Libmonster ID: RU-8174
Since the defeat of France in the war of 1870-1871, the French bourgeoisie has never put up with the loss of industrial areas - Alsace and Lorraine.
The colonial fever of the 80s and 90s barely ended and the section the globe between the imperialists, as again the thoughts of French diplomacy turned to the European continent.
The Franco-Russian alliance, formalized in 1891 - 1893, the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, and finally the Triple Accord (Entente) of 1907 - stages on the path of an active French policy of encircling Germany.
French diplomacy stubbornly avoided any serious political agreement with Germany. Back in 1898, during the period of Fashoda 1, Théophile Delcassé, one of the future creators of the Entente, having joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found in the ministry's safe a recording of a conversation between his predecessor, Gabriel Ganoto, with the German ambassador Munster, in which the latter made friendly proposals. The new minister did not hesitate to leave these proposals unanswered.
The Entente was not only a defensive alliance, but also an offensive one. As is known, the Anglo-French agreement was based on the seizure of Morocco, and the Anglo-Russian agreement was based on the partition of Persia.
Georges Clemenceau, the then chairman of the Council of Ministers, just after the formation of the Entente, on July 28, 1908, bluntly declared to the future French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Georges Louis:
"I think about the war and I find that it is inevitable. I even wrote about it, although maybe it was not necessary, but I always think about it ... we need to be prepared, and with the support that we get from England and Russia ... and maybe also with the support of Italy, where public opinion can oblige the government to "show itself on our side, we can win. In all cases, it will be a war for existence. If we are defeated, we will be crushed "(see Georges Louis, Notes of the Ambassador, p. 15).
The next milestones on the road to war preparation were January 1912 and January 1913. Senator Poincaré, one of the most stubborn revanchists, was called “to power, first as head of government and then as president of the republic. With his arrival, French diplomacy significantly intensified the preparations for war.
The new president always believed, like Clemenceau, that war with Germany was inevitable. To do this, he hastened to replace the ambassador in St. Petersburg Georges Louis in 1913 with the former minister Delcassé, the very Delcassé who, in the very first days of the war, proudly declared: “This is my policy triumphing today. How many times I have been accused of encircling Germany! with England, agreement "with Italy, the first agreement with Spain. It was I who really cultivated an alliance with Russia "(R. Poincaré" In the Service of France ". Vol. I, p. 99).
Poincare's personal visits to Nicholas II and the English king George strengthened the Entente and helped to develop a unified war plan. It is not for nothing that the Times, after Poincaré's trip to London, wrote about the significance of this visit as "the most important; in terms of its consequences of all official visits that have taken place in recent times" (Tarle, Europe, in the era of imperialism, p. 232).
In the days of July 1914, the French government in particular encouraged the aggressive intentions of tsarist Russia in every possible way. Paul Deschanel, Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, said: "Most of those who were ministers in July openly call Poincaré the culprit of the war. During the review, he told me (that is, Deschanel. - Ya. G.): "It will be very difficult for me
1 Fashoda is a village on the Upper Nile (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan), after which the incident between England and France was named. In 1893, Fashoda was occupied by a French detachment, which led to a serious conflict between England and France. Under pressure from England, France made concessions and cleared the territory it occupied.
p. 65
convince the Russians. "He wanted to say:" ... convince them that it is necessary to speak "(see Georges Louis," Notes of the Ambassador ", p. 57).
From the moment of "the appearance of war, the main goal of French diplomacy was to ensure victory. Peace between the belligerent bourgeois governments without victory, without defeating the enemy, peace without annexations and indemnities was out of the question."
“It is intolerable to listen to sweet Kautsky and Co., who talk about a democratic peace as if it could be concluded by the present and bourgeois governments in general. T. XIX, p. 282).
During the First World War imperialist war the efforts of French diplomacy were mainly reduced to recruiting new allies in the fight against the enemy, to drawing neutral countries into the war, and to ensuring the conditions for a future predatory world that would be most beneficial to French imperialism.
In the archives of the French Naval Ministry, among other documents "not subject to publicity", there is the following telegram, drawn up on August 3, 1914: "Toulon, Ministry of the Navy. Attack every German warship. Confirm receipt. Chief of the Naval General Staff, Vice Admiral J. Beer ".
This telegram bears an inscription in pencil: "Was not sent. See letter from the President of the Republic." The text of the president's letter reads: "Dear Minister. I believe that on the question of the Mediterranean Sea you should wait for tomorrow's meeting of the Council of Ministers. Loyal to you, R. Poincaré."
When subsequently, after 1 1/2 years, the Senate Maritime Commission demanded that Admiral Lakaz, the Minister of the Navy, issue these documents to her, she received a categorical refusal. In his "clarification to the Council of Ministers, President Poincare stated that if" I had not taken this precautionary measure, I could have been accused of pushing for war "(??). And he wrote: in his diary:" Everything the ministers agreed with me "(Poincaré. Quoted op. Vol. II, p. 271).
It is even possible that the Council of Ministers found the arguments of the respected president quite weighty, but upon closer examination of the issue, Poincaré's peacefulness turned out to be more than doubtful.
Poincaré's letter to the Minister bears the inscription: "Received August 3, 12 . 50 am in response to a letter from the minister dated August 3 at 12.15 pm, in which the minister asked whether he should order the fleet to search for the cruisers Goeben and Breslau and attack them "(ibid., P. 274) The German ambassador Shen handed the note with the "outward appearance" to the French government on August 3 at 7:30 am. Thus, Poincaré wrote a note to the Naval Ministry with a proposal to refrain from sinking the Goeben and Breslau 5 hours after the start of the war. It is quite understandable that at that time it was not a question of "unleashing a war" that had already been unleashed. The point was different.
Turkey has always served as a market for the export of capital for French imperialism. French investments in Turkey before the war reached 3 billion francs. In Eastern Anatolia, French companies had concessions for the construction of railways. Turkish finance was largely under French control. That is why the French diplomats were so intensely worried about the aggressive plans of tsarist Russia towards Turkey. Palaeologus, the French ambassador in Petrograd, at the beginning of the war (August 17; 1914) sought from the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov well-known assurances about Turkey. “You are not unaware,” he told the minister, “that the territorial inviolability and political independence of Turkey remain one of the guiding principles of French diplomacy” (Poincaré. Op. Cit. Vol. I, p. 64).
However, no effort has been made by French diplomacy to bring Turkey to the Triple Accord. One of the Turkish leaders, Javid Bey, told the French ambassador to Turkey that "opponents of the French orientation in the Turkish government come with great promises from Germany and reproach him, Javid, as well as Jemal Pasha and the grand vizier, for being in opposition to them, but never, they do not offer anything on behalf of the powers of the Triple Accord. Javid Bey would like to receive the authority to answer them in turn with some positive promise, for example, regarding the abolition of surrender "(ibid., p. 78).
But France was not at all going to give up capitulations and other privileges that she had in Sultan Turkey. The fact is that a closer rapprochement with Turkey could lead to the fact that the Balkan countries would rush into the enemy's enemy;
p. 66
wine would jeopardize Russia's military aid, about which one could not be sure whether she would actively fight if she was not guaranteed the neutralization of the straits. Therefore, Bompard, the French ambassador to Constantinople, in his conversations with Javid got off with vague and vague promises. Delcassé in Paris, when he was already the Minister of Foreign Affairs, directly told Izvolsky that he was against the attraction of Turkey to the coalition. Moreover, he proposed to form in the Balkans an anti-Turkish bloc of neutral countries (see "International Relations" (hereinafter "MO"). Vol. VI. Part 1, pp. 116 - 117).
Delcassé's predecessor on the Ques d'Orsay (that is, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Doumergue strenuously offered Russia to guarantee the integrity of the Turkish possessions and at the same time made it clear to Izvolsky that “this would not interfere with us (that is, Russia. - Ya. G.) in the elimination of the war, to resolve the question of the Straits according to our types "(" MO "T. VI. Part 1, p. 57).
So that Russia, in the event of the beginning of military operations in the south, could occupy Constantinople and the Straits on its own, the French government, like the British, issued an order not to prevent the German fleet cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" from going into the eastern Mediterranean. to the shores of Turkey. As Poincare predicted, both cruisers entered The Dardanelles were "bought" by Turkey from Germany. "The deed ... is done," the French president remarked with satisfaction (Poincaré. Quoted op. Vol. I, p. 46).
Now French diplomacy considered it more useful to have Turkey not as an ally, but as an adversary. "It would be more profitable to draw Turkey into the ranks of our adversaries, in order to thus end it," a prominent official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ponso frankly declared ("MO". Vol. VI, No. 259).
Therefore, on October 30, after the attack of German-Turkish ships on Russian ports and ships in the Black Sea, Bompar, together with the Russian and British ambassadors, hastened to demand a passport.
In the first 7 months of the war, the bargaining of the allies with Italy and among themselves over Italy flares up and down, depending on the course of hostilities. Not only the excessive appetites of the Italian bourgeoisie, but also the disagreements among the allies prevented Italy from going over to the side of the Entente. The Italian envoy in Bucharest Fashioti described the position of Italy with the greatest directness.
"... the longer the war drags on," he said to his Russian colleague Trubetskoy, "the weaker in quality and quantitatively enemy armies become. Consequently, the voice of Italy and Romania acquires all the more significance, the later they put their strength on the scales "(" MO ". Vol. VI. Part 2, p. 197).
On August 4, 1914, on the day of the "appearance by England of the ultimatum to Germany, Poincaré made the following entry in his diary:" Doumergue and Viviani told me today one rather unfortunate Russian proposal: to promise now Italy to Trentino and Wallon if she takes part in the war against Austria "(Poincaré. Op. cit. Vol. I, p. 10).
"It is possible, therefore, that this (ie, war. - Ya. G.) will put an end to the artificial dualism of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Italy has its own national aspirations. The present moment is of decisive importance to her. "(Ibid., P. 45) His hints become even more specific when he begins to assure the interlocutor that the French fleet will bombard Trieste and Pola only as a last resort (ibid.).
Especially great importance The French imperialists lent Italy to the action of Italy on the side of the Entente in the first months of 1915, when the Russian army, having no shells, retreated under the hurricane fire of German artillery, and all attempts of General Joffre to break through the front in Northern France ended in failure. French diplomacy was also aware that Italy's action on the side of the Allies would have a beneficial effect on vacillating Romania. Pointe
p. 67
Kara more than once conveyed the words of Romanian leaders that "if Italy acts, Romania will undoubtedly also act" (Poincaré. Op. cit. Vol. I, p. 154). Back on October 3, 1914, the Ca d'Orsay learned "from a secret and reliable source" that an agreement had been concluded between Romania and Italy and that neither of them would come out of neutrality without the consent of the other.
French diplomats never doubted that the leading role in the future peace conference would belong not to Italy, but to France. And so they did not stop at promises of future satisfaction of the far-reaching demands of Italy.
As early as September 21, 1914, a French Adriatic squadron landed two batteries in Antavari to keep Cattaro Bay under fire. With this event, the French were kind of inviting the Italian fleet to join the joint performance. On this occasion, Poincaré wrote that the actions of the squadron "cannot it (that is, Italy. - Ya. G.) not to please "(ibid., p. 172). On March 9, 1915, the Council of Ministers decided to send a detachment of Riccioti Garibaldi, deployed in the French army, to Trentino for guerrilla warfare in the rear of the Austrians. This adventure, as all Garibaldi and some ministers had to force Italy to join the war.
To achieve the fastest acceptance of the Italian demands, Palaeologus exerted constant pressure on the tsarist government. The Adriatic coast with Dalmatia was promised to Serbia even earlier. For a long time Sazonov did not agree to change this decision, especially since Italy's assistance was doubtful for Russia, while a small Serbian army with the greatest courage and bravery repulsed the onslaught of the Austrians, thereby facilitating the position of the Russians on the southwestern front. Sazonov believed that the promises made to Italy at the expense of Serbia's interests would negatively affect the resilience of the Serbian government and the Serbian army.
Only repeated statements by Palaeologus and Izvolsky's telegrams, in which the latter reported that France attached great moral and military importance to Italy's entry into the war, and asked not to resist Italian demands, forced the Russian government to Pripyat Italian demands.
Due to the intransigence of Russia, Poincaré even had to send Nicholas II on April 19, 1915, a rather harsh telegram, which says:
"My dear and high friend! Let me tell your Majesty how dangerous, in my opinion, the delay in the acceptance of the Italian memorandum by the Allies. General Joffre, like His Highness Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich wants Italy's speech to follow as soon as possible, but the only way to speed it up is to immediately sign an agreement. Until it is signed, one can fear that the negotiations will suddenly be disrupted by unforeseen circumstances ... Your Majesty, possessing such a high and enlightened understanding of the interests of the allied countries, will undoubtedly not fail to prevent a break, which could lead to the most serious consequences "(ibid. , pp. 382 - 383).
A week after the sending of this letter, on April 26, 1915, an agreement with Italy was finally signed in London, and a month later Italy about “declared war on Austria.
But even after this act, Italian diplomacy tried to maneuver and for 15 months, despite all the insistence of the French, did not present the passport to the German ambassador.
Italy's performance intensified the discord among the allies. Serbia has been troubled ever since. She did not know what exactly was promised to Italy, but not without reason she believed that these promises were made at her expense. The Russian pariahs could not come to terms with the introduction of Italy in the Balkans. Greece, which itself was aiming at Albania, began to treat the allies with great suspicion. "The more the coalition of allies expands, the more difficult it is ... to lead it," the French president wrote bitterly (ibid., P. 431).
The Anglo-French imperialists attached particular importance to the involvement in the war on the side of the Entente of the Balkan states: Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, because this achieved once "the unity of the enemy forces, the intensive exchange of German weapons and instructors for Turkish raw materials and foodstuffs was stopped. In order to implement these plans. and the Dardanelles expedition was undertaken.
The significance of the Dardanelles operation and the occupation of Constantinople, proposed by Churchill to the British naval ministers, was fully and quite cynically defined by another Englishman, the ambassador to Paris, Lord Francis Bertie. "If this happens," he wrote, "great changes will take place. Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, like hungry wolves, will rush at the dying Turk to grab a clod.
page 68
Chok, and the Turks will turn the front and betray their Huns friends. I hope that the public in England and abroad "will force the powers to reject, in principle, the Russian point of view on the rights of Muscovites in relation to Constantinople and the Straits" (Bertie "Behind the Scenes of the Entente", lay in on February 22, 1915).
The Dardanelles campaign revealed the Anglo-French contradictions.
By taking the Dardanelles, England hoped to protect Egypt from the Germans, as well as to seize such territories in Asia Minor or Syria, which could serve as a weighty argument during future peace negotiations. At first, the British tried to eliminate France from participating in the Dardanelles expedition, despite the fact that, according to a naval convention concluded between the allies, the command of a "single squadron in the Mediterranean should have belonged to France. In January 1915, conditions were worked out under which the command of the fleet off the coast of Syria was entrusted to the French.Churchill pledged, after a long dispute, not to land troops separately from France at Alexandretta, in which France was especially interested.
The Dardanelles expedition was to begin on 15 February. The failure of the expedition threatened to severely undermine the influence of the Allies, not only in the Balkans, but also in Egypt, Morocco and India, where Muslims made up the majority of the population. Therefore, it was decided to keep the expedition in strict secrecy, and in case of failure, declare that the allied fleet had no intention of taking the straits at all, but was only tasked with bombarding the forts.
As you know, the attempt to break through the straits made on March 18 ended unsuccessfully, and the Anglo-French fleet suffered heavy losses. The landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula also brought nothing but casualties. However, until the end of the year, until the last detachment of the landing force was withdrawn, allied diplomacy continued to pin its hopes on it. The French ambassador to London, Paul Cambon, whose opinion was reckoned with at the Elysee Palace, wrote to Paris:
“I will not cease to assert that Bulgaria will act only when we cross the Dardanelles. Ser. 438).
Unsuccessful actions in the Dardanelles intensified vacillations in the governments of other neutral Balkan states. The allies lost hope of their speedy entry into the war. “Neither Romania nor Greece,” writes Lord Bertie on June 1, 1915, “apparently intend to speak now; we have not yet won enough success with the Dardanelles to cheer them up, and the retreat and defeat of the Russians was enough to discourage them "(Bertie" Behind the Scenes of the Entente ", entry of June 1, 1915).
The clearer it became that the Dardanelles campaign was doomed to defeat, the more the Anglo-French contradictions came out. Kitchener, the British Minister of War, waving his hand to the Balkans, proposed sending a British expeditionary force to Alexandria and Port Said. He demanded that the French army also go there. But the plans of French imperialism did not at all include defending British Egypt. France continued to be most interested and alarmed by the Balkans. Bulgaria, which the Entente had virtually nothing to offer, except for Turkish territory up to the Enos-Media line, sided with Germany. A major offensive by the Austro-German forces against Serbia began. In the interests of France, it was necessary to preserve the Balkan front and thereby draw off the enemy troops from the western front. This is how the idea of a new "eastern front" was born, directly on the Balkan Peninsula.
Kitchener was skeptical about this French idea. During a trip to Mudros, he came up with a new project for an attack on Turkey. He proposed to seize the port of Alexandretta, near which the Baghdad railway runs. But the British are in Syria! The French president has something to worry about. After all, this same project had long been worked out by the French General Staff and was shelved because of Delcassa's tacit opposition. “And now the British will get ahead of us,” notes Poincaré, “and, fearing complications in Egypt and India, they will take a deposit at our expense” (Poincaré. Tsat, op. T. II. P. 139).
In view of strong opposition from France, the plan to capture Alexandretta was abandoned.
In 1915, on the western front, there was no sign of the promised imminent victory of France. The optimistic assurances of the commander-in-chief about the possibility of breaking through the front were less and less believed. Blow to the Ball
page 69
kanakh, it was possible to raise public opinion, move from positional war to mobile one and, finally, with the help of military pressure and intervention, force neutral countries to fight.
"His own view," Bertie writes, "Briand (vice-chairman of the cabinet. - Ya. G.) stated as follows, in order to improve the situation in Belgium and in the north of France, the campaign should be extended to the Balkans. Expedition of British and French troops to Thessaloniki with the participation of the Greek army and under pressure from Russia, undoubtedly, would have drawn Romania into the war and would have determined the position of Bulgaria, which, perhaps, has an obligation in relation to Austria and Germany ... If Russian troops landed in Varna or entered Romania, then the king and the government of Bulgaria would have to choose a mother-in-law by joint actions with the Entente and the fall "(Bertie" Behind the scenes of the Entente ", entry of February 4, 1915).
Allied diplomacy was not shy about means to achieve its goals, not stopping even before overthrowing the governments of neutral states.
Elsewhere, the same Bertie frankly wrote that the expedition should be created "with the aim of compromising Greece and persuading Romania to help Serbia" (ibid., Entry dated February 3, 1915).
About the Balkan expedition, there were disagreements not only between Paris and London, but also within the Council of Ministers and the Committee national defense in France itself. General Joffre and Delcassé, supporters of the development of decisive military operations in France, were against the expedition. This opposition was one of the reasons for Delcassé's departure and the subsequent resignation of the Vivashi cabinet. In his place, on October 30, 1915, came the "big ministry" of Aristille Briand, consisting of 24 ministers.
Joffre, after his appointment as generalissimo of all French armies, gave his consent to the Thessaloniki expedition. Burning was chosen as the object of activity, which stemmed from both the military-strategic and diplomatic clans of the allies. However, Greece did not want to leave its neutrality. And this "caused pressure on Greece from England and France.
The "democratic", "civilized" powers applied such methods as the promise of compensation, bribery, blackmail, provocative attacks, etc. The intervention and overthrow of King Constantine, the opponent of Greece's entry into Shishu, were the last means of "persuasion" launched into the course of Anglo-French diplomacy.
Back in early March 1915, the Entente seemed to be able to triumph: on March 7, the Greek envoy, in Nis (Serbia), on behalf of Venizelos, the chairman of the Greek Council of Ministers, informed Pasic that the Greek government had decided to break out of neutrality and place its fleet at the disposal of the Allies. and a land division. But suddenly, at 11 o'clock in the evening, it came out of Athens announcing the resignation of the Anglo-French protege, Venizelos. King Constantine condemned the policy of intervention in the war.
On August 31, 1915, the French Council of Ministers decided to require Greece to pass troops to occupy Macedonia. On October 3, France accepted Lord Bergi's offer of a guarantee in the event that Greece entered the war on the territory of her possessions and transferred to her after the war of Smyrna with the Hinterland. Former Greek Prime Minister Venizelos was in close contact with the French envoy Helmen. At the insistence of both of them, on October 17, 1915, the French government decided to cede the Bulgarian Aegean coast to Greece. England agreed to cede the island of Cyprus to Greece on condition that Greece would open military action against Bulgaria, which had entered the war.
In October 1915, the Allied Expeditionary Force landed in Thessaloniki. The occupation of the city and the railway to Niš began. Even such a devoted Entente supporter as Venizelos will be deeply outraged by the impudence of the Allies. "The allies," he exclaimed, "treat Greece as a conquered country!" (cm Poincaré. Cit. Op. Vol. II, p. 86).
France demanded that Russia send troops to "guard the Thessaloniki-Nis road" and to put pressure on Romania. But Sazonov told Paleologue that Russia "after the terrible losses it has suffered over the past 5 months" is not in a position to send soldiers. "There is a limit to human strength. Our troops are exhausted, our contingents are bad. Do not demand new efforts from us" (ibid., P. 87).
Despite these real difficulties for Russia, the French government insisted on sending cannon fodder. Poincaré personally drew up a formidable instruction to the French ambassador in Petrograd: “The mortgage on Constantinople, which Russia has achieved, has been playing a fatal role in the Balkan issue for several months now. , to the hostility of King Ferdinand-
p. 70
yes, to the success of Germany with King Constantine. When England undertook the Dardanelles expedition, France sided with To her only in the hope of conquering Constantinople for her ally (?? - Ya. G.) ... Today ... the imperial government is placing on France and England the entire burden of helping Serbia, And meanwhile, according to all the information we receive from Sofia, a significant part of the Bulgarian army declares that it will not fight against Russia. Consequently, the presence of Russian troops in Macedonia and a naval demonstration in front of Burgas and Varna would be of the greatest importance ... Be pleased to convey in a friendly and firm tone these serious considerations to the imperial government "(Poincaré. Cited op. T. II, p. 93) ...
But even this message could not force Russia to send troops to the Balkans. Only in the fall of 1916, the first contingent of Russian troops was sent to Thessaloniki.
The Thessaloniki expedition initially did not justify the hopes placed on it. She was unable to provide any military assistance to Serbia, she could not even connect with the remnants of the Serbian army, which was forced to seek refuge on the Adriatic coast of Albania. “Serbia,” writes Lloyd George, “was abandoned by the allies, despite the solemn promise of timely support. The Greeks, of course, feared that they would be left to their fate. to a much greater extent than the capture of several kilometers in France "(Lloyd George's" War Memoirs ". Vol. I - II, p. 348).
Subsequently, the French imperialists, with the help of their British allies, resorted to more and more rude, but at the same time more effective means to involve the neutral Balkan states in the war.
Helmen, as the Russian representative Demidov repeatedly reported, behaved defiantly in Athens and deliberately went to provocative actions. In Parsha, they began to prepare for decisive action - for the destruction of the Greek fleet and the bombardment of Greek cities. On November 11, 1915, Poincaré writes: "The government decided to send naval forces and demand that London do the same. In addition, we proposed to England to fix all loan payments for Greece, all supply privileges and all supplies for Greece pending clarification of the situation." (Poincaré. Quoted op. Vol. II, p. 137). The parliamentary military commission also insisted on the use of decisive measures against Greece: "... only a powerful demonstration of our military strength can prevent a great danger in the Balkans" (ibid., P. 138).
On November 28, at night, a squadron of French, British, Russian and Italian ships appeared on the roadstead in Milos. When asked by the frightened Greek Prime Minister Skuloudis, Helmen answered frankly: "The time has come for the Greek government to abandon its ambiguous position."
But Greece continued to maintain neutrality by all means.
A few days later, Helmen and his colleagues again paid a visit to Skuloudis and (handed him another memorandum, in which the Greek government was invited to withdraw its troops from the city of Thessaloniki and its environs. He demanded permission to search and destroy enemy submarines and to inspect ships in Greek territorial waters. Greece yielded to force and agreed to these demands, which in fact meant the elimination of neutrality.
However, this was not enough for the Allies. On December 30, the French general Sarrail, commander of the expeditionary forces, after the refusal of Schuloudis to remove the consuls of states hostile to France from Thessaloniki, arrested them and sent them to Marseille. This "was a flagrant violation of international law and Germany's provocative challenge to declare war on Greece.
On January 12, 1916, the French occupied, regardless of the Greek protest, the island of Corfu, which became the base of the new Serbian army.
When in the spring of 1916 the defense of Verdun insistently dictated the need to activate the remaining fronts, the French government further increased its pressure on Greece and Romania. Taking advantage of Greece's request for a loan, Briand in early March demanded the passage of Serb troops through Greek territory to Thessaloniki. When Greece refused to give its consent, the French cabinet was extremely outraged by this "betrayal" and decided to take coercive measures - blockade and outright annexation. The French government crushed Greece: "You are violating your obligations of benevolent neutrality; in this case, we are abandoning our obligations regarding the return of the occupied territory" (ibid., P. 350).
p. 71
that, - there were disagreements about how to deal with King Constantine. Poincaré is an iron fist, Briand hopes for, oratory. "
For propaganda and preparation of the coup, Venizelos received several million francs through the British capitalist-track by nationality - Basil Zakharov.
On September 1, 1916, the French government discussed the creation of a "revolutionary committee", that is, the interventional government of Venzelos, in Thessaloniki. But Briand and Minister of Finance Ribot were then against this plan, since they were not sure of the support of England, who feared that actions against the king would lead to the establishment of a republic in Greece. "Gray is alarmed by the possibility of a revolution in Athens and the fall of the king," Bertie notes on September 2, 1916. "If he falls, will they not want to establish a republic in Greece here?"
On September 9 in Paris, a telegram was received about the attack "on the French mission in Athens. Few doubted that this was another provocation of the French envoy. Even French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Briand in the Council of Ministers" expresses suspicion that they (incidents. - Ya. G.), possibly rigged by Helmain and the military and naval attaché "(Poincare, Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 401). ". Only disagreements among the allies - fears of England and direct opposition of the Russian tsar - gave King Constantine the opportunity to hold out on the throne for a few more months.
In June 1917, France forced King Constantine to abdicate. Wenzelos was again put in power, who broke off diplomatic relations with Germany on July 2, 1917. The Anglo-French imperialists achieved their goal: Greece entered the war on the side of the Entente.
The true goals of the war differed significantly from the official versions, in the name of which the French bourgeoisie, as well as the bourgeoisie of its allies and opponents, sent millions of workers to slaughter. Behind the broadcasts about "the crushing of German militarism, the abolition of the Wilhelm regime, the defense of civilization and democracy, the creation of the League of Nations, etc., etc., were hidden the real goals of the war: the seizure of territories, the dismemberment of the defeated countries, demands for indemnities.
Simultaneously with the first shots, the Allies begin to create plans for an imperialist redrawing of the world map. Already on the second day of the war, August 4, in his message to the chambers and the population, the French president wrote: "For more than forty years the French, in their sincere love for the world, harbored in the depths of their hearts their desire to receive legal compensation" (Poincaré. Cit. op.Vol. I, p. 491). In more intimate conversations, Poincaré was quick to decipher what this "compensation" was. On August 5, he wrote about his conversation with Clemenceau: "There was a moment - he (Clemenceau. - Ya. G.) uttered the word "Alsace", and the paintings of 1870 came to his mind, when he shed tears from excitement. I myself felt tears in my eyes. " which included the entire Saar region with a coal basin.
Immediately after the first German defeat on September 5-9, the intensive activity of the diplomatic offices begins. "The victory on the Marne," notes Bertie, "has revived the spirit of the French, and they are already ready to share the skin of an unkilled bear."
Active negotiations began on the redivision of the world.
In his "rough outline" Gray put forward the following requirements: 1) the acquisition of the German colonies; 2) neutralization of the Kiel Canal; 3) the surrender and sinking of the German navy; 4) the resolution of the question of the Scheldt; 5) transfer of Luxembourg to Belgium (German); 6) compensation of Holland at the expense of Germany; 7) military indemnities, 8) nullification of the dominant position of Prussia (see "MO". Vol. VI. Part 2, p. 329).
Izvolsky sent Sazonov the following additional conditions put forward by France (October 13, 1914): 1) correction of African borders; 2) the crushing of Prussia; 3) branch of Hanover; 4) transfer of Schleswig to Denmark; 5) preservation of Austria-Hungary.
Negotiations around the division of future conquests after Turkey's entry into the war intensified especially. England, which lost less in the war than other alliances
p. 72
Vicki, as always, was trying to get the most. Already on October 30, 1914, on the day of the sinking of the Russian gunboat, the British ambassador wrote in his intimate diary: "If it comes to a war with the Turks, then we must speak out for a created but Arab Caliphate."
France, in turn, has taken decisive steps to determine its share of production. Delcassé visited Bertie, with whom he had a frank conversation. This is how Bertie himself talks about him; "I have long suspected France's encroachment on the Rhine, as a border with Germany, as well as its lust for parts of Syria. All this was confirmed by Delcassé in an academic conversation tonight. France will take Mainz, Koblenz, Cologne, Belgium - Aachen ... the assumption that we, as always, will want to take everything for ourselves, and asked what I was ready to leave to France. I answered - Alsace-Lorraine and everything that we do not need ourselves! " (Bertie "Behind the Scenes of the Entente", entry of February 24, 1915).
What were the plans of France in the East, we learn from Poincaré's letter to Palaeologus, written in the midst of negotiations on the future fate of Constantinople.
The President wrote on March 9, 1915 regarding the transfer of Constantinople:
“The first, absolutely necessary precaution, I believe: not to publicly discuss the future fate of Constantinople and leave Romania, Italy and all other neutral states in the dark about Russia's desires, because to open these desires to them would mean scaring them away from the support that Sazonov, in my opinion, hopes to buy too cheap ... The surrender to Russia of Constantinople, Thrace, the straits and shores of the Sea of Marmara means the division of the Ottoman Empire. We have no "reasonable reason to desire this division." If it is inevitable, we do not want it to happen at our expense. Therefore, it will be necessary, on the one hand, to find such a combination that will allow us to reassure our Muslim subjects in Algeria and Tunisia regarding the further independence of the ruler of the faithful, and, on the other hand, in addition to preserving our institutions in the Middle East and observing our economic interests in Asia Minor , to achieve recognition of your rights to Syria, Alexandretta and the vilayet of Adana "(Poincaré. Quoted op. Vol. I, pp. 343, 344).
The Anglo-French imperialists were confident that in the course of hostilities Constantinople would fall into their hands and then they would be able to force Russia, exhausted by the war, to abandon its encroachments. "They consider it expedient (to France. - Ya. G.), - Bertie frankly wrote, - so that England and France would occupy Constantinople before Russia, so that the Muscovite would not have the opportunity to completely independently decide the question of the future of this city and the straits "(Bertie, entry dated February 26, 1915).
After the overthrow of the Egyptian Khedive and the "appearance of a protectorate over Egypt (December 18, 1914), British diplomacy began to take vigorous steps to create an Arab caliphate under British patronage." Poincare (Poincaré, cited op. Vol. II, pp. 116 - 118) He was promised a caliphate, in return for which Sheriff Hussein was to help the British against Turkey.
These intrigues of British diplomacy in Arab countries could not but arouse the suspicions of France. In order to calm her ally, England proposed on October 27, 1915, to jointly discuss a plan for the final partition of Asiatic Turkey and, along the way, to reach agreement on the creation of an Arab empire.
Georges Picot, Consul General in Beirut, was sent to London for negotiations. The British government did not object to the recognition of French power in Alexandretta, Adana and Cilicia. For this, Nicholson, Gray's assistant, demanded the establishment of the supreme power of the Meccan Sultan in Syria and Lebanon. In addition, the British insisted on the construction of a railway from Haifa, which meant competition with the Alexandretta railway. The English proposals could not be to the liking of the French government. In January 1916, France succeeded in wresting England's consent to the spread of French influence to the Divan from Tripoli and Beirut and to the Hinterland as far as Mossul. In return, England demanded Palestine. Briand did not agree. He sought at least the partition of Palestine between England and France, as well as condominiums (joint management) of the Haifa Railway. Paying attention to the British proposals, Poincaré warned the government against the cunning and cunning so characteristic of British diplomacy. England provided France with just those areas that, according to the Franco-German agreement of February 15, 1914,
As for Mossul, England sought to keep it, and only with the help of Russia did France manage to defend it.
In February 1916, Pico, together with Sykes, a former British military agent in Constantinople, drafted a treaty for the partition of Turkey. On March 9, Saike and Pico personally introduced him to the Russian Foreign Ministry. According to this project, Asian Turkey was divided into five zones of influence. Article 1 stated that France and England "are ready to recognize and take under their patronage an independent Arab state." But for this "in zone" A "France and in zone" B "Great Britain will have the right of priority in enterprises and local loans, the right to appoint advisers and officials." From the map attached to the draft treaty, it was clear that the dividing line of spheres of influence starts from the Mediterranean Sea and goes along the border of Palestine and Syria, and then to the northeast, right up to the Persian border. The English zone lay south of this line, and the French line is to the north.
Article 2 said that in Cilicia, Syria and the entire strip from the Gulf of Alexandretta to Lake Urmia in Persia, France, and in Mesopotamia, England establish "such administration or such control as they wish."
Palestine was to be under international administration (Article 3). Its ports of Haifa and Acre were provided to England (Article 4). Alexandretta became a free port for England, and Haifa for France (Article 5). The remaining clauses of the draft treaty established economic privileges for both states and stipulated the exclusion of third countries from the Arab empire.
The territory north of the French zone was granted to Russia (see "MO", vol. X, p. 332).
But Sazonov remained dissatisfied with the fact that the French possessions would be introduced like a wedge into the Russian-Persian border. The British, too, were obviously not quite pleased with such a close contact between the French and Persia. This is clearly demonstrated by the conversation recorded in the March 10 Russian Foreign Ministry record. "During his usual visit, the French ambassador stated that a final agreement had already been reached between the French and British governments and that therefore it (the draft) should be considered a settled matter. The British ambassador hastened to declare that the instructions he received from his government did not at all give a project of this nature, but, on the contrary, instruct him (the ambassador) only to present the elaborated assumptions for the approval of the Russian government, not at all making it a duty to insist on accepting them in their entirety "(MO. Vol. X, p. 372).
Sykes mediated negotiations between France and Russia. In response to Russian concerns about too much penetration of the European power into Asia Minor, Sayke reassured Sazonov that the French "usually over-exploit the local population and do not know how to arouse their sympathy for themselves as a nation" (ibid., P. 380).
After numerous altercations, this treaty on the partition of Turkey was adopted on April 26 - May 30, 1916. True, England never later renounced broader claims in Palestine. Palestine was an approach (both to Suez and to Egypt. When in April 1917 Bertie told Lloyd George that the French would be unhappy with the impending protectorate over Palestine, the prime minister bluntly stated: “The French will have to reconcile with our protectorate: we will come to Palestine as conquerors and will remain there, since we do not profess any special faith and are the only power capable of ruling Mohammedans, Jews, Roman Catholics and people in general, of any religions. " to the place that the turii occupied ...? "" Yes, said Lloyd George "(Bertie, entry dated April 20, 1917).
If England hoped to fool her "ally and seize Palestine, then France did not remain in debt. Having drawn up a plan for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, the French imperialist circles,
p. 74
led by Poincaré, Doumergue and others, did not abandon the idea of dismembering Germany, transferring their borders to the Rhine and capturing the largest German cities and richest territories.
At this point, the imperialist aspirations of the politicians of the third republic met with strong opposition from British diplomacy. The obstacles erected by "London" were not at all made clear by humane considerations. English politics, as its history testifies, has never been inclined to similar sentimentality. She always remained on solid, real ground of profit and gain. One of the main goals of the war was for England to nullify the economic and political role of Germany, not only in Asia and Africa, but also in Europe. This would allow Great Britain to play first violin in the orchestra of the powers of post-war Europe. She did not at all intend to concede the conductor's stand to any other country. The occupation by France of the richest Rhine provinces, of course, meant securing its dominant position on the continent and pushing the British fleet into secondary positions.
That is why France had to seek support against London in Petrograd, playing on the aggressive plans of tsarist Russia and on the Anglo-Russian contradictions in the Middle East. However, by 1917, more and more alarming news for the imperialists began to come from Russia. A revolution was brewing, which threatened to sweep away the autocracy. At the beginning of 1917, the minister of colonies, former prime minister and future president, Gaston Doumergue, was sent to Petrograd as ambassador extraordinary. His mission was all the more delicate in that he had to achieve the conclusion of an agreement on the transfer of the Rhine provinces to France in secret from the English and Italian ministers, with whom he arrived in Russia.
On February 14, 1917, that is, a few days before its collapse, the tsarist government signed the final agreement worked out by Doumergue, in which, in addition to the points relating to Alsace and Lorraine and the points where French support for Russian territorial claims was envisaged, there were the following two articles:
France had more coordination with all of its allies, and with some of them, quite accurate and detailed imperialist, predatory plans aimed at the seizure of territories from Germany, Austria and Turkey, and even to their complete dismemberment.
The methods of Anglo-French diplomacy during the First World Imperialist War have changed very little. Now, when the Anglo-French imperialists kindled in Europe the conflagration of the second imperialist war, behind the bombastic declarations about the salvation of democracy and civilization, behind the creepy cries of bourgeois scribblers about the great mission of France and England, about the "democratic" alliance of European countries, etc., etc. imperialist the governments of France and England again carefully conceal from their peoples the true goals of the war, and only in the quiet of ministerial offices and ambassadorial mansions, again, under the cover of impenetrable secrecy, is there a lively trade at the expense of neutral countries, new allies are being recruited, predatory plans for dividing the territories that have not yet been conquered are being worked out, again and again the map of Europe and the whole world is redrawn. ... Yandex
Permanent link for scientific papers (for citation):
J. GOLDBERG, FRENCH DIPLOMACY IN THE FIRST YEARS OF THE FIRST WORLD IMPERIALIST WAR // Moscow: Russian Libmonster (website). Updated date: 30.08.2015. URL: https: // website / m / articles / view / FRENCH-DIPLOMACY-IN-THE-FIRST-YEARS-OF-THE-FIRST-WORLD-IMPERIALIST-WAR (date of access: 21.04.2019).The Balkan wars further exacerbated the international situation in Europe. Despite the end of the Turkish rule over the Balkan countries, the situation in the region, as well as in Europe as a whole, was tense. A struggle broke out between the countries that fought with Turkey.
Austria-Hungary in the northwest and Turkey in the east of the region were waiting for the right moment to decide their far-reaching plans. Austria wanted to strike at Serbia, and Turkey wanted to regain the Aegean Islands. All this was closely followed in Berlin and St. Petersburg. Germany chose the time when it would be possible to start a war for the redivision of the world. Russia did not want and could not leave Serbia to the mercy of fate, in which it saw its ally against Austria-Hungary.
Everything that happened in the most direct way concerned France and England. In Paris, they understood that the defeat of Russia would not only weaken it, but also make it impossible to fight the threat of a German invasion. England, bound by a treaty with France, could not, in the conditions of the impending war, allow the weakening of her ally and the Entente.
However, British diplomacy until the very beginning of the war, that is, until the end of July 1914, concealed its goals. Moreover, she either negotiated with Germany, or took a neutral position on a number of secondary issues, such as financing the construction of the Baghdad road; the fate of the Portuguese colonies; determination of the borders of Albania, etc. At the same time, England demonstrated friendship with France, as evidenced by the visit of the English king George V in the spring of 1914 to Paris.
In late 1913 - early 1914, relations between Russia and Germany sharply deteriorated. In November 1913. Germany sent another military mission to Turkey led by Lyman von Sanders. It soon became known that the latter would command an army corps in Istanbul, which would enable him to keep the Bosphorus under control. Although after sharp negotiations Liman von Sanders resigned from the command post in the Turkish capital, Germany still retained certain opportunities in Turkey to influence the regime of the straits. Events around Liman von Sanders' mission shifted to 1914. and played an important role in the deterioration of Russian-German relations, since Russia has always been very sensitive to the problems of the Black Sea straits and saw in the German military mission a step towards establishing German control over them.
At the same time, on the initiative of France, negotiations were held between England and Russia to conclude a secret naval convention. Things were going slowly. The British, realizing the weakness of the Russian fleet, demanded large concessions, but Russia did not agree. Although both countries were interested in an early conclusion of the convention due to the growing tension, it was not possible to sign it before the start of the war.
In the summer of 1914, both the Triple Alliance and the Entente were ready to go to war. The immediate reason for it was the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo. The immediate start of the war against Serbia was demanded by the military circles of Austria. They were supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The prime minister, Count Tissa, a Hungarian by nationality, spoke out against it.
Everything depended on the position of Berlin. If earlier Germany more than once held back Austria-Hungary, this time Berlin showed firmness. The German leadership believed that Russia would take a hostile position, but would not go to war. Wilhelm II, having received the Austrian ambassador Segeny, pointed out the need to act quickly and energetically. This position of the Kaiser encouraged the supporters of military action in Vienna. Nevertheless, many days passed before an ultimatum was prepared, which was presented to the Austrian envoy in Belgrade on 23 July. The ultimatum was drafted so that no self-respecting state could accept it. The Serbian government, the ultimatum said, must undertake obligations: "not to allow any publications that incite hatred and contempt" towards the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; immediately close and confiscate all funds of those societies that are engaged in propaganda against Austria-Hungary; to dismiss from military and administrative service all officers and officials guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary; admit representatives of the Viennese government to the territory of Serbia to suppress the revolutionary movement directed against the territorial inviolability of Austria-Hungary. Representatives of Austria-Hungary were also supposed to take part in the investigation into the assassination of the Archduke. The ultimatum expired at 6 pm on Saturday 25 July, which meant Serbia had 48 hours to respond. The next day, the Austro-Hungarian government sent a message about the ultimatum to London, Paris and St. Petersburg.
Russia, neither economically nor militarily, was not ready for war. But the government understood that war was inevitable and considered an immediate general mobilization necessary.
In Paris, on the contrary, they expected war and exerted a great influence on Russia. In order to strengthen the alliance with Russia, push it to take more decisive actions and demonstrate the friendship of the two states to Europe, on July 20, French President R. Poincarce arrived in St. Petersburg. His visit was closely followed in Berlin and Vienna. It is no accident that the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was presented to Belgrade immediately after Poincar's departure from Russia. As for England, despite the presence of a significant pacifist group, the government and especially Foreign Minister E. Gray did everything to prepare for war. At the same time, neither Gray, nor the other members of the cabinet, either by spruce or by any action, revealed their plans. Despite all the efforts and tricks of the German ambassador in London Lichnovsky, Gray kept him in the dark about the true intentions of England until the very last day.
The German command in the summer of 1914 considered it necessary to hasten the start of the war in view of the fact that the German army was better prepared than the armies of other countries. Berlin believed that Russia would be combat-ready in a few years. Therefore, it was believed that the time was right for Germany. But it was still necessary to know how England would behave. Gray continued to darken. Upon receiving the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, he offered Germany to influence Vienna in order not to bring matters to war. Again, Britain's position was not mentioned, and this worried the government not only in Berlin, but also in Paris and Petersburg.
Events developed rapidly. On July 28, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and began hostilities. On July 29, it became known that the British fleet was heading at night to its naval base Scapa Flow. On the same day, Gray told Likhnovsky that the British government wished to continue to maintain friendship with Germany. England can stay on the sidelines if only Austria and Russia are involved in the military conflict. But if France and Germany get involved in the war, then England will have to take urgent measures. Likhnovsky understood everything and hastened to telegraph to Berlin. The ambassador's message made a tremendous impression in Berlin. Wilhelm II will write: "England opens its cards at the moment when she considered that we were driven into a dead end and were in a desperate situation!"
To this it should be added that on August 1, the day Germany declared war on Russia, Gray reported to Berlin that England's neutrality was possible provided Germany did not attack France and did not violate Belgium's neutrality. For Germany, this was unacceptable, since it meant canceling the Schlieffen plan and depriving Germany of its main goal - the defeat of France. What did Gray think to achieve with his proposal: to carry out insidious plans in relation to his allies, and above all to Russia, to play for time or have an extra trump card in parliament to participate in the war? Perhaps William II was right when he said that Gray did not want to openly oppose Germany, but wanted to be forced to do so.
If England had not been preparing for war secretly, but had directly declared its position, the war would not have started in August 1914, or in any case would not have assumed such a large scale.
Other disappointments awaited Berlin as well. It was known that Romania had joined the Entente. But the fact that Italy was not going to participate in the war on the side of the Triple Alliance, Berlin learned at the last moment. Berlin tried to stop Vienna, but it was too late: the Austrian army fought in Serbia.
In order to get ahead of the opponents, Berlin decided to act very quickly. The German command counted on Russia's slowness and hoped that while mobilization was carried out there, which would take about a month and a half, Germany would be able to defeat the French troops. To delay the deployment Russian armies, German Foreign Minister Beth-mann-Hollweg demanded from Petersburg to suspend all military preparations, stating that otherwise Germany would announce mobilization.
Nicholas II hesitated. The chief of the General Staff Yanushkevich managed to sign a decree on general mobilization with him on July 29, but the tsar, having received new messages from Wilhelm II, reversed his decision. Only the next day, Minister of Foreign Affairs S. D. Sazonov was able to convince Nicholas II of the need for general mobilization, since war is still inevitable and a delay in Russia's military preparations would only play into Germany's hands. At 5 pm on July 30, the decree on general mobilization was telegraphed to all regions of the country.
At midnight on July 31, the German ambassador Pourtales arrived at Sazonov and said that if Russia does not demobilize the next day, then Germany will also announce mobilization. On August 1, a general mobilization in Germany was announced, and in the evening of the same day, Pourtales handed Sazonov a note declaring war.
Germany sought to start military operations against France as soon as possible and by any means to delay the deployment of the Russian armies. In order to prevent border incidents, France on July 30 withdrew its troops 10 kilometers from the border. The next day German ambassador in Paris, Chen handed the French Foreign Minister a mail, in which it was reported about the demands made to Russia to stop the mobilization and the question of France's observance of neutrality was raised. The French, refusing to give an answer, declared that they retained their freedom of action, and on August 1, France began mobilization. On the evening of August 3, Germany declared war on France.
In England, E. Gray had to fight pacifists for several days. Opposing England's involvement in the war, prominent members of the government such as Lord Marley and John Burns resigned along with several other colleagues. Gray was helped by the Germans themselves, whose troops invaded Belgium. On August 4, London issued an ultimatum to Germany on the unconditional observance of Belgian neutrality. From midnight on August 4, England and Germany began to be at war. England's entry into the war meant the entry of the entire British Empire into the war. The war, which began in August 1914 in Europe, quickly took on a world character. Some countries took the side of Germany and its allies, others - on the side of the Entente. The war not only did not weaken diplomatic activity, but, on the contrary, strengthened it. Throughout the war, negotiations were conducted both between the participants of the Triple Alliance and Amtanta, and in the Balkans, in the Middle and Far East.
The belligerent countries tried to agree among themselves about the future world, about who would get what. A stubborn struggle unfolded around the Balkan countries, in which each of the two groups sought to attract new allies to their side. Germany, on the eve of the war, increased its influence in Turkey, and on August 2, 1914, the two countries signed union treaty, in accordance with which the Turkish army fell under the complete subordination of Germany, and the German military mission began to be permanently in Turkey. The Ottoman government pledged to ensure "the real influence and real authority of this mission in the general operations of the Turkish army." The treaty stated that if Russia intervened in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, then Germany would fulfill its duty towards an ally. Turkey in this case, too, had to declare war on Russia. After the signing of this treaty, which remained secret, Turkey announced mobilization.
In order to protect the Turkish coast and the constant threat to the Black Sea coast of Russia, two German warships - "Goeben" and "Breslau" passed through the Dardanelles. Gradually, the Turkish army and navy came under the command of German officers.
After the shelling of Sevastopol, Odessa, Novorossiysk and Feodosia by the Turkish fleet, Russia broke off relations with Turkey and declared war on it on November 2. England and France did this three days later.
At the same time, there was a diplomatic struggle for Italy. The fact is that the active actions of the Germans in Belgium, their successes at the beginning of the war in France influenced the Italian government. To persuade Italy to their side, the Entente offered her Trieste, Trentino and Volona, and Germany - lands at the expense of France, in North Africa and on the Mediterranean coast. After long bargaining, which continued until the spring of 1915, Italy nevertheless joined the Entente, signing a secret agreement with Russia, Great Britain and France on April 26 in London.
Italy pledged to use all means to wage war together with the allies against all their enemies (Art. 2). The French and English fleets were to provide active and constant assistance to Italy until the destruction of the Austrian fleet or until the conclusion of peace (Art. 3).
The Allied Powers promised to transfer to Italy under a peace treaty Trentino, Cisalpine Tyrol with its geographical and natural border Brenner, as well as Trieste, the counties of Gorica and Gradiska, all of Istria with Quariero, including Voloska and the Istrian Islands, as well as a number of small islands (p. 4) ... In accordance with Art. 5 the province of Dalmatia was to be annexed to it. Italy was also promised a number of rights and benefits in the Mediterranean.
May 23, 1915 Italy has declared war on Austria; war on Germany was declared only in August 1916.
From the first days of the war, Russia and France worried that the members of the Entente would remain faithful to each other until the end. On September 5, Russia, Britain and France signed an agreement not to conclude a separate peace during the present war. The three countries have pledged, when the time comes, not to set peace terms without prior agreement with each other.
From the first days of the war, the powers formulated the goals that they set in it. On September 1, 1914, during a meeting with the British and French ambassadors, Russian Foreign Minister S.D. Sazonov outlined his vision of the foundations of the future world. His project envisaged the incorporation of the lower reaches of the Neman and Eastern Galicia into Russia, the restoration of the autonomous state of Poland as dependent on the tsarist government, which should include Poznan, Silesia and Western Galicia.
Alsace and Lorraine should be returned to France, Sazonov said, and part of the Rhine province should be annexed by France itself.
Belgium should be increased at the expense of Germany. Schleswig and Holstein are to be returned to Denmark.
The Kingdom of Hanover must be restored.
A triune monarchy should be created, which will include Austria and two kingdoms - Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia and northern Albania should be annexed to Serbia.
Bulgaria will receive compensation in Macedonia.
Greece will receive the southern part of Albania.
For Russia, the problem of the Black Sea straits was of great importance.
In February 1915. The Anglo-French squadron approached the Dardanelles and with the fire of its guns suppressed all the fortifications located at the mouth of the straits. And on March 12 of the same year, England officially pledged to give Russia the city of Constantinople with a small part of the territory on the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Gallipoli Peninsula and southern Thrace. France joined the Anglo-Russian agreement in April.
When Italy withdrew from the Triple Alliance and joined the Entente, the members of both blocs continued to fight for Bulgaria. After Serbia, which fought with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria was the most important in the Balkans both from a military and geographic point of view. Of the Balkan countries, Serbia was the most interested in Bulgaria's position. Bulgaria's key importance was that it bordered Turkey and Serbia. These two countries were on opposite sides of the struggle. The negotiations of the Entente countries with Bulgaria went on for a long time and to no avail. Bulgaria joined the Triple Bloc. In October 1915 she signed an agreement with Turkey; in the same month an allied treaty was concluded between Germany, Bulgaria and Austria. Thus, Germany received a direct connection with Turkey through the Bulgarian territory. On October 14, Bulgaria attacked Serbia.
If the Entente lost in Bulgaria, the situation was different with Romania. On August 17, 1916, between Romania, on the one hand, and Russia, England, France and Italy, on the other, an agreement was signed, according to which Romania was obliged to start a war with Austria-Hungary, which happened on August 28. The Romanians were promised Transylvania, part of Bukovina and Banat; they were granted the right to annex the territories of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in accordance with the description of the borders.
While the battles were going on in the fields of Europe, diplomats were busy preparing for the future world. After long debates and conversations, the Entente countries decided to partition Asian Turkey. A number of agreements were signed between the British and the French. England was to receive Mesopotamia, France - Syria, small Armenia, a significant part of Kurdistan, Russia - the regions of Trebizond, Erzurum, Bayazet, part of Kurdistan and a strip along the Black Sea coast. After Italy entered the war on the side of the Entente, a significant part of Anatolia was allocated. It was planned to establish international control over Palestine, and to transfer the ports of Haifa and Akrazhe to England. As for Turkey itself, only the central and northeastern parts of Anatolia remained.
The German bloc also had its own ambitious plans. Berlin intended to create in the center of Europe a large economic union subordinate to Germany, which, in addition to herself, would include Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Poland and part of France. In the future, it was supposed to include Italy, Sweden and Norway. Thus, in the event of victory in the war of the German bloc in Europe, a new political association would be created, in fact - a militaristic empire. Moreover, in proportion to the military successes of Germany in the first years of the war, her appetites flared up. In Berlin, they began to dream about the annexation of Finland, the Baltic regions and even Ukraine, Belarus, Crimea and the Caucasus.
Germany's plans in the war can be judged from the memorandum of the Prussian Foreign Minister FW von Lebel of October 29, 1914, which was called “On the Purposes of War”. Germany, it said, must abandon what, at least it was useful to her, but which she "could not digest." At the same time, she must take everything that even she does not need directly, so that the enemy in the future will be weaker than Germany.
For Germany, von Lebel believed, in the future, "better ports and a wider coastline with freer access to the World Ocean, a stronger continental position in relation to the English rival" may be useful; it "needs the unconditional freedom of the seas, colonies with convenient harbors that can be defended, as well as colonies that supply raw materials and can become a market for sales."
"France," the memorandum went on to say, "is Germany's historical enemy," and it is necessary to annex the French territories rich in coal and ore. As for England, which “does not want to put up with a strong, capable Germany playing a role in world politics,” her hostility is a card in the future world historical game of Germany.
From Russia, von Lebel believed, "Germany should demand much more in order to get what the Germans want, and so that Russia can more easily come to terms with the territorial sacrifice on the border in the face of the whole world." It was said more than frankly.
These plans were based on the fact that Germany would achieve a quick victory, would be able to dictate its terms and redraw the map of Europe in its own way. But they were not destined to come true. The war dragged on, and with it dreams of not only a quick victory, but also of victory in general collapsed. The Entente countries had much more human, military and economic reserves than Germany and its allies. In addition, the United States was behind the countries of consent. Although the United States was in no hurry to enter the war, it still provided great assistance to England and France. The reserves of the Entente were constantly growing, while the reserves of Germany were being depleted.
Japan took advantage of the war in Europe in the Far East, which already on August 23, 1914 declared war on Germany. Tokyo had big plans of conquest. Japanese troops occupied Pacific German-owned islands and advanced into Chinese territory. Having captured Kiao-Chao, Japan explained this by the need to return Chinese territories to China itself. The cynicism of such a statement was fully manifested in the well-known 21 demands, contained in the note, which was presented to the Chinese government on January 18, 1915. Japan imposed difficult conditions on China. The Chinese government had to accept that Japan took over the rights that Germany held in Shandong province. Eastern and Inner Mongolia, Southern Manchuria fell into complete dependence on Japan. In practice, having accepted 21 demands, China found itself under Japanese protectorate.
The actions of the Japanese in China caused alarm among the Entente countries. Both Washington, London and Petrograd were dissatisfied with the fact that Japan was uncontrollably strengthening its positions in the Far East. But since she struck at Germany, the Entente powers, especially Russia, did not react to her actions in China.
Two years after the start of the war in Germany, the desire to conclude a separate peace began to grow. The diplomatic probe went in different directions. First, after the capture of Bucharest in December 1916, Berlin addressed a special note to neutral countries with a proposal to immediately organize peace negotiations. What was the German government counting on? Berlin believed that if the Entente countries agreed to negotiations, Germany would be able to split their ranks and carry out, if not all, then at least part of the changes planned by Germany on the world map; if the Entente refuses, German propaganda will be able to show the German people who do not want to end the bloodshed and conclude peace. However, this venture failed. A few days later, the Entente replied that peace can be talked about only after the violated rights and freedoms of peoples are restored, and small states can exist without fear of violence.
Most of all in Berlin they hoped that it would be possible to conclude a separate peace with Russia. After successes in the Carpathians and on the Caucasian front, by April 1915 the Russian armies went on the defensive, and then were forced to retreat. Reserves from the rear and units from France were brought up to the Russian front. In 1916, the domestic economic and political situation in Russia deteriorated. A crisis broke out in military production, and the revolutionary movement expanded. There was no unity in the ruling elite. The influence of those who advocated a separate peace with Germany increased. Among them was the recently appointed head of the government, BV Sturmer, who was supported by Rasputin. This group achieved in the summer of 1916. resignation of Minister of Foreign Affairs S. D. Sazonov, who was replaced by Sturmer.
To probe and pressure the tsarist government, Berlin acted through the relatives of the Russian tsarina. Letters to Nicholas II were forwarded about the desire to conclude peace by the group at court that considered a separate deal possible.
Meanwhile, there were also changes in government in England. In December 1916, Lloyd George became prime minister. With his arrival, England significantly increased its participation in the war. In the United States, too, there was a growing movement for the country's active participation in the war. Influential industrial and banking circles insisted on this. In 1916, US President W. Wilson was re-elected for a new 4-year term. In response to Wilson's call for concrete peace proposals, Germany declared that only belligerent countries could conduct peace negotiations, and resumed unrestricted submarine warfare. On February 3, 1917, the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and on April 6 of the same year declared war on her. By the end of 1916, a turn in favor of the Entente countries was outlined on the fronts. When the United States entered the war, its outcome was not in doubt.
Stanislav Chernyavsky
Russian diplomacy. World War I experience
The first task of the historian is to refrain from lying, the second is not to conceal the truth, and the third is not to give any reason to suspect oneself of bias or preconceived hostility.
To the reader
This book is about the hard work of Russian diplomats in a world-wide armed conflict. The habit of seeing heroes in arms makes it difficult to look objectively at the ordinary work of those who ensure victory by other means. But diplomats, like border guards, immediately move to the line of fire. They and their families, as a rule, become the first innocent victims of any exacerbation of the situation in the host country. The fate of many diplomats who find themselves in the hands of the enemy due to various circumstances ends tragically. It is especially offensive when this happens on the territory of the former Soviet republics or "fraternal socialist" states, in which the slogans are "with the Soviet Union forever!" long ago rotted away in a landfill.
Unfortunately, not all political leaders who have been put in power by the will of the peoples (or by a fateful coincidence of circumstances) are inclined to draw correct conclusions from the tragic events of history. That is why they lead many conflicts to a dead end, creating an environment fraught with world conflagration. In the summer of 2014, Russia often recalled the events of a century ago - the outbreak of the First World War, which was formally caused by the terrorist act against the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand on June 28, 1914. They recalled with fear that a similar situation could occur today.
The First World War was the result of a long accumulation of contradictions between the leading world powers. Chauvinist sentiments have intensified in all countries. The public, accustomed for several years of constant crises to balancing on the brink of disaster, did not lose hope that at the last moment someone would change their minds and retreat. Governments and diplomatic departments assured of the inevitability of a compromise without loss of prestige. For Russia, this task at that time turned out to be unbearable.
Speaking on August 1, 2014 at the opening ceremony of the monument to the heroes of the First World War in Moscow, President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin recalled that “for many centuries Russia has stood for strong and trusting relations between states. So it was on the eve of the First World War, when Russia did everything to convince Europe to peacefully, bloodlessly resolve the conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. But Russia was not heard, and it had to respond to the challenge, defending the fraternal Slavic people, protecting itself, its citizens from external threats ”1.
In the course of the crisis, the mechanism for making important foreign policy decisions in Russia once again demonstrated its inherent flaws - undemocratic, weak collegiality, a tendency to hesitate, and increased influence on the policy of the military elite.
From the very first days of the Great War - as it is still called in Europe - the foreign policy department of the Russian Empire was faced with the task of providing urgent practical assistance to a significant mass of compatriots caught in the war abroad.
Russian citizens, who found themselves in the hot summer of 1914 in Germany, Austria-Hungary and other European countries without money, and many without documents, expected support only from Russian diplomats. From the very first days of the war, the ministry began collecting and analyzing information about their situation, organizing the transfer of funds to them, and sought to improve their living conditions by concluding appropriate agreements with the enemy authorities through intermediaries. On the most sensitive issues - such as helping prisoners of war - diplomats had to overcome serious obstacles within the country, since the military elite was not interested in the fate of the "waste material". Meanwhile, the prisoners of war needed urgent professional protection.
All these problems had to be solved the Russian Ministry foreign affairs, acting, as they say now, "straight from the wheels", in an emergency mode.
The work on the book lasted more than ten years. It was based on the documents of the Archive foreign policy Russian Empire2, informational and reference publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia for internal use3 from the funds of the Central Scientific Library of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The greatest contribution to the creation of the book was made by materials from the AVPRI funds No. 133 "Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs", No. 159 "Department of Personnel and Economic Affairs" and No. 134 "Archive" War ", which contain unique information about the activities of central and foreign institutions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia during the First World War. Fund documents No. 138 “Secret archive of the minister. 1858-1917 ", № 139" The 2nd (newspaper) expedition of the Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. 1814-1914 ", No. 151" Political archive. 1838-1917 ", No. 323" Diplomatic Chancellery at the Headquarters. 1914-1918 "and № 340" Collection of documentary materials from the personal archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1743-1933 ”give a clear idea of the specific directions of the multifaceted activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the period under review, changes in the structure caused by the needs of wartime, of the daily working life of the Foreign Ministry.
Detailed information on the activities of foreign institutions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is contained in the reports of the imperial Russian embassies, missions and consulates on the activities of these institutions in providing assistance and placing in Russia Russian subjects captured by the war abroad, published in the departmental journal Izvestia of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 1915-1916 .4
An invaluable gift for the author was the publication at the end of 2014 of the collection of documents "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia during the First World War" 5, in which AVPRI documents little-known to researchers were published for the first time: intradepartmental certificates, notes, reports, as well as all-subject reports of the minister to the emperor on the formation and functioning of the Diplomatic Chancellery at the Headquarters, the Department of Money Transfers and Loans, the Department of Prisoners of War, the Special Political Department, the Department of Press and Information, the Cabinet of the Minister. Much attention in the collection is paid to the correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the military and other departments, the Russian Red Cross Society (RRCS), as well as various charitable societies to help prisoners of war.
In the work on the monograph, the so-called. “Colored books” - collections of diplomatic documents published in 1914–1916. in Petrograd 6.
Of course, from the standpoint of today, it is difficult for us to give an unambiguous assessment of the work done by Russian diplomats 100 years ago - there were successes, there were also serious failures. Only one thing is clear - they managed to accumulate a certain experience in the evacuation of compatriots in wartime conditions. Unfortunately, on the eve
During the Great Patriotic War and after it, this experience was not in demand. Compatriots found in the occupied territories were loaded into "calf" wagons and sent in thousands to concentration camps.
Our goal is to tell about the humanitarian mission of Russian diplomacy, non-standard approaches on the part of the diplomatic service to provide diplomatic tutelage to compatriots, their physical protection, the distribution of material assistance and the organization of mass evacuation to their homeland. Unfortunately, the issues of protecting compatriots abroad have not lost their relevance and are increasingly becoming the object of practical activity of modern diplomats.
Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov (July 29, 1860, Ryazan province - December 24, 1927, Nice) - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire in 1910-1916. On January 12, 1917, he was appointed ambassador to Great Britain, but due to the February Revolution he did not have time to leave for his place of service. An active participant in the White movement. In 1918 he was a member of the Special Conference under the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia A.I. Denikin. In 1919 - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the All-Russian Government A.V. Kolchak and A.I. Denikin
Sergei Andreevich Kotlyarevsky (July 23, 1873, Moscow province - April 15, 1939) - a famous Russian historian and lawyer. He published a lot in Russkiye Vedomosti on domestic and foreign policy, on national issues. On April 17, 1938, he was arrested on charges of "belonging to a terrorist organization and sabotage." On April 14, 1939, he was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court on charges of espionage and participation in a counter-revolutionary organization. Rehabilitated on November 18, 1992 by the conclusion of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation
Alexander Sergeevich Suvorin (1834-1912, Tsarskoe Selo) - Russian journalist, publisher, merchant, entrepreneur, theater critic, playwright. He belongs to the Russian nuggets who managed to make a dizzying career and become one of the largest public figures in Russia
Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below
Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.
Posted on http://www.allbest.ru/
Introduction
Chapter 1. Struggle of factions at the court of Nicholas II
1.1 The court entourage of Nicholas II: composition and peculiarities of the formation of groups
1.2 Germanophile sentiments in the highest court environment
1.3 The English question in foreign policy
1.4 The role of foreign capital as a factor in drawing Russia into the first world war
Chapter 2. Foreign Policy Course of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire
2.1 Activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire on the eve of the First World War
2.2 Strategic planning, military negotiations and the arms race
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
Formulation of the problem.
2014 marked the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War, its prehistory and history require further historical research. The theme of the Great War (as it was called in Russia since 1916), overshadowed by the revolutions of 1917 and the Civil War, has not yet received due reflection in Russian historical science and mass public consciousness. There is a need to determine its significance for socio-political discourse in modern Russia, the countries of near and far abroad; to reveal its place in the historical memory of Russian society at the beginning of the XXI century.
World War I (1914-1918)? one of the largest, turning points that changed the face of Europe and the whole world. This gigantic cataclysm, unprecedented until then, turned into the loss of millions of lives, the fall of powerful empires, the emergence of new national states, and fundamental changes in the system of international relations. The war had an impact on the fate of millions of people, determined many trends in world politics, in fact determined the further course of the development of human civilization.
For Russia, which took the most active part in the war, it became a great feat and at the same time a huge tragedy that plunged the country into the chaos of revolution and bloody struggle for power. The evolutionary transformation of Russian society, prepared by the reforms of the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries, was interrupted.
Russian foreign policy and diplomacy played an active role in the First World War, contributing to the rise of Russia's importance as one of the most important international political, economic and cultural centers. For the first time, our diplomats faced such ambitious tasks, on the solution of which the very existence of the state depended, requiring access to a new, higher level of political work, the establishment of intensive interstate contacts in a bilateral and multilateral format.
Russian diplomats actively contributed to strengthening the allied coalition, ensuring interaction with their main partners, seeking international isolation of Germany, and developing a program of post-war cooperation. The Bosphorus Agreements of 1915 became an achievement of St. Petersburg's foreign policy, although they were never implemented. germanophile russia world war
In contacts with allies, our diplomats did not allow infringement national interests have shown themselves to be experienced and skillful negotiators.
The reality of wartime required the Russian Foreign Ministry to carry out information-propaganda and counter-propaganda functions, use external levers to supply the army, take care of prisoners of war, etc. Public and economic diplomacy was increasingly asserting itself. The structure of the foreign policy department was being optimized, within the framework of which the Prisoners of War Department, the Special Political Department, and the Legal and Economic Departments were created.
During the war years, a humanitarian component emerged in Russia's foreign policy and diplomatic activities: assistance to the wounded, support for Russian subjects caught in the war abroad.
Russian diplomats have shown personal courage in emergency situations(for example, at the embassy in Serbia during the offensive of the enemy troops). Many were mobilized into the active army and fell on the battlefields.
Today we are turning to the history of the First World War not in order to identify its perpetrators, to divide its participants into winners and losers.
The main lesson is that the future of the European and world community lies in unity and cooperation, in an organic combination of national, regional and global interests, and not in attempts to ensure its security by force, to the detriment of the other side. Sustainable security can only be equal and indivisible. This principle is laid down in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which prioritizes the establishment of a just and democratic world order based on collective principles in solving international issues and on the rule of international law.
Historiographic review.
Soviet historians viewed World War I as a catalyst for revolution, but today scientists have turned to the study of how total war has changed the face of society, the behavioral stereotypes of the population, the nature of social institutions and state structures. This theme is connected with the foreign policy issues of the world war, starting with its diplomatic origins and ending with the smooth flow of the post-Versailles "respite" into the pre-war crisis of 1938-1939.
Some authors challenge the stereotypes of the past, which gave all the advantages of the narrative. The American historian J. Morrow, in his book "The Great War from the Position of Imperial History," published in 2003, rehabilitates the theory of imperialism. Historiography discusses the thesis that Germany's victory in the war would not be so destructive for humanity than her defeat, which gave rise to Hitler's revanchism. This thesis gives impetus to thinking about an alternative approach to solving the "Russian question". On the agenda is the problem of the continuity of Russian foreign policy, which sought, first of all, to create a "security zone" along the western borders of the state. Contemporary Russian scholars argue that the foreign policy of the Russian Empire was devoid of serious nationalist sentiments, which Western propaganda attributed to the role of the source of "Russian aggressiveness."
In a broader context, the world war contributed to the beginning of the "decline of Europe", which was stated in 1918 by O. Spengler. The philosopher dated the origin of the idea of writing his book in 1911, the period of the Moroccan crisis between Germany and France and the seizure of Tripoli by Italy. In the world war, Spengler saw a symptom of the incipient agony of Western culture.
Founded in the late XX - early XXI century. the system of European geopolitical coordinates resembles the Versailles system, which explains the special interest of the Russian Federation in the history of the First World War. The experience of the policy of the Russian Empire to protect its western borders at the beginning of the twentieth century. is relevant for modern Russia, but it has not received comprehensive coverage in Russian historical literature and needs further research. In a number of aspects, the conflicts of Russia with Austria-Hungary and Germany remain the object of scientific discussion both between Russian and foreign scientists and within the community of Russian historians.
The complexity and delicacy of the history of the twentieth century. lies in the fact that the perception of the most painful episodes in relations between Russia and the new states that emerged after the World War in the east of Central Europe is ideologized today not only by historians and politicians of the West and former Soviet republics, but also by Russian scientists and politicians. Undoubtedly, this affects the state of history teaching in secondary and higher educational institutions; on the formation of the historical outlook of youth and public consciousness in general.
Domestic historiography pays a lot of attention to the study of Russian foreign policy, but the author gives a description of the most important scientific publications, since it is necessary to consider both the policy of Russia and the policy of Austria-Hungary and Germany in Central Europe. The question turned out to be at the junction of domestic and foreign history, which determined its ambiguity. Research is usually devoted to bilateral or international relations, historical events or territorial problems.
Soviet publications of the 1920s - early 1930s. about Russia's policy in Central Europe were current and, therefore, controversial. An interesting book by the military historian AM Zayonchkovsky, who came to the conclusion that in matters of protecting the Russian western and southern borders, the policy of the empire bore "the imprint of an adventure." The direction of historical works as a whole was determined by the school of M.N. Pokrovsky, who defended the idea of a cardinal rupture of history Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, declaring tsarism to be the main culprit in the outbreak of world war. E. V. Tarle criticized the ideas of Pokrovsky, but, in turn, whitewashed the position of the Entente countries, including Russia, in unleashing a war.
On May 16, 1934, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved a decree on teaching civil history in Soviet schools. The idea of breaking the traditions of tsarist Russia and the USSR was replaced by the idea of continuity, which was defended by E.V. Tarle and S.F. Platonov. The turn in JV Stalin's policy ensured the return of historians to the study of Russian foreign policy. The General Secretary forbade, in particular, the publication of F. Engels's article "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism" (Engels argued that it was extremely reactionary). Written on July 19, 1934, Stalin addressed a letter of prohibition to members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, but allowed it to be published in the Bolshevik magazine in May 1941. In 1936, the defeat of the "anti-Marxist school of Pokrovsky" and the formation of an essentially imperial foreign policy ideology began. But even in the new conditions, the pre-war foreign policy of the Russian Empire was not specially singled out in the History of Diplomacy.
In the 1950s. the question of the politics of Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany in the region was considered in the context of international relations conditioned by stereotypes " cold war"However, since the late 1950s, unknown archival materials began to be published in the USSR and abroad. This allowed historians in the 1960s - 1980s to more objectively analyze international relations at the beginning of the 20th century. In the 2nd edition of Vol. II" Stories of Diplomacy "
V. M. Khvostov highlighted the nature of Russia's foreign policy, and in volume III wrote a chapter on the diplomatic struggle during the world war.
The continuity of the policy of the Kaiser and Weimar Germany was revealed by V. K. Volkov, T. Yu. Grigoryants, A. Ya. Manusevich, G. F. Matveev, I. I. Pop in collective works and collections of articles published by the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies of the USSR ... In the 1970s. military historians wrote about the First World War in collective works and monographs, mentioning the policy of Russia in Central Europe. The theme of the world war included the history of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, which ended Russia's participation in it. A.O. Chubaryan and other scientists noted that Russia did not suffer a military defeat, but withdrew from the war, saving soldiers' lives.
New conditions for studying the problem arose after the end of the Cold War and changes in the geopolitical situation in Europe. In Russian publications of the 1990s - early 2000s. there is a rejection of ideological stereotypes, an expansion of the range of factors that influenced the formation of Russia's foreign policy; analysis of the actions of Russian diplomacy in the context of European politics, deepening of research methodology.
To understand the prehistory of the problem, the monograph by P.V. Stegny on the partitions of Poland is of interest. The scientist noted that Polish question largely determined the essence of the phenomenon called the imperial component of Russia's foreign policy. In his opinion, an objective assessment of the partitions of Poland is possible if they are considered within the framework of the evolution of international relations in Europe. Poland has become a hostage and at the same time a "special case" of a large-scale geopolitical game. The task of Russia was to provide a defensible and controlled western flank, where Prussia and Austria were its likely adversaries. Stegny noted that Catherine II understood the importance of preserving Poland as a buffer between Russia, Austria and Prussia, but under pressure from the latter, she went for the final partition of Poland.
More and more historians are turning to the problem of geopolitical continuity in Russian politics. BN Mironov believes that the expansion of the Russian Empire was stimulated by geopolitical considerations: strong borders; the desire to find ice-free ports, to prevent rivals from seizing border territories or to include them in their sphere of influence. The scientist refers, in particular, to the opinion of the American historian R. Mellor, who wrote: "Russia acquired only what other states did not claim, or what they could not seize."
The issues of the policy of the Russian Empire on its western borders on the eve and during the World War are analyzed in Volume V of the History of Russian Foreign Policy, authored by scientists from the Institute of Russian History (IRI), RAS. Historians characterize the factors that determined Russian foreign policy, and gradually reveal the mechanism of its formation. It shows the efforts of the ruling circles to maintain the great-power status of Russia, reveals the contradictions between its national and imperial interests, largely explaining the collapse of the foreign policy of the tsarist and Provisional governments. The authors view Russia as a special type of empire, for which conquest was not the main means of territorial expansion, and political dependence and national inequality prevailed over colonial exploitation. The merit of the volume is the special chapters on the mechanism for making foreign policy decisions in Russia. The period under review was a time of growing attention to foreign policy on the part of Russian society: the authors, in particular, traced the evolution of the foreign policy views of the main political parties of Russia. An innovation is the characteristic of the "policy of agreements and balancing" adopted by the Russian government after the defeat in the war with Japan. But Russia entered the world war without completing either modernization or planned military preparations. The foreign policy of the Provisional Government is interpreted in a new way: it is shown that all the cabinets were in favor of continuing the war as part of the Entente.
Russia's foreign policy in 1907 - 1914 analyzes A. V. Ignatiev, revealing the mechanism of making foreign policy decisions in Russia (the role of the tsar, ministers, ambassadors, leaders of political parties). The scientist notes that the parties and the press had a relatively weak influence on foreign policy, characterizes the peculiarities of the geopolitical position of Russia. The geopolitical views of the statesmen and military leaders of the Russian Empire are considered in the essays published by the IRI RAS. A. Yu. Bakhturina writes about the policy of Russia in the Kingdom of Poland and in the temporarily occupied territories of Austria-Hungary during the World War.
In the 1990s. for the anniversaries - the beginning and end of the First World War - collections of conference materials on its problems have been published. The articles of the first collection are unequal in content and depth of analysis, sometimes fragmentary. The second collection presented the quintessence of what Russian and foreign historians gave on the problems of the World War. Scientists cite fresh facts, pose new questions, and reveal modern approaches to the history of war. In connection with the preparations for the 100th anniversary of the Great War, collective works have been published under the auspices of the Russian Association of Historians of the First World War. The essay on the history of World War II examines its genesis, the impact of war on the development of civilization, the results and consequences. The book covers military operations, politics, diplomacy, national psychological and civilizational aspects of war. The focus of the authors of the work on war and society is socio-economic, ideological and political, ethnic, confessional changes and revolutionary upheavals in the countries participating in the war. According to scientists, today the historical community is on the verge of a new stage in the study of the world war in general and the politics of Russia in particular.
Polish historiography pays considerable attention to Russian policy in Central Europe. R. Dmowski (leader of the Polish National Democracy Party - Endeks - and a member of the Russian State Duma) characterized Galicia and the Kingdom of Poland as "geographic ugliness", believing that "further territorial acquisitions" were necessary for their permanent possession.
Polish works of the 1920s. were mostly journalistic in nature. Without raising the question of the validity of the entry into the Polish state of the Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian lands, historians and politicians wrote that the Entente had paid Poland an insufficiently high price in solving the problem of its borders. Their position is most clearly reflected in Dmowski's work "Poland's Politics and State Restoration". But in M. Bobrzynski's book "The Resurrection of the Polish State", Dmowski's program was criticized, since the concept of endeks followed largely an ethnographic principle, which led to the loss for Poland of part of the lands in the east that were part of Rzeczpospolita before its partitions in the 18th century. The historian defends the program of J. Piłsudski (head of the Polish state in 1918 - 1922).
Before the 1926 coup d'état by Pilsudski, both the concept of endeks, who stood for Poland within comparatively ethnic boundaries, and the views of the Pilsudski on the creation of a "federal" (great-power) Poland, competed in the works of Polish historians. After the approval of the "reorganization regime", the legend of the "true" liberators of Poland, the Polish legions headed by Pilsudski, who fought on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary, prevailed. Thus, the historian V. Konopczyński criticized Pilsudski's desire to make Vilna the capital of the "Jagiellonian Rzeczpospolitej", which would become "the center of Central-Eastern Europe"; therefore, his books on the history of the twentieth century. were not published both in the 1930s and in the Polish People's Republic(due to the right-wing views of the author).
The works of historians of the Polish People's Republic of the 1960s - 1980s, containing previously unknown material and fairly balanced interpretations of the problem under study, are of significant importance. Volume III of the History of Polish Diplomacy contains important information. True, since the late 1960s. the study of the Polish question was influenced by the revisionist trend in the historiography of the People's Republic of Poland, which arose under the influence of the socio-political crisis in Poland. During the events of 1980 - 1981. the myth of Pilsudski as "the greatest political figure of the twentieth century" was galvanized. After the end of the Cold War, the legends of the pre-war years prevailed in Polish historiography, although a number of scholars analyze the Polish question from the standpoint of relative historicism.
German historiography. Continuity in the east of Central Europe was also characteristic of German politics. Nationalist German historians in the 1920s and 1930s proved that Germany belonged to the lands that had ceded to Poland by the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Today in the historiography of the FRG a prominent place is occupied by the liberal school of F. Fischer, known for an objective interpretation of the genesis of the First World War. The subject of Fischer's research in the book "Leap to World Domination" was the continuity of the goals of German imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 1970s - 1980s. Fischer extended his approach to World War I to the genesis of World War II, drawing attention to the preservation of the doctrine of "Germany's middle position in Europe." Fischer's student I. Heiss in the book "The Polish Borderland in 1914-1918." criticized the ruling circles of imperial Germany for the annexationist plans against Poland, comparing them with the Nazi ones.
Conservative historiography rejected Fischer's method of "political and social history", opposing its principles with a geopolitical approach (Fischer did not deny its importance). Conservative historians determined German politics in the 20th century. "its middle position in Europe" and "the poverty of the space it occupies." M. Broschat and H. Jablonowski, who tried to reduce the Polish question to the struggle of nationalities, studied the policy of Germany in the east of Central Europe.
In modern historiography of the FRG, there are different assessments of Germany's policy in Central Europe both during the years of the world war and after its end. O. Fehrenbach calls the Versailles Peace Treaty short-sighted: the treaty was too soft to destroy Germany; to just punish her is too humiliating. O. Dunn writes that Germany's defeat created "favorable preconditions" for it in the east of Central Europe: as a result of the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire, Germany had fewer competitors, and thanks to forced territorial concessions, the Reich got rid of problem territories with ethnic minorities. This point of view is shared by E. Kolb, stressing that Russia was ousted from Central Europe and for a long time was busy with its internal political problems.
Summing up, we note: on the eve of the world war, the leadership of the Russian Empire had a strategic interest in the adjacent territories of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but realizing the inconvenience of the geopolitical configuration of the western Russian borders and the country's unpreparedness for war, it sought to avoid the impending conflict. During the war, despite the professionalism of Russian diplomats, Russia clearly lagged behind the central and Western powers in terms of the "quality" of its foreign policy leadership, so the unfavorable situation for Russia in the region by 1917 was explained not only by Germany's military successes. It follows from the historiographic survey that there is a need for further study of the policy of the Russian Empire in Central Europe.
Characteristics of sources.
Since the 1920s, a number of collections of documents have been published that cover the diplomatic history of the First World War, and the selection of documents and their systematization was carried out so carefully that historians can use these collections with success even now. Such collections include: "Constantinople and the Straits", "Materials on the history of Franco-Russian relations for 1910-1914", "Partition of Asian Turkey", "Tsarist Russia in the World War." The Krasny Arkhiv magazine published documents from the Foreign Ministry and Headquarters Foundation of the Diplomatic Chancellery at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Highly a large number of various documents are included in the collection "International relations in the era of imperialism". All these publications were supplemented by the "Collection of treaties between Russia and other states. 1856-1917."
Quite recently, documents of the Council of Ministers of Russian History during the First World War were published. The publication was compiled by leading researchers of the St. Petersburg branch of the Institute of the Russian Empire of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian State Historical Archives, the European University in St. Petersburg and the Bakhmetyevsky Archive of the US Columbia University. The publication is based on the recordings of the meetings of the Council of Ministers.
Some information about the relationship between the allies who were part of the Entente and the supporters of this alliance, as well as about the attitude of public opinion to the policies of England, France and Russia, can be gleaned from periodicals published during the First World War. At that time, a large number of newspapers were published, representing various parties and social circles: these were the Cadets - Rech and Den; the newspaper of progressives - "Morning of Russia"; right-wing newspapers - "Zemshchina", "Russian banner" and simply information publications - "Petrogradskiy kuryer", "Birzhevye vedomosti" and many others.
An important historical source is memoir literature.
The memoirs of the Secretary of War of Great Britain, and then of Prime Minister Lloyd George, which are completely devoted to the First World War, have been translated into Russian.
Lloyd George considers the high commands of Austria-Hungary and Russia to be guilty of the beginning of the war. He also, of course, accuses Germany as the aggressor and assures that England would not have intervened in the war if Germany had not invaded Belgium. But it also attacks British Foreign Secretary Gray, whose policies he strongly criticizes.
He pays considerable attention to the problem of the lack of weapons among the Entente countries, which had tragic consequences at the beginning of the war, and especially, as he believes, for Russia. By the way, he notes, Russia’s defeats on the eastern front were also guilty of its allies, England and France, who did little to help her with weapons.
Of great value is the work of the French ambassador to Russia, Maurice Paleologue, who is interesting in that it reflects the role of Russia in the war through the eyes of a foreigner. This work has been published and republished many times in Russia.
The memoirs of M. Palaeologus are made in the form of a diary entry (from July 20, 1914 to May 17, 1917).
The retired diplomat does not hide his likes and dislikes. The regime of Nicholas II seems to him to be rotten through and through. He sympathizes with the cadets Milyukov and Muromtsev, the Octobrist Guchkov, the manufacturer Putilov. He believes that it was the liberal intelligentsia that could keep Russia from decay.
The first part of the memoirs is devoted to the crisis of the ruling circles of Russia in 1914-1916. The second - the first three months of the February Revolution. The first part, which deals with military-diplomatic subjects, is of the greatest interest to us.
Palaeologus describes the visit of French President Poincaré on July 20-23 to St. Petersburg and his meeting with Nicholas II in Peterhof. He tells in detail about his meetings with Buchanan and Sazonov on the 20th of July 1914. Palaeologus appreciates the efforts made by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to settle the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. However, he concludes: “We are diplomats, we have lost all influence on events, we can only try to foresee them and insist that our governments conform their behavior with them. France. About himself, Sazonoff and Buchanan Palaeologus writes that "all three of us have the right to assert that we have conscientiously done everything in our power to save the world of the whole world."
M. Paleologue speaks very favorably of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. But the Minister of War Sukhomlinov, on the contrary, makes an unpleasant impression on him. Since the French diplomat was a regular visitor to the meetings of the State Duma, he witnessed how issues related to the ongoing war were resolved there. In addition, he had the opportunity to get to know more closely the persons who had a certain influence on the policy of Russia.
In his memoirs, M. Palaeologus touches on the questions of how much Russia was interested in Italy's annexation to the Entente, how she tried to involve Romania in the war, how she sought Bulgaria's neutrality, how important for Russia was a positive solution to the problem of the Black Sea Straits and Constantinople for Russia.
The memoirs of Maurice Palaeologus make it absolutely clear that the main task of the diplomat was to keep Russia as a combat-ready ally against Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.
Of great interest are also the memoirs of French President Poincare, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army Marshal Joffre, British Ambassador to Russia Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador to France Bertie.
J. Buchanan in his "Memoirs" pays much attention to the question of how the relations of the Allies in the Entente developed during the flaring European crisis, while painting portraits of those political figures with whom he had to deal at that time. He also evaluates the behavior of Bulgaria, Romania and Italy in the initial period of the war, which took a position of neutrality.
From the Italian memoirs I would like to mention the book by L. Aldrovandi Marescotti " Diplomatic war. "At the beginning of the war, L. Aldrovandi Marescotti was an adviser to the Italian embassy in Vienna and was able to observe the reaction of the Austrians to the position taken by Italy. In addition, he writes about the negotiations that went on between Italy and Austria-Hungary over Italian national and territorial claims while noting the inflexibility of the Italian government.
Russian politicians also left their memoirs for historians.
In his memoirs, A.A. Ignatiev tells how he witnessed that the high French command was poorly informed about the situation on the eastern front. The Russian military agent sees his great personal merit in the fact that he was involved in organizing the supply of the Russian army from France and a significant place in his memoirs is occupied by the description of this process and the difficulties he faced.
S. D. Sazonov writes about what actions Russia took in the person of its diplomatic representatives to prevent the outbreak of war.
He gives a description of the positions and interests of England, France and Russia in the war.
The Foreign Minister stresses how important the issue of the Straits was for Russia. "The conviction that the future of the Russian state depends on the resolution that this issue will receive has long penetrated into the consciousness of Russian state people, and indeed of every educated Russian."
In "Memoirs" S.D. Sazonov explains the position of states that until a certain moment remained neutral, the position of Russia in the struggle to win them over to the side of the Entente. It becomes clear how difficult it was to achieve certain goals in order not to compromise some of Russia's interests.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia gives quite vivid portraits of political figures with whom he had to deal.
Interestingly, the assessments of the memoirists are often similar. Many write about the disagreements of the allies, which prevented them from solving some issues and problems. Many believe that it was precisely these disagreements that did not allow the war to end in a shorter time frame and with fewer losses.
A.D. Bubnov, holding in the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, first the position of flag captain, and then the chief of the Naval Directorate, of course, knew well all the members of the staff, on whom the course of hostilities depended and whose opinions could have a significant impact on the course of diplomatic negotiations. In his memoirs, he characterizes the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the chief of staff of H.H. Yanushkevich, General Yu.D. Danilov, head of the diplomatic office of N.A. Basili and others.
A.D. Bubnov draws the situation that prevailed at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, shows that there were disagreements between the military leaders on various issues. He also expresses his opinion on many events of the war, for example, on the offensive of the Russian army on the eastern front in August 1914, on the Battle of Galicia and, of course, on the Dardanelles operation and the Treaty of the Straits.
GN Mikhailovsky, as an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, witnessed what structural changes were taking place in this ministry at the beginning of the war. But he is more interested in issues related to deeper changes within the ruling circles of Russia.
Also G.N. Mikhailovsky makes some remarks about the relations between the allies within the Entente, which affect the solution of a number of important diplomatic issues.
The purpose of the work is to consider the diplomacy of the Russian Empire on the eve of the First World War, to assess the alternatives of foreign policy development by 1914.
The tasks of the work include:
Study of the struggle of groups at the court of Nicholas II
Study of Germanophilic sentiments in the highest court environment
Studying the English Question in Foreign Policy
Consideration of the role of foreign capital as a factor in drawing Russia into the First World War
Analysis of the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire on the eve of the First World War
Strategic planning studies, military negotiations and an arms race
The object of work is the foreign policy of the Russian Empire, on the eve of the First World War.
The subject of work is the foreign policy of the Russian Empire on the eve of the First world war in the context of the struggle of various development paths.
Chronological scope of the study. The main chronological framework of the event (1910-1914), however, indirectly, the study involves referring to the earlier years of the reign of Nicholas II.
Geographic scope of research - the territory of the Russian Empire
The methodological basis of the research is the general scientific methods of historical research (historical and logical, the ascent from the concrete to the abstract and from the abstract to the concrete, the systems approach and systems analysis, induction and deduction, analysis, description, and others).
The work consists of an introduction, two chapters, a conclusion and a bibliography (list of sources and literature).
Chapter 1. Struggle of factions at the court of Nicholas II
1.1 The court entourage of Nicholas II: composition and peculiarities of the formation of groups
The concept of the court environment in the broader sense includes a significant circle of people. This concept includes:
Members of the imperial family, numerous relatives of the current emperor;
Court ranks: chamberlains, equestrians, masters of ceremonies, chamber junkers, etc .;
Numerous dignitaries with access to the emperor: ministers, etc .;
Representatives of the military and police structures in direct contact with the court (palace police, privileged guards military units).
This list can be continued if desired. At the same time, it is important to note that in its quantitative expression it includes several hundred names. So, the relatives of the emperor from among the Romanovs numbered several dozen people. The number of owners of some court ranks (for example, chamberlains and chamber junkers) reached several hundred people.
In these conditions, one cannot speak of the influence on the political orientation of the authorities and, in general, on the political life of the country of all persons who were part of the court circle of Nicholas II. Moreover, not even all members of the Romanov family were politically active.
Analysis of the diary of Nicholas II makes it possible to distinguish the following categories of persons:
First category. The closest relatives of the emperor (mother, uncles, cousins, their wives, etc.). In different periods of time, the personal composition of persons included in this category has changed. This was caused by a number of reasons, both objective (death, illness, retirement due to age) and subjective (intrigue, struggle for influence).
Let us note the peculiarity of the processes in this layer of the imperial retinue: the circle of communication of Nicholas II with his closest relatives throughout the entire period of his reign narrowed. At the beginning of the reign (1894 - circa 1900), the emperor communicated quite widely with his relatives, including his mother, the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna, brothers of the Emperor Georgy Alexandrovich, Mikhail Alexandrovich, uncles of the Grand Dukes Vladimir Alexandrovich, Sergei Alexandrovich and other cousins of Nicholas Nikolaevich, Alexander Mikhailovich and others.
In this rather wide circle of contacts of Nicholas II, there is a tendency to single out an even narrower circle from among those who combined the functions of relatives and friends of the emperor. First of all, such persons include the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich (cousin of Nicholas II) and his wife, Grand Duchess Xenia Alexandrovna (sister of Nicholas II). Alexander Mikhailovich and his wife were close to the emperor from childhood, and this childhood friendship subsequently began to influence the course of state affairs.
Another step in the formation of a narrow circle of relatives was made in 1900-1905. During these years, the closest relatives to the emperor were Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich (uncle of Nicholas II), his wife Grand Duchess Elizabeth Feodorovna (sister of Empress Alexandra Feodorovna), as well as the Emperor's cousins, Grand Dukes Nikolai Nikolaevich and Peter Nikolaevich and those close to them the so-called "Montenegrin sisters", Anastasia Nikolaevna and Militsa Nikolaevna.
In 1905-1912. Alienation of Nicholas II and Alexandra Feodorovna from the members of the imperial family that were closest to them earlier - the Grand Dukes Nikolaevich (Nikolai Nikolaevich and Peter Nikolaevich) and the "Montenegrin sisters" was outlined.
Over time (especially in 1912-1917), the process of alienation of Nicholas II and Alexandra Feodorovna from the rest of the imperial family intensified. Analysis of the emperor's diaries, for example, for 1915-1917. shows that during this period of the reign the nature of relations between Nicholas II and his relatives practically changed. If in the first years of his reign he often communicated with a wide circle of relatives both in formal and informal settings, then in the last period of his reign he limited his contacts with relatives to "protocol events" (tea drinking, dinners, etc.) and business contacts (for example, communication with the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich on military issues).
Second category. Close friends of the emperor, not related to him by kinship. This includes high-ranking military personnel, officials, and even public figures... Among the important names are Prince E.E. Ukhtomsky, K.P. Pobedonostsev, Admiral K.D. Nilov and a number of others.
Note that at different stages of the reign, Nicholas II selected friends for himself, guided by various categories. At the beginning of the reign, the emperor's friends were the comrades of his childhood games and general youthful hobbies (E.E. Ukhtomsky). In addition, some close associates of Alexander III (for example, K.P. Pobedonostsev) were among the emperor's friends.
Over time, during the development of the reign, it was mainly high-ranking officers of privileged military units (guards regiments, personal yachts of the emperor, etc.) that became friends of Nicholas II. Vivid examples of this type of people were K.D. Nilov and N.P. Sablin.
A distinctive feature of the emperor's friends was their lack of a clearly expressed political program. Also, the friends of Nicholas II did not represent a single cohesive group. Often they were the conductors of various (often antagonistic) influences.
Third category. The closest associates of the emperor are the palace commandants - V.D. Dedyulin and V.N. Voeikov, head of the imperial chancellery A.S. Taneyev, ministers of the court and imperial estates - I.I. Vorontsov-Dashkov and B.V. Fredericks, numerous aides-de-camp. This category should also include high-ranking bureaucrats and dignitaries who played a key role in the foreign and domestic policy of Russia (S.Yu. Witte, P.A.Stolypin, I.L. Goremykin, B.V. Sturmer and others).
Analyzing the processes in this category, one trend should be highlighted. If in the initial period of his reign (1894-1911) Nicholas II attracted literate and skillful bureaucrats (S.Yu. Witte, P.A. began to be replaced by personally loyal, but inept, often corrupt dignitaries.
The nascent Russian bourgeoisie already had substantial economic resources in many respects. However, in fact, she was politically powerless and depended on the royal dignitaries and the court aristocracy. But the main support of the Russian nobility itself - its elite in the person of the court aristocracy - had to somehow adapt to the new capitalist relations. Moreover, the Russian nobility not only had to preserve their economic hegemony (“become bourgeois” itself, include some part of the bourgeoisie in its composition), but also prevent the possible replacement of itself in the role of the Russian elite by the bourgeoisie. It was these processes that led to the formation of "unknown and accidental forces."
Sources (including the materials of the Extraordinary Investigative Commission of the Provisional Government) often use the term "court circle" (for example, "Dr. Badmaev's circle"). The sources do not give an exact definition of this term. However, it is clear from the context that we are talking about the unification of a group of people around an influential court figure to defend their (including economic) interests. These "circles" often united both official courtiers and representatives of the newly-born Russian bourgeoisie, who were not allowed to enter the courtyard.
For example, the "circle" of a homeopathic physician P.A. Badmaev often lobbied for various economic projects (primarily with the participation of courtiers). So, P.A. Badmaev had his son N.P. Badmaev, owner of gold mines in Transbaikalia M.G. Titov, advisor to commerce A.E. Stelp and Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovich.
In his note to the Chief of the General Staff V.A. Sukhomlinov (the date was not set for the note, but it should have been written in 1908-1909, since it was during this period that Sukhomlinov served as head of the General Staff) P.A. Badmaev asked for assistance in petitioning the emperor for a loan from the Ministry of Finance to the Trans-Baikal Mining Association. At the same time, Badmaev appealed to Sukhomlinov's "statist feelings", pointing out that the enterprise led by him and his partners would be of great benefit to the state.
However, "circles" are just self-organization around some person. But who was at the head of these "circles"? In principle, several categories of persons can be distinguished around which such "circles" were formed:
Relatives of the emperor, his uncle, etc .;
Court officials and dignitaries with influence at the court are personal friends of the emperor (Prince V.P. Meshchersky, etc.), figures of the secret police who enter the court (P.I.Rachkovsky);
Court and court paranormal figures (church leaders, all sorts of elders (I. Kronstadtsky), mystics and magicians (Philip, Papus), doctors (P.A. Badmaev and his entire line).
It is necessary to give a characteristic to Nicholas II himself, without which it is impossible to understand his relationship with his own environment and the processes within this environment.
Nicholas II became emperor in November 1894 after the death of his father Alexander III from a transient renal disease. The accession to the imperial throne was, oddly enough, a surprise for the young emperor. As the great-uncle and close childhood friend of the emperor, Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich (“Sandro”), recalls, Nicholas II was literally shocked and said literally the following: “What will happen to Russia now? I am not yet prepared to be king! I cannot rule an empire. I don't even know how to talk to ministers. "
The personal diary of Nicholas II also testifies to a frivolous attitude, neglect and even contempt for one's own imperious duties. Let's take a few entries from it (old style).
Record of November 16, 1895: “Before the report, I received Richter (OB Richter - Adjutant General, Member of the State Council) on some matters. Again the classes dragged on for an hour of breakfast! "
Entry dated March 13 (Old Style) 1896: “Tiring day; I had to read a lot and accept and talk with a large number of people. "
And here are the diary entries from the period of the First World War. Record of March 12, 1915 (immediately after the return of the emperor from the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief): “It was nice to wake up with the consciousness that you were at home. But during the day I felt and reverse side- reports and a multitude of papers and telegrams, and a well-known vanity. "
It is quite obvious that the weakness of the young emperor was noticed by all those around him (first of all, the closest relatives). As the same Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich wrote, Nicholas II "ruled the first ten years of his reign, sitting at a huge writing table in his office and listening with a feeling, most likely approaching horror, the advice and instructions of his uncles."
And the uncles themselves “always demanded something. Nikolai Nikolaevich portrayed himself as a great commander. Alexey Alexandrovich ruled over the seas. Sergei Alexandrovich would like to turn the Moscow governorship general into his own fiefdom. Vladimir Alexandrovich stood guard over the arts. They all had, each of their own, favorites among the generals and admirals, who had to be produced and promoted out of turn, their ballerinas who would like to arrange a “Russian season” in Paris, their amazing missionaries, eager to save the soul of the emperor, their miraculous doctors, asking audience, their clairvoyant elders, sent from above ... and so on. "
Another problem of the emperor was his personal inexperience in state affairs. However, the emperor solved this problem by referring to the experience of his own father. “Emperor Nicholas II was always tormented by the same question:“ What would his father have done in this case? ”
That is why people from the entourage of Alexander III had a special influence on Nicholas II in the first half of his reign: K.P. Pobedonostsev, Prince V.P. Meshchersky, S.Yu. Witte, I.L. Goremykin. Note that these people were often difficult to combine with each other (primarily for ideological reasons). In particular, the same Witte was a supporter of the industrial modernization of Russia, his political views combined elements of both conservatism and liberalism, and Pobedonostsev was the leading ideologist of Russian conservatism.
In addition, they differed markedly from each other in business and personal qualities. Witte and Pobedonostsev, for all their ideological differences, could withstand the influence of the emperor's uncles. And, for example, I.L. Goremykin was quite dependent on the opinion of the "higher spheres" (first of all, the grand dukes and the emperor personally) and was concerned only with the problem of personal political and bureaucratic survival. Therefore, Goremykin never tried to contradict either Nicholas II personally, or the emperor's uncles, or other members of the imperial family.
The closeness of Nicholas II and Pobedonostsev was based on the fact that the emperor (just like his father) was a pupil of the Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod. According to the memoirs of Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, Pobedonostsev "influenced the young emperor in that direction in order to teach him to be afraid of all innovations." In particular, he took part in blocking the "political spring" of prince P.D. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, proposed to the emperor two candidates for the post of head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - D.S. Sipyagin and V.K. von Plehve (both were appointed at different times to the post of Minister of the Interior). However, in the early 1900s. Pobedonostsev's influence began to wane. And in 1905, he was generally removed from the post of Chief Prosecutor of the Synod.
Another confidant of Nicholas II was a conservative publicist, publisher of the newspaper Grazhdanin, Prince V.P. Meshchersky. Note that Meshchersky could influence Nicholas II not only personally, but also through his creatures - N.F. Burdukova, I.F. Manasevich-Manuilov and even partly S.Yu. Witte. The "political salon" of Prince Meshchersky was a kind of "forge of personnel" for ambitious young people. As S.Yu. Witte, under the patronage of Meshchersky were quite influential St. Petersburg officials - I.S. Kolyshko and N.F. Burdukov.
Relations between Meshchersky and Nicholas II developed unevenly. After the accession of the new emperor to the throne, Meshchersky was forbidden to write letters to the autocrat. However, by 1896 Meshchersky's relations with the emperor were restored, and correspondence was established between them.
At the same time, publicist B.V. Glinsky noted in his obituary to Prince Meshchersky that during the reign of Nicholas II, the ideological position of the publisher of "Grazhdanin" underwent quite serious changes. After the manifesto on October 17, 1905, Meshchersky already recognized the possibility of the existence of constitutional foundations of power in Russia. At the same time, the leaders of extreme monarchist organizations such as V.M. Purishkevich.
In the course of time, by about 1910s, informal ideological advisers like Meshchersky were replaced by all sorts of "old men" and "holy fools". The most striking example is the favoritism of G.E. Rasputin.
The need for "prophets" and "elders" was also due to the special religiosity of both Emperor Nicholas II and Empress Alexandra Feodorovna. In addition, the last Russian emperor paid special attention to the so-called "voice of the common man", which would broadcast the true "mood of the people" to the tsar. Such predilections of Nicholas II to a certain extent were due to objective reasons. The emperor could not help but feel that the government and society in Russia are mutually isolated, and the government does not know about the true moods of its subjects. And the need for a "people's representative" under the emperor concerned not only the religious sphere.
As an example of the activity of such a "popular representation" under Nicholas II, the so-called "Klopiada" should be cited. In 1898, Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich (a great-uncle and at the same time husband of Nicholas II's sister, Grand Duchess Xenia Alexandrovna) proposed to the emperor to create a system of informal information about the situation in the country. For the role of the tsar's chief confidant, a petty official A.A. Klopov (hence the term "Klopiada"), who was personally acquainted with the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich.
On the personal instructions of Nicholas II, A.A. Klopov was sent to Tula as an arbiter in the conflict between the local governor and the zemstvo. However, he could not fulfill his role, because he lacked experience and competence. Therefore, Klopov's "Tula mission" ended in failure. But he received the right to send letters personally to the emperor, which he used for twenty years.
Having a completely unique status of "personal correspondent" of the emperor, A.A. Klopov was not an independent figure who expressed his personal views to the emperor. Throughout his career, he was a puppet in the hands of several influential groups. So, initially he was taken care of by the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich and was an active participant in the struggle between the Grand Duke and the Minister of Finance S.Yu. Witte. Klopov was the author of a note on the dangers of foreign investment for Russia, of which Witte was a supporter. And the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich was the opponent of the Minister of Finance on this issue.
In 1902 A.A. Klopov unexpectedly went over to the side of S.Yu. Witte. In letters to Nicholas II, Klopov now began to actively praise Witte's activities. Moreover, in 1904, after the death of the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. von Plehve even certified Witte as the best candidate for the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And in 1915 A.A. Klopov, according to S.P. Melgunov, was used by one of the leaders of the bourgeois-liberal opposition, Prince G.E. Lvov for "broadcasting" to Nicholas II a number of ideas beneficial to Lvov.
...Similar documents
Islamic world in world politics and culture. Questions of morality in the cultural and political dispute between Islam and the secular West. The originality of the Islamic community. Middle East conflict, international security. Development centers for jihadist groups.
test, added 03/25/2013
The foreign policy of Great Britain after the Second World War. Features of the country's foreign policy during this period. The influence of the bipolar international order on political trends. The main vectors of the modern foreign policy course.
thesis, added 05/24/2015
The role of foreign policy continuity in the stability of international relations. Features of Russian statehood and diplomacy in the research of the founder of American Sovietology, Kennan. The main features of territorial expansion in the state.
test, added 08/29/2011
International relations: basic concepts, essence, history of development and significance of the main directions, their representatives. a brief description of elements of the theory of international relations. The concept of geopolitics, its role. Ukraine in world politics.
term paper, added 01/30/2011
Civil War in Syria as the central theme of world politics at the present time. The split in the camp of the Syrian opposition forces is the main factor that led to the emergence of the international terrorist organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
thesis, added 08/12/2017
Subject area and spheres of international relations, the history of their formation and development, the impact on this process of the First and Second World War. Paradoxes associated with the conduct of a nuclear war. The concept of political realism in Western Europe.
abstract, added 12/22/2009
Rusyns and Lusatians on the territory of Austria-Hungary and Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. Reconstruction and analysis of the causes, process and consequences of the genocide of Russian-speaking indigenous ethnic groups during the First World War. Concentration camps for Russians: Talerhof and Terezin.
term paper added on 05/06/2014
The role of the highest political elite in the state. The dominant role of the political elite in the life of society in our country in the process of its historical development, its structure and typological diversity. Features of the evolution of the ruling elite of the "Putin" period.
test, added 11/25/2010
The role of the institution of the church in the formation of the institution of political opposition in Russia, its typology and functions. Opposition parties and the protest movement in modern Russia. The role and importance of social networks in the formation of the protest mood of Russians.
thesis, added 06/18/2017
Features of Russia's status in the world community, its dual position from a geopolitical point of view. The role of the Normans and Orthodoxy in the formation of the Russian state. Grade possible options and the concept of the development of the world geopolitical system.
Introduction
Conclusion
Literature
Introduction
Relevance of the topic.
This year marks the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War. The First World War is considered one of the bloodiest wars in the history of mankind, which is marked by a huge number of wars.
Speaking about the reasons for the outbreak of the First World War, it is necessary to clarify that the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and the revolution of 1905-1907. to introduce difficulties in which Russian diplomacy had to act, especially since very significant changes have taken place on the world arena.
In this period of time, there is an increase in rivalry between England and Germany, which led to the formation of two opposing blocs in Europe.
The state of Russian society, torn apart, first of all, by social contradictions, undermined by the country's finances since the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian army demoralized by the inglorious end of the Far Eastern campaign, its incomplete rearmament and restoration of combat capability - all this complicated the possibilities of Russian diplomacy.
The tsarist government was also faced with the general task of adapting the activities of the state apparatus, including its foreign policy department, to the new conditions created by the emergence of the Russian parliament and the proclamation of political freedoms.
The autocracy was faced with a difficult task in choosing allies. It should not be forgotten that Germany remained one of the most important economic partners of Russia: the share of German goods accounted for more than 30% of Russian imports, and, accordingly, almost 50% of exported agricultural products went to the German market. However, the offensive of German capitals in the countries of the Near and Middle East inevitably led to a weakening of Russia's influence in these regions and, in addition, seriously threatened its strategic interests, primarily in the Balkans, in the Black Sea straits zone.
But Russia refused to rapprochement with Germany, as evidenced by the failure of Wilhelm II's attempt in 1905 to impose the Bjork Agreement on Nicholas II, which provided for mutual assistance of both countries during military conflicts in Europe.
Although the Franco-Russian alliance had already existed for more than one year, its unification with the Anglo-French Entente was problematic. England remained for Russia not only a traditionally unfriendly state, but also one of the active supporters of Japan, who contributed to the Manchu catastrophe of Russia.
The difficulty of choosing allies was aggravated by the aggravation of contradictions with Austria-Hungary, whose economic and political positions in the Balkans continued to strengthen. Neither the urgency nor the complexity of the task of maintaining at least the remaining positions in the Far East diminished for Russia. Hence the need to develop a foreign policy course that would make it possible to avoid significant concessions and at the same time not bring matters to dangerous complications.
The aggravation of the struggle of the great powers for the redivision of the world, the clash of the old colonial empires with new contenders for territorial conquests, the exacerbation of internal contradictions in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, the growing internal crisis in Russia, which found itself in a state of international isolation during the Russo-Japanese War - all this became the background on which Russian international diplomatic relations were built.
The purpose of this work is to determine the reasons for the defeat of the East Prussian operation in 1914.
consider the foreign policy of Russia on the eve of the First World War;
to investigate the actions of the Russian army during the hostilities of 1914.
Work structure. The work consists of an introduction, two chapters, a conclusion and a bibliography.
Foreign policy of Russia on the eve of the first world war
Great European diplomacy of the late 19th - early 20th centuries relied on a system of blocks and counterweights. The unstable peaceful equilibrium was maintained for several decades by the impossibility of any of the great powers to start a war against the other one-on-one, as was the case in 1870 between Prussia and France. The final composition of the blocs was determined in 1907-1908, when the Russian and British Empires resolved the contradictions that remained in the most important zones of contact of imperial interests: Afghanistan, Tibet and Persia.
So, in 1906 - 1914. in the international arena, there is a further exacerbation of the contradictions between the imperialist powers, which ultimately led to the outbreak of the World War in 1914. The main rivalry was between the leading European countries - England and Germany, who headed two opposing military-political blocs - the Triple Alliance and the Entente.
In the ruling circles of Russia on foreign policy issues, there are two groups - pro-British and pro-German. Most of the Russian landowners and the bourgeoisie were in favor of rapprochement with England against Germany. Their voice was especially insistent after the defeat in the war with Japan and in connection with the growth of German expansionist aspirations. The extreme right, the reactionary part of the landowners and the nobility of the court, were guided by Germany. This group was small but highly influential. She was supported by some ministers and diplomats.
Nicholas II showed his inherent hesitation. Ultimately, the orientation towards rapprochement with England won. This orientation was also supported by Russia's ally France, which in 1904 concluded a "cordial agreement" with England (a military-political alliance).
England, for her part, willingly went to rapprochement with Russia, seeing in her a counterbalance to Germany. In addition, the positions of Russia in the East after its defeat in the war with Japan were significantly weakened, so that in this region Russia no longer provided a serious rival for England. In May 1906, the British government turned to the Russian government with a proposal to start negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement and received a positive response. On August 18, 1907, in St. Petersburg, England and Russia signed an agreement on the delimitation of their interests in Iran, Afghanistan and Tibet. Iran was divided into three zones: the northern - the sphere of influence of Russia, the southeastern - the sphere of influence of England and the middle - neutral, in which equal opportunities were created for each of the contracting parties. Establishing joint control over the sources of Iran's income in order to ensure that the Iranian government makes good payments on government loans... The two powers assumed the functions of "maintaining order" in Iran in case of any social upheavals. Afghanistan was recognized as the sphere of influence of England, i.e. its protectorate over this country was recognized, but on condition that no measures "threatening Russia" be allowed on its territory. The parties agreed to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet. This agreement on the division of spheres of influence in the east essentially formalized the alliance between England and Russia. Completed the creation of the Entente (Triple Accord) - the military-political bloc of France, England and Russia.
Indeed, now a war against any of the three countries almost automatically meant a war against the other two. The Entente was opposed by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, but Italy was a relatively weak ally. Thus, Russia, not Germany, followed the old Bismarck rule: "There are three of us, while the five great powers are in control of the dubious balance." The rule became especially relevant after 1905, when the state interests of Russia again turned it towards Turkey and the Balkans. This was due to the fact that the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War again put on the agenda the problem of participation in international trade across the Black Sea and the system of straits associated with it - into the Mediterranean. As stated in the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Russia, whose commission examined the Balkan and Middle Eastern markets, "Turkey and the Balkans are a golden well from which Western Europe scoops up in big buckets, and we sit around thinking whether to spit or wait. "
The direction, which was secondary for several decades, from the end of the 1900s. again acquired paramount importance. But it was not for nothing that the wise Bismarck warned that "some damned stupidity in the Balkans" would be the spark that would ignite the fire of a great war.
With the assistance of Britain and France, relations between Russia and Japan were normalized: in June 1907, a Russian-Japanese trade agreement, a fishing convention and an agreement on political issues were signed. In the open part of the agreement, it was declared that both countries would respect the status quo in the Far East, and in the secret part, spheres of influence were determined. For Japan, these were South Manchuria and Korea, and for Russia - North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. Russian-Japanese agreements of 1910 and 1012 not only confirmed this, but also granted broader rights to Japan in Korea and Russia in Mongolia. Based on these agreements, Japan annexed Korea. Russia, by agreement with China, achieved in 1912 the proclamation of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia under the Russian protectorate. In 1913, Japan proposed to Russia to conclude a military-political alliance, but at that time did not meet with a positive response. This alliance was actually formed in 1916, during the First World War.
From the German side in the summer of 1905, at the final stage Russo-Japanese War, an attempt was made to tear Russia away from the alliance with France. In July of the same year, the German Emperor Wilhelm II paid a visit to Nicholas II, who was vacationing on the Finnish island of Björke. Here he managed to persuade the Russian tsar to sign an agreement on mutual assistance between Russia and Germany in the event of an attack on one of the contracting parties by any third European power. The treaty was to enter into force at the end of the Russo-Japanese War. In its meaning, it was directed against France, which deprived Russia of its main ally and creditor. Soon Russian diplomacy succeeded in disavowing the treaty. Wilhelm II was informed that the obligations assumed by Russia did not apply in the event of a war between Germany and France. This was a diplomatic refusal, and the treaty did not enter into force.
On the eve of the world war, the events unfolding in the Balkans took on an explosive character. In this region, which is of great economic and strategic importance, the interests of the leading European powers clashed. Their own interests were also pursued by the countries of this region, striving to expand their territories at the expense of a weakening Turkey or each other, which led to a series of military conflicts.
The first spark took off in 1908, when Austria, in violation of international treaties, annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina with 2 million Serbs to its territory.
A verbal agreement was reached between the Austro-Hungarian and Russian foreign ministers on the consent of the Russian side to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary, provided that the latter undertakes a commitment at a special international conference to support Russia's demand for the opening of the Black Sea straits for all of its courts and about closing them to military courts of other countries. Austria-Hungary also agreed to grant full independence to Bulgaria. Russia's attempt to negotiate with Paris, London and Berlin to convene such a conference was unsuccessful. In September 1908, Austria-Hungary, taking advantage of the proclamation of Bulgaria as an independent kingdom, announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, Turkey and Serbia protested. But he was not supported by Britain and France, not interested in changing the regime of the straits, which Russia was striving for. Germany resolutely sided with Austria-Hungary and demanded that Russia recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as abandon attempts to convene a European conference. Russia, in order to evade a military conflict, was forced to yield. Stolypin took a firm stand on this issue. He demanded that a military conflict be avoided by any means, believing that "to unleash a war means to unleash the forces of the revolution." Moreover, Russia was not ready for war.
This shameful defeat of the Russian Foreign Ministry, called "diplomatic Tsushima", led to Izvolsky's resignation. The new minister was appointed S.D. Sazonov, who largely followed the previous course. Under him, an attempt was made to achieve "pacification" with Germany through economic concessions. In 1911, the Potsdam Agreement was signed, according to which Germany recognized Russia's interests in Iran, and Russia promised not to hinder the construction of the strategic Berlin-Baghdad railway line and to mediate in the conflict between Germany and France over Morocco.
At the same time, the government was convinced that the only way to successfully combat the penetration of Germany into the Balkans could be the rapprochement of Russia with Turkey, and then the unification of Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro (if possible, Greece and Romania) into an alliance under the auspices of Russia. True, it was now specially emphasized that the alliance of Russia with Britain and France should also act effectively. All these efforts of Russian diplomacy met with opposition from Germany and Austria-Hungary, who wanted to create a Turkish-Bulgarian-Romanian coalition against Serbia and Montenegro. The disputes between Constantinople, Sofia, Belgrade and Athens over the autonomy of Macedonia turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle on the way to the Balkan alliance, which was planned by Russia. In addition, France sought from Turkey a concession for a railway in the region, in which Russia claimed the primary interests.
Britain's attempts to increase its influence in Tehran were discovered, which caused additional tension in Russian-British relations. The Russian-Turkish negotiations also ended in failure, at which Russia, using the conflict between Turkey and Italy, sought agreement to open the straits for the ships of the Russian navy with a guarantee of the inviolability of Turkey's European possessions. With persistent assistance from Russia, a Serbian-Bulgarian union treaty was signed in March 1912.
War against Turkey in the event of a conflict with it between Greece and Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. The Russian government hoped to keep the allies from undesirable complications in the Balkans. However, here too, Russian diplomacy was in for a failure - it did not manage to prevent armed conflict between the Balkan Union and Turkey.
Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 became the collapse of Russia's hopes of playing the role of a great power in the Balkans, regulating relations between the small states of the region, their relations with Turkey and interested European powers, and exercising control over the straits.
As a result of all the foreign policy efforts of the tsarist government, it turned out that it was in the Balkan region, the most explosive for Europe, that Russia was on the verge of a collision with Germany and Austria-Hungary, to which Bulgaria and Turkey were clearly inclined. At the same time, by the middle of 1914, Russia clearly could only count on the support of France, Serbia and Montenegro.
Britain's position remained uncertain until the July crisis of 1914. Russia's position in the system of international relations on the eve of the world war testifies that the autocracy failed in the third June period to restore the strength and influence of the country as a leading power.
Last years before the First World War were marked by an unprecedented arms race. Military appropriations have risen sharply, the size of the armies has expanded and the service life has increased. Russia in 1910 began to reorganize the army, and in 1913 adopted the "Great Program for Strengthening the Army," restoring and expanding the navy, the implementation of which was to be completed by 1917. However, Germany managed to implement its military program three years earlier. ... Completed preparations for the war and Austria-Hungary. In the spring of 1914, she developed a plan for an attack on Serbia, deciding to use the unification of Serbia with Montenegro or any other pretext to start a war.
Russia in the first world war
The war was triggered by the events in the Balkans in the summer of 1914. Austria-Hungary appointed provocative military maneuvers in the occupied Bosnia on the border with Serbia at the end of June. The heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who arrived in the Bosnian city of Sarajevo, on the day of the opening of the maneuvers on June 15 (28), was killed by student G. Princip, associated with a Serbian nationalist organization. War hysteria broke out in Austria-Hungary. The chief of the Austro-Hungarian headquarters said that it was necessary to immediately declare war on Serbia. The German Kaiser Wilhelm II, who considered the moment as the most suitable for unleashing a military conflict, even if it would lead to a war with Russia, France and England, strongly pushed Austria-Hungary to take decisive action.
Having secured a promise of Germany's support, Austria-Hungary on July 10 (23) presented Serbia with a tough ultimatum, which contained demands that violated its sovereignty: the introduction of a limited contingent of Austrian troops on its territory, ostensibly to "protect" Austrian citizens who were there, as well as admittance for investigation the murder of Franz Ferdinand by investigators from Vienna. Russia, trying to prevent a military conflict, demanded that Austria-Hungary extend the term of the ultimatum, and advised Serbia to accept it, with the exception of the clause on the introduction of Austrian troops on its territory. Nicholas II sent a telegram to Wilhelm II, suggesting that he "restrain" Austria-Hungary from military action against Serbia. However, these steps by the Russian government were unsuccessful. On July 28, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, and on the same day bombarded Belgrade from heavy guns.
The Austrian ultimatum could not be accepted, which meant war 48 hours later. The miracle of technology - the telegraph - allowed Nicholas II to quickly exchange telegrams with his "uncle Willie" - the German Kaiser Wilhelm II. However, even such operational communication did not help. The Kaiser asked Russia to "remain a spectator", but he himself supported the actions of the Austrians. In turn, the Austrians declared war on Serbia and began military mobilization, according to which the troops were deployed against Russia. Nicholas could not help but respond by announcing the mobilization of the Russian army. The Kaiser did not oppose the Austrian mobilization, but he did not just condemn the Russian one, but declared it hostile. In turn, France assured Russia that it would fulfill its allied obligations.
(3) July Nicholas II signed a decree on general mobilization. Germany demanded to suspend it by 12 o'clock on July 19 (August 1), and when this demand expired, officially declared a "state of war" with Russia. On August 3, Germany declared war on France and immediately sent its corps against her through Belgium. On August 4, under the pretext of violating Belgium's neutrality by German troops, England declared war on Germany. On August 6, Austria-Hungary entered the war with Russia, and on August 23, Japan declared war on Germany, which decided to use the military conflict in Europe to seize the German colonies in the Far East. So the military conflict in the Balkans turned into a world war, in which 33 states were involved. Turkey and Bulgaria subsequently joined the Austro-German military bloc, and a number of other countries joined the Triple Accord (Entente).
Russia entered the war unprepared. Germany, seeking to forestall Russia, its most serious military enemy, made every effort to unleash a military conflict as early as possible. It was important for her to avoid the simultaneous conduct of military operations on two fronts. Even at the turn of the XIX - XX centuries. field marshals Schlieffen and Moltke developed a plan for a "blitzkrieg war" with France. After defeating France, the German strategists hoped to turn the liberated troops against Russia. They took into account that the agreement between Russia and France for the mobilization and concentration of the Russian army on the western borders established a 40-day period.
Following this plan, the German command threw the main forces against France. Within a few days, German troops passed Belgium, entered the borders of France and, defeating the formations in front of them, launched a swift attack on Paris. The position of France turned out to be critical. German troops were already 120 km from its capital. The French government turned to Russia with a request for an early offensive by the Russian troops. Russia, in order to save France from defeat and prevent her withdrawal from the war, began military operations on the German front, not yet completing the mobilization and deployment of all armies. On August 4 (17), 1914, the forces of the North-Western Front began an operation in East Prussia. At first, the offensive of the Russian armies was successful, although divided and uncoordinated.
The outbreak of hostilities in East Prussia forced the German command to send two corps there from the western front, halting the movement towards Paris. Having strengthened the grouping of troops in East Prussia and taking advantage of the inconsistency in the actions of the two Russian armies, the German command defeated them. Their losses amounted to 170 thousand people, and the remnants of the Russian armies were driven out of East Prussia. At the cost of the death of these Russian armies, Paris was saved.
Simultaneously with the fighting in East Prussia, a major battle began in Galicia. This operation, which lasted more than a month, was successfully carried out by the Russian command. In the middle of 1914 the city of Lvov was occupied. Austro-Hungarian troops rolled back from the river. San. The Russian armies surrounded the large fortress of Przemysl (it capitulated at the beginning of March 1915) and found themselves 80 km from Krakow, thus advancing 300 km. During the 33-day fighting, Austria-Hungary lost 400 thousand people. Germany sent large formations to stabilize the front. By mid-September 1914, the advance of the Russian troops here was suspended.
The Galician battle thwarted the plan of the German General Staff, which was counting on the defense of the eastern front by the forces of Austria-Hungary. This front acquired decisive importance for Germany. The concentration of German troops on it gradually increased.
In October-November 1914, two major military operations were carried out on the territory of Poland - the Warsaw-Ivangorod one, in which more than 900 thousand people participated on both sides and which lasted the whole of October, and Lodz, in which more than 600 thousand people acted. During the bloody battles, the German command managed to remove the threat of an invasion into Germany and even somewhat moved the front line deep into Polish territory. However, it failed to inflict a serious defeat on the Russian troops, as planned. Both the Russian and Austro-German armies were drained of blood. Russian losses in killed, wounded and prisoners exceeded 2 million people, Austro-German losses, according to the German General Staff, - 950 thousand people (including over 700 thousand Austrians). Both sides went over to a defensive, trench warfare that lasted about three months. The fighting on the eastern front provided great support to the allies of Russia, who operated on the western front, where the losses of the Germans amounted to over 750 thousand people. And here the German army went over to the defensive. The German plan was thwarted in a short time to defeat the Anglo-French troops.
Based on the results of the 1914 campaign, the German command decides to concentrate in the near future on the eastern front to inflict a serious defeat on the Russian army, in order to subsequently inflict a decisive blow on the Anglo-French army on the western front.
During the 1914 campaign, Turkey joined the Austro-German bloc. Back in mid-August 1914, she entered into a secret military alliance with Germany. However, for some time Turkey took a wait-and-see attitude and even entered into negotiations with Russia to conclude an alliance with her. During August, the mobilization of the Turkish army took place. On August 10, Turkey allowed the German warships Goeben and Breslau into the Black Sea, and then formally "acquired" them together with the German crews.
On the night of October 29, without declaring war, the Turkish fleet attacked Sevastopol, Odessa and other Black Sea ports. In response to this action, Russia declared war on Turkey. Military operations began in the Transcaucasus. Here Russia formed the Caucasian army of 170 thousand people. Turkey has concentrated an army of 200,000 on this front. Until December 1914, stubborn battles took place in the Batumi and Erzurum directions. At first, the Turks were accompanied by some success, explained by the surprise attack on the Russian corps, which had not yet deployed along the front.
But during the Russian counteroffensive, the Turkish army was defeated, losing about 80 thousand people. This eased the position of the Anglo-French troops operating against Turkey in Mesopotamia and Syria, because in order to suspend the further advance of the Russian armies deep into Turkey, its command had to remove a number of corps from these fronts and abandon them in the Transcaucasus.
At the beginning of January 1915, the Russian Headquarters developed a plan of offensive actions in two directions: by taking a bridgehead in East Prussia, to strike at Berlin, and on the Southwestern Front to start the Carpathian operation to invade Hungary. By mid-January 1915, the offensive plan was developed by the German command. Limiting itself to defensive actions on the western front, it decided to forestall the actions of the Russian General Headquarters with a massive blow along the entire eastern front and deployed large reserves to the east. Already at the end of January 1915, two German armies launched an offensive in the Masurian Lakes region in eastern Poland against one Russian army stationed there, which, having suffered heavy losses, withdrew to the river. Beaver. Only through common efforts three Russians armies, the Germans were driven back to East Prussia. The attempt of the Austro-German armies to carry out an offensive in the Carpathians failed. The 8th Russian Army under the command of General A.A. Brusilova threw off the advancing units, overcame the Carpathians and entered the territory of Hungary.
However, in the spring and summer of 1915, the course of hostilities was unsuccessful for the Russian troops. Affected by the large human losses during the previous bloody battles and the inconsistency of the actions of the Russian command, but most of all - an acute shortage of weapons and ammunition. The German army outnumbered the Russian by 2.5 times in machine guns, 4.4 times in light and 40 times in heavy artillery, tens of times in the number of shells per gun. In April 1915, after a long and powerful artillery barrage, the enemy broke through the Russian front in Galicia. The Russian armies were unable to resist the massive attack and began to retreat. In early June, Lviv was abandoned, and by the end of June, most of Galicia.
Almost simultaneously, the German offensive began in the Neman region. By mid-July, the Germans captured the Libava sea fortress and approached Mitava. During July - August they took Kovno, Vilno, Vilkomir, Sventsiany, Mitava, approached Riga and Dvinsk. Warsaw fell in early August. Thus, by the end of the 1915 campaign, German troops occupied Galicia, Poland, Lithuania, part of the Baltic States and Belarus. The front stabilized along the line Riga - Western Dvina - Dvinsk - Baranovichi - Pinsk - Dubno - Tarnopol. Human losses in Russia amounted to 3.5 million people killed, wounded and captured. The cadre army was almost completely incapacitated. The marching units sent to the front were recruited at the expense of reservists and poorly trained recruits. The failures of the Russian troops in the 1915 campaign were also due to the fact that England and France, contrary to their allied obligations, almost did not conduct active actions against the Germans, limiting themselves to defense. This allowed the Austro-German block to keep 90 divisions on the western front, throwing 140 divisions to the eastern front. Thus, Russia bore the brunt of the war.
The resistance of the Russian armies, which cost them so many forces and casualties, gave England and France more than a year's respite to prepare to repel the German offensive, which was planned by the German command for 1916.
The successes of the Austro-German bloc contributed to the adoption by Bulgaria of the decision to join it in the fall of 1915. This worsened the position of the Entente countries in the Balkans. Serbia found itself in a critical situation. In December 1915, her army was defeated. Almost the entire Balkan Peninsula was dominated by the Austro-German bloc.
The 1916 campaign began in February with a general offensive by German forces on the western front. The main blow was directed at the large French fortress of Verdun, which covered the direct route to Paris. A fierce battle unfolded for this important strategic area, which lasted until mid-December 1916 and cost both sides about a million casualties.
The French troops at Verdun were saved by a massive Russian offensive under the command of General Brusilov, undertaken in early June. The front was broken through for 350 km (from Pinsk to Chernivtsi). The breakthrough depth reached 80-120 km. During the fighting, the enemy lost about 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured.
"Brusilov breakthrough" forced the German command to stop attacks on Verdun and transfer 11 divisions to the east, and the Austrians removed 6 divisions from the Italian front to close the gap in Galicia. However, this did not correct the position of Austria-Hungary and Germany on the eastern front. Brusilov's offensive was not supported by other Russian fronts, nor did it receive the necessary reserves to build on the success. In early September, his armies went over to the defensive.
The successes of the Russian troops in the summer of 1916 put an end to the hesitation of the ruling circles of Romania and inclined it to the side of the Entente. At the end of August 1916, Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary. The German command created two strong groups of troops and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Romanians in Transylvania and Dobrudja. By December 1916, almost all of Romania was occupied, which aggravated the position of the Russian armies in the southwestern sector of the front, the length of which increased by 500 km. Russia had to allocate weapons and ammunition from its meager arsenals to the Romanian army. But the position of England and France eased, for the German command reduced the line of the western front, transferring another 20 divisions to the eastern one.
In October 1916, hostilities on the eastern front again assumed a positional character.
During 1915 - 1916. a number of meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Chiefs of General Staff of the Entente countries were held. An agreement was reached on the coordination of military actions, a mutual obligation was made not to conclude a separate peace, and the issue of post-war changes in borders in Europe and the division of Turkey was also resolved. In particular, the allies promised to transfer the Memel region to Russia and resolve the issue of the Black Sea straits in its favor.
In solving the geopolitical tasks of Russia, the Dardanelles was of great importance. landing operation Entente (February 1915 - January 1916), held to divert Turkish troops from the Caucasian front. Too active preparation of the British for the operation frightened Petrograd. This led to the registration in March - April 1915 of a number of treaties, according to which England and France agreed to the transfer of Constantinople to Russia with the adjacent territory. However, both the naval part of the operation and the landing on the Galliopolis Peninsula were unsuccessful. As a result, the Allied troops were transferred to the Thessaloniki front.
world war first russia
Conclusion
The main reason for the First World War was the struggle for the territorial redistribution of the world. As noted in the work, the main knot of contradictions lay in relations between Great Britain, the largest colonial empire in the world, and Germany, whose increased economic power required new markets for sales and raw materials.
In addition, a difficult situation arose in the Balkans, into which the great powers and young states that gained independence were drawn.
Russia was interested in solving economic (grain export through southern ports) and possible military problems. The tsarist government traditionally sought to strengthen its authority among the Balkan, especially Slavic states, protecting them from the encroachments of Turkey and the countries of the Triple Alliance.
The dynastic ties of the Romanovs with the German Hohenzollerns made it possible to resolve controversial issues that did not go beyond the borders of the Balkans and the straits through diplomatic means. Without completing military training, Russia was less willing than other European countries to accelerate the onset of the war.
The millionth Russia entered the First World War as the weakest economically among the great powers of Europe who participated in the conflict.
“Russia,” stated Minister SD Sazonov, entered the war in an unfavorable international situation. Tsarist diplomacy failed to conclude a naval alliance with England, without which Russia could not feel secured against a fleet attack Central Coalition on the Baltic and Black Seas ".
But at the same time, Russia was financially dependent on France and England. 80% of the external debt of the Russian Empire fell to the share of Parisian banks. In addition, French monopolies and financial corporations owned 32% of all foreign investment in industry and banks in Russia. In turn, Russia 80% of all gold, cash - 431 million out of 540 million rubles. - kept in France.
Britain and France used financial pressure on Russia to drag it into the war. In 1913, Paris provided St. Petersburg with a loan of 400 - 500 million francs. on the conditions of an increase in the composition of the Russian army in peacetime and the construction of strategic railways on the approaches to Germany. Russia was to divert the forces of Germany upon itself and thus save France and England from the German invasion.
In fact, Russia's allies in the Triple Accord were not even going to fulfill their obligations to The Russian empire... The English and French fleets in the Mediterranean did not hold down the Austro-Hungarian and Italian naval forces, allowing them to threaten the Russian Black Sea fleet. As a result, the entire south of Russia was under the threat of a military invasion of the enemy.
This, however, did not bode well, since in August 1914 many military men were sure that the war would not be long. It was hoped that the country's reserves would be sufficient for several months to adequately fulfill allied obligations and participate in determining the fate of the post-war world as one of the winners.
But the war dragged on. And the lag of the military industry from the elementary army needs, its inadequacy to the requirements of modern warfare, the underdevelopment of infrastructure (primarily transport), the sluggishness of the bureaucratic apparatus of the autocracy led to the fact that huge sacrifices had to be made for the shortcomings of the country's development.
The Russian army suffered the heaviest losses, the war caused extreme tension in all spheres of Russian society.
Despite the fact that in 1916 it was generally possible to arrange supplies for the army and somewhat stabilize the situation at the front, the morale of the army was low: the goals of the war remained unclear for the majority, and the sacrifices did not look justified.
The situation in the Balkans was also unsuccessful for Russia. Tsarist diplomacy was never able to restore the Balkan Union. Bulgaria - his main support - withdrew from the union, Greece declared neutrality, the Romanian monarchy pursued an ambivalent policy, waiting for which coalition was more profitable to join, Turkey fell under the influence of Germany, and only Serbia and Montenegro were interested in an alliance with Russia. But both of these states themselves needed her support.
The situation was even worse with Russia's readiness for the difficult trials of the war. It cannot be said that the tsarist government did not take measures to strengthen the army and navy. In 1913, the absolute amount of military spending amounted to 869.5 million rubles, or 23.6% of the state budget, and in 1914 - 974.5. million rubles, or 27.49% of the budget. If the "Great Military Program" were fulfilled, Russia would become one of the strongest, and possibly the most powerful military power.
However, all this was only in the future, and in 1914 Russia was still far behind Germany, especially in terms of the technical equipment of the troops.
Literature
1.Viktorov V.V. Russia on the verge of centuries ( end of XIX- early XX century): Textbook. Part 1. Russia during the reign of Nicholas II / Ed. G.A. Amun. - M .: Financial Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation, 1999 .-- 226 p.
2.Dvornichenko A.Yu., Kashchenko S.G., Florinsky M.F. Domestic history (until 1917). - M .: UITs Gardariki, 2002 .-- 445 p.
.History of Russia XX - early XXI century / Ed. Milova L.V. - M .: Eksmo, 2006 .-- 960 p.
.Kirillov V.V. History of Russia: Textbook. - M .: Yurayt-Izdat, 2007 .-- 661 p.
.Moryakov V.I., Fedorov V.A., Shchetinov Yu.A. Russian history. M., 1998 .-- 496 p.
.Munchaev Sh.M., Ustinov V.M. Russian history. - M .: INFRA? M - NORMA, 2005 .-- 592 p.
.Oleinikov D.I. History of Russia from 1861 to 1917. Course of lectures: a manual for universities / D.I. Oleinikov. - M .: Bustard, 2005 .-- 414 p.
.Orlov A.S., Georgiev V.A. and other history of Russia. Textbook. - M .: Prospect, 2006 .-- 568 p.
.Pisarev Yu.A. Great powers and the Balkans on the eve of the First World War. - M .: Nauka, 1985.
.Tereshchenko Yu.Ya. History of Russia XX - XXI centuries. / Tereshchenko Yu.Ya. - Rostov n / a: Phoenix Publishing House, 2004 .-- 448 p.
.Fedorov V.A. History of Russia 1861-1917 - M .: Higher school, 2000 .-- 384 p.
Tags: Russian foreign policy on the eve of World War I Abstract History
