Chapter 22
“AND WINNERS ARE DESTROYED BY VICTORY” (June - October 1940 .)
This summer, Hitler made it clear that he was more interested in negotiations than in battles. He played the role of a magnanimous winner: “I don’t want my soldiers to behave in France like the French in the Rhineland after the first war!” He told Hoffman that any soldier caught looting would be shot on the spot.
The troops that entered Paris did not engage in robbery and violence. The Germans paid honestly for every purchase and enjoyed the June sun side by side with the French in the open cafes of the Champs Elysees. It was an awkward, often silent and indifferent neighborhood, but the fear gradually left the Parisians, who expected their women to be raped and their shops and banks to be robbed. Everyone knew that the Wehrmacht was really helping refugees returning to Paris, and it cannot be considered a great exaggeration to see a poster posted all over the city depicting a child in the arms of a smiling German with the inscription: “French! Trust the German soldier!
German soldiers and officers were neat and polite. They stopped, taking off their caps, at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, armed only with cameras. They behaved like tourists and certainly did not look like conquerors. It was clever advertising, part of a program designed to turn France into an obedient and productive vassal.
Hitler himself, accompanied by his adjutants, traveled for two days through the fields of past battles. This gave the Fuhrer pleasure. He showed his companions the sites of battles in Flanders, where once there was a living hell. But the Fuhrer did not look at the trenches mournfully and solemnly, but spoke continuously, explaining in great detail what happened here during the First World War. When he passed through Lille, which he depicted in his watercolor, one woman recognized him. "Devil!" – she screamed in horror. This amused Hitler, but a minute later he became gloomy and vowed that he would erase this image from the minds of the vanquished.
The sentimental journey ended on June 26, and the Fuhrer's thoughts turned to the unpleasant task of conquering England. This is not an easy mission, he told his adjutants, because a war with England is a war of brothers, and the destruction of the British Empire will hurt Germany. Therefore, he has no particular desire to fight with England. “I don’t want to conquer it,” the Fuhrer repeated. “I want to come to an agreement with her.”
Hitler did not yet have definite plans for an invasion of the British Isles. It seemed that he was waiting for England to take a step towards reconciliation. But these expectations were dashed on July 3, when British ships, in retaliation for the truce concluded by the former allies with Nazi Germany, suddenly attacked the French flotilla anchored in the Algerian port of Mers el-Kebir. In thirty minutes, the battleship Brittany was sunk, killing 977 French sailors and seriously damaging three more ships. The rest of the fleet managed to escape from the fire.
This incident strengthened the position of those who believed that cooperation with Hitler was the only way to save France. Under the terms of the armistice, the country was divided into two zones: occupied in the north and unoccupied in the south, with the Vichy government led by Marshal Petain. The British action made it difficult for him to try to prevent his prime minister, Laval, from entering into closer cooperation with Hitler, and made the task easier for Jean Giraudoux and the fascist intellectuals. As Alfred Fabre-Luce wrote, “England killed more French sailors in one day than Germany did in the entire war.” The incident also crushed Hitler's hopes for a possible settlement with England and at the same time emphasized his inability to control the French fleet and neutralize the British.
Hitler hesitated painfully between negotiations and the use of force. “I must not give up,” he told Puttkamer. “Ultimately the British will agree to an agreement.” But when Brauchitsch and Halder arrived at Berghof on July 13, the Fuhrer readily approved their plan to invade England. However, he immediately declared that the war “will only attract jackals eager to share the prey.” “Why doesn’t England want to make peace? - he asked himself and found the only answer: “England still harbors some hopes for Russian intervention.”
Three days later, Hitler issued a directive to prepare for an invasion of the British Isles. The operation was called Operation Sea Lion. In his speech on July 19, the Fuhrer sharply attacked Churchill, threatening that the war would lead to the destruction of England, and concluded the speech with the vague phrase: “I see no reason for continuing the war.” An hour later, Sefton Delmer, who worked in Berlin for a long time and met with the Fuhrer more than once, spoke on London radio. He said the British were "throwing back" Hitler's proposal "straight into his foul-smelling mouth."
Operation Sea Lion plan
The Nazi dictator's ostentatious love of peace did not impress President Roosevelt either. Speaking on the occasion of his agreement to run for president for another term, he said that there is only one way to deal with a totalitarian country - resistance, not appeasement. As Ambassador Dieckhof reported to Berlin, this speech demonstrated with utmost clarity the “complicity” of the United States in the war on the side of England.
But there was no official refusal from London, and when Hitler called his military leaders to a meeting on July 21, he seemed more puzzled than belligerent. “The situation in England is hopeless,” the Fuhrer began. “We won the war.” Then he fell into thought, but suddenly perked up and demanded a “quick end to the war.” Sea Lion is the most effective way to do this. However, immediately the Fuhrer’s self-confidence, or the appearance of it, began to weaken. He spoke of the difficulties of crossing the English Channel, where the enemy reigns supreme. This is not Norway, Hitler said, there will be no element of surprise. How to solve the problem of supplying troops? Admiral Raeder, who took notes, silently agreed with everything. The Fuhrer continued to argue that it was very important to achieve complete air superiority; the landing should be carried out no later than mid-September, while the weather was favorable to the Luftwaffe. He turned to Raeder. When will preparations for the invasion be completed? When will the Navy install coastal artillery? How to protect troops when crossing a canal? The embarrassed admiral thought about other problems: he would have to transport most of the troops on river barges, which would have to be delivered from the Reich. How will his weakened German fleet be able to resist the English? After losses in Norway, only 48 submarines, 1 heavy cruiser, 4 destroyers and 3 torpedo boats. Raeder replied that he hoped to announce technical details in a few days. But practical preparations for an invasion cannot begin until air superiority over the enemy has been achieved. Goering's deputy said that he was only waiting for orders for massive air raids. Without saying anything to this, Hitler ordered Raeder to submit a report as soon as possible: “If the preparations are not completed without guarantees of success by the beginning of September, other plans will have to be considered.”
Left alone with Brauchitsch, Hitler told him: “Stalin is flirting with England to continue the war and tie our hands. He wants to buy time."
Although Hitler achieved a sweeping victory in the West, it did not bring him the political stability he needed to go to war against the Soviet Union. His attacks on England only made this stubborn country more stubborn, and attempts to attract Vichy France to the crusade were approved in words, but were sabotaged in practice.
Despite these setbacks, Hitler still remained confident that he could prevent the conflict from escalating into a world war. He was convinced that England was on the verge of capitulation, and ordered an intensified propaganda campaign against it. Goebbels immediately ordered a radio broadcast to English language“forecasts” of Nostradamus, which allegedly predicted the destruction of London in 1940...
In a situation of painful uncertainty, Hitler chose the time for another meeting with his old friend Kubizek, to whom he had sent tickets to the 1940 Wagner Festival. They met on July 23 at the opera performance “Twilight of the Gods.” After warmly greeting his friend, Hitler complained that the war had interfered with his plans for the reconstruction of German cities. “I have so much to do, but I am forced to wage a war, spend my best years“- the Fuhrer complained. “Yes, we are getting old, Kubizek, and there is little time left to complete all our affairs.”
Hitler's relationship with Eva Braun became more and more marital. The war and the feeling of constant danger brought them closer. The Fuhrer spent more and more time at the Berghof. Sophisticated attempts to convince everyone that they are just friends have lost their meaning. The service staff treated the dictator’s mistress with respect, calling her “mistress” among themselves. Eva openly addressed Hitler as “you,” and he answered her in kind, sometimes calling her “baby.” In front of others, the Fuhrer sometimes stroked his mistress’s hand and showed other signs of affection. Their sexual relations were moderate. Hitler was already over fifty, and he was absorbed in work. Having become the universally recognized owner of the Berghof, Eva got rid of her previous inhibitions. No matter how difficult life was, the knowledge that she no longer had rivals was enough of a consolation.
This summer, Hitler came to the conclusion that the time had come to expand living space and destroy Bolshevism. He instructed the General Staff to carry out preparatory work, and on July 29, 1940, the head of the operations department, Jodl, decided to discuss this issue with the head of the Wehrmacht operations planning department, Colonel Warlimont. While waiting for their superiors in the dining car, Warlimont and three other officers believed that the general was going to present them with awards. Imagine their surprise when Jodl entered, first of all, he checked that all the doors and windows were closed, and then in a dry tone announced that Hitler “once and for all” had decided to rid the world of Bolshevism. By May 1941 there would be a surprise attack on Soviet Union. “The effect of his words was stunning,” recalled Warlimont, who at that moment, according to him, convulsively clutched his chair, not believing his ears. “This is impossible!” exclaimed Colonel Losberg. “How can the Fuhrer fight with Russia until England is defeated?” Jodl replied: “The Fuhrer fears that the mood of the people after the victory over England is unlikely to allow him to start a new war, this time against Russia.” Those present could hardly contain their bewilderment. This will also be a war on two fronts, which led to the defeat of Germany in the First World War. And why this sudden turn after the Moscow Pact? Did Stalin break his promises to supply raw materials and food? Jodl briefly answered all objections: a clash with Bolshevism is inevitable; it is better to attack now, when German military power is capable of crushing any enemy. Warlimont was not convinced by the answers, but Jodl, who had expressed exactly the same objections to Keitel, interrupted the debate. “Gentlemen,” he said, “this issue is not for discussion, this is the Fuhrer’s decision!” He ordered Warlimont to prepare the relevant documents under the code name “Prologue - East”.
On the last day of July, the Fuhrer summoned military leaders to the Berghof for a meeting officially dedicated to Operation Sea Lion. Admiral Raeder spoke first. He reported that preparations were in full swing, the material was being delivered as planned, and the conversion of the barges would be completed by the end of August. On the other hand, the situation with the merchant fleet is unfavorable as a result of losses in Norway. Mine sweeping has begun, but this is being prevented by enemy aircraft. Therefore, the admiral concluded, it was better to postpone the invasion until May next year.
Hitler did not agree. Such a delay, he said, would enable England to strengthen its military power and receive large supplies from America, and possibly from Russia. Therefore, he scheduled the start of the operation for September 15th. But he immediately stipulated this deadline by the fact that the Luftwaffe must first cause significant damage to British aviation, navy and port facilities in the south of England. "Otherwise the operation will be postponed until May 15, 1941."
This suited Admiral Raeder, since the burden of responsibility was placed on the Luftwaffe. As soon as Raeder and naval adjutant Puttkamer emerged, Hitler was critical of the Sea Lion's chances. “Our small fleet,” he sighed, “is only fifteen percent of the enemy’s tonnage. And the English Channel is a more formidable barrier than it looks on the map.”
At times the Fuhrer came close to abandoning the invasion of England. “Russia only has to hint that it does not want a strong Germany, and the British will perk up,” Hitler said. “But if you destroy Russia, England’s last hope will collapse.” Then Germany will become the master of Europe and the Balkans. Therefore, the decision is this: Russia must be destroyed in the spring of 1941.” The hesitation is over. Again it was the old Fuhrer, the man of destiny. “The sooner we destroy Russia, the better,” he continued. – The operation makes sense if we hit the heart of the Bolshevik empire with one blow. Simply conquering territory will not be enough.” The offensive must be carried out as a single, continuous operation. He will not repeat Napoleon's mistakes and will not fall into the Russian winter. “We’ll wait until May,” he said. “There are five months left for preparation.”
The plan captivated him. “The goal is the destruction of the vital centers of Russia,” Hitler emphasized with enthusiasm, outlining the directions of crushing blows: firstly, a campaign against Kiev, secondly, a throw across the Baltic states to Moscow, finally, a combination of forces from the north and south and an operation to capture of the Baku oil region...
A day later, Hitler issued two directives: one demanded the speedy occupation of England, the other expressed doubt about the success of the operation. The first began self-confidently: “In order to create the necessary conditions for the final subjugation of England, I intend to intensify the air and sea war against this country.” The Luftwaffe had to destroy British aircraft as quickly as possible and join Operation Sea Lion. “I reserve the right,” the Fuhrer emphasized, “to decide on retaliatory raids in response.”
The second directive, signed by Keitel on behalf of the Fuhrer, provided for the completion of preparations for Operation Sea Lion by mid-September. “8 to 14 days after the start of the air offensive on England, scheduled for August 5,” it said, “the Fuhrer will decide whether the invasion will take place this year or not. This decision will largely depend on the outcome of the air offensive."
Keitel recalled that when it came to Operation Sea Lion, Hitler was overcome with doubts about its feasibility, and he did not give up the idea of settling the conflict with England through diplomatic means. It obviously did not occur to Keitel that the matter was not only the Fuhrer’s hesitation: Operation Sea Lion was simply a camouflage for preparing an attack on Russia.
But Hitler was unaware that the essence of his two directives of August 1 was deciphered by the British secret service. And soon Goering’s order was deciphered to begin Operation Eagle on August 13 – massive aerial bombing of England.”
The air offensive began as scheduled, but due to bad weather only the 3rd Air Army took part. Almost 500 sorties were made, but the damage was insignificant, and the Luftwaffe losses were serious: 45 against 13 British fighters. The next day was again unlucky for Goering. On the 15th he threw all his three air armies at the British. This time, British counterintelligence established exactly what forces Goering would bring into action and approximately where they would strike. With this information, the Royal Air Force was able to send its fighters into the air where they needed them and at the right altitudes. Waves of German planes met strong resistance each time. In this largest air battle, the British shot down 75 aircraft, losing 34. Operation Eagle developed unsuccessfully: on the 17th the score was 70:27. The Germans had to withdraw from the battle their low-speed Stuka dive bombers, which had recently ruled the skies over France. Here they simply could not do anything with the high-speed Spitfires.
For four days - from August 19 to 22 - the weather was non-flying, and the Luftwaffe bombers remained at the airfields. Taking advantage of the lull, Goering summoned his commanders. The Reichsmarschall announced that from now on, raids on strategic targets would only be carried out at night.
The first of them took place on the night of August 23. One squadron of twelve aircraft went off course and dropped bombs on the city instead of aircraft factories and oil storage facilities on the outskirts of London. Nine civilians were killed, and the British air force, thinking it was deliberate, responded the next night by bombing Berlin. Little damage was done, but Berliners were shocked. After all, Goering assured them that they could sleep peacefully. Three nights later, the British bombers returned again: this time 10 residents were killed and 29 wounded. Hitler was furious because the German raid on London was the result of a navigational error. But the Fuhrer still did not dare to authorize the bombing of London. And two more raids were carried out on Berlin. This time Hitler decided to act. On September 4, he spoke at the Sports Palace at a conference of nurses and threatened England with severe retribution. To the cheers of the audience, the Fuhrer declared: “While they threaten to intensify raids on our cities, we will wipe their cities from the face of the earth. WITH God's help Let's fight back these air pirates! The hour will come when one of the rivals will fall, but it will not be National Socialist Germany! The answer was deafening: “Never!” Never!"
Two days later, Admiral Raeder, at the time of his next report to Hitler, dared to ask the question: “What will be the political and military directives of the Fuhrer if Operation Sea Lion does not take place?” Hitler took this question calmly, and Raeder reported with satisfaction to his colleagues: “The Fuhrer’s decision to land in England is by no means final... At the same time, the operation remains in force as a means of ending the war victoriously. However, the Fuhrer does not think about carrying out a landing if the risk turns out to be too great.” It was obvious that Hitler could not allow Operation Sea Lion to fail - this would dramatically increase the prestige of Great Britain. He wanted instant victory, but without risk. The Führer was especially distressed by the report from Puttkamer, who was present at maneuvers off the coast of France, where landing barges nearly capsized during high tide. According to Puttkamer, an amphibious landing could end in disaster.
If the success of the invasion could not be guaranteed, Hitler decided, air war remained. On September 7, the Fuhrer authorized massive raids on London. Bombers, wave after wave, rushed to the shores of England. At the end of the day, an armada of 320 bombers under cover large quantity fighter jets passed over the English Channel and unleashed their deadly payload on weapons depots, a power station and the docks on the Thames. As soon as Goering received a report that the city was engulfed in a “sea of fire,” he hurried to the microphone and, choking with delight, assured radio listeners that London was about to be destroyed. The devastating raids continued until dawn and resumed in the evening. Over these two days, 842 Londoners died. Fulfilling his threat to “wipe out their cities,” Hitler authorized another massive raid on London.
British counterintelligence warned Churchill about this, and four days before the raid he radioed the country: “Undoubtedly, Herr Hitler is not sparing his air force, and if this goes on for a few more weeks, he will destroy his air force.” At the same time, Churchill warned that the Germans were carefully and methodically preparing a large-scale invasion. “We must therefore view next week as the most crucial period in our history,” the Prime Minister concluded his speech, which strengthened the morale of the British.
Publicly, Hitler expressed complete confidence in victory, but at a meeting with the military on September 14, the Fuhrer could not hide his anxiety. While praising the Luftwaffe for the "stunning" effect of Operation Eagle, he nevertheless admitted that the preconditions for Operation Sea Lion were "not yet ripe." Due to bad weather, aviation did not achieve dominance in the skies. However, the invasion was not cancelled. Military experts believed that the raids would have a terrible effect on English nerves, and mass hysteria would break out within 10–12 days. Goering's deputy took advantage of the opportunity to push through his project of aerial terror against civilians. Raeder, who was happy to support any proposal as long as it did not involve naval attack, praised the project, but Hitler insisted that the Luftwaffe be limited to vital military objectives. “Bombing to cause mass panic should be a last resort,” he said.
It was decided to launch Operation Sea Lion on September 17th. By this time, German losses had become quite significant. In just one day, September 15, the British shot down 60 planes. And on September 17, Hitler was forced to admit that bombing would probably never bring the British to their knees. He made a statement in a narrow circle: given that it was not possible to achieve air superiority, Operation Sea Lion is postponed indefinitely... British counterintelligence and British pilots inflicted the first military defeat on Adolf Hitler. England was saved.
After making this decision, Hitler said to Puttkamer: “We conquered France at the cost of 30 thousand lives. In one night, trying to cross the English Channel, we can lose many times more.” According to the naval adjutant, Hitler was pleased that Operation Sea Lion had been shelved.
On the same day, British counterintelligence established that Hitler ordered the dismantling of landing equipment at all Dutch airfields. In the evening, Churchill convened the chiefs of staff. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force said Hitler had canceled Operation Sea Lion for at least this year. Churchill smiled broadly, lighting his massive cigar, and invited everyone to go out for some fresh air...
Operation Sea Lion was supposed to end within a month after it began. The command of the operations to defeat England was entrusted to Field Marshal Rundstedt, who ensured the defeat of France within six weeks. naval military england intelligence
At the next stage of the campaign, the army group of Field Marshal Bock was supposed to enter the fight. Hitler took upon himself the overall leadership of the defeat of England.
The German command, preparing to implement their predatory plans, ordered the main headquarters of the army, naval forces and air force to relocate to the landing preparation area by August 1st. Thousands of other documents from the fascist general staff, army group headquarters and separate armies, corps, divisions, regiments, even battalions.
Among these documents you can find printed memos “On the loading of troops onto ships”, “On the first battle after landing”, “On the conduct of troops on board landing ships”, “On overcoming water obstacles by assault boats, transports and using suspension bridges”2.
Some materials analyze the tactics of the British army and English volunteers and, accordingly, the behavior and tactics of the fascist troops. The combat training department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces compiled a special instruction “Combat in the Fog.”
The directives of the fascist German command, with great methodicality and scrupulousness, set tasks not only for the army, navy and air force, but also for the engineering service, signal corps, other branches of the military, right down to bakery companies, sanitary, supply and other units. The issues of providing troops with electricity and supplying paratroopers with water were thought through.
One of the Speidel brothers, who served in the department of the chief intendant, was appointed responsible for this (Hans Speidel himself at that time headed the headquarters of the fascist occupiers in France and Belgium). True, there were significant shortcomings in the plans of the Nazi command: the issue of organizing air defense landing areas, about parachute troops that were to be dropped in the vicinity of London and other English cities, there was no solution to a number of other specific problems.
However, all these shortcomings could undoubtedly be eliminated in the future. Particular attention in the directives of the fascist command was paid to ensuring the secrecy of the landing.
One of the points of Hitler’s Directive No. 16 read: “Preparation of the planned landing must be strictly classified. The very fact of preparations for a landing in England cannot be hidden. It is all the more important to classify by all means the time of the planned landing and the crossing areas.”
To ensure the surprise of the invasion, the German command developed secret plans to disinformation the enemy. One of von Bock’s orders to Army Group B contained a special requirement to carry out “disinformation in orders.”
According to many Western European historians - K. Klee, K. Assmann, Liddell-Hart and others, the German command could well have completed all preparations for the landing in August September 1940.
German superiority over England
What British forces did the German command plan to fight? According to intelligence data from the German General Staff, at the beginning of August 1940, the British army had 13-14 divisions on the coast to defend the south of the country.
The total strength of the active army was estimated by intelligence at 320 thousand people, the reserve army - at 100 thousand instructors and 900 thousand possible recruits1. In fact, according to Churchill's data from August 1940, 8 divisions were concentrated along the entire southern coast of England. In the second half of September, after extraordinary measures to form new formations, the British command had south coast 16 divisions, of which three armored divisions2.
Only in June did the British War Cabinet decide to reorganize the field army, which would have 26 divisions; Of these, only 2 divisions would be tank divisions3. By mid-August, according to British data, these 26 divisions had been created.
But what kind of “shock fist” was this between Churchill and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Allan Brooke, who replaced General Ironside in this post? Hitler's General Staff clearly overestimated the enemy's strength. True, by September 1940 the combat effectiveness of the British army had increased somewhat.
Tank units numbered 240 medium and 108 heavy vehicles at the beginning of the month. The number of light tanks reached 514 units4. The production of fighter aircraft increased sharply. Instead of the 903 fighters planned in July-August, 1418 were produced, that is, 1.5 times more.
However, the fascist army had an overwhelming superiority of forces. The German ground forces were 7-8 times larger than the British, and the Wehrmacht's weapons were 15-20 times stronger. Of the 170 German divisions, fully equipped, well-armed, with extensive experience in aggressive campaigns in Poland, Belgium, Holland and France, the Nazi command was ready to send 38 divisions, including 6 tank and 3 motorized, for a direct invasion of the British Isles5.
It is interesting that for Operation Overlord - the landing of armies in Northern France - England and the USA concentrated 36-39 divisions. No wonder W. Churchill bitterly admitted: “Truly, the Germans had no shortage of fierce, well-armed soldiers.”
To transport such a gigantic landing force, up to 4 thousand sea vessels with a total tonnage of 800-900 thousand tons were required. By the beginning of September 1940, the German naval headquarters, having confiscated the fleets of Denmark, Belgium, Holland, and France, had at its disposal 168 transport ships (with a displacement of 700 thousand tons), 1,910 barges, 419 tugs, 1,200 motor boats, initially concentrated in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, Cuxhaven and Bremen, Emden and Hamburg.
This was significantly more than Admiral Raeder required. Churchill believed that the Nazi command had ships that could transport 500 thousand people simultaneously6. On September 1, in connection with preparations for the transfer of troops to England, intensive movement began German ships to French, Belgian, Dutch harbors, to the area of the planned invasion.
The fascist German command created a powerful fist to strike at the British Isles, at “proud Albion”, almost 900 years since William the Conqueror, which had not experienced the bitterness of an enemy invasion. A terrible threat looms over Britain.
Exercises to force the English Channel “Coastal Battle”
The fact that the German invasion of England was not a bluff is evidenced by the practical steps to cross the English Channel taken by the Wehrmacht command in July - August 1940.
German troops and headquarters underwent accelerated training. Moreover, on July 29, the combat training department of the German General Staff drew up an order entitled “Preparation for the operation.” Training cruises and battles, the order said, were to be carried out in conditions close to a combat situation, to teach the troops everything they needed to know when landing from ships on the shore and in the first battles on the coast. Learn to use smoke screens.
To organize rehearsal exercises for crossing the English Channel, headquarters developed detailed documentation, bringing the exercises as close as possible to a real combat situation. Thus, one of the many developments of the divisional exercise “Coastal Battle” included a detailed plan for crossing the strait.
The order of the commander of Army Group B von Bock “On measures to prepare for an attack on England and Ireland” was very detailed, specific and eloquently testified to the predatory plans of the fascist command. This is also confirmed by many other documents of the General Staff, the command of army groups “A” and “B” and individual armies, the Air Force command, and the naval headquarters.
On July 30, the plan for Operation Sea Lion was discussed in detail at the General Staff ground forces. Chief of Staff Halder announced to the crowd Hitler's decision to invade England.
Giving a general military-operational assessment of the actions of Nazi Germany against England, Halder characterized them as a single complex of many operations. He warned against overestimating England's coastal fortifications and demanded that the command of the Air Force and Navy take merciless action against the English fleet.
Hitler and the German high command conducted not only military-strategic, but also political preparations for the landing in England. On Hitler's instructions, fascist diplomacy and generals sought the complete political isolation of England, so that in the days of the decisive battle not a single state would come to its aid.
IN political training Ribbentrop's department participated in the fascist invasion of England, and the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the main command and general staff of the ground forces, H. Etzdorf, was especially active. Thus, on October 8, 1940, Etzdorf conveyed Hitler’s instructions to Halder: the main task of fascist diplomacy is to create a coalition of powers against England.
At other meetings with Brauchitsch and Halder, Etzdorf repeatedly advocated that England should be completely isolated. Even at the meeting on July 22, he spoke about the need to prevent a rapprochement between England and the Soviet Union.
Intelligence and special services in Operation Sea Lion
German intelligence also worked a lot in preparing the defeat of England, and in particular in preparing Operation Sea Lion.
Agents of the German Abwehr and other spy agencies of Nazi Germany had their agents in this country. Extensive files with a wide variety of intelligence data were collected in the secret safes of the fascist general staff.
The multi-volume files of fascist intelligence contained detailed data not only on the topography, terrain, political, administrative and economic centers of England, but also on airfields, naval bases, landmarks for aviation, etc. The dossier contained numerous aerial photographs of cities, harbors, naval and air bases, equipped with very eloquent inscriptions and characteristics about the purposes of bombing and fascist sabotage. A separate volume contained spy information about Greater London.
The secret files of the Wehrmacht main headquarters contained spy materials about the British Air Force bases near Plymouth, about the docks in Birkenhead and Port Talbot and about many other objects1. Is it any wonder that in the summer and autumn of 1940, fascist aviation pilots carried out precise targeted bombing of London and Coventry, Birmingham and Portsmouth, Manchester and Hull.
Hitler and his henchmen considered the conquest of England almost a done deal. At a meeting held in the Reich Chancellery on July 21, attended by the leaders of the army, air force and navy, Hitler firmly announced the beginning of the decisive stage of the war against England. He had no doubt that victory over the enemy was imminent and therefore ordered “the completion of the main part of Operation Sea Lion” by September 152.
The German command (as well as the English Navy Ministry) believed that the most favorable time for landing troops in the stormy English Channel, taking into account the corresponding phase of the moon, high and low tide, was the period between September 15 and 30. True, during the preparation of the operation, fierce disputes arose between the commands of the three types of armed forces of the fascist “Reich” on the issue of the scale of the landing front.
The ambitious Goering, who commanded air force, did not want to play a modest role by participating in the general plan for the conquest of England. He believed that only the forces of German aviation could bring England to its knees. Therefore, the Air Force command developed its own plans, which were not coordinated with Halder and Raeder.
Goering assured the Fuhrer of the possibility of “bombing England out of the war,” arguing that the hardships of war and continuous bombing would lead to the overthrow of Churchill’s government, would frighten the enemy, break his will to fight and force English politicians to make peace with Germany.
German generals believed that success German plans landing in England will depend on whether Germany manages to achieve air superiority over the channel and the southern cities of England and destroy British aviation and airfields near London. Preparing loading ports, concentrating transports in the ports of France, clearing passages from mines and installing new minefields, covering the landing force from the air, landing it - all this, they believed, was impossible without establishing German Air Force dominance in the air.
A decision of “special importance.” Directive “On intensifying the air and sea war against England.”
At a secret military council on July 31, 1940, at Hitler’s Berghof, the fascist military leaders Keitel, Jodl, Brauchitsch, Halder, and Raeder made a decision of “special importance,” which largely determined the further course of the war.
At this council, plans for war were considered not so much against England as against the USSR. Hitler said that England was holding on only with the hope of support from the Soviet Union and the United States. If Russia, Hitler inspired the generals and admirals who silently listened to him, is crushed, Britain's last hope will be destroyed. Then Germany will be the ruler of Europe1.
The main conclusions of the meeting were Hitler's order to intensify preparations for the invasion of England and, if it did not take place, planning a war against the USSR for the spring of 1941. However, he did not allow the possibility of a war on two fronts.
As a follow-up to this order, the commander-in-chief of the German ground forces, Brauchitsch, issued “top secret instructions” on August 30 for the invasion of the British Isles. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief,” the directive read, “has ordered the armed forces to complete preparations for the landing in England. The purpose of the attack is to crush England as a base for continuing the war against Germany and, if necessary, to carry out its occupation.”2
The instructions defined tasks for the ground forces, navy and aviation. Hitler attached particular importance to German aviation in achieving victory over England. He told the audience: “If, after eight days of intense air war, German aircraft do not destroy a significant part of the enemy’s aircraft, ports and naval forces, the entire operation will have to be postponed until May 1941.”3
Hitler was faced with a dilemma - either immediately invade England and conquer it, or, as Churchill admitted, "he faced an endless continuation of the war with all the innumerable dangers and complications." Since, the Fuhrer believed, victory over England in the air would put an end to its resistance, the invasion of the British Isles would be only the finale to the end of the occupation of the country.
Therefore, on August 1, 1940, he signed Directive No. 17 “On intensifying the air and sea war against England.” “In order to create the preconditions for the final defeat of England,” it said, “I intend to continue the air and sea war against England more energetically than it has been so far.”4
German aviation was ordered to deliver crushing blows as soon as possible to aviation units, airfields and supply bases, and then to military installations, ports and especially food warehouses within the country. The Nazis wanted to break the resistance of the English people not only with the force of bombs, but also with the bony hand of hunger.
The 2nd and 3rd German air fleets deployed against England included 2,200 combat aircraft: 1,100 bombers, including 346 dive bombers, 900 single-engine fighters, 120 heavy twin-engine fighters5. According to inflated British data, England had at that time 240 bombers and 960 fighters.
In other words, the Germans could throw four bombers against every British fighter and more than two of their fighters against every British fighter. At the same time, Germany used only 1/3 of its air force against England.
"Battle of England". Invasion of the British Isles.
During June and early July, the Nazi air armies prepared to deliver a decisive blow to the British Isles.
After preliminary reconnaissance and test flights, the first large German air raid was carried out on July 10. The fierce “Battle of England” began. Three main stages of the German air offensive can be distinguished.
The first stage was from July 10 to August 18, when the main attacks of German aircraft were carried out on British military and merchant ships in the English Channel and on the southern ports of England from Dover to Plymouth. The German command set the task of involving British aviation in the battle and exhausting it, as well as striking at those seaports of Southern England that were to become targets of invasion under the Sea Lion plan.
At the second stage - from August 24 to September 27 - the German command sought to pave the way to London, eliminate British aviation and its bases, radar stations, as well as military-industrial facilities. The third and final stage came when Operation Sea Lion was postponed.
London, “the world’s largest target,” was subjected to especially fierce bombing. The residents of the capital suffered severe trials. From September 7 to November 3, for 57 nights in a row, German aircraft bombed the English capital and its environs.
On average, 200 bombers flew over London. The Nazis hoped to paralyze the British capital with a population of 7 million with fierce bombing, intimidate the English people and force the government to make peace. However, the Germans only sowed a storm of anger among the English people.
On the night of September 6, 68 German planes bombed London, but this was only reconnaissance. On September 7, 300 heavy bombers fiercely bombed London during the daytime. By order of Hitler, the main blow was struck at railway junctions and London docks, in the area of which the largest food warehouses with supplies for the entire country were located.
At the docks, a huge fire was raging from incendiary and high-explosive bombs: grain was burning; Molten sugar flowed out like fiery lava; the rubber was burning, enveloping the ashes in black acrid smoke; barrels of paint, whiskey and wine exploded.
From 20:00 to 07:00 in the morning, in the light of raging fires, another 250 bombers appeared over London. Thousands of Londoners - old people, women and children were buried under the ruins of houses and died in the flames.
German bombs hit the English Parliament building and turned many government buildings around Whitehall into ruins. Eight London churches designed by the immortal architect Christopher Wren have been reduced to ruins. Only the heroic efforts of Londoners managed to save St. Paul and the tombs of Wellington and Nelson.
Particularly fierce, “classic,” as Churchill called it, was the Nazi air raid on the citadel of England’s financial bosses, the City of London. The fires were Hitler’s “gratitude” for the millions of pounds sterling that the City of London bankers lent to the German fascists.
The bombs dropped on Buckingham Palace destroyed the palace church and uprooted the trees of the palace garden. Many times during the brutal bombings, the monarch of England, George, along with the prime minister, had to rush down to the unfinished shelter of Buckingham Palace.
Decisive turning point in the Battle of England
15. IX. 1940, according to Churchill, one of the decisive battles for England took place, a kind of “Battle of Waterloo”.
On this day, the German Air Force carried out its largest massive daytime raid on London, sending over 1,000 aircraft to the city. The largest air battle took place. That same day, Churchill left his residence at Checkers and arrived in Uxbridge, at the headquarters of Air Vice-Marshal Park, who commanded the 11th Air Group of the RAF.
Churchill was ushered into the operations center, located in a hardened bomb shelter 50 feet underground. He barely had time to descend when a message was immediately received that “more than 40” enemy aircraft had taken off from German airfields in the Dieppe area. Signals followed one after another: “60-plus” and then “80-plus.” More and more waves of attacking enemy aircraft were coming to bomb London.
All of Park's English squadrons got involved in a fierce battle. Churchill noticed the worry on the vice-marshal’s face and asked: “What other reserves do we have?” “There are no more reserves,” he answered quietly. The position of the British Air Force was desperate.
Who knows, Churchill recalled, what would have happened to England if the enemy had abandoned another hundred or two aircraft at a time when the British squadrons, forced to refuel and replenish ammunition every 70-80 minutes, were on the ground. But the Germans did not do this.
In the afternoon Churchill returned to Checkers. After resting, he called the chief private secretary, J. Martin, with the evening update. They were sad. “However,” Martin said, concluding his report, “all this is redeemed by the situation in the air. We shot down 183 aircraft, losing less than 40."
True, data obtained after the war showed that German aviation losses amounted to only 56 aircraft, and British ones - 26. Still, Churchill was inclined to consider September 15 a turning point in the “Battle of Britain.” Undoubtedly, the German air force command, which Churchill also admitted, made a serious strategic mistake by concentrating the main attacks on London.
Continuing raids on airfields would be much more dangerous for the fate of England. When German aircraft carried out massive attacks on airfields, they thereby jeopardized the operational centers and telephone communications of the British Air Force.
The entire complex system of organizing English fighter aviation was literally hanging by a thread, but when Goering transferred his bombing to London, the British fighter aviation command breathed freely. The history of the “Battle of Britain” was the history of Goering’s contradictory plans that were not fully implemented, and a haphazard change of priority targets for military bombing.
The German naval headquarters recognized the ineffectiveness of Goering’s “air war” without taking into account the requirements of naval warfare and outside the framework of Operation Sea Lion. In the form in which Goering waged this war, it “could not,” as the German naval headquarters admitted, “help prepare for Operation Sea Lion.”
As before, English ships operated almost unhindered in the English Channel and the Dover Canal. It was only at the end of September 1940 that Goering abandoned the hope of turning London into heaps of ruins.
The conventional wisdom that the German invasion of Britain in 1940 was stopped by the country's air force pilots is erroneous, because Hitler order to begin the seizure of the British Isles, no air force, no navy, no army of the island state could not oppose anything to the Wehrmacht, writes David Ax in an article for War is Boring.
The author notes that the armies of Great Britain and the Allies were subjected to attacks by ground and air forces in late May - early June 1940 Nazi Germany, were forced to evacuate from France. 338 thousand soldiers escaped from Dunkirk, leaving the Germans with 2.3 thousand artillery and 500 anti-tank guns, 600 tanks, and 64 thousand other mobile vehicles.
Thrown into British Army vehicles at Dunkirk. 1940
This accounted for almost half of the United Kingdom's heavy weapons, so over the next year the British army found itself powerless to defend the British Isles, as Hitler and his high command believed, began preparing plans for the invasion - Operation Sea Lion.
But the Nazi plans were thwarted by the British Air Force pilots, who inflicted such heavy damage on the German Luftwaffe - Berlin lost about 2 thousand aircraft, 2.6 thousand pilots and crew members, while London's losses amounted to 1.6 thousand aircraft - that Hitler was forced to call off the invasion.
This popular belief - like a large number of other beliefs about the Sea Lion - is wrong. According to Roberta Forczyk, author of We March Against England, the Germans could have established a bridgehead in Britain by the end of 1940.
Operation Sea Lion plan
First of all, because the defense of British airspace in mid-1940 was not decisive in slowing down the invasion, since the invasion did not depend on Luftwaffe superiority in the skies. A surprise German naval invasion at night, involving destroyers, barges and fishing boats, could come right under the noses of the RAF. Forczyk notes that if an invasion begins UK aircraft would be unable to stop the German advance. London's aviation was not the deterrent that stopped Berlin's plans.
The country's Navy also had little chance of stopping the Sea Lion. Thus, by the end of September 1940 - the date that the Germans considered the last time to begin the operation - only five of the country's 14 first-rank ships were in British territorial waters. Commander of the Royal Navy, Admiral Charles Forbes It was feared that these ships might be bombed by the Luftwaffe in the English Channel, so London relied primarily on destroyers and light ships, supported by a few cruisers, to counter any invasion. Forbes believed that the army and air force would be enough to stop the German advance.
London subsequently convinced Forbes to send one old battleship to defend against the invasion, but in the event of an attack, it would take him several hours to arrive at the battlefield.
The Royal Navy's plan in the event of an offensive was to send 40 destroyers and four cruisers in two groups to attack the landing force from the east and west. However, before the British ships could come into contact with the German forces, they had to be attacked from the air and also pass through minefields. This had to be done at night, given that Berlin planned to send four heavily armed flotillas. Although the United Kingdom's submarines might have fared better, the surface fleet's chances of stopping the invasion were slim.
The country's army was also not ready to withstand the landing of Wehrmacht forces six months after Dunkirk, since it lacked both heavy weapons and mobile transport. The British Army also followed an outdated concept more suited to the First World War.
Moreover, due to the failed intervention in France, a very large number of young officers died, so many units lacked trained commanders. In this regard, such units would hardly be able to develop new tactics in the event of a German landing.
Thus, if neither the professionalism of the RAF, nor the plans of the Navy, nor the Army could stop the advance, then Why didn't Germany take over the British Isles? The simple answer to this question is the Soviet Union. Hitler postponed Operation Sea Lion indefinitely in order to devote resources to the capture of the USSR, where millions of Germans would subsequently die and cause the fall of the Third Reich (see.
In the difficult summer of 1940 for England, full of trials and the bitterness of defeat, the fascist German command, intoxicated by military successes, carried out the practical development of plans to seize the British Isles, which went down in history under the coded name “Seelöwe” (Sea Lion).
As it became known from captured German archives, soon after the attack on Poland, the German Navy Ministry began studying the problem of invading England. Grand Admiral Raeder, who commanded the fascist fleet, already on November 29, 1939, presented the first draft of a plan for the invasion of fascist armies into the British Isles 1.
He considered the preconditions for an invasion of England to be the establishment of complete control over the ports and estuaries of the French, Belgian and Dutch coasts and the creation of appropriate bases here. Therefore, for the time being, the project of invading the British Isles was only theoretical.
After Dunkirk and the completion of the defeat of France, all these conditions were met, and Admiral Raeder could propose such a plan to Hitler. He, indeed, hastened to do this when it became clear that the defeat of the English and French armies was essentially a foregone conclusion.
Back on May 21, Raeder, in a conversation with Hitler in Charleville, raised the question of landing in England 2 . At a secret meeting with Hitler on June 20, 1940, with the participation of Keitel, who was responsible for the highest strategic planning of the fascist wars, Brauchitsch, Halder, Heusinger, Raeder and others, the Nazi leaders decided to invade England 3 .
The landing, according to Raeder's proposal, was to be preceded by a vigorous air offensive with the main attack directed against the English navy. To others an important condition The offensive was the conquest of air supremacy by German aviation.
10 days after the meeting of fascist leaders, the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the OKB, Jodl, presented Hitler with a memorandum stating that if it was not possible to end the war with England by political means, then it must be brought to its knees by force.
For a landing in England, Jodl pointed out, at least 30 divisions must be deployed, against which the British will not be able to deploy more than 20 formations. Jodl's note was the basis for all further plans for preparing for war with England.
IN last week June and early July, the German military command began to work closely on the plan for the conquest of the British Isles. On 01.VII.1940, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Halder, discussed the issue of war against England with the Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces, Admiral Schniewind, in Berlin.
1 Wheatley R. Op.cit., p.3-4.
2 Klee K. Das Unternehmen “Seelöwe”. Gottingen, 1958, p.57.
3 Reeder E. Mein Leben. Tubingen, 1957, pp.228-229.
Thus, Operation Catapult, as its critics feared, was at least - from a purely naval point of view - only half successful. Disgusted by this, as he put it, “dirty business,” Admiral Sommerville wrote in a letter to his wife: “I am afraid that I will get a big scolding from the Admiralty for allowing a battle cruiser to escape... I would not be surprised if after this I am removed from command . I won’t object because it was a completely unnecessary and bloody idea... To tell the truth, I didn’t like it.” He also called the attack "the greatest political mistake of our time", confident that it would turn the whole world against England. Captain Holland was so shocked by what happened that he asked to be relieved of command of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal.
In London, Winston Churchill outlined this “deplorable episode” to a silent House of Commons. He paid tribute to the courage of the French sailors, but stubbornly defended the inevitability of this “deadly blow.” When he finished his speech, once again emphasizing Britain's determination to "carry on the war with the greatest energy," all members of the House jumped to their feet in a long and tumultuous voice of approval. Tears rolled down Churchill's cheeks as he returned to his seat.
At Mers el-Kebir, Admiral Zhansoul buried more than 1,200 officers and sailors, of whom 210 died on his flagship. Of the leading characters in this tragedy, Zhansoul was consigned to oblivion and was not rehabilitated either by the Vichy government or by post-war France. Admiral Darlan was assassinated in Algiers in December 1942 by a young French royalist.
Of the ships that took part in this battle, the mighty Hood exploded and was lost with almost its entire crew in a battle with the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941 - a shell hit the powder magazine. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal was sunk by a German submarine in November 1941. The proud Strasbourg, like almost all the other French ships that escaped from Mers-el-Kébir, was scuttled by its crew at Toulon when German troops invaded the “previously unoccupied” zone of France in November 1942.
From any point of view, the "death blow" at Mers el-Kebir cast a long shadow over Anglo-French relations. Could it have been avoided? Was it necessary?
Historically, the most important consequence of Operation Catapult was its impact on Franklin Roosevelt and public opinion in the United States. In July 1940, Churchill's appeals to the Americans had a tangible effect on them, but the Americans doubted that Great Britain would be willing or able to continue the fight alone. One of the most influential (and vocal) skeptics of England's ability was the Anglophobe Joseph P. Kennedy, the American ambassador to London. Therefore, when deciding to sink the fleet of his former ally, Churchill undoubtedly took into account the impact of his move on America. It is not for nothing that in his memoirs, speaking about Mers el-Kebir, he pointed out: “It became clear that the English war cabinet was afraid of nothing and would stop at nothing.”
A few months later, Harry Hopkins, who enjoyed the full confidence of the American president, would report that this dramatic attack on the French fleet was more than anything else to convince Roosevelt of Churchill's (and Britain's) determination to continue the war.
Len Deighton
Any war is full of surprises and sudden events. Second World War was replete with them: from the fall of France to the two nuclear bombs dropped on Japanese cities in August 1945. However, no event was as unexpected as the air battles between the British air force and the Luftwaffe that broke out over England in the summer of 1940.
Operation Sea Lion
Undoubtedly, after the fall of France, Hitler - and most of his advisers - would have preferred peace negotiations with England. Mussolini's son-in-law, Count Ciano, noted in his diary: “Hitler now looks like a gambler who, having hit a big jackpot, would like to leave the gambling table without taking any more risks.”
Hitler was so convinced that the game was over and England had lost that he disbanded 15 of his divisions and transferred 25 divisions to peacetime states. But the British also turned out to be gamblers, they wanted to take risks and win back.
In mid-July 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 16. It began with the following phrase: “Since England, despite her hopeless military situation, shows no signs of readiness to come to a compromise, I have decided to prepare landing operation against England and, if necessary, carry it out." The operation was given the code name "Sea Lion". Many historians argue that the above phrase indicates that Hitler did not seriously intend to carry out this operation. A more convincing confirmation of the unreality of Directive No. 16 is the timing of readiness for its implementation: “All preparations must be completed by mid-August.”
Having received this directive, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral Raeder, responded to it immediately. The admirals agreed with her, however, pointing out that no dates for action could be determined until the Luftwaffe had gained air superiority over the Strait of Dover (English Channel). At the same time, they presented their draft operation, and on July 28, the command of the ground forces carefully studied it. Naval operators proposed a landing area near Dover. Using the narrowest part of the strait, they could lay minefields on the flanks of the corridor along which the ships of the invasion force would move. Despite the difficulties of operating in the shallow areas of the English Channel, there would be a group of submarines in them, while another group would cover the flank facing North Sea. According to calculations, the navy needed 10 days to deliver the first shock wave of the landing force to the English coast. The command of the ground forces was horrified by these calculations.
The army informed the fleet of the need to land troops on the section of the southern coast of England from Folkestone to Brighton (the main direction) and in the Cherbourg - Plymouth direction (a diversionary landing). The ground forces needed tanks and vehicles, which meant using all ferries to transport vehicles, as well as cross-strait facilities. The first echelon of troops was supposed to land on the shore in three days. The priority targets for capture were large areas of southern England, stretching almost all the way to London. If we take all this seriously, the first echelon should have included 280 thousand people, 30 thousand units Vehicle and tanks and 60 thousand horses! After reviewing the fleet's proposals, the Wehrmacht's Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch and his Chief of Staff Halder firmly stated: "We cannot carry out our part of this operation with the help of the means provided by the Navy."
On July 31, Hitler summoned the commanders-in-chief of the ground and naval forces to his dacha in the Bavarian Alps, near Berchtesgaden. Raeder was the first to convey his point of view. Preparations are proceeding as quickly as circumstances allow. The naval forces scoured all the ports of occupied Europe in search of suitable vehicles, but their conversion for military purposes and delivery to the ports of the Bay of Dover could not be completed before 15 September. In view of Army demands for landings on a wider front and the prospect of autumn storms, it would be better to plan the landings for May 1941, Raeder said.
Hitler was not angry at this proposal, but pointed out that the British army would be better prepared to repel an invasion the following year, and noted that the weather in May was unlikely to be much better than in September.
After sending Raeder home, Hitler continued to review the plan for Operation Sea Lion with the command of the ground forces. On one point he went so far as to express doubts about the “technical feasibility” of the entire operation. However, no doubts of this kind were reflected in the directive issued the next day. It was signed by Field Marshal Keitel and came from the Wehrmacht High Command, personally controlled by Hitler. Preparations were to be completed by September 15. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe had to launch an offensive in large forces. Depending on the results of the air raids at the end of August, Hitler had to decide on an invasion.
