The entry of England into the war entailed the participation of the entire British Empire in it. The European war took on the character of a world war. In addition, the performance of England to some extent predetermined the position of the United States.

During the war, the main efforts of the diplomacy of both warring camps were directed to the recruitment of new allies. Side by side with this task was another: concern for inter-allied relations and for drawing the contours of a future peace treaty.

Japanese speech

As for the recruitment of allies, this task cost the diplomacy of both sides a lot of work. Only Japan did not force itself to persuade, which itself began military operations against Germany. The Japanese imperialists quickly assessed the situation. All European powers were bound by the war. Japan got the opportunity to develop its expansion without fear of competitors. Its first prey was to be the German possessions in the Far East.

As early as August 15, 1914, the Japanese government issued an ultimatum to Germany without further diplomatic prefaces. It demanded that Germany "without any conditions and without any compensation" transfer Kiao-Chao to the Japanese "in order to return it to China." 8 days were given for a response. The Japanese government stated in this peculiar document that this "friendly offer" was being made solely for the purpose of strengthening peace in East Asia, and Japan was not pursuing the goals of territorial expansion.

The German government did not respond to this ultimatum. Then, on August 23, 1914, Japan declared war on Germany. Starting hostilities, she captured Qiao-Chao, the Qingdao railway, Jinan-fu, as well as a number of German-owned islands on pacific ocean. These seizures caused great displeasure not only in the United States, but also among the Japanese ally - Britain. Especially strong was the indignation of the dominions - Australia and New Zealand.

From the very beginning, British diplomacy was suspicious of Japan's unexpected readiness to fulfill its allied obligations. It was clear to British diplomacy that Japan was using the war in Europe only to strengthen its imperialist positions in the Far East.

The British were not wrong. The main task of Japan after the capture of the German colonies was the use of the European war for expansion in China. After the capture of Kiao-Chao and the islands, Japan actually did not take any further part in the war against Germany, except for the supply of ammunition and military equipment to Russia. At the same time, any obsolete rubbish was imposed on modern weapons as a forced assortment of Russia.

Nevertheless, Russian diplomacy welcomed Japan's accession to the Entente: this gave some additional guarantees against Japanese attack to the Far Eastern possessions of Russia.

Turkey performance

In the very first days of the war, the opposing sides of the Speech began a struggle to draw Turkey into it. Because of the influence on this country, as you know, a fierce competition has long been going on between the Entente and the Austro-German bloc. The Young Turk government leaned towards the German orientation. However, Turkey's financial and economic dependence on the Entente was still very high. In addition, it was not difficult to see that German diplomacy, only for the purpose of camouflage, assured that it was striving to preserve the territorial integrity of Turkey. According to the German Foreign Minister Jagow, this was to continue only until "until we have fortified ourselves in our zones and are ready for annexations."

Turkey in 1914 could not expect anything good from the victory of either of the warring parties. The Entente threatened to dismember it, Germany - to turn it into its vassal. The Young Turks' own predatory pan-Turkic desires spread to Russian and English territories. The Young Turks decided to make an alliance with Germany. However, the decision was made not without hesitation and not without a struggle. In the Young Turkish triumvirate, Enver and Talaat were Germanophiles, but Dzhemal was considered an adherent of the Entente. In the end, on July 22, 1914, Minister of War Enver Pasha, without the knowledge of most of the members of the government, told the German ambassador about Turkey's intention to enter into an alliance with Germany.

Ambassador Wangenheim had doubts about the advisability of such an alliance. He reported this by telegraph to Berlin. But the Kaiser decided otherwise. On the margin of his ambassador's telegram, he wrote: “Theoretically true, but at the moment inappropriate. Now it's a matter of getting every rifle that can shoot at the Slavs in the Balkans on the side of Austria-Hungary. Therefore, we must agree to a Turkish-Bulgarian alliance with Austria-Hungary joining it ... This is still better than, for theoretical reasons, pushing Turkey to the side of the Entente.

On August 2, 1914, a German-Turkish alliance treaty was signed. Its essence boiled down to the following. If Russia interferes in the Austro-Serbian conflict and Germany takes the side of Austria, Turkey is also obliged to declare war on Russia. The treaty placed the Turkish army at the complete disposal of Germany. This was provided for in Article 3 of the treaty: “In the event of war, the German military mission will remain at the disposal of the Ottoman government. The Ottoman government will ensure the exercise of the real influence and the real power of this mission in the operations of the Turkish army."

Nevertheless, the day after the signing of the treaty with Germany, the Turkish government published a declaration of its neutrality. This act was explained by the fact that Turkey was not militarily prepared. “We declared ourselves neutral only in order to gain time: we were waiting for the moment when our mobilization was over and we could take part in the war,” Jemal Pasha later wrote about the true intentions of the Young Turkish leaders.

It is characteristic of the mores of the Young Turk diplomacy that, having signed an alliance with Germany, the same Enver negotiated with the Russian ambassador and with a military agent, General Leontiev, offering them to conclude an alliance against Germany. Enver told Leontiev that Turkey had the most friendly feelings towards Russia. It is said that it is not connected with Germany by any alliance treaty and, moreover, is ready to place its army at the full disposal of Russia and direct it against any enemy on instructions from St. Petersburg. For this, Enver demanded the return of the Aegean Islands and part of Bulgarian Thrace to Turkey. Sazonov was very suspicious of Enver's proposal. He did not trust the sincerity of the Young Turks and was afraid to push the Bulgarians into the arms of Germany. Later it turned out that, in offering Russia an alliance, Enver resorted to the most primitive deception. In fact, he was only waiting for the arrival of German warships that had broken through to the straits. According to the plan of the Germans and Turks, these ships were supposed to change the balance of power in the Black Sea and threaten the South Russian coast. August 10 "Goeben" and "Breslau" entered the Dardanelles.

The Turkish government made a fictitious purchase of these ships. The Entente protested, but not too vigorously, for they were afraid to accelerate the break with Turkey. Russia's military preparations on the Caucasian frontier required a certain amount of time. The position of British diplomacy was also influenced by the need to reckon with the Indian Muslims, who honored their Caliph in the person of the Sultan. Therefore, it was important for British diplomacy that the initiative to break with Turkey did not come from England. Turkey did not pay attention to the protests of the Entente. To the demand to expel the German officers, the grand vizier thoughtfully replied that we still had to "consider the method of their expulsion - whether we narrow it down or on a neutral ship." The German officers remained in Turkey. With the advent of "Goeben" and "Breslau", not only the Turkish army, but also the fleet was under the command of the Germans.

In order to delay, and perhaps even prevent the intervention of Turkey, Sazonov suggested that the Allied Powers guarantee her territorial integrity. In addition, he planned to return the island of Lemnos to Turkey. He took into account that without significant territorial acquisitions, Turkey would not agree to an agreement with the Entente. This proposal ran into resistance from British diplomacy. Valuing relations with Greece, Gray refused to hand over Lemnos to the Turks. But the guarantee of territorial integrity was offered to Turkey, however, only in case of assassination attempts during the current war. However, this was not enough for the Entente to reach an agreement with the Constantinople government.

At the beginning of September 1914 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs received from intelligence reliable information about the true position of Turkey. From these data, the real nature of Turkish-German relations finally became clear to the Entente.

• On September 1, 1914, the Turkish government informed all the powers that it had decided to abolish the regime of capitulations from October 1, 1914. Turkey's attempt to free itself from imperialist bondage led to a peculiar diplomatic result. The ambassadors of all powers immediately handed over identical notes to the Turkish government protesting against the "arbitrary cancellation of capitulations." The fear of losing imperialist privileges in Turkey without appropriate compensation united even the most cruel enemies against it.

After the presentation of these notes, German diplomacy began to convince the Turks that for; The best thing for them is to fulfill allied obligations as soon as possible and. start a war. Then, in relation to: the countries of the Entente, the question of capitulations will disappear by itself; Turkey will always be able to reach an agreement with the powers of the Triple Alliance. For its part, the diplomacy of the Entente did not refuse to discuss the issue of capitulations: if only Turkey promised to remain neutral. Negotiations for surrender continued throughout September.

After the defeat of the Germans, it became obvious on the Marne that the war would drag on. This made the job of recruiting allies even more intense. In October, Germany provided a loan to Turkey. At the same time, it was agreed that Turkey would enter the war immediately after receiving part of this money. The Entente found out all this through the Russian government, whose intelligence managed to obtain the relevant reliable data.

But many members of the Turkish government are still not free from the fear of war. Among them was the grand vizier himself. The defeat of Germany on the Marne and the successes of the Russian troops in Galicia further increased their fears. In view of this, Enver, in accordance with German command", decided to put his country before a fait accompli. On October 29 and 30, 1914, the Turkish fleet under the command of the German Admiral Souchon fired at Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk. On the same day, October 29, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople received an order to request his passports.

The Turkish government was frightened by the provocative actions of Enver and Souchon. The grand vizier threatened to resign. He was hardly persuaded to stay in order to avoid an international scandal. On November 1, on behalf of the vizier, the Turkish envoy Fakhreddin appeared to Sazonov. The minister greeted him with the words: "I was going to send you your passports." “And I bring you peace,” the Turk declared in an ingratiating tone. He read Sazonov's telegram from the grand vizier, in which he expressed his regret about what had happened. Sazonov replied that the first condition for the restoration of peace should be the immediate expulsion from Turkey of all German officers. The Grand Vizier could no longer fulfill this requirement, even if he wanted to. Entente ambassadors left Constantinople. On November 2, 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey. England and France followed on 5 and 6 November. Thus the German imperialists and their agent Enver Pasha plunged the Turkish people into a disastrous adventure.

The performance of Turkey diverted part of the forces of Russia and England from the German fronts. Another consequence of Turkey's involvement.

in the war was the closure of the straits for merchant ships. This interrupted the maritime connection between Russia and its allies through the Black and mediterranean sea. The German fleet dominated the Baltic. Apart from the long road to Vladivostok with its insignificant capacity, communication with England and France could be maintained only through Arkhangelsk. The road to Murmansk did not yet exist. The routes through Romania, Serbia and Greece were very unreliable even in the first period of the war. At the end of 1915, this connection was completely interrupted by the Austro-German offensive against Serbia.

Italian performance

The struggle to attract allies spread to Italy. From the very beginning, the Italian government doubted which side victory would fall on. Meanwhile, the "jackal", as Bismarck once called Italy, always tried to follow that of the large predators, from whom one could rather profit from a piece of prey. In view of this, Italy was in no hurry to fulfill its allied obligations. On August 3, 1914, the Italian king informed Wilhelm II that, from the Italian point of view, the outbreak of this war did not fit the wording of casus foederis in the text of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. The king went on. He made a menacing allusion, noting that there are people in Italy who are inclined to start a war against Austria. On the margins of the king's dispatch, Wilhelm, in his own handwritten note, called his crowned brother a "scoundrel." On the same day, 3 August, the Italian government issued a declaration of neutrality. However, the Italian foreign minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, immediately confided to the German ambassador that if Italy were sufficiently rewarded, she would be ready to "explore ways to support her allies." The next day, August 4, the Italian government informed Sazonov just as confidentially about the position he had taken in relation to the Central Powers. At the same time, Sazonov testifies, he was told that "due to the small hope of getting what they want from Germany and Austria, Italy could enter into an exchange of opinions with us on the indicated ground."

The Italian government, therefore, did not limit itself to blackmailing the Central Powers. It entered into negotiations with the Entente, figuring out how much she would give her for declaring war on Germany and Austria. A long haul began. Already in August, the Entente governments offered the Italians Trentino, Trieste and Valona. It was easier for the Entente to raise the price: Italy's claims primarily extended to Austrian territories, to Albania and Turkey, that is, to countries that did not belong to the Entente. The position of Germany was more difficult: for Italy, the most valuable acquisitions would be precisely the Austrian possessions, the cession of which, of course, ran into resistance from the allied Austro-Hungarian government. Germany could, on the other hand, generously distribute land in North Africa at the expense of France. In addition, she promised Italy Nice, Corsica and Savoy. While all these negotiations were going on, the Italian "jackal" did not doze off. In October 1914, without wasting time, Italy captured the island of Saseno, located at the entrance to the Gulf of Valona. In December, she occupied Valona.

Prime Minister Salandra gave a kind of political and even "moral" justification for the principles of Italian diplomacy. In September 1914, he publicly declared that the Italian government had eliminated from its policy "every concern, every prejudice, every feeling that was not inspired solely by one boundless devotion to the motherland, Italian sacred egoism." Bülow, in his memoirs, described the essence of Salandra's politics in a slightly different and less exalted style. “He just wants to earn something for his country in the big world turmoil,” the German diplomat said laconically.

In view of its naval dependence on the Entente, Italy prudently refrained from going to war on the side of the Central Powers. For her, it was about whether to remain neutral, or to fight on the side of the Entente against their allies. This issue was decided by the Italians, depending on who gives more and who has more chances to win.

The advance of the Germans through Belgium in August 1914 maintained in Italy a propensity for neutrality and for negotiations with Germany. The Battle of the Marne and the suspension of the German offensive changed the situation, and Italy's negotiations with the Entente revived. The Salandra government, pursuing its "no prejudice" policy, demanded that the Entente raise the price. Serbia caused great difficulties for the Entente, which opposed the satisfaction of Italian claims to the Dalmatian coast, inhabited mainly by Slavs. However, Austria did not show any compliance. Salandra began to threaten his allies that "public opinion" would force him to take the side of the Entente. As a result, the German government increased its pressure on Vienna. In December, Prince Bülow, who had once been ambassador to Italy and had great connections there, was sent to Rome on a special mission. In his memoirs, Bülow tells about the negotiations that he led in the Italian capital. “On the day of my arrival in Rome,” he writes, “I visited the Foreign Minister, Sidney Sonnino, at the Copsult. This magnificent palace then housed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When I entered the Minister's reception room, I found myself there face to face with three Entente ambassadors: Barrer, Sir Rennel Rodd and Krupensky. Their attitude towards me was characteristic of the spirit of their peoples. The good Krupensky rushed to me and began to assure me that his personal feeling of friendship for me had not changed in the least. The intelligent and refined Rodd held out his hand to me and said in English: “I shake your hand and ask you to convey my best wishes to Princess Bülow.” Of all three ambassadors of the Entente, Camille Barrère was my oldest friend. But when he saw me, he, with the acting talent inherent in all the French, looked at me with horror, then covered his eyes with his hands and turned away. Further, Bülow sets out the essence of his conversation with Sonnino. “From the very beginning, Sonnino clearly and frankly set out to me his view of the situation. The Entente offers Italy as a military reward all the Austrian regions inhabited by Italians. In order to avoid a military clash between Italy and the Habsburg Monarchy, Austria must also, for its part, offer concessions in a concrete, binding form. These concessions must be offered in a decent manner. They must not be thrown to Italy as a sop to an annoying beggar. And above all, this must be done as soon as possible. A minimum of such concessions would be provided by Trentino.

The Vatican helped the Central Powers. In order to establish, perhaps closer contact with the Vatican, in addition to Bülow, the leader of the Catholic Center Party, Reichstag deputy Erzberger, was sent to Rome. “Benedict XV,” writes Bülow, “ardently supported my efforts to preserve peace. He desired the preservation of the Habsburg Empire, that last Catholic great power. He clearly realized that the war could be avoided only on the condition that Austria no longer hesitate to sacrifice at least Trentino ... The Pope instructed the Viennese Archbishop Cardinal Piffl to talk in this sense with the old Emperor Franz Joseph. But the eighty-four-year-old emperor did not even let the cardinal speak out when he modestly and timidly began to fulfill the desire of the holy father. A flush of anger flooded his old face. He took the cardinal by the hand and literally pushed him out the door.

Without stopping negotiations in Vienna, the Italian government at the beginning of March 1915 intensified its bargaining with the Entente. In addition to Trentino, Trieste, Valona, ​​the island of Saseno, the Dalmatian coast with its islands, colonial concessions in Africa and its other previous claims, Italy also demanded the formation of an autonomous principality from central Albania with its capital in Durazzo, clearly hoping to make the greatly reduced and weakened Albania. Northern Albania was to be divided between Serbia and Montenegro, southern Albania went to Greece, Valona with the district - to Italy itself; in addition, she claimed a loan in London in the amount of 50 million pounds. Finally, Italy insisted on concluding a military convention: in Rome they wanted to have a guarantee that Russia would not relax its pressure on the Galician front, and that the Anglo-French fleet would help in the fight against the Austrian fleet.

England and France were ready to promise all this. However, out of attention to Serbia, Russia protested against the transfer of territories inhabited by southern Slavs to Italy.

Italy received a new means of putting pressure on the Entente. On March 8, 1915, in Veno, at the crown council, it was finally decided to provide compensation to Italy. A dispute began between Italy and the Central Powers about exactly how much Italy should receive and when the transfer of the ceded territories should take place: immediately or at the end of the war.

Under pressure from England and France, Russia also made concessions: it agreed to give the Italians a significant part of Dalmatia. Thus, the Entente satisfied almost all the claims of Italy. Now the "jackal" could make his choice. On April 26, 1915, an agreement was finally signed in London. Italy pledged to start a war against her former allies in a month. For this, England provided her with a loan of 50 million pounds.

On May 3, the Italian government terminated the Triple Alliance. Then Bulow went on the most decisive diplomatic move.

“May 9,” he narrates in his memoirs, “I forced the imperial and royal ambassador, Baron Macchio, to my villa Malta, where I invited him for negotiations, to write a statement under my dictation, which was supposed to be secret on the same day sent to the Italian government in order and in which it was said that Austria-Hungary was ready to cede the part of Tyrol inhabited by Italians, as well as Gradisca and the western coast of the Isonzo, where there is a purely Italian population; Trieste is to become an imperial free-city with an Italian university and an Italian municipality; Austria recognizes Italian sovereignty over Valona and declares its political disinterest in Albania.

I had to apply strong pressure to force the timid Macchio to take the step that, back in January, could have had the desired consequences.

Having stocked up on such a document, Bülow immediately informed the head of the Italian "neutralists" Giolitti and their other leaders about it. Giolitti urgently arrived in Rome. Immediately upon his arrival, 320 deputies out of 508, that is, the majority, defiantly brought him business cards. Relying on the majority in Parliament, Giolitti told the king and Salandra that he did not agree with the policy outlined in the London Treaty of 26 April. Salandra resigned. The German case seemed to have been won. Now this moment, extreme chauvinists, supporters of the war, led by the former socialist renegade Mussolini, who was supported by the French, and d'Annunzio, behind whom there were powerful capitalist interests, organized demonstrations against the Parliament and the "neutralists" that prevailed in it. The king did not accept Salandra resigned.

The Italian imperialists covered up the predatory aims of their war with pompous rhetoric. In fact, Italy remained the same international "jackal". “Revolutionary-democratic Italy, that is, revolutionary-bourgeois Italy, which overthrew the yoke of Austria, the Italy of the time of Garibaldi, is definitively turning before our eyes into an Italy oppressing other peoples, plundering Turkey and Austria, into an Italy of a rude, disgustingly reactionary, dirty bourgeoisie, who is salivating with pleasure that she was also allowed to share the booty, ”wrote Lenin.

Relations between the Entente powers

The struggle to recruit new allies was complicated by rivalry between the main members of the warring factions. In the camp of the Central Powers, Germany enjoyed unquestioned hegemony. This simplified their inter-allied relations. However, there were significant frictions among them as well. This was revealed, among other things, by the Austro-German negotiations regarding the compensation of Italy. Even more internal conflicts arose in the Entente camp. Disputes over the provision of South Slavic regions to Italy were an example of the complications caused by the division of the booty that had not yet been received. Disagreements arose between the allies very early on questions of the strategic plan for the war. England and France considered the Western Front to be the main front. They assigned the most ungrateful role to the Russian army. She was supposed to draw the enemy forces onto herself at those moments when the considerations of the Anglo-French command required it. Indeed, the Russian advance into East Prussia saved Paris and ensured the French success on the Marne. But for Russia it cost the greatest sacrifices. The heavy role that the Western allies imposed on Russia was a consequence of the dependence of Russian tsarism on Anglo-French capital. During the war, this dependence increased even more. War 1914 - 1918 presented huge, previously unprecedented demands on the industry. backward economy tsarist Russia failed to meet these requirements. In the summer of 1915, this led to the retreat of the Russian army, which was left without shells. Russia had to turn to England and France. Requests to send ammunition and weapons flew from St. Petersburg and from the Russian headquarters to Paris and London. The Entente sent some military materials, but they did it slowly and sparingly. Diplomatic negotiations on the unification of the military efforts of the allies on both main fronts were no less slow moving forward. The Russian command responded to the needs of the Western Front. If Russian operations in East Prussia in 1914 helped win the Battle of the Marne, then in 1916 Brusilov's brilliant offensive helped save Verdun and stabilize the Italian front. But England and France did not show due promptness.

In 1915, the German command tried to shift the main blow to the Eastern Front. The result of this was the retreat of the well-fought but poorly supplied Russian army. Yet Russia has not been out of order. The tactical success achieved by Germany did not create a turning point in the course of the war. The chief of the German General Staff, General Falkenhayn himself, was afraid to continue the offensive deep into Russia. He believed that an attack on Moscow would lead the German army "into the boundless region."

By bearing the brunt of the German hordes in the 1915 campaign, Russia provided England and France with time to deploy their forces and resources. Thanks to this, by 1916 the Germans had already lost the advantages they had when starting the war.

But for their part, England and France hardly lifted a finger in order to alleviate the position of the Russian army in the summer of 1915. The Western Allies did not find it possible to launch a major offensive on the French front. And when, with a great delay, the French offensive finally began in Champagne, it turned out to be scanty in scale. Endless delays in diplomatic negotiations between the Entente countries on the coordination of fronts contributed to the prolongation of the war. At the headquarters of the French commander-in-chief in Chantilly during 1915 - 1916. a series of inter-allied military conferences took place. Here decisions were made on a simultaneous offensive in 1916 on all fronts against Germany and Austria-Hungary. However, these decisions were implemented belatedly, disorganized and incomplete. Meanwhile, already in 1916, the Entente was not only numerically, but also technically stronger than Germany. But the inconsistency of the actions of the allies helped the Germans hold out for another two years. Here is what Lloyd George writes about this in his memoirs: “I came to the conclusion that we could have achieved victory already in 1916 or, at the latest, in 1917, if the strategic leadership of military operations had shown more imagination, common sense and solidarity."

A lot of space in inter-allied politics was occupied by questions of financing the war. In the early stages of the war, English capital became the main creditor of all the Entente countries. Italy's performance was bought for cash with a loan of 50 million pounds. London provided loans and credits to St. Petersburg, largely replacing Paris in this matter. He also lent money to France, especially during the second period of the war. But London itself was soon forced to resort to the help of New York. Gradually, as the war dragged on, the following Entente financing scheme developed: New York - London - the rest of the Entente.

After a positional war was established in the west, both camps began searching for the enemy's most vulnerable sector, a strike on which would speed up the victory. Although the French and British command considered the Western Front to be decisive, there were also supporters in the Entente camp of shifting the main blow to the Middle East; from there, in their opinion, it was possible to hit Germany more accurately. This group of "Easterners" in France belonged to Generals Gallieni and Franchet d "Espere, in England - Kitchener, Churchill, Lloyd George.

This strategic question was the subject of negotiations between the British and French governments. On January 3, 1915, it was decided to start operations against the Dardanelles. The "Westerners" - Joffre, French, Millerand - fought for every division withdrawn from the Western Front. The Dardanelles operation was launched with insufficient forces and failed. This became apparent already in the spring of 1915.

However, before its failure, the Dardanelles operation managed to give impetus to the completion of inter-allied negotiations on the fate of the straits.

Conquest plans of the Entente powers

Negotiations on the division of future booty began in the camp of the Entente soon after the start of the war. On September 5, 1914, an agreement was concluded between Russia, England and France, according to which they mutually undertook:

• not to conclude a separate peace in the ongoing war;

• "when the time comes to discuss the terms of peace, none of the allies will lay down peace terms without prior agreement with each of the other allies."

On September 14, 1914, Sazonov outlined to Ambassadors Paleologus and Buchanan the main milestones of the future world. This program assumed the defeat of the German Empire and its allies. Its content was as follows: 1. Accession to Russia of the lower reaches of the Neman, Eastern Galicia, the transition of Poznan, Silesia and Western Galicia to the future Poland. 2. The return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the transfer to her "at her discretion" of the Rhineland and the Palatinate. 3. A significant increase in Belgium at the expense of German territories. 4. Return of Denmark Schleswig and Holstein. 5. Restoration of the Hanoverian kingdom. 6. The transformation of Austria-Hungary into a triune monarchy, consisting of Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary. 7. Transfer of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia and northern Albania to Serbia. 8. The reward of Bulgaria at the expense of Serbian Macedonia and the annexation of southern Albania to Greece. 9. Transfer of Valona to Italy. 10. Partition of the German colonies between England, France and Japan. 11. Payment of military indemnity. On September 26, Sazonov put forward additional demands from Russia in relation to Turkey: Russia should receive a guarantee of the free passage of its warships through the straits. Russia did not present any claims to the seizure of Turkish territory.

The question of dividing Turkey was first raised by British diplomacy. Responding to Sazonov's suggestion, Gray opined that if Turkey were to join Germany, "it would have to cease to exist."

In general, Gray accepted Sazonov's offer. But he called for the inclusion in the future "peace" program of demands for the extradition of the German fleet and the neutralization of the Kiel Canal. He also insisted on taking into account the territorial interests of Italy and Romania. Finally, Gray objected to the transfer of the Rhineland to France. Thus, from the very first months of the war, Anglo-French contradictions emerged, which subsequently developed so widely at the peace conference in 1919. Obviously, under pressure from British diplomacy, the French government was forced to declare that its territorial demands in Europe were limited to Alsace and Lorraine.

Because of the division of the Turkish inheritance, already in 1914 a diplomatic struggle unfolded between the allies. On November 9, in a conversation with Benckendorff, Gray tried to convince him that the Russian government should not use Persian territory for military operations against Turkey. At the same time, Gray developed the favorite motives of both Western allies: Russia should not divert forces from the German front. The fight against Germany will also determine the outcome of the war against Turkey. For greater persuasiveness, Gray added that if Germany was defeated, then the fate of Constantinople and the straits would be decided in accordance with the interests of Russia. Such promises testified that the activity of the Russian army, despite the Marne, was extremely necessary for the Western Front. Soon the words of Gray were repeated by Benckendorff and the king. George V was even more specific: he explicitly stated that Constantinople "must be yours." But in the official English note of November 14, addressed to the Russian government, the main motive came to the fore: it was necessary to send maximum forces to the German front, and to limit ourselves to defense on the Turkish front. To this was added the assurance that the question of the straits and Constantinople "should be resolved in agreement with Russia." Thus, on paper, Gray spoke less clearly than in oral conversations.

On February 25, 1915, the forts located at the mouth of the Dardanelles were silenced by the fire of the Anglo-French ships. Believing that the Dardanelles operation would be crowned with complete success, the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos told the envoys of the Entente that Greece intended to enter the war against Germany and its allies and send to the straits landing troops and fleet. The tsarist government was alarmed that Constantinople would not be handed over to the Greeks. Therefore, it categorically opposed their participation in the Dardanelles expedition. This "danger" disappeared, because King Constantine, who was a supporter of neutrality, on March 6 forced Venizelos to resign. Greece remained neutral.

The success of the Dardanelles operation threatened to transfer the straits to the actual disposal of England and France. Both of them, meanwhile, did not show much desire to seal their obligations with a formal agreement regarding the fate of the straits and the Turkish capital. The French were no more hasty than the British. On March 4, 1915, Sazonov demanded formal commitments from the allies. He intimidated them by stating that if the Allies continued their objections to the passage of the straits to Russia, he would be forced to resign. It is possible that he will be replaced by a person who adheres to the "old system of the Three Emperors Union".

On March 12, 1915, by an official note, England undertook to give Russia the city of Constantinople with a small hinterland, including the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of ​​Marmara, the Gallipoli Peninsula and southern Thrace along the Enos-Medes line. Further, Russia was to receive the eastern coast of the Bosporus to the Ismid Gulf, the islands of the Sea of ​​Marmara and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. Russia received all this at the end of the war, and only if England and France carried out their plans in Asian Turkey and in other areas. The British demanded in particular the annexation of the neutral zone of Persia to the sphere of British influence. The Russian government agreed, basically accepting these conditions. On April 10, France also agreed with the terms of the Anglo-Russian deal.

Germany's conquest plans

Germany's plans of conquest in their scope far exceeded those of the Entente. Germany demanded a radical redistribution of the world. Two German documents were especially sensational: a memorandum of six powerful economic organizations (the Central Union of German Industrialists, the Industrialists' Union, the Junker-Kulak Union of Farmers, etc.) and the so-called professorial memorandum. The memorandum of six economic organizations demanded the acquisition of extensive colonial possessions by seizing British, French, Belgian and other colonies; imposition of reparation payments on the Entente; a protectorate over Belgium annexing the French coast of the Channel to the Somme; the capture of the Briey iron ore basin, the fortresses of Verdun and Belfort and the western slopes of the Vosges located between them. Further, it was recommended to confiscate all medium and large land ownership in the annexed areas and transfer it into the hands of the Germans with the compensation of the owners at the expense of France. Extensive annexations were also envisaged in the East, at the expense of Russia: after the war, the authors of the note dreamed, an industrial boom "would require an expansion of the agricultural base." It was planned to seize the Russian Baltic provinces and "territories located to the south of them."

As early as the end of October 1914, the Prussian Minister of the Interior von Löbel submitted a note to the government on the aims of the war. It developed the following ideas:

“We need a border in the west, which would give us, if possible, the key to France. We can use the areas of coal and ore adjacent directly to our border. From a military point of view, it is also desirable to improve the East Prussian frontier. Finally, we need a military indemnity that would bind France economically for a long time and would deprive her of the opportunity to develop financial activities in other parts of the world to our detriment.

This means that the satisfaction of our needs must come first of all at the expense of France, that a fundamental change in the position of Belgium is necessary. To ensure this, it is necessary to achieve at least major partial successes in the struggle against England ...

Politically, Britain has now become the enemy that has opposed its vital interests to ours and with which we must end sooner or later: England does not want to tolerate a strong, capable Germany playing a role in world politics next to her.

As for the claims of Austro-Hungarian imperialism, it demanded the establishment of its rule over all the Balkans.

The predatory nature of the war on the part of German imperialism was exposed by VI Lenin. “When the German bourgeoisie refers to the defense of the homeland, to the struggle against tsarism, to upholding the freedom of cultural and national development, they are lying ...,” he pointed out, “for in fact the Austrian bourgeoisie undertook a predatory campaign against Serbia, the German one oppresses the Danes, Poles and French (in Alsace-Lorraine), waging an offensive war against Belgium and France for the sake of plundering richer and freer countries, organizing an offensive at a time that seemed more convenient for them to use their latest improvements in military technology, and on the eve of the so-called big military program Russia".

Bulgarian performance

Simultaneously with the struggle for the political orientation of Turkey and Italy, the struggle for the Balkans unfolded. Here Bulgaria was of the greatest importance. First, of all the Balkan countries, it had the most powerful army. Secondly, with its central position, it could serve as a springboard from which it was possible to strike from the rear against Serbia and Romania, as well as against Greece. The intervention of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers would create an extremely difficult situation for Serbia and, it seemed, would deprive Romania of the opportunity to join the Entente. On the contrary, it could be expected that the accession of Bulgaria to the Entente would have prompted Rumania and Greece to follow it.

So, Bulgaria in the conditions of the war of 1914 turned out to be the key to the entire Balkan bridgehead. Therefore, from the very first days of the war, Sazonov paid exceptional attention to attracting Bulgaria; he saw in this a decisive step towards the restoration of the Balkan bloc, destroyed by the second Balkan war. This could be achieved in only one way: to force Serbia and Greece to cede to Bulgaria the areas taken from it in 1913. Since August 1914, Sazonov persistently advised the Serbian and Greek governments to make concessions to Bulgaria. In Greece, these councils were completely hopeless: they only strengthened the position of the Germanophile-neutralists, headed by the king himself. The Anantophiles, led by Venizelos, were inclined to go to war, but, of course, not in order to pay for it themselves with the cession of Greek territory. It is not surprising that England, which highly valued the maintenance of close ties with Greece, did not at all approve of Sazonov's policy and even opposed it.

Sazonov had more chances in Belgrade. Serbia was at war, its position compared to neutral Greece was much more cramped. Pasic agreed to give part of Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria if the war ended with the victory of the Entente and Serbia received its South Slavic regions from Austria. Of course, it was difficult to seduce Bulgaria with such an uncertain prospect; to join the Entente, she needed something more tangible. But besides Macedonia, the allies could only promise Bulgaria the Enos-Medes line at the expense of Turkey. This promise could be fulfilled again only after the victory. However, the Bulgarian Prime Minister Radoslavov made it clear that only the immediate transfer of Macedonia could induce Bulgaria to take the side of the Entente. To this, the Serbs replied that the Serbian government would rather "prefer to leave all of Serbia to the Austrians than to cede a piece of Macedonia to the Bulgarians." The regent, Prince Alexander, even threatened a separate peace with Austria, referring to the plight of the Serbian army. He demanded military assistance and insisted that Russia stop seeking a reward "for the traitor of Slavic solidarity." Thus, the negotiations did not lead to any results.

The positions of the Central Powers were incomparably stronger in Sofia. They were helped by the fact that the main territorial claims of Bulgaria extended to the ally of the Entente - Serbia.

However, Bulgaria had not yet had time to prepare for war. As long as it remained neutral, without definitively joining the Central Powers, the Entente managed to bribe part of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie. This was achieved, among other things, by organizing the purchase of raw materials and other products of the Bulgarian national economy through a special joint stock company set up by British, French and Russian banks. The Bulgarian bourgeoisie, officials and ministers" received about 200 million francs in gold. In the summer of 1915, the negotiations between the Entente and Bulgaria were still ongoing.

Germany and her allies promised Bulgaria all of Macedonia and part of Old Serbia. In the event of Romania joining the Entente, Bulgaria was promised, in addition, to transfer not only the southern Dobruja, but also the northern part of this region.

The change in the military situation finally decided the outcome of the struggle for Bulgaria. The failure of the Dardanelles expedition was followed by the retreat of the Russian army, which left Galicia, Russian Poland, Lithuania, and part of Belarus. Then began the concentration of German troops against Serbia. The military successes of Germany overcame the Bulgarians' fear of the Entente. Bulgaria took a seductive, albeit dangerous, risk. On September 3, a Turkish-Bulgarian agreement was signed, and on September 6, an alliance treaty between Bulgaria, Germany and Austria. Thus the Quadruple Alliance was created.

Elections to the Greek Parliament in August 1915 brought Venizelos back to power. When in September the immediate threat of a Bulgarian attack on Serbia loomed, he told the envoys of the Entente that he was ready to fulfill the obligations of Greece, stipulated by the Greco-Serbian Union Treaty of 1913, but on the condition that the Allies come to Greece's aid and land a 150,000-strong army in Thessaloniki . The British and French governments accepted Venizelos' proposal. It was decided to send troops from the Gallipoli peninsula to Thessaloniki. However, the French government, with great difficulty, obtained from the commander-in-chief Joffre an order to send 64 thousand people to Thessaloniki, including those evacuated from Gallipoli. The British promised the same. Before the 150 thousand requested by Venizelos, 22 thousand were not enough. While these negotiations were going on, King Constantine dismissed Venizelos and confirmed the preservation of neutrality. In Thessaloniki, the Allies managed to land only a relatively small detachment. This slowness of England and France contributed a lot to the fact that on the night of October 13-14, Bulgaria attacked Serbia, opening hostilities. At the same time, the Austro-German forces operating on the Balkan front launched an offensive against Serbia from the north. At the end of October, there were only 80,000 allied troops in Thessaloniki. These forces failed to prevent the defeat of Serbia and the establishment of a territorial connection between Germany and Turkey.

Romanian speech

From the very beginning of the war, there was a diplomatic struggle in Bucharest similar to that fought in Constantinople, Rome, Sofia and Athens. Both warring factions tried to win over Romania to their side, offering her various baits at the expense of their enemies. The Union Treaty of 1883, which linked Romania with the Triple Alliance, by the beginning of the war had lost almost all real significance. It was shattered by the Romanian-Hungarian struggle in Transylvania and the Romanian claims to this area of ​​Hungary. Attempts by both Vienna and Berlin to influence Budapest in order to obtain concessions from the Hungarians to the Transylvanian Romanians met with little success. However, German diplomacy, from the very days of the July crisis of 1914, tried to help the cause by bribing Romania with a promise to give her Bessarabia. The answer of the Romanian Prime Minister Bratianu said that Bessarabia could be taken by Romania only in one case - if Russia was seriously defeated, so that Austria would also seize Russian lands. In this case, Romania could count on Austria-Hungary and Germany to guard the Romanian seizures as well. In Bucharest, they knew that the population of Bessarabia would be hostile to the Romanian invaders, and Russia would never come to terms with the loss of this territory. Simultaneously with Germany, Russia began to seduce Romania: she offered her Transylvania. But the Romanian government preferred to wait for the further course of military events. Refraining for the time being from entering the war, it decided for the near future to be satisfied with the most advantageous sale of its neutrality. Bratianu sought to obtain Bessarabia from Russia itself as a price for this neutrality. He met with support in Paris and London. Russia's allies found it quite natural to pay Romania at the Russian expense. However, the Russian government rejected these harassments. Bratian had more success, asking the Entente for compensation at the expense of Austria-Hungary. On October 1, 1914, a Russian-Romanian agreement was concluded, according to which Russia guaranteed the territorial integrity of Romania and recognized its right to Austro-Hungarian territories with a Romanian population. Rumania could take these territories "at a moment that she considers convenient", In other words, she could remain neutral until the victory of Russian weapons would bring her easy prey. The Romanian government succeeded in securing a loan on the London market; this, too, was the price of neutrality. It is typical for the Romanian diplomat that Germany also had to pay Romania: both for neutrality and for the passage of equipment to Turkey.

In the spring of 1915, the Romanians demanded from the Entente the recognition of their claims to the Austro-Hungarian territories up to the Prut and Tisza. Russia and Serbia did not agree to give the Ukrainian and Serbian regions to the Romanians. Just at this time, the Russian command asked the Western allies to divert German forces from the east by launching an offensive on the Western Front. In response, England and France advised Russia to obtain military assistance to Romania. To do this, they strongly recommended to meet her halfway. The tsarist government was forced to agree. But while the Russian-Romanian negotiations were going on, the retreat of the Russian army prompted Bratiana to once again evade participation in the war. He demanded the resumption of the Russian offensive in Galicia and Bukovina. However, in the summer and autumn of 1915, the Russian army could not even think about it.

With the turn of military happiness, the position of the Romanian government changed again. The failure of the Germans at Verdun and the grandiose offensive of Brusilov raised the chances of the Entente in 1916.

On August 17, 1916, an agreement was signed between Romania and the four powers of the Entente. Romania took the obligation to declare war on Austria-Hungary. For this, she was promised Transylvania, part of Bukovina and Banat. On August 28, Romania declared war on Austria. But already on October 10, representatives of the Romanian king arrived at the Russian headquarters, literally praying for help. Russia had to take over the Romanian front. But the allied Thessaloniki army did not move without providing any assistance to the Romanians. Thus, the opinion of the Russian high command that Romania's participation in the war would bring only damage to Russia was fully justified.

Education Narkomindel

On the night of November 9 (October 27), 1917, the II All-Russian Congress of Soviets created the Council of People's Commissars. A victorious uprising had just ended in Petrograd; echoes of the recent battle were still heard in the city, but the workers' and peasants' government had already begun its activities. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs also began to work. The new government immediately met with sharp resistance from the old world: on the day the Council of People's Commissars was formed, the enemies of the Soviet government called on all officials of the old apparatus of power to sabotage. When representatives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs came to the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they found only couriers there. Officials, having previously stolen the ciphers, fled from the ministry. The building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Palace Square was occupied by the Red Guards. They guarded the entrances to the armored rooms, where secret treaties, copies of dispatches and other documents were kept in fireproof cabinets. It was with difficulty that we managed to gather some employees of the ministry. Petryaev, a former comrade of the foreign minister, said that employees and officials of the ministry do not recognize the new government and do not want to work with it. They only agree to protect the ministry and conduct current affairs - about prisoners of war, about transferring money abroad, etc.

The counter-revolutionaries hoped that the Bolsheviks, having stumbled upon the sabotage of officials, would fail. The leader of the Mensheviks, Tsereteli, cynically declared to the Bolsheviks: “All the same, for better or worse, we have been twitching for 6 months. If you last even 6 weeks, I admit that you were right.”

But the calculations of the sabotaging officials were built on sand. They hoped that the Bolsheviks would treat the apparatus of power in the same way as all the leaders of past bourgeois-democratic revolutions: they would remove something, renew the composition of officials, but leave the old apparatus as a whole. In fact, the Soviet government set about demolishing the old state machine. The resistance of officials only accelerated its destruction.

By order published on November 29 (16), the Soviet government dismissed the officials of the ministry. The next day, November 30 (17), Maklakov, Ambassador of the Provisional Government in France, was deprived of his powers; On December 9 (November 26), all other diplomatic representatives of the overthrown government were relieved of their duties. The foreign powers, however, refused to recognize this order of the Soviet government; for a long time they continued to communicate with the old envoys and consuls, placing considerable sums at their disposal.

The Soviet government hastily began to create its own apparatus.

In the newly organized people's commissariats new people appeared from the class-conscious workers and soldiers. Old Bolsheviks who had gone through a good political school, advanced workers of the Siemens and Schuckert factory, and revolutionary sailors came to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Workers and Red Guards made up the first group of employees of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

By the end of January 1918, the total number of employees of the commissariat reached 200 people. They were full of revolutionary enthusiasm, but still inexperienced and little versed in matters of diplomacy.

In these first days of the revolution, relations with foreigners presented many difficulties. European governments refused to recognize Soviet power. Official communication with the diplomatic representatives of the Entente and neutral states ceased, but unofficial relations continued. First of all, it was necessary to issue permits and visas to foreigners wishing to leave Soviet Russia. At this time, the British government arrested a number of Russian Bolsheviks in London who wanted to leave for Russia. The Soviet government demanded their release, but for the time being it stopped issuing permits to leave Russia for British subjects.

1. /

Introduction

The entry of England into the war entailed the participation of the entire British Empire in it. The European war took on the character of a world war. In addition, the performance of England to some extent predetermined the position of the United States.

During the war, the main efforts of the diplomacy of both warring camps were directed to the recruitment of new allies. Next to this task, another one arose: concern for inter-allied relations and for drawing the contours of a future peace treaty.

2. Diplomacy during the First World War / Performance by Japan

Diplomacy

Rapprochement was extremely facilitated by British diplomacy. England took the side of these two countries, pursuing its traditional policy of confronting any continental power claiming continental hegemony. London began to conclude that only Russia could stop Germany's military power on the battlefields. Premier Asquith and then Lloyd George, Foreign Ministers Gray and Balfour, War Secretary Lord Kitchener and Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir William Robertson came to the conclusion that it was necessary to support Russia as a counterweight to Germany. The British ambassador to Russia in 1904-1906, Lord Hardinge, also made efforts in the first two decades of the century to eliminate mutual distrust, to create an alliance between Russia and the West. "I felt it was absolutely essential to find some form of agreement with Russia ... and when I came to the Foreign Office, I hoped that I could influence senior management." All the main telegrams to and from Petrograd are marked by Hardinge already in his capacity as Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Gray's permanent deputy, Sir Arthur Nicholson, while still an employee of the British Embassy in Tehran in the 80s (XIX century), came to the conclusion that the time had come to find a global understanding with Russia. As ambassador to Russia (from 1906 to 1909), he effectively participated in changing the negative tendencies of the 19th century that brought the two countries together. He was not a lone Russophile in the Foreign Office. Perhaps Nicholson was the most active Russophile in the British Foreign Office. He believed, and wrote to Gray about it, that "our mutual understanding with Russia determines the basis of our modern foreign policy."

Returning from St. Petersburg to the Foreign Office, Sazonov's initiatives aimed at an alliance with England were supported by Deputy Minister Sir Arthur Nicholson. He wrote on March 21, 1914: "I am convinced that if the Triple Entente is transformed into a second Triple Alliance, peace in Europe will be secured for one or two generations."

The new English ambassador to the St. Petersburg court, George Buchanan, was a good specialist in Russian affairs. This is acknowledged even by his opponents. Even sixteen years before his appointment to Petersburg, he, being a chargé d'affaires in the Principality of Hesse, met the beautiful, timid and restrained princess of Hesse, Alika, who was destined to become the Russian Empress Alexandra Feodorovna. There, in Hesse, Buchanan played tennis more than once in a club where the heir to the throne, the future Tsar Nicholas II, came. Appointed ambassador to St. Petersburg (1910), Buchanan made the highest assessment of Russia as a world power and as an ally

Especially rapid was the process of improving bilateral relations after the Algeciras Conference (April 1906), at which Teutonic self-affirmation was demonstrated in the most striking way. Sir Arthur Nicholson, then the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, received instructions from the entire top of Britain. At Gray's house, he was met by ministers Asquith, Haldane and Morley. A four-hour discussion of the entire spectrum of Anglo-Russian relations led to two conclusions. First, a general improvement with a temporarily weakened but potentially great Russia is desirable. Secondly, buffer states, such as Afghanistan, Tibet, Persia, should be strengthened in order to secure British possessions in Asia.

Decisive negotiations began between Izvolsky, who had just assumed his post, and Ambassador Nicholson on June 6, 1906 in St. Petersburg. Izvolsky was clearly afraid of "offending" von Bülow, Nicholson explained to Gray: "He is afraid that we are weaving a network and creating a hostile ring around Germany, he would not like to involve himself in any combinations and put his signature under any document directed against Germany".

In October 1906, Izvolsky went to Berlin to negotiate with Bülow. The Chancellor expressed the view that Berlin would welcome an Anglo-Russian rapprochement as long as it did not affect German interests. Izvolsky had to overcome the opposition of that part of the Russian general staff, which did not want to so easily give up the opportunity to keep the vulnerable parts of the British Empire on their toes.

For their part, the British showed their traditional quality of restraint. Foreign Secretary E. Gray advises Ambassador Nicholson:

"We need to avoid Izvolsky becoming suspicious that we are trying to take advantage of Russia's weakness at the moment."

In November, Nicholson told Izvolsky that England, under certain circumstances, could discuss Russia's positions in the Dardanelles. Nothing could have aroused the more keen interest of the Russian minister. He turned to Nicholson, beaming with pleasure. The ambassador's technique, writes his biographer and son Harold Nicholson, "was similar to that of a humane and highly experienced dentist who turned to three aching teeth. Delicately, but firmly, he discussed the situation in Afghanistan; at the first sign of pain, he applied an anesthetic, cotton and gutta-percha, and followed the next goal of Tibet. Thus, he entered into the full confidence of Mr. Izvolsky and achieved results in all three directions without affecting the sensitive nerves. "

On August 31, 1907, Nicholson and Izvolsky signed a bilateral convention in the Russian ministry. It was not a fixation of an alliance, there were no closed military articles in it, but it paved the way for a more complete mutual understanding in the future. The territorial integrity of Tibet and Afghanistan was guaranteed. The agreement on Persia was more complex: the country was divided into three zones - northern, middle and southern. The first was dominated by Russia, the third by Britain; the middle remained a buffer The British minister believed that before the 1907 agreement "our policy was to contain Russia in all directions. We did this during the Crimean War, in the time of Lord Beaconsfield and more recently in the Far East. For many years I have held this point of view that it was an erroneous policy, that a better way to settle relations with Russia could be found."

Ambassador Nicholson writes from St. Petersburg regarding the humiliation of Russia in the Balkans in 1908 to Foreign Minister Edward Greck "Never has such humiliation been felt here. never been subjected to such dictatorship by a foreign country."

Two lines (Russian and British) in world diplomacy began to converge London opposed this perspective with the alliance of the European West with Russia. When the Austro-Hungarian court annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, St. Petersburg was convinced that only Britain could provide assistance in mastering the straits.

Appointed ambassador to St. Petersburg (1910), Buchanan was valued for what was considered an accurate, clear and adequate assessment of the processes taking place in Russia, an assessment of Russia as a world power and as an ally. The tsar and the British ambassador developed a completely trusting relationship. Buchanan: "Our relationship became more and more intimate, and I personally warmly became attached to him. His Majesty had such charming manners that at audiences I felt like a friend, not like a king."

The trusting nature of the relationship undoubtedly helped bring Russia and Britain closer together.

In June 1908, the British royal yacht "Victoria and Albert" headed for Reval (Tallinn). Far from everyone in England saw such a rapid rapprochement with Russia as expedient. The rising Labor Party, led by Ramsay MacDonald, denounced the alliance with Nicholas, a "common killer" (as MacDonald wrote in the leftist press). On the royal yacht, which won an unimaginable number of prizes in sailing races, along with the king and queen were Ambassador Nicholson and the star of the British Navy, Admiral Fisher. The stormy North Sea spoiled the mood of the British (even Fischer did not leave his cabin), but the Kiel Canal brought calm. An honorary escort sent by the German emperor rode along the shore, and before the Russian Revel, four German destroyers accompanied the yacht.

The royal yacht anchored on a bright day in the roadstead of Revel next to the yacht of Emperor Nicholas "Standard" and the yacht of his mother - the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna - his wife's sister English king. The sea was so calm, and the company so kind, that the guests and hosts did not even go ashore during the two days of the visit. A solid ball-banquet was interrupted only for a male conversation about the future of relations between the two countries. Emperor Nikolai, Prime Minister Stolypin and Minister Izvolsky sent the female half of the society to listen to the arriving choir, while they themselves turned to the problems of control over the ocean expanses. Edward VII and Fisher were so enthusiastic that they gave Nicholas the title of Admiral of the British Navy. The king was already in the uniform of a colonel of the Scottish Fusiliers, and it took considerable effort to find the uniform of a British admiral. The Tsar was, according to Fischer, "happy as a child, because in the future he liked to meet British ships, not ground troops." The emperor immediately made Edward admiral of the Russian fleet. In the circle of women who joined, Admiral Fisher danced with Grand Duchess Olga, and then, at the request of the king, danced solo. Grand Duchess Olga wrote in her diary that she had never laughed so much in her life.

But something serious happened. Continuing negotiations in St. Petersburg, Izvolsky and Nicholson took another step along the path desired by Russia and put forward a demand for the opening of the Dardanelles for Russian military courts. Foreign Minister Gray reported to Nicholson: "Izvolsky considers the current moment critical. Good relations between England and Russia can be strengthened, or the countries will go into the future separately. He associated his personal prestige with rapprochement with England."

In 1912, Foreign Minister Sazonov suggested that the British conclude a full military alliance with Russia and France. The British politely abstained. But they did not express their opinion categorically.