Vistula-Oder offensive operation
At the first stage of the Vistula-Oder operation, front troops had to solve a number of operational tasks, the main of which were breaking through the enemy’s tactical defense zone at a high pace and defeating the main forces of Army Group A, located in the tactical and immediate operational depths.
The operation began on January 12 with a strike by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the Sandomierz bridgehead. According to the directive of the front commander of January 11, the offensive of the main forces of the front was preceded by reconnaissance in force, carried out by the advanced battalions after a short but powerful artillery preparation. With its start, the enemy, as expected, withdrew troops from the first trench, so the leading battalions quickly took possession of it. The powerful enemy resistance in front of the second trench only confirmed the correctness of the calculations when planning the artillery preparation, and it was carried out in full within 1 hour 47 minutes to the entire depth of the tactical defense zone. Some of the reserves located near the tactical defense zone also came under artillery fire. The artillery preparation was very effective. According to the testimony of prisoners, German officers and soldiers as a result of the fire Soviet artillery They lost their composure, left their positions without permission, and went into the depths of the defense. Troop control was lost.
Using the results of artillery preparation, the troops of the front’s strike group captured the first and second positions of the enemy’s main defense line during the first two to three hours of the battle. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the entire tactical zone of enemy defense and the subsequent development of the offensive in depth, the front commander decided at 14:00 on January 12 to introduce the 4th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies, the 31st and 4th Guards Tank Corps into battle. The weather had improved by this time, and the aviation of the 2nd Air Army was able to ensure the introduction of tank formations and strike at enemy reserves and at their defense facilities in the second zone.
The bet on a high rate of attack made by the Soviet command fully justified itself. The advance of the Soviet troops was so rapid that the enemy did not have time to complete preparations for the counterattack of the 16th Panzer and 20th Motorized Divisions from the Kielce area to the south, and the 17th Panzer Division from the Khmelnik area to the north, in order to stop the advance of the 1st tank armies. th Ukrainian Front. The Nazi reserves were introduced in parts on January 12 and 13 and were easily defeated by the advancing Soviet troops. At the same time, in the zone of action of the 3rd Guards Army of V.N. Gordov and the 13th Army of N.P. Pukhov on the approaches to Kielce, the enemy put up stubborn resistance. In order not to lose the pace of the offensive and break resistance, the front commander turned the 4th Tank Army D. D. Lelyushenko, which, after breaking through the second line of defense, developed an offensive in the direction of Chęciny, bypassing Kielce from the southwest.
Aviation played a significant role in the defeat of enemy reserves on January 13, which, despite the limited flight weather, made 692 sorties during the day against enemy concentrations in areas south of Kielce and Pinchuv.
“The front of the 4th Panzer Army was torn apart, and there was no longer any way to hold back the advance of the Russian troops,” recalled German General K. Tippelskirch. “The latter immediately introduced their tank formations into the breaches, which with the main forces began to advance towards the Nida River, at the same time undertaking an enveloping maneuver on Kielce with their northern wing.”
The offensive also developed successfully in the zone of the 52nd Army, whose troops, together with the 3rd Guards Tank Army, broke through the second line of defense and captured the city of Khmelnik. By the morning of January 14, the 3rd Guards Tank Army with its main forces reached the river. Nida captured the bridgeheads. The 5th Guards Army, operating on the left wing of the front’s strike group, advanced up to 25 km during January 13 and also crossed the river. Nida.
Thus, as a result of the fighting on January 12 and 13, the troops operating in the direction of the front’s main attack broke through the enemy’s tactical defense zone and defeated the main forces of the operational reserves brought into the battle. The troops of the front's strike group advanced up to 25 km, expanded the breakthrough to 60 km along the front and reached the river. Nida. The successful solution of this task created the conditions for the rapid development of the offensive in the Czestochowa direction and the deployment of the offensive of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.
On the morning of January 14, the main forces of the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front began pursuing the retreating enemy units. On the same day, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive, striking from the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads. The advance of the front troops was also preceded by reconnaissance in force from the forward battalions. It was carried out after a 25-minute fire raid by the bulk of the front artillery against enemy firing points and manpower in the main defense zone in the absence of aviation training due to bad weather.
At the Magnushevsky bridgehead, the advanced battalions of the 5th Shock and 8th Guards armies were successful, advancing 2-3 km, so it was decided to bring the main forces of the first echelon of corps into battle. During the first day of the offensive, troops of the 5th Shock and 8th Guards Armies defeated the main forces of the enemy's 8th Army Corps and advanced to a depth of 8-12 km. At the same time, the troops of the 5th Shock Army completed the breakthrough of the main line of enemy defense and rushed to the river. Pilica. It was very important to capture the bridge across it with a carrying capacity of 60 tons in order to carry out the crossing of tanks and self-propelled guns. This task was successfully completed by the 270th Guards Rifle Regiment of Colonel E. A. Petrov, who captured a small bridgehead on the river. Pilica in the Palczewa area.
The formations of the 8th Guards Army were unable to immediately break through the main line of enemy defense and were drawn into protracted battles. The advance of the 61st Army on this day was even less successful, the advanced battalions of which met at the turn of the river. Pilica has powerful fire resistance. The 55-minute artillery preparation for the attack did not produce significant results; the firing points were weakly suppressed. Therefore, the army formations, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, were able to force the river only in a number of places by the end of the day. Pilica and penetrate into enemy defenses to a depth of 4 km.
In order not to lose the pace of the offensive, to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone and to develop the offensive in depth, the front commander decided to introduce the 1st Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough in the 8th Guards Army zone. On January 15, at 14:00, she successfully entered the breakthrough, and by the end of the day, her advanced detachments had already advanced to a depth of 25 km and captured the crossing of the river. Pilica in the Sokul area (8-9 km east of Nowe Miasto).
Taking advantage of the success of the 1st Guards Tank Army, the 8th Guards Army began to advance. By the end of the day, its formations were fighting at the line Shchity (28 km east of Nowe Miasto) - Kamen - Se Kluki - Guzd-Stary - Zawade-Stare - Jedlinsk - Goryn - Lewaszowka - Maryanov - the western outskirts of Stanislawice. Having fought up to 14 km, they cut the Białobrzegi - Radom highway in the Kamen - Guzd-Stary section and, with their left flank units, linked up with the troops of the right flank of the 69th Army in the Kozienice area.
On the Puła bridgehead, the troops of the 69th (General V.A. Kolpakchi) and 33rd (General V.D. Tsvetaev) armies acted according to the same scheme, but more effectively. The advanced battalions, after a 25-minute artillery fire raid during the first hour of the offensive, captured the first position of the enemy’s main defense line, which made it possible to immediately introduce the main forces of the divisions of the first echelon of armies into battle. By 13:00 the main line of Nazi defense was broken through. As part of the 69th Army, the forward battalion of the 77th Guards Rifle Division, led by Major B.N. Emelyanov, acted with exceptional valor. For the collective heroism shown, all soldiers and officers (officers with this order, with the exception of aviation, were not previously awarded) of the battalion were awarded the Order of Glory. The Army Military Council awarded the unit the honorary name of Glory Battalion.
To develop the success achieved and capture the second line of enemy defense, by the decision of the commander of the 69th Army at 13:00 on January 14, the 11th Army was introduced into the breakthrough tank corps, who crossed the river. Zvolenka and by 14 o'clock captured a large enemy defense center on the second line - the city of Zvolen. By the end of the day, the troops of the 69th and 33rd armies had expanded the breakthrough along the front to 40 km and advanced 15-20 km in depth.
Realizing the threat of the 3rd Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front reaching the rear of its group south of Radom, the enemy began to withdraw formations of the 42nd Army and 56th Tank Corps to the Radom-Szydlowiec line. Thus, close interaction on the flanks of the two fronts yielded positive results.
The enemy's withdrawal from the river line began. Vistula was discovered in a timely manner, and troops of the 6th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front began pursuing enemy troops in the second half of January 15. By the end of the day they had advanced to a depth of 12 km and captured the city of Opatow. On the morning of January 16, the city of Ostrovets was taken.
At the same time, the troops of the 69th and 33rd armies of the 1st Belorussian Front on January 15 overcame the resistance of units of the enemy's 10th motorized division and during the day advanced to a depth of 15-20 km. The 11th Tank Corps of the 69th Army, in cooperation with the 25th Rifle Corps, broke into the eastern outskirts of Radom by the end of the day. The advanced units of the 9th Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough in the afternoon of January 15 in the 33rd Army zone, also approached the city of Radom.
The enemy brought the 40th Tank Corps from reserve into the battle, but was unable to close the gaps that had formed in the tactical defense zone and delay the advance of the Soviet troops.
Thus, as a result of the first two days of the offensive, the front’s strike groups broke through the tactical zone of the enemy defense to its entire depth and defeated the troops of the 8th Army, 56th and 40th Tank Corps. The advance of Soviet troops in depth reached: in the area of the Magnuszew bridgehead - 30 km, in the Puławy bridgehead - 50 km. By the end of January 15, the breakthrough areas on the bridgeheads were united.
Under attacks from the front forces, enemy formations, covered by rearguards, began to retreat to the rear army zone, which ran along the line Sochaczew - Skierniewice - Rawa Mazowiecka - Tomaszow. In this situation, the front troops, pursuing the enemy at a pace of 20-30 km per day, immediately overcame the prepared defense line and on January 17 captured the line Sochaczew - Skierniewice - Gluchow - Olszowiec.
The most important task of the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front was the liberation of the capital of Poland - Warsaw. The 47th Army began solving this problem on January 15 after a 55-minute artillery preparation. At the end of the battle, she advanced to a depth of 12 km and reached the river. Vistula. At 8 o'clock in the morning on January 16, from the bridgehead on the left bank of the river. Pilitz, the 2nd Guards Tank Army was introduced into the breakthrough, which began to develop an offensive in the direction of Sokhaczew, pursuing enemy units defeated in previous battles and covering the right flank of the 46th Tank Corps. In this regard, the enemy command, fearing the encirclement of its troops in the Warsaw area, began to hastily withdraw them in a northwestern direction.
In the current situation, the 61st Army increased the pace of pursuit of the retreating enemy to 16-24 km per day, and the 1st Army of the Polish Army under the command of General S. Poplavsky crossed the Vistula and, developing the offensive, liberated the capital of Poland, Warsaw, on January 17. The troops of the 47th Army fought to expand the captured bridgehead on the river. Vistula south of Modlin in close cooperation with the 70th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front.
“Fascist barbarians destroyed the capital of Poland - Warsaw,” the Military Council of the front reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The chief of staff of the 1st Belorussian Front, General M. S. Malinin, reported to the Chief of the General Staff, General A. I. Antonov, that the enemy had left Warsaw mined. “During mine clearance, 5,412 anti-tank mines, 17,227 anti-personnel mines, 46 land mines, 232 “surprises”, over 14 tons of explosives, about 14 thousand shells, aerial bombs, mines and grenades were removed, collected and detonated.” To help the residents of Warsaw, the Soviet government sent 60 thousand tons of bread, a lot of other food, medicine, and clothing.
As a result of the four-day offensive, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front defeated the main forces of the enemy’s 9th Army and broke through not only its tactical defense zone, but also captured the rear army zone (100-130 km). The defense breakthrough, which began in three directions, by January 17 merged into a single attack along the entire 270-kilometer front. The remnants of the defeated enemy formations, under the blows of Soviet troops, hastily retreated to the west. The enemy reserves brought into the battle for the tactical defense zone - the 19th and 25th tank and part of the forces of the 10th motorized divisions - suffered up to 50% losses and did not have a significant impact on the course of the operation.
However, despite the successful completion of the breakthrough of the enemy defense, the front forces failed to encircle and destroy the main forces of the 46th and 56th tank corps: the first in the Warsaw area, the second between the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads. In both cases, the enemy troops managed to escape the complete defeat that threatened them.
An attempt was made through the joint efforts of the 33rd Army of the 1st Belorussian and the 3rd Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front to encircle the troops of the enemy's 42nd Army Corps. But by January 18, when Soviet troops of two fronts united in the Skarzysko-Kamienna area, the enemy managed to withdraw his troops from the line of the river. Vistula to the west and avoid encirclement.
The main forces of the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front operated more successfully, developing a rapid offensive to the west. To stop the advance of Soviet troops, German command launched a counterattack with the 24th Tank Corps (Army Group A reserve). On January 15, a fierce oncoming battle unfolded near Kielce, in which the troops of the 4th Tank Army of General D. D. Lelyushenko and the 13th Army of General N. P. Pukhov defeated the enemy. In the battle for this important communications hub and large administrative and economic center of Poland, V. G. Ryzhov’s battalion from the 16th Guards Mechanized Brigade especially distinguished itself.
Front troops managed to overcome the intermediate zone of enemy defense along the river. Nida, cross the river. Pilica, and then r. Wart and by the end of the day on January 17, capture important enemy communications centers - the cities of Radomsko and Czestochowa.
The successful development of the offensive in the direction of the main attack made it easier for the troops of the left wing of the front to carry out their tasks. To develop an offensive to bypass the Krakow enemy group from the north-west, the front commander, on the morning of January 14, brought into battle from the line of the river. Nida between the 5th Guards and 60th Armies of the 59th Army and subordinated it to the 4th Guards Tank Corps, which had previously operated in the zone of the 5th Guards Army.
The rapid advance of the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the successful actions of the 38th Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front on the flanks of the enemy's 17th Army created a threat of encirclement and forced the German command to begin withdrawing its group from the area east of Tarnow in the general direction of Krakow . The troops of the Soviet fronts began to pursue the retreating enemy.
As a result, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in six days of fighting, managed to break through the enemy defenses on a 250-kilometer front, defeat the main forces of the 4th Tank Army and the 24th Tank Corps, defeat the 17th Field Army and advance in the direction of the main attack at 120-140 km.
By the end of January 17, that is, on the sixth day of the offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front and on the fourth day of the offensive of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, an operational breakthrough of the enemy defense was carried out on a front of 500 km and to a depth of 100-140 km. As a result of the successful offensive, the front troops defeated the main forces of Army Group A, captured such large industrial centers and important strongholds of the enemy's defense as Warsaw, Radom, Kielce, Radomsko, Czestochowa, and others. All this created favorable conditions for the development of the operation.
Member of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front, General K. V. Krainyukov, reporting to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, General A. S. Shcherbakov, on the state of affairs and situation in the liberated cities, noted: “The attitude of the overwhelming majority of the population of Krakow, Kielce, Czestochowa is positive . It perceived the arrival of the Red Army as a liberator from the Nazi invaders and everywhere expresses a feeling of gratitude to the Red Army for the liberation... However, the forces of reaction are very strong, especially in Krakow, where the Home Army has strong influence on youth."
The first stage of the Vistula-Oder operation was successfully completed. The German command did not expect such a rapid and deep advance of the Soviet troops and hastened to blame the commander of Army Group A, General J. Harpe, and the commander of the 9th Army, General S. Lüttwitz, for this disaster on the Vistula. They were removed from their positions and replaced respectively by generals F. Schörner and T. Busse. The new command hoped to gain a foothold on defensive lines prepared in depth and delay the advance of the Red Army.
At the second stage, with access to operational space, the main task of the Soviet troops was to pursue the enemy in order to prevent him from consolidating at intermediate lines and reaching the river. Oder and creating conditions for the attack on Berlin. In this environment for disruption railways enemy in the offensive zone of the 1st Ukrainian, 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts on the night of January 16-17, the forces of the 18th Long-Range Air Army attacked the railway junctions of Allenstein, Lodz, Katowice.
On January 17, the Supreme Command Headquarters clarified the further tasks of the troops: the 1st Belorussian Front, attacking directly in the Berlin direction, to capture the Bydgoszcz-Poznan line no later than February 2-4; 1st Ukrainian Front - advance with the main forces in the direction of Breslau, no later than January 30 to reach the river. Oder and seize bridgeheads on its left bank. In addition, the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in cooperation with the right wing of the neighboring 4th Ukrainian Front, was to liberate Krakow.
The commanders of the front troops assigned combat missions to their subordinates. In particular, the order of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front stated: “From 9.00 on January 17, 1945, continue the rapid offensive and by the end of the day reach the front with the main forces:
a) 61st Army - Nadarzyn (20 km southwest of Warsaw), Stara Wies, Marinin, Osowey, Radziewice, Mszczonów. With advanced detachments, occupy the towns of Blonie, Grodzisk, Zyrardow...
b) 5th Shock Army - claim. Mszczonów, Zovedy, Janów, Biala Raweka, Markhaty. Move strong mobile forward detachments to Skierniewice and Kurzeszyn...
c) 3rd Guards Army - Slupce (5 km south of Biała Rawek), Turbowice, Gudzimierz, Zdzhary, Domanowice. Move forward detachments to Rawa Mazowiecka.”
Carrying out the assigned tasks, the troops of both fronts launched a rapid pursuit of the enemy, which developed along a wide front and did not stop day or night. It was carried out by advanced detachments that were created in armies, corps and divisions. The main forces of combined arms armies and mobile troops during this period marched in columns and were deployed for battle only as necessary (to repel counterattacks and counterattacks, to capture important enemy strongholds and major road junctions).
The front commands daily clarified the tasks of the troops with their orders. For example, the 61st Army of the 1st Belorussian Front was ordered to reach the Sochaczew-Zaishev-Bolimów front by the end of January 18th. Forward detachments seize crossings on the river. Bzura near Kompina.
The forward detachments, without getting involved in battles for large strongholds, with their main forces destroyed the rear of the retreating enemy units and formations, and also cut off their communications, thereby creating a threat of encirclement for the retreating formations and often forcing them to leave the objects they defended without a fight. 
The German command sought to slow down the advance of Soviet troops and hold certain lines and areas. To do this, it transferred reserves from Germany, from the western front, as well as from other directions. Only in the period from January 18 to 20, the enemy transferred seven divisions to the advancing troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts.
But this did not prevent the development of the offensive of Soviet troops in both the Poznan and Breslau directions. In the offensive zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, individual divisions of the Nazis, taken from the reserve or withdrawn from other directions, due to lack of time, were brought into battle in parts, which facilitated their quick defeat. Therefore, in the first two days of the pursuit, the combined arms armies of the main front group advanced more than 55 km. On January 19, the 8th Guards Army, 11th and 9th Tank Corps and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps liberated the large industrial center of Poland, Lodz, from Nazi troops.
Particular attention was paid to the actions of mobile troops. In the order of the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front, the commander of the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies dated January 20, 1945, in particular, noted: “With the release of the tank armies on January 22, 1945 to the areas: 2nd Guards Tank Army - Nakel, Golang, Elzenau, Tsnin, Shubin, 1st Guards Tank Army - Oborniki, Plevleno, Poznan, Schwerzenz, Mukovanna-Gosylina, the front command intends to provide these armies with two days for technical inspection of vehicles and replenishment of supplies. Until that time, the situation requires rapid movement forward.”
The average daily pace of mobile connections reached 45 km, and on some days - 70 km. By the end of January 22, the advanced units of the mobile troops of the armies of the right wing and the center of the front approached the Poznan defensive zone and in a number of areas (in the areas of Nakiel, Bromberg and Poznan) wedged into it. At the same time, the gap from the main forces of the combined arms armies was more than 100 km. At this time, the troops of the left wing of the front (69th and 33rd armies), overcoming stubborn German resistance, fought southwest of Pabianice.
The enemy command sought at all costs to stop the advance of the front formations, to gain the time necessary to organize defense along the old German-Polish border, running along the line Schneidemühl - Czarnikau - Betshe. To defend the border fortifications, the remnants of the 9th Army were brought in, as well as parts of the 15th, 31st Infantry and 4th Motorized Divisions, transferred here from Army Group Center.
“Taking into account the weaknesses of the enemy, namely, that he does not have an organized defense on the Oder Quadrangle and on the Pomeranian Wall and that he will need at least ten days to bring up troops, the commander decided - and this decision turned out to be correct - to encircle the Schneidemühl and Poznan groupings, release the remaining forces and with a swift strike overcome fortified areas that are not ready for defense, reach the river. Oder, to seize the necessary bridgeheads in the interests of the subsequent operation,” - this is how G. K. Zhukov explained his decision on that situation in a speech at the military-scientific conference of the GSOVG in November - December 1945.
On January 23, units of the 2nd Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps captured the city of Bydgoszcz. On the same day, the 1st Guards Tank Army entered the area west of Poznan. By the end of January 25, the main forces of the 2nd Guards Tank Army were already crossing the river. Netze in the Charnikau region, and its advanced detachments are on the eastern outskirts of Schneidemuhl. The main forces of the 1st Guards Tank Army reached the Pinne-Grodzisk line and further south, where they linked up with units of the 11th Tank Corps of the 69th Army. With the arrival of mobile troops at the indicated line, an external front of encirclement of the Poznan enemy group was formed. At the same time, the troops of the 8th Guards and part of the forces of the 1st Guards Tank Army completed the encirclement of enemy troops directly in Poznan.
The remnants of the 19th and 25th tank, 251st infantry and 10th motorized divisions, as well as other units, were surrounded. The total number of enemy troops surrounded in the Poznan region reached 62 thousand people. By decision of the front commander, the 29th Rifle Corps of the 8th Guards Army and the 91st Rifle Corps of the 69th Army were left to eliminate the enemy garrison in Poznan, and the main forces of these armies continued to pursue the enemy. Overall leadership of the military operations to destroy the encircled enemy in Poznan was entrusted to the commander of the 8th Guards Army.
With the arrival of the main forces of the front at the Bromberg - Poznan line, the task set by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the directive of November 28, 1944 was completed. At the same time, the main forces of the front's mobile formations continued to pursue the enemy in a western direction, part of the front forces fought in the Schneidemühl and Poznan areas .
The situation in the zone of the main forces of the front was favorable for the development of the offensive with the goal of quickly reaching the river. Oder. The enemy was demoralized, did not have time to organize a stable defense, including on prepared lines, and partially lost control of the troops. G.K. Zhukov suggested that the Supreme Command Headquarters continue the offensive.
In the plan for further offensive actions, the front forces were tasked to reach the settlements of Waldau, Preuss, Friedland, Ratzebur, Tsyppnow, Freudenvier, Schonlanke, Runau, Gulch, Scharfenort, Opalenitsa, Grätz, Velikhovo, and Klyuchevo by January 30. By this time, the 2nd Guards Tank Army was supposed to capture the areas of Berlinchen, Landsberg, Friedberg, and the 1st Guards Tank Army - Meseritz, Schwiebtse, Tirgitigel.
At this point, it was planned to “bring up troops (especially artillery), tighten up the rear, replenish supplies, and put the material part of combat vehicles in order. Having deployed the 3rd shock and 1st Polish armies, from the morning of February 1-2, continue the offensive with all front forces with the immediate task of crossing the river on the move. Oder, and subsequently develop a swift attack on Berlin, directing the main efforts to bypass Berlin from the northeast, north and northwest.”
This report by G.K. Zhukov to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief testifies to the intentions that existed at that time to strike Berlin. However, the further advance of the front forces in the direction of Küstrin at such a high pace inevitably led to an increase in the gap with the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front and the threat of a flank attack by the enemy's East Pomeranian group on the front troops. This was directly pointed out by J.V. Stalin in telephone conversation January 25 and proposed to wait for the completion of the East Prussian operation of K.K. Rokossovsky’s troops and their regrouping across the Vistula. In addition, “please keep in mind,” added J.V. Stalin, “the 1st Ukrainian Front will now not be able to advance further and provide you on the left, since it will be busy for some time liquidating the enemy in the Oppeln-Katowice area.”
But at the same time, the Wehrmacht command took urgent measures to improve command and control and strengthen defense in Pomerania and in the Berlin direction in order to slow down the advance of Soviet troops and stop them on the river. Oder. On January 26, Army Group A was renamed Army Group Center, consisting of the 17th Field, 1st and 4th Panzer Armies, commanded respectively by Generals F. Schultz, G. Heinrici and F. Gräser. At the same time, Army Group Vistula was formed in Pomerania. Army Group "Vistula" occupied the front (leg.) Glogau - Lissa - Krotoszyn - Poznan - Schneidemühl - north of Bromberg and further along the river. Vistula to the Baltic Sea. Its main efforts were concentrated against the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. On the remaining section of the front from Glogau to the area southeast of Moravska-Ostrava, Army Group Center resisted the advance of the Soviet troops. Thus, by January 26, the main forces of the Vistula and Center army groups, consisting of over 30 infantry, six tank, three motorized divisions and four brigades, acted in front of the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts.
After additional negotiations, the Supreme Commander agreed with the proposal of the front command to advance part of the forces (troops of the 47th and 61st armies and formations of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) to cover the right flank, and the rest of the group to continue the offensive in order to quickly overcome the Meseritz fortified area with with fewer losses and reach the Oder.
Meeting stubborn resistance from the enemy, by the end of January 26, the combined arms formations of the front reached the line Krone - west of Nakiel - Rogazen - west of Poznan - north-west of Krotoszyn and were 120-150 km from the river. Oder. Mobile troops were 70 km away and operated at the Schneidemühl - Hochzeit - Betshe line and further south.
In developing the attack on Küstrin, the leading role was given to tank troops. The 2nd Guards Tank Army, striking in the general direction of Schönlanke - Berlinchen - Eberswalde, immediately overcame the Pomeranian fortified area, and by the end of January 28, its 1st Mechanized Corps was fighting 10 km west of Hochzeit. Following the tankers, the 61st and 5th shock armies advanced.
On January 29, troops of the 1st Guards Tank, 8th Guards, 69th and 33rd armies entered German territory, breaking through the Meseritz fortified area. At the same time, the tankmen of the 44th Guards Tank Brigade of Colonel I.I. Gusakov (advanced detachment of the 11th Guards Tank Corps of the 1st Guards Tank Army) acted heroically. For their heroism, the entire brigade personnel were awarded state awards, and 11 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union.
“However, with our troops reaching the Meseritz fortified line and the so-called Pomeranian Wall, the armies began to experience interruptions in the supply of fuel and lubricants and the most popular ammunition,” recalled G. K. Zhukov. - This happened for a number of reasons, and primarily because we advanced almost twice as fast as planned. Rear communications stretched for hundreds of kilometers, and the railways were not yet operational at that time due to extensive destruction and the lack of railway bridges across the Vistula.”
In the period from January 29 to 31, front troops overcame the resistance of enemy troops in the border regions of Germany, which was constantly growing. Enemy reserves continued to arrive in Pomerania; he was preparing to launch a counterattack on the flank and rear of the main grouping of the 1st Belorussian Front. In this regard, to support the right wing, the front commander additionally advanced the 1st Army of the Polish Army and the 3rd Shock Army (the second echelon of the front). Thus, by the end of January 31, four combined arms armies, part of the forces of the 2nd Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, which amounted to about half of all front forces, were brought in to support the right wing of the front.
The troops of the front's strike group continued to advance in a western direction. They achieved especially great success on January 31st. On this day, the 5th Shock Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Army reached the river. Oder and captured northwest of Küstrin, in the area of Kinitsa, a bridgehead more than 4 km wide and up to 2 km deep. The heroic actions of the forward detachment of the 5th Shock Army, which was led by the deputy commander of the 89th Guards Rifle Division, Colonel Kh. F. Esipenko and the representative of the Military Council of the 5th Army, the deputy head of the army's political department, Lieutenant Colonel D. D. Shaposhnikov, were highly praised by G. K. Zhukov, which he wrote about in detail in his memoirs.
By the morning of January 31, the advance detachment crossed the Oder and captured a bridgehead in the Ki-nitz-Gross-Neuendorf-Rehfeld area and then held it. For these battles, all soldiers, sergeants and officers of the 1st battalion of the 1008th were awarded orders and medals rifle regiment, and the battalion commander M.A. Alekseev and the party organizer of the battalion, senior lieutenant K. Usen-bekov, were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The 1008th and 1010th rifle regiments of the 266th rifle division were awarded the Order of Suvorov, III degree, for mass heroism.
The operation continued. The troops of the 1st Guards Tank Army, having overcome stubborn enemy resistance south of Meseritz, captured Liebenau. Formations of the 8th Guards Army occupied the city of Schwerin, the 69th and 33rd armies fought stubborn battles for the Meseritz fortified area on January 31 and broke through it in certain directions. Simultaneously with the advance of front troops to the river. Oder there were intense battles to destroy the encircled enemy in Schneidemuhl and Poznan.
By February 3, the front troops (5th Shock, 8th Guards, 69th and 33rd Combined Arms, 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies) reached the river. Oder in the zone from Zeden to the demarcation line with the 1st Ukrainian Front (Glogau region). At the same time, in the area south of Küstrin, on February 3, the troops of the 8th Guards Army managed to capture a small bridgehead on the left bank of the Oder. At the same time, the enemy in the areas of Küstrin and Frankfurt-on-Oder continued to hold small bridgehead fortifications, the elimination of which required significant effort and time from the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.
The struggle to expand and consolidate the captured bridgeheads on the river. The Oder was very tense. The situation was complicated by the fact that the enemy managed to temporarily gain air superiority, since Soviet aviation did not have a sufficient number of airfields near the river. The Oder could not provide timely assistance to the front troops, especially on the bridgeheads in the Küstrin area.
With the advance of Soviet troops to the Oder, the threat of an enemy counterattack from the north increased. Therefore, on February 1, for actions in this direction, the front commander turned the 2nd Guards Tank Army, and the next day the 1st Guards Tank Army. Thus, by February 3, the Pomeranian enemy group was opposed by four combined arms, two tank armies and a cavalry corps. Reflecting numerous enemy attacks, they stubbornly moved north. In the Berlin direction, four combined arms armies, two tank and cavalry corps, weakened in previous battles, remained.
Despite the fact that the Nazis did not have any significant forces in the Berlin direction at the beginning of February, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front were unable to continue the attack on Berlin, although it was 60-70 km away. The commander of the front troops gave the order to switch to defense and carry out defensive work with the involvement of the local population. At the same time, a front-line zone was created, free from the civilian population (except for those involved in the work) with a depth of 25 km.
In order to launch a successful offensive in the Berlin direction, it was necessary to eliminate the enemy group in Eastern Pomerania, complete the defeat of the garrisons in Schneidemuhl and Poznan, expand and consolidate the captured bridgeheads on the river. Oder, as well as to replenish the formations and formations of the front with people and material resources. Therefore, in accordance with the instructions of Headquarters, the offensive was stopped.
“Of course, it would be possible to ignore this danger, send both tank armies and 3-4 combined arms armies directly to Berlin and approach it. But the enemy, with a strike from the north, could easily break through our cover, reach the crossings on the Oder and put the front troops in the Berlin area in an extremely difficult situation,” G. K. Zhukov later wrote. In post-war discussions with V.I. Chuikov and other opponents, Zhukov motivatedly considered the then decision to postpone the attack on Berlin to be justified.
With the arrival of troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on the river. The Oder and the capture of bridgeheads on its left bank successfully completed the front-line Warsaw-Poznan offensive carried out at such a rapid pace. By the end of February 3, the front troops had almost completely cleared the right bank of the Oder of the enemy, only at Küstrin and Frankfurt the enemy held small bridgeheads. At this point, the 1st Belorussian Front gained a foothold and began preparations for the Berlin operation.
The total losses of front troops during the operation amounted to 77,342 people, of which 17,032 were irrecoverable.
During the predominantly defensive actions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in February 1945, the front command, following the personal instructions of J.V. Stalin, planned a private offensive operation of the troops of the right wing of the front. The goal of the operation was “to push the enemy to the north and the right flank of the front to reach the line of Lubov, Tempelburg, Falkenberg, Dramburg, Wangerin, Malov, Stettin, to cut off the communications of the Pomeranian group of enemy troops to the west and to help the left flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front quickly move into the area Stettin."
The main blow in the northwestern direction was planned to be delivered by the 61st Army, 2nd Guards Tank Army, 7th Guards Cavalry and 9th Tank Corps with the support of two artillery divisions. The auxiliary strike was carried out by the 1st Polish army and two rifle corps of the 3rd Shock Army.
The operation began on February 19 and was planned for 6-7 days, but already on February 20, the commander of the front forces ordered to suspend the offensive and go on the defensive until further notice.
In his report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, G.K. Zhukov explained his decision: “The enemy, trying to stop the further advance of our troops, during February brought 21 divisions to the front sector... Due to the fact that the 2nd Belorussian Front begins its offensive only February 24, 1945, and the enemy is conducting an offensive in large forces in the Collis, Piritz sector, I am forced to temporarily switch to a tough defense with the goal of wearing out the enemy until February 25-26. Then go on the offensive from the Reetz area in the general direction of Reetz, Gollnow with the task of cutting off the retreat routes for the Pomeranian group of enemy forces to the west.”
At the end of February, the offensive of the troops of the right wing of the front resumed and continued in March. The fight was fierce. At the same time, the front troops were preparing for the Berlin operation, the plan of which was presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on February 10.
The successful advance of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front created favorable conditions for the continuation of the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front on the main, Breslau direction and for an attack on the flank and rear of the Krakow-Silesian enemy group.
On January 18, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in his directive, defined the general task of the front and the tasks of each of the armies. According to the plan, the troops of the main group of the front (3rd and 5th Guards, 6th, 13th and 52nd Armies, 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies) were supposed to pursue enemy troops in the general direction of Breslau and immediately cross R. Oder. The troops of the left wing of the front (21, 59 and 60 armies) were given the task of capturing the city of Krakow and the Silesian industrial region. The front commander's reserve included the 6th Army and the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps.
The capture of the Silesian industrial region was supposed to be carried out by bypassing it from the north by the forces of the 21st Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and from the south by the troops of the 59th and 60th armies, in order to prevent the destruction of numerous factories, factories and mines. “Stalin paid special attention to the safety of the Silesian industrial region,” recalled General S. M. Shtemenko, and specifically spoke on this issue with the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal I. S. Konev.” “For me, as the commander of the front, it was already clear that the issue of liberating the Dabrow-Silesian industrial region must be resolved in a special way. It was necessary to take all measures to preserve its industrial potential to the maximum possible extent,” wrote I. S. Konev.
In the military-industrial complex of Germany, this area occupied second place after the Ruhr. Wehrmacht weapons were forged here, and one could not count on an easy capture of this area. At the same time, it was very important to preserve it.
In the course of carrying out their assigned tasks, the front troops, overcoming the opposition of the defeated formations of the enemy's 4th Tank Army, rapidly moved forward. During January 18 and 19, the greatest success was achieved by the troops of the 3rd Guards Tank and 52nd armies, which advanced more than 80 km in two days of the offensive and crossed the river. Wake up. By the end of January 19, the advanced units crossed the Polish-German border. The war entered the territory of the aggressor, which became a landmark event for Soviet soldiers and officers and caused a powerful spiritual upsurge.
The troops of the left wing of the front, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance on the approaches to the Silesian industrial region, launched battles to capture the city of Krakow. The enemy command, relying on the defenses around Krakow and in the city itself, sought to pin down the troops of the left wing of the front and gain time to prepare the defense of the Silesian industrial region. “Having assessed the situation on the ground together with the army commander, we decided to send the 4th Guards Tank Corps, attached to this army, under the command of General Poluboyarov, to bypass Krakow from the west. In combination with the actions of the 60th Army, which at that time was reaching the southeastern and southern outskirts of Krakow, this maneuver threatened the Krakow garrison with encirclement,” recalled I. S. Konev.
Fearing encirclement, the enemy began to withdraw troops to the west, and on January 19, thanks to the skillful actions of the troops of the 59th and 60th armies and the corps of P.P. Poluboyarov, the oldest and most beautiful city in Poland, the large industrial and cultural center of Krakow, which the Nazis were going to blow up, was taken safe and sound.
By withdrawing its troops along both banks of the Vistula to the west, the enemy command sought to organize the defense of the Silesian industrial region with the remnants of the 4th tank and 17th field armies (up to eight infantry and one tank division).
The Soviet command decided to deeply bypass the Silesian industrial region with tank formations, and then, in cooperation with combined arms armies advancing on Silesia from the north, east and south, force the Nazis, under the threat of encirclement, to go out into the open field and defeat them there, keeping the industry of Silesia intact . Under the current conditions, the front commander brought the 21st Army (the second echelon of the front) and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps from the front reserve into the battle to capture the Silesian industrial region. During January 19, troops of the 21st Army broke through the enemy defenses on the river. Wart and launched an attack on the Silesian industrial region.
The German command sought to delay the advance of Soviet troops in the Breslav direction and sent three infantry divisions there from the reserve. At the same time, using the slow advance of the 5th Guards Army of the Soviet troops, it withdrew its troops beyond the river. Oder.
In order to thwart the enemy's plan to withdraw his troops beyond the river. Oder and speed up the advance of the 5th Guards Army to the river, the front commander on January 21 decided to turn the 3rd Guards Tank Army south and strike in the general direction of Oppeln. The 3rd Guards Tank Army was tasked with striking along the eastern bank of the Oder to capture the city of Oppeln and cut off the enemy’s escape route to the river.
Carrying out the assigned task, the troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army launched a flank attack on the enemy group operating in front of the 5th Guards Army, and quickly reached the Oppeln area and cut off the communications of the Silesian group going to the west and north-west. Soviet troops loomed over the entire enemy group in Silesia, which forced the enemy troops to begin a hasty retreat in front of the front of the 5th Guards Army.
Pursuing the retreating enemy, the 5th Guards Army reached the river on January 22. Oder north-west of Oppeln, crossed to the west bank and captured the first bridgehead in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front. By the end of January 23, the troops of the main group of the front also reached the river. Oder and launched a struggle to capture bridgeheads on it.
At this time, in the fight for the Silesian industrial region, the right-flank formations of the 21st Army reached the river on January 23. Oder south of Oppeln, and the left flank units captured the city of Tarnowitz. The troops of the 59th Army reached the line east of Sosnowiec - Jaworzno, and the right-flank formations of the 60th Army, moving forward, bypassed the Silesian enemy group from the south.
During these battles, the Auschwitz concentration camp area was liberated. “In Auschwitz, according to the preliminary testimony of prisoners, hundreds of thousands of people were tortured, burned, or shot,” General K. V. Krainyukov, a member of the Front’s Military Council, reported to G. M. Malenkov. “I ask for an order to expel representatives of the Extraordinary State Commission for the Investigation of Fascist Atrocities.”
Despite the coverage of its flanks, the enemy group continued to offer stubborn resistance in the major cities of Silesia. According to intelligence data, the enemy force group defending the Silesian industrial region consisted of nine infantry divisions, two tank divisions, several combat groups, two separate brigades, six separate regiments, twenty-two separate battalions. Thus, the enemy group in the Silesian industrial region, although it consisted mainly of battle-worn troops, represented a solid force.
In order to quickly capture the Silesian industrial region, the front commander decided to strike with the forces of the 3rd Guards Tank Army from the Oppeln area at the rear of the enemy Silesian group and, under the threat of encirclement, force the enemy troops to retreat to the west. In his directive of January 24, the front commander set the task for the 3rd Guards Tank Army: to advance with the main forces in the direction of Gross Strelitz - Nikolai and, together with the 21st, 59th and 60th armies, to capture the Silesian industrial region.
On January 25, the troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army began to carry out the assigned task. The offensive developed successfully. On January 27, formations of the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps reached the communications of the Silesian enemy group, creating an extremely difficult situation for it. A further offensive by the 3rd Guards Tank Army in a south-eastern direction and the left-flank units of the 59th Army from the Jaworzno area in a western direction could in the near future lead to the encirclement of the enemy group in Silesia.
“Having closed the ring as a result of the operation,” recalled front commander I. S. Konev, “we will be forced to destroy this entire area and cause enormous damage to the largest industrial complex, which should become the property of the new Poland.” Moreover, storming factory after factory, mine after mine, building after building would mean losing many thousands of soldiers and officers. With the consent of Headquarters, it was decided to leave the enemy a free corridor to exit Silesia.
The advance of Soviet troops in the east and northeast and the attack of the 3rd Guards Tank Army from the northwest forced the enemy to hastily abandon the main cities of Polish Silesia and retreat along the abandoned corridor in a southwestern direction. On January 28, troops of the 59th and 21st armies captured the center of the Dabrowski coal region - the cities of Katowice and Königshutte, and on January 29 the entire Silesian industrial region was cleared of Nazi troops. The enemy units that retreated from the Silesian region were then defeated in the forests to the west of it.
The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front facilitated the advance of the troops of the neighboring 4th Ukrainian Front in the Western Carpathian operation in the western direction.
Since the end of January, the troops of the main group of the front continued to fight with the enemy to expand the bridgeheads captured on the left bank of the river. Oder. On January 24, the troops of the 4th Tank Army reached the Oder in the Keben-Steinau sector, and by the end of January 25, the advanced units of the 13th Army moved here. By January 26, in the area north and south of Steinau, troops of the 4th Panzer Army, in cooperation with the advanced units of the 13th Army, captured bridgeheads, encountering fierce enemy resistance. The enemy command concentrated against the troops that captured the bridgeheads here the 76th Infantry Division, the remnants of the 6,214,313 and 45th Infantry, 20th Motorized, 16th and 17th Tank (without tanks) divisions, as well as numerous battalions and units of various appointments. With these forces, the enemy tried to reset the formations of the 4th Panzer and 13th armies from the captured bridgeheads, but all counterattacks were repulsed. Continuing the offensive, Soviet troops captured the city of Steinau and combined the bridgeheads captured in this area into one up to 30 km wide and up to 20 km deep. In addition, part of the troops of the 13th Army continued to hold the bridgehead southeast of Parchwitz.
A fierce struggle for bridgeheads took place in the offensive zone of the 52nd and 5th Guards armies in the area north and south of Breslau and Olau. Through joint efforts, the armies captured the city of Olau, and the bridgeheads captured to the north and south of the city were combined into one, measuring up to 25 km along the front and up to 15 km in depth. At the same time, a small bridgehead 12 km northwest of Breslau was captured on the right flank of the 52nd Army.
While the main forces of the front's main group fought on the left bank of the river. Oder, the 3rd Guards Army, advancing on the right wing of the front, advanced 80 km from January 22 to 25 and was 100-140 km from the river. This was explained primarily by the fact that the distance to the Oder on the right wing of the front was twice as large as in the center and on the left wing. In addition, the army had to overcome the ever-increasing resistance of the Nazis. The remnants of the 24th Tank and 42nd Army Corps continued to operate in the army’s offensive zone, and the remnants of the right flank of the enemy’s 9th Army retreated here under the attacks of the 1st Belorussian Front. During the operation, more than 10 divisions withdrew into the offensive zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the attacks of the 1st Belorussian Front; in addition, seven divisions and about 150 different enemy units were transferred here from other fronts. All this sharply reduced the rate of advance of the 3rd Guards Army and increased its lag behind the advanced formations of the main front grouping.
Moving forward, the troops of the 3rd Guards Army, in cooperation with the 13th Army, surrounded and destroyed in the Lissa (Leszno) area the remnants of several divisions with a total number of up to 13 thousand soldiers and officers, of which up to 2800 were captured114. However, before the end of the operation, the troops of the 3rd Guards Army will reach the river. Oder failed. It was stopped by fierce enemy resistance at the Kolzig-Glogau line.
Tense fighting Front troops deployed in early February ended on February 7 with the consolidation of a previously captured bridgehead in the area northwest of Breslau and the formation of a second large bridgehead in the area southeast of this city.
This was of great operational importance. The front command could concentrate its main forces on the left bank of the river. Oder and begin a new operation in the Berlin and Dresden directions without crossing this major water obstacle, which in the conditions of the onset of flooding acquired special significance. The struggle for the capture, expansion and consolidation of bridgeheads on the river. The Oder and the capture of the Silesian industrial region ended the offensive operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
The General Staff certificate on the results of the offensive operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front in January 1945 noted that during 20 days of combat operations (from January 12 to January 31), front troops advanced west from 250 to 400 km at an average rate of 20 km per day , and on some days - 36-42 km. An area of about 50 thousand square meters was cleared of the enemy. km, 9 thousand settlements are occupied, including 115 cities. The southern part of Poland was completely liberated, the war was transferred to German territory. 10 enemy divisions were defeated, 43 thousand were captured, 147 thousand people were killed. Over 4 thousand guns, 988 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 22 thousand cars and many other equipment and weapons were captured and destroyed.
The losses of troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Vistula-Oder operation were: irrevocable - 26,219 people, sanitary - about 90 thousand people, as well as 1053 tanks and 372 self-propelled guns.
The Vistula-Oder operation, in its scope and results, is one of the largest strategic offensive operations not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the entire Second World War. During the twenty-three days of the offensive, the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, with the active assistance of the 2nd Belorussian and 4th Ukrainian fronts, advanced to a depth of 600 km, expanded the breakthrough to 1 thousand km and crossed the Oder on the move, capturing there are a number of bridgeheads on it. Moreover, the 1st Belorussian Front, having captured the Küstrin bridgehead, found itself 60 km from Berlin. A significant part of Poland and Czechoslovakia was liberated from the Nazi invaders, and military operations were transferred to the territory of Nazi Germany. The loss of vast territory, large industrial areas, large numbers of troops and weapons greatly weakened Nazi Germany and brought its final defeat closer. The successful actions of the Soviet troops created the conditions for further attacks on the enemy in Pomerania, Silesia, and then in the Berlin direction.
During the Vistula-Oder operation, Soviet troops within a short time defeated Army Group A (9th and 17th field armies, 1st and 4th tank armies). Of the 70 divisions, six brigades and more than 15 garrisons and groups of various sizes that took part in battles against Soviet troops at different times in the Vistula-Oder operation, over 31 divisions and five brigades were completely defeated, up to 25 divisions suffered losses in personnel of over 60- 70% and were organized into battle groups118.
Chief of the General Staff ground forces Germany G. Guderian admitted: “ Terrible month January confirmed all our fears regarding a major Russian offensive... In the first days of February, our position on both the eastern and western fronts became fatal.”
The huge losses that the enemy troops suffered forced the enemy command to hastily transfer large forces and assets to Poland, removing them from the western front, as well as from other sections of the Soviet-German front. This made it easier for the troops operating there to solve problems. On February 1, 1945, the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces, General D. Eisenhower, in his order to the 21st Army Group for the offensive, noted: “The Russian offensive has achieved great success, and the enemy is forced to begin withdrawing troops from the western front.” During the period from January 18 to February 7, the German command transferred more than 40 divisions to the offensive zone of the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts.
During the Vistula-Oder operation, the Soviet command demonstrated an increased level of military art. The method chosen by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to defeat the enemy by delivering powerful, deep, cutting blows was fully consistent with the current situation. He thwarted the plans of the Hitlerite command to exhaust and bleed the Soviet troops by consistent defense of the lines prepared between the Vistula and Oder.
In the actions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts to defeat the Nazi troops between the Vistula and Oder, two stages are clearly visible. In the first (from January 12 to 17), the enemy’s strategic defense front in a zone of about 500 km was broken through, the main forces of Army Group A were defeated and conditions were created for the rapid development of the operation to great depth. At the second stage (from January 18 to February 3), the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, with the assistance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian and 4th Ukrainian fronts on the flanks, during a rapid pursuit, defeated the enemy reserves advancing from the depths and captured Silesian industrial area and reached the Oder on a wide front, capturing a number of bridgeheads on its western bank.
The Vistula-Oder operation was characterized by the creation of a significant quantitative and qualitative superiority of Soviet troops in forces and means over the Nazi troops. This was ensured not only by the presence of general superiority, but also by the skillful massing of forces and means in the directions of the main attacks. At the same time, such a method of defeating the enemy as dissection was skillfully used. A large strategic grouping of the enemy was defeated by a deep frontal attack by two interacting fronts. As part of the Vistula-Oder operation, the 1st Belorussian Front conducted the Warsaw-Poznan offensive operations, and the 1st Ukrainian Front conducted the Sandomierz-Silesian offensive operations.
The average daily pace was 25 km, and in certain periods tank armies even reached 70 km. “Such swiftness,” noted G.K. Zhukov, “was achieved for the first time during the Great Patriotic War.” “The Russian offensive beyond the Vistula developed with unprecedented strength and swiftness,” wrote German general F. Mellenthin. - It is impossible to describe everything that happened between the Vistula and Oder in the first months of 1945. Europe has not known anything like this since the fall of the Roman Empire.”
The decisive conditions that determined the success of the operation were the rapid breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, the defeat of the first echelon and the nearest operational reserves of the enemy. In the 1st Belorussian Front it ranged from 8-10 km (8th Guards Army) to 20 km per day. In the direction of the main attack of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the rate of breakthrough of the tactical defense zone was 10-15 km per day. A quick breakthrough was ensured by the correct choice of the direction of the main attack, the creation of powerful groups, effective fire damage, skillful reconnaissance in force and the use of advanced battalions.
The vast experience of previous operations was taken into account. In all armies advancing in the directions of the main attacks of the fronts, army, divisional and regimental artillery groups were created, and in the corps of the 1st Belorussian Front - corps artillery groups. They provided continuous support for the attacking troops during the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and during the development of the offensive in operational depth. The rapid breakthrough of the tactical zone created favorable conditions for the rapid advance of Soviet troops in operational depth. “By the speed of action, the speed of defeating the enemy, and the high rate of advance of troops, we achieved complete operational-tactical, and sometimes strategic surprise,” stated G. K. Zhukov, analyzing the operation.
The skillful use of strong second echelons, tank armies, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, as well as reserves in the fronts and armies, made it possible to develop the offensive at a rapid pace and enabled the front command to carry out a wide maneuver in order to reach the rear of large groupings of enemy troops. The enemy was forced to admit, according to the testimony of General F. Mellentin, that the Soviet “Supreme High Command had completely mastered the technique of organizing the offensive of huge mechanized armies.”
During the Vistula-Oder operation, the organization and pursuit of retreating enemy troops to great depths developed. In this case, the main role was played by tank armies and corps, advancing with the support of the main forces of the air armies. The pursuit was carried out around the clock, which deprived the enemy of the opportunity to organize defense in depth. Before the Soviet troops reached the Oder, its reserves did not have a significant impact on the course of the operation.
The Vistula-Oder operation is characterized by a wide maneuver of troops. It was carried out with the aim of reaching the rear of large enemy groups, creating a threat of encirclement and forcing enemy troops to hastily retreat from the lines and areas they occupied and abandon the bulk of their equipment on the battlefield. Indicative in this regard are the maneuver of the 33rd Army of the 1st Belorussian and 3rd Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front to bypass units of the enemy’s 42nd Army Corps, as well as the maneuver of part of the forces to bypass Warsaw. Maneuvering actions contributed to blocking significant German forces in large settlements and cities (Poznan, Schneidemuhl, etc.), which, in turn, made it difficult for the enemy to create a continuous defense front. The presence of large gaps in enemy defenses provided favorable conditions for the development of the operation in depth.
Of great importance during the course and especially at the final stage of the operation was the maneuver of forces and means to counter large enemy groups concentrated to launch counterattacks on the flank and rear of the front strike groups. Thus, in the 1st Belorussian Front, the commander allocated large forces to secure the flank of the strike group: four combined arms armies (3rd shock, 1st Army of the Polish Army, 47th and 61st), one tank army (2nd Guards) and one cavalry corps (2nd Guards). This was due to a significant gap between the adjacent wings of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, which were advancing in diverging directions, as well as the threat from the enemy, who had concentrated a large group in Pomerania to counterattack the flank and rear of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front. This weakening of the strike force limited the front’s ability to capture and expand bridgeheads on the river. Oder.
Front aviation played a major role in the operation, which carried out about 25.4 thousand sorties, of which 72 to 85% of all sorties were to support and cover ground forces. With the arrival of Soviet troops on the river. Oder, the activity of front-line aviation decreased sharply, which was mainly due to the unsuitability of field airfields due to the ensuing thaw. At the same time, enemy aviation, having permanent airfields in the Berlin area, increased its activity, and it temporarily managed to seize the initiative, which complicated the struggle of our troops to capture and expand the bridgehead on the river. Oder.
The work of the front rear took place in very difficult conditions throughout the entire operation. Most of the bridges across the Vistula were blown up, the railway lines between the Vistula and Oder were destroyed and required restoration. All this forced the main burden of transportation to shift from railways to road transport. Incomplete provision of troops with basic types of food reduced the pace of their advance.
All these difficulties did not make it possible to make the results of the operation even more effective, but did not in any way detract from the enormous significance of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Vistula-Oder operation. It was achieved through the joint titanic efforts of home front workers and Soviet soldiers.
For the courage and military skill shown during the operation, 481 formations and units of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts were given honorary titles, 1,192 formations and units were awarded orders, thousands of soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals, many were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov (again) and I.S. Konev were awarded the Order of Victory. Moscow saluted the troops 25 times in honor of victories in the Vistula-Oder operation, in memory of those killed. The losses of the Red Army in the operation amounted to over 193 thousand people, 1267 tanks and self-propelled guns, 374 guns and mortars, 343 aircraft.
Vistula-Oder operation |
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Interfluve of Oder and Vistula, Germany |
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Victory of the Red Army |
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Opponents |
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Commanders |
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Georgy Zhukov |
Joseph Harpe |
Ivan Konev |
Ferdinand Schörner |
Opponents |
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THE USSR: 2,112,700 37,033 guns and mortars 7,042 tanks and self-propelled guns 5,047 aircraft |
About 400,000 4,103 guns 1,136 tanks 270 aircraft |
THE USSR: 43,251 killed and missing, 115,783 ambulances, 159,034 total |
The number of killed and wounded is unknown; 150 thousand were taken prisoner. |
Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation- strategic offensive of Soviet troops on the right flank of the Soviet-German front in 1945. Started on January 12 and ended on February 3. It was carried out by the forces of the 1st Belorussian (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov) and 1st Ukrainian Fronts (Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev).
During the Vistula-Oder operation, the territory of Poland west of the Vistula was cleared from German troops and a bridgehead on the right bank of the Oder was captured, which was subsequently used in the attack on Berlin. The operation included military history humanity as the most rapid offensive - for 20 days, Soviet troops advanced at a distance of 20 to 30 km per day. During this time, they overcame 7 enemy fortified lines and 2 large water obstacles.
Disposition on the eve of the offensive
By January 1945, the German army was in a critical situation. There were heavy battles in Hungary and East Prussia, and the Wehrmacht gradually retreated on the Western Front. During the Iasi-Kishinev operation, the Soviet army captured the Ploiesti oil region (Romania), which was strategically important for Germany. Allied bombing caused serious damage to German industry. The Air Force was practically destroyed and manpower reserves were exhausted. Despite this, in December 1944 the Germans launched a major offensive on the Western Front, Operation Watch on the Rhine, in a final attempt to change the course of the war. By the end of December 1944, the German offensive in the Ardennes ended a complete failure, and on December 25, American troops went on the offensive. By diverting forces to the Western Front, the German command was forced to simultaneously transfer reinforcements for the defense of Koenigsberg to East Prussia and near Budapest, which was surrounded by Soviet troops. As a result, the Vistula front in Poland, which had been stable since the beginning of September 1944, was weakened.
The Soviet command planned to launch an offensive in Poland on January 20, to break through the enemy’s defenses along an area with a total length of 480 kilometers, using the Sandomierz, Magnuszewski and Pulawy bridgeheads. Since the Allied forces were engaged in heavy fighting in the Ardennes, the Soviet headquarters agreed to postpone the operation and launch an offensive from January 12 to 15.
Strengths of the parties
By January 1945, in front of two Soviet fronts there were 3 German armies (28 divisions and 2 brigades) of Army Group A (from January 26 - Army Group Center) - approx. 400 thousand people, 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1200 tanks and assault guns, 600 aircraft. In addition to continuous defensive lines, the Germans created several fortified areas, the largest of which were Modlin, Warsaw, Radom, Krakow, Lodz, Bydgoszcz, Poznan, Breslau and Schneidemühl.
In the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts there were 16 combined arms, 4 tank and 2 air armies: a total of 1.5 million people, 37,033 guns and mortars, 7,042 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5,047 aircraft. The offensive began in conditions of overwhelming superiority in forces and means.
Progress of the operation
The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive early in the morning of January 12, delivering the main blow from the Sandomierz bridgehead, and the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front - on January 14 from the Magnuszewski and Pulawy bridgeheads.
Writer Antony Beevor, in his book The Fall of Berlin, wrote about the first day of the operation:
Since, by order of Hitler, tank reserves were advanced to the front line in advance, they found themselves within the range of Soviet artillery fire, suffered serious losses already in the first period of the offensive and could not be used in accordance with pre-developed defense plans, being drawn into the battle to cover gaps, formed in the battle formations of German troops.
On January 13 and 14, further north - in East Prussia - the offensive of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of General Chernyakhovsky and the 2nd Belorussian Front (General Rokossovsky) unfolded (see East Prussian Operation (1945)).
Hitler decided to suspend all active hostilities on the Western Front and return to Berlin from his headquarters in Ziegenberg only on January 15, on the fourth day of the successful Soviet offensive, despite the urgent requests of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Guderian. In the first days, Hitler refused to consider proposals for the transfer of reinforcements to the Eastern Front, but, returning to the capital, he ordered the transfer of the corps to begin. Greater Germany» from East Prussia to the area of the city of Kielce, 170 km south of Warsaw.
Meanwhile, the 47th Army, operating on the extreme right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, was outflanking Warsaw from the north. On January 16, the headquarters of Army Group A (commander - Colonel General Joseph Harpe) reported to the command of the Wehrmacht ground forces that it would not be possible to hold the city due to the small size of the garrison (several battalions). Guderian issued an order by which the command of Army Group A was allowed to independently make decisions regarding the continuation of the defense of Warsaw. Hitler, having learned about this, became furious and demanded to cancel the order, but radio contact with the garrison had already been interrupted.
On January 17, Soviet troops liberated Warsaw, in the battles for which units of the People's Army that were part of the 1st Belorussian Front (commanded by Brigadier General Sigmund Berling) took an active part. On the same day, Colonel General Joseph Harpe and the commander of the 9th Wehrmacht Army, General von Lüttwitz, were removed from command of the troops.
Anthony Beevor:
By January 18, the main forces of Army Group A were defeated, the enemy defenses were broken through on a 500-km front to a depth of 100-150 km.
On January 19, the advanced units of the 3rd Guards Tank, 5th Guards and 52nd Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, pursuing the enemy, entered German territory in Upper Silesia, and the troops of the left wing of the front liberated Krakow.
The German command began transferring part of the forces from the interior of Germany, from the Western Front and other sectors of the front to the border areas. However, attempts to restore the broken front were unsuccessful. On January 20-25, the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front overcame the Wartow and Poznan defensive lines and surrounded the 60,000-strong enemy garrison in Poznan. On January 22 - February 3, Soviet troops reached the Oder and captured bridgeheads on its western bank in the areas of Steinau, Breslau, Oppeln and Küstrin. At the same time, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front occupied part of southern Poland and northern Czechoslovakia and advanced to the upper reaches of the Vistula. Fighting broke out for Breslau, where the German group resisted until the beginning of May.
Results
As a result of the Vistula-Oder operation, 35 enemy divisions were completely defeated, another 25 lost from 50 to 70% of their personnel, and about 150 thousand people were captured. Soviet troops leveled the front and reached the distant approaches to Berlin. Significant enemy forces found themselves in pockets in Poznan and Breslau. The inability of the Germans to effectively conduct combat operations on two fronts and the inevitability of the impending Allied victory became obvious. The restoration of Polish statehood began - the national administration was restored in the liberated territories.
Total losses Soviet armies amounted to about 160 thousand people, of which about 44 thousand were irrevocable.
Notes
- ^ Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. No. 250 Received December 24, 1944. PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
- ^ Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. No. 257 Dispatched January 15, 1945. PERSONAL AND STRICTLY SECRET FROM PREMIER J.V. STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT Mr. F. ROOSEVELT
- ^ Antony Beevor, "The Fall of Berlin", ch. 2
Having gone through four years of war, the Red Army approached the territory of the German Oder River, whose destiny it had to decide. It was here, on the banks of the river that was fateful for German soldiers, that it was planned to deliver the most decisive blow to the enemy, carrying out thorough preparations for it (accumulating equipment, weapons and fuel).
The Vistula-Oder operation, which began on January 12, 1945, has deservedly gone down in military history as the most rapid. Main objectives of the operation:
- defeat of enemy Army Group A;
- liberation of Poland from fascist occupation;
- preparations for the capture of Berlin.
The cardinal directions of this military campaign were the cities: Breslau (in the south), Koenigsberg (in the north), Frankfurt an der Oder (the middle of the offensive territory). To achieve success in military operations at such a distance means mastering the real art of warfare.
Military situation on the eve of the operation
The Warsaw-Berlin direction posed quite a significant danger to Germany, for the defense of which the German command prepared seven defensive zones to a depth of six hundred kilometers. Army Group A was concentrated in the territory between the Vistula and Oder, consisting of 4 tank, 2 motorized and 30 infantry divisions (numbering 560 thousand people). To conduct long-term defensive operations, the following were intended: 1,220 tanks and assault guns, more than 5,000 guns and mortars, 600 aircraft, fortified areas were created (Warsaw, Poznan, Radom, Breslau, Krakow, Modlin, Schneidemühl).
The condition of the German troops at that time was at a critical level. The loss of the Ploiesti oil region of Romania as a result of the Iasi-Kishinev operation, the destruction of military aviation, the destruction of industry as a result of the bombing of the Allied forces, protracted battles in East Prussia and Hungary, where forces had to be transferred, weakening front-line positions in Poland, aggravated the situation.
Meanwhile, the presence of Anglo-American troops in Europe caused additional difficulties for the Germans. They had to distribute their forces. In order to destroy the weaker link (the British and Americans) and subsequently deliver a crushing blow to the Red Army troops, the enemy carried out Operation Watch on the Rhine on December 16, 1944. The German plans included: capturing bridges on the Meuse River, taking the main supply point of the Allies, Antwerp, then the capital of Belgium. However, the counter-offensive of the Allied forces disrupted their plans; only on January 1 did the enemy manage to launch a new offensive in Alsace.
On January 6, 1945, Stalin received a request from Churchill (Prime Minister of Great Britain) about the need to launch an offensive operation of Soviet troops against Warsaw due to the failure of the grouping of Anglo-American forces in the Ardennes. In order to assist the allies, the preparation time for the Vistula-Oder operation was reduced, the start of the offensive was changed from January 20 to January 12.
The leading role in crossing the Oder was given to the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front (under the command of G. Zhukov) and the 1st Ukrainian Front, led by I. Konev, at whose disposal were 5,047 aircraft, 37,033 guns and mortars, 7,042 tanks and self-propelled guns. The number of personnel reached 2 million military personnel.
Vistula-Oder offensive operation
The date January 12, 1945 was marked in history as the beginning of a major offensive by the Red Army on the Vistula. The troops raised their weapons at about 4.35 am.
The main components of this offensive of troops:
- Warsaw-Poznan operation (1st Belorussian Front);
- Sandomierz-Silesian operation (1st Ukrainian Front).
On January 12, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck the enemy from the Sandomierz bridgehead. Two days later, on January 14, groupings of troops of the 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive from the Pulovsky and Mangushevsky bridgeheads. Already on January 17, the enemy’s defenses were broken through to a depth of 100-160 km, in a strip of up to 500 kilometers, 2,400 settlements received long-awaited freedom, among them Warsaw. On January 19, the city of Lodz was liberated. Starting from January 22, battles for Poznan took place. On February 3, bridgeheads in the area of Frankfurt and Küstrin were captured, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Oder, and the Vistula-Oder operation was successfully completed.
Factors determining the success of this operation:
- high level of effectiveness of artillery fire;
- the power of attacks by tanks and infantry combined with close interaction between troops;
- good mobility of forces and means (the average daily rate of attack is 25-30 km per day, for tank armies - 70 km).
Results of the operation
The offensive from the Vistula to the Oder is characterized as an important strategic military operation, as a result of which most of Poland received long-awaited freedom. In addition, hostilities were transferred to German territory, which indicated the impending defeat of enemy troops and the imminent end of the war.
During the operation, 147,000 military personnel were captured, and 70 German divisions were destroyed. The loss of a huge amount of weapons (14 thousand mortars and guns, 1.4 thousand tanks and assault guns), the loss of large industrial areas became the main reasons for the weakening of the enemy and the creation of conditions for conducting combat operations in the Berlin direction, closer and closer to the enemy’s lair.
More than 600 thousand Soviet soldiers gave freedom to Poland at the cost of their lives. In June 1945, the medal “For the Liberation of Warsaw” was established.
It is noteworthy that the list of 18 commemorative commemorative coins in denominations of 5 rubles, dedicated to the battles and operations of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, includes a coin of 5 rubles 2014 Vistula-Oder operation. This emphasizes the importance of the brilliant victory of the Soviet troops during the crossing of the Oder.
12.1 3.2.1945, during the Great Patriotic War. Soviet troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts (Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev) broke through the defense of the German troops of Army Group A, from 26.1 Center (General ... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary
VISTAU ODER OPERATION, 12.1 3.2.1945, during the Great Patriotic War. The Supreme High Command began the operation earlier than scheduled at the request of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition to divert German forces from... ... Russian history
January 12–February 3, 1945, during the Great Patriotic War. Soviet troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts (Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev) broke through the defenses of the German troops of Army Group “A”, from January 26... ... encyclopedic Dictionary
Vistula Oder Operation Second World War,Great Patriotic War... Wikipedia
Vistula-Oder operation 1945- VISLA ODER OPERATION 1945, strategic. will come operation of the 1st Belorussian troops. and 1st Ukrainian French, carried out on January 12February 3. with the assistance of the troops of the lion. wing of the 2nd Belorussian. and right. wing of the 4th Ukrainian fr. The goal is to defeat it. fash. group... ... Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: encyclopedia
Coming. operation of the troops of the 1st Belorussian: (Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov), 1st Ukrainian. (Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev) and right. wing of the 4th Ukrainian (Army General I.E. Petrov) fronts January 12. 7 Feb. on the territory Poland, between pp. Vistula and Oder; component… … Soviet historical encyclopedia
Strategic offensive operation of the troops of the 1st Belorussian (Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) and 1st Ukrainian (Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev) fronts on January 12, February 3 during the Great Patriotic War 1941 1945;... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
Vistula Oder operation World War II, Great Patriotic War ... Wikipedia
Main article: Great Patriotic War Operation Barbarossa Great Patriotic War Second World War ... Wikipedia
Books
- Victorious 1945. Vistula-Oder offensive operation, Portuguese Richard Mikhailovich. The book tells about one of the largest strategic offensive operations of the Second World War - the Vistula-Oder. As a result of its implementation, Soviet troops, providing assistance...
- Victorious 1945 Vistula-Oder offensive operation, Portuguese R., Runov V.. The book tells about one of the largest strategic offensive operations of the Second World War - the Vistula-Oder operation. As a result of its implementation, Soviet troops, providing assistance...
With the entry of the 2nd Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough, our division had to cross after it from the forest area east of Wola Tseleyuvsk, across the Vistula in the Golendra area along army bridge crossings. Having reached the right flank of the advancing units of the first echelon of the corps, we must be ready to build on the success of the corps in the direction of Czaplinek, Sobików, Brwinów and repel possible enemy counterattacks from the north.
At the time when General Belov set combat missions, I was lying with a high temperature in my house; the chief of staff of the division, T. Ya. Novikov, was present in my place. None of us knew for what purpose I was called to the army command post; everything was strictly classified. I didn’t think that the commander would communicate his combat decision on the offensive of the army and its formations, so I sent Novikov there. The commander asked him why the division commander Vladimirov had not arrived, and when he learned about my illness, he placed the division in the third echelon, which did not suit us at all.
On the same day, Novikov returned to division headquarters and reported to me about the impending grandiose offensive and about the division’s task in this operation. Amazingly, as soon as I found out about this, my illness disappeared. It was only a shame that because of my illness the division ended up in the third echelon.
The next day, the corps commander verbally set a task for the division, which at first glance seemed simple. The division was assigned a rather modest role in this decisive operation. But, despite this, we experienced a state of excitement and elation, characteristic of commanders who begin to develop a new combat mission.
When, in a calm atmosphere, we analyzed the upcoming actions, we realized that the task was not as simple as it seemed, and that serious difficulties awaited the division on the way to its implementation. It was clear that the tank army would need a lot of time to cross to the western bank of the Vistula and we would have to wait a long time for the pontoon bridges to be released. In such a situation, the division would have fallen far behind the advancing units of the corps and would not have been able to be in the given place at the right moment in the battle. We were faced with a dilemma: either literally follow the battle plan, that is, follow the path of formal execution of the combat order, or find a solution in which the division would not be associated with the 2nd Tank Army.
That night neither I nor the chief of staff Novikov, nor the deputy for political affairs Khirny slept. Until dawn, bending over the unfolded map, we puzzled over the solution to this problem. With the first rays of the sun, we were illuminated by the bold idea that it was possible to cross the Vistula and Pilica on the right flank of the corps east of Pulko. It was an extremely tempting idea. With one blow we killed two birds with one stone: we freed ourselves from the crossing and took the shortest route to the given direction. There was also an advantageous tactical sense in crossing these rivers: acting in this direction, the division launched a flank attack on the main defensive group of the Germans, since their main forces were concentrated in front of the bridgehead. On the left bank, behind a wide water barrier, the enemy least expected active action on our part. The defense of the left bank of the Vistula, as was evident, was built on the principle of defense on a broad front - with separate strongholds and a military outpost system. The units allocated for the defense of the island of Kempa Konarska and the western bank of the Vistula in the Pulko sector and to the north were quite likely “from the forest to the pine.”
Thus, our actions in the direction of the southern part of the island of Kemp Konarska - Pulko - Ostrowek will be a complete surprise for the enemy. At first, the division will probably not encounter serious resistance and will be able to reach the flank of the German defense.
The only thing that caused concern was the state of the Vistula ice cover. In order to thoroughly check everything, it was necessary to go to the shore on the northern outskirts of Tatarchesko and carry out reconnaissance of the river, the area and the enemy.
A few hours later, a small group of officers was already on the banks of the Vistula. In order to penetrate the secrets of the enemy’s defense and get to know more closely the capricious nature of the Polish beauty of the river, we began to observe the enemy from a high dam. On the opposite German bank there was complete peace, not a single shot fired. In some places along the shore and in the depths of the defense, trenches and communication passages are barely visible. We did not see any wire obstacles or other engineering structures. The river, the width of which in this place is 400–500 m, is covered with smooth ice, only in the middle a narrow strip of ice gleams like a silver rope. It's a shame! It is reassuring that she has more than ten days left, and there is hope that she will still have time to be covered in ice. To increase the stability of the ice, it will be necessary to make lightweight wooden flooring. A powerful dam runs along our entire coastline, which will allow all preparatory measures to be carried out and concealed fire weapons, hidden from enemy observation and fire.
After reconnaissance, the possibility of crossing the Vistula and launching a surprise attack seemed indisputable. The fragile ice did not frighten us either: the division already had experience in crossing rivers in various seasonal and environmental conditions. Everyone who took part in reconnaissance of the area, unit commanders and service chiefs, warmly supported this idea and became noticeably more animated. No one doubted its success.
We imagined how, under the cover of darkness, parts of the division would reach the other side and, as if from underground, a fairy-tale army would rise up right in front of the nose of the confused enemy.
We felt an extraordinary surge of strength and a desire to bring this plan to life at any cost.
“Nothing great in the world is accomplished without passion,” one of the staff officers quoted Hegel. In our case, energy, passion, and fighting enthusiasm were overflowing. Now it was necessary, without delay, to make a decision, report to the corps commander and enlist his support.
The corps commander, General M.A. Siyazov, was on the bridgehead, at his observation post. I reported to him in detail about the results of the reconnaissance and about my decision to begin crossing the Vistula at the hour of the general attack, simultaneously with the advanced battalions of the divisions of the first echelons, and asked for his permission to prepare the division for crossing the rivers. The corps commander approved of our initiative, since a sudden flank attack on weak point the enemy made it much easier for the corps to complete its task.
“Okay, today I’ll report to the army commander and ask him to approve this decision,” Siyazov said.
The next day I again visited the corps commander. Siyazov greeted me warmly, as always, and said that the commander had given permission to cross the Vistula with only a company or, at most, a battalion, but no more, with the task of capturing the Pulko stronghold. There could be no question of crossing the river with the entire division. “What is it that the division commander is planning to drown the division in the Vistula?” - this was the reaction of the army commander to Siyazov’s report.
It was a half-hearted solution that did not suit me at all. I asked the corps commander to allow me, along with preparing the battalion, to prepare the entire division for the crossing. General Siyazov silently considered my request, then stood up, walked around the dugout and finally said:
Well, get ready, I don't mind. It will be seen there...
The 311th Division became part of the 61st Army immediately before it was sent from the Baltic States to Poland. Without knowing the combat qualities of the division, the commander could not risk the entire formation. Moreover, in the area of the pontoon bridges, along which he almost daily crossed to the bridgehead, the Vistula polyna was wide as nowhere else. This circumstance may have made him doubt the possibility of crossing the not yet frozen river.
I was confident in the correctness of my decision to cross the Vistula in order to reach the right flank of the army in a timely manner, protecting it from an enemy counterattack, and not cross the bridges around it, making a detour of more than twenty kilometers. I decided to personally contact the army commander.
Belov traveled around the divisions, and it was difficult to find him. Only in the afternoon I managed to turn to him with my request. In response, I received the same thing as Siyazov:
What, are you planning to kill the division? Look, the river fairway is not frozen, but the ice is as thick as cardboard.
No matter how I convinced him that not a single fighter would drown, that everything would be done as needed, with great benefit for us, it was all in vain. He refused all my arguments in favor of our decision:
Do as you were ordered.
It was clear that I would not be able to convince him that I was right. Having eaten a little, I went to my division command post.
As time went. It was impossible to delay preparing the division for the start of the general offensive of the front. The next morning, December 30, having once again discussed all the pros and cons with the chief of staff, Colonel Novikov and the chief of the engineering service, Vaganov, the final decision was made to prepare the division for crossing the Vistula.
Essentially, our decision fully corresponded to the spirit of the order of the army commander, moreover, we found the best option for its implementation. Yes, our decision was bold, risky, but not reckless. We constantly monitored the river regime, right down to measuring the thickness of the ice. In case of unfavorable conditions, you could abandon your plan and carry out the task, as required by high authorities.
The division was in the third echelon and had no means of reinforcement. Therefore, first of all, it was necessary to take care of creating a fire fist that would provide division units with a breakthrough of the enemy’s defense at least on a narrow section of the front.
We were lucky that at the front-line artillery warehouse there was a large number of 45 mm guns. They lost their importance as anti-tank weapons, but were quite suitable for suppressing and destroying manpower: “If there is no fish, there is no fish.” Three days later, the division had about fifty of these guns with three rounds of ammunition.
We could break through the enemy's defenses, relying only on our own strength. In order to reliably suppress the enemy with fire and have time to prepare for the start of a general attack required amount wooden floorings, assault bridges, ladders, i.e. all the necessary means at hand to increase the permeability of ice, it was decided to limit the breakthrough area to one kilometer. And the western bank of the Vistula, which we had to overcome, was steep and steep.
The idea behind the decision was as follows: the 311th Division would cross the Vistula and Pilica across the ice, break through the German defenses in the area of the lake northeast of Ostrowek, Pulko. Further, developing the offensive in the general direction towards Grabin, the immediate task is to capture the Ostrovek stronghold and elev. 118.2 (south). The subsequent task was to capture Konary and the section of the highway between Konary and Magerova Wola. By the end of the day, the division reaches the line Podgurzyce, Marynin, elev. 125.4. Upon reaching this line, the division covers the right flank of the army and prevents enemy counterattacks from the north.
The implementation of this plan was planned to be carried out in the following sequence: the forward battalion, supported by all fire weapons of the division, would cross the Vistula, destroy the enemy’s military outpost on the southern part of the island of Kempa Konarska, immediately break through the German defenses in the area of the lakes northeast of Ostrowek, Pulko and capture enemy stronghold Ostrowek. Behind the forward battalion, introduce the 1069th Infantry Regiment (the first echelon of the division) into the breakthrough, battalion by battalion, with the task of expanding the breakthrough front in the northwestern direction to capture the populated areas of Podgorzyce and Konary.
Developing the success of the first echelon of the division, introduce the 1071st Infantry Regiment (second echelon) into the breakthrough with the task of capturing the section of the Konary - Magerova Volya highway. Subsequently - locality Marynin and the area at elevation. 125.4.
The 1067th Infantry Regiment (the third echelon of the division) was tasked with advancing behind the 1071st Regiment and being ready to build on the success in the direction of Rossosh-Grabina.
So, with the capture of the advanced battalion of Pulko, five battalions, one after another at distances of 400–500 m, burst into the breakthrough in an unstoppable stream and, like spring waters in a flood, rush in depth and breadth.
Fire and movement are the immutable laws of offensive combat. However, with our artillery alone we would not be able to break through the enemy’s defenses. We had to abandon the existing order of organizing artillery support and come to a completely different solution. After N.P. Klyapin was wounded, inexperienced officers remained at the artillery headquarters; they could not be relied upon. For these reasons, we took upon ourselves all issues regarding the use of artillery and resolved them as the situation dictated.
When calculating the division's artillery and mortar resources, it turned out that there were 188 cannon and mortar barrels available, along with battalion artillery. Of these, about one third of the guns were 45 mm guns. It was still possible to put up with the number of barrels, but in terms of caliber, the main part of our artillery could not solve the problem of destroying a well-entrenched enemy. It was necessary to reinforce the artillery fire with fire in the layer. All machine guns, easel, manual and large-caliber, were collected up to 300 units. In one minute, they all fired up to 50 bullets per linear meter of the enemy’s defense breakthrough front.
Thus, the division's firepower, taken together, literally produced a shower of lead and shrapnel. This mass of fire was supposed to pin the enemy to the ground, force him to take cover and keep him in that position until our infantry approached the trenches.
We removed from the regiments and battalions, with the exception of the forward battalion, all machine guns with crews and artillery and mortar units. From all these fire weapons, it was necessary to create such a flexible organization that would allow, during the period of an artillery raid and the battle of the leading battalion, to use all the weapons in a strictly centralized manner and quickly pour them into their units and units as battalions and regiments were brought into battle.
Based on this, all regimental and battalion artillery, as well as all mortars, were combined into groups:
1st group - 18 120-mm mortars (from three groups of 6 mortars each);
2nd group - 54 82-mm mortars (from three groups of 18 mortars each);
3rd group - 50 45-mm guns (from two subgroups of 25 guns each);
4th group - 30 76-mm guns (regimental artillery and anti-tank division).
Heavy and light machine guns were combined into companies: 8 companies of heavy machine guns, 12 machine guns in each company. A total of 96 machine guns. 8 companies of light machine guns, 27 machine guns in each company. A total of 216 machine guns. Platoon heavy machine guns- 6 machine guns.
The most experienced officers were temporarily appointed commanders of these groups. The crews of the 45 mm guns consisted mainly of riflemen. All these groups during the artillery preparation period were controlled centrally by the division commander.
Having finished organizing the machine gun companies and batteries, we began planning the fire. The division's artillery regiment was entrusted with the task of suppressing and destroying enemy firing points found on the front line and in the strongholds of Pulko and Ostrowek. The entire regiment was supposed to support the leading battalion from the beginning of the crossing. With the introduction of the 1069th regiment into battle, support its offensive, and with the introduction of the 1071st regiment into the breakthrough, support it with two divisions.
The fire of improvised batteries and machine-gun companies was planned simply: each of them was given 2-3 areas of concentrated fire. The first section is at the front line, the second is in immediate depth, and the third is in the depths of the battalion area of the enemy’s defense. Light machine guns only two plots were given. Areas of concentrated fire were distributed in such a way that each area was fired in layers by several batteries and bullets. Particular attention was paid to the fire encirclement of the right flank of our offensive, from where a counterattack could be expected.
The transfer of fire from one area to another was carried out according to signals from the observation post of the division commander. The signals were sent by rockets. Each area of concentrated fire corresponded to a specific color of rockets.
Machine gun company positions were being prepared on the flanks of the division's offensive line. The flank position of the machine guns ensured firing safety for the attackers and made it possible to conduct crossfire at the target range. The fire of most of the companies of heavy machine guns was planned from semi-closed positions, which made it possible to fire over the heads of their infantry to the maximum range of bullets. To increase the firing range, the 45-mm cannon had to be adapted for firing from closed positions.
We had experience of such shooting (from closed positions with batteries of 45-mm cannons) back on the Volkhov Front, when we were on the defensive. During that difficult period of the war, the consumption of shells and mines was strictly limited; only the consumption of shells for 45-mm guns was not limited. We managed to adapt these batteries well for firing from closed positions. We observed more than once how the Germans, having come under fire from these guns, not hearing the shots and not understanding the nature of the sudden explosions of the shells, ran away and hid in panic, and after a while, taking revenge on us for our losses, they snapped at us with fire. Their return fire best evidenced the anxiety that our “amusing” artillery caused them.
No matter how weak the guns were, we had high hopes for them. Having the ability to expend shells unlimitedly, all the guns, firing about 700 shells per minute, kept the enemy under fire control over an area of up to 5 hectares.
On December 30, units of the division began regular combat training. The training was based on a ten-day program. The main attention was paid to tactical training. Since the division was replenished with a significant number of soldiers (up to three hundred people who underwent only two months of training in reserve regiments), training had to begin with individual soldier training and end with battalion live-fire exercises. All classes and exercises had one theme: “Offensive on field defense with overcoming a water barrier in winter conditions.”
During fire training, we studied the material parts of weapons, fired two training exercises, and threw hand and anti-tank grenades.
In engineering training, techniques and methods for overcoming anti-personnel barriers and rivers on fragile ice were practically practiced.
40 hours were allocated for tactical training of officers, 20 hours for staff training. Classes were conducted in the field and on a mock-up area.
Combat training of the division's units continued until January 12. The headquarters of regiments and divisions worked hard to ensure that everyone, from the soldier to the unit commander, firmly understood their place and role in battle. Each commander was shown his mission on the ground, and the artillerymen were shown their targets.
During the period of combat training, work was carried out at night to prepare the starting position for the offensive and everything necessary for the battle. Firing positions for artillery, mortars, direct fire guns, machine guns and observation posts were being prepared.
Sappers under the leadership of N.M. Vaganov, a competent engineer, responsible for his work and a brave officer, made floorings, assault bridges and other improvised means.
The signalmen of communications chief Sizov, an excellent specialist and person, put telephone cables in order and repaired telephone and radio equipment.
The transport company delivered ammunition day and night. In a word, work was in full swing in all areas.
With great gratitude I would like to say about the division's logistics chief, Comrade. Ugryumov and his chief of staff L.N. Khashkovsky, who managed their affairs so well that they completely freed me from solving logistical issues and worrying about supplying the troops with everything they needed.
In order not to alert the enemy, we did not conduct searches or conduct combat reconnaissance, limiting ourselves to round-the-clock surveillance of him. Particular attention was paid to masking the initial position. The commandant's service maintained the strictest order on the banks of the river and adjacent areas. All work and walking of people during the day was prohibited. The positions built overnight were carefully camouflaged.
During the preparatory period, officers of the political department of the division and units carried out a lot of work on political support. In all units, party and Komsomol activities were carried out with the task of mobilizing personnel to carry out upcoming tasks. The memo and leaflets of the political department of the front were studied with the personnel. Each soldier knew the mission of his company. The importance of surprise and swiftness of action for the success of the upcoming battle was explained. Suvorov’s demands - “swoop... like snow on your head... without allowing you to come to your senses; whoever is afraid is half defeated” - acquired a living meaning for every fighter. Discipline among the troops was strong. The personnel were determined to defeat the enemy. The firm confidence of senior commanders in victory was transmitted to subordinates, acquiring enormous strength.
Until January 10, our proposal to cross the Vistula hung in the air, but, despite the uncertainty of the situation, the division’s preparations were in full swing. Three days before the start of the general offensive, there was an order from the corps headquarters, in which, with the clause “if the ice allows,” the 311th division was given the task: “Force the Vistula River and the Pilitsa River across the ice, break through the enemy’s defenses in the Oz sector. 300 m north-west Pulko... and by the end of the day reach the line Podgurzyca, Marynin (claim) mark 125.4." We were more than pleased with the order from corps headquarters. We were allowed to act according to our own plan and were allowed, in case of danger, not to get into trouble.
IN last days Before the start of the operation, the front and army headquarters carried out comprehensive checks of the readiness of units and formations of the first echelons of the corps. But no headquarters showed interest in the 311th Division's offensive readiness. Apparently, the army headquarters did not pay attention to the combat order of the corps headquarters, since during the preparation of the Vistula-Oder operation, in order to maintain military secrets, battle decisions were reported to senior commanders on the map and combat missions were assigned to the troops orally. Tasks in writing were allowed to be assigned to “divisions of the first echelon three days, divisions of the second echelon two days before the start of the offensive.”
These combat documents essentially recorded the completed stage of work and could not be of interest during the tense days of the final stage of organizing and preparing a breakthrough. General M.A. Siyazov, as subsequent events showed, did not report his new decision to the army commander. The Army Military Council, therefore, did not know about our division’s readiness for the crossing before the breakthrough began.
On January 8, at 19:00, units of the division set out from the area of their location and by 6:00 on January 9, they concentrated in the forest north of elevation. 115.2. By 4 a.m. on January 13, the division took its battle formation for the offensive. The first echelon of the division, the 1069th regiment, having a regimental battle formation of three echelons, took the starting position for the attack on the Sambodze-Tatarchesko sector; 1071st Regiment, the second echelon of the division, in the gardens area, one and a half kilometers south of Vice-Vskhodnya; The 1067th regiment, the third echelon of the division, is in the forest, east of Volya Tseleyevsk.
With the onset of darkness, secretly from the enemy and from their command, parts of the division went to their starting position for the attack. If the army commander had known about our advance to the banks of the Vistula, he would certainly have returned the division to the area that was indicated by the army headquarters, and then goodbye to our battle plan, of the success of which we were confident. And we all lived then, both I and the unit commanders, with only this goal.
My command and observation post was already on the eastern bank of the Vistula in a dugout dug into the river dam. At the old command post, a shift of telephone operators and an officer was left so that if the commander called, they could immediately connect me with the authorities. This was done with the sole purpose of not arousing any suspicion among the commander about the change of command post.
I remember that after the end of the war, my old friend Lieutenant General Barinov told me:
I can’t understand how you could decide to take such a step as crossing the Vistula. After all, if you failed, you would be shot!
“I was obsessed with this idea, and I was one hundred percent sure of success,” I answered him.
I wanted to outwit the enemy, defeat his superior forces and, by entering one of his flanks, put him in a very difficult position. There was such an opportunity, and it was necessary to take advantage of it.
Two days before the infantry occupied the starting position, all the division's artillery and machine-gun companies were already in their positions in full readiness for battle.
The day of the attack finally arrived, January 14th. According to the army (front) plan, the 155-minute artillery preparation for the attack began with a 25-minute fire raid. Then the advanced battalions of the divisions of the first echelons were supposed to cross the Pilitsa River within one hour and seize bridgeheads on the western bank of the river, and with successful actions of the advanced battalions, their success was developed by the divisions. In the direction of the main attack of the army (23rd Rifle Division and 9th Guards Rifle Corps), the offensive of the troops was accompanied by a double barrage of fire to a depth of 1–2 km.
This order was established for the troops located on the bridgehead and did not apply to our division. We were left to our own devices. When planning artillery and machine gun fire in the division, we believed that to suppress the opposing enemy and break through his defenses it would not be enough to limit ourselves to one 25-minute raid.
On this alarming night, sappers checked the condition of the river's ice cover for the last time. The hole, as we expected, was covered with a layer of ice. The weather, one of the main problems that worried us the most, did not disappoint. One could breathe a sigh of relief.
The left bank is monitored from an observation post installed in the river dam. Just like last night, it's quiet. Apparently, the Germans have no idea about anything, although in front of the Mangushevsky bridgehead the enemy is continuously lighting up the approaches to their front line with missiles.
The time has come for the “war workers” to act. The commander of the sapper battalion, Major Y. V. Matveev, gives the last instructions to his commanders. Five groups of sappers under the leadership of the company commander, Senior Lieutenant S.F. Denisov and Sergeant M.U. Grigorenko, silently crawling their way to the opposite bank. They must make passages through minefields under the very noses of the Germans. The slightest mistake by one - and everything can end in failure. The work of sappers is covered by an artillery battalion, mortars and heavy machine guns. These fire covering weapons were aimed before dark and were ready to attack the enemy at the first signal from the sappers.
It took about two hours. It's quiet on the other side. As you can see, the sappers managed to quietly creep up to the front line of the Germans. Suddenly the enemy opened mortar fire. Mines lie randomly along the river bed, forming ice holes. A minute later everything became quiet. Rifle and machine gun fire was not heard, which means the Germans did not find the sappers. Another hour passes. Finally we see our heroes. Their faces are excited from the danger they have experienced. Senior Lieutenant S. F. Denisov reports:
Mission accomplished!
Time drags on slowly, like an eternity. In an hour we'll go into battle. The soul is both joyful and anxious. Who didn't survive the night before the attack?! “After all, the most terrible hour in battle is the hour of waiting for an attack.”
Long war years do not dull the intensity of feelings. Nerves are taut like strings. The hard work of thousands of people over many days will go through the main test - a brutal test in battle.
The leading battalion reaches the very bank of the river, ready for action. Its commander, Major D.P. Mamatov, remains calm and confident. He is one of the best battalion commanders, so he was given the honor of being the first to cross the Vistula and make a hole in the enemy’s defenses. The battalion commander's cheerful mood is transmitted to the soldiers and officers. They joke, make wisecracks and, like their commander, are confident of success. Looking at this united fighting team, the heavy burden of voluntarily assumed responsibility ceases to weigh on the shoulders: these guys will not let you down.
The clock hands are counting down the last seconds of the appointed hour of artillery preparation. Everything froze in anticipation of the solemn moment.
At 8:30 a.m., thousands of sharp flames on the bridgehead cut through the predawn darkness, lighting up the sky with a crimson glow. The thunder of the guns rang out, the earth shook, and the air trembled. Began! Green rockets soared from the division's observation post - a signal of the beginning of a divisional artillery attack. The roar of cannons was heard nearby, the mortars began to speak in a soft bass voice, and the machine guns crackled, choking with pleasure.
The thunder of cannons and the chatter of machine guns is wonderful music for a soldier's ear, although it does not always touch the soul. An experienced soldier skillfully understands the symphony of cannons, whether it brings victory or blows in vain. This time, it was clear from the animated, satisfied faces of the fighters that they were pleased with the orchestra of the “god of war.”
Standing on the river bank, we tensely watched the explosions of our shells and the flight of tracer bullets. I didn’t notice how the telephone operator ran up to me and shouted in my ear:
Comrade General, the corps commander is urgently calling you to the phone!
I went down to the dugout and picked up the phone.
Find out quickly and report what kind of machine-gun fire is happening on the right bank of the Vistula, in the Sambodze area. Didn't the Germans cross the Vistula? - I heard the alarmed voice of the corps commander in the receiver.
The piercing chatter of our machine guns broke through the roar of artillery cannonade, reached the bridgehead and caused concern to the corps commander.
Everything is fine here. Our machine gunners are firing along the left bank of the Vistula,” I answered the general.
You should still check to see if German intelligence is there.
The conversation was interrupted: the corps commander was called to another apparatus.
M. A. Siyazov’s concern was not unfounded. At corps headquarters, no one believed in the possibility of crossing the Vistula, believing that the clause in the order “if the ice allows” would warn the division command against a risky step. It is no coincidence that during the entire time the division was preparing for battle, no one at the corps headquarters ever asked what the division was doing, and did not demand any reports from us until the very last minute. The attention of the command and staff of the corps was completely absorbed in preparations for the breakthrough of the 23rd division, and ours was simply forgotten, although, frankly speaking, we did not try to remind ourselves.
That is why machine gun fire on the flank and in the rear of the corps so puzzled M.A. Siyazov, especially since during the period of artillery preparation, and especially at the beginning, fire from such a mass of machine guns was not used in the practice of our troops. The noise of machine gun fire was heard through the roar of a thousand barrels artillery shooting, because the machine gunners drilled holes (in the regimental workshops) in the bullets: in flight, the bullet casing was destroyed, took on an irregular shape and, rotating around its axis, squealed unbearably.
The last minutes of the artillery attack were passing. Major Mamatov's battalion with a battery of anti-tank guns quickly descended to the river and ran to attack. We watched them with excitement. Not a single fighter fell through the ice. The enemy continued to remain stubbornly silent, huddling in the cracks from the fire of our batteries and machine guns. The company of Lieutenant A.I. Sidorov is already on the other side. Twenty minutes later, Major Mamatov reports:
Captured the southern part of the island of Kemp Konarska and the enemy stronghold of Pulko. I continue to make good progress.
The head of the division's engineering service, Lieutenant Colonel N.M. Vaganov, an excellent and competent engineer, is in charge of the river.
The sapper battalion of Major Ya. V. Matveev is laying wooden flooring on the ice for the passage of artillery systems and vehicles. Dangerous places and ice holes formed by explosions of mines and shells are indicated by flags. The emergency team is in full readiness to provide the necessary assistance. Here the first gun of Sergeant V. L. Zhuravlev went along the flooring, followed by another, third, fourth...
Behind the first battalion, the battalion of Captain D.E. Savotin moved into battle with the task of expanding the breakthrough on the right and advancing on Pogruzhitsa. At the head of the battalion is the company of Lieutenant P. D. Bogdanov. She doesn't walk, she rushes to attack. Jumping ashore, the company immediately takes possession of a separate courtyard to the west of the lakes and, without stopping, advances in the direction of Podgorzyce. Behind the battalion, not lagging behind a single step, the platoon of junior lieutenant A.K. Demin moves and supports with accurate direct fire fire.
No sooner had the 2nd battalion reached the left bank than the battalion of Captain V.K. Sviridov appeared on the river with the task of attacking the eastern outskirts of Konara. At the head of the 3rd battalion is the commander of the 1069th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Zakki Khabibullin, surrounded by staff officers and signalmen. He is beaming, proud of the regiment - everything is going according to plan. Khabibullin loves military affairs, risk, and danger. For his combat prowess in the regiment he was nicknamed Genghis Khan.
The ice cracks and cracks in places under the heavy load, but sappers quickly move the decks away from dangerous places. With each battalion, regular firepower goes away. Fire control is gradually decentralized.
Officers of the division's political department inform the personnel about the successful crossing of the Vistula and the breakthrough of the enemy defenses by the 1069th Infantry Regiment.
Until the enemy is defeated, you cannot relax. As soon as the enemy comes to his senses, he will try to restore the situation with counterattacks from the depths of the defense. The division artillery commander, Colonel V.F. Buevich, is given the task of immediately transferring to the left bank of the river an anti-tank reserve consisting of a separate anti-tank fighter division and a sapper company under the command of the division commander N.E. Rosenberg with anti-tank mines, the division intelligence chief, Lieutenant Colonel E.G. Shulyakovsky to conduct reconnaissance in the direction of Kemp Konarska - Konary.
While the battalions of the 1069th Infantry Regiment were being introduced into battle, the leading battalion of Captain Mamatov captured the enemy stronghold of Ostrowek. In the battle for this fortified point, 45-mm cannon gunner M.D. Vintonyak, rifle squad commander Sergeant P.V. Dunkin, private S. Atliev and many others showed unprecedented courage and resourcefulness.
At 10 o'clock, Lieutenant Colonel Khabibullin reported by phone:
The regiment captured the village of Ostrowek. The enemy suffered heavy losses. The Germans remaining in the trenches and dugouts surrender. I am sending the first batch of prisoners of the 997th and 692nd security battalions, consisting of 34 people, to you. Among the prisoners is the commander of the 3rd company of the 997th security battalion, Lieutenant Weiss Erich. Our losses are insignificant.
The time has come to introduce the 1071st Infantry Regiment into the breakthrough. At the division observation post, the regiment commander, Major A.F. Saint-Etienne, is waiting for an order (in his younger years, as a cadet, he changed his surname Ryzhov to a more “euphonious” one. In connection with this, he had a lot of trouble during the period of the cult of personality). The regiment's immediate task is to capture the section of the Konary - Magerova Wola highway.
The battalion of Major K. A. Budkov quickly descends to the river. The soldiers and commanders, inspired by the first successes of the 1069th regiment, rush to join the battle while the enemy is disorganized. Major Budkov is an experienced commander; he is well versed in the current situation and understands that for the successful development of a breakthrough, only one thing is required - speed and pressure.
Behind the first battalion is the third, captain V.D. Toporov. The battalion moves cheerfully and boldly.
The second battalion appeared. He is led by Major A. A. Semiradsky, a slender, fit, excellent officer. Seeing me, he waves his hand welcomingly. We have known each other well for a long time. He got into trouble more than once, but he never lost his composure, remaining calm and confident. I never ceased to be amazed at how this still very young man surprisingly harmoniously combined gentle soulfulness with enormous willpower and courage.
The commander of the 122-mm artillery division, Major I.E. Ulybyshev, played an important role in the success of the division. An artilleryman of the highest class, endowed with a great sense of responsibility, he enjoyed great respect and love among the commanders of rifle units and units. He was constantly in the battle formations of regiments and battalions and, as a master of his craft, watching the battlefield, he always knew for sure how the enemy would respond to the actions of our infantry. Ulybyshev knew how to spot well-camouflaged firing points where others could not see them. Each of his projectiles reached their target. The most important thing is that he never waited for requests for fire from those he supported. Monitoring the advance of the rifle companies, the division promptly crushed with fire everything that impeded the advance of the infantry. Artillerymen such as Major Ulybyshev saved hundreds of lives by paving the way forward for the infantry with the fire of their batteries.
Anxieties and fears are left behind. It was nice to realize that, by crossing the Vistula, we correctly assessed both the enemy’s forces in the chosen direction and the factor of surprise in the given conditions. The river turned out to be our good ally. Its ice cover was not so strong as to cause concern to the Germans, and not so weak as to force us to abandon the crossing.
The results of the battle had to be immediately reported by telephone to the corps commander. After listening to my report, Major General Siyazov said:
Wait a minute...
Without lifting the receiver from my ear, I heard the corps commander conveying the contents of my report to someone. Not even a minute had passed before I heard the army commander’s voice on the phone:
Repeat everything you reported to the corps commander.
I repeated it word for word.
Tell me, how could your regiments end up behind the Vistula? “You’re obviously drunk or hopelessly confusing something,” the commander was indignant and perplexed.
With the start of the offensive, carried away by the division’s battle, I forgot that the commander allowed only one battalion to cross the Vistula, fearing the failure of the fragile ice. The harsh tone of the commander and his doubts about the veracity of my report reminded me of the entire background of this matter and confirmed what I had previously only guessed about, namely, that the order of the corps headquarters had not reached the Military Council. I didn’t immediately find what to answer. I didn’t want to let the corps commander down. However, after a short pause, briefly, without going into details, I reported how our regiments crossed the Vistula and ended up where the enemy did not expect them at all.
“I won’t believe you until I see the prisoners at my command post with my own eyes,” the commander said a little softer.
I assured him that the prisoners would be sent to him immediately, but in order to be convinced of the authenticity of my report, in ten minutes it was necessary to look at the western outskirts of Ostrowek, where the advanced units of the 1069th regiment would mark their front line with green fire rockets. The commander agreed, his voice warmed up, apparently he understood and believed everything. And my heart was relieved.
Immediately at the division observation post, before leaving for army headquarters, Oberleutnant Erich Weiss, a hefty man of about forty, a member of the National Socialist Party, was interrogated. When asked why the Germans surrendered without much resistance, he replied:
You have used a new weapon that destroys all living things. No person is capable of withstanding such a cruel test. This is inhumane.
The Nazi’s answer outraged and at the same time made us laugh. Words about inhumanity from the lips of a fascist sounded blasphemous. They took him out of the dugout and, pointing to the 45-mm cannons, said:
Here, look at our new weapon.
He looked, shook his head, but said nothing. But the infantry gunners had a great laugh at the hapless warrior.
As a result of the first day of battle, units of the division expanded the breakthrough to 3 km along the front and 6 km in depth, while capturing the heavily fortified points of Ostrowek, Pulko and elev. 118.2 (south). The soldiers, sergeants and officers showed high military spirit, examples of heroism and courage.
Particularly distinguished in battles were: battalion commander Major D.P. Mamatov, who died a brave death on the battlefield, company commander of the engineer battalion, Senior Lieutenant S.F. Denisov, commander of the 45-mm gun of the anti-tank fighter division, Senior Lieutenant Loboda, rifle squad commander, Red Army soldier I. G. Kaidan, fire platoon commander of a 120-mm mortar battery, Lieutenant F. D. Lipatov and many others.
On January 15, at 9:30 a.m., after a 30-minute artillery barrage, units of the division went on the offensive and completely cleared the island of Kempa Konarska from the enemy, captured the village of Podgorzyce, vys. 118.2 (north), along the highway north of Magerova Volya and started fighting for Konary and the grove south of Marynin. On the night of January 16, the enemy, having pulled up units of the 251st Infantry Division and up to 50 tanks from reserve, repeatedly launched counterattacks, but all his efforts were in vain. In the morning, the division, having defeated the remnants of the security battalions and up to two battalions of the 251st Infantry Division, captured the village of Konary, the city of Gura Kalwarya and, pursuing the enemy, reached the Sabikow, Czaplinek line, creating a serious threat of encirclement of the Warsaw group of German troops.
From that day on, having finally broken the enemy's resistance, the division, together with formations of the 89th Rifle Corps, began a decisive pursuit of the enemy. For a more complete assessment of the results of the sudden actions of the 311th Division, some data on personnel losses should be provided. On the first day, the losses of the division, operating in more difficult conditions, amounted to 26% of the losses of the 23rd division, on the second day - 44%, and for three days of fierce fighting - 45%, i.e. more than two times less compared to a division advancing from the left. Thus, the initiative of the division command, supported by the corps commander, fully justified itself. Somewhat later, the commander of the 61st Army gave the following assessment of the division’s actions: “The 311th Division, having crossed the Vistula at night, delivered a sudden and skillful flank attack to the enemy.”
Describing further military operations, the corps commander, Major General M. A. Siyazov, wrote: “... during the period of persecution from January 16 to 28, 1945, the division fought 400 km with minor losses in personnel and equipment and was the first to enter German territory. Having completed a difficult maneuver in a wooded area, with fierce enemy resistance and insufficient ammunition supplies, the division surrounded the 5-7 thousand garrison of the city of Schneidemuhl. In the Schneidemuhl area, the division captured large trophies: more than 30 locomotives with trains of military equipment, food and military equipment." This ended the division's fighting on Polish territory. For successful military operations, the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
Many of the participants in these battles received government awards. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Zakki Khabibullin, battalion commander Major K. A. Budkov, company commander Senior Lieutenant P. D. Bogdanov, regiment Komsomol organizer Lieutenant I. A. Sokolsky and the author of these lines were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Battalion commanders Major D.P. Mamatov, Major A.A. Semiradsky, rifle company commander Lieutenant A.I. Sidorov and Red Army soldier S.F. Orel were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.
Major Semiradsky and Lieutenant Sidorov died from mortal wounds received in fierce battles west of the town of Schneidemuhl. The commander of the artillery division, Major Ulybyshev, died a heroic death there.
The successful actions of the 311th Infantry Division in difficult conditions with very few losses were not an accident. They were prepared throughout the course of the war.
Day after day, combat experience was accumulated, the combat skills of the command staff were improved and the combat effectiveness of the troops was strengthened. The desire to fight and defeat the enemy became the main content of life. Together, this gave rise to combat activity, creative initiative and persistence in carrying out bold plans.
The idea of crossing the Vistula came as a result of a comprehensive study of all conditions, both favorable and hampering the accomplishment of the combat mission.
The route through the Vistula turned out to be the shortest, most reliable and tactically advantageous for the entire corps. The correct conclusion drawn from the assessment of the situation led to the correct solution to the problem.
The division's extensive practical experience in overcoming water obstacles with the excellent training of the sapper units allowed the division command to fearlessly decide to cross the river on insufficiently strong ice.
An important role in the success of crossing the Vistula and breaking through the enemy’s defenses was played by the organization of fire support thought out to the smallest detail. The simultaneous use of all group fire weapons of the division in a strictly centralized manner, especially in the initial period of the battle, made it possible to concentrate fire of exceptional density on a narrow breakthrough area. The unusual nature of such fire forced the enemy to hide in the cracks.
And finally, the intense and purposeful preparation for battle of the division's units and subunits, as well as the skillful mobilization of personnel to carry out combat missions and their confidence in success, were felt from the very first minutes of the battle.
