Among the Russian successes of the First World War, the Brusilov breakthrough stands apart as the most successful and large-scale offensive operation. Its results are a subject for controversy, because after such a brilliant victory the expected destruction of the Austro-Hungarian armies and the capture of all of Galicia did not occur, but the breakdown of the enemy’s military machine and a radical turning point in the war in favor of the Entente still emerged.
The question is: what exactly was the purpose of this offensive by the senior military leadership at Headquarters? As is known, the offensive of the Southwestern Front became part of Alekseev’s overall strategy in 1916. What goals did this strategy pursue in 1916 and how did it affect the planning and development of Brusilov’s offensive on the Southwestern Front? What factors were decisive?
Theory and strategy.
With the establishment of a positional deadlock on the Eastern Front in the fall of 1915, the Russian command faced a special strategic situation. As a result of the “Great Retreat,” the troops retreated to the swampy and wooded areas of Belarus. Their path to the operational space of Poland, Silesia and Galicia was blocked by forests and swamps, including Polesie, which divided the front into two parts - a forested area in Volyn and Southern Poland, separating the territories of Ukraine from Belarus. The only way to overcome this obstacle was to master the railway junctions, with the help of which the troops could overcome natural obstacles and enter the operational space.
Historian M.V. Oskin attributed this strategy to the influence of the “Key Theory”, popular in the 19th century, according to which the capture of a point that ensured control of the region was considered important in a military operation. Despite all the inaccuracies that abound in the works of this historian, there is some truth in them. famous military historian A.A. Kersnovsky wrote in his “History of the Russian Army” about this strategy during the First World War: “ Russian strategists of the World War did not at all consider the defeat of the enemy’s manpower to be a “real goal”, believing that such only in the occupation of geographical objects. «…» purely philistine view of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who assessed successes only from the point of view of occupying the “points” marked in bold on the map font».
Eastern Front in March 1916
Actually, as modern researchers wrote, « Russian command revealed a desire to capture geographical points, and not to broad maneuver. These geographical points... represent “keys”, the capture of which should give victory. The concept of position keys resolving operational and tactical problems, propagated at one time by Archduke Charles and transferred by General Jomini in the first half of the 19th century to Russian military academy, still found a place among Russian generals at the turn of the 20th century...».
The role of these “keys” was explained in detail by B. Liddle-Hart in his famous work “The Strategy of Indirect Actions”. Since Germany and Austria had a fairly dense railway network, the rolling railways, their junctions and road networks were of particular importance in the Eastern Theater. A similar situation was observed only in Poland, and, taking advantage of this, the Germans initially planned to lure Russian troops closer to Silesia, and then, encircling them, destroy them with attacks from East Prussia and Galicia.
Since 1915, the loss of Russian rockade units railways put our Headquarters in a hopeless position. It was doomed to ram the German positional defenses in order to reach these nodes and capture them, and only then could it be possible to develop a full-scale offensive in order to break the positional deadlock, allowing for a quick victory over the enemy.
Positional deadlock and Russian plans
The problem of a positional deadlock arose in the methods and means of overcoming it. A positional impasse had been established on the Eastern Front since the fall of 1915, stretching along continuous lines of fortified strips from the Baltic to the Dniester, and the command of both sides encountered such a phenomenon for the first time, completely unaware of how to overcome this defense. According to modern historian A.B. Astashov, positional warfare is a struggle at close distances for fortified positions, in the absence of large maneuver operations, slow advance of opponents across the terrain, and a significant presence of engineering and technical armed means.
Also, its positional nature was manifested in the parity of defensive and offensive means, taking into account the low activity of attacking divisions in the breakthrough zone and the high activity of reserve divisions transported by means of a railway maneuver(emphasis added) . Brusilov also mentioned the importance of railways when he wrote that the Germans would have time to transfer several divisions via railways, but he would only have one. He meant that the speed of concentration of troops, and therefore victory, depended on the presence of railways.
The Russian armies were forced into roadless areas, and their supplies depended exclusively on internal lines and the Moscow railway junction. The troops were deprived of the ability to quickly transport and regroup troops, depriving themselves of the ability to maneuver, making the army slow and immobile, which raised the issue of strategic necessity to capture the railway junctions occupied by the Germans. To reach them, it was necessary to overcome the positional deadlock and move on to maneuver warfare.
In December 1915, the first attempt was organized to overcome the positional deadlock in the east - an operation on the Strypa River by the troops of Infantry General D.G. Shcherbachev, which ended in failure. According to Zayonchkovsky, the operation became a prelude to the summer battles of 1916, showing the degree of unpreparedness of the Russian army to fight against enemy fortifications and equipment.
In March 1916, the offensive in the area of Lake Naroch by the forces of the Western and Northern Fronts also crashed against the German defenses, due to the fact that it was impossible to establish communications and support for the advancing troops through the terrain torn apart by artillery. The battles on Strypa and Naroch turned out to be unsuccessful attempts to break through the positional deadlock, since there was no artillery cooperation, and continued implementation of plans led to unjustified losses.
Initially, it was exclusively about defending one’s own positions, since the Russian army was weakened by the “Great Retreat.” According to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters, Infantry General M.V. Alekseev, defense and offensive were possible only with superior manpower, which was achieved north of woodland on the Northern and Western fronts; According to plans, the Southwestern Front was supposed to play only a supporting role.
General Alekseev at Headquarters
Brusilov himself strongly and actively defended the version from which it followed that his auxiliary role was to capture Kovel, an important railway junction in Volyn, which opened the way to Southern Poland. The role of these rocker units was emphasized back in the 80s of the 19th century by the Minister of War, Field Marshal General D.A. Milyutin. In his plans, he indicated that in fact the connection between the probable theater of war and central Russia rested on the Brest-Litovsk railway junction, which made it possible to transfer Russian troops through Polesie and the swamps to Pripyat.
With the development of railway construction, the role of Kovel as a new hub also increased. In the offensive plans of the fronts for 1916, an important role was assigned to the capture of large railway junctions that could give the Russians an advantage in the fight against the Germans.
Through Galicia to the Balkans, or through Polesie to Berlin?
North of Polesie, Russian troops had to fight with the Germans, who were strong in defense and overcome powerful defensive lines. Alekseev was counting on a plan that could decide the outcome of the war of maneuver: Russian troops were supposed to break through the Austrian defenses in Galicia and move south to join the advancing Thessaloniki Front of the Allies.
General Alekseev wanted this offensive because he considered the Balkans as the main direction foreign policy Russia, and, in connection with the military defeat of Serbia and Montenegro, considered it necessary to coordinate allied forces, in order to resist the Austro-Germans in an organized manner and finally win over the wavering Greeks and Romanians to the side of the Entente.
He proposed not to strike at the places of direct defense of the Germans, but to strike at their allies and weak points, i.e. defend on the Anglo-French and Russian fronts, and strike at Austria through the Balkans and with the forces of the Southwestern Front. He needed the Balkan front as an opportunity to pull back enemy forces from Bukovina and develop the success of the Russian strike in this direction in order to tighten the ring around Austria-Hungary, clear the way for Italy to attack and draw Romania into the Entente camp.
He hoped that with just such blows he would be able to oust the Austrians and resolve the Balkan issues, but, moreover, the Russian army, crushing its opponents one by one, was supposed to weaken Germany, and then it would be more than possible to crush the German defense if it did not go to its rear through the Hungarian plain and southern Poland. But the allies, in view of the preparation of a decisive offensive in France, could not allocate enough forces to Macedonia, and Alekseev had to follow the plans approved at the February inter-allied conference in Chantilly - to look for a solution to the war in the main theaters, one of which was Russian.
Balkans in 1916
Nevertheless, the Russians and French were looking for methods to attract new allies into their ranks in the Balkans, counting on them to solve issues of allied strategy with bayonets. Even on the eve of the war, Russia and France did everything possible to ensure that Romania did not enter the war on the side of the Central Powers, and in 1914-1915. the struggle was already underway for action in the Entente camp. By 1916, the question of Romania's entry into the war was reduced to military issues only.
In the spring-summer of 1916, Romanian Prime Minister Ian Bratianu made it a condition for Romania to have 250,000 Russian soldiers in Dobruzhda to provide cover from Bulgaria, while the Romanian army would move against Austria-Hungary. Alekseev was categorically against this large quantity troops, weakening the army before the impending general offensive.
The French military attaché in Russia, General Poe, informed Alekseev of his opinion regarding such great demands of the Romanians: these troops will be a reliable rear on which the Romanian offensive will rely; pulling the Bulgarians towards themselves will contribute to the Allies’ attack from Thessaloniki. Alekseev politely refused, pointing out that due to the weakness of the Bulgarians and Austrians and the defeat of the Turks in the Caucasus, the Romanians were not in danger, although in a letter to Foreign Minister Sazonov he named another reason for the rejection of the Allied plan - the weakening of the Russian front and the deprivation of its offensive capability.
At the same time, the Romanians did not give clear guarantees of their actions, which Joffre did not like, who believed that such a grouping in Dobruja would only weaken the Russian front on the eve of its offensive. The exorbitant demands of the Romanians forced Alekseev to refuse their help, and this led to a delay in negotiations, which the French command did not like, which attached great importance to Romania.
While Romania was neutral and bargaining was going on for the price of its entry into the ranks of the Entente, Alekseev decided to solve pressing problems of the front and strategy. On March 22, he outlined to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Emperor Nicholas II, his thoughts on the future campaign of the summer of 1916, based on the experience of the battles in Strypa and Naroch.
He proposed two options for an offensive on the front - an offensive north of Polesie and an offensive in the south. The offensive in the north was in accordance with the all-Union decisions at the Chantilly conference - to conduct a decisive offensive on the main fronts through joint offensive operations. In view of the numerical superiority achieved by the Russians north of Polesie, he proposed leaving troops there in order to, if necessary, have the strength to eliminate the likely offensive of the Austro-Germans.
Romanian officers in 1914
Waiting on the defensive was, in his opinion, pointless, since defense required the same material costs as an offensive, and on the 1200-verst front, the Russians were vulnerable everywhere due to poor railways and stretched forces. These circumstances, coupled with the obligations in Chantilly, forced Alekseev to become convinced of the futility of a war of attrition and make a choice in favor of an offensive in order to “ to forestall the enemy, to strike at him, to force him to comply with our will, and not to find ourselves in the difficult complete submission to his plans, with all the unfavorable consequences of an exclusively passive defense».
He hoped to carry out two short but very strong strikes with the forces of the Northern and Southwestern Fronts, which would divert the enemy’s strategic reserves in order to develop the success of the Western Front in the Berlin direction. The Vilna direction was chosen as the main attack, where the Western and Northern fronts directed their forces.
The Southwestern Front was only supposed to pin down the Austro-Hungarians and German units in the south and go on the offensive only after success at Evert and Kuropatkin in the direction of Lutsk-Kovel from the Rivne region. This plan was approved in Directive No. 2017\806 at a meeting at Headquarters on April 1 (14), 1916.
Brusilov’s new victory and Alekseev’s old plans
On May 22 (June 4), between 4 and 5 a.m., a long artillery barrage began, after which Russian troops went on the offensive throughout the entire Southwestern Front. This offensive went down in history as the Brusilov breakthrough - the only battle in history named after a commander, which achieved impressive successes in the first days.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Emperor Nicholas II wrote in his diary: “ Yesterday, in many sectors of the Southwestern Front, after heavy shelling of enemy positions, their lines were broken through, and in total 13,000 people, 15 guns and 30 machine guns were captured. May God bless our valiant troops with further success».
The commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front himself, cavalry general A.A. Brusilov noted this in his memoirs as follows: “ I will not describe in detail, as before, step by step fighting this memorable period of the offensive of the armies entrusted to me. I will only say that by noon on May 24 we had captured 900 officers, over 40,000 lower ranks, 77 guns, 134 machine guns and 49 bomb launchers, by May 27 we had already captured 1,240 officers, over 71,000 lower ranks and captured 94 guns , 179 machine guns, 53 bombs and mortars and a huge amount of all other military booty».
In addition to rich military trophies, the troops broke through a 480-kilometer-long front, the 4th and 7th Austro-Hungarian armies were destroyed, and the Russian troops received a moral victory after long defeats. This was noted later by Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Svechin: “ There were no lagging behind in the attacks».
Meanwhile, from June 5 (17) to June 14 (27), the Austrians were withdrawing troops to the Russian front. On June 14, the Austrian command gave the order to stop the offensive in Italy, which allowed the Italians to prepare for a counteroffensive, and the Austrians began to retreat.
The Brusilov breakthrough became the first successful offensive operation in conditions of trench warfare. True, entering the operational space of Galicia, according to military historian Strokov, did not yet mean overcoming the positional impasse.
The rate decided to take advantage of such a major success. Alekseev, who initially intended to attack Berlin with the forces of the Western Front, now returned to his idea of attacking the Balkans. The general wanted this offensive because he considered the Balkans as the main direction of Russian foreign policy, and in connection with the military defeat of Serbia and Montenegro, he considered it necessary to coordinate the allied forces in order to organizely resist the Austro-Germans and finally win over the wavering Greeks and Romanians to the side of the Entente.
He proposed defending on the Anglo-French and Russian fronts, and striking at Austria through the Balkans and with the forces of the Southwestern Front. He needed the Balkan front as an opportunity to draw back enemy forces from Bukovina and develop the success of the Russian strike in this direction: tighten the ring around Austria-Hungary, clear the way for Italy to attack and draw Romania into the Entente camp.
They died heroically, but never turned the tide of the war
Alekseev hoped that it was with such blows that he would be able to oust the Austrians and resolve the Balkan issues. This strategy was more conducive to overcoming the positional deadlock than direct head-on attacks on the fortified German positions, and made it possible to use the Russian advantage in manpower.
His proposals were rejected by the French command due to the fact that the failure at the Dardanelles convinced the Anglo-French of the ineffectiveness of this kind of action. The French decided to achieve victory through the shortest strike directly against the main enemy - Germany, since the Germans were at the gates of Paris, and the French command did not have any extra forces for Thessaloniki.
Personally, Joffre supported the idea of a strike in the Balkans, despite the active protests of the British and their statements that such an operation would not succeed. The British representative at Chantilly, General Robertson, stated that mountainous area, the hostility of the Greek population and the impending future offensive in the west, it is impossible to concentrate enough troops to guard communications, organize the supply of supplies to the troops and provide for the advancing units. From his point of view, this operation would be pointless and would not yield strategic results, so it would be better to wait on the Thessaloniki front. However, Alekseev foresaw such a situation and described it in a letter to cavalry general Yakov Grigorievich Zhilinsky, the Russian representative in Chantilly.
Alekseev tried to push the allies to decide to attack on the Thessaloniki front in order to inflict more significant losses on Austria-Hungary. Zhilinsky telegraphed to Alekseev that the allies themselves had not yet come to a complete agreement on the issue of Thessaloniki.
According to Zhilinsky's report, the Allied plans at the meeting in Amiens on May 26 were that it might be necessary in the future to retreat to the Ypres-Valenciennes-Hirson-Verdun line, where the reduction of the front would strengthen strategic reserves. Next, it was planned to push the German center back to the Belgian border, which would give space and free up reserves, and with a decisive blow push the Germans back to the Rhine. The Allies decided on a war to deplete the resources of Germany and its allies.
So the Allies wanted to provide themselves with a numerical and technical advantage before the decisive blow, which was supposed to break the forces of Germany and bring victory in the shortest direction.
In view of such opposition, Alekseev again had to abandon the attack on the Balkans and continue to conduct an offensive in the western direction - against Germany. With the beginning of the offensive on the South-Western Front, Alekseev advised Brusilov to transfer efforts to the south - to Lvov, in order to cut off the communications of the Austrians in Galicia and bring Austria out of the war. In the directives of the headquarters of the Headquarters, Brusilov was instructed to cut off the Austrians from the line of the San River and destroy them, not allowing them to retreat.
It is interesting to note that the Russian command nevertheless took into account the lessons of the Galician battle of August-September 1914, when the weakened armies of the northern flank could not pursue the Austrians, and the southern armies were busy capturing large points. The Austrians then managed to leave the San without any hindrance and retreat to the Carpathians. Now Alekseev and the emperor wanted to destroy the enemy’s manpower in order to calmly occupy strategically important areas. Headquarters knew the requirements of modern warfare, but the front-line command did not always rise to the occasion.
Meanwhile, a correspondence began between the front commanders and the Chief of Staff of Headquarters, which actually resolved one question - where to move next and how to do it?
The fight for the main direction
Alekseev sincerely wanted to launch a general offensive of the Russian armies to the West, so he tried to coordinate the attacks of the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front, Infantry General A.E. Evert and the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, cavalry general A.A. Brusilova. Alekseev outlined the idea of the Russian front: to concentrate forces into one fist and strike at Brest with attacks near Kovel, Pinsk and Baranovichi with the further advance of Brusilov to the San River in order to separate the Germans and Austrians, cut them off from rear communications, and stretch the German front. The Germans would have to withdraw forces from France in time for the expected Allied offensive on June 15th.
Evert clearly outlined the benefits of the offensive of the Southwestern Front: a strike from the Pinsk region in the direction of Brest-Kobrin would lead to much greater results than a frontal strike on Vilna, which was originally planned. He will lead the enemy to unfortified terrain, and the war will turn into a maneuverable one, which will increase the Russian advantage in manpower. For all this, it is necessary to strengthen troops in the Pinsk-Baranovichi area and the Southwestern Front.
The offensive on Vilna would have been long, the South-West would have had time to exhaust its reserves, and the surprise of the attack would have been lost. In view of the expected imminent fall of Kovel and Vladimir-Volynsk under the attacks of Brusilov’s troops, the armies could threaten Brest-Litovsk, the Germans would immediately clear the Pinsk area. A strike from Baranovichi, which was planned as auxiliary, could create a threat to them in the direction of Brest and Grodno, force them to retreat, expose their flanks and thereby weaken the Germans at Vilna. If the offensive near Pinsk is successful, the battle near Baranovichi will become much easier.
Alekseev was concerned about his proposal regarding Baranovichi, because, in his opinion, this might not distract the enemy’s forces and not produce results, especially since he initially planned to achieve success in this area in a different way: the 4th Army of the Western Front was supposed to attack in the Novogrudok region. Slonim, and the 8th Army, with a blow from Kovel, will assist it in the attack on the Kobrin-Brest area. Thus, the Pinsk direction became increasingly important for the command. Alekseev wanted to speed up the attack on Kovel and strengthen Brusilov with three corps, which, after capturing it, would develop an attack on Pinsk in order to free up Brusilov’s forces to defeat the Austrians.
Evert told Alekseev that if Brusilov succeeded, he would immediately begin preparing a strike on Baranovichi. As a result, Alekseev conveyed to him the final decision on the offensive at Baranovichi and Pinsk in order to ensure Kaledin’s success at Kovel, and on June 2 indicated that “ the defeat in the Pinsk region and the use of success cannot remain without a significant impact on the development of your operation».
The importance of Baranovichi was determined by the railway line, which provided a short and fast connection for the Austro-German front: Vilno-Lida-Baranovichi-Brest-Litovsk-Kovel-Lutsk, and in the event of the capture of Baranovichi, communication for the Germans would be interrupted along the entire front.
As can be understood from such detailed descriptions of the attacks planned by Alekseev and Evert, the whole essence of the strategy came down to mastering the junctions of the rock railways, which made it possible to overcome forested and swampy areas, forced the Germans to retreat under the threat of encirclement, clearing Belarus, and brought armies to the vastness of Poland and Galicia . There, a war of maneuver had already begun, where the Russians, who had enormous manpower, had the advantage, and the capture of railway junctions made it possible both to operate with these masses of troops and to keep strategically important areas under control for a further offensive.
If we return to the events that took place, as a result of the unsuccessful attacks of the 8th and 3rd armies against the Germans in the swampy areas of Pripyat, Brusilov and Evert were clearly despondent and did not want to begin a serious movement of troops one without the other. The result was the transfer of the 3rd Army to Brusilov to capture Pinsk and Kovel in the Pripyat region, creating a threat to the Germans from the flank and even a real break in the Austro-German front, and the demand for an immediate start of an offensive on the Western Front.
Evert launched an attack on Baranovichi, believing that this frontal attack, not supported by either the strength or movement of neighbors, was doomed to failure, and he turned out to be right - the positional struggle led to large losses and zero results. Then Alekseev used another method from his strategy.
Alekseev in 1916, with the offensive of Brusilov, decided to develop his idea of a shock fist, which would break through enemy defenses and ensure the capture of important positions. After the failure of the attack on Baranovichi, Alekseev decided to try the “fist” on the Brusilov front, since there was already an unsuccessful precedent for using breakthrough strike groups on Strypa and Naroch. The general himself even designated the location of the offensive, which had long ago appeared in operational correspondence and was still considered an independent goal of Brusilov’s armies, and now has become the main direction - Kovel: “ Fate itself made the Kovel region the theater of the main actions of the moment».
Back in early June, he considered it the main direction of Brusilov’s front, which, in general, coincided with the opinion of Brusilov himself: “ Now gather the appropriate forces for the immediate development of the attack and the capture of the Kovel region.” Alekseev concentrates the efforts of Brusilov’s front there, hoping that with the fall of Kovel, the troops could destroy the Austrians, since the capture of this region would break the enemy front and force both the Germans and Austrians to retreat.
On July 15 (28), the Guard offensive began on Stokhod: “ The companies marched forward, like guards, chain by chain, measuredly, persistently, stubbornly... Strength and power were felt. In front are officers in gold shoulder straps with regimental insignia on their chests. Behind them are soldiers with distinctive piping on their protective shirts. They walked, they died, and behind them the reserve companies also rolled valiantly in waves... But there were few passages in the wire, the swamp dragged in, hundreds of brave men died in the entire line».
According to one former guardsman, " Not a single infantry in the world would have given greater success under this exceptionally difficult situation, which was not in the power of the attacking troops to change. “...” As a result, two beautiful corps were stuffed into a swamp bag and thrown into the attack in conditions in which only a miracle could give victory" Russian troops were never able to break through the fortified Austro-German defensive line on Stokhod, losing a huge number of people in attempts to seize a bridgehead on the left bank of the river.
The Balkans again
In August 1916, Romania's long-awaited entry into the war took place. Even in the first days of the Brusilov offensive, the allied command set strict conditions for Romania - it would enter the war on allied terms or it would be too late, which forced the Romanians to drop the issue of the Russian army in Dobruja.
Romanians are always Romanians - whether in Transylvania or near Stalingrad
The Anglo-French hoped that they would attract the Austrians and Germans, and this would allow them to resume the offensive on the Somme and hit the Bulgarian army with troops in Thessaloniki. Alekseev also counted on this blow, expecting that the Romanians, together with Sarrail’s army, would “squeeze” and defeat Bulgaria. The expected attack of General Sarrail failed, which led to the curtailment of the offensive from Thessaloniki and a return to the old strategy.
On August 17 (30), 1916, a military-political convention between the Entente and Romania was signed, which included a clause on the start of the offensive no later than August 28.
Back in the July days, Alekseev still decided to send symbolic assistance to Dobruja, and he sought strength for it on inactive fronts. Since there were battles in the Kovel direction, he asked Brusilov to receive troops from the Western Front. He informed Evert that Romania could perform on August 1st.
Now, after the obvious failure of the attacks of the 3rd Army and Bezobrazov’s detachment on Kovel at Stokhod, Alekseev was able to switch his attention to Romania by strengthening the 9th and 7th Armies, advancing in the south, hoping that the performance of Romania would be able to open up the passes in the Carpathians for him and give him the opportunity to strike at the Hungarian plain from the rear. On August 2, Alekseev informed Evert that the concentration of German forces south of Polesie could be destroyed by the expected arrival of Romania on August 15, whose forces would draw upon the reserves accumulated by Hindenburg in Galicia and near Kovel.
Meanwhile, the front south of Polesie truly became more significant than expected. The accumulation of huge German reserves, supporting the weakened Austrians and holding the front from Kovel to the Carpathians, forced Alekseev to telegraph to the commander-in-chief that all other fronts should now become auxiliary: “ We have to continue the operation south of Polesie, accompanied by heavy fighting all the way from the mouth of the Stokhod to the demarcation line with the Romanians».
On August 18, the Southwestern Front resumed its offensive, but it was already eroding the strength of the armies. However, the attacks at Kovel continued from the beginning of September to the beginning of November, and their significance for the strategy turned out to be as follows: “ Nevertheless, the main goal was achieved - the Germans did not manage to remove a single division from this section of the front, they even had to reinforce this section with fresh units. Meanwhile, our troops managed to occupy designated positions in Transylvania and blocked the Austro-Germans’ access to Moldova».
As a result, Russian troops did not capture the railway junctions during the 1916 campaign, since they were unable to break through the positional defenses of the Austro-Germans and carry out their strategic plans to take Austria out of the war and enter the Balkans. The higher headquarters could not coordinate the efforts of the commanders, which led to individual operations, such as the Battle of Baranovichi and the Kovel operation, which were not successful. The war dragged on, the Brusilov breakthrough came to naught by September 1916, and the country was already on the verge of revolution.
The 1916 campaign was their last
B.P. Utkin
“Brusilovsky breakthrough” 1916 May 22 (June 4) - July 31 (August 13). One of the largest military operations of the First World War, which ended with a significant loss of Russian troops.
Russian forces under the command of General A.A. Brusilov carried out a powerful breakthrough of the front in the direction of Lutsk and Kovel. The Austro-Hungarian troops were defeated and began a disorderly retreat. The rapid advance of Russian troops led to the fact that they quickly occupied Bukovina and reached the mountain passes of the Carpathians. Enemy losses (including prisoners) amounted to about 1.5 million people. He also lost 581 guns, 448 bomb throwers and mortars, and 1,795 machine guns. Austria-Hungary was on the verge of complete defeat and withdrawal from the war. To save the situation, Germany removed 34 divisions from the French and Italian fronts. As a result, the French were able to preserve Verdun, and Italy was saved from complete defeat.
Russian troops lost about 500 thousand people. The victory in Galicia changed the balance of power in the war in favor of the Entente. In the same year, Romania came over to its side (which, however, did not strengthen, but rather weakened the position of the Entente due to the military weakness of Romania and the need to protect it. The length of the front for Russia increased by about 600 km).
The military history of Russia is rich in events that left an indelible mark on the military-historical consciousness of the people and are inscribed with golden pages in science, in the centuries-old experience of overcoming historical disasters while repelling foreign aggression. One of these pages is the offensive operation of the Southwestern Front (SWF) in 1916. It's about about the only battle of the First World War, which was named by contemporaries and descendants after the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front, cavalry general Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov, on whose initiative and under whose brilliant leadership it was prepared and carried out. This is the famous Brusilovsky breakthrough. In Western encyclopedias and numerous scientific works it entered as "Brussilow angritte", "The Brusilov offensive", "Offensive de Brussilov".
The 80th anniversary of the Brusilov breakthrough arouses great public interest in the personality of A.A. Brusilov, to the history of the idea, methods of preparation, implementation and results of this operation of the First World War, unique in its success. This interest is all the more relevant because in Soviet historiography the experience of the First World War is extremely insufficiently covered, and many of its military leaders still remain unknown.
A.A. Brusilov was appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief (GC) of the armies of the Southwestern Front on March 16 (29), 1916. At that time, this front-line association represented an impressive force. It included four armies (7th, 8th, 9th and 11th), front-line units (artillery, cavalry, aviation, engineering troops, reserves). The Kiev and Odessa military districts (they were located on the territory of 12 provinces) were also subordinate to the commander-in-chief. In total, the front grouping consisted of more than 40 infantry (inf) and 15 cavalry (cd) divisions, 1,770 guns (including 168 heavy); the total number of troops on the Southwestern Front exceeded 1 million people. The front line extended for 550 km, the rear border of the front was the river. Dnieper.
Choice of GC YuZF A.A. Brusilov by the Emperor and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command had deep foundations: the general was rightfully considered in the Russian army one of the most honored military leaders, whose experience, personal qualities and performance results were in harmonious unity and opened up prospects for achieving new successes in the conduct of military operations. He had 46 years of experience behind him military service, which happily combined participation in hostilities, leadership of units, higher educational institutions, command of formations and formations. He was awarded all the highest awards of the Russian state. Since the beginning of the First World War, Brusilov commanded the troops of the 8th Army (8A). As a commander during the battles of the initial period of the war, and then in the Battle of Galicia (1914), the 1915 campaign revealed his talent and best qualities Brusilov - commander: originality of thinking, courage of judgments, conclusions and decisions, independence and responsibility in the leadership of a large operational formation, dissatisfaction with what has been achieved, activity and initiative. Perhaps the greatest discovery of Brusilov, the commander, made during painful thoughts during the period of twenty-two months of war and finally determined by the spring of 1916, was the conclusion, or rather, the conviction that the war must be waged differently, which many commanders-in-chief of the fronts , as well as the highest ranks of Headquarters, are not capable of turning the tide of events for various reasons. He clearly saw the obvious vices of the military and government controlled country from top to bottom.
1916 is the culmination of the First World War: the warring parties mobilized almost all their human and material resources. The armies suffered colossal losses. Meanwhile, neither side achieved any serious successes that would at least to some extent open up prospects for a successful (in their favor) end of the war. From the point of view of operational art, the beginning of 1916 resembled the initial position of the warring armies before the start of the war. IN military history the current situation is usually called a positional deadlock. The opposing armies created a continuous front of defense in depth. The presence of numerous artillery and high densities of defending troops made the defense difficult to overcome. The absence of open flanks and vulnerable joints doomed attempts at a breakthrough, and especially maneuver, to failure. The extremely significant losses during the breakout attempts were also proof that operational art and tactics did not correspond to the real conditions of the war. But the war continued. Both the Entente (England, France, Russia and other countries) and the states of the German bloc (Austria-Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, etc.) were determined to wage the war to a victorious end. Plans were put forward and options for military operations were sought. However, one thing was clear to everyone: any offensive with decisive goals must begin with a breakthrough of defensive positions, looking for a way out of the positional impasse. But no one managed to find such a way out even in 1916 (Verdun, Somme, failures of the Western Front 4A, Southwestern Front - 7A). The deadlock within the SWF was overcome by A.A. Brusilov.
Offensive operation of the SWF (June 4-August 10, 1916) - component military operations of the Russian army and its allies in the Entente, as well as a reflection of the prevailing strategic views, decisions made by the parties and the balance of forces and means in 1916. The Entente (including Russia) recognized the need to conduct an offensive against Germany coordinated in time and tasks. Superiority was on the side of the Entente: on the Western European Front, 139 Anglo-French divisions were opposed by 105 German divisions. On the Eastern European Front, 128 Russian divisions operated against 87 Austro-German divisions. The German command decided to go on the defensive on the Eastern Front, and on the Western Front to take France out of the war with an offensive.
The strategic plan for conducting combat operations by the Russian army was discussed at Headquarters on April 1-2, 1916. Based on the general tasks agreed upon with the allies, it was decided that the troops of the Western (WF; GC - A.E. Evert) and Northern (SF; GC - A.N. Kuropatkin) fronts should prepare for mid-May and conduct offensive operations. The main blow (in the direction of Vilno) was to be delivered by the Western Front. According to the plan of the Headquarters, the Southwestern Front was assigned a passive auxiliary role; it was tasked with conducting defensive battles and pinning down the enemy. The explanation was simple: the Southwestern Front is not capable of attacking, it is weakened by the failures of 1915 and the Headquarters has neither the strength, nor the means, nor the time to strengthen it. All cash reserves were given to the Polar Fund and the Northern Fund. It is clear that the plan was based on a quantitative approach to the capabilities of the troops.
But was it necessary to determine the role of each front, including the Southwestern Front, only by quantitative indicators? This is exactly the question posed by A.A. Brusilov first before the emperor upon appointment to the post, and then at a meeting at Headquarters. He spoke after the reports of M.V. Alekseeva, A.E. Evert and A.N. Kuropatkina. Having completely agreed with the decision on the tasks of the Polar Division (the main direction) and the Northern Front, Brusilov, with all conviction, determination and faith in success, insisted on changing the task of the Southern Western Front. He knew that he was going against everyone:
the inability of the Southwestern Front to advance was defended by the Chief of Staff of Headquarters M.V. Alekseev (until 1915 - chief of staff of the SWF), former commander of the SWF N.I. Ivanov, even Kuropatkin, even dissuaded Brusilov. However, Evert and Kuropatkin did not believe in the success of their fronts either. Brusilov managed to achieve a review of the decision of the Headquarters - the Southwestern Front was allowed to attack, however, with partial, passive tasks and relying only on its own forces. But this was also a definite victory over routine and mistrust of the Southwestern Front. There are few examples in military history when a military leader, with such tenacity, will, perseverance and reasoning, sought to complicate his own task, put his authority, his well-being at stake, and fought for the prestige of the troops entrusted to him. It seems that this largely determines the long-standing question: what motivated Brusilov, what were the motives for his activities?
The successful solution of the task of the Southwestern Front in the operation was initially associated not with quantitative superiority over the enemy in forces and means (i.e., not with the traditional approach), but with other categories of operational (in general, military) art: the massing of forces and means in selected directions , achieving surprise (by deceiving the enemy, operational camouflage, operational support measures, the use of previously unknown techniques and methods of armed struggle), skillful maneuver of forces and means. It is absolutely clear that the fate of the operation depended to a greater extent on its initiator, organizer, and executor. Brusilov understood this; moreover, he was convinced that failure was excluded, the only bet was on victory, on success.
In May, German-Austrian troops inflicted a severe defeat on the Italians. In this regard, the leadership of the Entente turned to Nicholas II with a request to speed up the start of the offensive. The emperor decided not to abandon his friends in trouble and to launch an offensive two weeks ahead of schedule. But the commander of the Southwestern Front, General Brusilov, did not waste time. Appointed to this position on March 17, he acted actively. Before the start of the offensive, a thorough reconnaissance of enemy positions was carried out. Like Suvorov in his time near Izmail, he created a defensive zone similar to the zone of Austro-German fortifications and trained soldiers on it. In general, Brusilov, during his short combat experience (1914-17), showed himself to be another Suvorov. The soldiers of the 8th Army, which he commanded before the Southwestern Front, really loved their general. After all, what is the cost of one order to allow the wearing of warm clothes that are not required by the regulations? And this is when in other units, despite the severe frost, the commanders struggled with it in every possible way. And the Battle of Galicia, in which the 8th Army suffered minimal losses, thanks to the talent of the general.
In addition to Suvorov’s training, Brusilov also introduced something new. The blow had to be delivered not in one, but in four directions. Thus, the enemy could not find out the direction of the main attack. In addition, the situation with Verdun was excluded, when more and more new reinforcements were brought to one place, at the expense of other sectors of the front. Now the Austro-Germans could not bring the concentration of their forces at one point to a very large figure.
By the time the offensive began, the Southwestern Front had some advantage over the enemy in manpower (573 thousand bayonets versus 448) and field artillery (1,770 guns versus 1,301). However, in heavy artillery, so necessary for the destruction of built long-term structures, our troops lost three times (168 guns versus 545). Brusilov decided to concentrate troops in the offensive areas in order to have a 2-1.5 times superiority in infantry and 1.5-1.7 times in artillery.
On May 22, 1916, the offensive of Russian troops began. Those interested can take a look at the map. The advance of the troops of the Northern and Western Fronts did not have great success. But the Southwestern Front fought back for them all. His offensive went so well that it was decided to consider the Lutsk direction as the main one. In addition, Brusilov was allocated additional troops. One of the factors that influenced the course of the battle was that Brusilov was opposed by Hungarian government militias. According to the memoirs of contemporaries, they surrendered to the regiments as soon as the situation was not in their favor. This is precisely what Austrian historians tried to justify their defeat with. They even stated that not a single regular Austrian unit was captured. The opposite is confirmed by Austrian banners taken from the encircled units.
From the first day the breakthrough was successful. Having broken through a 16-kilometer section near Lutsk by May 25, Russian troops expanded it to 70-80 kilometers and advanced 25-35 kilometers inland. Neither the Germans nor France and England have seen such success since 1914. By June 2, the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was defeated. However, the reserves, numbering 5 divisions, ran out here. In addition, the Germans, who had always been a more militant nation than the Hungarians, came to the aid of the Austrians. The offensive in the Lutsk direction was stopped. Without the support of the Western Front, which had not yet moved its troops, and new units, further advance was not possible.
In many ways, the success of the operation was determined by the new tactics of the Russian troops. Near the Masurian swamps, the Germans advanced in columns. In 1915, they still attacked in dense chains, so that the regiment was several hundred meters deep. Now the Russians used waves of chains. The meaning of this formation was as follows: a company of 4 platoons was divided into 2 parts. The first chain was three platoons. One platoon followed them, providing fire cover. In addition to chain dashes, as is done now, chain dashes were carried out. In front of the enemy's trenches, the chains merged and together stormed the positions. In battalion order, machine guns and a specially designated company also provided fire cover. In addition, Russian troops took the lesson of the Great Retreat of 1915. The artillery began the battle. Here the Russians first used a barrage of fire. Behind the rampart were the grenadiers or “trench cleaners” who had been revived after Peter the Great. Specially created teams occupied the trenches when the barrage of fire went behind enemy lines. At this time, the enemy was still sitting in the dugouts. One soldier could thus clear the area occupied by the company from the enemy with one grenade. However, this required subtle calculations. A hasty grenadier risked running into the fire of his own artillery, smashing the barbed wire or driving the enemy underground. Those who were not in a hurry risked catching the enemy crawling out of the ground. In this case, he found himself one on one against enough big company angry people. The fact is that the grenadiers acted in small groups. They were armed with a pistol and a cleaver (most often a captured bayonet). With such weapons, there could be no talk of driving the company out of the trenches.
Army reform also played a major role. Additional teams were introduced into the regiments, and the number of machine guns was increased. Each team was given its own insignia. By the end of the war, things had reached the point where the non-commissioned officer of some team of some national regiment looked like christmas tree by the number of stripes and chevrons. But all these innovations gave positive result. In response to the use of chemical shells against Russian units in January 1916, chemical teams were introduced into the regiments. On the approaches to the city of Stanislav, the Russians used chemical shells. The success of their use determined the development of the Russian military chemical industry. The front began to receive 150 thousand such shells every month. The soldiers' equipment also changed. All of them were given gas masks and helmets of the French type - “Adrianovka”. These helmets remained on the heads of our soldiers for a long time. With some modifications, they survived until the Soviet-Finnish war.
As a result of the offensive operation, the Southwestern Front inflicted a serious defeat on the Austro-Hungarian troops in Galicia and Bukovina. The losses of the Central Powers, according to Russian estimates, amounted to about one and a half million people killed, wounded and captured. The high losses suffered by the Austrian troops further reduced their combat effectiveness. To repel the Russian offensive, Germany transferred 11 infantry divisions from the French theater of operations, and Austria-Hungary transferred 6 infantry divisions from the Italian front, which became a tangible aid to Russia’s Entente allies. Under the influence of the Russian victory, Romania decided to enter the war on the side of the Entente, although the consequences of this decision are assessed ambiguously by historians.
The result of the offensive of the Southwestern Front and the operation on the Somme was the final transition of the strategic initiative from the Central Powers to the Entente. The Allies managed to achieve such interaction that for two months (July-August) Germany had to send its limited strategic reserves to both the Western and Eastern Fronts.
At the same time, the summer campaign of the Russian army in 1916 demonstrated serious shortcomings in troop management. The headquarters was unable to implement the plan for a general summer offensive of three fronts, agreed upon with the allies, and the auxiliary attack of the Southwestern Front turned out to be the main offensive operation. The offensive of the Southwestern Front was not supported in a timely manner by other fronts. The headquarters did not show sufficient firmness towards General Evert, who repeatedly disrupted the planned dates for the offensive of the Western Front. As a result, a significant part of the German reinforcements against the Southwestern Front came from other sectors of the Eastern Front.
The July offensive of the Western Front on Baranovichi revealed the inability of the command staff to cope with the task of breaking through a heavily fortified German position, even with a significant superiority in forces.
Since the June Lutsk breakthrough of the 8th Army was not provided for by the Headquarters plan, it was not preceded by the concentration of powerful front-line reserves, therefore neither the 8th Army nor the Southwestern Front could develop this breakthrough.
Also, due to fluctuations in the Headquarters and the command of the Southwestern Front during the July offensive, the 8th and 3rd armies reached the river by July 1 (14). Stokhod without sufficient reserves and were forced to stop and wait for the approach of the Special Army. Two weeks of respite gave the German command time to transfer reinforcements, and subsequent attacks by Russian divisions were repulsed. “The impulse cannot stand a break.”
It is for these reasons that some military historians will call the successful operation of the Southwestern Front a “lost victory.”
The huge losses of the Russian army in the operation (according to some sources, up to half a million people in the SWF alone on June 13) required additional recruitment of recruits, which at the end of 1916 increased dissatisfaction with the war among the Russian population.
Despite its incompleteness, this operation represents an outstanding achievement of military art, which is not denied by foreign authors. They pay tribute to the talent of the Russian general. “Brusilovsky breakthrough” is the only battle of the First World War, the name of which appears in the title of the commander.
Oydup-ool Syldys Vladimirovna
The Brusilov breakthrough of 1916 occupies an important place in the history of the First World War. Its scale and drama shocked the world no less than Verdun, which became a symbol of the strategy of attrition. However, today in Russia much less is known about this major operation of the Russian army.
The Brusilov breakthrough was an offensive operation of the troops of the Russian Southwestern Front on May 22 (June 4) - July 31 (August 13), 1916, during the First World War, in which Russian troops led by General A.A. Brusilov broke through the positional defenses of the Austro-Hungarian troops and occupied a significant territory of Western Ukraine.
Download:
Preview:
Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Tyva
Municipal Budgetary Educational Institution
Average comprehensive school With. Kochetovo Tandinsky kozhuun
ABSTRACT on the topic:
"BRUSILOV BREAKTHROUGH
1916"
Performed: 9th grade student
Oydup-ool Syldys
Checked by: teacher
Stories of Oyun K.S.
Kochetovo – 2014
Introduction.......................................................... ........................................3
1.Name, planning and preparation of the operation.………………….........4
2. Balance of forces and progress of the operation…..…………………..…………………..8
2.1. First stage…………………………………………………………...8
2.2. Second stage………………………………………………………..10
3. Results of the Brusilov breakthrough………………………………………………………..12
Conclusion................................................. ..................…………………............14
List of used literature……..……………………......15
Appendix……………………………………………………………………………….16
Introduction
First World War 1914 - 1918 became one of the bloodiest and largest conflicts in humanity. It began on July 28, 1914 and ended on November 11, 1918. 38 states out of 59 existing at that time participated in this conflict independent states. About 73.5 million people were mobilized; of these, 9.5 million were killed or died from wounds, more than 20 million were wounded, 3.5 million were left crippled. This war led to the collapse of the most powerful European states and the formation of a new political situation in the world.
The First World War had a huge impact on the events of the twentieth century: it gave impetus technical revolution and made violence a weapon of destruction in international disputes. The lessons of the First World War are still relevant today, when some powers, like Germany once, lay claim to world domination.
Relevance The topic I am revealing is determined to be poorly understood. Certain aspects of this problem are only touched upon in separate scientific research, in the works of some historians and “amateurs”.
Work structureincludes: introduction, three paragraphs, conclusion, list of references, appendix.
1. Name, planning and preparation of the operation
The Brusilov breakthrough was an offensive operation of the troops of the Russian Southwestern Front on May 22 (June 4) - July 31 (August 13), 1916, during the First World War, in which Russian troops led by General A.A. Brusilovbroke through the positional defenses of the Austro-Hungarian troops and occupied a significant territory of Western Ukraine.
The Brusilov breakthrough of 1916 occupies an important place in the history of the First World War. Its scale and drama shocked the world no less than Verdun, which became a symbol of the strategy of attrition. However, today in Russia much less is known about this major operation of the Russian army.
Contemporaries knewbattle as the “Lutsk breakthrough”, which corresponded to the historical military tradition:battles were named according to the place where they occurred. However, it was Brusilov who was given an unprecedented honor:operation in the spring of 1916 on the Southwestern Front they received the name after one of the authors of the operation plan foroffensive - “Brusilov offensive.”
When the success of the Lutsk breakthrough became obvious, according to a military historianA. A. Kersnovsky , “a victory such as we have never won in a world war,” which had every chance of becoming a decisive victory and ending the war, fear arose in the ranks of the Russian opposition that the victory would be attributed to the tsar asSupreme Commander which will strengthen the monarchy. Perhaps in order to avoid this, Brusilov began to be praised in the press, as they had not been praised beforeN. I. Ivanova for victory in , nor A. N. Selivanova behind Przemysl , nor P. A. Pleve for Tomashev, nor N. N. Yudenich behind , Erzurum or Trabzon.
Summer offensiveRussian army was part of the overall strategic planEntente on 1916 , which provided for the interaction of the allied armies on varioustheaters of war . As part of this plan, the Anglo-French troops were preparing an operation onSomme . In accordance with the decision of the conference of the Entente powers inChantilly (March 1916 ) the start of the offensive on the Russian front was scheduled forJune 15 , and on the French front - onJuly 1 1916.
Russian DirectiveHeadquarters headquarters from April 24 1916 ordered a Russian offensive on all threefronts (Northern , Western and South-West). The balance of forces, according to Headquarters, was in favor of the Russians. At the end of March, the Northern and Western Fronts had 1220 thousandbayonets And sabers (personnel designationsinfantry And cavalry of that time) against 620 thousand among the Germans, the Southwestern Front - 512 thousand against 441 thousand among the Austro-Hungarians and Germans. The double superiority in forces north of Polesie also dictated the direction of the main attack. It should have been inflictedtroops Western Front, and auxiliary attacks - Northern and Southwestern Fronts. To increase the superiority in forces, in April-May the units were replenished to full strength.
The main blow was supposed to be delivered by the forces of the Western Front (commanding general A. E. Evert ) from the Molodechno region toVilna . Evert received most of thereserves And heavy artillery . Another part was allocated to the Northern Front (commanded by General A.N. Kuropatkin) for an auxiliary strike from Dvinsk - also to Vilno. The Southwestern Front (commanded by General A. A. Brusilov) was ordered to attack Lutsk - Kovel, duringwing German group, towards the main attack of the Western Front.
Bid feared that the armies of the Central Powers would go on the offensive in the event of a French defeat at Verdun and, wanting to seize the initiative, instructed the front commanders to be prepared for an offensive earlier than planned. The Stavka directive did not reveal the purpose of the upcoming operation, did not provide for the depth of the operation, and did not indicate what the fronts were supposed to achieve in the offensive. It was believed that after the first line of enemy defense had been broken through, a new operation was being prepared to overcome the second line.
Contrary to the assumptions of the Headquarters, the Central Powers did not plan large offensive operations on the Russian front in the summer of 1916. At the same time, the Austrian command did not consider it possible for the Russian army to launch a successful offensive south of Polesie without significant reinforcement.
May 15 Austrian troops went on the offensive on the Italian front in the Trentino region and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Italians. The Italian army was on the brink of disaster. In this regard, Italy turned to Russia with a request to help the offensive of the armies of the Southwestern Front in order to draw off the Austro-Hungarian units from the Italian theater of operations.May 31 The headquarters ordered an offensive by the Southwestern Front toJune 4 , and the Western Front - on - June 11 . The main attack continued to be carried out by the Western Front (commander GeneralA. E. Evert ).
He played an outstanding role in organizing the offensive of the Southwestern Front (Lutsk breakthrough)major general M. V. Khanzhin . In preparation for the operation, the commander of the Southwestern Front, General A. A. Brusilov, decided to make one breakthrough at the front of each of his four armies. Although this scattered the Russian forces, the enemy also lost the opportunity to timely transfer reserves to the direction of the main attack. The main blow of the Southwestern Front on Lutsk and further on Kovel was delivered by the strong right-flank 8th Army (commander GeneralA. M. Kaledin ), auxiliary strikes were carried out by the 11th Army (GeneralV. V. Sakharov ) on Brody, 7th (generalD. G. Shcherbachev ) - on Galich , 9th (general P. A. Lechitsky ) - on Chernivtsi And Kolomyia . Army commanders were given freedom to choose breakthrough sites.
By the beginning of the offensive, the four armies of the Southwestern Front numbered 534 thousand bayonets and 60 thousand sabers, 1770 light and 168 heavy guns. Against them were four Austro-Hungarian armies and one German, with a total number of 448 thousand bayonets and 38 thousand sabers, 1301 light and 545 heavy guns.
In the directions of attacks of the Russian armies, superiority over the enemy was created in manpower (2 - 2.5 times) and in artillery (1.5 - 1.7 times). The offensive was preceded by a thoroughintelligence service , troop training, engineering equipmentbridgeheads , bringing Russian positions closer to Austrian ones.
In turn, on the southern flank of the Eastern Front against Brusilov’s armies, the Austro-German allies created a powerful, deeply echeloned defense. It consisted of 3 lanes, spaced 5 km or more from each other. The strongest was the first of 2 - 3 linestrenches , with a total length of 1.5 - 2 km. It was based onsupport nodes , in the intervals - continuous trenches, the approaches to which were shot from the flanks, at all heights -pillboxes . Cut-off positions went deeper from some nodes, so that even in the event of a breakthrough, the attackers found themselves in"bag" . The trenches had visors,dugouts , shelters dug deep into the ground, with reinforced concrete vaults or floors made of logs and earth up to 2 m thick, capable of withstanding anyshells . For machine gunners Concrete caps were installed. In front of the trenches there were wire barriers (2 - 3 stripes of 4 - 16 rows), in some areas current was passed through them, bombs were hung, and mines were laid. The two rear zones were less well equipped (1 - 2 lines of trenches). And artificial obstacles were erected between the stripes and lines of trenches -marked , wolf pits , slingshots.
The Austro-German command believed that the Russian armies could not break through such a defense without significant reinforcement, and therefore Brusilov’s offensive was a complete surprise to them.
2. Balance of forces and progress of the operation
Strengths of the parties | Northern Front | Western Front | Southwestern Front | Total |
Russian army | 466 000 | 754 000 | 512 000 | 1 732 000 |
Austro-German Army | 200 000 | 420 000 | 441 000 | 1 061 000 |
2.1. First stage
Artillery training lasted from 3 amJune 3 until 9 a.m. June 5 and led to severe destruction of the first line of defense and partial neutralization of enemy artillery. The Russian 8th, 11th, 7th and 9th armies (594 thousand people and 1938 guns), which then went on the offensive, broke through the well-fortified positional defense of the Austro-Hungarian front (486 thousand people and 1846 guns), which commandedArchduke Friedrich. The breakthrough was carried out in 13 areas at once, followed by development towards the flanks and in depth.
The 8th Army achieved the greatest success at the first stagecavalry general A. M. Kaledina , which, having broken through the front,June 7 took Lutsk , and to June 15 completely defeated the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army of the ArchdukeJoseph Ferdinand . 45 thousand were captured.prisoners , 66 guns, many other trophies. Units of the 32nd Corps, operating south of Lutsk, took the city of Dubno. The breakthrough of Kaledin's army reached 80 km along the front and 65 in depth.
The 11th and 7th armies broke through the front, but the offensive was stopped by enemy counterattacks.
9th Army under the command of a generalP. A. Lechitsky broke through the front of the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army, crushing it in a counter battle, and toJune 13 advanced 50 km, taking almost 50 thousand prisoners.June 18 9th Army storm took the well-fortified city.Chernivtsi , called by the Austrians “the second Verdun” for its inaccessibility. Thus, the entire southern flank of the Austrian front was compromised. Chasing the enemy and smashingparts abandoned to organize new lines of defense, the 9th Army entered the operational space, occupying Bukovina: the 12th Corps, having advanced far to the west, took the city of Kuty;3rd Cavalry Corps , having jumped even further, he occupied the city of Cimpolung (now in Romania); and the 41st Corps30 June captured Kolomyia, going to the Carpathians.
The threat of the 8th Army taking Kovel (the most important center of communications) forced the Central Powers to transfer two German troops to this direction.divisions from the Western European theater, two Austrian divisions - from the Italian front and big number units from other sectors of the Eastern Front. However, startedJune 16 The counterattack of the Austro-German troops against the 8th Army was unsuccessful. On the contrary, the Austro-German troops themselves were defeated and thrown back across the Styr River, where they gained a foothold, repelling the Russiansattacks .
At the same time, the Western Front postponed the delivery of the main attack prescribed to it by Headquarters. With the consent of the bossheadquarters Supreme Commander GeneralM. V. Alekseeva General Evert postponed the date of the Western Front offensive untilJune 17 . Private attack of the 1st Grenadier Corps on a wide section of the frontJune 15 was unsuccessful, and Evert began a new regrouping of forces, which is why the offensive of the Western Front was postponed to the beginning of July.
Applying to the changing timing of the offensive of the Western Front, Brusilov gave the 8th Army more and more new directives - now of an offensive, now of a defensive nature, to develop an attack now on Kovel, now on Lvov. Finally, the Headquarters decided on the direction of the main attack of the Southwestern Front and set a task for it: not to change the direction of the main attack to Lvov, but to continue to advance to the northwest, to Kovel, to meet Evert’s troops, aimed at Baranovichi and Brest. For these purposes, BrusilovJune 25 2 corps and the 3rd Army were transferred from the Western Front.
TO June 25 In the center and on the right flank of the Southwestern Front, relative calm established itself; on the left, the 9th Army continued its successful offensive.
June 24 started artillery preparation Anglo-French armies on the Somme, which lasted 7 days, and on July 1 the Allies went on the offensive. The operation on the Somme required Germany to increase the number of its divisions in this direction from 8 to 30 in July alone.
The Russian Western Front finally went on the offensive3 July , A 4th of July The Southwestern Front resumed its offensive, delivering the main blow with the forces of the 8th and 3rd armies to Kovel. The German front was broken through. In the Kovel direction, the troops of the Southwestern Front took the cities of Galuzia, Manevichi, Gorodok and reached the lower reaches of the river. Stokhod, having captured bridgeheads here and there on the left bank, because of this the Germans had to retreat further north, to Polesie. But it was not possible to completely overcome Stokhod on the shoulders of the enemy. Having brought up fresh troops, the enemy created a strong defense here. Brusilov was forced to stop the attack on Kovel for two weeks in order to bring up reserves and regroup forces.
Offensive on Baranovichi The attack group of the Western Front, undertaken on July 3-8 by superior forces, was repulsed with heavy losses for the Russians. The offensive of the Northern Front from the Riga bridgehead also turned out to be ineffective, and the German command began transferring troops from areas north of Polesie to the south, against Brusilov.
2.2. Second phase
In July, the Russian Headquarters transferred the guard and strategic reserve of the Transbaikal Cossacks to the south, creating the Special Army of General Bezobrazov. The Southwestern Front was given the following tasks: the 3rd, Special and 8th armies must defeat the enemy group defending Kovel and take the city; The 11th Army advances on Brody and Lvov; 7th Army - onMonasteries , the 9th Army, having moved forward, turns north to Stanislav (Ivano-Frankivsk ).
July 28th The Southwestern Front launched a new offensive. After massive artillery barrage, the strike group (3rd, Special and 8th armies) launched a breakthrough. The enemy stubbornly resisted. Attacks gave way to counterattacks. The special army won a victory near the towns of Selets and Trysten, the 8th defeated the enemy nearKosheva and took village Torchin. 17 thousand prisoners and 86 guns were captured. As a result of three days of fierce fighting, the armies advanced 10 km and reached the river. The drainage is no longer only in the lower, but also in its upper reaches.wrote: “The Eastern Front was going through difficult days.” But the attacks of the heavily fortified marshy defile on Stokhod ended in failure; they failed to break through the German defenses and take Kovel.
In the center of the Southwestern Front, the 11th and 7th Armies, with the support of the 9th Army (which hit the enemy in the flank and rear), defeated the Austro-German troops opposing them and broke through the front. To contain the Russian advance, the Austro-German command transferred everything it could to Galicia: even two Turkish divisions were transferred from the Thessaloniki Front. But, plugging the holes, the enemy introduced new formations into the battle separately, and they were beaten in turn. Unable to withstand the blow of the Russian armies, the Austro-Germans began to retreat. The 11th Army took Brody and, pursuing the enemy, reached the approaches to Lvov; the 7th Army captured the cities of Galich and Monastyriska. On the left flank of the front, the 9th Army of General P. A. Lechitsky achieved significant success, occupying Bukovina and11th August took Stanislav.
By the end of August, the offensive of the Russian armies ceased due to the increased resistance of the Austro-German troops, as well as increased losses and fatigue of personnel.
3. Results of the Brusilov offensive
As a result of the Brusilov breakthrough, the Southwestern Front defeated the Austro-Hungarian army, while the fronts advanced from 80 to 120 km deep into enemy territory. Brusilov's troops occupied almost all of Volyn, almost all of Bukovina and part of Galicia.
Austria-Hungary and Germany lost more than 1.5 millionkilled, wounded and missing (300,000 killed and died from wounds, more than 500,000 prisoners), the Russians captured 581 guns, 1,795 machine guns, 448 bomb launchers and mortars. The huge losses suffered by the Austro-Hungarian army undermined its combat effectiveness.
The troops of the Southwestern Front lost about 500,000 soldiers and officers killed, wounded and missing, of which 62,000 were killed and died from wounds, 380,000 were wounded and sick, and 40,000 were missing.
To repel the Russian offensive, the Central Powers transferred 31 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions (more than 400 thousand bayonets and sabers) from the Western, Italian and Thessaloniki fronts, which eased the position of the Allies in the Battle of the Somme and saved the defeated Italian army from defeat. Under the influence of the Russian victory, Romania decided to enter the war on the side of the Entente.
The result of the Brusilov breakthrough and the operation on the Somme was the final transfer of strategic initiative from the Central Powers to the Entente. The Allies managed to achieve such interaction that for two months (July-August) Germany had to send its limited strategic reserves to both the Western and Eastern Fronts.
From the point of view of military art, the offensive of the Southwestern Front marked the emergence of a new form of front breakthrough (simultaneously in several sectors), which was developed in last years World War 1, especially in the 1918 campaign in the Western European Theater of Operations. Similar tactics have also been triedRed Army during offensive operationsGreat Patriotic War (Ten Stalinist blows ).
The highest telegrams addressed to the commander of the Southwestern Front, GeneralA. A. Brusilova :
Tell My dearly beloved troops of the front entrusted to You that I am following their brave actions with a feeling of pride and satisfaction, I appreciate their impulse and express my most heartfelt gratitude to them
Supreme Commander-in-Chief Emperor Nicholas II
I greet you, Alexey Alekseevich, with the defeat of the enemy and thank you, the commanders of the armies and all the commanders up to and including junior officers for the skillful leadership of our valiant troops and for achieving a very major success with diamonds.
Conclusion
The Brusilov breakthrough of 1916 occupies an important place in the history of the First World War. Its scale and drama shocked the world no less than Verdun, which became a symbol of the strategy of attrition. However, today in Russia much less is known about this major operation of the Russian army.
Brusilov's offensive limited Germany's options both at Verdun and at the Somme. The consequences of the Brusilov breakthrough were enormous. The calculations of Germany and its allies that Russia would not be able to recover from the defeats of 1915 collapsed. In 1916, the victorious Russian army again appeared on the battlefields, achieving such successes that the Entente powers did not know either in 1915, or in 1916, or in 1917.
Although far-reaching goals were not set and were not achieved, strategically the Brusilov breakthrough broughtinvaluable benefits to the Entente. The Italian army was saved: immediately after the Southwestern Front began to move, Austria-Hungary abandoned the offensive. 16 Austrian divisions left Italy for the Russian front.
From the French theater, despite Verdun and the Somme, 18 German divisions were transferred against Brusilov, plus four newly formed in Germany. More than three German divisions and two of the best Turkish divisions were taken from the Thessaloniki Front. In other words, in order to fend off the offensive of Brusilov’s army, all the fronts on which Germany and its allies fought were weakened.
The battles in the summer and autumn of 1916 on the southern wing of the Eastern Front restored the reputationRussian army . They have taken their rightful place in history. The glory of Brusilov’s soldiers did not fade, just as the bitterness of the meaninglessness of the sacrifices suffered for Russia did not soften.
List of used literature
1. "Great Soviet Encyclopedia". – M.: “ Soviet encyclopedia", 1971. T. 4, 19.
2. “Soviet encyclopedic dictionary.” – M.: “Soviet Encyclopedia”, 1980.
3. Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G., Brandt A.A. "History of Russia, 20th century." – M.: Education, 2010.
4. “History of the First World War. 1914 - 1918" edited by Rostunov I. I. - Moscow: "Science", 1975.
5. S.G.Nelipovich . Brusilov's breakthrough as an object of mythology.
Application
1. Table “Ratio of sides at the beginning of the war”
2. Table “Aspect Ratio in 1916”
Southwestern Front
Total
Russian army
466 000
754 000
512 000
1 732 000
Austro-German Army
200 000
420 000
441 000
1 061 000
3. Map “First World War. Campaign 1916 Russian Front"
4. Map “Offensive of the Southwestern Front (Brusilovsky breakthrough)”
The offensive of the Southwestern Front of the Russian army in the summer of 1916, which inflicted a heavy defeat on the armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany. One of the largest operations of the First World War and the only one named after the commander's surname.
In 1916, World War I reached its peak. Having mobilized almost all human and material resources, suffering colossal losses, none of the opponents achieved success that gave at least some hope of victory. Continuous, deeply echeloned fronts, an abundance of artillery, and rapid fire made the defense insurmountable. Any active actions were doomed to failure, choking on blood. Figuratively speaking, the enemies grabbed each other to death, fell to the ground and continued to fight on the ground. The Entente (England, France, Italy, Russia) and its opponents (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Romania, Turkey) were determined to wage the war to a victorious end. But for this we need to attack, and everywhere there is a positional dead end.
For the Russians, the most difficult year was the second year of the war, 1915. A well-prepared enemy pushed them east. Its technical level (the number of troops with artillery, machine guns; airplanes, combat gases, etc.) was high, and its organization was unparalleled. The German General Staff calculated operations down to the second and fought according to all the rules of science. During the difficult retreat, all of Russian Poland, the western parts of Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, and most of Austrian Galicia conquered in 1914 were lost; a lot of military equipment was lost: at the beginning of 1916, the troops had less artillery and machine guns than in July 1914. The main thing is a lot of blood: Russia has lost 4,360,000 people since the beginning of the war, including 1,740,000 prisoners. 54 percent of the losses occurred during the great retreat from May 1 to November 1, 1915. The enemy's calculations were coming true, and there was reason to give up.
Russia and the allies agreed to coordinate the actions of their armies. The Russians had three fronts against the Germans and Austrians - Northern (General Kuropatkin), Western (General Evert) and Southwestern (General Brusilov). Northern and Western had a double advantage in manpower over the enemy, which dictated the direction of the main attack. It was to be delivered by the Western Front, with auxiliary strikes by the Northern and Southwestern Fronts. The plan aroused Kuropatkin’s objections: “The Germans have become so strong that you can’t count on luck.” Evert agreed: “Until we have much more heavy artillery, it is better to defend.” What is this, cowardice of the commanders? But they can be understood. They were already burned by the bloody March offensive. In the West, such losses were “ordinary”; German and French generals coldly drove their soldiers to the slaughter, but the Russians had a different psychology: “There is no way out of the positional deadlock, which means we will shed blood in vain.” The idea of containing the enemy by defense, given the economic and food difficulties of the Germans, was quite reasonable.
General Brusilov saw a way out of the positional deadlock. On May 15, the Austrians inflicted a heavy defeat on the Italians. Standing on the brink of disaster, they asked for help, delaying the offensive of the Southwestern Front by the forces of Austria-Hungary. The Russian Headquarters agreed, pointing out that it could not allocate additional forces to Brusilov.
Forces of the Southwestern Front
By the spring of 1916, Russia had recovered. Off to the front good weapon. The troops were supplied with the most popular three-inch guns, replacing all worn-out guns with new ones. Shells were coming in a continuous stream, and on the boxes the workers wrote: “Hit, don’t be sorry!” Hand grenades arrived in large quantities; the regiments had detachments of grenadiers who mastered them. 90-mm bomb throwers, backpack flamethrowers, rifle grenade launchers, armored cars, smoke bombs, and chemical shells appeared. The success of Russian science and technology is evidenced by the fact that just a year after the first German gas attacks, not only all soldiers on the front line, but even all horses were equipped with an effective coal gas mask! Until 1917, the same French used improvised means (cotton and gauze bandages, fires in front of the trenches). British attache Knox wondered: “Russia’s military position has improved in a way that no foreign observer would have predicted during the retreat days of last year.” And the Russian soldier cheered up: “Well, now we’ll fight!” The only thing missing so far was heavy artillery. But there were 2-3 times more machine guns than at the beginning of the war. The troops underreported the number of captured trophies, keeping the weapons for themselves. In addition, they were given special teams with foreign-made machine guns. This abundance can be explained simply: the infantry lacked firepower - escort light artillery, mortars, and trench guns. Machine guns increased the density of fire.
In March, Brusilov took command of the 550 km long Southwestern Front, which included four armies (7th, 8th, 9th and 11th): 534,000 bayonets, 60,000 sabers, 1,770 light and 168 heavy guns. Restoring order to the troops broken by the retreat, the general took tough measures: “There should be no mercy for those who surrender. Open rifle, machine gun and cannon fire on them, even stopping fire on the enemy. If necessary, do not hesitate before a general execution.” The order was rarely used, but it created fear among the troops. The soldiers were informed of countless facts of enemy atrocities in the occupied lands, against Russian prisoners. The case of “fraternization,” a typically Western pharisaism that began on the French front, is indicative. At the command of the officers, the opponents met in a neutral zone, exchanged small gifts and, on command, dispersed, backing away so as not to be shot in the back. The Russian soldiers also decided: “We are for fraternization with all our hearts!” But the German “bros” began to explain to them: “Your tsar is bad, your officers are rubbish, turn your weapons against them,” and on Easter they simply captured 100 Ivans who came to congratulate them. What kind of “Christian love” can there be for an occupier who has come to kill you? Brusilov ordered: “All contacts with the enemy are only through a rifle and bayonet!” On the eve of the battle, the personnel were eager to finally strike the enemy: “The troops were in brilliant condition, wanting to break the enemy and throw him out of our borders.”
“The possibility of Russian success is excluded!”
Brusilov was opposed by four Austrians and one german army(448,000 bayonets, 38,000 sabers, 1,300 light and 545 heavy guns). The enemy more than compensated for the slight numerical disadvantage with an abundance of equipment and the power of defense. He prepared it for 9 months; it consisted of 3 stripes at a distance of 5 km from one another. The most powerful was the first, 1.5–2 km deep, with support nodes, pillboxes, and cut-off positions that brought the enemy into a “bag” for extermination. Trenches with concrete canopies, deep dugouts with reinforced concrete vaults, machine guns under concrete caps. There was a forest of up to 16 rows of barbed wire; current was passed through it, bombs were hung, and mines were laid. The foreland was dotted with landmines, abatis, wolf pits, and slingshots. Flamethrowers were waiting for the Russians in the Austrian trenches. Behind the first stripe there were two more weaker ones.
The Kaiser, having visited the front, was delighted that he had never seen such positions even in the West! Confident in his invulnerability, the enemy demonstrated models of these defensive structures at an exhibition in Vienna as the highest achievement of fortification. A week before the Russian offensive, they discussed whether it would be dangerous to withdraw several divisions from here in order to quickly defeat Italy, and they decided: “It’s not dangerous, Ivan won’t get through here,” because this was proven by his previous failures. They relied heavily on their heavy artillery (174 heavy guns vs. 76 Russians in the 8th Army sector, 159 vs. 22 in the 11th Army sector, 62 vs. 23 in the 7th Army sector, 150 vs. 47 in the 9th Army sector ). With such superiority, they also complained that many heavy batteries were transferred to the Italian front. And one more thing: the enemy did not believe that after the severe defeats of 1915, the Russians were capable of anything serious. The chief of staff of the German army group, General Stolzmann, in the commander's ardor, directly stated: “The possibility of Russian success is excluded!”
Preparation
And the Russians decided to fight without the minimum required superiority of forces (3:1), having only 18 percent more soldiers, and even inferior to the enemy in technical means of combat. Brusilov decided to attack with each of his armies. This scattered forces, but the enemy also lost the opportunity to transfer reserves. Depending on the importance of the tasks, these armies had different strengths. Brusilov concentrated a third of the infantry and half of the heavy artillery of the front in the right-flank 8th Army of General Kaledin for a strike on Lutsk and Kovel. The second most powerful left-flank 9th Army of General Lechitsky aimed at Chernivtsi and Kolomyia. The small 7th and 11th armies in the center were supposed to pin down the enemy. Brusilov gave the commanders the freedom to choose breakthrough sites, where they created a superiority over the enemy in manpower by 2.5 times and in artillery by 1.5 times.
The operation took 1.5 months to prepare. Digging the ground at night, we approached the enemy in trenches at 100–200 m in order to reach him with one throw. We equipped the main and reserve firing positions, command posts and observation points. They carried out reconnaissance carefully. Aerial photography of the entire enemy front was taken, the images were transferred to a map, enlarged, and multiplied. Hundreds of observers identified firing points and batteries around the clock. The data was supplemented by human intelligence, interviews with prisoners and defectors. Commanders of all echelons received plans of their sectors with the exact location of enemy positions, scrupulously prepared on the ground, and went to the front line. The gunners used instruments to determine the distance from their future positions to the targets, marked landmarks, and calculated data for firing. The shooting was carried out with single shots from individual guns, so as not to alert the enemy. In the rear of all the armies, training camps with fortifications similar to those that were to be taken were equipped, and the soldiers intensively trained to overcome them. Of course, it is impossible to hide preparations of such a scale, but Brusilov confused the enemy by not allowing him to determine where the main blow would be. The breakthrough areas were also prepared by corps that were not part of the strike groups, 20 areas in total! Because of the scope engineering work it seemed that the Russians were burrowing into the ground for defense. The troops secretly concentrated in the rear, which was checked from their airplanes. The movements were carried out at night, and controllers monitored blackout measures. The strike groups reached the starting line several days before, the artillery only a day before the strike.
"Artillery Offensive"
On June 4, at 3 a.m., artillery preparation began. Its power was calculated individually, the fire lasted from 6 to 45 hours. So, in the Lutsk direction, with very strong fortifications, shells tore everything to shreds for 29 hours. The Brusilov breakthrough gave rise to the concept of an “artillery offensive.” No shooting in squares! The preliminary shooting was justified. Enough passes were made in the wire fences; the 1st line of defense was completely swept away and turned into mountains of rubble and torn bodies. Keeping the rate of fire, the batteries fired not at the officers' signals, but like this: the gunners, holding the cords and looking at each other, fired a burst behind the right-flank gun. Having studied the enemy’s defense tactics, we inflicted maximum losses on him even before the start of the attack, twice falsely stopping the shelling of the 1st lane. This usually means infantry is attacking. The Austrians fled from shelters into the trenches, to the machine guns, and the barrage of fire returned. The third time, the enemy no longer dared to leave the shelters, and the infantry that arrived en masse took the hidden prisoners prisoner, which explains their huge number.
There was not a second's break between the artillery barrage and the assault. Heavy artillery carried fire into the depths of the enemy reserves of the 3rd line of defense. The light one hit the targets until the last moment, and when the infantry burst into them, some of the batteries cut off counterattacks from the front and flanks, and some followed the infantry, punching its path with shells. This was the main tactical innovation - for the first time in the First World War, infantry escort artillery appeared and worked “excellently”, the independence and survivability of which immediately increased. Previously, she suffered heavy losses under enemy fire. But by shooting, he inevitably reveals himself - now the guns “extinguished” enemy cannons and machine-gun nests after their first shots. The role of escort was performed by mountain three-inch guns mod. 1909. Before the war, there were 526 of them, the Petrograd and Putilov factories produced another 1,400. Having worked in the Caucasus and the Carpathians, they were useful in the field troops, like a howitzer, firing over their heads. They were one and a half times lighter than a field gun, and the crew easily moved them behind the attacking infantry. A few words about the quality of the ammunition: out of ten Austrian shells fired in a row, sometimes not a single one exploded; the failure of eight was almost an ordinary occurrence. But Russian shells made of steel cast iron practically did not misfire. The fire attack was a complete success everywhere thanks to skillful management and consistent concentration of fire, sector by sector, suppressing the enemy’s defenses, which allowed the infantry to advance almost without losses. The commander of the 4th Rifle (“Iron”) Division, General Denikin, recalled: “For the first time, our artillery completed a task that had hitherto been accomplished at the cost of great blood.”
"Roll Attack"
The establishment of many combat and false bridgeheads was justified: the enemy was taken by surprise everywhere. The front burst in 13 areas at once, the breakthrough expanded towards the flanks and in depth. We took care of consolidation in the taken positions and continuity of the offensive, so that the enemy, who fell into panic, did not organize active countermeasures. To do this, the advancing infantry was divided into “attack waves.” Each regiment formed 4 waves, moving one after another at a distance of 150–200 steps, the interval between fighters was 5 steps. Armed with grenades, machine guns, smoke bombs, and wire cutters, the first two waves took the first trench, did not linger, attacked the second, where they consolidated. This was done taking into account enemy tactics. He usually opened fire on the Russians who had broken through and were stuck in the first trench. Then the heavy batteries cut off the approach of help - and with a powerful counterattack those who broke through were exterminated. But now I found a scythe on a stone. Each company had an assault group of the most agile soldiers. Walking at the head of the attack, they eliminated firing points with grenades and massive rifle and machine-gun fire, clearing the way for their advancing comrades. The third and fourth waves quickly rolled over the first two, and with fresh forces took the third trench and artillery positions. This method later became widely used under the name “roll attack.”
The 6th Corps worked perfectly, taking all three lines of trenches on the move, defeating not the Austrians, but the Germans. Everything was done so clearly that even the deep shelters, which became traps, were not saved. The Russians were right there, grenades and smoke bombs flew down, there were almost no survivors. The vaunted solidity of German structures did not help. The soldiers sitting in the surviving shelters hastily surrendered. Standing at the entrance, the Russian “cleaner”, if he refused to surrender or even hesitated, threw hand grenades inside, and there was no longer any salvation. Quickly realizing this, the enemy quickly climbed up with his hands raised. The prisoners gave the following picture of losses: in the 1st line of trenches - 85 percent killed and wounded and 15 percent prisoners; in the 2nd line - 50 percent of each category; in the 3rd line - all 100 percent of prisoners.
The most significant success was achieved by the 8th Army with its greatest density of attackers, the front of each division was only 2.5 versts. It wedged itself between the 2nd and 4th Austrian armies (the latter was utterly defeated by June 15), already in the first days achieving such successes as none of the allied armies had ever achieved: on a front of 80 km, Austrian positions were broken through to 30 km in depth! Having burst into Lutsk, the first thing the soldiers did was cut down the gallows in the city garden, where the occupiers executed rebellious residents.
The 11th and 7th armies also broke through the front, but the enemy stopped their offensive. Brusilov did not withdraw reserves from other directions, but ordered: “Fight to the death!” You can't close all the holes. Break through in the right place, but in others the enemy himself will not be able to stand it, he will run.” The 9th Army crushed the 7th Austrian Army, by June 13 it had broken through 50 km, and on June 18 it stormed Chernivtsi, called the “second Verdun” for its inaccessibility: solid reinforced concrete, a jungle of barbed wire with a current running through it, artillery up to a caliber of 305 mm. The enemy could have defended himself for a long time, but he broke down morally. The panic began. Having blown up bridges across the Prut, the garrison burned and blew up warehouses, trains on the tracks, and heavy batteries. The city fell, and the entire southern flank of the Austrian front was breached. Everything that came under the blow of the Russian hammer was doomed. The enemy retreated so quickly that they blew up the bridges, leaving their own on the Russian shore to be destroyed.
One against all
Pursuing the randomly retreating enemy, the Southwestern Front entered operational space. It was necessary to strike while the iron was hot, but he was not supported by other fronts. General Evert, delaying the delivery of the “main attack” prescribed to him by Headquarters, finally set out on July 3, but very unsuccessfully, with heavy losses, and did not help the Southwestern Front. The offensive of the Northern Front also failed. Nevertheless, on July 4, Brusilov went to Kovel, the most important transport hub. To contain it, the growing enemy transferred Austrian divisions from the Italian, German from Western European, other sectors of the Eastern and even Turkish from the Greek front to Galicia, a total of 31 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions (400 thousand bayonets and sabers). This was no longer a fight with the “lowered” Austrians, but with the Germans, who, with proactive commanders and technical superiority, fought the Russians with smaller forces. At first, they ironically called Brusilov’s actions “broad reconnaissance without the concentration of the necessary fist,” but the state of the Austrians stunned them so much that they realized: without German support, Austria is doomed, a Russian breakthrough further to the west will be the beginning of the end for Germany. The German forces were already running out (“We had only 1 cavalry brigade in reserve for a front of 1000 kilometers”), and they used a system of private support, rushing to the breakthrough sites, cementing the defense, holding back the fleeing Austrians, slowing down the onslaught of the exhausted Brusilovites. But, plugging the holes, they entered the battle separately, and the Russians beat them one by one.
Gradually the momentum of the advance was lost. Fighting against fresh German divisions, without receiving reinforcements, the Southwestern Front reached a natural obstacle - the Carpathians, and by mid-September was forced to stop and gain a foothold on the achieved lines. Brusilov did not have enough of the very forces that were collected on the Western Front for the offensive to please the French allies.
"Allies"
The “Allies” considered themselves the main force opposing aggressive Germany. Sometimes they did no better than the enemy. They gave Russia loans at extortionate interest rates to buy weapons, while at the same time they demanded to shed the blood of Russian soldiers “for free” when it was necessary to unload their front. Unlike the Ivans, who fulfilled allied obligations at all costs, the allies acted as was beneficial to them. They did not lift a finger during the difficult months for Russia of the Great Retreat of 1915. In 1916, they demanded a Russian offensive to distract the Germans from the French Verdun (the British refused to do this). Having no time to prepare, the Northern and Western fronts went forward without artillery support, through the spring thaw, drowned in blood, losing 150,000 people killed and wounded. The Germans lost 9 times less, but suspended their attack on Verdun for 2 whole weeks. This allowed the French to regroup and bring up reserves: “Russian soldiers hung in bloody rags on the German wire, but saved thousands of lives for the French. By April 1916, one and a half times more Russians than French had fallen for Verdun.” And the Tsarist Headquarters always, treacherously towards their country, agreed with the actions of the “allies”. It’s amazing that the Russian army could fight for 3 whole years under such leadership! The Brusilov breakthrough reminded us of the irresistible Russian “steam roller”, which neither enemies nor “friends” needed. They were perplexed: “The first successful offensive in a positional war! By the way, where did the Russians get such a general, because they are stupid mediocrities?” And they lied: “Brusilov is an Englishman in Russian service.” The West was overwhelmed by another “attack of love” for Russia, although ordinary citizens and front-line soldiers were delighted. And the military-political elite became very concerned about the strengthening of the Russians, openly rejoicing at their failures.
But Russia greeted the news of Brusilov’s victories with sincere jubilation: “The peasants, workers, aristocracy, clergy, intelligentsia, students - everyone told me with an endless telegraph tape that they are Russian people, and their heart beats together with my dear, bloodied in the name of the Motherland , but a victorious army." The emperor congratulated. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich was laconic: “Congratulations, kisses, hugs, blessings.” The Italian ambassador bowed in the Duma to “the intrepid Russian troops who saved us.”
results
Brusilov's offensive was extremely significant for the further course of the war.
Already in the first 10 days they knocked out the enemy. His 4th and 7th armies were virtually destroyed (no killed or wounded were captured), and the others suffered a severe defeat. Austria-Hungary was on the verge of complete collapse and withdrawal from the war.
Having an insignificant superiority before the start of the operation, breaking through the defense that had been created for 9 months, the Russians already in 3 weeks disabled more than 50 percent of the forces of the enemy group opposing them. In total, its losses amounted to 1,325,000 people, including Austria-Hungary 975,000 (of which 416,924 prisoners) and Germany 350,000 killed, wounded, and captured. The Southwestern Front captured 580 guns, 448 bomb throwers and mortars, 1,795 machine guns; advanced to a depth of 120 km, liberated almost all of Volyn, Bukovina, part of Galicia and ended active operations at the end of October. Before him again stood more than 1,000,000 Austro-Germans and Turks. Consequently, the Brusilovites took on up to 2.5 million enemy soldiers!
The frontal operation yielded strategic results: Italy was saved, the French managed to preserve Verdun, and the British managed to survive the Somme. Germany had to throw its limited reserves, now to the west, now to the east - and exhaustion set in, its strength was exhausted. There were only 560,000 men fit for military service in the Reich who had not yet been called up to the front. The balance of forces changed in favor of the Entente, and the strategic initiative passed to it.
The losses of the Southwestern Front during the offensive amounted to 498,867 people: 376,910 wounded, 62,155 killed and died from wounds, 59,802 missing and captured. Where does the Internet “chernukha” about “a million killed” come from? In addition to the deliberate lies of the authors fulfilling the enemy's order, distortion occurs as the data is rewritten. During Brusilov’s life they wrote: “lost almost half a million,” then: “put down half a million,” then the “floor” was removed - and 62,155 dead were turned into a million. This is how the enemy rewrites. Today his people in the Russian media and historical science gloat: “This offensive was a harbinger of the death of Russia, its death knell.” The undead are burying Russia for the thousandth time. In "scientific" works.
"The Brusilov Phenomenon"
In an interview with a front-line correspondent, Brusilov said: “I’m not a prophet, but I can say that in 1917 we will defeat the Germans.”
The general had every reason for such a statement. The Russian army did not have the same quantity and quality of weapons and supplies as in 1917 throughout the war. But the moral factor of victory correlates with the material factor in a ratio of 3:1.
The success of the Brusilov breakthrough depended significantly on its initiator, organizer and performer - Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov. His front was assigned a passive role. Going against everyone, he achieved a revision of the decision in front of the emperor himself and the highest generals, “defeating his own” - worthless bosses and careerists. There are few examples in history when a person with such persistence sought to complicate his own task. And the “parquet generals” always put pressure on people like Brusilov with all their might. "Worm" was at the very top. But talk about the low qualities of the commanders of the Russian army is a lie. It is enough to compare its losses with the losses of the enemy and allies in the First World War, as well as with the losses of the Red Army in 1941–1945. In contrast to many, Brusilov was a “Suvorovite”: “Fight not with numbers, but with skill!” The preparation was exemplary, everything was thought out and done in a timely manner. Success was helped by the lack of direction for the main attack as such. In 1916, the Russian army defeated more than strong enemy, far surpassing anything the Western Allies had done. Brusilov could lay claim to the laurels of the main commander of victory in the “Second Patriotic War", as the First World War was then called. Other people's mistakes cannot diminish his merits and the significance of the feat of the soldiers entrusted to him. On the day of his funeral, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR laid a wreath on the coffin with the inscription: “To an honest representative of the older generation, who gave his combat experience to the service of the USSR and the Red Army.”
Supporting the Brusilov breakthrough with all the forces of the Entente would have led to the rapid defeat of the enemy. Unfortunately, this did not happen... The war ended only in 1918 with the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary. And Russia was no longer among their winners.
From our dossier
To fight for air supremacy on the Southwestern Front, a front-line fighter aviation group was formed for the first time. Aviation carried out bombing attacks and machine-gun fire on enemy targets in the rear and on the battlefield.
Over 3 years of extremely difficult fighting, the Russian army took 6 times more prisoners than all other allies combined: 2,200,000 people and 3,850 guns, including 1,850,000 Austrians and 2,650 guns, 250,000 Germans and 550 guns, 100,000 Turks and 650 guns During the same time, France took 160,000 prisoners and 900 guns, England - 90,000 prisoners and 450 guns, Italy - 110,000 prisoners and 150 guns.
Ctrl Enter
Noticed osh Y bku Select text and click Ctrl+Enter
