Rostov strategic offensive operation 1941 All books are about: “Rostov offensive map .... Kaunas offensive operation

Part two. Operation "Commander Rumyantsev" (Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive

Battle of Rostov-on-Don (1941)- one of the first successful offensives of the Red Army in the war, along with the Battle of Moscow and the Elninsky operation.

November 21, 1941 153rd day of the war

The 9th Army of the Southern Front is advancing towards the Agrafyonovka - Kuteinikovo line. The 56th Separate Army leaves Rostov-on-Don, and German forces completely capture the city.

November 27, 1941 159th day of the war

“After the regrouping of troops from the 37th Army's right flank to the Stoyanov-Generalskoe front sector, the Southern Front resumed the offensive. The main forces of the 37th Army struck from the Stoyanov-Generalskoe front through Sultan-Saly to the western outskirts of Rostov, and the 9th Army moved to Rostov through Bolshiye Saly. The 56th Army advanced in three groups and attacked Rostov from three directions. Under the onslaught of Soviet troops, the enemy was forced to start a retreat from the Rostov "sack". The enemy put up the greatest resistance to the main forces of the 37th Army and the western group of the 56th Army, which were advancing towards each other. The Nazis strove at all costs to prevent these troops from uniting and completing the encirclement of the German divisions. "

November 28, 1941 160th day of the war

Soldiers of the 6th company of the 33rd motorized rifle regiment at night cross the Don on thin ice, penetrate into Rostov and take up defensive positions in the area from Teatralnaya Square to the 13th line. In the morning, two more companies cross the Don and advance to Teatralnaya Square.

November 29, 1941 161st day of the war

As a result of the Soviet counteroffensive, Rostov-on-Don was liberated. On the same day, JV Stalin sent a telegram to the commander-in-chief of the South-West direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union SK Timoshenko and the commander of the Southern Front, Colonel-General Ya. T. Cherevichenko: “I congratulate you on the victory over the enemy and the liberation of Rostov from the German fascist invaders. I salute the valiant troops of the 9th and 56th armies, led by Generals Kharitonov and Remezov, who have hoisted our glorious Soviet banner over Rostov. "

November 30, 1941 162nd day of the war

Soviet troops pursue the 1st Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht to the fortified line of the Mius Front, where the front is stabilized until July 1942.

While the enemy threw his main grouping into an offensive against Moscow, a turning point was outlined in favor of the Soviet troops in the northern and southern sectors of the Soviet-German front.

Soviet troops operating in the Tikhvin region and near Rostov, stubborn defense exhausted the enemy strike groups, which were rushing in the north to join the Finnish troops, and in the south to the routes to the North Caucasus. By mid-November, our troops stopped the enemy offensive near Tikhvin and north of Rostov, and then, having launched a counteroffensive, threw it back to the west.

In particular, the Soviet counter-offensive near Rostov pursued a twofold goal: first, to defeat the enemy grouping that threatened Rostov; secondly, to pin down the enemy forces, prevent their transfer to Moscow and thereby facilitate the defense of the capital and the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive in the central sector of the front.

In the first half of November 1941, the enemy failed to make a breakthrough in the Shakhty direction, followed by an exit to the rear of Rostov. Nevertheless, the exit of his forces to the Millerovo, Astakhovo, Agrafenovka area (60 km north of Rostov) complicated the position of the Southern Front troops in the Rostov direction. Having strengthened his grouping, the enemy could with subsequent strikes threaten directly the Shakhty industrial region and the important Voronezh-Rostov railway.

The enemy also received the opportunity to develop an offensive in the northern and northeastern directions to Kamensk and Voroshilovgrad, especially at the junction of the 9th and 18th armies in order to dismember the troops of the Southern Front, encompass and defeat the 12th and 18th armies and reach the border of the Seversky Donets River.

In addition, the semi-enveloping position of the German troops in relation to the Soviet troops made it easier for the enemy to strike the flank of the 56th separate army defending Rostov.

All these circumstances insistently demanded the speedy implementation of the counteroffensive that was being prepared in order to defeat the 1st tank army of the enemy.

The headquarters of the Supreme Command, giving instructions for the defeat of the 1st German Tank Army, demanded not only to stop the enemy's advance, but also to push it back to the west in order to eliminate the threat of a breakthrough into the Caucasus. Moreover, the active offensive actions of the troops of the Southern Front were supposed to pin down the main forces of Army Group South and prevent the German command from reinforcing Army Group Center in the Moscow direction, where decisive events were taking place at that time.

In the current situation, the Supreme Command Headquarters makes a decision: to deploy the 37th Army, which has completed its concentration in the area of ​​Krasnodon and Kamensk, under the command of Major General A.I. Lopatin at the junction between the 18th and 9th armies on the Rovenka, Dolzhanskaya, Biryukovo front to strike southward to the flank and rear of the 1st German Panzer Army. Two (35th and 56th) cavalry divisions were concentrated behind the right flank of the 37th Army.

With the deployment of the 56th Separate Army under the command of Lieutenant General F.N. Remezov on the approaches to Rostov and with the advancement of the 37th Army and two cavalry divisions to the front, the forces of Soviet troops operating between the Seversky Donets River and Taganrog Bay were increased by 11 rifle and 6 cavalry divisions and 3 tank brigades, that is, more than twice.

In total, the Southern Front (commander from October 5, 1941 - Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko, member of the Military Council - Army Commissar 1st Rank A.I. Zaporozhets, Chief of Staff - Major General A.I. Antonov) and On November 15, the 56th separate army had 22 rifle, 9 cavalry divisions and 5 tank brigades.

The enemy forces operating on this sector of the front: the 4th German Army and Italian Corps of the 17th Army and the 1st Tank Army (49th Mountain Rifle Corps, 14th and 3rd Motorized Corps), still consisted of seven infantry , two mountain rifle, three tank and four motorized divisions.

Soviet troops were approximately equal in number. And the enemy had a double superiority in tanks (250 against 120 of ours).

To strengthen the aviation of the Southern Front, the Stavka gave it a reserve aviation group, two mixed aviation divisions and a regiment of night bombers for the period of the counteroffensive.

The aviation of the Southern Front and the aviation of the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Strategic Direction that supported it numbered a little more than 200 aircraft (fighters - 70, bombers - 120, attack aircraft - 13), and in bomber aviation 2/3 of the aircraft were night bombers of the Po-2 type. Of the total number of aviation, 159 aircraft operated in the direction of the main strike of the 37th Army. According to our intelligence, the enemy had about 200 aircraft in this sector of the front.

The strike force of the 37th Army included 235 guns of divisional artillery and reinforcement artillery.

The enemy in front of the front of the 37th Army had only about seven divisions of artillery (84 guns), but widely used heavy mortars, of which there were a significant number (3-4 batteries per division).

While the 37th Army was moving into its assigned zone from 11 to 16 November, the 1st Panzer Army of the enemy changed the direction of its main attack. The command of this army refused from a deep detour of Rostov through Shakhty and Novocherkassk. In the Bobrikovo, Astakhovo, Rodionovo-Nesvetayskoye sector with a total length of 60 km, the enemy left one Viking motorized division, reinforced by part of the forces of the 16th Panzer Division. The remaining forces of the 14th motorized corps (two tank and one motorized division) were pulled by the enemy to the left flank of the 3rd motorized corps on the Kuteinikovo-Stoyanov line. The 14th Motorized Corps was to strike at Rostov from the north through Bolshiye Saly, the 3rd Motorized Corps - from the west through Chaltyr.

In order to divert Soviet forces from the Rostov direction, the 4th German Army Corps (right-flank corps of the 17th Army) began an offensive from the Bakhmutka River along the right bank of the Seversky Donets River in the general direction of Voroshilovgrad and by the evening of November 16, wedged into the location of the troops of the 12th army northeast of Artemovsk to a depth of 20 km.

The troops of the 12th Army with stubborn defense and counterattacks held back the offensive of the 4th Army Corps, and although the enemy in the next five days managed to advance another 35 km to the east and reach the Golubovka area, the front of the 12th Army was not broken through and the enemy offensive on Voroshilovgrad did not affect the operations of our troops in the Rostov area.

In connection with the change in the direction of the offensive of the enemy strike group to the south, the strike directly at Rostov, the Soviet Supreme High Command clarified its original plan of the offensive operation. In its final form, this plan was as follows: the 37th Army should deliver the main blow from the front of Dar'evka, Biryukovo in the general direction to Bolshe-Krepinskaya to the rear of the enemy motorized corps. The 18th Army struck with the forces of two left-flank rifle divisions on Dmitrievka and Dyakovo with the task of reaching the upper reaches of the Mius River, and the 9th Army, with the forces of one rifle and one cavalry divisions from the Novoshakhtinsk region, in the direction of Boldyrevka with the task of assisting the 37th army in the defeat of the 1st tank army of the enemy. The 35th and 56th cavalry divisions were to, after the rifle divisions reached the Dyakovo area, advance from behind the left flank of the 18th army in the direction of Kuibyshevo, Artemovka with the task of operating in the nearest rear of the 49th German mountain rifle corps and reaching the Krynka river line support the 37th Army from the west.

Support for the offensive of the strike group of the Southern Front from the Donbass was assigned to the troops of the 12th Army, as well as the right flank and center of the 18th Army.

The mission of the 56th separate army was determined by the Supreme Command Headquarters on November 14 as follows: “In connection with the reduction of the enemy strike group to the south and aiming it at the front of the 56th separate army, the main task of the 56th separate army is to firmly hold the Rostov-Novocherkassk region. If the offensive of the Southern Front is successful and the part of the enemy's strike group is diverted onto itself, the 56th Separate Army is obliged to assist the Southern Front in achieving a general defeat of the enemy with a short blow.

At 0800 hours on November 17, the main forces of the German motorized corps, consisting of three tank and two motorized divisions, resumed their offensive on Rostov.

An hour later, the strike group of the Southern Front - the 37th Army and the troops of the flanks of the 18th and 9th armies adjacent to it - launched a counteroffensive in the general direction of Bolshe-Krepinskaya in order to defeat the 1st tank army of the enemy.

Two left-flank divisions of the 18th Army met resistance from two German mountain rifle divisions defending on the Novo-Pavlovka, Dmitrievka, Dyakovo line, and had no success until November 21, but pinned down the forces of the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps.

On the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 37th Army, knocking down the advance units of the enemy, advanced 15-18 km. In the next four days, having met fierce resistance from the German motorized and part of the forces of the tank divisions, which were going over to counterattacks, they advanced 15-20 km and reached the Tsimlyanka, Millerovo, Agrafenovka line by November 21.

Due to unfavorable meteorological conditions, the front's aviation acted ineffectively until November 20 and could not provide the necessary support to ground forces. Since November 20, aviation has stepped up its combat activities and destroyed the enemy in the strongest strongholds, facilitating the advance of our troops.

The 9th Army was advancing even more slowly, against which the enemy deployed part of a motorized division and a tank division. By the evening of November 21, the 9th Army reached the Agrafenovka-Kuteinikovo line.

There were major shortcomings in the actions of the troops of the Southern Front, which did not allow the offensive to be carried out at a high pace. The main ones were: weak maneuvering of forces and means, timidity in decisions, insufficiently clear interaction of the infantry with tanks, artillery and aviation, the lack of the necessary exactingness of the chiefs in relation to the fulfillment of the task set by them. As a result, the strike grouping of the Southern Front from 17 to 21 November did not use all its capabilities to defeat the barrier set against it and advance to the line from which it would be possible to strike into the rear of the German motorized corps.
Due to the slow pace of the offensive, the shock grouping of the Southern Front troops until the morning of November 22 did not affect the battles that were being fought at that moment by the main forces of the enemy's motorized corps in the Rostov area. The enemy succeeded in occupying Rostov, pushing back the troops of the 56th separate army to the south over the Don River and to the east in the direction of Novocherkassk, on the line Grushevskaya, Bolshoi Mishkin.

However, the overhanging position of the strike grouping of the Southern Front and its continued advance in the southern direction posed a threat to the flank and rear of the enemy, which had broken through to Rostov. Under these conditions, the occupation of Rostov on November 21 did not give the Nazi troops any advantages, they could not develop their offensive either to the south or to Novocherkassk and were forced to go over to the front on the defensive to the south, east, and soon to the north.

On November 22 and 23, the strike group of the Southern Front, continuing to develop the offensive, advanced up to 25 km and reached the line of Novo-Pavlovka, Lysogorka, and the Tuzlov River.

In a situation where Soviet troops created an immediate threat of an attack on the left flank and to the rear of the main forces of the enemy's 1st tank army, the command of this army, having no reserves, was forced to begin on November 21 the transfer of its troops from Rostov to strengthen the defense on the right bank the Tuzlov river. At this line, our troops met the enemy's defenses, which were already tighter than hitherto.

By the evening of November 23, the balance of forces in the sector of the strike grouping of the Southern Front turned out to be less favorable than it was at the beginning of the operation, but it was still quite favorable for our troops. The forces of the 37th Army outnumbered the opposing enemy by more than two times, and the forces of the 9th Army in their sector of the offensive - by 2.5 times.

The troops of the 37th and 9th armies in seven days advanced about 60 km and removed the same distance from the railway stations. They could well continue the offensive without large regroupings and any significant pause.

The headquarters of the Supreme Command repeatedly demanded an increase in the pace of the offensive of the strike group of the Southern Front, and aimed it in the general direction of Taganrog. On the morning of November 22, 1941, the Stavka indicated to the commander of the Southern Front that the loss of Rostov did not cancel the task of the front troops - striking the rear of Kleist, but, on the contrary, increased the need for them to occupy Taganrog, and ordered the troops to demand decisive, energetic actions.

The directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of November 24 emphasized that the purpose of our troops' actions in the Rostov direction is “the defeat of the Kleist armored group and the capture of the Rostov, Taganrog area with access to the Novo-Pavlovka, Kuibyshevo, Matveev Kurgan, r. Mius ". Therefore, the commander of the Southern Front was asked, "... while continuing the offensive operation, set the troops the task of capturing Rostov and Taganrog ...", and the commander of the Transcaucasian Front - "... with the forces of the 56th Army to assist the troops of the Southern Front in seizing the Rostov region."

Thus, the Headquarters demanded from the commander of the Southern Front to energetically continue the offensive of the front's strike grouping to the rear of the main forces of the enemy's motorized corps, and to develop its main attack in the direction of Taganrog.

The commander of the Southern Front misunderstood the task assigned to him. He decided first to capture Rostov, and then to launch an offensive on the Mius River and Taganrog. To implement this decision, he spent three days on a regrouping of troops, as a result of which only two rifle divisions were left on the previous front of the 37th Army, and the remaining forces of this army (four rifle divisions and three tank brigades) were transferred to the Stoyanov, Generalskoe ... Two cavalry divisions were also castled in the Chistopol region. East of the 37th Army, on the Tuzlov River, the 9th Army advanced. Cavalry and rifle divisions and a tank brigade deployed west of Novocherkask on the Grushevskaya-Bolshoi Mishkin line were transferred to it from the 56th Army.

If on the evening of November 23, the main forces of the strike grouping of the Southern Front occupied an enveloping position in relation to most of the enemy motorized corps forces, then after regrouping, on the evening of November 26, they hung over the flank and rear of only two German motorized divisions defending in the Rostov area.

At the same time, our reconnaissance did not detect the withdrawal of enemy tank divisions from the Rostov area, and the front commander counted directly in the Rostov area to destroy the main forces of the enemy's 1st tank army. To do this, he ordered to strike the main forces of the 37th Army from the Stoyanov, Generalskoe line at Sultan-Saly, the western outskirts of Rostov, with the main forces of the 9th Army - from the Kontiponka, Budyonny line at Bolshiye Saly, Rostov and formations transferred from 56- th army, - from the side of Novocherkassk to Rostov.

The cavalry divisions were entrusted with the task of advancing to the Valuevsky area, securing the right flank of the shock grouping of the Southern Front, and then by the end of November 27 with an exit and the Sinyavka area to cut the communications of the Kleist group.

The 56th Army struck in three groups: with the eastern group - from the Krasny Dvor region to the eastern outskirts of Rostov; the central group - from the Bataysk region to the southern outskirts of Rostov and the western (stronger) group - from the region north of Azov to the western outskirts of Rostov and Chaltyr.

The offensive of the strike group of the Southern Front and the 56th Army on Rostov began on the morning of November 27. Under the blows of our troops, the enemy was forced to start withdrawing from the Rostov sack.

The main efforts of the fascist German command on November 27-29 were aimed at delaying the offensive of the main forces of the 37th Army from the north and the western group of the 56th Army from the south and thereby ensuring the withdrawal of their divisions from the Rostov area. To this end, the enemy opposed the strike group of the 37th Army with two tank divisions.

On November 29, our troops managed to break through the enemy's front both on the northern face south of Stoyanov and in the south in the Chaltyr area. On this day, one rifle division of the 37th Army advanced in the area north of Sultan-Sala, and the western group of the 56th Army captured Chaltyr. At the same time, the central group of the 56th Army and the Novocherkassk grouping of the 9th Army, after three days of street fighting, cleared Rostov of the enemy.

From November 30 to December 2, chased by our troops, the battered troops of the German motorized corps retreated to the line of the Mius River from Kuibyshevo to Pokrovsky and further to the Sambek line, the Sambek River, where they managed to gain a foothold and with the help of arriving reinforcements to stop the offensive of the armies of the left wing of the Southern Front.

As a result of the slow advance of the strike group of the Southern Front and the wrong decision of the front commander, made by him after the withdrawal of our troops to the Tuzlov River, the enemy's motorized corps were not surrounded and destroyed. However, in the battles near Rostov - first offensive and then defensive - they suffered heavy losses in personnel and materiel. The enemy was driven back from Rostov.

To stop the further advance of the Soviet troops, the command of Army Group South hastily dispatched four divisions from the Kharkov region. Thus, all the free forces of Army Group South were diverted to the Rostov sector.

The defeat of the 1st German Tank Army near Rostov and the pinning down of the remaining forces of Army Group South by the troops of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts in conditions when all the reserves of the latter were used up, created a certain balance of forces in the southwestern strategic direction, and the front here is on stabilized for a long time. At the same time, the counteroffensive of the Southern Front forces, which fettered all the forces of Army Group South, did not allow the German command to strengthen the Moscow sector at their expense, which had a beneficial effect on the outcome of the defensive battles near Moscow in November-early December and on the subsequent successful counteroffensive of the Soviet troops. in the main (western) strategic direction.

Rostov offensive operation(November 17 - December 2, 1941) - a strategic offensive operation of the Red Army. One of the first successful offensives of the Red Army in the war, which, along with the counteroffensive near Moscow, led to the halt of the German offensive on the Soviet-German front in the winter of 1941. As part of this operation, a front-line Bolshekrepinskaya offensive operation and an offensive operation to liberate Rostov were carried out.

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✪ Alexey Isaev about the battle for Rostov

✪ Kharkov battle (1942)

✪ Liberation South of Russia 1941 45 years Rostov region

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Parties' plans

The 56th Separate Army (Lieutenant General F.N. Remezov) was deployed on the approaches to Rostov. In total, as of November 15, the Southern Front and the 56th Separate Army had 22 rifle divisions, 9 cavalry divisions and 5 tank brigades (including 16 rifle and 5 cavalry divisions on the Southern Front, 7 tank brigades, a total of 262,600 people; in the 56th Army - 5 rifle divisions, 5 cavalry divisions, 1 tank brigade, a total of 86,500 people). To strengthen the air force of the Southern Front, the Supreme Command Headquarters gave it a reserve aviation group, two mixed aviation divisions and a regiment of night bombers for the period of the offensive. In total, the Soviet Air Force consisted of just over 200 aircraft.

The enemy forces operating in this sector of the front: the 4th German Army Corps and the Italian Corps of the 17th Army and the 1st Tank Army (49th Mountain, 14th and 3rd Motorized Corps) consisted of 7 infantry, 2 mountain rifle , 3 tank and 4 motorized divisions.

In terms of the number of troops and aviation, an approximate equality of the sides was created, the Germans had a double superiority in tanks (250 versus 120), in artillery, the Soviet troops had a slight superiority.

By November 16 German command It was partially forced to reconsider its plans: the 1st Panzer Army of the enemy changed the direction of its main attack, a deep bypass of Rostov through Shakhty and Novocherkassk was replaced by an attack almost in a straight line from north to south through Bolshiye Saly (14th Mechanized Corps), and 3 -th motorized corps delivered a converging blow from the west through Chaltyr. In order to divert Soviet forces from the Rostov direction, the 4th German army corps on the left flank of the 17th German army began an offensive along the right bank of the Seversky Donets river in the general direction of Voroshilovgrad against the 12th Soviet army and by the evening of November 16 advanced to 20 km ... In the following days, the troops of the 12th Army stubbornly held back this offensive and, although they withdrew another 35 km by the end of December, they did not allow the front to break through, weakened the enemy and did not allow him to provide assistance to his troops near Rostov.

In connection with the change in the direction of the offensive of the enemy strike group to the south, the strike directly at Rostov, the Soviet Supreme High Command clarified its original plan of the offensive operation. In the final form, this plan was as follows: the 37th Army should deliver the main blow from the front of Dar'evka, Biryukovo in the general direction to Bolshekrepinskaya to the rear of the enemy motorized corps. The 18th Army struck with the forces of two left-flank rifle divisions on Dmitrievka and Dyakovo with the task of reaching the upper reaches of the Mius River, and the 9th Army, with the forces of one rifle and one cavalry divisions from the Novoshakhtinsk region, in the direction of Boldyrevka with the task of assisting the 37th army in the defeat of the 1st tank army of the enemy. The 35th and 56th cavalry divisions were to, after the rifle divisions reached the Dyakovo area, advance from behind the left flank of the 18th army in the direction of Kuibyshevo, Artemovka with the task of operating in the nearest rear of the 49th German mountain rifle corps and reaching the Krynka river line support the 37th Army from the west.

Support for the offensive of the strike group of the Southern Front from the Donbass was assigned to the troops of the 12th Army, as well as the right flank and center of the 18th Army.

The mission of the 56th separate army was determined by the Supreme Command Headquarters on November 14 as follows: “In connection with the reduction of the enemy strike group to the south and aiming it at the front of the 56th separate army, the main task of the 56th separate army is to firmly hold the Rostov-Novocherkassk region. If the offensive of the Southern Front is successful and the part of the enemy's strike group is diverted onto itself, the 56th Separate Army is obliged to assist the Southern Front in achieving a general defeat of the enemy with a short blow.

The beginning of the battle

At 0800 hours on November 17, the main forces of the 1st Panzer Army (3 tank divisions, 2 motorized divisions) resumed their offensive on Rostov. By coincidence, after 1 hour, the 37th Army of the Southern Front and the troops of the flanks of the 18th and 9th armies adjacent to it went on the offensive in the general direction of Bolshekrepinskaya. On the first day of the offensive, the troops of the 37th Army, knocking down the advance units of the enemy, advanced 15-18 km. In the next four days, meeting fierce resistance from the German motorized and part of the forces of the tank divisions, which were going over to counterattacks, they advanced 15-20 km and reached the Tsimlyanka, Millerovo, Agrafenovka line by November 21. The troops of the 18th Army met stubborn resistance and did not succeed until November 21, but fettered the forces of the 49th Mountain Corps. Units of the 9th Army also slowly advanced.

Due to unfavorable meteorological conditions, the Soviet aviation of the front acted sporadically and ineffectively until November 20, but then intensified its combat activities, concentrating efforts on destroying the enemy in the strongest strongholds.

The haste in organizing the offensive and significant shortcomings in the actions of the troops (weak maneuvering, the predominance of stereotyped tactical decisions, unworked interaction of the infantry with tanks, artillery and aviation) adversely affected the course of the operation - the shock group of the troops of the Southern Front did not break through the German defense, but pushed it through. In the early days of the operation, the German command was confident that it would be able to quickly wear down the Soviet troops and localize the offensive, as it often did in the preceding months of the war. Therefore, Kleist's corps continued their offensive and on November 21 captured Rostov-on-Don, dropping the troops of the 56th separate army south over the Don River and east towards Novocherkassk. But the success was short: the threat to the flank and rear from the 37th Army continued to increase. There was no question of any further development of the success of the 1st German Panzer Army: all forces were brought into battle, they suffered heavy losses, there was nothing to advance with. Already on the day of the capture of Rostov, Kleist was forced to send his first units from Rostov back to the north, to organize a defense on the right bank of the Tuzlov River.

After the fall of Rostov, Marshal Timoshenko not only did not weaken the onslaught, but also pushed his troops forward even more persistently: on November 22 and 23, the 37th Army fought up to 25 km and reached the line of Novo-Pavlovka, Lysogorka, Tuzlov River. Now the threat to cut off Kleist's army in Rostov from the main forces of Army Group South and surround it has become real.

Second stage of the offensive

The directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of November 24 emphasized that the purpose of our troops' actions in the Rostov direction is “the defeat of the Kleist armored group and the capture of the Rostov, Taganrog area with access to the Novo-Pavlovka, Kuibyshevo, Matveev Kurgan, r. Mius ". Therefore, the commander of the Southern Front was asked, "... while continuing the offensive operation, set the troops the task of capturing Rostov and Taganrog ...", and the commander of the Transcaucasian Front - "... with the forces of the 56th Army to assist the troops of the Southern Front in seizing the Rostov region."

The further development of events was negatively affected by the extremely unfortunate decision of Marshal Tymoshenko. He decided to deliver the main blow to the main forces of the 1st Panzer Army in Rostov (in order to speed up the liberation of the city), while the Headquarters demanded an attack on Taganrog and it was there to reach the Sea of ​​Azov, cutting the German troops in two. To implement this decision, the Southern Front spent 3 days regrouping the troops, transferred the main forces of the 37th Army (4 rifle divisions, 3 tank brigades) to the starting line Stoyanov, Generalskoe, and 2 cavalry divisions to the Chistopol region. Also, the 9th Army moved to the border of the Tuzlov River, reinforced with one cavalry and one rifle division, a tank brigade. As a result, instead of a threat to encircle the entire 1st German Panzer Army, the Southern Front created such a threat only to those of its troops that operated directly in the Rostov area (and these are only two motorized divisions). The beginning of the withdrawal from Rostov of enemy tank divisions Soviet intelligence did not find it.

On November 27, Soviet troops resumed their offensive along converging directions: the 37th Army advanced from the Stoyanov line, Generalskoye to Sultan-Saly, the western outskirts of Rostov, the 9th Army from the Konstantiponka line, Budyonny to Bolshiye Saly, Rostov, part of its forces from side of Novocherkassk to Rostov. The 56th Army (November 23 was included in the Southern Front) also attacked in three groups - from the Krasny Dvor region to the eastern outskirts of Rostov; from the Bataysk region to the southern outskirts of Rostov; the strongest group is from the Azov region to the western outskirts of Rostov and Chaltyr. Only 2 cavalry divisions remained to solve the task of intercepting Kleist's escape routes to the west.

Immediately realizing the scale of the threat, Kleist, without waiting for the permission of Runstedt and Hitler, urgently began to take measures to save his army. He transferred both of his tank divisions to meet the 37th Army on the line of the Tuzlov River, threw the 1st Slovak motorized division there (previously it served to protect the rear and the coast of the Sea of ​​\ u200b \ u200bAzov), allocated cover forces for the defense of Rostov and under the protection of these most dangerous sectors began to withdraw all other troops. On November 27, the first units of the 56th Army crossed the Don on the ice and broke into Rostov, where fierce street fighting began. On November 29, part of the forces of the 37th Army broke through the German defenses and entered the area north of Sultan-Sala, and the 56th Army captured Chaltyr. On the same day, units of the 56th Army and the 9th Army, after three days of street fighting, completely liberated Rostov-on-Don.

From November 30 to December 2, the 1st Panzer Army, using the advantage in mobility and hiding behind rearguards at intermediate lines, withdrew from Rostov to the line of the Mius River, frustrating the attempt of the remaining weak forces of the 37th Army to continue the offensive on Taganrog. To save it, the command of Army Group "South" hastily threw four divisions here from near Kharkov. In this direction, the front stabilized, the Soviet troops could not break through this line on the move because of the losses incurred and the lack of supplies.

The result of the operation

The Rostov offensive operation was the first large-scale success of the Soviet troops in the winter campaign of 1941-1942. Together with the Soviet counter-offensive near Moscow, the Rostov operation finally buried the Barbarossa plan. The moral and political effect of these victories can hardly be overestimated - the Wehrmacht had never experienced such severe defeats, they created confidence in the defeat of fascism both in the Soviet Union and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, and in Nazi-occupied Europe. For the defeat suffered, Hitler removed from his post the commander of Army Group South, Rundstedt.

From an operational point of view, it was possible to push the German troops back 60-80 kilometers, remove the threat of a breakthrough of German troops to the Volga and the Caucasus. The southern flank of the Soviet-German front stabilized for six months. The strike force of Army Group South - 1st Panzer Army - suffered heavy losses and lost its offensive capabilities for a long time. All German reserves were brought into battle and exhausted - in December 1941, not a single German division from Army Group South was transferred to Moscow. These achievements of the Soviet troops are all the more significant because just a month and a half before the start of the Rostov offensive operation, the Southern Front experienced a catastrophic defeat in the Donbass and had to be recreated practically anew.

The Soviet command, and above all Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko, managed in the difficult conditions of the German offensive and in the absence of superiority over the enemy (moreover, with his double superiority in tanks) to find the most vulnerable spot, quickly gather the necessary forces for a strike and turn the tide of the battle without any operational pause. But the unsuccessful decision to transfer the direction of the main attack to a secondary target did not allow the 1st Panzer Army to be surrounded. The second unfavorable factor was the weak tactical skill of the Soviet troops, which still allowed the enemy to hold back the Soviet offensive on key lines with relatively small forces. The average daily rate of advance of rifle formations was 4-5 kilometers, and only on the most successful days for individual formations was 10-12 kilometers.