Let's take a look at its effectiveness and the effectiveness of armored forces. Taking the most accurate criterion of efficiency as a point of account - the number of destroyed enemy soldiers.
I'm not going to calculate the number of tanks, guns and mortars that took part in the battles to one. It's not needed. We are interested in the order of the numbers.
To avoid screaming, we will take the most kosher initial figures from the tables of reference work:
Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense
Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU
Institute General History Academy of Sciences of the USSR
Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR
HISTORY
WORLD WAR II
1939-1945
Order of the Red Banner of Labor
Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense
Moscow.
And we will not even look closely at them, although honestly I really want to say. Ask what and how they counted in these tables.
The most massive German artillery system, the 75 mm anti-tank gun RAK.40, was produced from 1942 to 1945, a total of 23303 units were produced (2114, 8740, 11728 and 721, respectively. All figures for Shirokorad).
The most common Wehrmacht howitzer, the cornerstone of divisional artillery - 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18 (in all modifications) was released during the WWII in the number of 18432 units (since 1939 - 483, 1380, 1160, 1249, 4103, 9033, 1024).
Approximately a comparable number of 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns were fired.
Let's not waste time on trifles. As a basis for calculations, we take tables No. 6 and No. 11 above, with general data.
About amendments to tables.
As we know, the Allies supplied tanks and artillery through the Lend-Lease and in fairly large quantities. We will neglect these figures, we will count them for the post-war issue of tables.
Let us also remember that at the beginning of the war there were 117,581 artillery systems and almost 26,000 tanks in the Red Army and Navy, let's drop these figures into the offset of weapons of the districts that did not participate in the war, the Far Eastern Front and other little things in life. On the German side, we will balance the captured weapons of the countries seized by Hitler and the entire production of weapons and military equipment up to 1940 inclusive. In general, we will calculate the efficiency based on the 1941-1945 production.
We consider (Germany-USSR):
Artillery (all in thousand units):
1941: 22.1 - 30.2; 1942 40.5 - 127.1; 1943 73.7 -130.3; 1944 148.2 -122.4; 1945 27 - 72.2.
Mortars:
1941: 4.2 - 42.4; 1942 9.8 - 230; 1943 23 - 69.4; 1944 33.2 -7.1; 1945 2.8 - 3.
Tanks (self-propelled guns):
1941: 3.8-4.8; 1942 6.2-24.4; 1943 10.7-24.1; 1944 18.3-29; 1945 4.4 - 20.5.
Total:
Artillery:
311,5 - 482,2
Mortars:
73 - 351,9
Tanks (self-propelled guns):
43,4 - 102,8
Or:
427,9 - 936,9
.
In general, the USSR produced more than double the number of tanks, guns and mortars than Germany. But that is not all! As my readers probably know, the USSR was not at war with Germany alone. And whether anyone likes it or not, Hitler's losses on the Western Front (I will equate West Africa with him) are about a third of the total during WWII.
Since this material will spoil a lot of chairs at Internet potsreots, I will be kind, let us assume that although the aforementioned weapons and military equipment were involved in the West, a quarter of its total number was used.
3/4 of 427.9, this is approximately 321 thousand tanks, artillery systems and mortars who killed the soldiers of the Red Army and 936,9 killing Wehrmacht soldiers.
Let's round the numbers to 320 000 and 930 000 accordingly, for simplicity of further calculations. Even 350 000 and 900 000 ... Let's remember about the allies of the Reich.
Now we find out how many of each other's servicemen were killed.
Regarding the losses of the Soviet Union, curious people can go on reference and will get acquainted with the calculations that slightly refute Grigory Fedotovich Krivosheev, with the same ones as his initial ones.
I must say that shadow_ru The mistakes of "Griff ..." are far from being alone, with the calculations in the balance of the re-called, with a giggle (already) have been procrastinating among people interested in the issue since at least 2006. In general, everyone who needs to know about these more than 2 million fighters, but no one in the government is interested in this.
Total reliable figure of irrecoverable demographic losses of the USSR Armed Forces (calculated by the balance method without Krivosheevsky errors with balance) - 11 405 thousand people.
With the loss of the enemy in "Vulture ..." is also a very funny situation, for example the result of viewing the last edition... This is just aerobatics, to recognize the figures of the German explorer Rüdiger Overmans as kosher and start to bring a new balance like this:
"After 2000, German scientists headed by the historian Professor Rüdiger Overmans carried out many years of work on a thorough analysis of reporting and statistical documents stored in the archives of Germany. As a result of the study, it was found that the total irrecoverable losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to 5 million 300 thousand soldiers and officers. This information is published in the book "German military losses in World War II", Munich.
Taking into account the results of the study of German scientists, the authors of this work have made appropriate adjustments to the previously available information about the irrecoverable losses of the countries of the fascist bloc on the Soviet-German front. They are reflected in table. 94".
Tab. 94 corresponds to table. 201 editions "Russia and the USSR ..." and instead of 3 604.8 thousand killed, died from wounds, etc.
Further, the authors conclude that the ratio of irrecoverable losses was 1: 1.1 (previously it was 1: 1.3).
Mega-perederg, you will not say anything. For Overmans, this number is the total number of those killed, killed and died on all fronts, as well as in captivity.
In this situation, if Grigory Fedotovich again made a slight mistake by 2 million people, it is logical to refer to the figures he recognized as reliable, directly... So to speak, without intermediaries:
Roughly, the Wehrmacht and SS troops lost 3.55 million people in the East, killed in action and died in captivity.
The ratio of 11.405 million versus 3.55 is certainly unpleasant, but we must not forget that about 3.9 million Soviet soldiers died in captivity. In Overmans, as you can be sure, only post-war mortality is highlighted, but this is normal, in the first half of the war the Germans were able to be taken prisoner extremely badly, respectively, their frantic mortality is quite comparable to the mortality in the German VP camps in the same period, later, when the attitude towards them improved didn't really matter. Let's take the total number of Germans who died in Soviet captivity at 205,000. Too lazy to look for an exact figure.
In general, the mortality figures of 46, 47 and further years are practically only the Soviet Union, the allies dispersed the bulk of the Boshes to their homes by the end of 1945.
As a result, on the Eastern Front, approximately 7.5 million Soviet soldiers and approximately 3.7 million servicemen of Germany and its allies perished in battles (130,000 Romanians, 195,000 Hungarians, 58,000 Finns - I don't know how G.F. 682,000, I don't think the rest are Slovaks)
And now we count the efficiency.
Not so long ago, a book by Christoph Russ was published "Human material. German soldiers on the Eastern Front" (M., Veche, 2013, ISBN 978-5-9533-6092-0) concerning the 253rd Infantry Division operating in the east.
The impressions can be read. Among other things, it gives the ratio of shrapnel and bullet wounds among the military personnel of the division, 60 to 40%. The infantry division for 4 years of the war is a very good sample, and we dance from it.
We multiply 3.7 million troops of the Reich and its allies by 0.6, we get 2.22 million invaders who died from shrapnel wounds - mostly from artillery fire. Although the figure is very optimistic, the Finns have a ratio of bullet wounds to shrapnel wounds following the results of the Continuation Wars 69% to 31%. We drop 120,000 on losses from aviation and estimate losses from artillery (including tanks) and mortar fire at about 2 million souls... We'll drop another 100,000 on grenades. Everything here is greatly overestimated, but let it be. I will save the hearts of the saviors of my homeland.
Based on Ozeretskovsky's "Wound Ballistics", on the other side of the front, on average, during the war, approximately the same ratio was observed, adjusted for a higher mortality rate from shrapnel wounds (scan.
2,000,000 / 900,000 = 2.22 people.
4,275,000 / 350,000 = 12.21 people
.
I kiss on the forehead. The effectiveness of enemy tanks and artillery in terms of a mortar or gun crew, platoon, battery or tank there exceeded the Soviet one by about 6 (six) times.
If anyone wants, we can jointly repeat the calculations not with approximate, but with exact numbers.
I can't imagine how this ratio can be lowered at least to 1: 5. But maybe I'm wrong?
It is possible to further glorify the personnel policy of the most effective manager of the century in the 20s and the first half of the 30s with "politically valuable" graduates of artillery schools, even when they graduate, they have no idea of logarithms. Obviously not atheists could expect miracles in this world.
EXPERIENCE TEACHING ARTILLERS
For centuries, artillerymen and engineers strived to make the artillery weapon technically perfect. How much effort, perseverance and hard work it took to do this. But these works were not in vain. Now our artillery can successfully solve all the tasks that arise in front of it in battle.The weapon, no matter how perfect it may be, by itself cannot decide the fate of the battle. One must be able to correctly apply it in battle, be able to derive the greatest benefit from it.
The largest technical improvements in artillery have usually come about as a result of wars; in battles and battles, new principles of the combat use of artillery were born.
During the war, mistakes were corrected, new methods of using artillery in combat were tested in practice. The experience of the civil war was very valuable in this respect.
At the beginning of the Civil War, artillery was used in battle in the old way - the way it was used to using it at the end of the First World War. In connection with the new forms of combat, it was necessary to use artillery in a completely new way. The old tactics of artillery were replaced by tactics of flexible maneuver and a decisive concentration of artillery in the direction of the main attack of the troops.
The following examples show how old obsolete traditions were broken in the combat use of artillery. In October 1918, the 70,000-strong White Guard army of General Krasnov, armed and equipped by the Germans, surrounded Tsaritsyn and pressed the heroic defenders of the city to the banks of the Volga. The number of Soviet troops defending Tsaritsyn did not exceed 50 thousand people. The stock of shells and cartridges of the defenders of the city was coming to an end, and the routes of communication with Moscow and the Caucasus were cut off by the White Guards. The situation was difficult. On October 16, the White Guards occupied the Voroponovo station, located just 10 kilometers west of the city, and continued to advance, bombarding the Red Army units with shells. Due to the lack of shells and rifle cartridges, the heroic defenders of Tsaritsyn more and more often had to fight back with bayonets and sabers. By the end of the day on October 16, the front was already 7 kilometers from the city. Towards evening, our observers noticed that new military units had arrived to help the White Guards. As it turned out later, a White Guard officer brigade of about a thousand people approached the front.
This is a critical moment. Tsaritsyn was in mortal danger.
In this difficult moment, Comrade Stalin, who personally led the defense of Tsaritsyn on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, mobilized all forces and means to repulse the enemy. Almost all artillery pieces and ammunition were concentrated in the central sector of the front opposite Voroponovo station.
On a 40-kilometer front, there were about 200 guns. Almost all of them were now drawn to the central sector of the front. The batteries stood only a few dozen paces apart, preparing to repel the attack of the White Guards.
At dawn, the white artillery opened fire, and soon moved to the attack and their infantry. The officers' regiments marched in full dress uniform, chain by chain, column by column. Ahead was the officer's brigade, followed by the regiments of General Krasnov. The White Guards counted on the fact that the Red Army men would not stand, that the mere sight of a mass of armed men steadily moving forward would demoralize them. The artillery of the Red Army was silent: it was waiting for a prearranged signal. Already the advanced lines of the Whites, half a kilometer from our infantry ... Already only 400 meters remain ... Every second one could expect that the White Guards' chains would change from a quick step to a swift run and go over to the attack. At that moment, a signal was given: 4 high bursts of shrapnel - 4 bright white clouds of smoke hanging in the clear morning sky. And after that the whole steppe rumbled. The sounds of gunfire and the explosions of shells merged into a continuous, continuous rumble. Each battery fired at its assigned sector of the front, and all together created a solid wall of fire. The shells exploded in the thick of the advancing enemy columns. Having suffered heavy losses, the White Guards lay down. They were stopped, but not yet defeated. At that time, an armored train approached from the north along the circular railway line; on the right and left flanks of the front sector, trucks, converted into armored vehicles and armed with machine guns, burst forward; the batteries moved the fire into the depths of the White Guards in order to cut off the escape routes of their forward units. The red infantry launched a counterattack. She moved quickly forward. And as the artillery carried the fire farther and farther, the still smoking battlefield, strewn with the corpses of the White Guards and plowed by shells, opened before the eyes of the observers. The half-destroyed White Guard regiments in disarray rolled back south and west, scattered across the steppe. The siege ring was broken. Red Tsaritsyn was saved. In 1919, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Stalin directed the rout of the White Guard troops of General Yudenich, who were rushing to Petrograd. The position of the Soviet troops was complicated by the fact that in the rear of the Red Army, at the forts "Krasnaya Gorka" and "Seraya Horse", a counterrevolutionary mutiny was raised. It was impossible to take the well-armed forts by storm, advancing only from land with the support of a small number of artillery. Comrade Stalin proposed to attack the rebellious forts with a combined strike from land and sea, using the powerful artillery of the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Comrade Stalin's plan was approved and implemented. The suppression of the rebellious forts was carried out brilliantly. The rebellious forts, which could not withstand the powerful blows of naval artillery, were taken by Red Army units and detachments of Baltic sailors and St. Petersburg workers. Yudenich's army was defeated and its remnants were driven back to Estonia. Powerful support was provided by artillery to infantry on the Southern Front, when troops under the leadership of MV Frunze stormed Perekop. The artillery of the First Cavalry Army also acted boldly and decisively, showing examples of skillful interaction with cavalry and high maneuverability on the battlefield. Studying the experience of past wars helped our party and the Soviet Government correctly outline further steps towards the development of Soviet artillery and clearly define the tasks that artillery must solve in battle. The rearmament of artillery with new types of guns, which followed in 1937 and 1938, contributed to a significant increase in its power. The force of the crushing blows of the Soviet artillery was soon experienced by the enemies of our Motherland, who dared to encroach on the inviolability of the borders of the Soviet country. In the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 and in the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939/40, our artillery provided powerful support to infantry and tanks, hit the enemy's manpower, destroyed his military equipment and destroyed his powerful engineering structures.
The Communist Party and the Soviet Government also tirelessly cared about the education of well-trained artillery cadres devoted to the cause of the Party and our Socialist Motherland. In 1937, on the day when the Soviet people honored their aviation and celebrated its successes, Comrade which pointed out the importance of artillery in modern warfare: “It is not only about aviation in modern warfare. The success of a war is decided not only by aviation. Who thinks that with the help of one powerful aircraft; you can win a war - deeply mistaken. If we look into history, we will see what an important role artillery played in all wars. Aircraft on the battlefield appeared relatively recently; it begins the first fight with the enemy in the deep rear, inspires fear and panic, shakes the enemy morally, but this is not what is required for the final defeat and victory over the enemy. Artillery was always required to decide the success of a war. How did Napoleon win? First of all, with its artillery. How were the French defeated in 1870 at Sedan? Mainly artillery. How did the French beat the Germans at Verdun in the World War? - Mainly artillery. For the success of the war, artillery is an exceptionally valuable branch of the armed forces. " To make our artillery first-class, many conditions were required. What was needed was, first of all, a powerful industry equipped with last word technology. Experienced designers were needed who fully mastered modern science; we needed engineers, technicians and workers, metallurgists, mathematicians, mechanics, ootics, electrical engineering, radio engineering ... The industrialization of the country, carried out under the leadership of our Communist Party, brought success to the business. Without the development of heavy industry, we would not have had such a powerful artillery that has earned the honorable name - the main fire strike force of the Soviet Army. During the years of the first five-year plans, scientific research work was widely developed, which ensured a high technical level of our artillery. Institutes and technical schools have trained thousands of engineers and technicians. Cadres of skilled artillerymen were also trained. Thanks to the concerns of the Communist Party, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Army had first-class artillery, which in every respect surpassed the artillery of any of the capitalist countries. During the war, work on the creation of new types of artillery weapons expanded even more widely. As you know, in the first two years of the war, the Nazis had to strengthen the armor protection of their tanks: it turned out that their armor was easily penetrated by Soviet artillery shells. In 1943, on the Soviet-German front, new powerful tanks appeared with the "fearsome" names "tiger" and "panther". Their armor was very thick and durable. It was necessary very quickly to create a new anti-tank weapon "that could penetrate the armor of powerful Nazi tanks. In a very short time, such a weapon was created. The new gun appeared on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and immediately gained great popularity among Soviet soldiers; this gun pierced the armor of all tanks and self-propelled guns that were in service with the Nazi army. Ground and anti-aircraft artillery was armed with new materiel. Rocket mortars entered service, the appearance of which on the battlefield was a complete surprise to the Nazis. Soviet artillery was also well equipped with all types of reconnaissance and communications equipment and fire control devices.
Even in the period of defensive battles with superior enemy forces, the Communist Party foresaw a radical turn in the course of the war on the Soviet-German front and prepared the Soviet Army for the final defeat of the enemy. In the upcoming battles, artillery, with its massed fire, was supposed to destroy enemy fortifications, suppress enemy fire weapons, exterminate manpower and clear the way for our infantry, cavalry and tanks. In the battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery successfully coped with all these tasks,
THE REAR HELPS THE FRONT
To conduct a modern war requires a lot of military equipment and especially artillery weapons. War requires constant replenishment of the materiel and ammunition of the army and, moreover, many times more than in peacetime. In wartime, not only do defense factories increase their output, but also many “peaceful” factories switch to defense work. Without the powerful economic foundation of the Soviet state, without the selfless labor of our people in the rear, without the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, without their material and moral support, the Soviet Army would not have been able to defeat the enemy. The first months of the Great Patriotic War were very difficult for our industry. The unexpected attack of the German fascist invaders and their advance to the east forced the evacuation of factories from the western regions of the country to a safe zone - to the Urals and Siberia. The movement of industrial enterprises to the east was carried out according to plans and under the leadership of the State Defense Committee. At remote stations and half-stations, in the steppe, in the taiga, new factories grew with fabulous speed. The machines started working in the open air as soon as they were installed on the foundation; the front demanded military products, and there was no time to wait for the completion of the construction of factory buildings. Among others, artillery factories were deployed. The speech of the Chairman of the State Committee played a huge role in strengthening our rear and mobilizing the masses to defend the Motherland. Defense of J. V. Stalin on the radio on July 3, 1941. In this speech, JV Stalin, on behalf of the Party and the Soviet Government, called on the Soviet people to reorganize all work on a war footing as soon as possible. “We must,” said JV Stalin, “strengthen the rear of the Red Army, subordinating all our work to the interests of this cause, ensure the intensified work of all enterprises, produce more rifles, machine guns, guns, cartridges, shells, aircraft, organize the protection of factories. power stations, telephone and telegraph communications, establish local air defense. " The Communist Party quickly rebuilt the entire national economy, all the work of the Party, state and public organizations in a military way. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, our people were able not only to fully provide the front with weapons and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserves for the successful completion of the war. Our party has transformed the Soviet country into a single military camp, armed the home front workers with an unshakable faith in victory over the enemy. Labor productivity has increased tremendously; new improvements in production technology have sharply reduced the time required to manufacture weapons for the army; the output of artillery weapons increased significantly, and the quality of artillery weapons was continuously improved.The calibers of tank and anti-tank artillery guns have increased. Initial speeds have increased significantly. The armor-piercing ability of Soviet artillery shells has increased several times. The maneuverability of artillery systems has been significantly increased. The most powerful self-propelled artillery in the world was created, armed with such heavy weapons as a 152 mm howitzer cannon and a 122 mm cannon. Particularly great successes were achieved by Soviet designers in the field of jet
Neither fascist artillery nor fascist tanks could compete with Soviet artillery and tanks, although the Nazis plundered all of Western Europe, and the scientists and designers of Western Europe mostly worked for the Nazis. The Nazis had the largest metallurgical plants in Germany (Krupp plants) and many other plants in European states occupied by Hitler's troops. And nevertheless, neither the industry of the whole of Western Europe, nor the experience of many Western European scientists and designers could provide the Nazis with superiority in the field of creating new military equipment.
Thanks to the care of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, a whole galaxy of talented designers has been grown in our country, who, during the war, created new types of weapons with exceptional speed.
The talented artillery designers V.G. Grabin, F.F.Petrov, I.I. Ivanov and many others created new, perfect models of artillery weapons.
The design work was carried out at the factories as well. During the war, factories produced many prototypes of artillery weapons; a significant part of them went into mass production.
For the Second World War, a lot of weapons were required, incomparably more than for past wars. For example, in one of the greatest battles of the past, the Battle of Borodino, two armies - Russian and French - had a total of 1227 guns.
At the beginning of the First World War, the armies of all the belligerent countries had 25,000 guns, which were scattered on all fronts. The artillery saturation of the front was insignificant; only in some areas of the breakthrough, up to 100–150 guns were collected per kilometer of the front.
The situation was different during the Great Patriotic War. When the enemy blockade of Leningrad was broken in January 1944, 5000 guns and mortars from our side took part in the battle. When the powerful enemy defenses were broken through on the Vistula, 9,500 guns and mortars were concentrated on the 1st Belorussian Front alone. Finally, during the storming of Berlin, 41,000 Soviet artillery pieces and mortars fell on the enemy.
In some battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery fired more shells in one day of battle than the Russian army used up during the entire war with Japan in 1904-1905.
How many defense factories had to be, how fast they had to work in order to produce such a huge amount of guns and ammunition How skillfully and accurately the transport had to work in order to continuously transfer countless cannons and shells to the battlefields!
And the Soviet people coped with all these difficult tasks, inspired by their love for the Motherland, for the Communist Party, for their Government.
Soviet factories during the war produced huge quantities of guns and ammunition. Back in 1942, in just one month, our industry produced much more guns of all calibers than the Russian army had at the beginning of the First World War.
Thanks to the heroic labor of the Soviet people, the Soviet Army received a continuous stream of first-class artillery weapons, which in the skillful hands of our artillerymen became the decisive force that ensured the defeat of Nazi Germany and the victorious end of the war. During the war, our domestic industry increased its production from month to month and supplied the Soviet Army in increasing quantities with tanks and aircraft, ammunition and equipment.
The artillery industry annually produced up to 120,000 guns of all calibers, up to 450,000 light and heavy machine guns, over 3 million rifles and about 2 million submachine guns. In 1944 alone, 7 billion 400 million cartridges were produced.
The Soviet people, selflessly working in the rear, helped the Soviet Army to defend the freedom and independence of our Motherland and saved the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement.
The victory of our country in the Great Patriotic War talking about vitality the Soviet social system, about the invincibility of the cause for which the Soviet people fought under the leadership of our party, making the Great October Socialist Revolution.
The great strength of the leadership of the Communist Party ensured the Soviet people complete victory over a powerful and insidious enemy in the most difficult of all wars that mankind has ever had to wage.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party appeared before all the peoples of the Soviet Union as the inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the fascist invaders. The organizational work of the Party brought together and directed all the efforts of the Soviet people towards a common goal, subordinating all forces and means to the cause of defeating the enemy. During the war, the party became even closer to the people, and became even more closely connected with the broad masses of the working people.
SOVIET ARTILLERY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
We have already said that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, our army had first-class artillery, which in all respects surpassed the artillery of any foreign army. Soviet artillery personnel were well trained and distinguished by high moral qualities.
In the initial period of the war, our artillery with its fire repelled the attacks of enemy tanks, which were the main striking force of the German fascist army, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, helped our infantry to stop the enemy and gain a foothold on advantageous lines.
How did the artillery solve its combat missions?
When Hitler's armored hordes attacked our homeland, they met stubborn resistance and well-aimed fire from Soviet artillery, which took on the brunt of the fight against enemy tanks. Our artillery was the force that helped the Soviet Army to thwart Hitler's plans for a "lightning-fast" defeat of our Motherland.
For a more successful fight against Nazi tanks, it was necessary to form new anti-tank artillery units. Special anti-tank artillery units were formed, which played a crucial role in the defeat of enemy tanks.
Bravely defending the prepared lines, the Soviet artillerymen dealt blow after blow to the enemy. Each city, which the enemy approached, turned into a fortress, on the approaches of which selected German fascist units perished. The legendary defense of the hero cities: Odessa, Leningrad, Sevastopol, Stalingrad has forever gone down in history.
In all defensive battles, artillery with its fire ensured the strength of the defense of our troops. When defending Leningrad and Sevastopol, along with hired artillery, coastal and naval artillery successfully operated, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.
Soviet artillery became especially famous in the battles on the outskirts of Moscow, for the capture of which the Nazis threw 51 divisions, including 13 tank and 5 motorized ones, in order to defeat the Soviet Army and, having captured Moscow, end the war before the onset of the winter of 1941.
For twenty days in a row, the battle on the outskirts of the capital of our Motherland did not subside for an hour. The artillerymen courageously fought against fascist tanks, set fire to and knocked out armored vehicles in dozens and hundreds. One of the regiments of anti-tank artillery destroyed 186 enemy tanks on the outskirts of Moscow. For the courage shown in the battles against the German fascist invaders, for the perseverance, courage and heroism of the glorious destroyers of enemy tanks, this regiment was transformed into the 1st Guards Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment.
The Soviet troops, having crushed the enemy's striking forces, stopped it, "and then, pulling up and concentrating the reserves, on December 6, 1941, launched a counteroffensive. Near Moscow and in other sectors of the front, the enemy was defeated and thrown back far to the west. During these battles, the enemy suffered huge losses. During the first 40 days of our offensive, the Nazis lost only 300,000 soldiers and officers killed, hundreds of tanks, guns and mortars, thousands of cars and many other weapons and military equipment.
The defeat of the enemy armies near Moscow was of great importance for the further course of the war. For the first time during the Second World War, the fascist troops were not only stopped, but completely defeated. As a result of the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the German fascist army was dispelled.
Assessing the role of artillery in the defensive battles of the Soviet Army near Moscow and Leningrad, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin wrote in an order dedicated to the celebration of Artillery Day on November 19, 1944: “As you know, artillery was the force that helped the Red Army stop the enemy's advance near approaches to Leningrad and Moscow ".
SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLES OF STALINGRAD
At the beginning of the book, we already mentioned what role it played: Soviet artillery in the Battle of Stalingrad. The role of our artillery was so great that it is necessary to tell about it in a little more detail.
Having suffered defeat near Moscow and in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the Nazis hastily began to prepare a new offensive against the Soviet Union. They wanted to break through our defenses, bypass Moscow from the east, cut it off from the Volga and Ural rear, and then strike at Moscow. In this adventurous plan of the fascists, the capture of Stalingrad was envisaged. To accomplish this task, the Hitlerite command concentrated on the Stalingrad direction huge forces of infantry, tanks, self-propelled artillery, aviation: and many other military equipment.
The fascist command decided to launch an offensive with the expectation of capturing Stalingrad by July 25, and capturing Kuibyshev by August 15 and ending the war in the east by the winter of 1942. The Nazis began to carefully prepare for the offensive. The breakthrough of the front was planned in the direction of Voronezh and Stalingrad.
In developing their plans, the Hitlerites hoped that the American-British imperialists would not come to the aid of the Soviet Union, that they would not land their troops on the coast of France in order to create a second front against Nazi Germany.
Indeed, the American-British imperialists were constantly postponing the opening of a second front in Europe; they wanted to exhaust and weaken the Soviet Union in such a way that after the war our country would fall into economic dependence on the United States of America and England.
In addition, they hoped that a difficult war with the Soviet Union would weaken Hitlerite Germany; which was the most dangerous competitor of the USA and England in the world market.
On July 24, 1941, in the New York Times, US Senator Truman, who later became President of the United States, wrote: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning, then we should help Germany ... And thus, let them kill as much as possible. "
In violation of their allied obligations, the American-British imperialists secretly negotiated peace with fascist Germany with the Soviet Union.
In the days of the heavy battles of Stalingrad, the American-British imperialists had under arms about six million inactive soldiers and huge masses of military equipment. These forces and means could “provide substantial assistance to the Soviet Army, but in the summer of 1942 the American-British reactionaries raised a fuss in their newspapers that American and British troops were not prepared to open a second front in Europe.
By this they made it clear to Hitler that he could concentrate all his forces against our army without fearing for his rear.
At the same time, the imperialists of the United States and Britain supplied Hitlerite Germany with the most important military materials through "neutral" countries.
This is how the monopolists of the United States and Britain clearly and secretly helped Hitlerite Germany in her struggle against the Soviet Union.
Choosing the Stalingrad direction, the Nazis hoped that in the Stalingrad steppes they would be able to make the most extensive use of tank and mechanized troops, quickly complete the capture of Stalingrad and Kuibyshev and finally defeat the Soviet Army.
But they grossly miscalculated, they did not take into account the ability of our army to resist for a long time; Nor did they foresee the inexhaustible strength of our Soviet people, their unshakable will in striving to destroy the enemy.
The Supreme High Command promptly unraveled the plans of the Hitlerite command and developed a plan for the defeat of the fascist troops at Stalingrad. Soviet troops were tasked with exhausting and bleeding the German fascist troops rushing to Stalingrad in stubborn battles, and then encircling and destroying them. This plan was successfully implemented.
In the battles that unfolded between the bend of the Don and the Volga, our army inflicted strong blows on the German fascist troops, destroying selected Hitler regiments and divisions and delaying the advance of Hitler's troops. To cover the distance from the Don to Stalingrad, the Nazis had to wage bloody battles for about two months. Only in mid-September did the fascist German troops manage to approach the outskirts of the city.
At Stalingrad, the Nazis met resistance and stubbornness unprecedented in the history of warfare of the Soviet troops and workers of the Stalingrad enterprises.
The enemy threw division after division into battle, but all his attempts to capture the city were broken on the staunch defenses of our troops. The corpses of the Nazis were littered with the approaches to the city and the ruins of city blocks. The forces of the enemy were melting away. The heroic defenders of Stalingrad smashed "selected Hitlerite troops and prepared the conditions for their complete defeat.
Soviet artillery played a particularly large role in this battle, it waged a fierce and long-term struggle against the German fascist tank and mechanized troops on the far and near approaches to Stalingrad and delayed their advance. The artillerymen blocked the path of the enemy's infantry and tanks with the fire of their guns, inflicting enormous damage on him in manpower and equipment. By this, the artillery made it possible for our troops to prepare the defense of the city.
Artillery of all calibers took part in the heroic defense of Stalingrad, from small-caliber cannons to high-power guns. Together with ground artillery, our anti-aircraft artillery destroyed the enemy in the air and on the ground.
The interaction of artillery fire with infantry was very well organized. Defensive battles in Stalingrad were very active. Our units continuously counterattacked the enemy and kept him in a tense state, in constant expectation of an attack.
During September - October and the first half of November 1942, the Nazis made an average of 10 attacks per day. The struggle was fought for every inch of Soviet land, for every quarter, for every house, for every floor of a house. Soviet soldiers, including artillerymen, heroically defended the city. They turned every block, street, house into fortresses, which destroyed fresh reserves brought into battle by the Hitlerite command.
In the same months, the Nazis undertook 4 offensive operations, which lasted several days; they threw more than ten divisions into battle at once, supported by 400-500 tanks.
The German-fascist invaders managed to break into the city, but they could not completely seize it.
The defenders of Stalingrad remembered the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - "Stalingrad must not be surrendered to the enemy" - and tried at all costs to defend the glorious Soviet stronghold on the Volga. The soldiers of the Stalingrad Front wrote to Comrade Stalin: “Before our battle banners, before the entire Soviet country, we swear that we will not shame the glory of Russian weapons, we will fight to the last opportunity. Under your leadership, our fathers won the Tsaritsyn battle, under your leadership we will also win in the great battle of Stalingrad! " The defenders of Stalingrad kept this oath with honor.
Thousands of Stalingraders - residents of the city took part in street battles.
Here is one typical case. The Nazis tried to force a Russian woman to help them bypass the house, which was defended by our submachine gunners. This attempt cost the Nazis dearly. The woman led the enemy soldiers into the courtyard under the fire of our riflemen and shouted: "Shoot, comrades!" Almost all the Nazis were killed. One of the fascists, wounded, shot at a woman. When our arrows ran up to her, she said: "Still, I was not mistaken." Glory to the nameless heroine!
The defensive battles of the Soviet Army at Stalingrad were only the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad. Heroically resisting, the defenders of Stalingrad stopped the Nazi offensive in the Stalingrad direction.
The devastating fire of the Soviet artillery produced tremendous devastation in the enemy's position.
During the defensive battle, which lasted from mid-July to November 19, the Nazi armies were bled white. They lost 182,000 killed and over 500,000 wounded. In addition, our troops knocked out and destroyed 1,450 enemy tanks, 4,000 machine guns, over 2,000 guns and mortars. 1337 aircraft were destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery fire and fighter aircraft. All this reflected on the morale of the Nazis and made them talk about the "inaccessibility of the Stalingrad fortress", about the "Volga Verdun", about the "incomprehensible stubbornness of the Russians."
Lance corporal Walter wrote in a letter home: “Stalingrad is hell on earth, Verdun, Red Yerden with new weapons. We attack daily. If we manage to take 20 meters, then in the evening the Russians will throw us back. "
But, despite heavy losses, the Nazis decided to hold their positions at Stalingrad during the winter, and in the summer to start the offensive again in order to achieve their insane goal - to capture Moscow.
Even while fierce battles were going on in the streets of the city, our new units and formations were concentrated in the Stalingrad area, armed with new military equipment, capable of defeating the enemy.
To defeat the enemy, it was required to concentrate a large number of troops and military equipment. Especially a lot was needed for artillery, the main striking force of the advancing fronts. The artillery was supposed to break through the enemy's defenses with its fire and ensure the transition of our troops to the counteroffensive. In the silence of the night, the roar of engines could be heard incessantly. It was guns, tanks, cars moving towards the front, ”and there was no end in sight to the long columns of people and equipment. All preparations for the offensive were carried out in secret. The troops approached the front only at night. During the day they took refuge in settlements and in numerous gullies, carefully camouflaging themselves from aerial observers! enemy. Our troops carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. Soviet artillery reconnaissance did a great deal of work in the preparatory period. She identified important targets on which the artillery had to bring down its fire. Much attention was paid to organizing interaction between various branches of the armed forces.
Finally, by mid-November, preparations for the offensive were completed. The task was to surround and completely destroy all enemy divisions that had broken through to Stalingrad.
For this, our troops, in close cooperation, had to break through the front of the Nazis and defeat them in the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad, and then with a swift strike of mobile troops in the direction of the Don, encircle the Nazi hordes near Stalingrad and destroy them.
On November 19, 1942, according to a plan developed by the Supreme High Command, Soviet troops went over to a decisive counter-command.
Before the start of the infantry and tank offensive, an unprecedented artillery preparation was carried out. Thousands of guns and mortars rained down on enemy positions a huge amount of shells and mines. A sudden powerful fire strike was struck at the enemy's centers of resistance at the front line and in the depths of the defense, at its mortars and artillery batteries, at command posts, at reserves. The whole area was, as it were, plowed up by a gigantic plow of war. The surface of the earth was dug with many craters from the explosions of shells, mines and aerial bombs... Entire enemy units ran out of trenches and dugouts and rushed from side to side in panic, finding no escape. The losses of the fascists in manpower and equipment were enormous. Despite the fog that limited visibility, our artillery coped with its tasks perfectly.
Enemy trenches and fortifications were destroyed by massed artillery fire. On the first day of the offensive, artillery from only one front destroyed and suppressed 293 heavy machine guns, 100 artillery and 60 mortar batteries, destroyed 196 dugouts, 126 defensive structures. Artillery fire destroyed a lot of enemy soldiers and officers.
Having broken through the enemy's front, our troops began to advance rapidly. Our artillery moved along with the troops and did not lag behind them.
During the offensive, the Soviet artillerymen showed the high skill of controlling massive fire. They smashed enemy fortifications and accompanied our attacking infantry, cavalry and tanks with fire.
Thus began the rout of the Hitlerite army, a rout in which Soviet artillery played an outstanding role.
As a result of a well-organized infantry offensive in cooperation with artillery, tanks and cavalry, on November 23, a 330,000-strong group of selected German fascist troops was surrounded. The history of war knows no example of the encirclement and complete defeat of such a huge mass of troops armed with the latest technology.
In December 1942, Hitler turned to the encircled troops with a special order - he demanded at all costs to keep the position near Stalingrad.
The Hitlerite command made desperate attempts to save the encircled troops. To help them in the areas of Tormosino and Kotelnikovo, the Nazis created two strong groupings of troops, 8 divisions each, which were to break through the ring of Soviet troops around Stalingrad.
In December, our troops defeated both of these enemy groupings and continued to develop the offensive further and further west.
This is how the Nazis' attempts to liberate their encircled armies ended ingloriously.
Meanwhile, our troops, which surrounded the main group of the Nazis at Stalingrad, were preparing for its destruction.
In the last, decisive battle, according to the plan of our Supreme High Command, it was necessary to dismember the encircled enemy forces into parts and then destroy each isolated enemy grouping separately. The artillery was entrusted with the task of paving the way for infantry and tanks through the enemy's fortifications, suppressing and destroying his fire weapons and manpower.
On January 10, at 8:5 a.m., from the front commander's point, there was a command to begin the offensive. The air shuddered with the thunder of artillery cannon, which simultaneously began on the entire front. Squadrons of our bomber and assault aviation appeared in the sky.
The offensive of our troops was supported by strong artillery fire. The artillery was used in large masses and provided good fire for the actions of our infantry and tanks.
The sounds of shots and explosions of artillery shells, mines and aerial bombs merged into a continuous hum. Losses inflicted on the enemy
fire of our artillery, mortars and aviation, were very significant. According to the testimony of the prisoners, "whole battalions knelt down and turned to God with prayer, asking him to spare and protect them from the fire of Russian artillery."
Our tanks with the landing forces landed on them rushed towards the enemy; after them the rifle subunits went on the attack. For two weeks, units of the Soviet Army, advancing from the west, with fierce battles advanced east to Stalingrad and by the end of January 26, 1943, in the Mamayev Kurgan area, joined forces with General Chuikov's troops advancing from Stalingrad.
The fascist German troops were cut into two parts: the northern one in the area tractor plant and the Barricades plant and the southern one in the northwestern half of the city.
On January 31, the southern group of Hitler's troops was finally defeated; On February 1, our troops began an assault on the northern grouping of enemy forces. After the artillery preparation, the enemy's defense was broken, and on the next day our troops defeated this last enemy center of resistance. Our artillery fulfilled the tasks assigned to it with honor. Suffice it to say that in the period from January 10 to February 2, artillery fire
98 tanks were destroyed and burned, over 70 batteries were suppressed and destroyed, about 1000 wood-earthen emplacements and over 1500 dugouts were destroyed. Several tens of thousands of fascist invaders died under the explosions of shells and mines.
Our anti-aircraft artillery provided great assistance to the advancing troops. In the battles at Stalingrad, anti-aircraft artillery shot down 223 enemy aircraft and disabled a large number of aircraft.
The front commander reported to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that the destruction of the encircled Stalingrad grouping of enemy forces had been defeated ended at 16 o'clock on February 2, 1943.
The Battle of Stalingrad ended with the complete defeat of the 330,000-strong elite Hitlerite army, which consisted of 22 divisions.
The size of an unprecedented massacre in history is evidenced by the figures of the enemy's losses. At the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, 147,200 corpses of the killed Nazis were picked up and buried in the ground. In the period from January 10 to February 2, the front forces destroyed about 120,000 and captured 130,000 Nazi soldiers and officers.
In addition, it was captured: guns - 5762, mortars - 1312, machine guns - 12701, tanks - 1666, armored vehicles - 216 and many other property.
Thus ended one of the greatest battles in the history of warfare - the Battle of Stalingrad. In the battles of Stalingrad, the role of artillery in modern warfare as the most formidable weapon, as the main striking force of the Soviet Army, was especially clearly revealed. On the example of the Battle of Stalingrad, it became clear to what extent artillery must be used to achieve victory in a modern war. The Stalingrad victory showed how the military skill of our soldiers, officers and generals has grown.
The battle of Stalingrad put an end to the offensive of Hitler's troops into the interior of our country. The mass expulsion of the invaders from the Soviet land began. The word "Stalingrad" has become a symbol of the courage and heroism of the Soviet people. It resonated in the hearts of all honest people in the world and raised them to fight against fascism, to fight for their freedom and independence.
The defeat of the Hitlerite army at Stalingrad forced imperialist Japan and the secret ally of Nazi Germany, Turkey, to refrain from intending to openly oppose the Soviet Union.
SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE AT KURSK
Back in January - February 1943, our troops defeated the Nazis in the region of Voronezh and Kursk and threw the Nazi troops back far to the west.
In the outlines of the front, a ledge formed, which deeply went into the enemy's position. At this line, the front stabilized, and both belligerents began to prepare for summer hostilities.
Hitler's army intended to once again break through the front of the Soviet Army. By strikes from the north and south, the Nazis wanted to take the Kursk grouping of our army into "ticks" in order to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops concentrated in the Kursk region, to capture Kursk on the fifth day of the offensive, and then move to Moscow.
To imagine the scale of this battle, suffice it to say that the Nazi command concentrated in the Kursk direction: more than 430 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 3 thousand tanks, including new heavy tanks "Tiger" and self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", 6,763 guns, 3,200 mortars and 1,850 aircraft, including about a thousand bombers.
And this plan of the enemy was solved in a timely manner by the Soviet command. The necessary measures were taken to prevent the Hitlerite command from carrying out his plans. The troops defending Kursk were prepared for both defense and offensive.
The Soviet Army, taking into account its rich experience in the battles near Moscow and Stalingrad, was preparing for decisive battles with the enemy.
Our troops created powerful defenses in the areas of a possible offensive of the Nazis in order to wear out and bleed the enemy in defensive battles, and then go over to a decisive counteroffensive and defeat the enemy.
The gunners carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. They studied the experience of past battles, improved their skills, learned to beat the enemy for sure.
On the night of July 5, when the Nazis concentrated large forces for the offensive in the starting areas, our artillery, 10 minutes before the start of the offensive, made a powerful fire attack on the enemy. Several hundred guns suddenly dropped their shells on the German fascist positions. The artillery crushed the enemy infantry, his tank and motorized troops preparing for the offensive, as well as batteries, observation and command posts of the enemy.
The crushing fire of artillery and mortars inflicted huge losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment and lowered the morale of the fascist troops. As a result of a powerful artillery fire raid, the Nazis lost 90 artillery and mortar batteries, 10 ammunition and fuel depots were blown up, 60 observation posts were suppressed, many tanks and other military equipment were knocked out.
A surprise attack by our artillery and mortars upset the battle formations of enemy infantry and tanks. Having suffered heavy losses in artillery, the Nazis were forced to shift part of the artillery tasks to aviation. Only a few hours later did the Nazis come to their senses from the unexpected blow and were able to undertake their offensive.
And when the Nazis nevertheless went on the offensive with a large force of tanks and infantry, they met fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. The famous battle of Kursk began.
To the south of Orel and north of Belgorod, battles flared up, unprecedented in fierceness and in the number of military equipment used in them. In the northern direction from the Orel region, the Nazis threw into battle 7 tank, 2 motorized and 11 infantry divisions, and from the Belgorod area - 10 tank, one motorized and 7 infantry divisions, the bulk of which operated along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. Tanks and self-propelled guns were the first to go on the offensive. The infantry followed the tanks in armored personnel carriers. Enemy bombers in large groups, wave after wave, covered their advancing troops.
Despite the enormous forces, the Nazis were unable to break through our defenses. They were met with heavy massed fire from our artillery and defending troops. Enemy tanks took off into the air, exploding in minefields, caught fire from well-aimed shots of artillerymen and armor-piercers. Five times the Nazis rushed to the attack, but to no avail. Fierce fighting continued throughout the day. The enemy failed to achieve major successes. On the Oryol and Belgorod directions, at the cost of heavy losses, the fascist troops only wedged several kilometers into our location.
On July 11, a fierce tank battle unprecedented in its size unfolded again, in which more than 1,500 tanks and large air forces participated from both sides. In one day of the battle, the enemy lost over 400 tanks and did not advance a meter. Already on the seventh day after the start of the offensive, the northern grouping of troops was stopped, and on the twelfth day - and the southern one. By July 13, the Nazis, as a result of huge losses, were forced to end the offensive along the entire front. The new campaign against Moscow ended in complete failure for the Nazis.
The plan of the Hitlerite command collapsed. The stable, prearranged defense of the Soviet troops turned out to be really insurmountable.
Our artillery played an exceptionally large role in the battles near Kursk, which bore the brunt of the fight against the masses of Nazi heavy and light tanks that were trying to breach our defense line. The struggle of Soviet guns with enemy armored vehicles ended with the victory of the Soviet artillerymen. In the first three days of fighting alone, Soviet artillerymen, together with other branches of the armed forces, destroyed 1,539 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns.
The artillerymen steadfastly and courageously fought against enemy tanks and increased the glory of the Russian artillery with heroic deeds. In some cases, the artillerymen fired until the last shell, and then turned into hand-to-hand combat. Here is an example of the courageous struggle of “Soviet artillerymen against enemy tanks.
In the battle near Ponyri, a large group of enemy tanks and infantry moved to the gun of Sergeant Major Sedov. Sergeant Major Sedov, letting the enemy go 200 meters, opened fire on the tanks. He fired a cannon at the most vulnerable spots of the tanks, preventing the enemy from recovering. In a short period of time, Sedov knocked out four "tigers" from his gun and destroyed up to 100 enemy soldiers. And when the enemy shell smashed the gun, Sedov and his comrades took anti-tank grenades and continued the battle with the Nazi tanks.
An invaluable service to the ground forces was provided by anti-aircraft artillery, which operated together with them on the battlefield. Anti-aircraft artillery in the battles near Kursk destroyed 660 enemy aircraft.
Having exhausted and drained of the elite fascist divisions in the battle of Kursk, our troops broke through the enemy's front and themselves launched a counteroffensive, which then developed into a powerful offensive on the front stretching over 800 kilometers. Prepared in advance, deeply echeloned, powerful defensive lines and fortified centers of resistance, created by the Nazis for almost two years, were destroyed by our artillery, operating in conjunction with other branches of the armed forces.
As a result of the defeat of the Nazi armies near Kursk, the fascists' myth that "the Russians know how to attack only in winter" was dispelled. The Soviet troops proved that in the summer they break through the enemy defenses and conduct the offensive as well as in the winter.
On August 5, 1943, the Soviet Army, after intense street fighting, captured Orel and Belgorod. On this day, in the capital of our Motherland - Moscow - the first artillery salute sounded in honor of the victory of our troops that liberated Oryol and Belgorod. Since then, every major victory of the Soviet troops began to be marked with an artillery salute.
The Battle of Kursk played an important role during the Great Patriotic War. On the significance of the Battle of Kursk, Chairman of the State Defense Committee JV Stalin said: "If the Battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the German fascist army, then the Battle of Kursk put it before a catastrophe."
After the defeat at Kursk and Kharkov, all hopes of the Nazis to stay in the east collapsed.
A continuous offensive of the Soviet Army to the west began.
1943 was a turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The major victories of the Soviet troops were not only important for the Soviet-German front, but they also influenced the entire course of the Second World War.
In 1944, the Soviet Army delivered ten crushing blows to the enemy, as a result of which up to 120 divisions of Nazi Germany and its allies were defeated and disabled. In these decisive battles, the Soviet artillery, as always, honorably performed all the tasks assigned to it.
Having driven out Hitler's troops from our country, the Soviet Army shifted its military operations to enemy territory. Soviet troops, advancing westward, liberated one country after another, enslaved by Nazi Germany. And only after it became obvious that the crushing blows of the Soviet Army were inevitably fatal and that the Soviet Union alone, alone would put an end to Nazi Germany and its satellites, were the American and British generals forced to hurry up with the opening of the second front with a delay of two years.
However, despite the existence of a second front in Western Europe, the main forces of the German fascist armies were still on the Soviet-German front. Our army continued to bear the brunt of the war on its shoulders.
The offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1944/45 was one of the largest in the entire war. In terms of the number of troops and military equipment that participated in it, and in terms of the force of the blows, this was an offensive unparalleled in the history of war. Suffice it to say that in just 40 days of our offensive the Nazis lost: over 1,150,000 soldiers and officers captured and killed, about 3,000 aircraft, more than 4,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, and no less than 12,000 guns. With a mighty blow, the artillery broke into the enemy's defenses on the 1200-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Carpathians; by the end of January 1945, the Soviet Army cleared the territory between the Vistula and Oder rivers from enemy troops, thwarted the Nazi offensive on the Western Front in the Ardennes and reached the last fortified lines covering the capital of Nazi Germany - Berlin.
SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE FOR BERLIN
The battle for Berlin began in the second half of April 1945, when our troops captured bridgeheads on the Oder and Neisse rivers.
The Hitlerite command understood that the fate of Berlin would be decided on the Oder, so a system of heavily fortified defensive zones with numerous concreted firing points and other engineering structures had been created in advance over the entire vast territory from the Oder to Berlin.
Every inch of land in this area was prepared for defense; the presence of numerous lakes, rivers, canals, a dense network of settlements with stone houses further strengthened the defense.
Berlin and the approaches to it were also turned into a fortified area. On the approaches to Berlin, the Nazis built an additional three powerful strips of fortifications. Berlin was divided along the circumference into eight defense sectors, the city center was most strongly fortified.
Barricades, anti-tank barriers and concrete gun emplacements were erected on every street. To defend the approaches to Berlin, the Nazis deployed several armies. All special units, military schools and academies were also sent to the defense of Berlin. Members of the Nazi Party were mobilized to create tank destroyer brigades, which were armed with Faust cartridges (a new jet weapon to fight tanks). Separate battalions were specially trained for street fighting. In total, in the Berlin direction, the Hitlerite command concentrated up to half a million troops with a huge amount of military equipment.
Soviet soldiers irresistibly rushed to Berlin in order to quickly put an end to the fascist beast in its lair.
By order of the command in the artillery units, a struggle unfolded for the honor of firing the first shot at Berlin. The units read with enthusiasm the address of the Military Council of the front, which said: “Fighting friends! Comrade Stalin, on behalf of the Motherland and the entire Soviet people, ordered the troops of our front to smash the enemy on the nearest approaches to Berlin, seize the capital of Germany, Berlin, and hoist the banner of Victory over it. "
To complete this last battle, such a quantity of manpower and military equipment was concentrated, which made it possible in the shortest possible time to break the resistance of the fascist troops and capture Berlin. No other operation has involved as much artillery as it was concentrated for the offensive on Berlin.
The preparation of the offensive was carried out very carefully and secretly,
The Nazis did not know when our offensive would begin.
On April 14, 1945, our artillery suddenly opened powerful hurricane fire along the entire front. The enemy took this for the beginning of the offensive of our troops. But the offensive from our side did not follow, and the Nazis calmed down, believing that the offensive had failed. In fact, the artillery fire was undertaken for reconnaissance purposes.
The offensive was scheduled for another day.
The beginning of the general offensive on Berlin was announced by a volley of a huge mass of artillery and mortars. On the night of April 15-16, a blow of unprecedented force was suddenly struck at the enemy's defensive lines.
After artillery and aviation training, Soviet infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns went on the attack. The swift offensive of our troops was supported by artillery fire and air bombing strikes.
Our attack turned out to be unexpected and overwhelming for the enemy. Our tanks quickly crushed forward positions and broke into the enemy's defensive zone. Destroying trenches, breaking barriers, destroying the enemy and its weapons of fire, Soviet tanks and infantry were rapidly advancing. The Nazis did not expect such a powerful blow, their resistance was quickly broken. The defeated Nazi divisions began to retreat to Berlin. Units of the Soviet Army pursued the enemy on the heels and on April 20 approached the capital of Germany.
At 11 o'clock on April 20, the battalion commander, Major Zyukin, was the first to open fire on the den of the fascist beast - Berlin. Artillery
the fire continued to grow - after Major Zyukin's batteries, other batteries entered the battle. The closer our troops approached Berlin, the more the resistance of the Nazis increased.
After five days of fierce fighting, our troops surrounded Berlin, and on April 21, the storming of the city itself began.
Our soldiers met with a prepared defense. The Nazis blocked the streets with numerous heaps and barricades. Groups of multi-storey buildings were turned into powerful strongholds with many firing points. Soviet troops had to knock the enemy out of every street, from every building. Fierce battles took place on the stairs of multi-storey buildings, in basements, on roofs. From building to building, from block to block, our infantrymen, artillerymen, mortarmen, tankers, sappers, signalmen were advancing in battle.
In these difficult conditions, our gunners brilliantly coped with the assigned front tasks. Rolling out their guns for direct fire, they destroyed enemy firing points, destroyed their defenses and cleared the way for infantry and tanks. Brave Soviet artillerymen, under enemy fire, rolled their guns over dilapidated barricades and rubble.
Our artillery helped the infantry and tanks to cross the Spree River and the canals, of which there are a lot in the city. Having suppressed the enemy's defenses on the opposite bank, the artillery ensured the capture of coastal areas.
So, clearing block by block, our troops, supported by artillery fire, made their way to the city center, to the Reichstag building.
Before the assault on the Reichstag, the last short artillery preparation was carried out, after which our infantry rushed into the attack and burst into the building. The battle for the capture of the Reichstag lasted for several hours.
At 14 hours 20 minutes on April 30, 1945, the Reichstag was taken. The banner of the Victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was hoisted over Berlin.
At 3 pm on May 2, 1945, the Berlin garrison surrendered unconditionally to the victorious Soviet troops.
Soviet artillery, with its crushing blows, contributed to the final defeat of the Nazi troops defending Berlin.
41,000 took part in the battle for Berlin artillery pieces and mortars, which fired a huge number of shells and mines with a total weight of over 26,000 tons.
In the bloody battles for Berlin, which lasted sixteen days, about 150,000 Nazi soldiers and officers were killed; over 300,000 Nazis were taken prisoner by Soviet troops. (475)
The greatest offensive in history by the heroic Soviet Army ended in the complete defeat of the fascists and brought the peoples of Europe liberation from the terrible tyranny of Hitlerism.
* * *
The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany ended with the victorious Battle of Berlin. In commemoration of the victory over Nazi Germany on May 9, 1945, on Victory Day, the capital of our Motherland saluted the valiant troops of the Soviet Army with thirty artillery volleys from a thousand guns.
However, there was another threat of an attack on our homeland - from imperialist Japan, which for decades had provoked military clashes in the Far East.
On the borders with the Soviet Union, Japan concentrated its best, elite troops - the one and a half million Kwantung Army, which relied on numerous field and long-term defensive fortifications.
In order to eliminate this last hotbed of war and secure the Soviet Far East from the threat of a military attack, it was necessary to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army and force Japan to unconditional surrender.
Three months after the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Army, true to its allied duty, began military operations against the Japanese Kwantung Army.
On the night of August 9, 1945, the Soviet Army, the ships of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla dealt crushing blows to the enemy. The defeat of the Japanese army began.
Despite the difficult conditions, the combat operations of our troops were distinguished by great swiftness. The retreating Japanese units did not have time to get ready for battle, as they were already overtaken by the shells of the Soviet artillerymen.
Thanks to such swiftness and high mobility, Soviet artillery, together with infantry and tanks, in a short time fought through the whole of Manchuria and ended its military campaign on the shores of the Yellow Sea.
With their military operations, the Soviet artillery largely contributed to the defeat of the Japanese army.
On September 2, 1945, militaristic Japan declared itself defeated and surrendered unconditionally.
In the war of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany in the west and against the Japanese militarists in the Far East was victoriously completed.
Having won the Second World War, the Soviet people defended the freedom and independence of our Motherland, saved the peoples of Europe from the threat of fascist enslavement.
The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was the victory of the new Soviet social and state system, the victory of our Armed Forces.
Everything that is told in this book shows how varied and responsible the combat work of gunners is, how much knowledge they must have in order to successfully cope with their work.
“To be a good artilleryman,” said Comrade Voroshilov, “especially an artillery commander, means to be a comprehensively educated person. Perhaps not a single type of weapon requires from a commander and a soldier such discipline of mind, will and knowledge as artillery. "
On the battlefield, gunners must be proactive, bold and courageous; the fate of the battle very often depends on their courage and heroism.
The Great Patriotic War showed that all these qualities are fully possessed by the artillerymen of our glorious Soviet Army, selflessly devoted to their Motherland.
With such a cadre of artillerymen, our artillery, armed with the most advanced artillery equipment, together with other branches of the armed forces, will ensure the victory of the Soviet Army over any enemy if he dares to interfere with the peaceful and victorious movement of the Soviet people towards their great goal - communism.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have always shown and are showing tireless concern for the defense capability of our Motherland, the 19th Congress of the Communist Party, having outlined a majestic program of building communism in the USSR, set the Communist Party the task of strengthening the active defense of the Soviet Motherland against the aggressive actions of its enemies in every possible way.
Our people, defending the cause of peace by all means, can boldly rely on their Soviet Army and its main firepower - artillery.
MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3/2000, pp. 50-54
The experience of using artillery in the Great Patriotic War and modern practice
Colonel A. B. BUDYAEV,
candidate of military sciences
FIFTY-FIVE years separate us from the day when the Great Patriotic War ended. Its members have long completed their service in the Armed Forces, the combat experience they have accumulated is gradually forgotten, and yet this experience is of lasting importance.
Today, scientific research is increasingly focused on those forms and methods of armed struggle that are used abroad in the course of local wars. However, they imply the use of the latest weapons and military equipment, which our Armed Forces, given the deplorable state of the country's economy, are unlikely to be equipped in the near future. That is why, when determining the ways to increase the effectiveness of the combat employment of artillery, it is necessary to turn to the richest heritage of the artillerymen of the Great Patriotic War.
In the preparation and conduct of MFA combat operations, one of the main issues is about the organization artillery reconnaissance... IN during the war years, it was subdivided into air and ground. Air reconnaissance was carried out by the crews of the reconnaissance aviation, parts of which were transferred to the operational subordination of the front artillery headquarters, and from observation balloons. Ground reconnaissance was carried out from observation posts (OP) of artillery commanders of all levels and artillery instrumental reconnaissance. In addition, special teams were allocated to monitor enemy artillery, and in some cases, artillery reconnaissance groups were sent beyond the front line. At that time, it was believed that discovering a target was no less valor than hitting it. This position was confirmed literally in every battle. If the artillery fired not just “towards the enemy,” but against targets that had been reconnoitered in advance and accurately, success in battle was guaranteed.
The enemy always tried to act suddenly, so he carefully camouflaged his battle formations, and it was not easy to open his fire system. Under these conditions, artillery reconnaissance worked with special stress, and the duty of artillery scouts at observation posts was organized according to the principle of guard duty, which emphasized the responsibility of the personnel on duty. This approach had a beneficial effect on the discipline of the observers, the organization of their work and did not allow unmasking the places of reconnaissance.
As combat experience shows, optical reconnaissance gave the greatest effect in cases when the reconnaissance sector assigned to one observer did not exceed 1-00 (6 °), so that he had the opportunity to study every fold of the terrain, to detect even subtle targets.
Optical reconnaissance was based on a wide network of observation posts, some of which were carried forward, into the infantry battle formations, and sometimes beyond the line of combat contact of troops. It also happened that the most distant targets could be opened from points located at heights, in the depths of our battle formation, and targets at the front line could be reconnoitered only when they were as close to them as possible. So, in
In the battle of Stalingrad, the scouts of one of the artillery regiments, sergeants Karyan and Razuvaev, were observing at a distance of 200 m from the enemy and discovered three well-camouflaged guns, a machine-gun battery and a large dugout during the day. An artillery battery was found in the same regiment, the exact coordinates of which could be determined only when Lieutenant Chernyak got close to the German front line. In both cases, the targets were destroyed.
Very often, artillery scouts were included in the military reconnaissance groups and night search parties. With them, they infiltrated the front edge of the enemy's defenses and reconnoitered targets, and subsequently often controlled fire.
The use of all types of artillery reconnaissance, the inclusion of artillerymen in the military reconnaissance groups, as well as the careful organization of the work of each observer, the collection and processing of reconnaissance data, ensured the receipt of sufficiently complete information about the targets. Major General of Artillery M.V. Rostovtsev, sharing his combat experience, wrote: "... our fire will always be properly accurate, if the artillery commanders are painstakingly engaged in reconnaissance, and the combined-arms commanders do everything possible to contribute to this."
Consider how you can today, using the existing means of artillery reconnaissance, to increase its effectiveness.
For reconnaissance in artillery subunits of combined-arms formations and units, it is advisable to have artillery observer groups of two or three people: a group commander (a sergeant, and in some cases an officer - a specialist in artillery fire control and topographic geodetic referencing), a scout-rangefinder, a signalman-sniper. The group's armament should include a laser rangefinder with a coordinate converter, a navigation device, a portable radio station, and special small arms.
We propose to have the number of groups equal to the number of guns in an artillery battery (in a mortar battery - to the number of fire platoons). We believe that in the rocket artillery and artillery of the army (corps) set, optical reconnaissance should be carried out by the forces of existing bodies.
The presence of such a structure of reconnaissance bodies in the regimental and divisional level will make it possible to organize effective defeat of the enemy from the maximum firing ranges of artillery. For example, in the transition to the defense outside of contact with the enemy, a network of forward observation posts should be deployed in advance behind the forward edge of our troops. Observation points must be equipped in engineering terms and carefully camouflaged. From them, the targets for which artillery fire has been prepared, as well as the most probable routes for the advance of the enemy, should be clearly visible. After completing missions from forward OP, groups, while continuing to control artillery fire, move along a predetermined route to the battle formations of their troops.
Improvement organizational structure artillery reconnaissance will be facilitated by the inclusion of units, formations and formations in the staff of artillery headquarters artillery reconnaissance control posts.
Another important issue is placement of artillery in the combat formations of troops. One of the main principles of organizing artillery combat operations during the Great Patriotic War - massing it in the main directions * - remains relevant in modern conditions... This implies both the massing of artillery subunits (units) and the massing of their fire.
According to the current statutory documents, the main firing positions are selected (depending on the organizational affiliation of the artillery and the conditions of the situation) at a distance of 2-6 km from the forward units of their troops. This situation has remained unchanged since the Great Patriotic War. However, the firing range of barreled artillery in those years averaged 10 km. Today, the capabilities of artillery exceed this indicator. more than doubled. Thus, modern divisional artillery is capable of striking the enemy practically to the entire depth of the combat mission of a formation in an offensive. As in the war years, artillery firing positions are assigned in the direction of the main attack of our troops. In rather narrow zones of the forthcoming offensive of units, formations, a significant amount of artillery is concentrated, and not less than 2-3 hours before the start of the artillery preparation of the attack. At modern means intelligence to hide such a grouping from the enemy is very problematic. In addition, having concentrated a large number of artillery fire units in the direction of the main blow, we give the enemy the opportunity to reveal our plan in advance. In addition, when going on the offensive on the move with the advancement from the depths, the deployment of combined arms subunits for the attack will take place in the area of the firing positions of the artillery, which at that time is conducting high-density fire, carrying out, as a rule, the last fire raid of the artillery preparation of the attack. The firing positions, especially in summer conditions, will be shrouded in dust and smoke, which will significantly complicate the actions of tank and motorized rifle subunits.
In our opinion, the massing of artillery must be ensured primarily by massing its fire. Having placed the main part of the firing positions on the flanks of the combat formations of units, operating in the direction of the main attack (the breakthrough sector), we, firstly, will mislead the enemy about our intentions, and secondly, we will ensure the necessary depth of his defeat. In the main direction, you can equip false firing positions and simulate the firing from them with nomadic guns. This arrangement is also supported by the fact that the effectiveness of firing at platoon strongpoints from firing positions located on the flanks is 1.5-2 times higher than when they are defeated from the front.
In a defensive battle, the main artillery firing positions are assigned in the tank-hazardous directions between the battalions of the first and second echelons. Artillery groupings of units, formations, and sometimes formations are deployed in a small space. This massing of artillery subunits increases their vulnerability, unmasks the areas on which the stability of the defense depends on the retention. The increased capabilities of artillery in terms of the depth of engagement make it possible to designate areas of the main firing positions at a greater distance from our forward edge. So, for grouping the artillery of the formation, they can be chosen between the second and third positions of the defense of our troops and away from the direction of concentration of the main efforts. It is also possible to deploy parts of the artillery grouping of the formation there, in some cases it can be deployed behind the third position.
The expediency of this approach is also evidenced by the fact that in the course of repulsing an attack, especially when the enemy penetrates into the defensive areas of the first echelon battalions, artillery should fire with maximum intensity, without moving to reserve firing positions.
Between the first and second positions on the most important tank-hazardous directions, taking into account the terrain conditions, firing positions should be assigned to artillery divisions from the regimental artillery grouping. They must be engineered and camouflaged. In case of a fight against enemy armored objects that have broken through to the OP area, it is necessary to prepare areas for direct fire.
Requires separate consideration the issue of the placement of command and observation posts. IN In an offensive battle, combined-arms formations (units), as a rule, are reinforced by a fairly large amount of artillery. In addition, they are also assigned supporting artillery units and units. The command and observation posts of batteries, battalions, observation posts of artillery groups cover all areas more or less suitable for their deployment in a dense network. In many cases, they are literally "overlapping". For example, a regiment advancing in a breakthrough sector can be reinforced and supported by at least two artillery divisions. This means that it will be necessary to deploy at least a dozen command and observation posts at intervals of 100-200 m along the front with a depth of their location of about 500 m. special troops will be in the same area, the difficulties arising in this connection will become clear.
In the history of the war, a case is known when up to ten command and observation posts of infantry and artillery were at a dominant height in the zone of action of a formation that was preparing for an offensive. They had a wide variety of devices: some were well camouflaged and equipped with solid ceilings, others were built in a hurry, representing only open slots. The whole area in this area and on the approaches to it was covered with a web of wires. At each command and observation post, combat life proceeded in its own way. In some, the movement of fighters and officers was strictly regulated. They camouflaged themselves at the approaches to the NP, choosing hidden paths to move. In others, everyone walked openly, unmasking not only themselves, but also their neighbors. As soon as the division started the offensive, the enemy artillery opened fire at the height. The control of the units was disrupted, which primarily affected the interaction between the infantry and artillery and led to large losses of our troops.
The experience of the soldier, as well as of the training of troops in the post-war period, shows that the issues of the deployment of command observation and observation posts, especially in motorized rifle and artillery units located in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, should be resolved centralized in the combined arms headquarters. When assessing the terrain, the combined arms headquarters must determine areas suitable for the location of observation and command and observation posts. The fewer there are in the offensive zone, the more organization is needed in their use. Otherwise, most commanders will prefer areas that are easy to observe and may find that the best ones will be occupied by those who need them less.
In addition, in each area of the location of observation posts, it is necessary to appoint a general chief, making him responsible for maintaining order. He must determine camouflage measures at observation posts and monitor their implementation, outline the ways of approach, organize their equipment. On the open areas On the route, it is necessary to arrange vertical masks, and tear off the communication passages and cracks on those fired by the enemy. Equipment locations should also be equipped. On routes leading to the location of observation posts, traffic controllers should be posted to meet arriving liaison officers, messengers and point them in the right direction.
We believe that it is necessary to abandon the deployment of commanders of artillery units of army (corps) and rocket artillery on the KNP. Their workplace should be fire control points, located in the areas of firing positions. This is due to the fact that it is at the firing positions that a large amount of work is carried out to carry out fire missions, combat, technical and logistical support. In addition, this will reduce the total number of observation posts, reduce the loss of command personnel of artillery subunits.
Summing up what has been said, we want to once again emphasize the need for a creative approach to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, its processing, taking into account the peculiarities of armed struggle in modern conditions.
* In the most important operations of the final stage of the war, the density of artillery reached 300 guns per 1 km of the breakthrough area.
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History and heroes of the elite type of troops born during the Great Patriotic WarThe fighters of these units were envied and - at the same time - sympathetic. "The trunk is long, life is short", "Double salary - triple death!", "Farewell, Motherland!" - all these nicknames, hinting at a high mortality rate, went to soldiers and officers who fought in the destroyer anti-tank artillery (IPTA) of the Red Army.
The crew of the anti-tank gun of senior sergeant A. Golovalov is firing at German tanks. In recent battles, the crew destroyed 2 enemy tanks and 6 firing points (battery of senior lieutenant A. Medvedev). The explosion on the right is a return shot from a German tank.
All this is true: the salaries increased by one and a half to two times for the IPTA units on the staff, and the length of the barrels of many anti-tank guns, and the unusually high mortality among the artillerymen of these units, whose positions were often located nearby, or even in front of the infantry front ... But the truth is and the fact that the share of anti-tank artillery accounted for 70% of the destroyed German tanks; and the fact that among the artillerymen who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, every fourth is a soldier or officer of anti-tank subunits. In absolute numbers, it looks like this: out of 1,744 artillerymen - Heroes of the Soviet Union, whose biographies are presented in the lists of the Heroes of the Country project, 453 people fought in anti-tank fighter units, the main and only task of which was direct fire at German tanks ...
Keep up with the tanks
The very concept of anti-tank artillery as a separate type of this type of troops appeared shortly before the Second World War. During the First World War, conventional field guns were quite successful in fighting sedentary tanks, for which armor-piercing shells were quickly developed. In addition, the armor of tanks until the early 1930s remained mainly bulletproof and only with the approach of a new world war began to increase. Accordingly, specific means of combating this type of weapons were required, which anti-tank artillery became.
In the USSR, the first experience in creating special anti-tank guns fell on the very beginning of the 1930s. In 1931, a 37 mm anti-tank gun appeared, which was a licensed copy of a German gun designed for the same purpose. A year later, a Soviet semi-automatic 45 mm gun was installed on the carriage of this gun, and thus the 45 mm anti-tank gun of the 1932 model of the year - 19-K appeared. Five years later, it was modernized, resulting in a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model - 53-K. It was she who became the most massive domestic anti-tank weapon - the famous "forty-five".
Calculation of the M-42 anti-tank gun in battle. Photo: warphoto.ru
These guns are the main means of fighting tanks in the Red Army in the pre-war period. It was with them that, from 1938, anti-tank batteries, platoons and divisions were armed, until the fall of 1940, which were part of rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry battalions, regiments and divisions. For example, a platoon of 45-millimeter guns - that is, two cannons - provided the anti-tank defense of the infantry battalion of the pre-war state; rifle and motorized rifle regiments - a battery of "forty-five", that is, six guns. And as part of the rifle and motorized divisions, since 1938, a separate anti-tank division was provided - 18 guns of 45 mm caliber.
Soviet artillerymen prepare to open fire with a 45-mm anti-tank gun. Karelian front.
But the way the fighting began to unfold in World War II, which began on September 1, 1939 with the German invasion of Poland, quickly showed that anti-tank defense at the divisional level may not be sufficient. And then the idea came up to create anti-tank artillery brigades of the Reserve of the High Command. Each such brigade would be a formidable force: the standard armament of a unit of 5322 people consisted of 48 76 mm guns, 24 107 mm guns, as well as 48 85 mm anti-aircraft guns and 16 more 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. At the same time, there were no proper anti-tank guns in the staff of the brigades, however, non-specialized field guns, which received standard armor-piercing shells, more or less successfully coped with their tasks.
Alas, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the country did not have time to complete the formation of the anti-tank brigades of the RGK. But even under-formed, these units, which came at the disposal of the army and front-line command, made it possible to maneuver them much more efficiently than anti-tank units in the state. rifle divisions... And although the beginning of the war led to catastrophic losses in the entire Red Army, including in artillery units, due to this, the necessary experience was accumulated, which pretty soon led to the emergence of specialized anti-tank units.
The birth of the artillery special forces
It quickly became clear that the standard divisional anti-tank weapons were not able to seriously resist the tank wedges of the Wehrmacht, and the lack of anti-tank guns of the required caliber forces them to roll out light field guns for direct fire. At the same time, their calculations, as a rule, did not have the necessary training, which means that sometimes they did not act effectively enough even in favorable conditions for them. In addition, due to the evacuation of artillery factories and the massive losses of the first war months, the shortage of main guns in the Red Army became catastrophic, so they had to be disposed of much more carefully.
Soviet artillerymen roll 45-mm anti-tank guns M-42, following in the ranks of the advancing infantry on the Central Front.
In such conditions, the only correct decision was the formation of special reserve anti-tank units, which could not only be placed in defense along the front of divisions and armies, but maneuvered by them, throwing them into specific tank-hazardous areas. The experience of the first war months also spoke of the same thing. And as a result, by January 1, 1942, the command of the active army and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had one anti-tank artillery brigade operating on the Leningrad front, 57 anti-tank artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery divisions. Moreover, they really did exist, that is, they actively participated in the battles. Suffice it to say that five anti-tank regiments were awarded the title of "Guards", which had just been introduced in the Red Army, following the results of the battles in the autumn of 1941.
Soviet artillerymen with a 45 mm anti-tank gun in December 1941. Photo: Museum of Engineering Troops and Artillery, St. Petersburg
Three months later, on April 3, 1942, a decree of the State Defense Committee was issued, introducing the concept of a fighter brigade, the main task of which was to fight the Wehrmacht tanks. True, its staff was forced to be much more modest than that of a similar pre-war unit. The command of such a brigade had three times less people- 1795 fighters and commanders against 5322, 16 guns of 76 mm against 48 in the pre-war state and four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns instead of sixteen. True, twelve 45-millimeter guns and 144 anti-tank rifles appeared in the list of standard weapons (they were armed with two infantry battalions that were part of the brigade). In addition, for the sake of creating new brigades, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered within a week to revise the lists of personnel of all combat arms and "withdraw all junior and rank-and-file personnel who previously served in artillery units." It was these fighters, having undergone a short retraining in the reserve artillery brigades, and made up the backbone of the anti-tank brigades. But they still had to be re-equipped with fighters who did not have combat experience.
Crossing the artillery crew and 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K across the river. The crossing is carried out on a pontoon from A-3 landing boats
By the beginning of June 1942, twelve newly formed fighter brigades were already operating in the Red Army, which, in addition to artillery units, also included a mortar battalion, an engineering and mine battalion, and a company of machine gunners. And on June 8, a new GKO decree appeared, which brought these brigades into four fighter divisions: the situation at the front required the creation of more powerful anti-tank fists capable of stopping German tank wedges. Less than a month later, in the midst of the summer offensive of the Germans, who were rapidly advancing to the Caucasus and the Volga, the famous order No. 0528 was issued "On renaming anti-tank artillery units and subunits into anti-tank artillery units and establishing advantages for the commanding and rank-and-file personnel of these units."
Pushkar elite
The appearance of the order was preceded by a lot of preparatory work, which concerned not only calculations, but also how many guns and what caliber new parts should have and what advantages their composition would use. It was quite clear that the soldiers and commanders of such units, who would have to risk their lives every day in the most dangerous sectors of the defense, needed a powerful not only material, but also a moral incentive. They did not assign new units during the formation the rank of guards, as was done with the Katyusha rocket launchers, but decided to leave the well-proven word “fighter” and add “anti-tank” to it, emphasizing the special significance and purpose of the new units. For the same effect, as far as can be judged now, the introduction of a special sleeve insignia for all soldiers and officers of anti-tank artillery - a black diamond with crossed golden barrels of stylized Shuvalov's "unicorns" was calculated.
All this was spelled out in the order in separate clauses. Special financial conditions for new units, as well as norms for the return of wounded soldiers and commanders to the ranks, were prescribed by the same separate clauses. So, the commanding staff of these units and subdivisions was given one and a half, and the junior and private - a double salary. For each damaged tank, the gun crew was also entitled to a cash bonus: the commander and gunner - 500 rubles each, the rest of the crew numbers - 200 rubles each. It is noteworthy that initially other amounts appeared in the text of the document: 1000 and 300 rubles, respectively, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin, who signed the order, personally lowered the prices. As for the norms for returning to service, the entire commanding staff of the anti-tank units, up to the battalion commander, had to be kept on a special account, and at the same time, the entire composition after treatment in hospitals had to be returned only to the indicated units. This did not guarantee that a soldier or officer would return to the same battalion or division in which he fought before being wounded, but he could not be in any other divisions other than anti-tank ones.
The new order instantly turned the anti-tank crews into the elite of the Red Army's artillery. But this elitism was confirmed at a high price. The level of losses in the anti-tank subunits was noticeably higher than in other artillery units. It is no coincidence that anti-tank units became the only subspecies of artillery, where the same order No. 0528 introduced the position of deputy gunner: in battle, crews that rolled out their guns to unequipped positions in front of the defending infantry front and fired direct fire, often died earlier than their equipment.
From battalions to divisions
New artillery units quickly gained combat experience, which spread just as quickly: the number of anti-tank fighter units grew. On January 1, 1943, the Red Army's anti-tank artillery consisted of two fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, two heavy anti-tank fighter regiments, 168 anti-tank fighter regiments and one anti-tank fighter division.
An anti-tank artillery unit on the march.
And for the Battle of Kursk, Soviet anti-tank artillery received a new structure. Order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 0063 of April 10, 1943 introduced in each army, primarily the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Southwestern and Southern fronts, at least one anti-tank regiment of the wartime army staff: six 76-mm batteries guns, that is, a total of 24 guns.
By the same order, one anti-tank artillery brigade of 1215 people was organizationally introduced into the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, South-Western and Southern fronts, which included an anti-tank regiment of 76 mm guns - only 10 batteries, or 40 guns, and a regiment of 45-millimeter guns, armed with 20 guns.
Guards artillerymen roll a 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937) into a prepared trench. Kursk direction.
The relatively calm time separating the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad from the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the command of the Red Army used to the fullest in order to complete the formation, re-equip and retrain the anti-tank units as much as possible. No one doubted that the coming battle would rely heavily on mass use tanks, especially new German vehicles, and it was necessary to be ready for this.
Soviet artillerymen at the 45-mm anti-tank gun M-42. In the background is a T-34-85 tank.
History has shown that the anti-tank units had time to prepare. The Battle of the Kursk Bulge became the main test of the artillery elite's strength - and they withstood it with honor. BUT invaluable experience, for which, alas, the fighters and commanders of the anti-tank subunits had to pay a very high price, was soon understood and used. It was after the Battle of Kursk that the legendary, but, unfortunately, already too weak for the armor of new German tanks, "forty-five" began to gradually remove from these units, replacing them with 57-mm anti-tank guns ZIS-2, and where these guns were not enough, the well-proven divisional 76-mm cannon ZIS-3. By the way, it is the versatility of this gun, which has shown itself well both as a divisional gun and as an anti-tank gun, along with its simplicity of design and manufacture, that allowed it to become the most massive artillery gun in the world in the entire history of artillery!
Fire Bag Masters
In ambush "forty-five", 45-mm anti-tank gun model 1937 (53-K).
The last major change in the structure and tactics of using anti-tank artillery was the complete reorganization of all fighter divisions and brigades into anti-tank artillery brigades. By January 1, 1944, there were as many as fifty such brigades as part of the anti-tank artillery, and in addition to them there were 141 more anti-tank artillery regiment. The main weapons of these units were the same 76-mm ZIS-3 cannons, which the domestic industry produced at an incredible speed. In addition to them, the brigades and regiments were armed with 57-mm ZIS-2 and a number of "forty-five" and 107 mm guns.
Soviet artillerymen from the units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps fire at the enemy from a camouflaged position. In the foreground: 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (sample 1937), in the background: 76 mm regimental gun (sample 1927). Bryansk front.
By this time, the principled tactics of the combat use of anti-tank fighter units had also been fully developed. The system of anti-tank areas and anti-tank strongholds, developed and tested before the Battle of Kursk, was rethought and refined. The number of anti-tank guns in the troops became more than sufficient, experienced personnel were enough for their use, and the fight against Wehrmacht tanks was made as flexible and effective as possible. Now the Soviet anti-tank defense was built on the principle of "fire sacks" arranged along the path of movement of German tank units. Anti-tank guns were placed in groups of 6-8 guns (that is, two batteries) at a distance of fifty meters from each other and were camouflaged with great care. And they opened fire not when the first line of enemy tanks was in the zone of confident defeat, but only after practically all the attacking tanks entered it.
Unknown Soviet girls, privates from the anti-tank artillery unit (IPTA).
Such "fire bags", taking into account the characteristics of the anti-tank artillery guns, were effective only at medium and short combat ranges, which means that the risk for the gunners increased many times over. It was necessary to show not only remarkable restraint, looking at how German tanks pass almost nearby, it was necessary to guess the moment when to open fire, and to conduct it as quickly as the capabilities of the technique and the strength of the calculations allowed. And at the same time, be ready to change position at any moment, as soon as it was under fire or the tanks went beyond the distance of confident defeat. And to do this in battle, as a rule, they had to literally on their hands: most often they simply did not have time to fit horses or cars, and the process of loading and unloading the gun took too much time - much more than the conditions of the battle with the advancing tanks allowed.
A crew of Soviet artillerymen fires a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model (53-K) at a German tank on the street of the village. The number of the calculation gives the loader a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile.
Heroes with a black diamond on their sleeve
Knowing all this, one is no longer surprised at the number of heroes among the fighters and commanders of anti-tank destroyer subunits. Among them were real sniper gunners. Such as, for example, the commander of the gun of the 322nd Guards Fighter-Anti-Tank Regiment of the Guard Senior Sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov, who had almost three dozen Nazi tanks on his account, and ten of them (including six "Tigers"!) He knocked out in one battle. For this he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Or, say, the gunner of the 493rd Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment gunner Sergeant Stepan Khoptyar. He fought from the very first days of the war, went with battles to the Volga, and then to the Oder, where in one battle he destroyed four German tanks, and in just a few January days of 1945 - nine tanks and several armored personnel carriers. The country appreciated this feat at its true worth: in April of the victorious forty-fifth, Hoptyar was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Hero of the Soviet Union, gun commander of the 322nd Guards Fighter-Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guards Senior Sergeant Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich Asfandiyarov (1918-1977) and Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter-Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the 1919 Varmaylovich Guards - 99 read the letter. In the background, Soviet artillerymen at the ZiS-3 76-mm divisional gun.
Z.L. Asfandiyarov at the front of the Great Patriotic War since September 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the liberation of Ukraine.
On January 25, 1944, in the battles for the village of Tsibulev (now the village of Monastyrischensky district of the Cherkasy region), the gun under the command of the guard senior sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov was attacked by eight tanks and twelve armored personnel carriers with enemy infantry. Having let the attacking column of the enemy at the range of a direct shot, the crew of the gun opened targeted sniper fire and burned all eight enemy tanks, of which four were Tiger tanks. The guard himself, senior sergeant Asfandiyarov, destroyed one officer and ten soldiers with fire from his personal weapons. When the gun went out of action, the brave guardsman switched to the gun of the neighboring unit, the crew of which was out of order and, repelling a new massive attack of the enemy, destroyed two tanks of the "Tiger" type and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. In just one battle, the crew of the guard of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov destroyed ten enemy tanks, of which six were of the "tiger" type and over one hundred and fifty enemy soldiers and officers.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2386) to Asfandiyarov Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich was awarded by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 1, 1944.
V.M. Permyakov was drafted into the Red Army in August 1942. In the artillery school he received the specialty of a gunner. Since July 1943 at the front, he fought as a gunner in the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment. He received his baptism of fire at the Kursk Bulge. In the first battle, he burned three German tanks, was wounded, but did not leave the combat post. Sergeant Permyakov was awarded the Order of Lenin for his courage and perseverance in battle, accuracy in the defeat of tanks. Particularly distinguished himself in the battles for the liberation of Ukraine in January 1944.
On January 25, 1944, in an area at a fork in the road near the villages of Ivakhny and Tsibulev, now the Monastyrischensky district of the Cherkasy region, the crew of the guard of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov, in which Sergeant Permyakov was the gunner, was among the first to meet the attack of enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers by infantry. Reflecting the first onslaught, Permyakov destroyed 8 tanks with precise fire, four of which were of the Tiger type. When the enemy troops approached the positions of the artillerymen, they engaged in hand-to-hand combat. He was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield. Having repulsed the attack of the submachine gunners, he returned to the gun. When the gun went out of action, the guards switched to the gun of a neighboring unit, the crew of which was out of order and, repelling a new massive attack of the enemy, destroyed two more Tiger-type tanks and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. During the raid of enemy bombers, the gun was broken. Permyakov, wounded and shell-shocked, was sent to the rear unconscious. On July 1, 1944, Guard Sergeant Permyakov Veniamin Mikhailovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2385).
Lieutenant General Pavel Ivanovich Batov presents the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to the commander of the anti-tank gun Sergeant Ivan Spitsyn. Mozyr direction.
Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin at the front since August 1942. He distinguished himself on October 15, 1943 when crossing the Dnieper. Sergeant Spitsin's crew destroyed three enemy machine guns by direct fire. Having crossed to the bridgehead, the artillerymen fired at the enemy until a direct hit broke the gun. The artillerymen joined the infantry, during the battle captured enemy positions along with cannons and began to destroy the enemy from his own guns.
On October 30, 1943, Sergeant Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 1641) for exemplary performance of combat missions by the command at the front of the fight against the German-fascist invaders and for the courage and heroism shown at the same time.
But even against the background of these and hundreds of other heroes from among the soldiers and officers of the anti-tank artillery, the feat of the only twice Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Petrov stands out. Drafted into the army in 1939, he graduated from the Sumy Artillery School right on the eve of the war, and met the Great Patriotic War as a lieutenant, platoon commander of the 92nd separate artillery battalion in Novograd-Volynsky in Ukraine.
Captain Vasily Petrov earned his first "Gold Star" Hero of the Soviet Union after crossing the Dnieper in September 1943. By that time, he was already the deputy commander of the 1850th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, and on his chest he wore two Orders of the Red Star and a medal "For Courage" - and three stripes for wounds. The decree awarding Petrov the highest degree of distinction was signed on the 24th, and published on December 29, 1943. By that time, the thirty-year-old captain was already in the hospital, having lost both arms in one of the last battles. And if it were not for the legendary order No. 0528, ordering the return of the wounded to the anti-tank divisions, the freshly baked Hero would hardly have got a chance to continue fighting. But Petrov, always distinguished by firmness and perseverance (sometimes disgruntled subordinates and bosses said that stubbornness), achieved his goal. And at the very end of 1944 he returned to his regiment, which by that time had already become known as the 248th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment.
With this regiment of the guard, Major Vasily Petrov reached the Oder, forced it and distinguished himself, holding a bridgehead on the west bank, and then participating in the development of the offensive on Dresden. And this did not go unnoticed: by the decree of June 27, 1945, Artillery Major Vasily Petrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the spring exploits on the Oder. By this time, the regiment of the legendary major had already been disbanded, but Vasily Petrov himself remained in the ranks. And he remained in it until his death - and he died in 2003!
After the war, Vasily Petrov managed to graduate from Lviv State University and military academy, received a Ph.D. in military sciences, rose to the rank of lieutenant general of artillery, which he received in 1977, and served as deputy chief of the missile forces and artillery of the Carpathian military district. As the grandson of one of General Petrov's colleagues recalls, from time to time, getting out for a walk in the Carpathians, the middle-aged military leader managed to literally drive up his adjutants, who could not keep up with him, on the way up ...
Memory is stronger than time
The post-war fate of the anti-tank artillery completely repeated the fate of all the Armed Forces of the USSR, which changed in accordance with the changes in the challenges of the time. Since September 1946, the personnel of units and subunits of anti-tank artillery, as well as subunits of anti-tank rifles, ceased to receive increased salaries. The right to a special sleeve badge, of which the anti-tank crews were so proud, was preserved for ten years longer. But it also disappeared over time: another order on the introduction of a new uniform for the Soviet army canceled this patch.
The need for specialized anti-tank artillery units was gradually disappearing. The cannons were replaced by anti-tank guided missiles, and units armed with these weapons appeared in the state of motorized rifle units. In the mid-1970s, the word "fighter" disappeared from the name of anti-tank subunits, and twenty years later, along with the Soviet army, the last two dozen anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades also disappeared. But whatever the post-war history of Soviet anti-tank artillery may be, it will never undo the courage and those feats with which the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army's anti-tank artillery fighters glorified their branches during the Great Patriotic War.
Artillery during the Second World War Part I
M. Zenkevich
Soviet artillery was created during the Civil War and went through two stages in its pre-war development. In the period from 1927 to 1930. the modernization of the artillery weapons inherited from the tsarist army was carried out, as a result of which the main tactical and technical characteristics of the guns were significantly improved in accordance with the new requirements, and this was done without great expense on the basis of the available weapons. Thanks to the modernization of artillery weapons, the artillery firing range has increased by an average of one and a half times. The increase in the firing range was achieved by lengthening the barrels, increasing charges, increasing the elevation angle and improving the shape of the projectiles.
The increase in the power of the shot also required some alteration of the carriages. In the carriage of the 76-mm cannon mod. In 1902, a counterbalancing mechanism was introduced, muzzle brakes were installed on the 107-mm and 152-mm guns. A single sight of the 1930 model was adopted for all the guns. After the modernization, the guns received new names: 76-mm gun model 1902/30, 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 etc. Of the new artillery models developed during this period, the 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 The beginning of the second stage in the development of Soviet artillery dates back to the early 1930s, when, as a result of the accelerated development of heavy industry, it became possible to begin the complete rearmament of artillery with new models.
On May 22, 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR adopted the artillery armament system developed by the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) for 1929-32. It was an important program document for the development of Soviet artillery. It provided for the creation of anti-tank, battalion, regimental, divisional, corps and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as artillery of the Reserve of the High Command (RGK). The system was adjusted for every five-year plan and was the basis for the development of new weapons. In accordance with it, in 1930, the 37-mm anti-tank gun was adopted. The carriage of this gun had a sliding frame, which ensured a horizontal angle of fire of up to 60 ° without moving the frame. In 1932, a 45-mm anti-tank gun was adopted, also on a carriage with a sliding frame. In 1937, the 45-mm cannon was improved: a semiautomatic device was introduced into the wedge breechblock, suspension was used, and ballistic qualities were improved. A lot of work was carried out to re-equip divisional, corps and army artillery, as well as high-power artillery.
As a divisional gun, the 76-mm gun mod. 1939 with a semi-automatic wedge gate. The carriage of this weapon had a rotating upper machine, high-speed lifting and turning mechanisms, and sliding beds. Suspension with suspension and rubber tires on wheels allowed transportation speeds of up to 35-40 km / h. In 1938, a 122-mm howitzer mod. 1938 This gun, in terms of its tactical and technical data, far surpassed all foreign models of this type. The corps artillery was armed with a 107-mm cannon mod. 1940 and 152-mm howitzer mod. 1938 g.
The army artillery consisted of: 122-mm cannon mod. 1931/37 and 152-mm howitzer mod. 1937 The first sample of the 122 mm cannon was developed in 1931. The 122 mm cannon mod. 1931/37 was obtained by imposing the barrel of a 122-mm cannon mod. 1931 on a new carriage arr. 1937, adopted as a single gun carriage for a 122 mm cannon and a 152 mm howitzer. For all guns of divisional and corps artillery, a sight was adopted that was independent of the gun, which made it possible to simultaneously load and aim the gun at the target. The problem of creating high-power Soviet artillery was also successfully resolved.
In the period from 1931 to 1939. adopted for service: 203-mm howitzer mod. 1931, 152-mm cannon mod. 1935, 280 mm mortar mod. 1939, 210-mm cannon mod. 1939 and 305-mm howitzer mod. 1939 Carriages of 152-mm cannons, 203-mm howitzers and 280-mm mortars of the same type, tracked. In the stowed position, the guns consisted of two carts - a barrel and a gun carriage. In parallel with the development of the material part of the artillery, important measures were taken to improve ammunition.
Soviet designers developed the most advanced long-range shells in shape, as well as new types of armor-piercing shells. All shells were equipped with fuses and tubes of domestic production. It should be noted that the development of Soviet artillery was influenced by such a widespread idea abroad at that time as universalism. It was about the creation of so-called universal or semi-universal weapons, which could be both field and anti-aircraft weapons. For all the attractiveness of this idea, its implementation led to the creation of overly complex, heavy and expensive weapons with low combat qualities. Therefore, after the creation and testing of a number of samples of such weapons in the summer of 1935, a meeting of artillery designers was held with the participation of government members, at which the insolvency and harmfulness of universalism was revealed and the need for specialization of artillery according to its combat purpose and types was indicated. The idea of replacing artillery with aircraft and tanks did not find support in the USSR either.
This path, for example, was taken by the German army, which made the main emphasis on aviation, tanks and mortars. Speaking in the Kremlin in 1937, I.V. Stalin said: “The success of a war is not decided by aviation alone. For the success of a war, artillery is an exceptionally valuable branch of the armed forces. I would like our artillery to show that it is first class. " .jpg)
This line of creating powerful artillery was strictly implemented, which was reflected, for example, in a sharp increase in the number of guns of all purposes.If on January 1, 1934, the Red Army had 17,000 guns, then on January 1, 1939, their number was 55,790. and on June 22, 1941, 67355 (without 50-mm mortars, of which there were 24158). In the pre-war years, along with the rearmament of rifled artillery, extensive work was carried out to create mortars.
The first Soviet mortars were created in the early 30s, but some leaders of the Red Army viewed them as a kind of "surrogate" of artillery, of interest only to the armies of underdeveloped states. However, after the mortars proved to be highly effective during Soviet-Finnish war 1939-40, their mass introduction into the troops began. The Red Army received 50-mm company and 82-mm battalion mortars, 107-mm miners and 120-mm regimental mortars. In total, over 40 thousand mortars were delivered to the Red Army from January 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941. After the start of the war, along with solving the problems of increasing the supply of artillery and mortar weapons to the front, design bureaus and industrial enterprises developed and introduced into production new artillery systems. In 1942, the 76.2-mm divisional gun mod. 1941 (ZIS-3), the design of which, with high combat characteristics, fully met the requirements of continuous production. To combat enemy tanks in 1943, a 57-mm anti-tank gun ZIS-2 was developed on the carriage of a 76.2-mm cannon mod. 1942 g.
A little later, an even more powerful 100-mm gun mod. 1944 From 1943, 152-mm corps howitzers and 160-mm mortars began to enter the troops, which became an indispensable means of breaking through enemy defenses. In total, during the war years, the industry produced 482.2 thousand guns.
351.8 thousand mortars were manufactured (4.5 times more than in Germany, and 1.7 times more than in the United States and the countries of the British Empire). In the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army also widely used rocket artillery. The beginning of its use can be considered the formation in June 1941 of the First separate battery, which had seven BM-13 installations. By December 1, 1941, in field rocket artillery, there were already 7 regiments and 52 separate divisions, and at the end of the war in the Red Army there were 7 divisions, 11 brigades, 114 regiments and 38 separate divisions of rocket artillery, for which more than 10 thousand .repeating self-propelled launchers and over 12 million rockets. (1).jpg)
volley "Katyusha"
ZIS-3 76-MM CANNON SAMPLE 1942 
A few weeks after the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow on January 5, 1942, the ZIS-3, the famous 76-mm divisional gun, received the go-ahead.
"As a rule, we received the tactical and technical requirements for the development of new guns from the Main Artillery Directorate," says the well-known designer of artillery systems V. Grabin. But some of the guns were developed on our own initiative. ...
Caliber 76 mm - 3 inches - from the beginning of this century was considered the classic caliber of a divisional gun. A cannon powerful enough to hit enemy manpower from closed positions, suppress mortar and artillery batteries and other fire weapons. A cannon mobile enough to, while moving across the battlefield by the forces of a combat crew, accompany the advancing units not only with fire, but also with wheels, crushing bunkers and bunkers with direct fire. Experience of the First World War. showed that with the saturation of the trench defense with fire weapons, the advancing units needed battalion and regimental melee artillery. And the appearance of tanks required the creation of special anti-tank artillery.
Equipping the Red Army with military equipment has always been in the center of attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. On July 15, 1929, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) made a historic decision to create new military equipment, including artillery. carrying out the program drawn by the party, Soviet designers were working on the creation of both melee artillery and anti-tank artillery (37 and 45-mm guns). But when, by the end of the 30s, there was a gap between the capabilities of these anti-tank guns and the armor of tanks, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) developed a tactical and technical task for a 76-mm divisional gun capable of fighting against tanks. 
Solving this problem, the team of designers, headed by V. Grabin, in 1936 created the 76-mm divisional gun F-22. Three years later, the F-22 USV was adopted. In 1940, the same team developed a 57 mm anti-tank gun. And finally, in 1941, by imposing a 76-mm barrel on the improved carriage of this gun, the designers (A. Khvorostin, V. Norkin, K. Renne, V. Meshchaninov, P. Ivanov, V. Zemtsov, etc.) created the famous ZIS -3, - which was highly appreciated not only by our allies, but also by opponents.
... "The opinion that the ZIS-3 is the best 76-mm weapon of the Second World War is absolutely justified," said the German professor Wolf, the former head of the department of artillery structures at Krupp. structures in the history of barrel artillery ".
The ZIS-3 was the last and most advanced 76mm divisional gun. Further development of this class of guns required the transition to a larger caliber. What is the secret of the ZIS-3's success? What, if I may say so, is the "highlight" of its design?
V. Grabin answers these questions: "In the lightness, reliability, convenience of combat operation of the crew, manufacturability and cheapness." Indeed, not containing any fundamentally new units and solutions that would not be known in world practice, the ZIS-3 is an example of a successful design and technical formation, an optimal combination of qualities. All non-working metal has been removed in ZIS-3; the muzzle brake was used for the first time in domestic serial 76-mm divisional guns, which reduced the length of the recoil, reduced the weight of the recoil parts and lightened the carriage; riveted beds are replaced by lighter tubular ones. Leaf springs in the suspension device are replaced by lighter and more reliable spring springs: A carriage with sliding beds is used, which sharply increases the angle of horizontal firing. For the first time a monoblock barrel was used for this caliber. But the main advantage of the ZIS-3 is its high manufacturability.
The design team headed by V. Grabin paid special attention to this quality of the guns. Working according to the method of accelerated design of artillery guns, in which design and technological issues are solved in parallel, engineers systematically reduced the number of required parts from sample to sample. Thus, the F-22 had 2080 parts, the F-22 USV had 1057, and the ZIS-3 had only 719. The number of machine-tool hours required for the manufacture of one weapon also decreased accordingly. In 1936 this value was 2034 hours, in 1939 - 1300, in 1942 - 1029 and in 1944 - 475! It is thanks to its high manufacturability that the ZIS-3 went down in history as the first gun in the world, put on line production and assembly line assembly. By the end of 1942, only one plant was producing up to 120 guns per day - before the war, this was its monthly program. 
ZIS-3 towed by T-70M
Another important result achieved when working using the accelerated design method is wide unification - the use of the same parts, assemblies, mechanisms and assemblies in different samples. It was the unification that made it possible for one plant to produce tens of thousands of guns for various purposes - tank, anti-tank and divisional. But it is symbolic that the hundred-thousandth cannon of the 92nd plant was precisely the ZIS-3 - the most massive cannon of the Great Patriotic War.
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A-19 122-MM CANNON SAMPLE 1931/1937 
“In January 1943, our troops had already broken through the blockade and fought stubbornly to expand the breakthrough at the famous Sinyavino heights,” recalls Marshal of Artillery G. Odintsov, former commander of the artillery of the Leningrad Front: “The firing positions of one of the batteries of the 267th corps artillery regiment were in a swampy area, camouflaged by thickets of dense bushes. Hearing ahead of the roar of a tank engine, the senior on the battery, not doubting that the tank was ours, and fearing that he would crush the cannon, decided to warn the driver. But, standing on the carriage, he saw that a huge, unfamiliar tank with a cross on the turret is moving directly at the gun ... The shot was fired from some 50 m.The shell literally demolished the splintered turret, and its pieces hit the armor of the next tank with such force that its crew fled without even having time to turn off the engine. ”Then our tankers pulled out the enemy vehicles.
A serviceable "tiger" passed through the streets of besieged Leningrad, and then both tanks became exhibits of a "trophy exhibition" in the Moscow Gorky Park of Culture and Leisure. So the 122-mm corps cannon helped to capture one of the first "tigers" that appeared at the front intact, and helped the personnel of the Soviet Army to recognize the vulnerabilities of the "tigers". 
The first World War showed what a dear price France, England and Russia had to pay for their neglect of heavy artillery. Counting on mobile warfare, these countries relied on light, highly mobile artillery, believing that heavy weapons are unsuitable for rapid marches. And already in the course of the war, they were forced to catch up with Germany and, making up for lost time, urgently create heavy weapons. And nevertheless, at the end of the war, the United States and England considered corps artillery generally unnecessary, and France and Germany were satisfied with the modernized corps guns of the end of the First World War.
The situation was quite different in our country. In May 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic approved the system of artillery weapons for 1929-1932, and in June 1930, the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a decision to accelerate the development of industry in every possible way, primarily defense. The industrialization of the country has become a solid foundation for the production of modern military equipment. In 1931, in pursuance of the approved weapons system, the 122-mm A-19 cannon was manufactured at the artillery plant No. 172. This gun was intended for counter-battery warfare, for disrupting enemy command and control, suppressing his rear, preventing the approach of reserves, the supply of ammunition, food, etc.
"The design of this gun, says Major General of Engineering and Technical Service N. Komarov," was entrusted to the design bureau of the All-Union Arsenal Arsenal. The working group headed by S. Shukalov included S. Ananiev, V. Drozdov, G. Vodokhlebov, B Markov, S. Rykovskov, N. Torbin and I. The project was done quickly and immediately sent the drawings to the 172nd plant for the production of a prototype. capabilities of the plant.
In terms of projectile power and firing range, the gun surpassed all foreign guns of this class. True, she came out somewhat heavier than them, but the large weight did not affect her fighting qualities, since she was designed for mechanical traction.
The A-19 differed from the old artillery systems in several innovations. The high initial velocity of the projectile increased the length of the barrel, and this, in turn, gave rise to difficulties in vertical aiming and when transporting the gun. To unload the lifting mechanism and facilitate the gunner's work, we used a counterbalancing mechanism; and in order to protect the critical components and mechanisms of the gun from shock loads during transportation, the fastening mechanism was stowed: before the trip, the barrel was separated from the recoil devices, pulled back along the cradle and fastened with stoppers to the carriage. For the first time on tools of such a large caliber, sliding beds and a rotating upper machine were used, which provided an increase in the angle of horizontal firing; suspension and metal wheels with rubber tires of the rim, which made it possible to transport the gun along the highway at a speed of up to 20 km / h " ... _1.jpg)
After comprehensive tests, the prototype A-19 was adopted by the Red Army. In 1933, the barrel of a 152-mm cannon of the 1910/1930 model was put on the carriage of this gun, and the 152-mm cannon of the 1910/1934 model entered service, but work on improving the single carriage continued. And in 1937, the Red Army adopted two body guns on a unified carriage - a 122-mm cannon of the 1931/1937 model and a 152-mm howitzer - a 1937 cannon. In this carriage, the lifting and balancing mechanisms are divided into two independent units, the elevation angle is increased to 65 °, and a normalized sight with an independent line of sight is installed.
The 122-mm cannon gave the Germans many bitter minutes. There was not a single artillery preparation in which these wonderful weapons did not participate. With their fire, they crushed the armor of Hitler's "Ferdinands" and "Panthers". It is no coincidence that this gun was used to create the famous ISU-122 self-propelled gun. And it is no coincidence that this gun was one of the first to open fire on Nazi Berlin on April 20, 1945.
122 mm cannon model 1931/1937
B-4 203-MM MODEL GAITZER 1931 
Shooting with direct fire from howitzers of high power of the artillery of the reserve of the main command (ARGK) are not provided for by any firing rules. But it was for this kind of shooting that the commander of the battery of 203-mm howitzers of the Guard, Captain I. Vedmedenko, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
On the night of June 9, 1944, on one of the sections of the Leningrad Front, under the noise of a firefight that drowned out the roar of engines, tractors dragged two huge massive tracked guns to the front edge. When everything calmed down, only 1200 m separated the camouflaged guns from the target - a giant bunker. Reinforced concrete walls two meters thick; three floors going underground; armored dome; approaches, covered by the fire of the flank bunkers - this structure was not without reason considered the main point of enemy resistance. And as soon as dawn broke, Vedmedenko's howitzers opened fire. For two hours, a hundred-kilogram concrete-piercing shells crushed two-meter walls, until finally the enemy fortress ceased to exist ...
“For the first time, our artillerymen began to fire direct fire at concrete fortifications from ARGK high-power howitzers in battles with the White Finns in the winter of 1939/1940,” says Artillery Marshal N. Yakovlev. and on the front line among the soldiers and officers who directly serve these wonderful weapons. "
In 1914, the mobile war, which the generals counted on, lasted only a few months, after which it took on a positional character. It was then that the number of howitzers began to increase rapidly in the field artillery of the belligerent powers - weapons capable, unlike cannons, of hitting horizontal targets: destroying field fortifications and shooting at troops hiding behind the folds of the terrain.
Howitzer; as a rule, it leads a hinged fire. Striking action a projectile is determined not so much by its kinetic energy at the target as by the amount of explosive contained in it. Lower than the cannon, the muzzle velocity of the projectile allows you to reduce the pressure of the powder gases and shorten the barrel. As a result, the wall thickness decreases, the recoil force decreases and the carriage becomes lighter. As a result, the howitzer turns out to be two to three times lighter than a cannon of the same caliber. Another important advantage of the howitzer is that, by changing the magnitude of the charge, it is possible to obtain a beam of trajectories at a constant elevation angle. True, a variable charge requires separate charging, which reduces the rate of fire, but this disadvantage is more than compensated for by its advantages. In the armies of the leading powers, by the end of the war, howitzers accounted for 40-50% of the total artillery fleet.
But the trend towards the construction of powerful field-type defensive structures and a dense network of long-term firing points insistently demanded heavy guns with increased range, high projectile power and fire overhang. In 1931, following the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Soviet designers created a domestic high-power howitzer B-4. It began to be designed at KB Artkom in 1927, where the work was headed by F. Lender. After his death, the project was transferred to the Bolshevik plant, where Magdesiev was the chief designer, and among the designers were Gavrilov, Torbin, and others.
B-4 - 203-mm howitzer model 1931 - was intended for the destruction of especially strong concrete, reinforced concrete and armored structures, to combat large-caliber or sheltered by strong structures enemy artillery and to suppress long-range targets. 
To speed up equipping the Red Army with a new weapon, production was organized simultaneously at two factories. Working drawings in the process of development were changed at each plant, adapting to technological capabilities. As a result, practically two different howitzers began to enter service. In 1937, unified drawings were worked out not by changing the design, but by assembling individual parts and assemblies that had already been tested in production and operation. The only innovation consisted in setting up a tracked course. allowed firing directly from the ground Without special platforms.
The B-4 carriage became the basis for a whole family of high-power guns. In 1939, a number of intermediate samples were completed by the 152-mm gun Br-19 and the 280-mm mortar Br-5. These works were carried out by a team of designers. plant "Barrikada" under the leadership of the Hero of Socialist Labor I. Ivanov.
Thus, the creation of a complex of high-power ground guns on a single carriage was completed: cannons, howitzers, and mortars. The tools were transported by tractors. For this, the guns were disassembled into two parts: the barrel was removed from the gun carriage and placed on a special gun carriage, and the gun carriage, connected to the front end, made up the gun carriage.
Of all this complex, the B-4 howitzer was the most widespread. The combination of a powerful projectile with a high elevation angle and a variable charge giving 10 muzzle velocities determined its brilliant fighting qualities. At any horizontal targets at a distance of 5 to 18 km, the howitzer could shoot along the trajectory of the most advantageous steepness.
B-4 justified the hopes placed on it. Having started her military path on the Karelian Isthmus in 1939, she went along the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, participated in all large artillery preparations, the storming of fortresses and large cities.
203-mm howitzer model 1931
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ML-20 152-MM GAUITZ-GUN, SAMPLE 1937
“When I am asked what type of artillery fire makes the highest demands on the art of personnel, says Marshal of Artillery G. Odintsov, I answer: counter-battery warfare. who fires back, threatening the shooter The greatest chances of winning the duel are with the one who has higher skill, more precisely a weapon, a more powerful projectile.
The experience of the fronts showed that the best Soviet weapon for counter-battery warfare was the 152-mm howitzer-cannon model of 1937 ML-20 ".
The history of the ML-20 dates back to 1932, when a group of designers of the All-Union Arsenal Arsenal - V. Grabin, N. Komarov and V. Drozdov - proposed to create a powerful 152-mm corps cannon by imposing the barrel of a 152-mm Schneider siege cannon on the carriage 122 mm cannon A-19. Calculations have shown that such an idea when installing a muzzle brake, which takes away part of the recoil energy, is real. Tests of the prototype confirmed the validity of the admitted technical risk, and the 152-mm cannon of the 1910/34 model entered service. In the mid-30s, a decision was made to modernize this weapon. The modernization work was headed by the young designer F. Petrov. Having studied the features of the carriage of the A-19 gun, he revealed the main disadvantages of this gun: the lack of suspension at the front end limited the speed of movement; the lifting and balancing mechanism was difficult to fine-tune and provided an insufficiently high vertical aiming speed; it took a lot of energy and time to transfer the barrel from the marching position to the firing position and back; the cradle with recoil devices was difficult to manufacture.
Having developed anew the cast upper machine, dividing the combined lifting and balancing mechanism into two independent ones - a sector lifting and balancing, having designed a front end with suspension, a sight with an independent aiming line and a cradle with a cast trunnion clip instead of a forged one, the designers created for the first time in world practice an intermediate type weapon with properties and guns and howitzers. The elevation angle, increased to 65 °, and 13 variable charges made it possible to obtain a gun, which, like a howitzer, has hinged trajectories and, like a cannon, high initial projectile velocities.
A. Bulashev, S. Gurenko, M. Burnyshev, A. Ilyin and many others took an active part in the development and creation of the howitzer-gun. .jpg)
"ML-20, developed by us in 1.5 months, was presented to state tests after the very first 10 shots fired at the factory range, recalls the winner of the Lenin and State Prizes, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General of the Engineering Service, Doctor of Technical Sciences F. Petrov. These tests were completed at the beginning of 1937, the gun was put into service and put into mass production in the same year. At first everything went well, but suddenly the barrel of one, then another, then a third howitzer-cannon from shots at low elevation angles began to "give a candle" - spontaneously bulge up to the maximum angle. It turned out that for a number of reasons the worm gear was not self-braking enough. We, and especially me, this phenomenon caused a lot of trouble, until after weary days and sleepless nights, a fairly simple solution was found. We offered to put a spring-loaded steel disc with a small adjustable gap in the threaded cover fixing the worm in the crankcase. At the moment of firing, the end part of the worm comes into contact with the disk, which, creating a large additional friction, prevents the worm from turning.
What a relief I felt when, having found such a solution and quickly sketching out sketches, I introduced him to the director and chief engineer of the plant, as well as the head of the military acceptance. All of them that night ended up in the assembly shop, which, however, happened quite often, especially when it came to fulfilling defense orders on a tight schedule. An order was immediately given to make the parts of the device by morning.
When developing this weapon, we paid special attention to improving manufacturability and reducing cost. It was with the production of the howitzer-gun in artillery technology that the widespread use of steel shaped casting began. Many assemblies - upper and lower machines, hinge and trunk parts of beds, wheel hubs - were made of cheap carbon steels. " 
Originally intended for "reliable action against artillery, headquarters, offices and field-type structures," the 152-mm howitzer-gun turned out to be a much more flexible, powerful and effective weapon than previously thought. The combat experience of the battles of the Great Patriotic War continuously expanded the range of tasks assigned to this remarkable weapon. And in the "Service Manual", published at the end of the war, ML-20 prescribed the fight against enemy artillery, the suppression of long-range targets, the destruction of pillboxes and powerful bunkers, the fight against tanks and armored trains, and even the destruction of balloons.
During the Great Patriotic War, in all large artillery preparations, in counter-battery combat, in the assault on fortified areas, the 152-mm howitzer-gun of the 1937 model invariably participated. But a particularly honorable role was played by this weapon in the destruction of heavy fascist tanks. A weighty projectile, fired at a high initial velocity, easily tore off the "tiger" turret from the shoulder strap. There have been battles when these towers literally flew in the air with limp gun barrels. And it is no coincidence that the ML-20 became the basis of the famous ISU-152.
But, perhaps, the most significant recognition of the excellent qualities of this weapon should be considered the fact that the ML-20 was in service with Soviet artillery not only during the Great Patriotic War, but also in the postwar years.
BS-3 100-MM FIELD GUN, SAMPLE 1944 
"In the spring of 1943, when Hitler's" tigers "," panthers "," Ferdinands "began to appear on the battlefields in large numbers, - recalls the famous artillery designer V. Grabin, - in a note addressed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I suggested, along with resuming production 57 mm anti-tank gun: ZIS-2 cannon, create a new weapon - 100 mm anti-tank gun with a powerful projectile.
Why did we choose the 100 mm caliber, new for ground artillery, and not the existing 85 and 107 mm guns? The choice was not accidental. We believed that a weapon was needed, the muzzle energy of which would be one and a half times greater than that of the 107-mm cannon of the 1940 model. And 100-mm guns have long been successfully used in the navy, a unitary cartridge was developed for them, while the 107-mm cannon had separate loading. The presence of a shot, mastered in production, played a decisive role, since its development takes a very long time. And we had little time ... .png)
We could not borrow the design of the naval gun: it is too cumbersome and heavy. The requirements of high power, mobility, lightness, compactness, high rate of fire led to a number of innovations. First of all, a high performance muzzle brake was needed. The previously used slot brake had an efficiency of 25-30%. For the 100-mm cannon, it was necessary to develop a double-chamber brake design with an efficiency of 60%. To increase the rate of fire, a wedge-shaped semi-automatic shutter was used. Lead designer A. Khvorostin was entrusted with the configuration of the gun. "
The contours of the gun began to appear on the Whatman paper on the May holidays of 1943. In a few days, the creative groundwork was realized, formed on the basis of long reflections, painful searches, studying combat experience and analyzing the best artillery structures in the world. The barrel and the semi-automatic breech were designed by I. Griban, the recoil devices and the hydropneumatic balancing mechanism were designed by F. Kaleganov, the cradle of cast construction was designed by B. Lasman, the equal-strength upper machine was V. Shishkin. The issue with the choice of the wheel was hard to decide. The design bureau usually used the automobile wheels of the GAZ-AA and ZIS-5 trucks for the guns, but for new cannon they didn't fit. The next car was a five-ton YaAZ, however, its wheel turned out to be too heavy and large. Then the idea was born to put paired wheels from GAZ-AA, which made it possible to fit into the given weight and dimensions.
A month later, the working drawings were sent to production, and after another five months the first prototype of the famous BS-3 - a cannon designed to combat tanks and other motorized vehicles, to fight artillery, to suppress long-range targets, to destroy fire means of infantry and manpower, enemy forces.
“Three design features distinguish BS-3 from previously developed domestic systems,” says A. Khvorostin, winner of the State Prize. requirements for lightness and compactness of units, and the change in the carriage scheme significantly reduced the load on the beds when firing at the maximum angles of rotation of the upper machine. any angle of horizontal guidance, did not exceed 1/2 of the recoil force.In addition, the new scheme simplified the equipment of the combat position.
Thanks to all these novelties, BS-3 stood out with an unusually high metal utilization rate. This means that in its design it was possible to achieve the most perfect combination of power and mobility. "
The BS-3 was tested by a commission chaired by General Panikhin - a representative: the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army. According to V. Grabin, one of the most interesting moments there was a shooting at the "tiger" tank. A cross was drawn on the turret of the tank in chalk. The gunner received the initial data and fired a shot from 1500 m. Approaching the tank, everyone was convinced: the shell almost hit the cross and pierced the armor. After this, the tests continued according to a given program, and the commission recommended the weapon for service. 
BS-Z tests prompted a new method of dealing with heavy tanks. Once at the range, a shot was fired at a captured Ferdinand from a distance of 1500 m. And although, as expected, the projectile did not penetrate the 200-mm frontal armor of the self-propelled gun, its gun and control complex were out of order. BS-Z proved to be able to effectively fight enemy tanks and self-propelled guns at distances exceeding the range of a direct shot. In this case, as experience has shown, the crew of enemy vehicles was struck by fragments of armor that broke off from the hull due to the enormous overvoltages arising in the metal at the moment the shell hit the armor. The manpower that the projectile retained at these ranges was sufficient to bend and twist the armor.
In August 1944, when the BS-Z began to enter the front, the war was already drawing to a close, so the experience of the combat use of this weapon is limited. Nevertheless, BS-3 rightfully occupies an honorable place among the weapons of the Great Patriotic War, for it contained ideas that were widely used in artillery designs of the post-war period.
M-30 122-MM HOOBITS SAMPLE 1938 .jpg)
"W-wah! A gray cloud shot up on the enemy's side. The fifth round hit the dugout where the ammunition was stored. A grenade with a deceleration fuse hit several rolls and exploded inside the warehouse. Following the barely audible sound of a burst, a large black pillar rose high up. smoke, and an explosion of enormous force shook the surroundings "- so in the book" Howitzers Are Firing "P. Kudinov, a former artilleryman, participant in the war, describes the everyday combat work of the M-30 of the famous 122-mm divisional howitzer, model 1938.
Before the First World War, the caliber of 105 mm was adopted in the artillery of the Western powers for divisional howitzers. Russian artillery thought went its own way: the army was armed with 122-mm divisional howitzers of the 1910 model. The experience of military operations has shown that a projectile of this caliber, possessing the most advantageous fragmentation effect, at the same time gives a minimally satisfactory high-explosive effect. However, at the end of the 1920s, the 122-mm howitzer of the 1910 model did not meet the views of experts on the nature of a future war: it had insufficient range, rate of fire and mobility.
According to the new "System of artillery weapons for 1929-1932", approved by the Revolutionary Military Council in May 1929, it was planned to create a 122-mm howitzer with a weight in the stowed position of 2200 kg, a firing range of 11-12 km and a combat rate of fire of 6 rounds per minute. Since the model developed for these requirements turned out to be too heavy, the modernized 122-mm howitzer of the 1910/30 model was retained in service. And some experts began to lean towards the idea of abandoning the 122-mm caliber and adopting the 105-mm howitzers.
"In March 1937, at a meeting in the Kremlin," recalls the Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General of the Engineering and Technical Service F. Petrov, "I spoke about the reality of creating a 122-mm howitzer and, answering numerous questions, gave out what they say, My optimism was fueled by the great, as it seemed to me then, the success of our team in creating a 152-mm howitzer - the ML-20 cannon. responsible for everything I said at a meeting in the Kremlin, I suggested that the management of my plant take the initiative in developing a 122-mm howitzer. For this purpose, a small group of designers was organized. But the persistence and enthusiasm of the designers - S. Dernov, A. Ilyin, N. Dobrovolsky, A. Chernykh, V. Burylov, A. Drozdov and N. Kostrulin - took their toll: In 1937, two projects were defended: the one developed by V. Sidorenko's team and ours. Our project was approved. 
In terms of tactical and technical data, primarily in terms of maneuverability and flexibility of fire - the ability to quickly transfer fire from one target to another - our howitzer fully met the requirements of GAU. In terms of the most important characteristic - muzzle energy - it was more than twice as good as the 1910/30 model howitzer. Advantageously, our gun differed from the 105-mm divisional howitzers of the armies of the capitalist countries.
The estimated weight of the gun is about 2200 kg: 450 kg less than the howitzer developed by the team of V. Sidorenko. By the end of 1938, all tests were completed and the gun was put into service under the name of the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model. "
Wheels combat move were first equipped with a car-type travel brake. The transition from the traveling position to the combat position took no more than 1-1.5 minutes. When extending the beds, the springs were automatically turned off, and the beds themselves were automatically fixed in the extended position. In the stowed position, the barrel was secured without disconnecting from the rods of the recoil devices and without pulling back. To simplify and reduce the cost of production in the howitzer, parts and assemblies of existing artillery systems were widely used. So, for example, the bolt was taken from a standard howitzer of the 1910/30 model, the sight from a 152-mm howitzer was a cannon of a 1937 model, the wheels were from a divisional 76-mm cannon of a 1936 model, etc. Many parts were manufactured by casting and stamping. That is why the M-30 was one of the simplest and most inexpensive domestic artillery systems.
A curious fact testifies to the great survivability of this howitzer. Once during the war, it became known at the plant that the troops had a weapon that had fired 18 thousand shots. The plant offered to exchange this copy for a new one. And after a thorough factory inspection, it turned out that the howitzer has not lost its qualities and is suitable for further combat use. This conclusion was unexpectedly confirmed: during the formation of the next echelon, as if it were a sin, a shortage of one weapon was discovered. And with the consent of the military acceptance, the unique howitzer again went to the front as a newly manufactured weapon. 
M-30 direct fire
The experience of the war showed that the M-30 brilliantly performed all the tasks that were prescribed to it. She destroyed and suppressed the enemy's manpower as in an open area. and located in field-type shelters, destroyed and suppressed infantry fire weapons, destroyed field-type structures and fought against artillery, etc. enemy mortars.
But most clearly the advantages of the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model were manifested in the fact that its capabilities turned out to be wider than prescribed by the leadership of the service. -In the days of the heroic defense of Moscow, howitzers fired direct fire at fascist tanks. Later, the experience was reinforced by the creation of a cumulative projectile for the M-30 and an additional point in the service manual: "The howitzer can be used to combat tanks, self-propelled guns and other armored vehicles of the enemy."
See the continuation on the website: WWII - Weapons of Victory - WWII Artillery Part II
