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet could not be completely surrounded, so the defense of Odessa began. The first line of 80 km long was located 25-30 km from the city. The second and main line of defense were 6-8 km from the city and accounted for about 30 km long. The third and last line of defense was organized within the city itself. Forces that were initially engaged in strengthening, consisted of the 25th and 95th rifle divisions, the 2nd Cavalry Division, the 421th Rifle Division, the 54th Rifle Regiment and the NKVD regiment. There were 34,500 people in the Red Army and 240 artillery guns. Air support was provided by two squadrons of the hydraulic parameters and one squadron of bomber. Later, other fighters were joined by the defenders, as well as the IL-2 squadron.

Heroic defense Odessa

On August 10, on the site of the 3rd corps, the main part of the 7th rifle division was reached by Alsace. In the 5th Corps sector, the 1st armored division broke through the first defense line of Odessa. That evening, the Romanian division reached the second line of defense. The 1st Cavalry Brigade took Severinovka and joined the 1st armored division. At the same time, the 10th Doban Regiment seized Soviet troops on the Lozova. The 4th Army gradually closed the circle around Odessa, but on August 13, Antonescu temporarily stopped the offensive to strengthen the line to the west of Hadzhibay.

Cool turn

The offensive resumed on August 16, when Romanian troops attacked the whole line, capturing on August 17 Odessa reservoirs. Soviet troops had stubborn resistance, made repeated counterattacks, caused and suffered large losses. The Royal Romanian Air Force actively supported the ground forces, disturbing the movement of the Soviet naval forces in Odessa and from it, as well as destroying the armored train on August 20.

On the night of August 18, the Romanian motor torpedo boats attacked the Soviet column of transport transport (light cruiser "Comintern", two destroyers, four gunners, forty motor torpedo boats and seven auxiliary trails) south of Odessa, having damaged one fighter. It was one of the few actions that the Romanian fleet took to support the siege.

New losses

By August 24, despite the constant attacks, Romanians were bogged down before the main line of defense of the Soviets. The 4th Army has already incurred 27,307 victims, including 5329 killed in battle. Nevertheless, the tips were also weakened, and thanks to the seizure of Kubanka, Romanian heavy artillery began to threaten the Odessa port. Over the next three days, the battle reigned.

On August 28, Romanians resumed an offensive, enhanced by the German assault battalion and ten heavy artillery battalions. The 4th, 11th and 1st army corps were advanced in the direction of Gnilyakovo and Vacarkane, but the next day they were discarded in some areas of the strong Soviet counterattack. On August 30, Romanians again took the initiative in their hands, but received very little benefit. Hitler and the German Supreme Command noted that Antonescu used the Tactics of the First World War in Odessa. The advice temporarily walked to Kubanka, but in the evening they were thrown back. Soviet troops in Vacarzhanov were surrounded and continued to fight until September 3, when the united German and Romanian infantry successfully stormed the village, but the defense of Odessa was standing.

Nazis losing their positions

On September 3, General Chuperca presented Memoirs Marshal Antonescu, pointing to the poor state of front divisions, which were exhausted after almost a month of continuous hostilities, which contributed to the defense of Odessa. He proposed to reorganize six divisions (3rd, 6th, 7th, 14th, 21st infantry and guards Divisions), which will be divided into 2 housings and will be maintained by 8 heavy artillery battalions.

These divisions are then attacked in one area to break through the Soviet line. However, the proposal was rejected by Antonesska and the head of the Romanian General Staff by Brigadier General Alexander Joranit, who argued that the attack in one direction could lead to the fact that the rest of the Romanian line would be too open.

Marshal Antonescu subsequently issued a new directive calling for attacks between the Tatar and the Dong title, as well as the Gnilyakovo and the Dong title, which should have been made by the 11th and 3rd buildings, respectively. Joanita sent a note by the head of the German military mission to Romania Major General Artur Gaufu, in which he reported on the situation in Odessa and asked for help in the form of aircraft and several pioneering battalions. Although the Royal Romanian Air Force enjoyed some success in the fight against the terrestrial and air forces of the Soviets, they were poorly equipped for air raids, and the tips were constantly strengthened and supplied through the Navy.

The end is already close

So the defense of Odessa was continued in 1941, and in the meantime, the Romanian offensive was suspended in anticipation of reinforcements. German detachment arrived under the command of Lieutenant General Rene von Kurbie, consisting of one infantry regiment, one assault pioneer regiment and two artillery regiments. At the same time, the advice also received 15,000 people and ammunition. On September 9, Lieutenant-General Joseph Jacobic, who was directly ordered to follow the directives of the General Staff directives, was appointed instead of Chupecki. The offensive resumed on September 12, but was again temporarily suspended on September 14, since the Romanian and German artillery parts exhausted their inventory reserves. Two battalions of the vyasetor were surrounded by the troops of the Red Army near the Bank of Hadzhibay, but eventually released, despite attempts Soviet Union Destroy them.

On the night of September 15, Soviet troops stopped contact with the Romanian 1st corps and retreated to the southeast. September 16, the 1st corps rose to the north-west of Gross-Libental. Romanian troops also occupied territory south of dry liman. More than 3,000 Soviet soldiers were captured, but these losses were replaced by the 157th rifle division with a number of 12,600 servicemen. In addition, 18 Soviet companies were brought from Novorossiysk. However, the partisan battles continued in the city catacombs.

Defense Odessa: Heroes and Defenders

With the promotion of the troops of the axis in the Soviet Union, the bid of the Supreme Commander decided to evacuate the defenders of Odessa. On the night of October 14-15, 1941, the Black Sea Fleet evacuated the garrison to Sevastopol, where most divisions were subsequently destroyed during fierce fights, which were held there during the defense of Sevastopol. The Black Sea Fleet was also evacuated to evacuate 350,000 soldiers and civilians.

In the battle, the world's best woman Sniper Lyudmila Pavlichenko, who later received a medal for the defense of Odessa subsequently. Her first 2 murders were committed near Belyaevka. During the defense of Odessa, she made 187 confirmed killings. The total number of killed Pavlichenko during World War II amounted to 309 (including 36 snipers).

Operations in Odessa revealed significant flaws in the Romanian army, with the result that both the military and political leaders of the country called on to stop military operations against the Soviet Union. With such results for the "axis" the defense of Odessa 1941-1942 ended.

The heroic defense of Odesses on August 5, October 16, the troops of a separate seaside army and part of the Black Sea Fleet forces in the active support of the city's population in the Great Fatherland, War.

In connection with the unfavorable situation that established on the Right-Bank Ukraine and in Moldova, the rate of VGC 5 Aug. He ordered the troops of the southern front on Rubbrozh Chigirin, Voznesensk, Dniester Liman, and Odessa to defend to the last opportunity. The defense of the city was placed on the deployment. Primorsk army (Commander Lieutenant General P. Sofronov, from October 5, Major General I. E. Petrov) and the Black Sea Fleet.

George Pavlovich Sofronov Ivan Efimovich Petrov

Against the Primorsk army, which had 2 rifle and 1 cavalry division in its composition, fell 5 infantry, 2 cavalry divisions and 1 motorized team of the 4th Romanian army.

On the defense of the city, the Odessa party organization mobilized all his strength. According to her appeal in defensive work, SV participated 100 thousand people In a short time, 3 will be built, turn, turning: advanced - 20-25 km from the city, the main - 10-14 km and the front cover - 6-10 km; On the streets of Odessa, about 250 barricades are elevated. The city was obscured by the structures of the overall length of St. 250 km. Covering the city from the sea and firing support for the troops carried out a detachment of ships (cruiser "Comintern", 2 destroyers, 4 gunboats, 6 trails, torpedo and guard boats, 2 mine barrage) and coastal artillery.

At the end of July 1941, the seaside army of the Southern Front occupied the defense on Dniester - from Tiraspol to the Black Sea coast. It is right before it, on a wide front of the Dnestra, the 9th Army defended the 9th. The 11th German and 4th Romanian army struck in the junction between them. Having tightening three fresh infantry divisions - two Romanian and one German, the enemy crossed the East Coast of the Dniester in the Dubossar area and tried to develop success in the eastern and southeast directions ...

Due to the tense atmosphere on the southern front and the departure of our armies, on July 27, in his telegram, the Narc of the Navy - Kuznetsov N.G. - pointed out the fleet to the military advice: "... specifically warn the commander of the Odessa VM base, that he should not move away, and fight to the base to the end."

Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov

People's Commissar demanded immediately start creating land defense, coastal defense Odessa And carefully prepare the interaction of ships and aviation. The Military Council of the Fleet demanded from the commander Odessa VBM: organize round-the-clock work; Use all forces and means, weapons, including mines. Send to Sevastopol What is not needed for defense. It is categorically forbidden to evacuate military units.

Fire of the main caliber

By order of the head of the garrison of Odessa Zhukova Gabriel Vasilyevich From August 8, Odessa with surroundings was announced on siege Position. It was forbidden to enter the city to citizens without special pass. The movement of citizens and all types of civil transport from 20 to 6 o'clock in the morning was prohibited. Return from work and following on official matters during this period was allowed only on special passes issued by the Comfunction of the garrison ...

Counter-Admiral Zhukov GV, commander of the Odessa defensive area

Parts Primorsk army, leading heavy battles, continued to retrieve. The enemy wedged into the junction of the 9th and seaside armies and by August 10 expanded the breakthrough to several tens of kilometers. Together with 9th armyth 30th Rifle Division of the Primorsk Army, in which only 25th Chapaevskaya, strongly shaped 95 -I and hurked cavalry division. German commandBy continuing the 11th army to pursue our units departing to the East, sent the 4th Romanian army to Odessa. The enemy tried to break into the city on the shoulders of our discovered troops, suturing at the same time parts of the seaside army of the path of retreat, to then surround it.

Residents of besieged Odessa, 1941

Odessa also defended the part of the Odessa naval base - coastal batteries and ships, the 1st and 2nd marine shelves, rifle regiment, created on the basis of the 26th border detachment, 82nd and 83rd fortified areas, 15th air defense brigade, part of the militia and fighter battalions.

On the morning of August 11, the enemy infantry with the support of tanks was wedged into the site of the 1st battalion of the regiment of the border troops, which occupied the defense from the shore of the Great Advyksky Limana to the Odessa railway line - Voznesensk.

The five tanks managed to approach the tanks. Fight battle. The border guards had no guns or anti-tank guns. There were only rifles, pomegranates and bottles with a fuel liquid and an inflexible determination not to let the enemy in Odessa. Bundles of garnet and bottles with a combustible mixture border guards set fire to all five tanks. Seeing these sinister bonfires, the fascist infantry trampled and, carrying big losses, retreated.

Commander of the 1st Regiment of Marine Corps Osipov Ya.I.

From all sides, the enemy troops continued to adopt on Odessa - nine infantry divisions, one tank and two cavalry brigades. Nevertheless, neither the thirteenth nor the fourteenth enemy went to the city. And meanwhile, the locomotives delivered on the plastic from Odessa were taken into a deep rear of ten echelons, each 80 cars and platforms, with the equipment of ship repair plants. However, by the Germans by August 13, still managed to go to the sea between Tiligul and Advyksky Limans, after completing the environment of Odessa. The message from the big earth is now only carried out by sea and through the air.

Odessa defenders fought heroically. September 16, 1941 Among the first participants in the defense of Odessa Junior Sergeant Nechipurenko A.A. He was awarded the Order of Lenin. Perfectly operated the 36th battery of 152-millimeter Gaubitz Lieutenant Boyko DP

152 mm Gaubitsa

For the speed and maneuverability during the battle, it was called "ambulance". It should be noted that the battery commander Lieutenant Boyko was not a professional artillers. He was a historian, but perfectly held in any combat atmosphere, even when the tanks and infantry of the enemy turned out to be a few meters from the firing position.

An anti-aircraft battery on the Red Army Square, 1941

Here are the excerpts from the notes Boyko D.P.
"24 August. Occupied a fire position with a red migranet. In the morning, beat the attack of the enemy. We conduct a counter-follower struggle. Fire lead at the limiting distance. The direct hit of the enemy projectile "cut off" half the trunk of the first gun is wounded.

August 28. The enemy is the main blow in the direction of Bulgarian farms. Emief chains are shown in the breakout smoke. I stand on the tank brush and correct the fire shrapnel on the upcoming opponent. The fascists ripped off their way of corpses ... Attacks are repulsed. "

The 36th battery often had to shoot on the upcoming opponent with direct vendor. Commander of the 25th Chapaevsky Division Petrov I.E. repeatedly reported counter-admiral Zhukov G.V., that only thanks to the fire support of the 36th battery, a breakthrough of the front in the division sector is not allowed. Commander of the 36th Battery Boyko D.P. Among the first was awarded the Order of Lenin.

From the operational report on August 18: "Parts of the Primorsk army beat off the opponent's attack and defend on previous positions. 1st regiment of marine infantry under the command of Colonel ME AND. Osipova With the support of ship and coastal artillery returned the position lost on the eve. On the battlefield, the enemy left up to 600 killed soldiers (all from the infantry division), 6 tanks, 18 guns. " Success was not easy. Sailors suffered large losses. In the 1st and 2nd battalions, only 122 people remained.

Commander of the 95th Division Major General Vorobev V.F. Even on the eve, according to intelligence data, he knew that the enemy was preparing for the offensive.

By order of Vorobyva, the head of the division artillery Colonel Piskunov D.I. put forward artillery batteries on a tan hazard direction - along the railway. Defense on this site was holding the 161th rifle regiment. His commander Colonel Silver S.I.. and commissioner Livshin S.E. Well prepared people to fierce battle. There was a case: under the machine gun fuel Rota lay down. And then Livshin rose to full growth and went. One went under a machine gun. That could not allow fighters. The whole company jumped on his feet and rushed to the enemy.

Enemy infantry moved chains after tanks. Putting the tanks and infantry of three hundred meters to the front edge, our parts opened fire from all types of weapons. The bulk of the fight against tanks took on batteries of the 97th separate anti-tank division. Division commander Captain Barkovsky V.I. Brilliantly ruled the battle. Most batteries led fire direct vendor. Several tanks were chopped, and those who managed to break through to the front edge were set on fire bottles with a fuel liquid and undermined grenades. The battle lasted all day. The enemy could not stand and with large losses stepped out on the initial frontiers, leaving 25 baked and burned tanks.

And about sailors. Small watchman who commanded senior lieutenant SquareFor two and a half months he had fifty-nine fights with fascist aircraft. In total, eighty-four aircraft fluttered on it, which dropped one hundred ninety-four bombs. Such a flattering boat attention is explained by the fact that the Watchboat of the Black Sea Fleet was a belly on the eye of the fascists: these boats were constructed by transportation with ammunition and troops, carried a sent to the sea, warning Odessa to appear bombers from the sea, supported and landed the landings and for it Time shot down about twenty aircraft. One day, three four-dimensional bomber flew at the Lieutenant Lieutenant boat. One of them was able to destroy sailors.

The intensity of the situation in a deposited city demanded the greatest consistency in the actions of the ground forces and parts of the fleet. Therefore, the issue of a single command of the group located in Odessa was resolved. August 19, 1941 in accordance with the BGK directive on the creation Odessa defensive area (OOP), the commander of the area was appointed counter-Admiral Zhukov G.V. He was obeyed by the troops of the seaside army, the Odessa naval base and all civilian organizations. Now all the forces and means of the city focused in one hands.

The rate was set to: Defense Odessa at the turn of Fontanka, Kubanka, Kovylevka, Ribdan, Farmomayevsky, Belyaevka, Lighthouses, Carolino-Bugaz Station. Mosts, the frontier passed only 20 kilometers from the city.
It was prescribed to hastily build the necessary strengthening, turn the city into an impregnable fortress, mobilize Odessa to the defense of all able-bodied population.

"From the suburbs - the range, Dofinovka and Grigorievka - German batteries fired the city and port. The enemy tried to break a thin string of maritime communication, the only connection with the Big Earth - with Sevastopol. Parts of the Red Army, Marine Cherry Shelves, Sea Coastal Batteries, turned into the rear - on land, Aviation, based on the airfields filled with shells, ships, fighting from air attacks, and citizens, defenseless from bombs and shells, held Odessa.

The city was sitting without fresh water: The city station of the water pipe in Belyaevka was in the hands of the enemy. The Govke line has emerged in the newspaper about the standards of drinking water and about digging wells in the courtyards and on the streets.

It resembled the Middle Ages: fortress in siege, water on the outcome. Odessa was not at all a fortress. It was a peaceful, cheerful and hardworking city, never thought about siege. But in the Great Patriotic War it turned out that Odessa was indeed a fortress - the fortress of the unreleased Soviet spirit "(L. Sobolev" Odessa in battle ").

A big role in the defense of Odessa was played armored train. They applied a huge damage to the direct flooring of their guns. It was not by chance that the opponent did everything to disrupt the actions of our moving fortresses: shelled artillery, bombed from the air of the canvas of the railway, threw tens of aircraft on the armored train. It was absolutely impossible to repair the damaged cloth during the day - the enemy did not regret the mines and shells. The paths worked only at night, but it was not easy. The enemy covered the road with rockets, held under the sight of machine guns and mortars. And yet Sonin fighters, God, Dubincchuk, Frosinichev, and others, capturing the tool and materials, went on the road.

Ahead of the repair team was sent a watch, two gunner was guarded behind her - Ismradjikov and Kalimbet Erinjaev. Under the enemy's fire, the repairmen replaced the rails and sleepers, corrected the mound. Even more difficult for their task in battle. One of the armored traders made a bold raid. He crossed the "none" strip and broke into the arrangement of the enemy. Having collapsed on the enemy the entire supply of shells, the land armor moved back, and then the observer of the field saw the rails climbed by the shell. Hudtolev repairmen, Stepko, Karimanan, led by the younger sergeant, jerked from the platform and began to work. Mines rushed around, lylish and thinly wounded fragments, but they continued to work until they restored the path.

Armored Train "Chernomorets"

Production of armored train in the locomotive depot of Odessa

A few days later, Mikhail Otyan, who was killed in the area of \u200b\u200bRomanian Junker, found a diary. Among other grief recordings in it was this: "This morning the opponent's armored train appeared and opened a mad fire. Bullets and shells flew in a hail. We have huge losses. "

On the night of September 2, the enemy tried to break through defense in the eastern sector. The first night attacks occurred. The 421th Infantry Division, formed from the military portions of the Eastern Sector and replenished with 4 thousand Odessans, closed the breakthrough site, threw the enemy attack and destroyed the minor groups of the enemy who leaked at night. The attacks were carried out on the front of the front of the 1st Marine Regiment.

Did not stop the raids of enemy aviation on port. It did not pass the day so that there would be no victims. Sometimes crazy shell rushed in places of concentration of wounded, thirsting landing on transport. In many places Odessa burned ... Having, obviously, information about the extreme voltage of the forces defending, caused by big losses, the enemy decided, by all means, to make the last throw for breakthrough and to seize Odessa "by any forces and means", as ordered Antonesska at the meeting of officers in the benefit.

On the night of September 3, all over the front of the enemy fell a weak defense link. In the eastern sector, he attacked along the railway towards Korsouns. The 421th division not only kept his position, but also hit the opponent from the village of Protopopovka. In the Western sector, focusing large forces, the enemy tried to break through the defense line of the 95th Rifle Division. Repeatedly moving into a bayonet counterattack, our parts did not allow a breakthrough.

The next day, the front line would be broken if they were not rapidly delivered by ships by the ships by the marching battalions from Sevastopol. As soon as they arrived in Odessa, they immediately, not expecting darkness, directed machines to the front edge.

The position in the besieged Odessa meanwhile deteriorated. On September 12, the enemy continued to focus the troops in the area of \u200b\u200bLenintal and made attempts to expand the breakthrough and enter the dry estuary area.
As a result of the opponent's occurrence on the farm October and an important in the Western sector, our 245th and 161th rifle regiments moved to new frontiers. In the southern sector, part of the 25th Chapaevskaya and the 2nd cavalry divisions held their positions, but the 31st rifle regiment was dumped with an opponent.

The enemy aviation bombed and mined the port. In the port on this day, 121 were killed and 162 people were injured. The hospitals were delivered 1364 wounded, and 1209 wounded were evacuated on ships and transport.
All the next day, the enemy tried to expand the breakthrough on the site of the Chapayev division in the direction of the southern outskirts of the range and farms Bulgarian. Everything said that the Natisk enemy is strengthened, and our forces melted. In the battalions of the 90th and 287th rifle regiments, there were in the ranks of 50-60 fighters, and only 300 people remained from the 7th cavalry regiment. A real danger has been brewing: due to the complete absence of reserves, individual sites could completely be offended. To strengthen OOP, the rate decided to transfer from Novorossiysk 157 - I'm a rifle division.

In the morning on September 15, the opponent began offensive three infantry divisions. And after three days, our offensive began. Cruiser "Red Caucasus" and "Red Crimea", having delivered landing from Sevastopol and securing his disembarking, then by order of the fleet commander went back.

Maintenance of the upcoming fire "Boy", "impeccable" and "merciless". The adjustment posts promoted with the marines continuously directed their fire.

The landing of the landing in Grigorievka and the offensive actions of the 421st and 157th divisions were successful. The 13th and 15th Infantry Divisions of the enemy were crushed, captured prisoners and trophies: 40 guns of various caliber, a four-cruise battery, having fired at Odessa, mortars, machine guns, a lot of equipment and ammunition. The enemy lost a bridgehead from which the artillery fire in the city and port. Successful offensive in the eastern sector of the front and strengthening defense of the 157th rifle division wrapped all defenders of Odessa, and an opponent's attacks around the front in the morning on September 23 no longer caused great anxiety.

homemade tank "nor" - on the fright (decorative gun)

On September 26, the enemy, focusing at the Perekop Isthmus to two infantry divisions and to a hundred tanks, after artillery and aviation preparation, passed on the offensive over the front and mastered the Turkish shaft and Armenian. At the same time, the enemy persistently enhanced pressure on Odessa. Intelligence raised that he focused against seven infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade against one of the southern sector and a cavalry brigade and prepares in the direction of Lenintal - Tatarka. Still lacked shells, the Boezapas had to save. The ammunition arriving by the sea covered only current costs.

On the evening of September 25, the opponent led an offensive on a new recovery. Artilleryrs helped to beat off the attack. At night, the enemy repeated it, and the 3rd regiment was forced to move away. Having turned into a counterattack, he returned a new recovery, but it demanded a large cost of shells.

Situation on the Crimean Peninsula continued to worsen, Therefore, the Soviet command decided: "Due to the threat of the loss of the Crimean Peninsula, representing the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, and in view of the fact that at present the army is not able to simultaneously defend the Crimean Peninsula and the Odessa defensive area. The bid of the Supreme Commands decided evacuate OOP and at the expense of his troops to strengthen the defense of the Crimean Peninsula. "

Brigadd Commissioner M. G. Kuznetsov, Division Commissioner F. N. Voronin, Division Commissioner I. I. Azarov, Lieutenant General G. P. Sofronov, Council Admiral G. V. Zhukov, Regiment Commissioner L. P. Bocharov and Brigadd Commissioner A. G. Kolybanov

While the struggle behind the Crimea went on a silence, it remained the opportunity to organize troops from Odessa and strengthen the defense of the Crimea. With the loss of Crimea, the meaning was lost to keep Odessa, because to supply Odessa from the Caucasus if the enemy will capture the Crimean airfields, it will be almost impossible.

Of course, the defenders of Odessa were insulting to leave the city on the eve of the prepared offensive, strong, surrounded by combat experience, to leave Odessa, for which so much blood is shed.

Odessa lived the thought that the army is about to discard the enemy. Residents were preparing for the winter campaign: vegetables were prepared, they were engaged in savory, cared for the production of iron furnaces, they took into account fuel; There was already sewn about ten thousand warm wrens, sharovar, hats. From September 15, in accordance with the decision of the city executive committee in the departed city began academic year. More than 2,000 children studied in the catacombs specially equipped for this purpose.

But the decision to evacuation was final ... The drug addicts to the fact that at the evacuation of Odessa did not repeat the tragedy of Tallinn, and demanded a secretiveness, at least at the beginning of it. Before leaving the last echelon, it was ordered to strike a strong blow to the enemy, creating the visibility of the offensive, and thereby force him at the time of our care to engage in order. It was necessary to prepare all military facilities in advance to explode and arsogue.

Evacuation of the population

Evacuation began on October 1. Initially, the evacuation plan was designed for 20 days, but the situation did not allow hesitate, pull with evacuation. At any time, an unexpected enemy could happen at a strong enemy. Before the four Soviet divisions, standing in the defense, there were 18 enemy divisions. The enemy could at any time with a decisive blow to break through our defense, so the evacuation was decided to finish by October 15. In this case in no case should have been to move on the following frontiers, and immediately begin preparations for sudden care of troops from the front edge for landing for transport and ships.

In the first 10 days of evacuation, 52 thousand people were taken out, more than 200 artillery guns - from 152 to 45 mm, 488 mortars, 3260 horses, more than 1 thousand cars and tractors, 16 aircraft, Miscellaneous Military Property and Technical Cargo, Including more than 18 thousand tons of equipment of factories. Then, another 45 thousand people were evacuated to the remaining five days. From 12 o'clock on October 15, the Military Council moved his team point to the cruiser "Chervona Ukraine", from where he began to lead the coagulation of the Odessa defensive area. This is the same, on the cruiser, later the considerable part of the Ariergard came.

Lögio cruiser "Chervona Ukraine"

To mislead the enemy, the departure time was envisaged methodical fire artillery Cover, first in areas before the front edge, and then in the depths of the opponent's defense. On the night of October 16, coastal and anti-aircraft batteries, covered with the waste of the terrigum parts, were blown up. Those who undermined them were delivered to the port on cars, the larger part of the batteries' personal composition went on the boats to the schunam waiting on the raid. Our sailors were able to bring to Sevastopol strongly damaged from the raid of the fascist aircraft ship "Georgia"By delivering more than 3 thousand people on it and 300 tons of valuable cargo.

The ship "Georgia"

Since the evacuation of Odessa was held secretly, very well and organized by a sudden departure from the front edge, the opponent's aviation did not appear above the courts, and the cover of the ships was carried out operational group Of the 62 of our fighters.

Memorial defenders Odessa

The article is written on materials of the book Azarov I.I. "The deposited Odessa", Odessa, ed. "Lighthouse",