In the initial period of the war, our fighter aviation suffered heavy losses, and often could not cover Soviet troops at the front edge and in the front-line strip. Using this, German fighters-bombers, pixers and attack aircraft applied heavy losses by Soviet troops and refugee columns. Especially from the noges suffered strongly suffered by the infantry parts on the march, railway formulations on the distillations and transport columns. The situation was aggravated by the acute shortage of anti-aircraftic agents intended for the immediate cover of the troops. The pre-war Soviet industry did not have time to fully equip the troops with the necessary anti-aircraft weapons, part of the air defense and divisional air defense, as of June 22, 1941, were equipped with anti-aircraft machine guns by only 61%. For the most part, in the troops there were installation of rifle caliber, created on the basis of Maxim Machine. The share of large-caliber 12.7-mm machine guns to the beginning of the war was very small.
In 1941, the main military air defense age was the quadructural 7.62-mm anti-aircraft gunner M4 arr. 1931 The installation was four Maxim Machines Maxim. 1910/30 g, mounted on an anti-aircraft machine in the same plane. For better cooling machine-gun trunks with intensive shooting, a device forced water circulation was used. With a good density of fire, the anti-aircraft installation M4 was too heavy. Its mass in combat position along with the system of forced water cooling and the welded frame for installation in the car body reached 400 kg.
The quarrellied installation, as a rule, was installed on cargo half-sighters, on railway platforms and even in the sled. In February 1943, 7.62-mm machine-gun installations, as obsolete, brought out of the composition of anti-aircraft regiments and anti-aircraft divisions of the reserve of the chief command. They were replaced by more efficient 12.7-mm large-caliber machine guns, but in the secondary sections of the front, the surviving M4 was used until the end of the fighting. Anti-aircraft Maxims throughout the war were part of machine-tube platforms on anti-aircraft armored trains and were installed on anti-aircraft platforms that covered echelons and individual stations.
Paired anti-aircraft installation arr. 1930
In addition to the tightened plants, in smaller quantities to the beginning of the war in the troops there were tween arr. 1930 g and single anti-aircraft plants arr. 1928, when they were created, infantry machine guns Maxim were also used. All of them had water cooling, and the pace of shooting 600 duct / min per trunk. Table range of air targets was 1,500 m. In practice, the effective shooting range by airplanes did not exceed 800 m. Quite often, the Maxim Machines on anti-aircraft machines were forced to be used to reflect the adversary infantry attacks. In this case, for firing was used for the infantry machine guns, racking sights.
Calculation of the anti-aircraft installation of the ORP. 1928 leads air target fire in Stalingrad
The general disadvantage of anti-aircraft installations based on Maxim Machine was an excessive weight and unacceptably a great time of translation from hiking in a combat position. Before the reflection of the raid the enemy aviation was required to fill the casing with water, otherwise the trunk was quickly overheated and the machine gun could not fire.
In the 30s for the cavalry parts, a special anti-aircraft machine was produced, mounted on a machine-gun tachang. The disadvantage of such a machine was the limit of the possible sector of anti-aircraft fire. In this regard, anti-aircraft guns with a circular fire were required to cover from air strikes from air to the cavalrymen. But since the quadrupteed M4 was overly heavy and cumbersome, for the Tachaca mounted paired Obra settings. 1930
For firing on the air enemy on the front, Maxim Machines were used. 1910/30, on a universal tripod-wheel machine S.V. Vladimirov Ob 1931, who allowed fire, both ground and air targets.
Maxim machine gun on a universal machine S.V. Vladimirov Ob 1931
The machine gun was completed with a ring anti-aircraft gun, allowing shooting on aircraft flying at a speed of up to 320 km / h at an altitude of up to 1500 m. However, on its advanced installation, as a rule, they were not bored and fired by aircraft using a regular racky sight, which certainly reduced efficiency anti-aircraft fire. However, the mass production of machine guns on a universal machine began only in 1939. In view of the major complexity of Machines, Vladimirov, not so much released. For this reason, in the troops they were several times less than machine guns on the wheel station A.A. Sokolova arr. Nevertheless, Maxim Machine gunners on a universal machine were used throughout the war.
In order to somehow cover yourself from blows from the air, the troops created improvised anti-aircraft installations. Most often for this, machine guns mounted moss, mounted on hand-made swivels, or simply TVs with an axis covered in the ground.
Machine gun DT-29 in the position for anti-aircraft shooting on the Light armored car BA-64
In the initial period of the war, part of the Soviet armored vehicles was equipped with anti-aircraft tunnels P-40 with DT-29 machine guns. The tank option was created taking into account the installation of the machine gun in the close combat department. Instead of wooden butt, there was a retractable metallic. With DT-29 machine gun dismantled the casing designed to protect the hand arrow from burns about the trunk, it made it possible to reduce the dimensions and improved cooling.
According to regulatory documents, one combat vehicle in a tank or armor automotive company should have been equipped with an additional anti-aircraft machine gun. The first anti-aircraft trains on T-26 tanks were tested even during hostilities in Spain. By virtue of the convenience of the installation and simplicity of the design of Tourly, P-40 was quite large distribution. They were also installed on armored trains, armored vehicles, motorcycles and cars of increased passability of GAZ-64 and GAZ-67. Compared to Da-27, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire from the DT-29 turner variant was higher, which was determined by the best stability, the possibility of circular shelling, a more capacious disk on 63 ammunition and the presence of a special anti-aircraft ring sight. Not the last role was played by the best preparation of tankers when playing fire by airplanes.
TURKE P-40 with DT-29 machine gun on armoredagon
In the fall of 1941, in the KB of the Kovrovsky factory, a quadse-fastened anti-aircraft installation of DT-29 machine guns was created. Machine guns were installed horizontally in two rows on the chariot machine. The total pace of shooting was 2400 duct / min. However, according to the results of tests in mass production, the installation was not transmitted.
By June 1941, a significant number of obsolete aircraft guns yes, Da-2 and PV-1 accumulated in warehouses. The two first had a lot in common with infantry DP-27, and the second is an adapted for use in aviation Maxim Machine gun, with air cooling and increased to 750 duct / min pace of shooting. As for yes and da-2, there was no single standard for use as zenith.
One of the options for an anti-aircraft gun unit using Da-2
The machine guns were mounted on the turret or the simplest swivels created on the former civilian enterprises or in armory workshops in the front-line strip.
Preserved anti-aircraft installation Da-2 in the exposition of the museum
The use of Degtyarev's aircraft gunners was facilitated by the fact that they were originally equipped with sights designed to keep fire for quickly moving air targets.
Since the principle of operation of automation Yes and Da-2 did not differ from DP-27 and DT-29, surrogate anti-aircraft plants were quickly mastered in the troops. Machine guns were equipped with 63 cartridges. Noticeable external differences yes from DT-29 was that instead of the butt, a nailed wooden pistol handle and a back handle were installed. On the paired Da-2 there was a shortened shoulder emphasis. Paired machine guns were equipped with large flamesakers, to prevent blinding the arrow.
Anti-aircraft installation of a wool in a weapon workshop
Single and paired cabins were mounted on the tremendous machines made in weapon workshops, providing circular shelling and height adjustment. Responsibilities for the maintenance of fire and maintenance of machine-gun installations, as a rule, were assigned to aircraft technicians and guns.
In 1939, to replace Maxim Machine to the troops, the Machine Machine of DS-39, developed by V.A. Degtyar. Compared to Maxim Machine, a new machine gun was much easier. For firing for air targets Designer GS Garanin has developed a trenalog anti-aircraft machine to the machine gun.
DS-39 on a trental anti-aircraft
Externally, DS-39 resembles a reduced large-caliber machine gun DShK. Compared to the Machine Machine gun, the DS-39 machine gun was much easier and had air cooling, after intense shooting, its barrel could be quickly replaced by the spare. The machine gun was equipped with a firing pace switch for ground (600 duct / min) and air targets (1200 duct / min). Before the war, Degtyarev created a quarreled anti-aircraft installation, which was tested in the bodies "half-timers", but she was not produced serially.
However, with all its meritors, DS-39 could not oust the outdated machine gun of Maxim. This is partly to blame the military themselves, not ready to abandon the plated machine-gun tapes, which ensured the unification with the machine guns already exist in the troops. Initially, Degtyarev designed his machine gun under the metal tape, and the transition to the deck had a negative impact on the reliability of the automation functioning. In addition, DS-39 was more sensitive to low temperatures and dusting. Degtyarev guaranteed that its machine gun can be brought to an acceptable level of operational reliability, but in June 1941, the mass production of DS-39 has stopped and returned to the assembly of Maximen Machines.
The Soviet leadership perfectly understood the need to replace Maxim Machines. Although the available machine guns allowed intensive fire, they were well mastered and loved in the troops, their excessive weight made it difficult to accompany the advancing infantry. So far, our troops behaved defensive battles, it was not so critical, but with the transition to offensive operations, all the shortcomings of an outdated machine gun manifested themselves to the fullest.
In 1943, the SG-43 designer P.M. was defeated in the competition for a new machine machine gun Goriunova. Unlike Maxim, the new machine gun had a replaceable air cooler trunk. The machine gun was installed on the wheeled Machine of Degtyarev, or on the Machine Sidorenko - Malinovsky. Both options allowed fire for land and air targets.
SG-43 prepared for anti-aircraft shooting
The appliance of the machine gun included a rocker anti-aircraft gun, calculated on the maintenance of fire targets, moving at a speed of up to 600 km / h on the range of up to 1000 m.
In addition to domestic anti-aircraft gunners in the Red Army during the war years, foreign samples were used - trophy and lend-lease: American 7,62-mm Browning M1919A4, 12,7-mm Browning M2, 7.62 and 7.7-mm British Vickers Motors , as well as trophy 7.92 mm MG-13, MG-15, Mg-34 and Mg-42 machine guns.
Red Army teams are taken captive by the pilot BF 109, which committed a forced landing
To reduce losses, German pilots were forced to increase the height of the bombing, and with a strong rifle-machine-gun shelling from the ground, avoid storming using machine-gun weapons.
FW 190 who has committed a forced landing in the Soviet Middle Rim
Anti-tank guns significantly exceeded the range of fire and the devastating effect in the event of all other types of infantry small arms in the goal. From heavy 14.5-mm bullets did not save even the heaviest armor of the HS-129 and FW 190F attack aircraft. Noticeable losses from the fire of Soviet PTRs in 1942, the picing bombers JU 87 were carried.
Downed Ju 87.
From anti-tank guns, they repeatedly managed to knock down the FW 189 adjustments to our infantry, the pilots of which kept the height of more than 1000 m - outside the zone of efficient fire from the rifles.
This is how such an episode was described by the Military Correspondent Lieutenant P. Kozlov in the newspaper 236th Rifle Division "To Glory Motherland" of May 25, 1944:
"All fighters quickly dispersed and lay down. Machine gunners, armor-friendly all. Who had a weapon, adapted it to shooting on the aircraft. Having made a circle over a springboard, "Rama" continued his course. Krasnoarmeytsy T.T. The treated and swan installed the anti-tank rifle of Simonov's design on the tubercle and waited for a convenient point for the opening of fire. "Fokke-Wulf" approached their defense area.
Taking the control of 3 figures, drovely produced several shots. The smoke of the gaps of thermal bullets lay ahead of the fascist vulture.
Then the trezark took a chance of 1.5 figures less and shot.
The enemy plane shuddered slightly and glanced. And after a few seconds, "Rama" smoked and the burning torch flew down.
- Hooray! - Fighters shouted from joy, "Fokke-Wulf" burns ...
This example convincingly shows that infantry weapons can be successfully reflected by the raid of enemy aviation. At the same time, the following requirements must be followed: to be calm, in time to hide in the gap, disguise. And as soon as the aircraft decreases, lead aiming fire on it.
Armor-friendly drove and swan from the commander of the part received gratitude and presented to government awards. "
In the modern war, the leadership of the Red Army was concerned about the creation of modern air defense agents.
The royal inheritance in the form of: 76 mm of zenith lander guns, a few 40-mm Vickers machines and semi-pedars Maxim machine guns, not satisfied with modern requirements.
The first Soviet anti-aircraft installation was designed by M.N. Kondakov under the machine gun of the Maxim Obr. 1910 It was made in the form of a tripod and connected to the machine gun with the help of hellum. Possessing simplicity and reliability, installation of the arr. 1928 Provided circular shelling and big elevation angles.
It was accepted by a ring sight, designed for firing on airplanes moving at a speed of up to 320 km / h at a distance of up to 1500 m. In the future, with an increase in flight speed, the scope was repeatedly modernized.
In the PKB of the Tula Armory In 1930, a paired anti-aircraft plant was designed, which turned out to be much more massive. The possibility of fire from each machine gun was preserved separately, which reduced the consumption of cartridges during a shot.
She also enacted, although for a number of reasons did not receive much spread.
Due to the need to equip the air defense troops with more powerful installations capable of providing a massive fire known to the gunsmith N.F. Tocherev was created a typical anti-aircraft mounting machine gun Maxim Obr. 1931
She possessed high rapidity, good maneuverability, permanent combat. Archery for air targets from her was carried out with the help of the same sights that in single and paired installations.
Due to the presence of a liquid cooling system and a large tape tape, it was for its time effective tool Fighting low-fatty aircraft. Possessed high combat rainfrength and density of fire.
A good combat effectiveness of the installation, first applied in combat on Hassan, noted foreign military observers who were present in the Japanese army.
The quarrellgent installation of the Tokarev system was the first complex anti-aircraft installation adopted by armament of the ground forces.
During the Great Patriotic War, the quarrellized anti-aircraft plant was successfully used to cover the troops, important military facilities and cities, was repeatedly used with great efficiency to combat the live enemy power.
After taking into service the aviation rapid machine gun cabad, in 1936. The serial release of a spray anti-aircraft installation began. However, the waters did not fit. For this machine gun, special release cartridges were required, the use of conventional infantry ammunition led to a large number of delays in shooting. The machine gun turned out to be little adapted for service on Earth: complicated in design and sensitive to pollution.
Most of the existing anti-aircraft installations with machine guns of the cab was used for airfield airfields, where there were conditioned ammunition and qualified service.
In the initial period of the war, to strengthen the air defense and compensation of incurred losses, it was decided to use the aircraft gunners of PV-1, and Da-2 available in warehouses.
It was decided to follow the path of maximum simplification, without a significant reduction in combat efficiency.
Based on PV-1 N.F.Tokarev in August 1941. CPU was created. In 1941-42 626 such installations were made.
Significant part of them were used in the defense of Stalingrad.
Paired and single aviation machine guns and designs V.A.Tegtyreva mounted on the simplest swivel.
Often it happened in the military workshops, in the field. Despite the relatively low pace of shooting and disk shop with a capacity of only 63 patrons, these installations played a role in the initial period of war.
During the war in connection with the increase in the survival of aircraft, the value of the rifle caliber installations in the fight against the association of the enemy falls noticeably, and they are inferior to the championship of the large-caliber machine gun DSHK, although they continue to play a definite role.
February 26, 1939 Decision of the Defense Committee is adopted 12.7-mm. DSHK machine gun (Degtyarev-Schpagina-Schpagina) on a versatile Machinery Kolesnikov. For firing for air targets, the machine gun was equipped with special anti-aircraft tariffs. The first machine guns entered the troops in 1940. But by the beginning of the war in the troops there were still very little.
DShK became a powerful means of fighting enemy aviation, having high armored aircraft, it significantly exceeded the CPU of the 7.62-mm caliber. by the range and highness of effective fire. Thanks to the positive qualities of the DSHK machine guns, the number of them in the army constantly grew.
During the war, paired and construction of DSHK installations were designed and manufactured.
In addition to domestic machine guns for anti-aircraft shooting, those supplied by Land Lases were used: 7.62 mm "Browning" M1919A4 and large-caliber 12.7-mm. "Browning" m2, as well as trophy MG-34 and MG-42.
Especially in the troops, powerful quented 12.7-mm were valued. Installations of the M17 of American production mounted on the chassis of a half-sized armored personnel carrier M3.
These SAUs showed themselves a very effective means of protecting the tank parts and compounds on the march from the air attack.
In addition, M17 was successfully used about the time of battles in cities, driving a dense fire on the upper floors of buildings.
The pre-war industry of the USSR could not fully equip the troops with the necessary anti-aircraft weapons, the war-ended defense of the USSR on June 22, 1941 was equipped with anti-aircraft machine guns by only 61%.
No less difficult situation was with large-caliber machine guns. Joyanka 1942. In the current army there were only 720 pcs. However, with the transition to military rails, the industry in all increasing volumes of troops is saturated with weapons.
Six months in the army already -1947 pcs. DSHK, and by January 1, 1944.-8442 pcs. For two years, the number has increased almost 12 times.
The value of machine-gun fire in military aircraft And the country's air defense stored throughout the war. Of the 3837 opponent aircraft, shot down by the troops of the fronts from June 22, 1941 to June 22, 1942, 295 accounted for anti-aircraft machine guns, 268 - on a rifle-machine-gun fire forces. From June 1942, the state of the Army Zhenitel-Artillery Regiment included the company DSHK, which had 8 machine guns, and from February 1943 - 16 machine guns.
Formed from November 1942, the anti-aircraft artillery divisions (Zenad) of the RVGK had one such as the same company in each shelf of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. It is sufficiently characterized by a sharp increase in the number of large-caliber machine guns in the troops in 1943-1944. Only during the preparation for the Kursk battle on the fronts 520 12.7 mm machine guns was directed. True, since the spring of 1943, the number of DSHK in Zenad decreased from 80 to 52 while increasing the number of guns from 48 to 64, and according to the updated spring of 1944, the state, Zenad had 88 anti-aircraft guns and 48 DSHK machine guns. But with the order of the defense addict of March 31, 1943. From April 5, an anti-airflower regiment was introduced into the state of tank and mechanized buildings (16 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and 16 large-caliber machine guns, the same regiment was introduced into the composition of the cavalry case), in The state of tank, mechanized and motorized brigades - anti-aircraft machine gun Rota with 9 large-caliber machine guns. In early 1944, anti-aircraft gunners of 18 DShK were introduced into the state of some rifle divisions.
DSHK machine guns were usually rounded. Thus, the anti-aircraft-pavement company of the division is usually four platforms (12 machine guns) covered the area of \u200b\u200bfireproof artillery, two platforms (6 machine guns) - the command center of the division.
Anti-aircraft machine guns were introduced into the composition of anti-aircraft batteries of the middle caliber to cover them from the enemy attacks from small heights. Machine gunners often successfully interacted with air defense fighters - concing the enemy fighters with fire, they provided their depreciation from their pilots. Anti-aircraft guns usually have no further than 300-500 m from the front edge of the defense. They covered advanced units, control points, front-line railway and highways.
A very difficult time for the beginning of the war was the situation with anti-aircraft artillery.
As of June 22, 1941, there was:
-1370 pcs. 37 mm. Automatic anti-aircraft guns arr.1939 (61-K)
-805 pcs. 76 mm. Field Guns arr.1900 on anti-aircraft installations of Ivanov's system
-539 pcs. 76 mm. Anti-aircraft guns arr. 1914/15 Lander Systems
-19 pcs. 76 mm. Anti-aircraft guns arr. 1915/28
-3821 pc.76-mm. Anti-aircraft guns arr. 1931 (3rd)
-750 pc.76-mm. Anti-aircraft guns arr. 1938
-2630 pcs. 85 mm. arr. 1939 (52-K)
A significant part of them were hopelessly outdated systems, with weak ballistics that do not have anti-aircraft control devices (Poazo).
Let us dwell on the guns that have real combat value.
37 mm. The automatic anti-aircraft gun arr.1939 was the only small-caliber machine adopted to the war, it was created on the basis of the Swedish 40-mm Bofors gun.
37 mm Automatic anti-aircraft gun of the 1939 sample is a single-barreled small-caliber automatic anti-aircraft gun on a four-star faucet with an intendable four-wheeled stroke.
Automation of the gun is based on the use of the power of the return on the scheme with a short barrel rollback. All the actions necessary for the production of shots (opening the shutter after a shot with an extraction of the sleeve, the shooting of the drummer, feeding the cartridges to the cartridge, closing the shutter and the descent of the drummer) are automatically produced. Manual is aiming, guidance to the gun and the feed routine with the cartridges in the store.
According to the management of the gun, its main task was recognized by the struggle against air targets on the range of up to 4 km and at altitudes up to 3 km. If necessary, the cannon can be successfully used for firing targets, including software and armored vehicles.
During the Bottle of 1941, anti-aircraft guns suffered significant losses - until September 1, 1941, 841 instruments were lost, and in just 1941 - 1204 guns. Huge losses with difficulty were filled with production - on January 1, 1942 there were about 1600 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. On January 1, 1945 there were about 19,800 implements. However, this amount includes 40 mm. Booth guns supplied by Land Lases.
61-K for the Great Patriotic War were the main means of air defense of the Soviet troops in the front-line strip.
Shortly before the war, a 25-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun of the 1940 sample (72-K) was created, borrowed a number of structural solutions from 37 mm. 61-K But by the beginning of the fighting in the troops she did not hit.
The anti-aircraft machines 72-K were intended for air defense of the level of the rifle regiment and in the Red Army position between the large-caliber anti-aircraft gunners of the DSHK and more powerful 37-mm anti-aircraft guns 61-K. However, the use of exchange charge for an anti-aircraft with a small gauge strongly reduced practical rapidity.
Due to the difficulty with the development of their serial production, a significant number of 25-mm anti-aircraft guns appeared in the Red Army only in the second half of the war. Anti-aircraft machines 72-K and paired installations 94-km on their basis were successfully applied against low-teeth and divergent purposes. By the number of instances released, they strongly yielded 37-mm. machine guns.
The most numerous at the time of the war is 76 mm. Anti-aircraft gun arr. 1931 (3rd) was created on the basis of the German 7.5-cm anti-aircraft 7.5 CM Flak L / 59 of the Rainmetall Firms within military cooperation with Germany. Original samples made in Germany, in February-April 1932, were tested on the research anti-aircraft polygon. In the same year, the gun was adopted under the name "76 mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1931. "
For her, a new projectile was developed, with a bottle shape of the sleeve, which was used only in anti-aircraft guns.
76 mm Anti-aircraft gun arr. 1931 is a semi-automatic cannon, as the opening of the shutter, the extraction of shooting sleeves and closing the shutter during the shooting is automatically produced, and the filming of the cartridges in the cartridge and the shot are made manually. The presence of semi-automation mechanisms ensures high combat gunfire guns - up to 20 shots per minute. The lifting mechanism allows you to fire in the range of the corners of the vertical fitting from -3 ° to + 82 °. In the horizontal plane of shooting can be carried out in any direction.
Gun arr. 1931 was a completely modern tool with good ballistic characteristics. Her faucets with four folding beds provided a circular shelling, and with the weight of the shell of 6.5 kg, the vertical range of shooting was 9 km. A significant disadvantage of the gun was that the transfer of it from a hiking position in combat occupied relatively long time (more than 5 minutes) and was a rather laborious operation.
Several dozen guns were installed on Yag-10 trucks. SAU received the 29k index.
In the body of a cargo car YAG-10 with a reinforced bottom, the swinging part of the 76.2-mm anti-aircraft gun arrived. 1931 (3K) on the standard end. To increase the stability of the platform during shooting, the gun tube was omitted relative to the platform by 85 mm. The car was complemented by four folding "paws" - the stops of the "jack-type". The body was supplemented with protective armored shields, which in the fighting position were highlighted horizontally, increasing the tool service area. In front of the cabin installed two chargers with ammunition (2x24 cartridges). The folding sides were places for four calculation numbers "in the campaign".
On the basis of the gun 3-K, a 76-mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1938 sample was developed. The weapon is also installed on a new, four-wheeled wagon. What significantly reduced the deployment time and increased the speed of transportation of the system. In the same year, a synchronous-monitoring drive of the system of academician M. P. Kostenko was developed.
However, the growth of speeds and the "ceiling" of aircraft, an increase in their survivability demanded an increase in the reach of anti-aircraft guns in height and increasing the power of the projectile.
76-mm designed in Germany. The anti-aircraft gun had an increased margin of safety. Calculations have shown that it is possible to increase the gauge of the gun to 85 mm.
The main advantage of the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun before its predecessor is a 76-mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1938 sample - in the increased power of the projectile, which created a greater volume of lesion in the target area.
Due to the extremely compressed deadlines allocated for development new system, leading designer G.D.Dorokhin decided to impose an 85-mm trunk on the platform of 76-mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1938, using the shutter and semiating of this tool.
To reduce returns, a muzzle brake was installed. After the conversion tests, the anti-aircraft gun was launched into mass production on a simplified faucet (with a four-wheeled carriage) 76,2-mm anti-aircraft gun arr. 1938
Thus, a qualitatively new anti-aircraft gun was created minimal costs and in a short time.
In order to increase the accuracy of aircraft shooting, the batteries of 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were completed with the controls of the control of artillery anti-aircraft fire Poazo-3, which allowed to solve the task of the meeting and produce the coordinates of the preemptive point of the target within the range of 700-12000 m, at an altitude of up to 9600 m at The base of the base up to 2000 m. In Poazo-3, an electrical simultaneous transmission of the data generated on the gun was used, which ensured the high rates of fire and its accuracy, as well as the possibility of firing on maneuvering purposes.
85 mm. The anti-aircraft gun 52-K became the most perfect Soviet anti-aircraft gun of the middle caliber of the time of war. In 1943 In order to increase the service and performance characteristics and reducing the cost of production, it was upgraded.
Very often, the Soviet anti-aircraft guns of the middle caliber were used for firing for terrestrial purposes, especially in anti-tank defense. Zenitics sometimes became the only barrier on the path of German tanks.
Anti-air defense funds played a very important role in the Great Patriotic War. According to official data, during the war land means 21,645 aircraft aircraft, including anti-aircraft guns of a caliber of 76 mm and more - 4047 aircraft, anti-aircraft guns - 1401 aircraft, anti-aircraft guns - 2401 planes, rifle and machine guns - 540 aircraft
But it is impossible not to note a number of misses in creating air defense.
In addition to the obviously not satisfactory quantitative saturation of the troops with anti-aircraft weapons, there were serious shortcomings in the design and creation of new samples.
In 1930, the USSR and the German firm "Rainmetall" represented by the submarine LLC "Bütst" concluded an agreement for the supply of a number of samples of artillery weapons, including automatic anti-aircraft guns. According to the terms of the contract, the company "Reinmetal" in the USSR, two samples of 20 mm automatic anti-aircraft gun and complete design documentation for this tool were delivered. It was adopted in the Soviet Union for weapons under the official name "20 mm automatic anti-aircraft and anti-tank gun arr. 1930. " However, in the USSR for production reasons, they could not bring them to an acceptable level of reliability. In Germany, this machine that received 2 CM Flugabwehrkanone 30 was adopted and massively applied to the very end of the war.
At the end of 1937 at the factory. Kalinina was made by the first prototype of a 45-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun, which received the factory Code ZIK-45, later changed to 49-k. After the improvement, it successfully passed the tests, but Military Guide was short-sightedly considered that 45-mm. The projectile has excessive power, and designers proposed to develop a similar 37 mm. Zenitka.
Structurally 49-k and 61-K were almost no difference, had a close price (60 thousand rubles against 55 thousand rubles), but at the same time the reach and destructive effect of 45-mm shells is significantly higher.
Instead of not too successful 25 mm. Machine 72-K having manual exchange charging, which limited the pace of shooting, for the needs of the regimental air defense service, 23-mm Aviation Cannon of the Volkova-Yarteva design (VS), having ribbon food and high rapidity. During the war, VS was installed on IL-2 attack aircraft, where he had proven perfectly. Only in, for weapons torpedo boatsThe number of 25-paired 23 mm was used. anti-aircraft guns.
Only in after the war, paired anti-aircraft machines Zu-23 and ZSS "Shilka" were created under the cartridge.
Also, the possibility of creating a highly efficient anti-aircraft agent during the war under 14.5 mm was also missed. Patron PTR. This was done only after the end of hostilities in a large-caliber machine gun Vladimirov (CPV), which is in service with so far.
The implementation of all these missed capabilities would significantly increase the potential of the air defense of the Red Army and accelerated victory.
Based on:
Broadband A. B. Encyclopedia of domestic artillery.
Ivanov A.A. Artillery of the USSR in World War II.
http://www.soslugivci-odnopolhane.ru/orugie/5-orugie/94-zenitki.html.
http://www.tehnikapobedy.ru/76mm38hist.htm
http://alexandrkandry.narod.ru/html/weapon/sovet/artelery/z/72k.html
Major General M. Tour
One of the most powerful means of suppressing the enemy in the operations of World War II was aviation. Her domination in the air and the possibility of applying massive blows was one of important conditions Successful solutions to the troops of the tasks in both defensive and offensive operations.
Creating an effective anti-heart defense capable of reflecting the massive blows of the opponent's aviation and thereby ensure their troops freedom of maneuver on the battlefield, due to a number of reasons amounted to a solely complex problem of the first half of the war. The study of some issues of this problem and constitutes the purpose of this article. It addresses the state of air defense of the troops to the beginning of the war, the development of anti-air defense funds and its organizational forms during the war.
Our pre-war theory of operational art correctly determined the role and importance of the air defense of the troops in operations. Development of anti-air defense and its organization in the prewaging time paid a lot of attention. But for a number of reasons in the operations of the first period of war, the air defense of the troops did not meet the requirements of it, which was very hard for the combat actions of the compounds and parts and was one of the serious reasons for our failures in this period.
By the beginning of the war, the land forces did not have the necessary means of combating opponent's aviation. As part of the rifle division, there was a zenith artillery division, and in each rifle shelf - an anti-aircraft machine-gun company. In total, the division was 8-37-mm and 4 -76.2-mm anti-aircraft guns, 9 large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and 24 quarterly anti-aircraft machine guns. In the shooting case there was an anti-aircraft artillery division of 12-76.2-mm or 85 mm anti-aircraft guns. Thus, the rifle housing in the composition of the three rifle divisions had 48 anti-aircraft guns, 27 large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and 72 quadalar anti-aircraft machine guns.
With the defense of the corps at the front of 20-25 km, even a regular number of fire funds gave the opportunity to have 1 km of the front of only two anti-aircraft guns, one large-caliber machine gun and 3 quadseless anti-aircraft plants, which, of course, was very small.
Fighter Aviation, like all aviation as a whole, was organizationally sprayed in armies, which did not allow to massage her efforts to cover the troops in decisive directions. In service with fighter aircraft, there were mainly outdated types of aircraft (I-15, I-16 and others), significantly inferior in speed, the ceiling of flight and in service.
The air surveillance system, alert and communication (VOS) did not ensure the successful solution of tasks assigned to it. By the beginning of the war in the troops there were no staff of air surveillance, alerts and communications. It was believed that the task of observation and alerts of air hazardous troops would be successfully carried out by abnormal observers of parts and units, and in the army and front-line rear, also abnormal observers of rear objects and a network of air surveillance, alerts and communications (submission) of the country's air defense. In the case of the transfer of hostilities outside our territory, the strengthening of fronts and armies of the VNOS radio radiors was envisaged. Long-distance detection tools did not matter. The visual observation ensured the detection of the opponent's aircraft on a distance of only 10-12 km, which the plane overcomed in 1-2 minutes.
Until the Great Patriotic War, our theory proceeded from the fact that anti-air defense, no matter how strong it, cannot completely eliminate the spans of small groups and individual opponent aircraft to the planned objects. Therefore, the main purpose of military air defense was to reflect the massive raids to ensure their troops freedom of maneuver at all stages of the operation. This task was supposed to be carried out by joint efforts of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aviation, covered troops and rear objects, as well as anti-aircraft machine guns, which in the air defense of the troops was given a significant place.
The whole front-line area was divided into three zones of anti-air defense: anguide - a depth of 30-50 km (from the front line to the border of the troch rear); Zone of the army rear and front-line zone. Military zone Anti-heart defense in turn shared on corps, division and regimental areas.
The military zone was covered mainly by terrestrial anti-heart defense. Fighter aviation in this zone acted only episodically. The first frontier of the opponent's aviation meetings of our fighter aviation was established in the army rear at a depth of 50-60 km from the front line. However, here enemy aviation could meet the resistance of only fighters shifts. The massive application of the fighter aviation front against invaded air forces The enemy was envisaged only at a depth of more than 100 km from the front line, i.e. in the front rear area. Thus, the bulk of the troops acting in the first echelon, in the absence of aviation cover and the lack of anti-aircraft drugs, turned out to be very weakly protected from the strikes of the enemy Air Force.
The control of the air defense system was rather complicated. Army land means of air defense of the USSR were sprayed in parts and connections. Fighter aviation submitted to the commander of the Air Force. In order to combine the efforts of all funds, the organization of the best interaction in the field management of the front (army) there was a department of anti-air defense, subordinate to the front of the front of the front (commander). However, the chief of this department could to some extent influence the use of only terrestrial anti-air defense tools. With respect to fighter aviation, he did not have any rights. All this determined the spraying of the already limited means of air defense, which had our troops to the beginning of the war, and did not contribute to the creation of reliable military air defense.
From this one we can conclude that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the organization of air defense of the troops, as well as anti-air defense funds, did not provide effective struggle With an air opponent and a reliable cover of air troops.
During the war, the anti-air defense of the troops developed depending on the quantitative and qualitative growth of air defense, especially anti-aircraft artillery and aviation.
In the first months of the war (June - October 1941), a significant part of the anti-aircraft artillery, which was part of the civil defense of the country's territory, due to the general retreat of our troops, was included in the fronts. This to some extent compensated for the lack of anti-aircraft artillery in the troops, but could not fundamentally improve their anti-air defense. In addition, fierce battles with the air opponent were forced to lead in conditions when a significant number of anti-aircraft parties were completely unmobilized, and the aviation of border districts, which was in stationary airfields at the very border, in the first days of the war suffered large losses and could not implement Reliable cover of troops. The air surveillance system, alerts and communication was also violated. The troops were led by defensive battles in the context of complete domination in the air of the opponent's aviation, which caused systematic strikes on combat orders of troops, areas of loading and unloading, military echelons, control points, airfields, railway sites, crossing and other objects with groups from 3 to 40 bombers with Heights 1000-3000 m.
Due to the large losses of aviation and the impossibility of its massaging, the anti-airflow defense of the troops was carried out mainly by anti-aircraft artillery and small arms adapted for firing for air targets. Air defense troops during operations carried large losses in the material part. In addition, a significant amount of anti-aircraft gun armament was used for the staffing of the fighter-anti-tank parts. The production of anti-aircraft artillery arms due to the evacuation of industrial enterprises has decreased. All this led to a large noncompliament of fire funds in the parts of the anti-air defense. For example, the South-West Front by the end of the second month of war had only 232-76.2-mm and 176-37-mm anti-aircraft guns, which was 70 and 40 percent, respectively. The staff needs front in this artillery.
After disbanding the rifle cases, their anti-aircraft artillery divisions were facing the recycling of anti-aircraft divisions of rifle divisions and air defense divisions of the country. However, this event was not seriously affected by the staffing parts of the anti-aircraft artillery, since the loss of material part continued to increase. For example, the staffing of the anti-aircraft artillery parts of the same south-western front as of September 1, 1941 for anti-aircraft guns was about 40 percent., And for anti-aircraft machine guns - about 66 percent. full-time need.
Due to the impossibility of replenishing the material part of the anti-aircraft gun divisions of rifle divisions in December 1941, they were reorganized into anti-aircraft artillery batteries in the composition of 6-37 mm of zenith guns. Since that time, the cover of military groups was carried out, as a rule, only by individual batteries of small or medium caliber anti-aircraft artillery.
One of the most significant disadvantages of the air defense of the troops in operations of 1941-1942 was an exceptionally weak fighter-aviation cover. The small fighter aircraft covered mainly rear objects, reserves, second echelons, command items. There was very little strength on the cover of the combat order of the troops of the first echelon. So, out of 4451 departures, performed by the military air forces of the Western Front in November 1941, to cover the combat order. Only 325 aircraft-departures were produced, that is, 7.3 percent, while the enemy in The front strip at the same time performed 2500 flights. For seven days of the defensive battle (August 17-23, 1942), the 8th Air Army of the Stalingrad Front for the purpose of covering the troops made 596 aircraft-departures (on average 85 per day), the aviation of the enemy made up to 1000-1500 aircraft-flights in day. Due to the insufficient number of fighter aircraft, the remoteness of our airfields (up to 100 and more km), the aviation cover of the first operational echelon's troops was very weak, that in the air in the air of the opponent's aircraft was extremely difficult on their actions.
In the defensive battle of the Stalingrad Front, from July 23 to August 7, the fighter aviation covered the concentration of reserves, unloading troops and equipment at railway stations. The cover was carried out from the "duty on earth" position, in readiness No. 1 and periodic patrols in the air groups of 4-6 fighters. Fighter aviation often tied air battles with escort fighters, and the enemy bombers received the opportunity to bring strikes to our troops with impunity.
Another equally significant disadvantage was the wrong distribution of anti-air defense to objects, which led to their excessive spraying. For example, in the organization of the air defense of the Western Front's troops in May 1942, 59 percent was allocated for the cover of the troops. anti-aircraft artillery, supply stations - 21 percent., Airfields-12 percent, bridges and cross-8 percent. Such a distribution of anti-heart defense funds did not provide the massive use of anti-aircraft artillery to reliably cover the troops of the 1st echelon, against which the bulk of the opponent's bombers usually acted.
The shortcomings should also include the weak interaction of ground-based anti-air defense with aviation, as a result of which there were cases of shelling of their aircraft or blows of aviation in their troops; fuzzy operation of the air surveillance system, alerts and communications; lack of centralized anti-aircraft artillery control in the reflection of the opponent aviation raids; And finally
the lack of a single leadership by all means of anti-air defense.
By the summer of 1942, a number of events were held in order to improve management mainly by terrestrial anti-air defense. Order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated June 2, 1942, all anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft guns and means of air surveys, alerts and communications were subordinated to the commander of artillery Soviet army and according to the commander of the artillery of fronts and armies. The same order, the leadership of the army and front army departments were entrusted to the relevant commander of artillery and introduced the position of Deputy Commander of the Artillery of the Front (Army) on benthogs-free defense. At the same time, the formation of army regiments of anti-air defense consisting of 4 batteries for four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns in each and one anti-aircraft gunner of large-caliber machine guns (16 machine guns) began.
In the most important operations of the second half of 1942, the army, operating at the main direction of the front, had already several Army anti-aircraft guns. For example, the 33rd army of the Western Front in the offensive operation of the South-west of Gzhatsk in August 1942 had five shelves. With the end of the operation in the army, one regiment was left, and four were transferred to other armies of the front. In the offensive operation in November 1942, the 5th Tank Army of the South-Western Front had five zenith artillery regiments, and the 21st Army - four shelf.
Despite a number of activities carried out in order to improve the air defense of troops, massage of anti-aircraft artillery on the scale of the front and the army continued to remain weak. In the order of the NGO of October 22, 1942, it was stated that the improper distribution of air defense military tools, which enhate their sprayed use, does not ensure the necessary cover of troops and the objects of the rear in the decisive directions. As a result, the opponent's aviation, acting massive, almost impunity inflicts systematic strikes according to our troops. The order required to cover the main group to use, except aviation, anti-aircraft artillery groups, consisting of army anti-aircraft artillery regiments, anti-aircraft batteries and anti-aircraft machine guns of compounds. The anti-aircraft artillery group required to include from half to two thirds of all military anti-aircraft drugs of the front (army). The army anti-aircraft group was supposed to lead the Deputy Commander of Artillery Army on Air Defense. Thanks to the creation of anti-aircraft artillery groups, the anti-aircraft cover of the troops improved somewhat, but only a change in the organization of the management of land means of air defense was impossible to solve the entire problem of improving air defense efficiency. Along with this, it was necessary to sharply increase the number of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aviation in the troops.
From the fall of 1942, it was a fracture in the work of the country's military production. The troops in increasing quantities began to receive combat techniques. For example, if in 1942 the troops received 3499 - 37-mm and 2761-85-mm anti-aircraft guns, then in 1943, respectively, 5472 and 3713.
The number and quality of ground-based air defense tools increased during the almost all of the war, which is seen from the following table.
Admission of anti-aircraft artillery from industry during the war
The expansion of the production of anti-aircraft artillery armament made it possible to embark on November 1942 to the formation of large compounds of anti-aircraft, artillery - anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the reserve of the Supreme Command. Initially, they were created as part of the four regiments of the anti-aircraft artillery of a small caliber (such as the army anti-aircraft artillery regiment). In total, the division was 64-37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 64-12,7-mm anti-aircraft pool-meta. The absence of average caliber anti-aircraft artillery excluded the participation of such divisions in the fight against opponent's aviation at altitudes of more than 3000 m. And there was a serious disadvantage. In addition, the divisuses did not have their rear units, which was one of the causes of frequent interruptions in the supply of parts by ammunition.
From the second half of February 1943, the control battery was included in the composition of anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and one of the shelves of anti-aircraft artillery the small caliber is replaced by a medium-sized artillery regiment, which made it possible to fight enemy aircraft at the heights of more than 3000 meters.
In March 1943, instructions for combat use of the anti-aircraft artillery division was approved, which indicated that the division could cover troops on an area of \u200b\u200b63 square meters. km (9 km on the front and 7 km deep) with a density of 1.5 guns per quarter. km or 9 guns per 1 km of front.
In order to ensure a larger massage of anti-aircraft artillery in decisive directions in the first half of 1943, separate anti-aircraft artillery batteries were excluded from the rulers division and transferred to the staffing of anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the Supreme Commanding reserve. At the same time, part of the already created army anti-aircraft gunners and individual anti-aircraft guns of the reserve of the Supreme Commander is also facing the formation of anti-aircraft artillery divisions.
Thus, from May 1943 almost all anti-aircraft artillery was included in the reserve of the Supreme Commander and organizationally in anti-aircraft divisions, individual divisions of the reserve of the chief commandment and army anti-aircraft artillery shelves. Anti-aircraft divisions, as a rule, covered troops; Separate divisions of anti-aircraft artillery of medium caliber - rear objects; The army shelves were used to cover the troops and rear of the army. There was an opportunity to use anti-aircraft artillery massive on decisive directions.
Due to a significant quantitative increase in anti-aircraft artillery, the effectiveness of the air defense of the troops increased. This was also explained by a sharp change in the conditions in which he had to implement an air defense. Soviet air force, including fighter aircraft, much quantitatively and qualitatively, while the military air forces of the German fascist troops were significantly weakened. The arrival of fighter aircraft increased from year to year. In 1942, the aviation industry was issued 9844 fighters, in 1943-14 607, and in 1944-17 872. The ratio of forces quickly changed in favor of the Soviet air forces. In the struggle for domination in the air, which reached the highest voltage in the first half of 1943, the Soviet air-air, the forces came out by the winners.
Operations of our troops from the battle under Kurk and until the end of the war were proceeding under the conditions of the domination of our aviation, which was much facilitated by the fulfillment of the tasks of anti-air defense. Now the troops were often covered by the major forces of fighters. Ground defense facilities in some cases have already been comparatively massaged on decisive directions of the front.
By the beginning of the battle near Kursk, our Air Force had a significant numerical superiority over the enemy, especially in fighter and assault aviation.
As part of the 16th air army of the central front to the beginning of the operation there were seven fighter aviation divisions, of which three divisions covered the troops of the front, and the rest are the actions of bombarding and assault aviation. In the 2nd Air Army of the Voronezh Front there were five fighter aviation divisions. The cover of the troops to the beginning of the operation was carried out by two expansion divisions. Thus, 40-43 percent was intended for the cover of the troops. all the fighter aviation of the Central, and Voronezh fronts.
Central and Voronezh fronts have a large number of anti-aircraft artillery. In the central front there were five zenith-artillery divisions, ten separate Army anti-aircraft gunners and four separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions. The Voronezh Front had four anti-aircraft artillery divisions, eleven separate anti-aircraft artillery shelves and two divisions of the anti-aircraft artillery of the middle caliber of the supreme-commissioning reserve. To combat low-fat and dive aircraft opponents in significant quantities used weapon. Fronts and army had separate companies Air surveillance, alerts and communications.
Ground defense facilities in the central front strip were massaged on the decisive direction. Thus, out of the total number of the entire anti-aircraft artillery of the front, covered by the troops of the first echelon, in the 3rd army strip of 32 km width (a few more than 10 percent. The total width of the defense strip) was concentrated 50 percent. anti-aircraft artillery average and 40 percent. Small caliber. This made it possible to create an average density of zenith artillery in the decisive direction of about 5 guns per 1 km of front. Included in the main grouping of the troops of the front (48, 13 and 70th army) included 100 percent. anti-aircraft artillery of medium caliber and about 90 percent. Small caliber artillery.
The anti-aircraft artillery, allocated to cover the main groups of armies, in some cases came down in one anti-aircraft artillery group, which was headed by the commander of the anti-aircraft artillery division or deputy commander of artillery on air defense.
The air surveillance service, alerts and communications has been improved. IN rifle shelves Non-standard posts were created, in divisions, at the expense of the army service of air surveys, alerts and communications - two posts, of which one was located at the forefield, and the other - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe division command item. Army company's posts were created at the headquarters of the buildings, at the airfields, in aircraft chambers and at the headquarters of the army. At the front, posts were introduced by the alert service in the area of \u200b\u200bthe command points of the armies and the front, on the airfields and the objects of the front-end value. Regimental and divisional posts for the transmission of air alarms were used only by military telephone connection. The posts of army and front-line mouth were associated with radio with airfield airfields and with the appearance of an enemy aircraft notified about it primarily by aerodromes.
Thus, by the beginning of the battle under Kursk, the air defense of the troops undoubtedly was organized better than in previous operations. Despite this, the fighting of air defense troops in the first days of battle was characterized by exceptional tensions. The lack of funds for the long-range intelligence of the air enemy continued to significantly reduced the combat capabilities of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aviation.
The unfolded defensive battles of the Central and Voronezh fronts identified a number of shortcomings in the organization of the air defense of the troops, mainly in the part of the fighter-aviation cover. Both fronts carried out the cover of the troops by patrolling by large groups of fighter in one height. Due to the shortcoming of the airfields of the reserve of duty fighter fighter aircraft forces in the air, weakly increased, aviation management on the radio from the ground and its interaction with terrestrial anti-air defense means were not sufficiently stable. A significant disadvantage of air defense was the poor notification of troops. A widely developed alert system, which included a large number of abnormal and weakly prepared posts that did not have its own means of communication were not sustainable. With the beginning of the defensive battle, it was broken. However, the main cause of the weakness of the alert of the troops was the lack of far-detecting aircraft.
Despite the presence of a large amount of funds, the anti-air defense of the troops in view of the specified shortcomings of the organizational order in the first days of the battle could not reflect the massive blows of the opponent's aviation. Our troops carried serious losses.
In order to increase the effectiveness of air defense, during the defensive battle, a number of urgent measures were adopted: almost all the fighter aircraft fronts were attracted to cover the troops; The combat order of fighters began to be echelonized in height; The control points of the commanders of the fighter aviation divisions are close to the front line and they were radio stations on them; A maneuver of anti-aircraft artillery was held, as a result of which its density in the directions of the main strikes of the enemy was brought to 9-12 guns per 1 km of front. The organization of interaction between ground and air defense systems has improved. The anti-aircraft artillery began fire on the enemy aircraft before our fighters attack them, and stopped the fire upon the release of the latter on the course for the attack.
IN the conditions of increasing resistance of the anti-air defense Aviation of the enemy carried large losses, its activity from the second day of the offensive began to fall sharply and by the end of the battle was limited to flights of only individual aircraft. The domination in the air was conquered by our aviation at the Oryol-Kursk direction to the end of the third, and in Belgorod Kursk - to the outcome of the sixth day of the defensive battle. The enemy's aviation losses in both directions during the defensive battle amounted to over 1,700 aircraft, of which about 1400 (more than 80 percent) were shot down by our fighter aviation.
The most important factors that had an impact on the improvement of the air defense of our troops in the offensive operations of 1943 were: a further increase in the number and quality of anti-air defense funds, the conquest and retention of domination in the air, as well as the growth of command-made skills.
The most important feature of the air defense in the operations of 1944 and 1945 was to increase the efficiency of the alert and the fighter-aviation cover. From the second half of 1943, aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the fronts began to be equipped with radar stations, with the help of which the opponent aircraft could be detected at a distance of up to 80-120 km, which made it possible to significantly expand the border of the action of our aviation and meet aircraft on distant approaches to the front line of our troops . For example, in the Berlin operation of the 1st Belarusian Front, three zones of action of our fighter aircraft were organized: hunters fighters; Fighter patrols on the approaches to the battlefield; Fighter patrols directly over the combat orders of the upcoming troops. The group of hunter aircraft patrolled over German airfields, conducted the fight against the opposition aircraft, with his intelligence, were looking for and destroyed small groups of aircraft in the air and reported the approach of large opponent aviation groups. The zone of fighter patrols on the approaches to the battlefield spread to a depth of 15 km from the front line, between the front line and the free hunting area.
Together with an increase in the effectiveness of fighter aircraft, the anti-aircraft cover of the troops was noticeably improved. Skillful maneuvering and redistribution of anti-aircraft artillery, decisive massage of funds in the most important areas was the basis combat application anti-aircraft artillery in offensive operations of 1944-1945.
The armies accumulated the experience of the anti-aircraft cover of moving troops with powerful anti-aircraft artillery groups. For example, in the Yas-Chisinau operation, the 6th tank army had an anti-aircraft artillery group as part of the anti-aircraft artillery division and three separate anti-aircraft artillery regiments. .
However, together with the general improvement in the situation in the air, the anti-air defense of the troops still had a number of shortcomings. During the offensive operations, there were cases of a significant lag behind anti-aircraft artillery and airfields from troops. As a result of this troop fronts, the final stage of most operations was carried out with a weakened anti-aircraft and fighter-aviation cover. Aviation of the enemy received the opportunity to strike at our troops with significant groups, retained their promotion and thereby contributed to their troops in the front stabilization. So it was at the final stage of the Belarusian operation, when the opponent's aviation applied massive strikes on the troops of the 1st Baltic Front in the region of Ielgava, Shauliy, according to the 3rd and 2nd Belarusian front troops at the turn of the Neman River and for the Troops of the 1st Belarusian Front On the river Vistula. On July 29, the opponent's aviation groups from 4 to 30 aircraft applied strikes on the 69th Army in the Pulawy area and the 2nd Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front Eastern Warsaw, producing about 300 aircraft-departures. Our 6th air army, which ensured the offensive of the left wing of the front, was able to make only 95 aircraft-departures on this day. On August 1, the opponent's aviation groups 6-8 and up to 40 aircraft repeatedly bombed areas of crossing over the Vistula in the strip of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belarusian Front, having completed about 340 flights-flights, while the 6th air army was able to do only 98 aircraft-departures. In the recent days of July 1944, the opponent's aviation for the above reason impunity attracted strikes on the combat order of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and the 51st Army of the 1st Baltic Front in the Shauliy area. During the Budapest operation, the opponent's aviation on certain days struck the troops of the 6th Guards Tank Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front with groups from 4 to 30 aircraft.
In the overwhelming majority of operations of the Great Patriotic War, the air defense of the troops increased due to the forces and means of air defense of the country's territory. A particularly important role, such a measure played in operations near Leningrad, Moscow, in the battle on the Volga and in the Berlin Operations. Performing exclusively responsible tasks for covering large objects outside the front-line band and strategic value objects in the front-line strip, air defense troops in the country, at the same time, also very often ensured the cover of front-line objects, and in some cases front reserves. For example, in the Berlin operation for the defense of the objects of the rear and the crossing of the 1st Belarusian front, 1203 anti-aircraft guns of the Western Front of the Air Defense were used.
This briefly briefly develop the air defense of the troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.
The experience of the air defense of the troops acquired during the Great Patriotic War largely retains its importance and modern conditions. The massage of the forces and means of anti-air defense in decisive directions, maneuver with these forces during the operation, clear interaction of all air defense and centralized management of them - all this is now based on the organization of air defense.
At the same time, the further development of air attack funds puts increasingly complex tasks before the air defense and requires further improvement of anti-air defense and methods for their use. A deep study and summary of the experience of the air defense of the troops in the Great Patriotic War will help to more correctly determine the paths of further development of forms and anti-air defense methods in modern conditions.
Military Historical Journal №1 / 1962
Air defense troops during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) Lecturer: Performed: Vernuhaeva A.N. and Tkachenko A. Yu
Air defense - a set of measures to ensure protection (defense) from the agent of the opponent's air attack on April 8, the Day of the Air Defense Forces (Air Defense Day)
The war found the air defense troops during their re-equipment. In the anti-aircraft artillery, there were still few new 37-mm automatic and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. In the troops there were not enough high-speed Yak-1 and MiG-3 fighters, 46% of the aircraft fleet were outdated aircraft. The accelerated pace began to take measures to equip the troops with new techniques. Yak-1 MiG-3
The composition of these compounds to the beginning of the massive raids of fascist aircraft there were more than 600 fighters, more than 1000 guns of medium and small calibers, about 350 machine guns, 124 post aircraft aerostats, 612 posts VOS, 600 anti-aircraft spotlights Gas transport for a balloon
The aerostate aircraft is lighter than air used for flying the lifting force of a gas (or heated air) with a density of a smaller density than the ambient air density. Aerostats were widely used to protect cities, industrial areas, factories, government buildings of naval databases and other facilities. From the attack from the air. For accurate bombing, airplanes are forced to descend rather low and fly directly above the object. It is in such places, right above the roofs of buildings, above the bridges, over the factory pipes and the balloons were launched, not allowing enemy bombers to engage on the object a squall of fire. The height of the "hanging" of the balloon was calculated very precisely. The enemy aircraft could not take care of the balloon: when bombing, with such a small height, the car would simply cover the explosive wave from its own bombs. And if the plane dropped the bombs from above, they destroyed the balloon (he absorbed and fragments), who gently collapsed on the object or next to it. Even when the aerostat hung at a high height, the pilot could not fly under it: the cables that hold the air giant were prevented.
The action of the barrier's balloon was designed for damage to aircraft when colliding with cables, shells or trimmed by the charges of explosive. What forced the enemy aircraft to fly at large altitudes and made it difficult to the sighting bombing with a dive.
By type of filling, balloons are divided into: gas - Charles, thermal - Mongolfier, combined - Rosiet. Anti-aircraft guns almost always lacked - especially in cities subject to constant bombing. In addition, the ballogene's balloon was strong weapons in combination with anti-aircraft. They climbed most often at night when the anti-aircraft guns are "blind." In the afternoon, while the enemy pilot tried to fly out or shoot a balloon, the aircraft was tracked and shot from land tool.
Katyusha is an unofficial Soviet collective name of domestic combat vectors of jet artillery. 1941 - the first volley of the famous "Katyush" thundered by the name of the famous Blancher song on the words of Isakovsky "Katyusha". The version is convincing, because for the first time the battery shot on July 14, 1941 (on the 23th day of the war). He shot with a high steep mountain of straight tip - Association with a high steep bank in a song. Krasnoameman Kashirin, arriving after shelling the Rudney on the battery, surprised exclaimed: "This is a song!" "Katyusha", "answered Andrei Sapronov (from the memories of A. Sapronov in the newspaper" Russia "). Through the Communication Node of the Staff Rota, the news of the miracle weapon named "Katyusha" for the day has become the property of the entire 20th army, and through its command - and the whole country. To reduce "Cat" - there is a version that the polygonists are exactly called BM-13 - "Kostikovsky automatic thermal" by the name of the project manager, Andrei Kostikova (though, given the secrecy of the project, the possibility of exchanging information between polygoners and front-line people is doubtful). Another option that the name is associated with the "K" index on the mortar housing - the installation was produced by the Kalinin factory (according to another source of the Comintern name). And the front-line lifted to give nicknames of arms. For example, M-30 Gaubitsa called "Mother", Gaubitsa ML-20 - "Emela". Yes, and BM 13 at first, sometimes called "Raisa Sergeyevna", thus decrypting the reduction of the PC (jet projectile).
Another, exotic version. Guides for which shells were installed were called skates. The Sorogatvukhlogram projectile raised two fighters, straightened into the straps, and the third usually helped them, pushing the shell so that he was exactly lying to the guides, he also reported that the projectile was put up - rolled into guides. It should also be noted that the settings were so classified that it was even forbidden to use the "PLI" commands, "fire", "volley", instead of them sounded "Sing" or "Play" (for the launch it was necessary to twist the electrochkhatka handle) that might also be connected with the song "Katyusha". Yes, and for our infantry, Katyusch was the most pleasant music.
Many bombers were equipped with devices for cutting the balloon balloon cables. The Germans tried very hard to protect their own aircraft from the "attacks" of aerostats. In particular, the so-called paravans were installed on the bombers. Parawan was a triangle of cables connecting the nose of the aircraft (lengthened by a special sixth) and the ends of his wings. Thus, the ball of the balloon simply slipped off the aircraft, not clinging for the propellers or other protruding details. However, only a very skilled pilot could hold the aircraft in the air after a similar collision. In addition to Paravanov, other solutions existed. The blades were installed on the wings to cut the cables (they helped, straight to say weakly), and the aircraft equipped with pyropatrons for the ignition of the anesthes.
"Night Witches" 46th Guards Taman's red-known Order of Suvorov 3th degree of a night bombarding aviation regiment (46 GW. NBAP) - a female aviation regiment in the USSR Air Force during the Great Patriotic War. During the war years 23, the regiment was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union
Air defense troops, defended Moscow, destroyed 738 enemy aircraft. In addition, 6 Fighter Aviation Corps cause assault strikes, destroyed 567 aircraft at the opponent's airfields. In general, the air defense troops destroyed 1305 aircraft, 450 tanks and 5,000 cars were destroyed in battles with a terrestrial enemy.
On November 9, 1941, the position of the commander of the air defense of the territory of the country and her, Major General Homadin was appointed, was appointed.
To improve the interaction of the power and air defense tools in January 1942, fighter aviation was subordinate to the command of the air defense. In April 1942, the Moscow Front FRONT was formed, and in Leningrad and Baku created air defense armies. The first operational associations of air defense troops appeared.
In June 1943, the Office of the Commander of the Air Force, the territory of the country was disbanded. After the reorganization conducted by April 1944, Western and Eastern Fronts were created, as well as the Transcaucasian air defense zone, which in the same year were reorganized into the North, South and Transcaucasian air defense fronts. The air defense troops, defended Moscow, were reorganized into the special Moscow air defense army. In the Far East, in March 1945, three air defense armies were created: Primorskaya, Primur, Zabaykalskaya.
During the war, the organizationally took shape as a kind of military air defense age-aircraft artillery and fighter aviation. During the years, the air defense troops successfully coped with their tasks. They provided the defense of the industry and communications, allowing breakthrough to objects only individual aircraft, as a result of which briefly stopping enterprises and violations in the movement of trains in certain areas of railways.
By fulfilling its tasks, the air defense troops of the country destroyed 7,313 of the aircraft of German aircraft aviation, of which 4168 forces of the IA and 3145 anti-aircraft artillery, machine-gun fire and barrier balloon. Over 80,000 soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals of air defense troops were awarded orders and medals, and 92 warrior awarded a high title of Hero of the Soviet Union and 1 - twice. For successful combat operations, 11 compounds and parts of air defense troops were honored with honorary names and 29 titles of Guards.
And today they rightfully remain on the advanced borders of the Defense of the Fatherland
Every year on the second Sunday of April, the whole country, its armed forces, veterans of military service celebrate the day of the air defense forces. This holiday was established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 20, 1975 in honor of the large merit of air defense forces in the Great Patriotic War and the fulfillment of particularly important tasks in peacetime.
Patriotic air defense has a long and very difficult story. It can be considered by the military command of Russia in December 1914 by the decision on the deployment of anti-aircraft (then it was called the air) defense of the capital - St. Petersburg and the imperial residence in the royal village. In subsequent years, the air defense of Odessa and a number of other cities were created.
At the same time, then the basic principles of such defense were formulated, which are relevant today: the integrated use of various means, including ground (anti-aircraft) and air (aviation); focusing the fixed forces on the defense of the most important objects; Circular construction of defense objects with its strengthening at the most dangerous directions; The creation of an intelligence system in the form of a network of observation points (on the defense of St. Petersburg and Odessa, these items united in the "radio telegraphed air defense").
The beginning of the establishment of anti-heart defense in the USSR should be considered 1924-1925, when under the direction of M. V. Frunze in the country began to be held military reform. During the reform, a strategically absolutely correct understanding of the huge prospects for military aviation and the scale of her threats in future wars was developed. And most importantly, it was recognized as an important and necessary organization of the active struggle against the military aviation of the enemy.
For this, it was offered on the basis of a non-heated (anti-aircraft) means special forces AirFighter (from August 1924, the term "Airfold Defense" began to be used). These troops should be applied in cooperation with Fighter Aviation Air Force.
Here you should pay attention to one important aspect: In those years, the authors of military reform understood that the rapidly developing military aviation sharply increase the depth of the armed zone, would cover not only the front, but also the rear of the country; Accordingly, the airfighter troops must solve the tasks of reflection of aviation strikes both by the current troops and objects and communications in the rear. So for the first time the need to create and develop military air defense air defense and air defense system.
After the sudden death of M. V. Frunze, military reform essentially was minimized. The development and understanding of the conceptual provisions in the field of the construction of anti-heart defense was not completed. At the same time, the part of the developments was embodied.
In 1925, the headquarters of the Red Army were developed on the organization of air defense of the USSR and the creation of the authorities of the leadership of it in the center and on the ground. In the same year, the Directive of the RKKK headquarters was announced that the headquarters of the Republic of Kazakhstan starts the organization of the Country Defense. In the Directive, the challenges of the country's air defense were formulated in peaceful and wartime, their difference from the tasks in the front line.
With the RLS family of P-35/37, the creation of a country radar field began
Photo: Alexey Matveyev
In 1927, a department was created at the headquarters of the Red Army, which in 1930 was transformed into the 6th PVA control of the headquarters of the Red Army. Given the ever-increasing significance of the air defense, in May 1932, the 6th control was reorganized into the RPC Air Defense Unit directly subordinate to the Commissar of Defense. At the same time, despite the official division of anti-air defense on the military air defense air defense and air defense system, all air defense troops on the ground were subordinate to the commander of military districts.
The basis of air defense troops was compounds and parts of anti-aircraft artillery. They also consisted of parts and divisions of anti-aircraft machine guns, anti-aircraft spotlights, airborne balloons, air surveillance troops, alerts and communications (VOS). The fighter aviation of the Air Force of Military Districts into the air defense troops was not included and attracted to the fight against an air opponent on the basis of interaction.
From the beginning of the 1930s. The process began the process of substantially increasing the power of air defense as part of the border military districts. In 1932, the first anti-aircraft artillery divisions were formed. In 1937, for defense of Moscow, Leningrad and Baku were formed by the Air Defense Corps, and for the defense of other major cities (Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Batumi, etc.) - divisions and individual air defense brigades.
In February 1941, 4 months before the start of the war, the entire border area of \u200b\u200bthe country was divided into air defense zones, whose responsibility boundaries were combined with the borders of military districts. In total, 13 air defense zones of the country (air defense) were created. In 9 air defense zones with large spatial sizes, brigade regions of air defense regions were created. 36 such areas were formed. As part of a number of air defense areas, air defense points were distinguished, individual objects covered by parts and units of anti-aircraft artillery.
Assistants of the commander of military districts of military districts were appointed commander of the air defense systems. The exception was central (Moscow) and North (Leningrad) air defense zone, where commander were assigned commanders according to 1 and the 2nd air defense buildings. The commander of the air defense zones were in double subordination - the Military Districts and the Main Department of the Fuel and Air Defense of the Red Army (the latter was formed in 1940 on the basis of the PVC PVAC control). Practice has shown that such a biothelium is inefficient.
In the last prewar years, the military air defense troops have become stiguously equipped with new weapons and techniques. In terms of anti-aircraft artillery, 37 mm automatic and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, artillery anti-aircraft fire control devices - Pouazo-2 and Poazo-3, began to flow. The deposit from 1939 began to receive the first domestic radar detection Rus-1 and Rus-2.
Industry serially produced spotlights, sound selectors and aerostats of the air bar. From 1940, Yak-1 and MiG-3 fighters began to enter the fighter aircraft, and since 1941 - Lagg-3.
However, time for sufficient rearmament of air defense troops was not enough.
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, disadvantages were rewarded in the organization of anti-heart defense of the country, when all the forces of air defense were subordinate to the fronts. Already in the first months of the war, the five main air defense zones - North, North-West, Western, Kiev and South, who were aimed at the plan of military leadership, the first echelon of anti-air defense, actually ceased to exist.
Airfield Large Savino (Perm). Fighter-interceptor MiG-31
Photo: Leonid Yakutin
German aviation, bypassing fragmented groupings of anti-aircraft artillery, almost impunity penetrated 500-600 kilometers deep into the country and subjected to bombardment of defenseless objects of industry and communications.
In this regard, the General Staff of the Red Army was even published a special directive of July 9, 1941, which was prescribed "to free the commander of the air defense zones - assistants to the commander of the fronts for air defenses from the direct leadership of the FRONT troops and to draw them to the execution of direct duties in the air defense zones."
The directive could not change the state of affairs, as nothing was changed in the organization of the air defense itself. And only after the crushing raids of German aviation for defense facilities in Voronezh, far behind the front line in August 1941, I. V. Stalin intervened in the affairs of air defense.
As a result, on November 9, 1941, the decision of the USSR of the USSR No. 874 "On strengthening and strengthening the country's territory of the country's territory" was published. In this modest, the document is first set out in principle new organization Air Defense and its structure.
The pre-war air defense system for the country subordinated to the Military Districts (fronts) was completely rejected. Country air defense troops were derived from their submission and for the first time transformed into an independent genus of the RCKA troops, subordinate to the defense addict and headed by the commander of the air defense troops - deputy addict of defense defense. Major General M. S. Gromadin was appointed the first commander of the air defense troops.
A few later, the military air defenssment was transferred from the Air Force to operational submission, and in January 1942 introduced into the state of 39 fighter aircraft regiments, only more than 1,500 aircraft. Now, along with the tasks of defense of individual objects, the air defense troops could solve the tasks of the cover of the country's regions. The operational construction of the new air defense system was not tied to the boundaries of fronts and military districts, but was determined by the location of the covered objects and communications.
The organization's effective air defense system for the large administrative and industrial center was the Moscow Air Defense system. It included the 1st air defense corps (commander - Major General Artillery D. A. Zhuravlev) and promptly subordinate to him the 6th Fighter Aviation Corps (commander - Colonel I. D. Klimov).
By the beginning of massive air raids to Moscow (July 22, 1941), this grouping had more than 600 fighters and 1,000 anti-aircraft guns, about 350 anti-aircraft guns, over 600 anti-aircraft spotlights, 124 aircraft aerostat posts, 612 VOS posts. Moscow air defense system was built on the principle of circular defense, its depth was 200-250 kilometers.
During the war years, the German Luftwaffe produced 141 plates to Moscow, only about 8,600 aircraft. According to official data, 234 aircraft broke through to the city (less than 3%), almost 1,400 aircraft were shot down. These successes are largely due to the massive use of air defense forces and the effective organization of defense: such a concentration of air defense forces during World War II did not have any capital, including London and Berlin.
Unfortunately, the history of the domestic air defense killer knows less brilliant examples. So, in the course of the three massive raids of German aviation to the car factory. Molotova In Gorky in June 1943, a huge damage was caused to the plant, despite the very strong grouping of the Gorky Divisional Air Defense region. The most important defense company was actually disabled, and it took more than three months and almost 35 thousand workers.
In the future, during the war, the military air defense troops underwent organizational changes that objectively dictated by an increase in their combat composition and changes at the front. In April 1942, the Moscow Front FRONT was formed, and in Leningrad and a few later in Baku formed the air defense armies. So the first operational associations of air defense troops appeared. The transition of the Red Army to wide offensive actions has significantly changed the nature of the combat use of air defense troops. In June 1943, the Office of the Commander of the Air Defense Forces was abolished, and two air defense fronts were created instead: Western and East. The air defense troops on the cover of Moscow is reorganized into the special Moscow air defense army.
RPN C-300PM and NVO on one of the sites of Polygon Ashuluk
Photo: George Danilov
By the end of the war, all compounds that carried out air defense in the country's rear were summarized in Central Front Air defense with headquarters in Moscow. Advanced compounds and parts of air defense troops were formed Western and southwest air defense fronts. In the Far East in March 1945, on the eve of the beginning of hostilities against Japan, three air defense armies were created: Primorskaya, the Amur and Zabaykalskaya, which became part of the fronts.
In general, during the Great Patriotic War, the air defense troops solved a number of major operational and strategic and operational tasks, many large administrative and industrial centers, hundreds of industrial enterprises and troops and groups of troops were retained from destruction and destruction. Organizationally took shape as a kind of troops Air defense anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aviation. Large development received the Deposit Service. Operational associations and operational-tactical air defense compounds, compounds and parts of the generation of troops were created. For merits when performing military debt, over 80 thousand soldiers and officers, air defense troops were awarded orders and medals, 92 soldiers became the heroes of the Soviet Union.
With the end of World War II peace and tranquility, humanity, alas, did not receive. Former allies on the anti-Hitler coalition again turned out to be on different sides of the barricades. A long-term political and military confrontation began two world systems, the name of the Cold War began. Many people began to be binding to the famous speech of W. Churchill on March 5, 1946 in the American city of Fulton (Missouri).
Then the British Prime Minister first voiced the term "iron curtain", dividing Europe, and called on relations from the USSR to build solely from the position of force. At the same time, the United States has already possessed nuclear weapons and the means of delivering it - strategic aviation, which created a real air threat of not only the groupings of the Soviet Armed Forces, but also the economic potential of the country, including the strategic rear.
In this regard, despite the overall reduction of the armed forces and the hardest post-war economic situation of the country, the Supreme Military Council adopts a strategic decision on the deployment of air defense for the entire territory of the country, even where it was not in the war. Several earlier, in February 1946, the position of the commander of the air defense authorities, which now directly submitted to the commander of artillery was introduced. The command of the air defense troops was entrusted to develop a plan for amplifying air defense in the Volga region, in the Urals and in Siberia, as well as its creation in Central Asia.
In terms of the organization of the air defense of the country, ambitions of the species of the Armed Forces were again aggravated: the air defense troops offered to increase the number of air defense districts and create an air defense of the country by analogy with the military air defense of the CU, Ground troops Offered to return to the pre-war organization, dividing the power of the country's air defense for military districts, the Air Force proposed to include air defense troops in their composition.
In 1948, the "intermediate option" was adopted: the territory of the country was divided into a border strip and internal territory; In the border band, the responsibility for the air defense was entrusted to the military districts, in the internal territory - the country's air defense troops, in which, instead of four air defense districts that existed in the first post-war years were created 12 districts of air defense.
On April 4, 1949, the military-political union of 11 countries of Europe and the United States was created - NATO Block (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The creation of this structure has increased overall political and military tensions in Europe and in the world as a whole, as well as the intensity and scope of provocative and intelligence flights of NATO aircraft in the USSR airspace.
At the same time, the reorganized air defense system was unable to effectively counteract air violars, which have already reached the regions of Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev.
The whole series of organizational transformations of air defense troops began. Trying to make an organized start in the fragmentation of the air defense, in the border districts and on the fleets, the so-called border bands of air defense (PFS) were formed. The organization and management of PFPs still rest in military districts and fleets. Without receiving the expected result, the military leadership based on the PFP created the "air defense of the cross-border line" (crib).
At the same time, the leadership of the screams were transferred to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force was simultaneously the commander of the Ambralists). Direct responsibility for anti-sophisticated defense in the districts (i.e., in military districts), they were transferred to the commander of military districts on the communals of the Air Force with the Air Force.
However, the remaining fragmentation of the air defense did not change anything in essence. Violations air borders continued to be more expensive, and the depth of invasions of foreign aircraft reached the Moscow region.
Soon it became clear that the screaming for the Air Force - the structure is excessive and essentially useless. Therefore, in June 1953, the crew of the crop at the Commanded of the Air Force was disbanded. One part of the screaming forces was transferred to the military districts and on fleets, another - in the troops of the air defense troce. At the same time, the general responsibility for the entire war-ended defense of the country, including within the borders of military districts, was assigned to the commander of the air defense troops.
Such an association of all air defense forces was very conditional in nature, as in the border areas of force and funds were still part of military districts and fleets. The interaction between them was weak. Soon it was confirmed. On April 29, 1954, three American strategic bombers in-47 violated the Government from the Baltic Sea, penetrated Novgorod, Smolensk and Kiev and were left to the West with impunity. 10 days later, the day before the victory day was followed by a new border breakdown.
These outrageous pre-holiday incidents were not ignored to the highest political leadership of the country. In the course of urgently conducted inspection, serious shortcomings were opened in the organization of the entire anti-air defense of the country, which was based on the fragmentation of air defense forces.
On May 27, 1954, a special decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR cm "On the unpunted flights of foreign aircraft over the territory of the USSR" was published. The same decree declared a new air defense system. Given the rapid development of military aviation, a significant increase in its combat capacity, as well as the increasing scope of violations of the USSR airspace by NATO aircraft, was recognized by the expedient air defense troops from the kind of troops to deploy to the view of the Armed Forces - the military air defense troops. It included all the main air defense forces and established the boundaries of the country's state border. In the military districts there were only parts of the air defense air defense of the land compounds, and on the fleets - ship facilities. In the military air defense troops, the generally accepted Army military structures were restored in 1944: associations (district, army) and compounds (corps, divisions) air defense. Fighter aviation of military districts was promptly subordinated to the new structures of the military air defense of the country.
Simultaneously with the above-mentioned decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Sciences of the USSR, the decision of the USSR Council "On Ensuring the military air defense troops with new technique" was adopted. This decree was very timely, since last years There was a noticeable lag of the development of air defense of air defense from the development of military aviation.
Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov was appointed the first commander-in-chief forces of the country's air defense system. However, soon after his death, the commander-in-chief became Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov. An experienced military leader and a thoughtful organizer, he made a great contribution to the formation and development of a new type of armed forces. It was with him that the foundations of operational art and tactics of air defense troops were formed and many fundamental principles of a comprehensive organization of the control of the air enemy were relevant today.
At the initiative of S. S. Biryuzov and under his leadership, the military science was created in 1957. In 1957, military science in air defense troops by combining the scattered scientific units of the Troops in the first in the Armed Forces of the USSR, a unified comprehensive research institute of the type of sun research institute -2 Air Defense (subsequently - the 2nd Central Committee of MO, and at present - the FFA Research Center of the 4th Central RF).
Due to the mass re-equipment of troops on a fundamentally new technique, the need for highly qualified personnel and military engineers has sharply increased. Therefore, at the initiative of S. S. Biryuzov in the mid-1950s. A number of new military air defense institutions were created.
From 1956 in Kalinin (now Tver) began training Military Academy Air defense. Today, this is the Military Academy of Space Defense, which became the forge of military team and engineering personnel for air defense troops (East Kazakhstan) not only our country, but also a number of neighboring countries and far abroad.
1950s. - Truly revolutionary in terms of developing air defense, creating fundamentally new samples. It is for this period that the formation of anti-aircraft missile troops, reactive fighter aircraft, radiotechnical troops.
In August 1950, a decision was made to create a system of anti-aircraft missile defense of Moscow. The project was called "Berkut". The head developer of the system was the specially created design bureau No. 1 (KB-1) - the future of the glorified NGO "Almaz", known worldwide with its anti-aircraft managed rocket weapons. A. A. Tselletn became the leader of the development. The air defense system consisted of 10 radars of circular review A-100 and two rings around Moscow inpatient sectoral multichannel SPCs (only 56), each in the B-200 target radar and anti-aircraft controlled rockets of the vertical start in-300. The air defense system was created in a fantastically short period - in less than five years. And this is despite the fact that all its elements were developed almost from scratch, and the volume capital construction It was truly huge. Already in May 1955, the C-25 air defense system was adopted and served three decades.
In 1957, the first distinguished air defense troops began to arrive (that is, nonstationary) S-75 medium range. These complexes, like any other, were widely used in real combat actions, including Vietnam and the Middle East. In Vietnam, only in 1972 - the last year of the war - 421 American aircraft, including 51 B-52, was destroyed by the C-75 complexes. Such losses became one of the decisive factors forcing Americans to leave Vietnam. Modernized S-75 SPC is still in service with a number of neighboring countries and far abroad.
In 1961, the development of a small-range C-125 was completed, the main specialization of which is the fight against certain purposes. For the first time, a solid fuel Zur B-600P was developed for the first time. The export version of the SIR ("Pechora") was supplied in 35 countries of the world. The first combat baptism of SPC received in 1970 in Egypt. Then there were Syria and Libya. In March 1999, in the sky over Yugoslavia, an American-"Invisible" F-117A was shot down as a rocket of S-125.
In June 1958, the Government's decision was adopted on the development of the Far Action C-200 VIS. By January 1960, her sketchy project was already ready. In VIS for the first time in Russian practice, the principle of self-deployment of ZUR on target was implemented. When creating VSUS developers faced a number of technical difficulties, many of which had to be solved during the polygon and state tests. Advanced VIS C-200 adopted in February 1967
Thus, for 10 years in the USSR, a well-thought-out set of types of zenith rocket armament, which made it possible to build an effective system of anti-aircraft missile defense of various facilities and areas of the country.
An impressive pace was the development of fighter aviation. The first mass domestic reactive fighter of the 1st generation was MIG-15. The first airlocks with MiG-15 fighters were formed in 1949. The debut of the large-scale combat use of these aircraft was the war in the sky of Korea (November 1950 - July 1953), where our migi did not inferior to the latest American fighters F-86 "SATIBR" : Total soviet pilots About 1,100 opponent aircraft shot down, their losses were 335 fighters.
To replace the fighters of the 1st generation MiG-15, MiG-17, Yak-25 in the late 1950s - early 1960s. fighters and aviation rocket complexes Interception of the 2nd generation - Su-9 (1959), SU-11-98 (1961), SU-15-98, Tu-128-C4 and Yak-28 (1965). ARCP SU-15-98 for a long time was the basis of the fighter aviation of the military air defense system.
In June 1954, the formation of radiotechnical air defense troops was completed. By this time, the domestic industry has mastered the production of a sufficiently wide range of radar techniques. One of the first massive radars of the post-war period was the movable two-coordinate radar of the centimeter range of P-20 "Periscope", the M-range of M-Discovery P-8 "Volga" RLS (1950) and Radio-Sithomer PrV-10 "Cone".
In 1955-1956 The troops began to receive the RLS of the meter range of the duty regime of the P-15 "Trail" to detect the minor goals and the RLS P-12 "Yenisei". In the RLS P-12, the coherent-compensation equipment of the CDC was first applied. This radar gradually displaced almost all previously created RLS meter range.
Somewhat later, in 1959, mobile radar detection "Defense-14" was adopted, and in 1961 - Altai RTQ as part of four radio cells and two range finders. In the same year, the troops began to act in the troops of the PRV-11 "Top". The latest modifications of this radio personnel are still in service with the RTV of the Air Force of Russia and a number of CIS countries.
Gradually, automation means of automation began to be used for combat management. The first control system of control system (ACU) has become a system of alert, control and guidance of fighter aircraft aircraft. The command points of the operational link began to be equipped with a complex of automation tools (KSA) "Almaz-2".
In the context of the new organizational structure of the military air defense system and equipped with new weapons with sharply increased combat capabilities, the ideology and principles of the organization of air defense were changed. It was recognized as appropriate in a number of countries of the country to move from the object to the zonal (zonal-object) principle of organization of defense. In the cross-border (seaside) areas in the 1st echelon defense, SPRs were put forward with the creation of bandwidth of anti-aircraft missile defense. Fighter aircraft was the basis of the 2nd echelon, but with the provision of possibilities if necessary, act in the VSV zones.
Created in the 1960s. The air defense system was mainly focused on the Western, southwestern and southern strategic directions, where the main forces of the USA and NATO were focused. In the future, with an increase in the possibilities of US strategic aviation and equipping it with strategic wicked missiles, the northern direction was potentially dangerous. In this regard, work was launched on the organization of air defense in this direction (the "Shield" system) on the basis of the ARCP of a long interception.
Changed organizational structure The military troops of the country. By 1960, the operational link was enlarged. Instead of 20 associations and air defense compounds, 13 were left: two air defense districts, five air defense armies and six air defense buildings, whose responsibility zones covered the whole country. Soon the changes were carried out at the operational and tactical and tactical level. Instead of corps and divisions of labor of the troops, air defense compounds (hulls, divisions) of a mixed composition, in which the kind of troops (SPV, IA, RTV) were represented by regimental structures.
Relatively calm and very productive development of the military air defense of the country under the leadership of Marshal S. S. Biryuzov, and then Marshal P. F. Batitsky ended in 1978. Head of the General Staff of the USSR N. V. Oharkov put forward the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating a so-called unified air defense system and armed forces. The commander-in-chief of the military air defense officer P. F. Batitsky, however, the highest political and military leadership (L. I. Brezhnev and D. F. Ustinov) supported N. V. Ogarkov. As a result, Batitsky left the post of commander, and in December 1979, the decision of the Defense Council was adopted, according to which the system of air defense was essentially returned to the pre-war organization.
The territory of the country was again divided into border and internal areas. In the border areas disbanded the Baku District Air Defense and five separate armies of the air defense (Minsk, Leningrad, Kiev, Arkhangelsk, Khabarovsk). Corps and air defense divisions in them were again subject to military districts. Fighter aircraft shelves from these compounds seized and transferred to military units of military districts. As a result, the unity of managing the forces and means of air defense was violated and a unified system of air defense of the country actually ceased to exist.
At the end of 1982, after the death of L. I. Brezhneva P. F. Batitsky managed to draw the attention of the new secretary-General Yu. V. Andropova on the so-called reform of the military air defense system. As a result, the Commission of the CPSU Central Committee was created, which after a two-year work concluded that the reorganization of N. V. Ogarkova was the wrong and "Country air defense troops should be returned to the previous state."
The corresponding decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the CM of the USSR was adopted on January 24, 1986. In the border areas, five former air defense associations were restored, returning them to the immediate submission by the Commander-in-Chief Air Defense. Instead of the Baku Civil Code, a separate air defense army with headquarters in Tbilisi was formed.
At the same time, the biothelium above the air defense troops remained: they were promptly submitted to the commander-in-chief of the directions (soon abolished), and in fact, the military districts.
Despite organizational oscillations, in 1970-1980. There was a dynamic process of equipping the air defense troops with new weapons and military equipment.
Since 1979, fundamentally new VSS C-300P (head developer - NGO "Diamond" began to flow into the troops. Currently, the modifications of this system (C-300PS, C-300PM) constitute the basis of the armament of the SIR. On the basis of this VIS, the C-50 air defense system was created, which replaced the previously existing C-25 system.
Fighter aviation continued to develop. In the 1970s. The industry has mastered the mass production of 4-generation interceptor fighters - MiG-23P and MiG-25PD, and at the beginning of the 80s, the fighters of the 4th generation began to enter the troops - MiG-31 (1981), MiG-29 (1983) and Su-27 (1984).
Fighter-range fighter MiG-31 first was equipped with a BRLS with a phased antenna lattice and possessed high possibilities for detection and destruction winged rockets. It was considered as the main element above mentioned air defense system in the northern direction "Shield". The 4th generation aircraft currently make up the basis of the IA Air Force.
Almost completely updated their fleet of radiolocation techniques. Radiotechnical troops. During the period under review, RLS and RLK ST-68U (Mind), "Casta 2-1" and "Cast 2-2", "Periscop-Vm", "Defense-14C", P-18, P-37 , "Sky" and "Sky-U", "Desna-M", "opponent-g", "Gamma-C1", K-66 (m).
The new technique was equipped with parts and units of Rab.
Considering the high dynamics of hostilities of air defense forces, military leadership pay great attention to the development of combat management tools and the equipment of the troops. At the same time, there was a process of integrated equipment of the CSA of the control points for the operational, operational-tactical and tactical links of the control. The command items of the operational management were equipped with Diamond CSA. In an operational-tactical department of management, the ACS "Lights-1", "Light-2" was introduced. Command points of compounds and parts of the childbirth of the troops were equipped with a CSA type "Sezhezh", "Vector-2", "Baikal", "Rubezh-1", "Niva", AKUP-1.
In the 1970s. The military air defense troops included the forces and means of rocket and space defense (RKO). The RKO system combined a missile warning system (SPRN), a system for controlling the outer space (SCPC), anti-missile system (Pro) and anti-anti-free defense system.
SPRN officially stood on combat duty in 1976 as part of the command post, six nodes of early detection (Dnipro radar) and Space Echelon Us-k. In 1978, the modernized system of the city of Moscow A-135M was adopted in the composition of the DON-2N radar, the command-computing item and two types of anti-abslicas. In November 1978, the complex of PKO IS-M was adopted. A few years earlier began to function center for control of outer space.
The further history of the country's air defense troops is inextricably linked with the history of the formation and development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, its beginning was far from joyful. Already in 1992, announced the reform of the Armed Forces.
The reform was carried out in the absence of a whole military ideology of ensuring the military security of the state as a whole and a clear understanding of the rational appearance of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation ("The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation" and the military doctrine of the Russian Federation were accepted only in early 2000).
As a result, the main result of the reform of the air defense troops was a sharp reduction in combat composition and financing for their content. A new weapon has almost ceased to the troops, the level of combat training has decreased to a dangerous limit.
In July 1997, a large-scale reorganization of the country's air defense occurred. In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the air defense troops were eliminated as the type of armed forces. The air defense forces from their composition were transferred to the Air Force, and the forces of RTCs in the RVSN (later - to the composition of the newly educated space forces). In the environment of military specialists, disputes about the benefits and harm of these transformations still do not subscribe.
However, life does not stand still. As Russia's economic situation strengthened, its armed forces were strengthened. Considerable attention began to be focused on the country's contradiction of the country.
Military science played a significant role in the development and strengthening of air defense. With its active participation in the early 2000s. A project "Concept of air-space defense of the Russian Federation" was developed, which in November 2002 was approved by the board of the Ministry of Defense. Subsequently, the concept was approved by the President of the Russian Federation and became one of the fundamental documents in terms of the development of the countries of the country. At the same time, a systemic project of air-space defense of the Russian Federation was developed, and a little later, a sketch-technical project of the complex system of the Moscow Moscow and the Central Industrial District.
The large amount of research was carried out by definition and streamlining the most important objects of the armed forces, the economy and infrastructure in the interests of improving the organization of their anti-air defense. Active were carried out scientific research in the field of the development of the combined CIS air defense system formed in 1996
In 2010-2011 There were significant changes in the organization's air defense system (East) of the country. To date, the power and air defense facilities in the Air Force are focused in four commanders of the Air Force and Air Defense, each of which is promptly subordinated to the relevant military district (in accordance with the new military administrative division of the country from December 1, 2010, four military districts are functioning in the Russian Federation - Western , South, Central and Eastern). The previously existing air defense cells are transformed into the EAS brigades. Fighter aviation is reduced to aviation bases.
On the basis of space troops formed the troops of East Kazakhstan. They include the Space Command (RN and Space System System Systems) and the PVA-Pro command, providing air-space defense of Moscow and the Central Industrial District. It includes a system of Moscow and three air defense brigades. From December 1, 2011, the troops of the East Kazakhstanssocus took over the combat duty.
In recent years, the process of re-equipment of air defense troops (East Kazakhstan) on a new technique has significantly revived. The newest VSS C-400, Pancirry, 4+ fighters began to enter the troops. The newest radar technique enters the radio engineering troops. Control systems are equipped with more intelligent and high-speed automation facilities. The leadership of the country was voiced by impressive amounts of financing of the armed forces, planned for the period up to 2020. The implementation of these plans will significantly increase the pace of rearness of the troops, will ensure significant growth in their combat capacity.
The experience of local wars and armed conflicts of recent decades convincingly testifies to the steady increase in the role of aviation in the modern war. Space space becomes more potentially dangerous. Under these conditions, issues of improving the means and methods to counter potential threats from the air and from space are becoming increasingly relevant.
The modern system of the Russian Federation is designed to ensure the solution of the entire totality of the tasks of the control of air-space:
- warning about aerial, rocket and cosmic attack, exploration of air and space environment and alert about her troops;
- protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in airspace and control of the procedure for using airspace;
- reflection of aggression in the air-space sphere, anti-airframe defense of the most important objects of state and military administration, key objects of the armed forces, economics and infrastructure.
The air defense troops passed a glorious and difficult path. There were ups and downs, minutes of glory and years of disappointments, high achievements and failures. And today, they rightly remain on the advanced borders of the Defense of the Fatherland, strengthening and multiplying the combat fame of our grandfathers and fathers.
Boris Leonidovich Zaretsky
candidate of Military Sciences, Corresponding Member of Avn, Senior Researcher Niz PVA (Tver)
Yuri Timofeevich Alekhin
candidate of Technical Sciences, Professor Avn, Senior Researcher, NIC PVA (Tver)
Sergey Glebovich Kutsenko
senior Researcher NIC PVA (Tver)
