Hungarian armored vehicles. Armored vehicles of Hungary during the Second World War. Medium tank "Turan" Production and modifications

We strongly welcome you! I am with you, Egor Yakovlev, and Bair Irincheev. Good evening, Egor. Hello, dear viewers. Based on the results of the last video about Soviet-Finnish relations from 1918 to 1943, Bair and I received a number of questions and today we will try to answer them. Bair leads us in asking questions, and I will join in as the play progresses. Yes. Dear viewers, thank you very much to everyone who commented and everyone who sent questions, comments, and so on. There are many questions, Egor and I will now briefly try to comment on them. The first meaningful question: “Good afternoon, Bair and Egor. Can the campaigns in Soviet Karelia in the 1920s be covered?” Yes, you can. This is a separate video, this is a big topic, because there were many campaigns of Finnish volunteers, nationalists, Karelian separatists and others in Soviet Karelia. He was not alone, and they were all different. There, in addition to military operations, which, due to the small number of both sides, were not very large, i.e. there it was not an assault on the Mannerheim Line or the Battle of Kursk, but there was an interesting political component, how referendums were held in the occupied territories and how the local population voted to join Finland and not to join Finland, and so on. Those. This is a completely separate topic, plus we have wonderful specialists from academic life at Petrozavodsk State University, these are professors Verigin and Kilin, who, I hope, will be able to describe all this in colors and in all details, i.e. We will also tell you about this, but we are planning, in my opinion, to go to Petrozavodsk to film an intelligence interview in those very places. So yes, it will be covered, but that is a completely separate topic. Next question: “Can you shed more light on the joint actions of the Soviet and Finnish armies against Nazi Germany, the attitude of the fighters towards each other in such formations. Well, maybe how did the Third Reich look at it? Although this one is less interesting than the first two questions. Thank you in advance". If you mean that in 1944 the Soviet Union and Finland concluded a truce and then the Finns, turning their arms against their former allies, began to fight against the Germans, this is the so-called Lapland War, which is exactly the name it has in Finnish historiography. There was no situation where the Red Army and the Finnish army together planned some kind of military operation and carried it out together. Those. we were engaged in the Petsamo-Kirkines operation, it was our operation, while the Finns were conducting their own military operations. There were no joint actions between the Soviet and Finnish armies. If you mean about the Finnish fighters in the Red Army, then most of them fought in the ranks of the 71st rifle division. Moreover, the division was recruited from Ingrian Finns, from Karelians, from Vepsians, and actually fought in Karelia and marched from Karelia to the Volkhov Front and to Poland. Here it is necessary to clarify that these are Soviet citizens. Yes, these are exactly Soviet citizens, of course. It was units of this division that defeated the Germans? Yes, this is a battle, 41 years old, a battle at Tolvajarvi, there the 163rd German division, Potsdam, it was the 71st Karelian division that was very badly battered, and it was from this division that the only hero of the Soviet Union was the Ingrian Finn Pyotr Abramovich Tikilyainen from the Volosovsky district of the Leningrad region. Next question: “Dear Yegor and Bair, how much more difficult do you think it would have been for Leningrad if the border had not been pushed back in 1940? And was there a theoretical possibility that the White Finns abandoned the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, if there had been no Winter War? Egor, maybe you can comment on this? Yes. I think that such a possibility did not exist, because small countries, they do not have the opportunity to remain neutral in such a colossal mess as the Second World War was. The example of Switzerland, which was the banking capital of Europe and this, in fact, was valuable, thanks to which its neutrality was preserved, is completely inappropriate here, just like the example of Sweden, which in essence, of course, was, although not a belligerent party, but in in fact, it was a raw material appendage of Germany. Nickel was exported from Sweden, which was vital for the actions of the Wehrmacht, so the neutrality of Finland, thanks to its geographical location, is most likely out of the question. In the worst case scenario, Finland would be captured by German forces by force, as happened with Norway and Denmark. However, it must be said that the history of relations between Germany and Finland tells us that the Finnish elites were deeply Russophobic, and this brought them closer, a priori brought them closer to Hitler’s elites. Therefore, we know that for a long time the overwhelming majority of the Finnish elites were determined to tear away Soviet Karelia in their favor, the Kola Peninsula, and, if they were lucky, other lands. Therefore, naturally, Finland could not do this alone and could only take advantage of the favorable situation in Europe that would arise as a result of a major war between major, great powers. Under these conditions, it was inevitable, this logic of annexation, the logic of great Finland, it inevitably dictated joining the powerful enemy of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the USSR had good reason to fear this kind of alliance, and actions to push back, diplomatic activity in order to move the border away from Leningrad, were quite logical and, moreover, repeated the centuries-old policy of the Russian tsars, who, in fact, starting with Peter I, were engaged in to ensure the safety of St. Petersburg. Therefore, in my opinion, the situation in Leningrad would have been even more difficult if the border had not been moved back. My comment is the following: I agree with Egor. If we return to the last video and to the ever-memorable film of the Rossiya channel, where it was said that Winter was stormed by Finnish rangers from the 27th rangers battalion of the Kaiser’s army, then by 1939 most of these former rangers, they had already become middle and senior command staff of the Finnish generals . Those. these were generals, colonels, and majors, there were 700 of them. As you understand, they were all strongly pro-German and indeed, it is probably difficult to imagine the situation with Norway, when Norway was captured by force. Rather, the Finnish army would really greet them as allies if there was any landing in Finland. There would have been a coup d'etat and, for example, Talvela, General Talvela, who was 100% pro-German, would have become a Finnish dictator. There were many of them there, such figures. Talvela - he was an ardent supporter of the importance of capturing Soviet Karelia. Actually, he led the Olonets campaign, i.e. he led one of the regiments in the Olonets campaign in 1919, i.e. he was so radical. As far as I remember, Talvela was suspected of preparing a pro-Nazi rebellion already in 1944. There were several of them there. Indeed, there were such suspicions, and now there are conspiracy theories, that indeed part of the generals believed that it was necessary to remain on the side of Nazi Germany at all costs and continue the war. Yes. In any case, Mannerheim’s line was so pragmatic about leaving the war, about leaving the coalition with Germany, it was not supported by all the generals; on the contrary, there were ardent supporters of the coalition with the Nazis. They are simply very big Germanophiles and indeed they worshiped Nazi and non-Nazi Germany with all their might. This is all due to the fact that they already, excuse me, in 1914 entered into German army volunteers. That is, from my point of view, if the border had not been pushed back, then it was quite possible that German troops would appear near Streletsky, the Germans would have the opportunity to fire at Kronstadt from Finnish territory, i.e. Most likely it would have been harder. Again, let’s say independent Finland invites German troops onto its territory, who in fact were already there, by the way, under the pretext that they were transiting to Norway. Yes. Well, in fact, Sweden also granted transit rights, and they easily rode around Northern Europe. Yes, well, Sweden in this case, we are just talking about Finland, yes, that is. German troops were quite legally on the territory of Finland, the Soviet Union could not do anything about it. Therefore, if there had been a Soviet-Finnish war in 39-40, if it had not happened, Norway would still have been captured and Germany, accordingly, would have received legal grounds to be on Finnish territory. Now German troops are stationed on Finnish territory, what can the Soviet Union do? He can either watch indifferently as the Germans settle in there, more openly or covertly. Or the Soviet Union could start a war against Finland, but later, and perhaps under conditions of a German attack. Politically this is unprofitable, because the Soviet Union will be exposed as the aggressor. So, the second part of the question is “was there a theoretical possibility that the White Finns abandoned the attack on the Soviet Union in 41, if there had not been the Winter War?” From a military point of view, as Yegor absolutely correctly said, the Finnish military developed 2 war plans against the USSR. Option 1 is what we actually got during the Soviet-Finnish War, when Finland was really alone, Western assistance was more of a moral aid and rhetoric in favor of Finland. And indeed, this military plan implied that it would be possible to hold out for some time, but no offensive actions, only limited counterattacks could be launched, which, in fact, they did during the Soviet-Finnish War with varying degrees of success. On the Karelian Isthmus all their counterattacks failed, north of Ladoga - there have already been intelligence inquiries about this and there will be more, there the Finns were much more successful. But option 2 of military operations against the Soviet Union implied the situation that Yegor described, that there was a big war going on in Europe and the Soviet Union could not be too distracted by Finland. And in this situation, the Finns had a plan, it was not defensive, it was rather of this nature - first we defend ourselves, then we launch counterattacks, throw back the Soviet units somewhere where we can. Those. the second plan, which was implemented in 1941, they really implemented it, it meant precisely a situation where it was possible not only to successfully defend one’s territory, but also to snatch something from a neighbor. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that in 1941, during the war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany Finland would have stood aside and watched calmly. Obviously, they most likely would have been on the side of the Germans, and it was this deep mistrust between the USSR and Finland that served as the reason for diplomatic efforts to push back the border. When diplomatic efforts failed, a military operation was carried out, which Dmitry Yuryevich and I are now examining. I repeat, once again I would like to focus the attention of the audience on the simple truth that they usually say that the “continuation war”, as the Finns call it, was a consequence of the Soviet-Finnish war of 39-40. But if this were only the case, then indeed, Finland probably stopped at the old border, taking exclusively its territory. But Finland nurtured obvious annexationist plans and, in fact, it was precisely the fact that it did not stop at the old border that became the reason why Great Britain declared war on Finland, because England, Churchill made it very clear that if Finland took what belonged to it , then okay, this will be enough and England will remain on the sidelines. But since Finland made its choice in favor of an annexationist military policy, England declared war on it. Accordingly, such plans were made in advance. Moreover, war was declared on December 6, 1941. Great Britain announced en masse Finnish war, Bulgaria and Romania, but let me remind you that December 6 is Finnish independence day, i.e. It all coincided very well too. We’ll talk about this later, specifically about the ups and downs of ’41. I would also like to emphasize for dear viewers that the Finnish term “continuation war” did not appear immediately. He appeared much later than the war itself began. As you and I know, the Finns called the Soviet-Finnish War talvisota, i.e. talvi - earth, sota - war, and 41 years, i.e. Finnish offensive, they first called kesäsota, i.e. summer war, because it was planned that everything would end over the summer, that Germany would defeat and destroy the Soviet Union, Finland would regain its territories plus what it had long wanted to take for itself, and by Christmas everyone would go home. There was such a clear mood in the Finnish army that guys, the war is only for the summer, now everything will be fine. And then, when all this did not work out, after the Battle of Moscow, this propaganda term had to be sharply remade, we had to come up with this logic of a continuation war, and the logic is that the Soviet-Finnish war was only 1 round, and after of this 1st round Finland takes revenge, i.e. The Finnish logic here is as follows: if there had been no Finnish war, i.e. and there wouldn't be second war, in short, the Soviet Union is to blame for everything. This is their official point of view, which they promote in every possible way, but, again, this is what they have the right to, but in the same way we can challenge it. From my point of view, if there had not been a Soviet-Finnish war, then anyway in 41, after the Germans, the Finns would have found a reason to take part in all this. Next question: “The Lapland War. How actively did the Finns fight against their recent German allies? The topic of Finnish ace pilots is interesting, or even to analyze the actions of the Finnish Air Force.” The Lapland War, by the way, too interesting point , that under the terms of the armistice, which was signed by the USSR and Finland on September 19, 1944, the Germans were given a certain period of time to get out of Finland. And in the truce, the agreement stated that Finland undertakes that if after a certain date the Germans did not leave, Finland was obliged to begin hostilities. This is their contractual obligation. And the fact that now in the Finnish press very often, by the way, they write, and in popular science books, in the press, that “damned Stalin forced us to fight against the Germans, they would have left anyway, but here, in short, they forced us in October start military operations against the Germans in Lapland and so on, what the hell is this, damned Stalin.” Comrades, they signed it themselves, this is one of the terms of the agreement. That Finland did not really want to implement it is understandable. Of course, I didn’t want to fight again and lay down my soldiers, but this is one of the conditions of the agreement, so this modern Finnish rhetoric is more likely to be of such a propaganda nature. I'll explain why. In fact, this rhetoric is translated into Russian as “damned Stalin won the war against us.” Because the alternative to this agreement was only the passage of the Red Army through Finland with its subsequent involvement in the Soviet bloc. Thus, Finland, by pledging to expel the Germans from its territory, bought independence and good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union. That's all. And, so to speak, those who write like this are mourning the fact that they failed to win the war, failed to capture Karelia, failed to capture the Kola Peninsula and were forced to act as the losing side. Yes. So, regarding the intensity of hostilities. At first, it’s clear that I didn’t really want to, because it seemed like just yesterday the officers were talking, drinking cognac, coffee and having a nice conversation with each other. Suddenly everything changed dramatically and, sorry, dear Germans, but you have 2 weeks to get out of here. If anything happens, we open fire. That is, of course, the Germans regarded this as a betrayal and, in fact, some local agreements between German and Finnish officers, that let us disperse peacefully, were the first to be violated by the Germans. But then, when the Germans began to retreat north from the areas of Lapland they had occupied, they absolutely calmly began to use scorched earth tactics, i.e. all the roads are mined, all communications are destroyed, all the bridges are blown up, all the houses are burned, all the boats, their bottoms are broken, we leave nothing to the Finns, since they have betrayed us so much. And, of course, after this the fighting became more intense, but it all ended on April 28, 1945, when the last German soldier left Finnish territory and is now celebrated in Finland as a day of remembrance for veterans, i.e. the day the war ended. But the Lapland War is a separate topic altogether. I'll tell you one incident from my life. I was in Rovaniemi and there I talked with one of the local residents, who told me over a cup of coffee - “we had very difficult battles here, the Germans were simply fierce.” This sounded unexpected to me. I say - were the Germans violent here? Well, they just burned Rovaniemi. Let’s insert a couple of pictures when the Finns enter Rovaniemi, it’s just like Stalingrad, everything is destroyed. Such hatred simply poured out of him. Yes, that is in the north in the 70s, when German tourists came to ski, the locals looked at them very askance, because everything was very lively. There, the Germans really slammed the door when leaving and simply destroyed the whole of Rovaniemi. So, the topic is the Finnish ace pilots and, in general, an analysis of the actions of the Finnish Air Force. Not my topic, yes, there are several Finnish ace pilots, heroes who left memories. Their combat score needs to be seriously checked and there are specially trained specialists for this matter. If we talk about the actions of the Finnish Air Force as a whole during the Soviet-Finnish Great Patriotic War, then it should, of course, be noted that the nature of their actions was dictated by the extremely small number of the Finnish Air Force. Those. they tried to protect their pilots as much as possible, especially the bombers. The fighters, of course, worked to the best of their strength and capabilities, yes, they won victories, especially at the first stage of the Soviet-Finnish War, when our Air Force commanders considered that SB bombers in tight formation could repel fighter attacks. It turned out that this is not so, unfortunately, very unfortunately. But it must be said that indeed Finnish fighters and Finnish anti-aircraft gunners were unable to disrupt a single Soviet Air Force raid on any Finnish city, despite all their efforts. But, again, this is a separate topic. So, further. “What was the fate of ethnic Finns throughout the USSR? Were there any relocations deeper into the territory, did they serve in units of the Red Army? How were Finland’s diplomatic relations with other states – Norway, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark and others?” Ethnic Finns who lived in the border area were evicted in the 1930s. And, again, this may look like a completely unmotivated evil repression of the evil Stalinist regime, but there is a large number of reports from the NKVD that in Karelia, on the Karelian Isthmus, in all border areas, ethnic Finns living in these areas, the first thing is that they are connected with smugglers, this is understandable. When there is a border, there will always be smuggling. The second thing is that they absolutely calmly shelter Finnish intelligence officers who cross the border line illegally, they are not extradited to the Soviet authorities, and in general they are more likely to belong to Finland than to the Soviet regime. And there was not just one such report, there were quite a lot of them. As a result, Stalin's Soviet leadership of that period, it was decided that if there is a black sheep in this herd, then we remove the entire herd from here. They were evicted as disloyal to the Soviet government, and, in general, were scattered throughout the territory of the USSR, most of them were taken to the Vologda region, if I know correctly, and then they were taken to the Urals. “Did they serve in the Red Army?” Yes, the 71st rifle division, they really were numerous there, but rather there were Karelians and Ingrian Finns. In 1942, there was an order for the Red Army to remove all military personnel of German and Finnish nationality from the front line as also unreliable, because the war was being waged against Germany and Finland. I met veterans who fell under this and they ended up in the labor army, i.e. actually labor army- these are the same labor camps, i.e. felling wood somewhere in the Urals. Someone managed to avoid this. It’s not like everyone who had a Finnish name written in their passport, that they were loaded en masse and sent somewhere to the Urals. But I have met evidence from such Finns and others. “Diplomatic relations of Finland with other states - Norway, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, etc.” Well, Norway was occupied by the Germans in 1940, Estonia is part of the Soviet Union, Sweden is supposedly neutral, but in fact, during the Soviet-Finnish War, Sweden was the belligerent arsenal of Finland, i.e. she waged a normal hybrid war. During the Great Patriotic War war yes, Sweden, despite the fact that it declared neutrality, it traded with the Germans and allowed them to transit, and, in fact, for Finland Sweden is always the big brother. Those. with formal neutrality, there was quite serious assistance from Sweden in relation to Finland both in the Soviet-Finnish War and in the second war too. If we talk about the Soviet-Finnish War, then Sweden really immediately officially declared to all Finnish requests “King, send troops”, they, of course, immediately responded that this would not happen, we are neutral, but at the same time a Swedish volunteer corps was formed, 8000 a man who did not hide at all. Those. There were recruitment posters everywhere for this corps. He fought at the front against the Red Army for 2 weeks in the north. Those. they got to the front quite late. Sweden supplied a large amount of artillery and ammunition to Finland, and this number of guns that they supplied to the Finns was immediately compensated for by supplies from Germany. Those. The Swedes did not just take and give 200 guns to the Finns, because from a military point of view, understand that you are sitting in Stockholm, in the Swedish General Staff, and the war between Finland and the Soviet Union begins, and, of course, you immediately think that Finland will defeated and you are next in line and you need to strengthen the defense of your state, and not distribute weapons even to your neighbor, who is now fighting. Therefore, indirectly, Germany, one might say, helped Finland. The only thing that was bound by the non-aggression treaty was not particularly advertised there in any way, but indirectly, through third countries, it all happened. About iron ore I must say about the Swedish one. Yes, of course, Swedish ore, rare earth metals, all this went to Germany and the Allied landing, which so greatly impressed the Soviet leadership, the possibility of the Allied landing in the north of Sweden and Norway, and the appearance of the Anglo-French corps in the north of Finland, on the Finnish side, this was all connected precisely with the desire of the allies, thus also to annoy Nazi Germany in a hybrid way. Those. occupy the mining area and completely cut off the supply of resources to the economy of Nazi Germany, i.e. again, this help that the Western powers promised Finland was for a reason. Nothing just happens like that in politics, it only happens in human relationships, and even then not always. And the allies pursued their own goals, absolutely their own goals, but the result was that they made peace. During. Yes, peace was concluded on time. “Will there be a detailed analysis of the fighting of the war with the White Finns in 40?” Yes, it is already being done. “Dear Bair Klimentievich and Yegor Nikolaevich, could you tell me where I can read the text of the appeal of the Senate (the government and parliament of Finland), with which they addressed the Council of People's Commissars, on recognizing the independence of Finland? Contacted on December 18 (old style) 1917. I cannot find its text either in literature or on the Internet. Perhaps I didn’t look well.” According to the official data that is written on the website of the Finnish parliament, they, the Finnish parliament, have a whole section dedicated to historical materials and in historical materials, there is 1 section - this is precisely the recognition of the independence of Finland. They describe it this way: first, a delegation went there, talked informally with Lenin, Lenin said, please send some paper, we will look at it and, accordingly, after that we will recognize your independence. This paper was written, therefore, apparently, it was preserved somewhere in our archives, but, again, this is a little out of my period, so I did not dig and I myself did not see this text anywhere, unfortunately. I do not know either. “Tell us about Toivo Antikainen, in Karelia during the USSR there were regular skiing competitions “Antikainen Ski Track”, I wanted to know the truth about him.” Toivo Antikainen is a radical red Finnish commander who took part in the Finnish civil war . After the defeat of the Workers' Guard, he fled to the USSR, i.e. even then in Soviet Russia, he actively took part in repelling the Finnish campaigns in Karelia. Actually, the school of Finnish red commanders took revenge there, on the Soviet side against their Finns. Antikainen, he was precisely the hero of these battles. If my memory serves me correctly, in 1942 he was killed in a car accident. There is a monument to him in Arkhangelsk. “Antikainen Ski Track” is dedicated precisely to the young years of the Soviet republic and all these military operations in Karelia. Antikainen was a very radical Red, so, of course, he would have taken the events of 1944 with hostility, i.e. He left this world on time. “In your opinion, does it make sense to sort through the points that were voiced in the film on the Rossiya channel?” Yes Yes. We will film an analysis of this and other documentaries of the Rossiya TV channel in the Blue Phil genre. The script for these films is preparing many wonderful discoveries for us. Yes. Next question: “Why, when talking about the White Terror in Tampere, did they not say a word about the destruction of 200 Russian soldiers of the 106th Infantry Division led by Lieutenant Colonel G.V. Bulatzel? The White Terror against the Russians in Tampere was no less bloody than in Vyborg.” Yes, you are absolutely right, but... It’s impossible to tell about everything. Tampere is a separate story and you just see, not only is there, you see, the difference between Vyborg is that in Vyborg there was a mass execution of Russians, and in Tampere, unfortunately, they put everyone up against the wall, those. this is exactly why Mannerheim is very loved in Tampere, because before the assault, Mannerheim scattered leaflets from an airplane with a blue swastika, not he personally, but on his behalf, a leaflet was scattered, saying give up, you were deceived by the Red Russes, Russian pigs or Muscovites , you can translate them however you like. You, honest Finns, give up, I promise - there will be no executions. Well, then, when after 2 days the cleansing of Tampere began, something began to happen there that... they killed Russians, non-Russians, everyone they could. The logic was this: Russian means red. Red means to the wall. There was a goal. Well, the Reds forced him to be their military adviser, the Reds in Tampere - they did not know how to fight, they were workers, some of whom saw a rifle at all for the first time in their lives. Therefore, there was a goal, they just came and said - Mr. Lieutenant Colonel, citizen Bulatzel, that’s it, you advise us how to fight, and if you refuse, then we will simply shoot you right now. Is this really true? There is evidence, right? Well, at least this is what is stated in Finnish sources, that he was shot precisely because he was Red. Those. he was shot by the Whites when they occupied Tampere because he was a military adviser to the Reds. But again, it is emphasized that he did not do this of his own free will. The fact is that the 106th Infantry Division was generally left-wing. This is a unique formation, which, on the one hand, was completely in revolutionary positions, and on the other hand, it retained its combat effectiveness. There, part of the 106th Infantry Division was inclined to the Socialist Revolutionary program, and part was in Bolshevik positions. And as far as I can judge, according to the logic of 17, what is the difficulty of the officers’ position at this moment is that they became hostages of the mass of soldiers. Those. on the one hand, some were really forced, and on the other hand, some officers simply followed their soldiers purely psychologically, because they saw that all the soldiers, the entire mass, were configured in this way. And it’s very unclear what you should do. Those. The best scenario for you, if you don’t agree with them, is to just run away from there, because they are clearly hostile to you. And some officers completely followed this mass of soldiers, and many famous Soviet military leaders in the future, for example, Marshal Shaposhnikov, or A.M. Vasilevsky, they were all at that moment chosen as commanders after order number 1 in their formations. Although Shaposhnikov was a career officer, he was already a colonel. In March he was a lieutenant colonel, and by October a colonel. And Vasilevsky was a staff captain. And they followed this mass of soldiers. I think quite sincerely. Here is an interesting position of Bulatzel. We need to look further, but the fact remains a fact, because Bulatzel was really shot despite the fact that, in my opinion, they were even personally acquainted with Mannerheim in general, before all these events, back in imperial times. So the Finnish civil war is a completely separate topic, which has been little studied in our country, because the cases are old, the cases are connected not only with Russia, but also with Finland. But we would suggest that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs discuss the possibility of installing a memorial sign or plaques dedicated to the victims of the White Terror in Tampere during the Finnish Civil War. Next question: “The following questions remain unclear. Did the Soviet Union even consider the possibility of ensuring the security of Leningrad in a purely diplomatic manner without exchanging territories? By a non-aggression pact or in some other way to buy Finland's neutrality. If not, why not? If so, why didn't it work? How profitable an exchange was offered and why were the Finns so stubborn about the territory?” We had a non-aggression pact with Finland. We had it imprisoned and it didn’t help, it didn’t solve the situation in any way, unfortunately. It was simply impossible to buy the neutrality of Finland, again, due to the extremely hostile attitude of the Finnish elites of that time, in the 30s. I'll explain. Here, firstly, the Soviet Union had a non-aggression pact with Germany. Did it help? Apparently not, this is the first one. Second: let’s say some additional agreement is concluded with Finland, which spells out all the guarantees. The existing government of Finland, for example, is determined to adhere to the provisions of this treaty. However, I repeat, this agreement does not insure against the deployment of German troops on Finnish territory, it does not insure. In fact, even if all the agreements were in place, the agreement was concluded after 1940, and the Soviet Union, as we discussed last time, really sought to maintain good neighborly relations with Finland. In any case, set it to neutral. However, under these conditions, Finland allowed the Germans to station their contingents on its territory. Yes, this was disguised as transit to Norwegian territory, but, nevertheless, German troops were stationed there. Actually, the Germans launched an attack on Murmansk from the territory of Finland. Therefore, there the army of Norway was partly located in Finland under the command of Nicholas von Falkenhorst, as far as I remember. Yes, I think so. This means, accordingly, no treaty guaranteed that German troops would not rise and one day stand on the territory of Finland, one day carry out a coup d’etat, would not bring to power a government that would terminate this treaty, and, accordingly, would not will attack Finland. A strong, real guarantee that the security of Leningrad would be ensured was only the withdrawal of territory, which was precisely what was going to be accomplished through exchange. And this brings us to the next question: “How profitable was the exchange offered and why were the Finns so stubborn about the territory?” Complex issue. From a modern point of view, if we really rely on after-knowledge and look at the fact that we ended up with a post-war operation, when the situation was resolved militarily during the Soviet-Finnish war, then the exchange was more profitable than what the Finns received as a result , because the Soviet Union did not demand Vyborg, the Soviet Union did not demand the Saimaa Canal, which was extremely important for Finland, the Soviet Union did not demand the entire northern Ladoga region. They asked to move the border to the current line. Well, we are even silent about Pechenga with its nickel deposits. Yes. The situation is as follows: if you look at the Soviet demands, then the question was only about part of the border in the center and in the western part of the Karelian Isthmus. Those. a distance of 80 km, now the Orekhovo district on the Priozerskoe highway, this suited the Soviet Union quite well, i.e. they asked in the central and western parts to move the border by 50 kilometers. In exchange, the Finns were offered the very territories that they claimed during their campaigns, which is exactly what Rebolovo was offered. Part. Some of them, of course, not all of them. But, nevertheless, Stalin believed that these are normal conditions, this is a normal exchange, let’s change and close the whole situation. If the previous question was about a treaty, then the Soviet Union proposed a treaty not only of non-aggression, but also of friendship and mutual assistance with Finland. Those. if Finland is attacked by a third power, then the Soviet Union is obliged under this treaty to send troops into the territory of Finland and help Finland militarily. This is exactly the same proposal. The Finns refused. They said that “we are a neutral country, we do not have the right to conclude such agreements, if we conclude such an agreement with you, we are no longer neutral.” Formally, they are right. Why are the Finns so obsessed with territory? This was the position of the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs of that time, his name was Elias Erkko, he was a newspaper magnate and also an ardent Russophobe. He said that if you give these Russians a finger, they will bite your arm off at the elbow, so there can be no compromise, not even an inch of our native land. And, in fact, he really managed to push this through in the government of that time, and this set an uncompromising line in the negotiations. Although we note that there were forces that looked at the issue more adequately - both Mannerheim and Paasikivi. Paasikivi, who headed the delegation. Once again, a small detail that will also allow you to understand the mood of the Finnish side during the negotiations, October-November 1939. At the first round of negotiations, Molotov and Stalin, the first two officials of the state, were personally present on the Soviet side. The Finns sent Paasikivi for negotiations, who at that moment was the ambassador in Stockholm, this is a person of a lower rank, if not 2 ranks lower. Those. sent, the Minister of Foreign Affairs simply did not go, the Prime Minister did not go. They actually sent a man, yes, Paasikivi, he knew the Russian language well, he had negotiated with Soviet Russia back in Tartu, about the previous peace treaty of 1920. In our time, it would simply look like a spit in the face of the Soviet Union in general, that they were sending a person of clearly not a high rank. In principle, yes, the Soviet Union was unlucky in terms of negotiators; the only power that sent a serious person to negotiate with the Soviet Union was Nazi Germany. She sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs, because you know that chronologically at the same time negotiations were taking place with England and France, they were represented there, England was represented by the semi-retired Admiral Drax and exactly the same semi-retired General Dumeng, and Drax, moreover, did not have any powers to conclude an agreement. He just came to hang out in Moscow. I think that in our literature, in our historiography, and even more so in journalism, they very often undertake, pay special attention to this fact, I thought that in England there is some kind of reverse assessment. But quite unexpectedly, I was watching a wonderful series called “Up and Down the Stairs,” where the main character is a diplomat, the British Deputy Foreign Secretary. And this is where this plot plays out. There is melodrama, but this plot is also played out. He is an anti-fascist and he sees where Chamberlain's crazy policies are leading. And so he condemns the Munich Agreement and when he is informed that Admiral Drax has been sent to negotiate with the Soviet Union, he says, he is talking with a prince of royal blood, and when he hears that Drax has been sent, he says “they might as well send a waiter." In general, in modern Britain, apparently, there is also a critical attitude towards these individuals, and, in fact, it was about the same with Paasikivi. Yes, that means the next question: “How behind the scenes were the pre-war Soviet-Finnish negotiations? Not in the sense of diplomatic secrecy, but in the sense of their coverage in the then media and public debate on both sides.” The Finnish press wrote a lot and at the same time, actually, it didn’t write very much, i.e. Parliament did not really know, and the public did not really know what they were demanding, but it is clear that all this was presented from a very patriotic point of view. This is picture 3, that we do not sell or rent this land; in fact, some Finnish merchants hung such posters in their stores. As I understand it, the Erkko newspapers played the lead in coverage. In general, whoever owns the newspapers covers them. Therefore, yes, in fact, the demands from the Soviet side were covered quite hostilely. In our country, on the contrary, as you understand, Soviet demands were portrayed as adequate, generous, and so on. And vice versa, the Finns were reminded of all their antics in the early 20s. And the defeat of the labor movement in the Finnish civil war, and expeditions to Soviet Karelia, and the sending of intelligence officers, and support for the separatists in Karelia. And support, by the way, for the White émigré terrorist cells that were based in Zelenogorsk; in the 20s they carried out several terrorist attacks in Petrograd, and then in Leningrad. Those. The Finns were reminded, they rolled out a whole list of things that, it turns out, we have a hostile neighbor, and probably, if we don’t come to an agreement, we’ll have to punish him. And this rhetoric only intensified after the failure of the negotiations and after the decision was made on a military operation. There was simply a direct manipulation of public opinion that it was time to teach the neighbor a lesson. Those. again, dear viewers and listeners, you don’t need to think that Soviet people was some kind of herd that did not follow the news, to which nothing needed to be explained. Whatever the Soviet government did, they immediately took it all in hand and went to carry it out. No, absolutely not like that. The government has gone to great lengths to explain why we do this. Before the Finnish war, it’s clear that for 2 weeks they were just pumping up, the editorials of Pravda - they’re all about how the Finns behaved badly here and are unyielding here. We made them a good offer, but they refused. So they are still hostile and so on and so forth. Those. this was all covered from both sides indeed. “Egor, are there plans to pay attention to the Kronstadt rebellion in future programs?” Yes, definitely, of course. There’s a huge question about the losses of the USSR in the war for you, Egor, but I think it’s better not here. Yes, dear friends. Let us write a separate program on this topic. “Please tell me, did Great Britain’s participation in the 1939 war give Finland any obligations, could it fulfill them? What deadlines for their implementation, if any, did she set for herself, and did they (the deadlines) differ from reality? Well, union treaty they didn’t have any, i.e. Finns are neutrals. And it is clear that the rhetoric was Finnish. Indeed, the Western world regarded the actions of the Soviet Union as aggression. There were volunteers from the UK who were going to take part. 50 people. One of them was the future famous actor Christopher Lee. Those who visit my page know that I really love Star Wars. Christopher Lee, who played Count Dooku in the new trilogy, as well as Saruman in The Lord of the Rings, in his youth was going to take part in this war on the side of Finland. He then served in the Royal Army during the Second World War. If we talk further, it means that in fact there were no obligations, there was a promise to send an Anglo-French expeditionary force, but again, with its own tasks. Frightening bombing of Baku. Yes, with the frightening bombing of Baku, but in fact it all remained rhetoric. Although, indeed, these actions of Great Britain were tracked by our intelligence and, indeed, reports that Great Britain and France might intervene on the side of Finland were the reason why the Soviet Union in March was also ready to conclude a peace treaty with Finland on much more severe terms for Finland than what was proposed in October. Regarding arms supplies, I can’t remember offhand right now. Right after the beginning of the war Chief Inspector of Artillery of the Finnish Army, General Vilho Nenonen, staff captain of the Russian Imperial Army, an artilleryman who studied with us, in St. Petersburg, at the Mikhailovsky Artillery Academy, immediately went around Europe to purchase artillery. And it was in Great Britain that he ordered a large number of heavy howitzers, six-inch and eight-inch Vickers howitzers from the First World War. They didn't have time to Finnish war and they started talking only in 1941. In particular, picture 4 is a howitzer firing a shot in Maynila, and if you remember, Maynila was the reason for launching a military operation against Finland. The Finns, when they came to Maynila and immediately crossed the border in Maynila, they defiantly set up this howitzer, wrote “Maynila” on the shell, and fired towards Leningrad, saying that now we have fired real Maynila shots. In the Second World War, again, now we’ll finish answering questions, in fact, there is only 1 question left and then we’ll move on to 41-44, to all sorts of diplomatic conflicts. In the second war, Great Britain declared war on Finland on December 6, 1941, and when we signed first a truce and then peace with the Finns, Great Britain also signed with Finland as one of the participants in this conflict. And, in fact, the last question, in my opinion, was not about this video, but about the previous one. I don't see him here. There was a question why on June 22, first Finland declared neutrality, then... Hitler first allegedly said that Finland was our ally, then somehow it went... Framed. He set him up, and he set him up very badly. All the hostile actions of the then Finland - sending in saboteurs, placing German planes on the territory of Finland, etc., etc., which were undertaken by the Finns, did not lead to the fact that the Soviet Union did not immediately declare war on Finland. Those. How is it that the Finns are trying to somehow attack us militarily, to harm us, but the Soviet Union does nothing. Those. Stalin leaked or Molotov leaked? Here, dear viewers, we are talking specifically about the military component. Let's remember that we now have a border between Russia and Finland - this is the longest border in Europe, it is more than 1000 km long. And when the Great Patriotic War had already begun, when a life-and-death struggle against Nazi Germany had already begun, to get another front of 1000 km, even against Finland, you had to be, in fact, a traitor to your country and a very narrow-minded military man. Indeed, all the efforts of the Soviet Union from 41 to 44 were so that Finland, without losing face, could possibly leave the war. In this regard, there is a private letter from Churchill to Mannerheim, secret, and there is a response from Mannerheim to Churchill, this is a well-known story. This letter, telegram, is quoted extensively on the Internet, i.e. the fact that the Soviet Union did not respond to Finland’s provocations is clear that at that time it was simply more profitable for us, the Soviet Union, that Finland would not enter the war. Because if she enters the war, then we have an even huge front that we need to hold, and we need to keep troops there. It seems to me that the following is how the understanding of the situation in the Soviet leadership developed. I think that the Soviet leadership understood perfectly well that Finland was encouraging Germany in one way or another. Maybe she didn’t fully understand to what extent, but, in any case, the vector of her policy was clear. But in the situation of June 22-23, this seemed like a lesser evil compared to participation, with Finland’s full entry into the war. Moreover, despite this setup on the part of Hitler, Finland itself declared its neutrality and diplomatic contacts began, because the Soviet embassy worked in Finland, in Helsinki, and Soviet diplomacy immediately began to request Finland’s position, Finland responded that it adheres to neutrality and for some time, perhaps not for long, the Soviet leadership retained the illusion that this was the case, or at least in the Finnish elites there was a struggle over what position to take in this situation. If I remember correctly, Molotov immediately summoned the Finnish ambassador to his place and asked what Finland’s position is, are you neutral, and, if I remember correctly, the ambassador replied that Finland will act as it sees fit for itself and is most beneficial for itself. Those. The answer was already like that, quite arrogant. But there was a statement of neutrality. Yes it was. But on 26, accordingly, the Finns declare war against the Soviet peoples. This is literally a few days. Those. On 24, the decision was made to bomb, because it became clear that an attack was coming from Finnish territory. It became clear that simply regardless of whether Finland is at war or not at war, its territory is a springboard for an attack on Leningrad. Therefore, the Soviet Union began bombing airfields... And other targets. Other military targets on Finnish territory. As a result, the raid was extremely unsuccessful; there were casualties among the civilian population of Finland, which really gave the Finnish government simply carte blanche. It was immediately stated that we were attacked, we are again a victim of aggression, so we declare war. Those. On June 26, Finland officially declared war on the Soviet Union. And I would like to emphasize another interesting point: in July there was absolutely the same situation with Petsamo, because the British, our allies, brought an aircraft carrier and bombed Petsamo, also carrying out an operation of absolutely the same significance. Those. the task was also to bomb the Germans who were sitting in Petsamo. There were also, in my opinion, casualties and destruction, fortunately, not as significant as during the Soviet raid (fortunately for the Finns), but Finland, after that, did not declare war on Great Britain, it only protested and asked for monetary compensation for destroyed property, for damaged property, and so on. A very interesting detail, by the way. Yes. But everyone forgot about it, yes. Absolutely the same situation, i.e. in one situation the Finns “yeah, we were attacked and that’s why we declare war,” and in another situation “well, you bombed us, so let’s pay compensation.” Finland, of course, maneuvered very much. We need to clarify for our viewers what Finland achieved, what goals it set for itself in the war after it completed its main offensive operations in January 1942. And the vision of the Finnish leadership is at the moment when it seems to the Finnish leadership that it is Nazi Germany and the European Union, version 2.0, led by Nazi Germany, that will win. On November 29, 41, Prime Minister of Finland Jukka Rangel, a close friend and supporter of Finnish President Risto Ryti, also a lawyer, also from the University of Helsinki, i.e. a member of the Finnish elite, very pro-German, appears before the Finnish Parliament with an extensive government report on the state of affairs and accordingly makes a presentation to the Parliament, i.e. He is like this, one might say, well, as usual, the prime minister does in parliament, reports for the year on the work done, and so on. This document is on the website of the Finnish parliament; unfortunately, I translated only part of it, because it is very lengthy. It must be said that in this document, the Prime Minister of Finland, of course, accuses the Soviet Union of all sins, accuses the Soviet Union, starting in 20, of constantly violating all agreements, and then they attacked us, and attacked us again , and attacked a third time. From which he concludes that since we have such a terrible eastern neighbor, then for these reasons the only guarantee for ensuring security remains territorial acquisitions. “The foreign regions we occupied, from which the enemy threatened us, must be left under the military occupation of Finnish forces. How far our occupation of the security zone will extend is a question that should not be answered during the battle, because... it is determined by strategic views. However, it is clear that these military objectives have their limits. We do not claim territories simply for the sake of territories. We have a vast country and there are enough places for our people to work to obtain food and improve their standard of living. But the peaceful work of the people is impossible if our current enemy can again begin to build his intrigues from those areas from which it will be impossible for us to repel his attack the next time. We live in a risk zone. It was not possible to create an effective international security system. Our only opportunity for effective defense is to reduce and straighten the lines of combat contact. It should also not be forgotten that part of the Finnish people live in the areas in question. During its period of independence, Finland has already tried many times to improve the situation of the Finnish population in these areas. This happened in connection with the conclusion of the Tartu Peace Treaty. After the guarantees under this peace treaty turned out to be insignificant, Finland tried to assist for the benefit of the Eastern Karelians by contacting international organizations. All measures, however, turned out to be empty, and the Finnish population of eastern Karelia continued to be mercilessly oppressed and destroyed. Regarding the present situation, the Finnish government pointed out in its recent response to the United States the pitiful situation into which the population of occupied eastern Karelia would fall if they were again forced to live under the heel of Bolshevik power.” Space in quotation. “What was said above about Finland’s security guarantees fully applies to the situation of the Eastern Karelians. The only satisfactory solution to these issues is that their area of ​​residence remains under occupation by Finnish forces. It is Finland's duty to do everything possible to ensure the security of their situation." Well, then a report on the international situation. “Relations between Finland and Germany are clear and smooth. They are based on common military benefits and brotherhood in arms. They are also based on sincere friendship and mutual respect. Finland is grateful that this time it is not alone in fighting the enemy. The great armed forces of Germany, which are fighting on the gigantic Russian front for the sake of destroying Bolshevism, which threatens the security and well-being of all countries of the world, have so tied up the forces of the Red Army that Finland is fighting on its fronts in much more equal conditions than in the war 2 years ago . German troops also provided direct military support to our country, closing the northern part of the front between Finland and the Soviet Union. Economically, relations with Germany have become very valuable to us. After our ocean routes were cut already in mid-June, our international trade - both imports and exports - is directed mainly to Germany, and through Germany to the countries of central and southern Europe. It is especially important to emphasize that we constantly receive significant amounts of grain and other vital goods from Germany, and this is of decisive importance for our country.” Let's take a break. There is a comment about the grain that Finland received from Germany. The fact is that, just as in the case of Finland, so in the case of Germany, its import was blocked by the British fleet. And the grain that Germany transported to Finland to support its allies, it could transport only for the simple reason that it removed this grain from the occupied territories, from the occupied territories of Ukraine and southern Russia. Thus, Finland, although indirectly, nevertheless endured the hardships of the war in the same way at the expense of the Soviet Union, as Germany did. I made my remark, but in my opinion it is very important. Yes. Then there are praises for other countries - Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and all other allies of Nazi Germany. And then the Prime Minister of Finland continues. “The fight against a common enemy has thus created mutual respect and trust between peoples fighting shoulder to shoulder. As I said in the previously mentioned report to the government on June 25 - i.e. the day before the start of the war - then the struggle began for the sake of all humanity against Bolshevism, which strives for world revolution, general destruction and terror.” Well, again, the report needs to be translated in full; it is replete with, in general, such strong statements that clearly create a bias. The Prime Minister outlined his position very clearly. Just the last 3 lines. I would only like to emphasize that, in my opinion, all issues of relations and contradictions between states would be easier to resolve if the harmful influence of the USSR, based on Bolshevism, were decisively eliminated in international politics.” Those. everything will be fine if there is no Soviet Union. This is a report from November 9, 1941. Indeed, the Germans are actually standing near Moscow, Leningrad is blockaded, and there is still about a week left before the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow. Actually, German and Finnish newspapers are full of headlines that the Kremlin towers with Kremlin stars are already visible, which is why the report is very optimistic. But this is related to the fact that some of us still say that Finland has stopped at the old border. No, it also occupied eastern Karelia, and here the Prime Minister emphasizes, i.e. he argues from his point of view the necessity of why we need eastern Karelia. Those. this is also a buffer against Russia, and plus, again, Eastern Karelians related to the Finns live there and we need to protect them, this is Finland’s sacred duty. Indeed, ideologically he justifies the emergence of a great Finland. There will be a separate program about great Finland. On November 6, 1941, the Finnish parliament, a week after these hearings, approved the 1920 border as the state border. He thereby nullifies the Moscow peace treaty. It’s also good that they were smart enough not to include Petrozavodsk and all these occupied territories, and specifically annex them to their state. But, nevertheless, on December 6, 1941, indeed, Finland officially abandoned the Moscow Peace Treaty of 1940 and on the same day a declaration of war by Great Britain simultaneously arrived at them. Again, there are documents from October already, not that the battle for Moscow is underway and Stalin begins to panic and demands that Great Britain urgently do something. No, Soviet diplomacy already in September and October, in fact, asked, or rather, did not ask - it hinted to Britain that it would be nice for you to declare war on all these comrades who are fighting against us, because we are allies. Again, the difference between a non-aggression pact and an alliance treaty is clearly visible here. Those. If there is a non-aggression treaty, we declare neutrality to each other, and an allied treaty, it already implies a much greater degree of integration and much greater interaction in terms of decision-making. In fact, the USSR tried not to do anything without the consent of the allies. All 3 powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, they still tried to somehow coordinate their actions and at least inform the allies what was happening. Those. this is a much more serious interaction. And on December 6, 1941, Great Britain declared war on Finland, Romania and Bulgaria. But as British diplomats have already discussed, they said that this, in general, has no practical significance. But it has ideological significance. Ideologically, this was really of great importance, which... It frightened me seriously, because it is one thing to fight against the Soviet Union, which, so to speak, is placed outside the framework of civilization, as they believe, a rogue state, everyone seems to agree on this. Here it turns out that no, the Soviet Union is a normal European power that has allied relations with Great Britain, and now they are not fighting with the Soviet Union, but with the anti-Hitler coalition. Yes. Let me remind you, dear viewers, that in fact the anti-Hitler coalition in 1943 was called the United Nations, i.e. United Nations. This was already the foundation post-war system security was already laid down then. Well, of course, in Finland all this was perceived very, indeed, negatively, a caricature appeared, picture 1, where Stalin was riding Churchill, straddling him. That's pretty much how it was. But this is 41 years old; indeed, it seems to all Western pro-Nazi forces that victory is close. I think he and Roosevelt took turns skating. It's true. Regarding Roosevelt, by the way, to be honest, this is a good question, because I don’t know any caricatures of Roosevelt. Well, where do the caricatures of Roosevelt come from? They were in Germany. In Germany this is understandable. But the Finns. Why do the Finns? There was also an interesting collision, of course, that Great Britain declared war, but the United States did not declare war, they only recalled their ambassador on June 30, 1944 and expelled the Finnish ambassador from Washington, and so they maintained diplomatic relations. Despite the fact that Soviet diplomacy also put a lot of pressure on them, saying - listen, look, Great Britain has already declared war on Finland, they are an ally just like you. Why don't you declare war on Finland? To which the Americans responded with their pragmatism - yes, but we are allies, let’s declare war on Japan, please, right now, because the Soviet Union had a non-aggression treaty with Japan. Declare war on Japan and we will declare war on Finland. Well, we discussed this story last time, but it seems to me that this had a practical meaning, because through the United States it was possible to put pressure on Finland. Yes, just like through Sweden. As well as through Sweden, yes, i.e. these were pressure channels. This had its own logic. Yes. But ’43, Stalingrad, then, as Yegor rightly said, Kursk, then Sicily, i.e. Indeed, the situation in Germany is changing dramatically. I think a breakthrough of the blockade was hinted at. And the breaking of the blockade, the Finnish military became seriously worried in January-February 1944, when the blockade was lifted. Those. they saw the military defeat of the Germans and some Finnish generals, at first they did not even believe their eyes that everything was so bad for the Germans, because they really believed that the German army was very strong. A very important moment is the Tehran Conference, when the leaders of the 3 powers of the anti-Hitler coalition gathered and discussed, in addition to the general military campaign in the summer of 44, let me remind you, dear viewers, that June 44 was a coordinated attack, these were coordinated operations in both the East and the West front. On the western front this is “Overlord” - the landing in Normandy, and for us it is “10 Stalinist strikes”. Just the Soviet offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, the Soviet offensive on Svir and Operation Bagration, they were to a large extent synchronized with Overlord in order to really break the front, i.e. tear apart the German reserves and simultaneously defeat Nazi Germany and their allies on all fronts. So, in Tehran they discussed Finland for a long time, what to do with them as a result. And Roosevelt, in his typical American manner, said that “Mr. Marshal, what can the US government do to get Finland out of the war?” And Stalin immediately outlined the conditions of the USSR, indeed, on what conditions we could make peace. Because this pacification of Finland was really the goal of Soviet diplomacy in ’41, and ’42, and ’43, i.e. efforts were made, but, unfortunately, there was no result. So, the position of the Soviet Union, dear viewers, is not the occupation of Finland and its incorporation into the Soviet Union, but a return to the 1940 treaty, a public and complete severance of relations with Nazi Germany on the part of Finland and compensation. Compensation for what the Finns did in Karelia took away a piece of Soviet territory that never belonged to them. The bargaining begins. Churchill says the damage is easy to do but difficult to repair. Finland is a poor country, they won’t be able to pay you. Churchill says that perhaps they can cut down a few trees and supply them for you, but nothing more. Stalin replies that they will pay, I know how to make them pay. Churchill insists that they will never pay you, this is a poor country, this is not Germany or some large European countries. Stalin says - well, we’ll just occupy some part of Finland with troops and leave from there only when they pay off their debts. Churchill, he doesn’t back down, he’s also a very experienced politician, he says – listen, what about your slogan “a world without annexations and indemnities”? You announced it in 1918, if I’m not mistaken. To which Stalin smiled broadly, appreciated the usor and said that you know, I am becoming a conservative, so they will still pay. After this, there really is a bargaining over where the border will be, whether we give or not give up Petsamo, but the Soviet Union said that our conditions are fundamental - this is a break with Germany, this is the border of 1940, regarding some progress, maybe Perhaps you can also bargain where the border will be, and thirdly, compensation, i.e. you owe us compensation for the damage that was caused. Those. Let's record that already in 1943 the Soviet Union absolutely agreed to the preservation of an independent Finland subject to the fulfillment of certain and fairly moderate conditions. Yes, Egor, thank you very much for highlighting this. Churchill asked this question directly to Stalin, i.e. he said so that we understand that the Soviet Union has its own sphere of influence, there are security issues of Leningrad, the Baltic states, the Baltic Sea, we understand all this. But it would be unpleasant for Great Britain if you included Finland in your power against the wishes of the population of this country. To which Stalin replied that no, let them live as they want in these very inconvenient areas, but I will teach them a lesson. Those. a return to the year 40, a break with Germany and, most importantly, monetary compensation. Those. not with money, but with goods, industrial goods, which the Soviet Union needs to restore the national economy and the economy, destroyed precisely by what the Finns and Germans did, and all the other allies of Nazi Germany did in the occupied territories. And the main bargaining, the main dispute was about compensation? About money, yes. All other conditions somehow did not raise questions. It's clear. As Dmitry Yuryevich says, first, of course, about money. Yes, about money. Both Roosevelt and Churchill tried to somehow negotiate with Stalin either a complete abolition of compensation or its reduction. Protocols from 3 sides, the British vision is very well reflected in Churchill’s memoirs, and not in this thick book, where Churchill compressed all his memories of the Second World War, he also wrote a five-volume book, dear viewers, there are 5 volumes. In volume 4 "Triumph and Tragedy", i.e. “Triumph and Tragedy”, he describes it all well there. And if you take Churchill’s usual memoirs, there is something very casual about this, or, in my opinion, it is completely absent. At least in the English version. The American Vision is on the website of some American university, I won’t lie, the link is below. You can read the American protocol. The Soviet protocol, it generally complies, the only thing is that some are bypassed sharp corners , they are not included in the transcript. This is all there, and it is confirmed by all 3 parties. And I heard that the Finns are just ignoring these decisions of the Tehran Conference and are trying to present the matter in such a way that the insidious Soviet Union tried to capture Finland and only with their last strength, bleeding, they held on to the last line and thus attacked the USSR defeat. Yes, that is this is the main postulate. This means that they have won their independence once again. Yes. This is the main postulate of modern Finnish official state propaganda that this was already the 3rd war for the independence of Finland and that the great and terrible Soviet Union, led by the no less great and terrible Stalin, wanted to occupy all of Finland in 1944, well, since the great and terrible Stalin it didn’t work out, which means he was defeated, and Finland won a defensive victory. Tehran is completely thrown out of any discussion at all, it is simply not considered. In the same way, the Finns do not really like to remember that Great Britain declared war on them, i.e. they believe that they fought only against the Soviet Union, and that Great Britain was not there at all. In fact, the very fact of the blockade, the food blockade, says a lot. Now it’s clear that we discussed, more or less agreed, what are the practical steps? Roosevelt asks Stalin - are you ready to receive the Finnish delegation in Moscow, if we call them now, say that fly to Moscow, talk to the Russians, are you ready to receive them? Stalin said that we are ready to accept, but, in my opinion, now this is absolutely not necessary, because the Finnish government is pro-Nazi and to this Roosevelt says that yes, I know. They will arrive in Moscow, we will talk, we will not agree, and this will immediately be presented by Nazi, German propaganda as another failure of the Allies. And Stalin clearly said that yes, let them come, but my opinion is that they are not ready to make peace on any terms. Then Stalin said these words: even if Ryuti comes, even if the devil comes, I’m not afraid of devils. And indeed, at the end of March for 44 years, a Finnish delegation has been arriving in Moscow, on March 27 they have a meeting, and the delegation is headed, as always, by Paasikivi, already 10 times from the Finns. All the faces are familiar, in fact, Paasikivi and Enkel are there. On the Soviet side, Molotov, Dekanozov, Shtemenko and Podtserob. They discuss it for a long time. Molotov immediately, of course, he immediately says right off the bat - do you have the authority to conclude a truce or peace? Right. Paasikivi immediately says no, we just came to listen to you again. Haven't been to Moscow for a long time. We haven't been for a long time. We came to get clarification about your conditions, because Kollontai told us something that you were ready to talk. But we did not understand, you want to conclude a final peace or truce, so could you please clarify this. For at least half an hour, Molotov patiently discussed peace, armistice and all these definitions with Paasikivi and the delegation. Actually, Yandex.Disk with all these files under transfer, this is the first, second - please go to the website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which made all these documents available for free access to the 70th anniversary of the victory. The link is also under the video. These are amazing documents. Examples of diplomatic skill. At all. There, of course, Molotov terribly generally trolled just the Finns, i.e. He simply drove Enkel into hysterics. I won’t retell all this here, here is the minutes of the meeting on 18 pages. The most important thing is this, i.e. there it is clear that everyone remembers each other both in 1939 and 1941 and so on, but Molotov, in fact, at the end of this long conversation with Finnish diplomats says that “it is clear to everyone that the USSR did not want war with Finland in June 1941. However, Finland attacked the Soviet Union, deciding that together with Germany it could gain something, and that the Soviet Union would not stand on its feet. But the Soviet Union stood its ground, and Finland must take this into account.” And then Molotov told the delegation that... he compared the Soviet Union with the Russian Empire? He said that the Russian Empire kept Finland within its fold, carried out Russification, and the Bolsheviks gave it independence, pursued a friendly policy, but the Finns still did not calm down. Yes. Actually, this is exactly what he tells them, that in fact you don’t love us, us Bolsheviks, our Soviet government, this is your business, but, roughly speaking, the situation is as follows: if there were not a Soviet government, but an imperial one, royal, then you would have no independence at all. And then, in fact, Molotov raises the issue of the blockade of Leningrad, he in no way hushes it up, he says, on the contrary, “the Finns, together with the Germans, carried out the blockade of Leningrad for 2.5 years. Hundreds of thousands of people died of hunger in Leningrad. Now everyone can see that the danger turned out to be exactly as we foresaw it. Our worst fears were realized. Finland, although it gained independence from Russia, was among the allies of Germany, which attacked the Soviet Union.” And then Paasikivi’s answer, what we just discussed in answers and questions. Paasikivi replies that if there had not been a war in 1939-40, the Finns might have fought together with the Soviet Union or the same thing would have happened to them as with Norway and Denmark. Let's hear Vyacheslav Mikhailovich's answer. Molotov, responding to this remark, asks: were there German troops on Finnish territory at the time when Germany attacked the USSR? Answering in the affirmative, Paasikivi says that an inconvenient subject of conversation has been raised. Great. Molotov says that he was not the initiator of this conversation. Enkel started talking about feelings, so he, Molotov, decided to speak out about the feelings of his people. The fact is that Enkel, when the conversation came up about the border of 1940, Enkel said that you, please, understand the feelings of our people, we fought here and we believe that it was you, the Soviet Union, who treated us unfairly. And then Molotov very sharply interrupts him and says - what feelings can we have, excuse me, if we just had a blockade of Leningrad, 100 thousand people died there, and how will we, the leadership of the USSR, explain to the Soviet people that we are returning to border 39 years old. The Finns, by the way, immediately came up with trump cards and said - let’s go back to ’39, that is. border on Beloostrov. This is, excuse me, March 1944, how is that possible? But Molotov immediately said that this was out of the question, we had an agreement in 1940, which you violated. And indeed here, just read in full, there are those who call Molotov a stone ass and believe that he was a narrow-minded person, he is, in fact, a brilliant diplomat. As far as I remember, Churchill wrote that Talleyrand, Metternich and someone else would gladly accept him into their company in the afterlife, in heaven, if the Bolsheviks allowed him to go to heaven. But, as a result, once we talked, we parted and didn’t agree on anything. Indeed, Enkel was almost hysterical, in general. It's not clear what they were really hoping for. The point is that in April the Finnish government responded, very politely, in French, through our embassy in Sweden, saying that we are sorry, but these conditions are unacceptable. Those. The Finns refuse these conditions. As a result, we are undergoing the Vyborg offensive operation; this is a topic for a separate book that I have written. I am now preparing its second edition, expanded and corrected, because Finnish historians have pointed out several mistakes that I made in it. But the point is that our offensive near Beloostrov actually begins on June 9-10, and on June 20, after a short battle, our units enter the city of Vyborg and raise a red flag over the tower of St. Olof. And at this moment the Finns again contact our people in Stockholm, with Alexandra Kollontai. They say, listen, could you voice your conditions again? What was there? What was it? Could you repeat it, please, maybe we can somehow come to an agreement now. The response note is a very serious stumbling block in the study of our relations, because I personally have not seen the text of this note; the only place where it is quoted is Mannerheim’s memoirs. And it says there, in Mannerheim’s interpretation, that since the Finns have deceived us many times, please write a letter of guarantee, signed by the President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, that Finland is ready to surrender, and send a delegation to Moscow. And this formulation, i.e. at least as it is given in Mannerheim’s memoirs, that Finland is ready to surrender was perceived by the Finnish leadership as a demand for unconditional surrender. But this is precisely their perception, yes, that is. what if there is capitulation, then why send a delegation to Moscow at all? We ourselves will then come to you in Helsinki in tanks if you surrender. Those. Obviously, either the wording was unsuccessful, again, I emphasize once again that I have not seen the original. It really needs to be dug up in the archives, because the Finns, in fact, cite Mannerheim’s formulation and, of course, immediately declare the Soviet Union guilty of continuing the hostilities, which flared up with renewed vigor on June 25 at the Battle of Tali-Ihantala. If you had somehow formulated the terms more softly now, then perhaps we would have come to an agreement. But, again, here we see only the Finnish interpretation of these events. I have not seen the full text of this note, i.e. This, by the way, is such an interesting, very exciting study that needs to be done about what our people really wrote there, what the Finns interpret like this. We need to look in the foreign policy archives. Yes. Exactly the original text itself, and what kind of discussion there was with the allies, for example. Those. what was Great Britain’s position on this whole matter, what were the instructions from Molotov, Alexandra Kollontai, for example. What really was the position of the Soviet Union at this moment. But the intrigue does not end there, because firstly, things are not going well for the Finns at the front, to put it mildly, secondly, Germany finds out, of course, about all these movements that Finland is clearly making behind the back of Nazi Germany . And the arrival of the Paasikivi delegation in March, was it secret? I think it got some press coverage, but I won't lie. Of course, I think the Germans knew about this. And as a result of all this, as a result of the cunning movements of the Finns, as a result of the fact that things were going badly for the Finns at the front at that time, on June 23, 1944, without protocols, without anything, without warning, Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, flew to Helsinki affairs of Nazi Germany. He goes straight to President Ryti and says. Well, he said it very diplomatically, of course, but the point was that we are supplying you with weapons, we are supplying you with grain. And we are very afraid that it will fall into the wrong hands. To the enemy. It will fall into the wrong hands. And plus we also see that you are somehow starting to take actions related to some kind of separate peace with the Soviet Union, we really don’t like this. Therefore, write a letter of guarantee as the President of the Republic of Finland that you will not conclude a separate peace and will remain an ally of Nazi Germany. And Ryti wrote such a letter. Letter of guarantee as President of the Republic. After which the Germans resumed arms deliveries. The key was that they very quickly transferred about 10,000 Panzerfausts from Estonia, and this gave the Finnish infantry the opportunity to effectively fight our armored vehicles, unfortunately. And thanks to the very active support of the German Air Force, if anyone doesn’t know, but again, we are moving a little away from diplomacy into military affairs. The Germans transferred an entire wing of dive bombers and fighter-bombers from the Baltic states to Finland, and they were from the very airfields where they sat in 1941, i.e. airfields of Utti and Lappeenranta, they flew and bombed our units at the front 3 times a day, i.e. They provided enormous air support to the Finnish ground forces, and they actually doubled the strike potential of the Finnish Air Force. Those. Well, the German pilots helped the Finns very, very much. But time passes, all our military efforts after Vyborg were not crowned with complete success, but more on that separately, because this is also, from a military point of view, an interesting operation and a forgotten operation in our country, we need to remember our heroes who fought there after the capture of Vyborg . And already in mid-July 1944, the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus gradually subsided and turned into a positional war. And the main, best units of the Leningrad Front will be relocated to the Narva bridgeheads. On July 26, 1944, after the hardest battles, ours took Narva and began an assault on the Sinimäe heights; the hardest battles, of course, were for our guard. But on August 4, the Finnish leadership finally realized that it was time to do something. It’s time to make peace with the Soviet Union, because obviously now the Germans will be expelled from Estonia in the next few weeks. Germany is defeated. Germany is defeated, yes, that is. again, let's remember that Army Group Center in Belarus has already been destroyed, 50,000 prisoners have already been driven around Moscow. The Germans did not throw our allies into the English Channel, i.e. both bridgeheads will obviously already be alive and the operations of our allies in the west are also developing quite successfully, but the Finns also understand that now, if the Russians are still liberating Estonia and taking Tallinn for themselves, then there will simply be no supplies of any weapons, nothing will happen. Therefore, on August 4, Risto Ryti speaks before parliament and says - you know, I signed a letter to the Germans, sorry, I didn’t say anything to the people’s representatives about this, I repent, I’m resigning. I'm tired, I'm leaving, sorry, it turned out ugly. Then it turned out ugly with the Germans, because the parliament immediately voted for Mannerheim as the new president of Finland and Mannerheim immediately, through Kollontai, contacted the Soviet Union, said that that’s it, let’s put up with it - this is the first, second - he wrote a farewell letter to Hitler that he cites in his memoirs, and there he basically justifies the fact that he breaks all promises in general and is really ready to fulfill all the demands of the Soviet Union. Mannerheim's motivation is formulated very beautifully, no matter what happens to Germany in this war, the German nation will continue to exist, and if Finland loses in this war, i.e. goes with Germany to the end, it is not a fact that it will continue to exist as an independent state. Therefore, as President of the Republic of Finland, writes Mannerheim, I have no right to risk my people, my country, which the parliament entrusted to me. So sorry, all the best to you. And indeed, on September 4, the ceasefire agreement came into force, on September 19, after long and painful negotiations with the Finnish delegation, i.e., in fact, even Molotov began to lose patience, because the Finns arrived in Moscow and again in their typical Finnish manner, By the way, dear guests, if you deal with the Finns in business negotiations, I hope not in military matters. The Finns have a characteristic feature that they take some small detail, which from their point of view is very important, and cling to it terribly, and negotiations around this small detail can go on for several days without any visible progress and simply in some way. that moment... From our point of view, this is very tiring and looks like incomprehensible obstinacy and stubbornness. They did exactly the same thing at the armistice negotiations in September 1944, they began to cling to the wording, to some small details, and Molotov directly told them - listen, we agreed with Romania in 1 evening, we have already met with you 4 times and progress No. You’ve been planning to persist here for a long time, let’s finalize the agreement and sign it. The agreement was finalized by Great Britain, which also took part in all this, correctly, because the war was between Finland on the one hand, the USSR and Great Britain on the other. The British ambassador was so tired that he did not come to sign the treaty, he gave a power of attorney to sign the treaty to guess who? Molotov. No. Zhdanov. There is a power of attorney for English language and in Russian that Her Majesty’s government, or rather His Majesty then, authorizes Lieutenant General Zhdanov to sign an armistice agreement with Finland for Great Britain, i.e. this, of course, was also terrible trolling on the part of the British, that you are so unimportant that, like, let Zhdanov sign for us. Those. The document is also on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the link is below, Yandex.Disk, there are all these negotiations, there is a power of attorney. Many thanks to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for posting this, because it’s really very interesting to read all this there. Listen, but there was probably some resistance among the Finnish elites, i.e. Surely there were forces that did not want this break with the Germans? Well, Mannerheim still enjoyed such authority that all this somehow didn’t really play a role, because why didn’t Paasikivi, for example, become president. Because Paasikivi, yes, he is a respected person, but he is a civilian, he is very gentle, everyone in Finland considered him to be a compromiser with the Soviet Union, and Mannerheim is also a military man, a military hero, an authority. Well, this is, I would say, Marshal Petain on the contrary. Yes exactly. Marshal Petain was appointed to make peace with the Germans, and Mannerheim was appointed to make peace with the Russians. And so that the army would follow him, because again, if Paasikivi had been installed, then Tavela and his comrades, other officers, could easily have staged a pro-Nazi military coup. There are rumors that there was some kind of preparation for a pro-Nazi military coup, what are the Finns writing about it? Rather, it was not preparation. I won’t say anything about the coup, because I didn’t study it, but they were preparing for a guerrilla war, i.e. they were already making weapons caches, just like right-wing Finnish officers. Moreover, they made them, these caches, already in 1944, and only in 1946 was it actually discovered, and they began to imprison them there for this matter. Those. Some believed that the truce on September 19 would indeed not end the matter, that the Soviet Union would arrange something for Finland and send in troops. The Soviet Union did indeed send troops, but not to the entire territory of Finland, but only to the Porkala-Ud base. This means, dear guests, if you are traveling to Finland, Porkala-Ud is the current Kirkkonummi, it is 40 km from the parliament and the presidential palace. Those. when they talked about it at the negotiations, the Finns said - well, okay, the border is 1940, we are losing Pechenga, but, probably, you want Hanko again? Molotov said no, Hanko is not needed, let’s have Porkalo. After which the Finns were shocked, because it was about the Soviet base Porkalo-Ud and there was an expression by Oscar Haykel, in my opinion... Oscar Enkel, if I remember correctly, the general who said that this is a gun aimed at the heart of Finland, the capital is needed move it to Tampere and we’re all done for. He had a nervous breakdown, the Finnish delegation said that she fell ill and left. Those. Stalin and the Soviet leadership are here, just in case, they stationed a tank regiment 40 km from the vital centers of the political life of the Republic of Finland in case some kind of encroachment on the part of the Finns began there again. And the most interesting thing is that they did not unload our troops in Porkala-Ud, but they unloaded at the central station in Helsinki and marched there. Those. in 1944, residents of the Finnish capital, they first saw German troops in June 1944, which came from Estonia and went to help the Finns near Vyborg, this is the 122nd Infantry Division. And then, in September, we saw Soviet troops heading to build their military base on the territory of independent Finland. It is important to emphasize that this was a truce, it was not a final peace, because the Soviet Union, seeing these Finnish attempts to outwit everyone, said that there are conditions, and only after Finland fulfills all these conditions we will conclude a final peace with you. Therefore, there is a truce, a control commission headed by Zhdanov comes to Helsinki and strictly ensures that the Finns fulfill all these conditions. And only in 1947 in Paris, the Republic of Finland, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom concluded a peace treaty, which is still in force between our countries. I remember that Zhdanov came up with the story in order to establish business relations with Mannerheim. There is a legend, dear guests, that when Zhdanov... Zhdanov was radical, he actually planned to organize a trial of Finnish war criminals, there is war criminal No. 1 - this is Risto Ryti, and there is war criminal No. 1A - this is Marshal Mannerheim. We hold a trial in Petrozavodsk and after that we hang both of these figures near the Lenin monument in front of a gathering of the local population, who had very bad feelings towards the Finns after the occupation. But, again, Stalin said that Mannerheim is a figure who suits everyone, on the one hand. On the other hand, he is ready to do whatever is necessary, so let’s leave Mannerheim alone, but let’s imprison Ryti, this Rangel, who read a wonderful speech before parliament, imprison, and imprison more war criminals. It must be said that there is no need to compare the international trial of Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg and the trial of war criminals in Finland, because in Finland it was not an international tribunal; the investigation was conducted by the Finnish Ministry of Internal Affairs under the leadership of Comrade. Zhdanov, and the Minister of Internal Affairs at that time was Urho Kekkonen, who later became the President of Finland, and this Paasikivi-Kekkonen line became the basis of good neighborly relations between the USSR and Finland during the Soviet period. You wanted to tell about the story, but what about Zhdanov? Zhdanov is the man who wanted to hang Mannerheim, at the first meeting with Mannerheim he says, Mr. President, and during the First World War I fought under your leadership, under your command. The conversation takes place in Russian. Mannerheim, maybe the Russian was a little rusty, but he spoke. What Mannerheim says - well then, let's go and drink vodka. This flexibility of politicians on both sides, one, Zhdanov, he clearly heard Stalin’s signal that we would not touch Mannerheim, but Mannerheim... He clearly heard Zhdanov’s signal. No, well, just a man, he also hated the Bolsheviks all his life, etc., but when it comes to life and death, let’s go and drink vodka. Here. Indeed, this is the beginning of a completely new relationship between Finland and the USSR. If in 1818 Mannerheim writes in his order that “I will not sheathe my sword until eastern Karelia is free from the damned Bolsheviks, anyone there.” In 41 he writes that “in 18 I promised and in 41 I did, this is a new beginning for Finland, this is a new blossoming for Karelia, a great Finland, a great future,” etc., very pompous rhetoric. In 1944, the same Mannerheim writes that “the bitter experience of the last 5 years has shown us that the key to the safe existence and prosperity of Finland is good, trusting, good neighborly relations with all our neighbors.” And, indeed, Finland turns to face the Soviet Union, and a completely different period begins. But this is where the story with our border ends, because in these protocols you will see that in fact Molotov, there was a bargaining for Petsamo, as always. This is Pechenga. Petsamo, Pechenga, yes, i.e. there Paasikivi said - Will you leave Petsamo to us? Molotov said - no, we won’t leave it, because we gave it to you 2 times and 2 times our enemies ended up there, so how can you live without Petsamo, that’s what was said. Paasikivi said - maybe we can compensate for this somehow? Molotov says - what do you want as compensation? - Well, maybe some Vyborg, the Saimaa Canal. Molotov said no. By the way, an interesting point about Vyborg; it was discussed at the negotiations in Tehran, i.e. there, when Roosevelt said that we might leave Vyborg to them, Stalin said that this was out of the question. Those. there is simply no mention of Vyborg at all, Vyborg is ours. And Petsamo and Pechenga become a Soviet region, i.e. Russia is returning it to itself. Finland thereby loses access to the ocean, i.e. it was an ice-free port and also a very important area where there were nickel mines. And Finland mined this nickel in a concession with the British, because its own money was sorely lacking. All this is over, the territory is Soviet, Soviet engineers and industrialists are already beginning to develop these mines, and then they realize that the hydroelectric power station that supplied all this remains on the Finnish side of the border. Moreover, there is a tiny piece there, literally 5 km from this power plant, so in 1947 our people turned to the Finns and said - listen, you owe us a lot of money. The fact is that Finland, it bought self-propelled guns, planes, tanks, Panzerfausts and everything else from the Germans, it did not pay in cash, because the amount was huge, it took it all on credit. Those. Finland had a very large debt for arms supplies to Nazi Germany. Nazi Germany lost, and accordingly, all of Finland's debt to Germany passed to the Soviet Union. Those. we defeated Germany, you owed the Germans, now you owe us. Well, this is by way of compensation. Yes Yes. And, accordingly, the Soviet Union says to the Finns - listen, you have a debt there, let’s give us this small piece with a hydroelectric power station, and we will write off part of the debt for you. The Finns agreed. This was the last shift in the border between the USSR and Finland, and if you look at Russian-language Wikipedia, you will see that it says that the Soviet Union bought this piece. But “bought” and “took for debts” is still a slightly different formulation, i.e. Here the wording of Wikipedia, they, as a rule, are not in our favor. I don't think that's the case here. I think this formulation may have been chosen by the Finnish government at that time in order not to inflame revanchist sentiments. By the way, did these moods exist? Or have they appeared to a greater extent now? Then, of course, they were suppressed very much throughout the Soviet period. The entire Soviet period in general was friendship, trade, good relations. And, rather, Finnish revanchism, to return Karelia, appeared more likely after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when there was no longer very strong self-censorship on the part of the Finnish government, and any pressure from Russia ceased to appear at all. Well, you live in Finland, tell me, do modern Finns have some kind of complex about the fact that they lost? Some, from my point of view, not all. It seems to me... Well, that is, is this some kind of noticeable phenomenon or is it some kind of marginal phenomenon? From my point of view, this is still the lot of the officer corps to some extent, this is their professional war. And it is clear that if there is another war, it is clear who it will most likely be against. Those. again some kind of... Better against Sweden. Well, hardly against Sweden. The officer corps is very right-wing, Mannerheim, of course, is their hero, this is their commander in chief, whom they greatly respect. But otherwise, it seems to me that ordinary people are already so tormented by all sorts of other problems that this doesn’t really interest anyone at all. Yes, about 400,000 people were forced to leave the territories that were ceded to the Soviet Union, people lost everything, i.e. real estate, some factories, farmland, what their ancestors built over the centuries. People found themselves cut off from their roots; for them, of course, it was a severe trauma that they had to start everything over again. To rebuild life again in another Finland, without Vyborg, without the Saimaa Canal, without the entire northern Ladoga region, without Priozersk, without Kanneljärvi and other things. Of course, they transferred this bitterness to both their children and grandchildren, but quite a lot of time has already passed and it seems to me that some kind of revanchist sentiments, yes, they exist, there are some radical groups, and at every election there are municipal or parliamentary elections, some candidate will pull this card onto the table and put it down, let's try to return it all. But modern Finland has many other concerns of its own than the return of Karelia, and now Finland is part of the European Union... the Karelian Isthmus. Yes. They call it Karelia, and the Karelian Isthmus, and the northern Ladoga region. From their point of view, this was their Karelia once. But now Finland’s foreign policy is determined, of course, by the European Union, membership in this organization, and Finland will never make any independent drastic movements, this is understandable. At the governmental level there is now a cooling of relations, as with the whole of Europe, in general, but rather, this is something, from my point of view, that is becoming history. Of course, it will be interesting for me to hear how they will teach my son all this at school, because he studies at a Finnish school and is also very interested in history. Still would. And, accordingly, it will be interesting for me to listen to how this will be taught to them, I will force him to write a presentation or essay, where both points of view will be presented - both Russian and Finnish. Please tell me which Finnish war criminals were convicted as a result of these post-war trials? Among the famous ones is Lennart Esch, a famous Finnish general. He was charged with the fact that he, commanding the Olonets group, i.e. sat there near Olonets, on the Olonets Isthmus, excuse me, on the Onega Isthmus, between Ladoga and Lake Onega, in 1942 he verbally ordered a demonstration execution of our prisoners. Those. he just went there somewhere on some kind of inspection trip, stopped at some prisoner of war camp, there they complained to him that the prisoners of war were almost rebelling against ours, i.e. they refuse to go to work, and they make other claims to the Finnish camp administration. And Ash verbally said - shoot about 10 people as a warning, this will solve the problem. And the most interesting thing is that, like many Finnish officers, Ash tried to sail to Sweden. Those. The distance by sea is very short, and a lot of people left. Martinen, Lauri Törni – these were all Finnish saboteurs who entered Soviet territory. In particular, a member of the Finnish DRG - a sabotage reconnaissance group that destroyed the camp in Petrovsky Yam. It was possible to find out who exactly was sitting on a tree stump and shooting the nurses running out of the burning building with single shots from a machine gun. There is the name of this man, here he is in 1944, realizing that they might be looking for him, he left and never returned to Finland, he died in Florida in 2004. And many Finnish saboteurs, who had something on their souls, some kind of sin, which is a war crime, they simply left. Those. they fled on boats, on yachts, on some schooners to Sweden, and from Sweden somewhere further away. Many left for America, South America . Those who did not have any serious crimes began to return in the 60-70s, they were not persecuted. And some actually remained there. Ash also tried to swim away, his boat just started to sink, after which he decided that it was not fate and returned to the shore and went and surrendered to the police. I think they only gave him 2 years. Those. everything was quite soft there. But tell me, it is well known that Mannerheim did not extradite Finnish Jews to the Germans, and Finnish Jews, accordingly, did not become victims of the Holocaust. What about the Soviet Jews captured in the occupied territories? Soviet prisoners of war... Well, including civilians. Civilians, there is no evidence that the Finns handed them over, but there is evidence that in the north of Finland, where German troops were stationed and Finnish troops stood nearby, there was brisk trade. Sorry, not trade, prisoner exchange. The Finns asked the Germans for Finno-Ugric Soviet prisoners of war, and the Germans, of course, asked for Jews, commissars, political workers and commanders. Those. Finns handed over, Finnish troops handed over Jews to the Germans. Yes. And this, of course, became a big scandal in Finland, because before that - the study appeared only in the 2000s - before that it was said that we handed over only 6 Jews to the Germans, these were people without passports, they had some serious problems with the documents and they were transferred, respectively, the Finnish Ministry of Internal Affairs sent them to Germany and supposedly one of them even survived after all this, i.e. survived the Holocaust. And then, in the 2000s, bang, it turns out that we were also handing over Jewish prisoners of war to the Germans, and it is also clear with what consequences for our prisoners. But for his Jews, yes, there is the same Jukka Rangel, in a conversation with Himmler he said wir haben keine judenfrage, i.e. We don't have a Jewish question in Finland. Those. There are none of our own, all citizens of Finland. What do you think, in general, in principle, this Nazi worldview, implicated in domination, enslavement of other peoples, how much did it influence Finland, how widespread were such sentiments there? In propaganda, this was completely copied from the Germans, let’s say. Those. if you look at how the war was covered, the course of hostilities, the Finns completely repeated all the statements and postulates of German Nazi propaganda. In Rangel’s speech, in my opinion, this is clearly visible, Bolshevism is there... Bolshevism, yes, but this is not actually Nazi history, right? No, it was precisely the idea of ​​Russians and Eastern peoples as inferior that was there. They really, just like the Nazis, just like the Germans, they looked out among our prisoners of war for the most downtrodden, the ugliest, the most wounded, defective, crippled, or distinctly Asians, and with pleasure they photographed them in the same way. But the only thing, again, is that they somehow, they did not have this policy of destruction, this did not happen. They just all go to a concentration camp at once. However, there were concentration camps based on race. That's all it was. By the way, I am very grateful to you for your vocabulary, you said that there really is Great Britain, the Nazis are building Greater Germany, and the Finns are building Greater Finland, Suur-Suomi, also the idea of ​​​​building their own great national state, where the Finns will play a leading role, i.e. they are leaders among the Finns, Ingrian Finns, Eastern Karelians, Vepsians. It was not clear what to do with the Estonians, because it seems that the Estonians themselves want their own state, but it seems that they are also our brothers. Those. Of course, they did not commit such genocide, but still, my opinion is that, fortunately, the military luck turned around quickly enough. It didn't come to that. Yes, I just didn’t get around to many things. But about great Finland and how they really began to build it in 1941, this will be a separate program altogether. It is very interesting how they tried to integrate the Karelians, how the policy was built in relation to the Finno-Ugric population, and in relation to the non-Finno-Ugric, alien element, as they called it. The terminology is quite Nazi. Again, if you read the Finnish newspapers of 1941, even the headlines, you will not find any drop of compassion for Russia and even to some extent for Great Britain, i.e. there... About Leningrad too. Yes, an interesting question. The Finns understood perfectly well what was happening in Leningrad. Yes, they knew, they wrote it in the newspapers. Already in November 1941 they wrote that the city was blocked, horror was happening in the city. If the city does not surrender, then it is doomed. Here we recently talked with Boris Nikolaevich Kovalev, a famous historian who has worked a lot on the Spanish “blue division”. They had their own media, their own newspapers, which published simply mocking caricatures of events in besieged Leningrad occurred, and on the fate of the Second Shock Army. Those. There they bullied me to the fullest. Did the Finns have something like that? To be honest, I have not seen any cartoons about Leningrad. I definitely didn't see this. Caricatures of Stalin and Churchill - this is understandable. Well, maybe not caricatures, some sarcastic, sarcastic headlines. No, no, it’s more likely that the city is doomed, and there were headlines in the spirit of Nazi propaganda, i.e. I have never seen such trolling and bullying. These are actually simply translated reports from the Berlin news agency, one to one. It's right there in the headlines. And the rhetoric, and the headlines, and the text of the articles. And they even created exactly the same propaganda structure as the Germans. During the Finnish war they didn’t have much, but during the war of 1941-44 they had special propaganda companies, they were called, you’ll laugh now, PR companies. What are you doing? Tiedotus. Tiedotus is now PR, public relations. Those. public relations company That's who really invented PR. The point is that, just like the Germans, they recruited writers and artists, graphic artists, designers, photographers, and cameramen. They could not just photograph everything, they could create complete content, i.e. and they took photographs, and wrote an article, and made a drawing, and filmed a chronicle. They are really more like public relations, creators of propaganda content. This is completely copied from the Germans. The Germans also had these. The Germans called propaganda companies, propagandakompanie, and the Finns called them tiedotuskompanie, i.e. “a company of bringing information to the masses.” Interesting. The last question that also interests me very much. Tell me, did an anti-Nazi, anti-fascist movement exist in Finland during the war? Yes, it was, but it was very small, simply because the Communist Party, as we know, was very thinned out, this time. Secondly, the Communist Party was generally illegal, so most of the Communists were in prison at that time. And they couldn’t do anything serious. Indeed, there was, in my opinion, one underground group near Tampere, which, just like anti-fascists in Europe and anti-fascists in the occupied Soviet territories, blew up German trains. But there were, I think, 20 people. There was only one such group in all of Finland. But, again, their ranks swelled there when the Finns decided to create their own penal battalion and invited political ones there, too. Deserted? There, right there, in my opinion, in the train to the front, massive escapes began, there, in fact, half of the communists immediately jumped out of the car and simply went underground. Those who reached the front, many at the first opportunity went over to the side of the Red Army. How did their fate turn out later? To be honest, I don’t know about this. I did not deal specifically with those who defected from this 20th separate battalion “Black Arrow”, as it was called. Those. This is about the question of when political figures were allowed to go to the front. People who don't share... They haven't changed their beliefs? They didn’t change their beliefs, and after that... Did any of these people subsequently become famous in post-war Finland? Here is one of those who went to the front as a prisoner, he later became the Minister of the Interior either under Kekkonen or Paasikivi. Because then, after the war, this was, by the way, one of the conditions of the truce, that if the Communist Party was allowed, let’s return to normal parliamentary democracy. What was his name, do you remember? I don't remember now. Unfortunately, I don’t remember the names of politicians well, unlike generals. Those. it was there, but it was very small. And the defeat in the civil war, and the 30s, and the ban on the Communist Party, all this, of course, is simple for them... So you see how long and difficult the path to peace was, but, fortunately, peace has come. And let's hope that this peace will be much longer than the path to it. Yes exactly. Why are we telling all this, well, again, simply because in modern discussions, especially on the Internet, as a rule, the blame for all this is placed on only one side, i.e. to Russia. For all. Not for all of this, but for everything in general. To Russia, to the Soviet Union, that only we are to blame, and everyone else is not, it’s just like that. But this, again, is probably the most important postulate in propaganda, and indeed even in foreign policy, whoever is the first to shout “they started it first, and we are not to blame” turns out to be right. Those. people's perceptions. All these speeches of the Prime Minister, all the propaganda, this is exactly what... Yukka Rangel, he also says - we are generally waging a defensive war in relation to the war of 41-44, and for some reason we took Petrozavodsk, Olonets, Medvezhyegorsk, entered Vologda The area was so well defended successfully. But the most important lesson, probably, is that the struggle and conflicts between Finland and the Soviet Union, they were not of such a fundamental nature of a life-and-death struggle as with Nazi Germany. We have always had territorial disputes with the Finns, which have been resolved for now, and let's hope that the peace will not be interrupted anymore, because nothing good will come from this for anyone. And the second important point with which I would like to conclude our program today is that this is an absolutely ordinary and normal part of European history, i.e. our conflicts and tensions with Finland over border areas are an absolutely normal European situation. Please look at Alsace and Lorraine, the Sudetenland and any other border areas in Europe. Everything is the same, i.e. Before the Second World War, these borders were cut and redrawn as they wanted. This is such a part of the world in which we live, Europe. Fortunately, after World War II, this was stopped for some time. Those. to say that our borders were fixed after the Second World War, they will no longer change, but... They continue to change, over the past 20 years quite a lot of borders have changed. Yes. But let's hope for the best and all these things need to be understood when you talk about all the difficult relationships with neighbors. The same relations were with other countries - with Poland, with the Baltic states, with anyone. There were a lot of relations with Turkey. By the way, we were asked to talk about relationships with all our neighbors. This is a very interesting topic, I think we will get to it somehow. A vast, vast subject. That's all for today. Bair, thank you. Thank you. All the best, don’t forget, there, under the video, Bair left a lot of interesting links. Yes. That's it, thank you, all the best. Until next time. Until next time.

In the most popular tank reference book of F. Heigl in the 30s, published twice in the USSR in the “Commander’s Library” series, Hungary was given four emotional lines: “The Treaty of Trianon prohibits Hungary from possessing armored combat vehicles. However, in the heart of every Hungarian there is a protest against this treaty: “No!” No! Never!"

From this information, quite unique for a reference publication, one could conclude that the Hungarians did not agree with the terms of the treaty.

With the Treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920, the victorious powers in World War I limited the size of the armed forces of Hungary (a state that, as is known, arose after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918) to 35 thousand people, while prohibiting aviation, tanks and heavy artillery. An exception was made for 1 2 armored vehicles intended for police service.

Attempts to circumvent the restrictions of the treaty were made by Hungary repeatedly and not without success. In 1920, 14 German LK II light tanks were secretly acquired. The Entente Control Commission found out about this, but was unable to detect the tanks. Having dismantled the cars into parts, the Hungarians carefully hid them. In 1928, five tanks were assembled and assigned to the 1st Tank Company.

It should be noted that England, trying to contrast Hungary with the countries of the Little Entente - Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, turned a blind eye to violations of the Treaty of Trianon. As a result, in 1931 the Hungarians acquired five Italian FIAT 3000B tanks, a year later the English Carden-Loyd Mk VI wedge, and in 1937 the German Pz.lA light tank.

In August 1935, the first large batch of combat vehicles was purchased from Italy: 25 CV 3/33 tankettes, which received the Hungarian designation 35M; in 1936 - 125 CV 3/35 (37M) tankettes. The Hungarians installed their 8-mm machine guns of the 34/37M model, produced under a Czech license by Gebauer. Command vehicles were equipped with a square commander's cupola. Subsequently, wedges fought in Yugoslavia, and in 1941, 65 vehicles took part in combat operations on the Soviet-German front.

In 1938, the Hungarian government adopted a plan for the modernization and development of the armed forces. In particular, much attention was given to measures to create armored forces. The main difficulty along this path was the lack of tanks, although the Hungarian industry was able to produce modern combat vehicles. To speed up the process, we took the path of purchasing licenses.

In March 1938, the Swedish company LandsverkAB in Landskrona was ordered one copy of the Landsverk L60B tank. Upon arrival in Hungary, it was subjected to comparative tests along with the German Pz.lA. The Swedish vehicle demonstrated incomparably better combat and specifications. They decided to take her as a model for light tank Hungarian production, called 38M To Id i.

As for medium tanks, the situation was somewhat more complicated. Our own designs (Straussler's V-3 and V-4 tanks) were still far from complete, and attempts to acquire combat vehicles abroad (Landsverk LAGO tank, Italian M11/39 and German Pz.IV) ended in failure.

At the beginning of 1940, Hungarian specialists became interested in the experimental medium tank S-2c (T-21) of the Czechoslovak company Skoda. The latter was a development of the famous light tank of the same company S-2a (LT-35), which the Hungarians were able to get acquainted with in March 1939, when they occupied Czechoslovakia together with German units. Experts from the Institute spoke in favor of the T-21 military equipment, in their opinion, it was the best medium tank of all those actually available. The Germans were not at all interested in this car, and they did not object to handing it over to the Hungarians. After testing, on August 7, 1940, the parties signed a license contract. On September 3, the tank was adopted by the Hungarian army under the name 40M Turan.

Attempts to create a heavy tank of our own design, Tas (“Tosh”), armed with the German 75-mm KwK 42 cannon, were unsuccessful.

In 1943, based on the Turan tank, the Zrinyi assault self-propelled gun was developed and mass-produced, modeled after German assault guns.

A license for the production of another anti-aircraft self-propelled gun Anti based on the L60B tank was purchased from the Swedes. It was produced in Hungary under the name Nimrod and was based on the chassis of the Toldi light tank.

In 1932, the first attempt was made to create a Hungarian armored car. Then and subsequently, until 1937, this work was carried out under the leadership of the talented engineer N. Straussler. By 1940, the 39M Csaba armored car was developed and launched into production in Hungary.

In 1943, the project of a heavy armored car similar to the German four-axle armored vehicle Puma was completed, but they did not have time to start its production.

Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union on June 27, 1941. By this time, almost all of the Hungarian armored vehicles were part of the so-called “mobile corps” (Gyorshadtest). It included the 1st and 2nd motorized brigades with the 9th and 11th tank battalions, respectively, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade with the 11th Armored Cavalry Battalion. Tank battalions consisted of three tank companies of 18 vehicles each. The armored cavalry battalion had two mixed companies with CV 3/35 tankettes and Toldi light tanks. In total, the “mobile corps” consisted of 81 Toldi tanks in the first line. Since the fall of 1943, one of the companies of the tank battalions was armed with Nimrod self-propelled guns.

In 1943, the 1st and 2nd tank divisions were deployed on the basis of motorized brigades. Each division included a three-battalion tank regiment (39 medium tanks per battalion), a motorized infantry brigade, an artillery regiment and other support and support units.

The 1st Cavalry Division, formed at the same time, included an armored cavalry battalion with 56 Toldi tanks.

In October 1943, the formation of assault gun battalions began.

The Hungarian army also had significant quantities of foreign armored vehicles coming from Germany. At the same time, the Hungarians received both German-made combat vehicles and captured tanks captured by the Wehrmacht. It should be emphasized that since Hungary turned out to be Germany’s most reliable and combat-ready ally, it received the most modern German armored vehicles, as can be seen from the table below.

Light tank (konnyu harckocsi) 38M Toldi

The first large-scale tank of the Hungarian army. It is a partially redesigned Swedish light tank Landsverk L60B, the production of which was licensed in 1938. Produced by Ganz and MAVAG from 1939 to 1943. 199 units produced.

Serial modifications:

38M Toldi I - basic version. The tank's hull and chassis did not undergo significant changes compared to the Swedish prototype. The turret underwent minor changes: in particular, hatches in the sides, viewing slots, as well as a cannon and machine gun mantlet. Combat weight 8.5 tons, crew 3 people. Armament: 20mm 36M anti-tank rifle and 8mm 34/37M machine gun. 80 units produced.

38M Toldi II - additional armor protection for the frontal part of the hull and along the perimeter of the turret. 110 units produced.

38M Toldi Pa - 40 mm 42M cannon with a barrel length of 45 calibers and a coaxial 8 mm 34/40AM machine gun. The thickness of the mask armor is 35 mm. The tank's mass is 9.35 tons, its speed is 47 km/h, and its range is 190 km. Ammunition 55 rounds and 3200 rounds. Converted from Toldi II 80 units.

43M Toldi III is the best version of the tank with frontal armor of the hull and turret increased to 20 mm. The gun mantlet and driver's cabin were protected by 35 mm armor. The widened rear of the turret made it possible to increase the gun's ammunition capacity to 87 rounds. 9 units produced.

Toldi tanks entered service with the 1st and 2nd motorized and 1st cavalry brigades. These units took part in hostilities against Yugoslavia in April 1941, and two months later, as part of the so-called “mobile corps,” against the USSR. Initially, they included 81 Toldi tanks, then 14 more arrived. The corps fought about 1000 km to the Donets River, and in November 1941 returned to their homeland. Of the 95 Toldi that took part in the battles, 62 vehicles were repaired and restored, only 25 of them due to combat damage, and the rest due to transmission failures. In general, the operation of the tank showed that its mechanical reliability is low, and its armament is too weak (an anti-tank rifle at a distance of 300 m penetrated only a 14-mm armor plate located at an angle of 30° to the vertical). As a result, the tank could only be used as a reconnaissance and communications vehicle. In 1942, only 19 Toldi were sent to the Eastern Front. By February 1943, during the defeat of the Hungarian army, almost all of them were destroyed.

Since 1943, “Toldi” of all modifications were mostly part of the 1st and 2nd tank and 1st cavalry divisions and took part in hostilities in the USSR, Poland and Hungary. On June 6, 1944, the Hungarian army had another 66 Toldi I and 63 Toldi II and Toldi NA tanks. During the 1944-1945 campaign they were lost.

38M Toldi I

38M Toldi On

43M Toldi III

TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE Toldi I TANK

COMBAT WEIGHT, t: 8.5.

CREW, people: 3.

OVERALL DIMENSIONS, mm: length - 4750, width - 2140, height - 1872, ground clearance - 350.

ARMAMENT: 1 36M anti-tank rifle, 20 mm caliber, 1 34/37M machine gun, 8 mm caliber.

AMMUNITION: 208 rounds for a shotgun, 2400 rounds for a machine gun.

RESERVATION, mm: front, side and rear of the hull - 13, roof and bottom - 6, turret -1 3,

ENGINE: Bussing-NAG L8V/36TR, 8-cylinder, carburetor, V-shaped; power 1 55 hp (114 kW), working volume 7913 cm?.

TRANSMISSION: dry friction main clutch, five-speed planetary gearbox, lockable differential, side clutches.

CHASSIS: four double rubber-coated road wheels on board, two support rollers, front drive wheel; suspension - individual torsion bar.

OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME: ascent angle, degrees. - 40; wall height, m ​​- 0.6; ditch width, m - 1.75; ford depth, m - 0.7.

COMMUNICATIONS: radio station R/5.

Medium tank (kozepes harckocsi) 40M Turan

A medium tank, which was a slightly modified version of the Czechoslovak experimental tank S-2c (T-21) from Skoda. In preparation for serial production, a Hungarian gun and engine were installed on it, the armor was strengthened, and surveillance devices and communications equipment were replaced. The most popular Hungarian tank. In 1941 - 1944, 424 units were manufactured by Manfred Weiss, Magyar Vagon, MAVAG and Ganz.

Serial modifications:

40M Turan I is the first and most numerous option. In design and layout it is most similar to the Czech prototype. 285 units produced.

41M Turan II - 75-mm 41M cannon with a barrel length of 25 calibers, ammunition capacity of 56 rounds. The shape of the turret and commander's cupola has been changed. Combat weight 19.2 tons, speed 43 km/h, cruising range 150 km. 139 units were produced.

Turans began to arrive in service in May 1942, when the first 12 tanks arrived at the tank school in Esztergom. On October 30, 1943, Honvedscheg had 242 tanks of this type. The most fully equipped was the 3rd Tank Regiment of the 2nd Tank Division, which had 120 vehicles. There were 61 Turan I tanks in the 1st Tank Regiment of the 1st Tank Division, and 56 tanks of this type were in the 1st Cavalry Division. In addition, the 1st company of self-propelled guns had two Turans and three vehicles were used as training vehicles.

"Turan II" began to enter the army in May 1943, and in March 1944 there were 107 "Turan II" tanks in the Hungarian army.

In April, the 2nd Panzer Division was sent to the front, consisting of 120 Turan I and 55 Turan II. Hungarian medium tanks received their baptism of fire on April 17, 1944, when the division counterattacked the advancing Soviet units near Kolomyia. The tank attack on difficult wooded and mountainous terrain was unsuccessful. By April 26, the advance of the Hungarian troops was stopped. The losses amounted to 30 tanks. In September, the division took part in the battles near Torda, suffered heavy losses, and was withdrawn to the rear.

The 1st Cavalry Division took part in heavy fighting in eastern Poland in the summer of 1944. Having lost all its tanks, it was withdrawn to Hungary in September.

Since September 1944, 124 Turans of the 1st Panzer Division fought in Transylvania. On October 30, the battles for Budapest began and lasted 4 months. The 2nd Panzer Division was surrounded in the city itself, while the 1st Panzer and 1st Cavalry divisions fought to the north of it. In fierce battles near Lake Balaton in March - April 1945, the Hungarian tank forces ceased to exist. At the same time, the last “Turans” were destroyed or captured by the Red Army.

Self-propelled artillery mounts and command tanks were produced on the basis of this vehicle.

40M Turan I

41M Turan II

TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 40M Turan I TANK

COMBAT WEIGHT, t: 18.2.

CREW, people: 5.

OVERALL DIMENSIONS, mm: length - 5550, width - 2440, height - 2390, ground clearance - 380.

ARMAMENT: 1 41 M cannon, 40 mm caliber, 2 34/40AM machine guns, 8 mm caliber.

AMMUNITION: 101 shots, 3000 rounds.

AIMING DEVICES: telescopic sight.

RESERVATION, mm: hull front - 50...60, side and stern - 25, roof and bottom - 8...25, turret - 50...60.

ENGINE: Manfred Weiss-Z, 8-cylinder, carburetor, V-twin, liquid cooled; power 265 hp (195 kW) at 2200 rpm, displacement 14,886 cm?.

TRANSMISSION: multi-disc main dry friction clutch, planetary six-speed (3+3) gearbox, planetary turning mechanism, final drives.

CHASSIS: eight double rubber-coated road wheels on board, interlocked in pairs into two balancing bogies, each of which was suspended on two semi-elliptic leaf springs, a thrust roller, five support rollers, a rear drive wheel; each caterpillar has 107 tracks with a width of 420 mm.

MAX SPEED, km/h: 47.

POWER RESERVE, km: 165.

OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME: ascent angle, degrees. -45; ditch width, m - 2.2; wall height, m ​​- 0.8; ford depth, m - 0.9.

Self-propelled gun (pancelvadasz) 40M Nimrod

A light anti-tank self-propelled gun developed by the Swedish company Landsverk based on the L60B tank. In the Hungarian version, the self-propelled gun was based on the extended chassis of the Toldi light tank. At the end of the war it was used mainly as a self-propelled gun. In 1941 - 1944, MAVAG manufactured 135 units.

Serial modification:

On the chassis of the Toldi tank, which is extended by one track roller, a rotating turret with weapons is installed, open at the top. The turret housed five crew members. The 40-mm automatic cannon is mounted on a stand in the central part of the hull.

“Nimrods” began to arrive in service with the troops in February 1942. Since these self-propelled guns were considered anti-tank, they formed the basis of the 51st tank destroyer battalion of the 1st Panzer Division, which was part of the 2nd Hungarian Army, which arrived on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1942. Of the 19 “nimrods” (3 companies of 6 self-propelled guns plus the battalion commander’s vehicle), after the defeat of the Hungarian army in January 1943, only 3 vehicles survived.

Having suffered a complete fiasco in the anti-tank field, Nimrods began to be used as air defense weapons ground forces, and very effectively.

During the battles with the Red Army in Galicia in April 1944, the 2nd Tank Division had 37 ZSUs of this type, of which 17 vehicles were in the 52nd tank destroyer battalion. In addition, five companies of 4 vehicles each formed the air defense of the division. On December 7, 1944, the 2nd TD had another 26 ZSUs in service. 10 Nimrods took part in the German counterattack at Lake Balaton. Several of these self-propelled guns fought in surrounded Budapest.

40M Nimrod

TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SAU 40M Nimrod COMBAT WEIGHT, t: 10.5.

CREW, people: 6.

OVERALL DIMENSIONS, mm: length - 5320, width - 2300, height - 2800, ground clearance -350.

ARMAMENT: 1 automatic anti-aircraft gun 36M 40 mm caliber.

AMMUNITION: 160 rounds.

RESERVATION, mm: hull front - 1 3, side and stern - 7, bottom - 6, turret - 13.

ENGINE and TRANSMISSION - like the base tank.

CHASSIS: five double rubber-coated road wheels on board, three support rollers, front drive wheel; suspension - individual torsion bar.

MAX SPEED, km/h: 50.

POWER RESERVE, km: 225.

OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME: ascent angle, degrees - 40; ditch width, m - 2.2; wall height, m ​​- 0.8; ford depth, m - 0.9.

COMMUNICATIONS: radio station R/5a (only on command vehicles).

Self-propelled gun 43M Zrinvi II

An assault weapon created on the basis of the Turan medium tank, modeled on the German StuG III. The most successful Hungarian armored vehicle of the Second World War. In 1944, Manfred Weiss and Ganz produced 66 units.

Serial modification:

In the front plate of the low-profile armored cabin, a converted 105-mm MAVAG infantry howitzer with a 20.5-caliber barrel length is installed in a frame. The body is of riveted construction. All crew members, including the driver, were located in the wheelhouse.

On October 1, 1943, the Hungarian army began to form assault artillery battalions of 30 self-propelled guns each, which, along with German-made combat vehicles, began to receive Zrinyi II. By the beginning of 1945, all remaining self-propelled guns of this type were part of the 20th Eger and 24th Kosice battalions. The last units, armed with zrinyi, capitulated on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

The Zrinyi were typical assault weapons. They successfully accompanied the attacking infantry with fire and maneuver, but struggled Soviet tanks in 1944 they could no longer do so. An attempt to arm a self-propelled gun with a long-barreled 75-mm cannon (“Zrinyi I”) was reduced to the production of one prototype.

43 M Zrinyi II

43M Zrinyi I

TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SAU 43M Zrinyi II

COMBAT WEIGHT, t: 21.6.

CREW, people: 4.

OVERALL DIMENSIONS, mm: length - 5550, width - 2900, height -1900, ground clearance - 380.

ARMAMENT: 1 howitzer 40/43M 105 mm caliber.

AMMUNITION: 52 rounds.

RESERVATION, mm: hull front - 75, side and stern - 25, roof and bottom - 8...25.

ENGINE, TRANSMISSION and CHASSIS - like the base tank.

MAX SPEED, km/h: 43.

POWER RESERVE, km: 220.

OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME: ascent angle, degrees. - 45; wall height, m ​​- 0.8; ditch width, m-2.2; ford depth, m - 0.9.

COMMUNICATIONS: radio station R/5a.

Armored car (felderito oenceikocsi) 39M Csaba

The only serial Hungarian light reconnaissance armored vehicle. It is one of the most successful vehicles of this type during the Second World War. Produced by Manfred Weiss from 1940 to 1944. 135 units produced.

Serial modifications:

39M - the turret and supporting hull are riveted, assembled from straight armor plates located at rational angles of inclination. The engine was located in the stern on the right, and the rear control station on the left. 105 units produced.

40M - commander version, armed only with an 8 mm machine gun. Radio stations R/4 and R/5 with loop antenna. Combat weight 5.85 tons. 30 units manufactured.

Chabo armored vehicles entered service with the 1st and 2nd motorized and 1st and 2nd cavalry brigades, one company each. The company included 10 combat vehicles, one command vehicle and two training vehicles. The mountain rifle brigade had a platoon of three Chabos. All of these formations, with the exception of the 1st KBR, together with the Wehrmacht took part in the aggression against Yugoslavia in April 1941.

In the summer of the same year, the 2nd motorized and 1st cavalry brigades, as well as a company of armored vehicles of the 2nd cavalry brigade - a total of 57 Chabos - fought on the Soviet-German front. By December, 40 armored vehicles were lost. During the fighting, the weakness of their weapons and armor was revealed.

By the summer of 1944, there were 48 Chabos left in the Hungarian army, 14 of which fought in Poland as part of the 1st Cavalry Division.

The last time armored vehicles of this type took part in battles on Hungarian territory was in the winter of 1945. All of them were destroyed by the Red Army.

39M Csaba

TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 39M Csaba ARMORED VEHICLE

COMBAT WEIGHT, t: 5.95.

CREW, people: 4.

OVERALL DIMENSIONS, mm: length - 45 20, width - 2100, height - 2270, wheelbase - 3000, track - 1700, ground clearance -333.

ARMAMENT: 1 36 M anti-tank rifle, 20 mm caliber, 1 34/37AM machine gun, 8 mm caliber.

AMMUNITION: 200 rounds of 20 mm caliber, 3000 rounds of 8 mm caliber.

ARMOR, mm: hull front-13, side-7, turret-10.

ENGINE: Ford G61T, 8-cylinder, carburetor, V-shaped, liquid cooling; power 90 hp (66.2 kW), working volume 3560 cm?.

TRANSMISSION: six-speed gearbox, transfer case.

CHASSIS: wheel arrangement 4x2 (when driving in reverse 4x4), tire size 10.50-20, suspension on transverse semi-elliptic springs.

MAX SPEED, km/h: 65.

POWER RESERVE, km: 150.

OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME: ascent angle, degrees - 30; wall height, m ​​- 0.5; ford depth, m - 1.

COMMUNICATIONS: radio station R/4.

author Kolpakidi Alexander Ivanovich

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From the book Heinkel He 111. History of creation and use author Ivanov S.V.

Hungary Representatives of the Hungarian air force In the summer of 1940, they negotiated with the German side on the purchase of 40 He 111N. But, probably due to the intervention of Romania, the deal could not be concluded and Hungary had to be satisfied with two He 111R transport versions.

From the book Self-loading pistols author Kashtanov Vladislav Vladimirovich

Hungary Femaru 37M Before World War II, the Hungarian army adopted a pistol from the Femaru Fegyven es Gepgyar RT model 37M designed by Rudolf Frommer. This weapon appeared as a result of rethinking the role of an officer's service pistol on the battlefield. Combat experience,

From the book Armored vehicles of European countries 1939-1945. author Baryatinsky Mikhail

Hungary In the most popular tank reference book of F. Heigl in the 30s, published twice in the USSR in the “Commander’s Library” series, Hungary was given four emotional lines: “The Treaty of Trianon prohibits Hungary from possessing armored combat vehicles. However

Medium tank "Turan"

At the beginning of 1940, Hungarian specialists became interested in the experimental medium tank Gb2s (T-21) of the Czechoslovak company Jlkoda. The latter was a development of the famous light tank of the same company 1Ъ2a (LT-35), which the Hungarians were able to get acquainted with in March 1939. Experts from the Institute of Military Technology spoke in favor of the T-21; they considered it the best medium tank of all those actually available. The Germans were not at all attracted to this car, and they did not object to handing it over to the Hungarians. On June 3, 1940, the T-21 was sent to Budapest, and on June 10 it arrived at the Honvedscheg Central Test Site in Haimaskeri. After tests, during which the T-21 traveled 800 km without breakdowns, on August 7, 1940, the parties signed a license contract. On September 3, the vehicle was adopted by the Hungarian army under the name “Turan”. Turan is the mythological ancestral home of the Magyars, located in Central Asia, from where they began their migration to Europe in the 6th century. Soon the tank received the army index 40M.

Medium tank T-21

In preparation for mass production, the original Czech design underwent some modernization and changes. A Hungarian gun and engine were installed, the armor was strengthened, and surveillance devices and communications equipment were replaced. This work was carried out under the guidance of the designer of the Manfred Weiss company, engineer Janos Korbul. First order for 230

combat vehicles, issued by the Ministry of Defense on September 19, 1940, were divided between four companies: Manfred Weiss (70 units), Magyar Vagon (70), MAVAG (40) and Ganz (50). However, there was still a long way to go from the issuance of the order to its actual implementation. The start of production was hampered by the lack of a complete set of technical documentation, since the latest drawings from Jlkoda were received only in March 1941. The execution of modernization drawings was also delayed. As a result, the first Turan prototype, made of non-armored steel, left the factory floor only on July 8. The troops began to receive new tanks only in May 1942. A total of 285 40M Turan 40 tanks were produced; in Russian literature they are sometimes referred to as “Turan I”.

The layout and design of the hull and turret, assembled using riveting on a frame made from angles, basically corresponded to the Czech prototype. The thickness of the rolled armor plates of the frontal part of the hull and turret was 50 - 60 mm, the sides and stern - 25 mm, the roof and bottom - 8 - 25 mm.

Medium tank T-21 in the yard of the Skoda plant. The vehicle is equipped with Czechoslovakian weapons: a 47-mm vz.38 cannon and two 7.92 ZB vz.37 machine guns. The MTO roof has been dismantled

The 40-mm 41M 40/51 gun was developed by MAVAG based on the 37-mm 37M gun intended for the V-4 tank, an anti-tank gun of the same caliber and the Skoda 37-mm A7 gun. One 8-mm 34/40AM Gebauer machine gun was installed in the turret in a ball mount, the other in the front plate of the hull on the left along with an optical sight, protected, like the barrels of both machine guns, by a massive armor casing. The cannon's ammunition included 101 rounds, and the machine guns' ammunition included 3,000 rounds.

Turan I

The tank was equipped with six periscope observation devices and a viewing slot with a triplex in the front hull plate opposite the driver's seat. An R/5a radio station was installed near the radio operator's position.

8-cylinder carburetor V-type engine Manfred Weiss-Z with a power of 265 hp. at 2200 rpm it allowed a tank weighing 18.2 tons to accelerate to a maximum speed of 47 km/h. The capacity of the fuel tanks is 265 l, the range is 165 km.

Medium tank "Turan I" during the crossing. 2nd Panzer Division. Poland, 1944

The Turan transmission consisted of a multi-disc main dry friction clutch, a planetary 6-speed gearbox, a planetary turning mechanism and final drives. The transmission units were controlled using a pneumatic servo drive. A backup mechanical drive was also provided.

It should be noted that, having a specific power of 14.5 hp/t, the Turan had good mobility and maneuverability. They were provided, among other things, with convenient controls that did not require much physical effort.

Turan I with armored screens

Lengthwise cut

Cross section

Layout of the Turan I tank: 1 - installation of a forward machine gun and an optical sight; 2 - observation devices; 3 - fuel tank; 4 - engine; 5 - gearbox; 6 - rotation mechanism; 7 - lever of the mechanical (backup) drive of the rotation mechanism; 8 - gear shift lever; 9 - pneumatic cylinder of the tank control system; 10 - lever for driving the turning mechanism with pneumatic booster; 11 - machine gun embrasure; 12 - driver's inspection hatch; 13 - accelerator pedal; 14 - brake pedal; 15 - main clutch pedal; 16 - turret rotation mechanism; 17 - gun embrasure

The chassis was generally similar to the chassis of the light Czechoslovakian tank LT-35 and, for one side, consisted of eight rubber-coated twin small-diameter road wheels, interlocked in pairs and assembled into two bogies, each of which was suspended on two semi-elliptical leaf springs. One double roller was installed between the front bogie and the guide wheel, which had a gear ring, making it easier for the tank to overcome vertical obstacles. The drive wheel was located at the rear. The upper branch of the caterpillar rested on five dual rubberized support rollers. The design of the chassis provided the tank with a smooth ride without strong vertical vibrations or swaying.

In addition to the linear tank, a command version of the Turan RK was also developed, intended for commanders of companies, battalions and regiments. This vehicle had not only a standard R/5a radio station, but also an R/4T radio station, the antenna of which was mounted on the rear plate of the turret.

In May 1941, that is, even before the new tanks entered the army, the Hungarian General Staff raised the question of modernizing the Turan in order to change its armament, apparently under the impression of German tank Pz.IV. The vehicle, designated 41M “Turan 75” (“Turan II”), was equipped with a 75-mm 41M cannon with a 25-caliber barrel length and a horizontal wedge breech. The turret had to be redone, increasing its height by 45 mm and changing the shape and size of the fixed commander's cupola. Ammunition was reduced to 52 artillery rounds. The remaining components and assemblies of the tank have not undergone any changes. The weight of the vehicle increased to 19.2 tons, the speed and range decreased slightly. In May 1942, "Turan II" was put into service, in 1943 it was launched into mass production; until June 1944, 139 units were produced.

"Turan I" from the 2nd Tank Division. Eastern Front, April 1944

Commander "Turan II". A characteristic external difference between this vehicle and a linear tank was the presence of three radio antennas on the turret. Only the front-mounted machine gun has been retained; the turret machine gun and cannon are missing (a wooden imitation is installed instead of a gun)

Along with linear tanks, 43M Turan II command vehicles were also produced. Their armament consisted of only one 8-mm machine gun in the front hull. The turret machine gun and cannon were missing, and instead of the latter, a wooden imitation was installed. The tower housed three radio stations - R/4T, R/5a and the German FuG 16.

Since the short-barreled gun was not suitable for fighting tanks, the Institute of Military Technology was instructed to study the issue of arming the Turan with a long-barreled 75-mm 43M cannon. At the same time, it was planned to increase the thickness of the frontal armor of the hull to 80 mm. The mass was supposed to increase to 23 tons.

In December 1943, a sample of the 44M Turan III tank was manufactured, but serial production could not be launched due to the lack of a sufficient number of guns.

In 1944, the Turans, following the example of the German Pz.NI and Pz.IV tanks, began to be fitted with screens that protected them from cumulative shells. A set of such screens for Turan weighed 635 kg.

As already mentioned, Turans began to enter service with the troops in May 1942, when the first 12 vehicles arrived at the tank school in Esztergom. On October 30, 1943, Honvedscheg had 242 tanks of this type. The 3rd Tank Regiment of the 2nd was the most fully equipped

tank division - it had 120 vehicles, and in the 1st tank regiment of the 1st tank division - 61 Turan 40, another 56 units were part of the 1st cavalry division. In addition, the 1st company of self-propelled guns had two “turans” and three were used as training ones.

Turan 75 tanks began to arrive in Hungarian troops in May 1943; by the end of August there were already 49 of them, and by March 1944 - 107.

The photo above shows a massive armored mantlet for the recoil devices of a 75 mm cannon.
In the center is an autonomous installation of a forward machine gun, the barrel of which is covered with an armor casing. The bulletproof bolt heads are clearly visible. On the sides of the turret of this tank, in addition to the screens, there are track tracks.
Below are armored casings for the sight and machine gun

In April of the same year, the 2nd Panzer Division was sent to the front, consisting of 120 Turan 40s and 55 Turan 75s. Hungarian medium tanks received their baptism of fire on April 17, when the division counterattacked the advancing Soviet units near Kolomyia. The tank attack on difficult wooded and mountainous terrain was unsuccessful. By April 26, the advance of the Hungarian troops was stopped. The losses amounted to 30 tanks. In August - September, the division took part in the battles near Stanislav (now Ivano-Frankivsk), suffered heavy losses, and was withdrawn to the rear.

The 1st Cavalry Division took part in heavy fighting in eastern Poland in the summer of 1944, retreating to Warsaw. Having lost all its tanks, it was withdrawn to Hungary in September.

Since September 1944, 124 Turans of the 1st Tank Division fought in Transylvania. In December, fighting took place in Hungary, near Debrecen and Nyiregyhazy. In addition to the 1st, both other mentioned divisions also took part in them. On October 30, the battle for Budapest began and lasted four months. The 2nd Panzer Division was surrounded in the city itself, while the 1st Panzer and 1st Cavalry divisions fought north of the capital. As a result of fierce battles near Lake Balaton in March - April 1945, the Hungarian tank forces ceased to exist. At the same time, the last “Turans” were destroyed or captured by the Red Army.

"Turan II" with mesh screens modeled after the German "Thoma type"

A Red Army soldier inspects a captured Turan II tank equipped with mesh screens. 1944

As already mentioned, the Hungarian medium tank was created on the basis of a Czechoslovak design from the mid-1930s. If preparations for its serial production had not been so delayed and if its release had been completed by 1941, the Turan could have become a formidable adversary for the Soviet BT and T-26. But in April 1944, this angular riveted machine was already a complete anachronism. It should be noted that the Hungarians adopted the German experience with a significant delay: the Turan II received a short-barreled 75-mm cannon similar to the Pz.IV. at a time when German tanks were already being rearmed with long-barreled guns.

In 1942, again taking into account German experience, the Hungarians decided to create their own assault weapon. The only suitable base for it was the Turan, the width of which was increased by 450 mm. In the 75-mm front plate of the low-profile riveted armored cabin, a converted 105-mm infantry howitzer 40M from MAVAG with a barrel length of 20.5 caliber was installed in the frame. Horizontal pointing angles of the howitzer are ±11°, elevation angle is +25°. The self-propelled gun's ammunition consisted of 52 separate-loading rounds. The vehicle did not have a machine gun. The engine, transmission and chassis remained the same as the base tank. The combat weight was 21.6 tons. The crew consisted of four people. This most successful Hungarian armored fighting vehicle of the Second World War period, designated 40/43M “Zrinyi 105” (“Zrinyi II”), named after the national hero of Hungary Miklós Zrinyi, was put into service in January 1943 and released in small quantities - only 66 units.

On October 1, 1943, assault artillery battalions of 30 self-propelled guns each began to be formed in the Hungarian army, which, along with German-made combat vehicles, began to receive Zrinyi assault guns. By 1945, all remaining self-propelled guns of this type were part of the 20th Eger and 24th Kosice battalions. The last units armed with these self-propelled guns capitulated on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

Zrinyi I

Zrinyi II

Armed with a 105-mm howitzer, the Zrinyi self-propelled gun was a powerful assault weapon

A battery of Zrinyi II self-propelled guns during tactical training. 1943

"Zrinyi" were typical assault guns. They successfully accompanied the attacking infantry with fire and maneuver, but in 1944 they could no longer fight Soviet tanks. In a similar situation, the Germans re-equipped their StuG III with long-barreled guns, turning them into tank destroyers. The Hungarians, with their more backward economy, found such an event beyond their capabilities.

Only two combat vehicles from the family of Hungarian medium tanks have survived to this day. “Turan 75” (number 2N423) and “Zrinyi 105” (number ZN022) can be seen on display at the Museum of Armored Weapons and Equipment in Kubinka near Moscow.

The phrase “Hungarian tank building” itself brings a smile today. In fairness, it is worth noting that in the 1940s there was not much European countries could afford to produce tanks. Despite all attempts, Hungarian designers failed to create competitive combat vehicles; they always lagged behind the leading tank-building powers. The Hungarian Turan tank had no chance of catching up with Soviet tanks in terms of protection and firepower.

Medium tank 41.M Turan II

For all their shortcomings, Turan tanks took an active part in the fighting on the Eastern Front, and Hungary itself was one of the most loyal allies of Nazi Germany. Hungarian troops fought on the side of the Nazis almost until the end of the war in Europe. In total, during mass production from 1942 to 1944, up to 459 Turan tanks of various modifications were assembled in Hungary, according to various estimates. The last combat operation of the Second World War, in which Turan tanks took part, was the battle at Lake Balaton in March-April 1945. It was in this area that the last combat-ready Hungarian tanks were lost, and some of the vehicles were captured by Soviet troops.

Czechoslovakian roots of the Hungarian Turan tank

Despite the fact that the Hungarian troops took an active part in the battles on the Eastern Front, they did not gain any glory in these battles with the Soviet troops, and the Hungarians did not have much noticeable success in the battle with the Red Army soldiers. Hungarian units were most actively used in the southern direction of the Eastern Front, and the main theater of combat for the Hungarian army was the steppes, where the capabilities of motorized and tank units were best revealed. But the Magyar units had serious problems with armored vehicles; Hungarian armored vehicles simply could not compete on an equal footing with the Soviet T-34 medium tanks and heavy KVs. This is not surprising, given that Hungarian tank building began only in the late 1930s.

Prior to this, the Hungarian government tried to conclude contracts for the supply of armored vehicles with several countries at once. Thus, the Toldi light tank was ordered from Sweden, the main armament of which was a 20-mm anti-tank rifle. The mass of these combat vehicles did not exceed 8.5 tons, and the armor of the first series was 13 mm. The tank was created on the basis of the Swedish Landsverk L-60, one copy and a production license for which were acquired by Hungary. Naturally, the Hungarian military dreamed of getting more advanced tanks with better weapons and security. But attempts to negotiate with Germany on the purchase of Pz.Kpfw tanks. III and Pz.Kpfw. IV ended in nothing. The same fate awaited negotiations with Italy for the transfer of a license for the production of medium tanks M13/40; negotiations dragged on until the summer of 1940, when the need for Italian vehicles simply disappeared.

Prototype of the Czechoslovak T-21 tank

The savior of the Hungarian armored forces was Czechoslovakia, which was completely occupied by Nazi troops in March 1939. The country's well-developed industry was in the hands of Germany, as well as numerous military developments, among which was tank S-II-c or T-21, developed by Skoda designers. Fighting machine was developed on the basis of the successful Czech tank LT vz.35, which was widely used in Wehrmacht units. The Germans were not interested in the T-21, so they were not against transferring finished prototypes to Hungary. In turn, Hungarian experts considered the tanks to be the best among all medium tanks available for the country. At the same time, the Hungarians could not place an order for the production of tanks at the Skoda factories, since they were fully loaded with German orders.

The first prototype of the future Turan tank arrived in Hungary in early June 1940. After testing and traveling 800 km without breakdowns, the vehicle was recommended for adoption in July of the same year after a number of modifications and improvements were made to the design. Important changes included: the appearance of a commander's cupola; increase in frontal armor to 50 mm; and increasing the tank crew to five people, with three people placed in the turret. The example for the Hungarians when making changes to the design of the tank were the Germans, who were considered recognized authorities in tank building and the use of tank forces.

The version of the tank modernized by the Hungarians was put into service on November 28, 1940 under the designation 40.M, and the tank received its proper name “Turan”. Delays in the transfer of technical documentation and the deployment of serial production of tanks, which simply did not exist in Hungary until the end of the 1930s, led to the fact that the first serial Turan tanks reached the tank school in the Hungarian city of Esztergom only in May 1942.

Tank late for the war

For its time, the Turan was not at all the worst combat vehicle in the world. It is important to understand that Czechoslovak engineers presented the first prototype of the future Hungarian tank back in the winter of 1937. The tank was initially developed for export; it was planned that its buyers would be the armies of Italy, Romania and Hungary. In May 1939, the tank changed its designation to T-21 and a year later it ended up in Hungary under this designation. For the late 1930s, the combat capabilities of the Czech tank were still suitable. Frontal armor reinforced to 30 mm (compared to the LT vz.35) and the presence of a 47 mm Skoda A11 cannon made the vehicle quite formidable on the battlefield.

The main problem was that the tank, developed in the late 1930s, was late for the war for which it was created. The Hungarian adaptation, although it received frontal armor reinforced to 50-60 mm (all armor plates were installed vertically or with slight angles of inclination) and a commander's cupola, was distinguished by the installation of a 40-mm semi-automatic gun of its own production 41.M, created on the basis of the German anti-tank gun PaK 35/ 36. Despite the good barrel length of 51 caliber, the gun could not boast of great armor penetration. At a distance of 300 meters at an angle of contact with armor of 30 degrees, the armor-piercing projectile of this gun penetrated only 42 mm of armor, and at a distance of a kilometer - 30 mm. The capabilities of the 40-mm gun were more than enough to combat the light Soviet tanks T-26 and BT-7, which formed the basis of the Red Army tank fleet in 1941, but they could not withstand the new Soviet tanks T-34 and KV Turan.

Hungarian medium tank 40.M Turan I with 40 mm gun

The problem was aggravated by the fact that the first serial Hungarian tanks began to roll off the production line only in 1942; they did not have time to take part in the offensive against Stalingrad and the Caucasus. But this also saved them from the subsequent disaster, in which the 2nd Hungarian Army, fighting on the Eastern Front, according to various estimates, lost up to 150 thousand personnel, up to 70 percent of its material and all heavy weapons.

Assessing the capabilities of the Turan tank

The full combat debut of the Turan tanks dragged on for two years; they took part in battles with Soviet troops only in April 1944. By that time, attempts were made to modernize the tanks that were late to the war. Already in 1942, in parallel with the Turan I, in Hungary they decided to begin assembling the Turan II tank, the main difference of which was the presence of a 75-mm short-barreled gun with a barrel length of 25 calibers. The weight of this version of the Hungarian tank increased from 18.2 to 19.2 tons. At the same time, the 8-cylinder gasoline engine with a capacity of 265 hp remained the same. accelerated the car to 43 km/h when driving on the highway; the version with a 40-mm cannon had slightly better performance - 47 km/h. The updated modification received the designation 41.M Turan II.

Attempts by the Hungarian military to give the tank project from the late 1930s a second life should be considered unsuccessful. But they were unsuccessful precisely because of the time the tank appeared on the battlefield. Back in 1940 and 1941, the vehicle would have looked advantageous compared to light tanks with bulletproof armor, which formed the basis of the armored forces of the Red Army. But in 1944, the main opponents of the Turans were the T-34 and T-34-85 medium tanks, which the Hungarian tank crews simply could not fight on equal terms. The 40-mm cannon did not penetrate the frontal armor of the T-34 at any distance; at least it was only possible to effectively penetrate the lower part of the side armor plates of the T-34. The transition to a short-barreled 75-mm cannon did not significantly change the situation. In fact, in 1944, the Hungarian analogue of the German Pz.Kpfw tank entered the battlefield. IV, with which Germany began the war against the USSR. As an infantry support tank, the 41.M Turan II could be called a good vehicle, the 75-mm projectile had a good high-explosive fragmentation effect, but fighting modern Soviet armored vehicles and Lend-Lease Shermans was a very difficult task for the Hungarian tank.

Medium tanks 41.M Turan II with a 75 mm gun in a tank park

Anti-ballistic armor with 50-60 mm of frontal armor looked good in the early 1940s. This was enough to withstand most anti-tank guns of the pre-war period up to and including 45 mm. In fact, the "Turans" were faced with the massive use by Soviet troops of 57-mm and 76-mm cannons, which were guaranteed to penetrate their armor at a distance of up to 1000 meters, and the 85-mm cannon of the updated "thirty-fours" did not leave the Hungarian tankers any chance at all. The anti-cumulative screens that the Hungarians began installing on their armored vehicles in 1944 could not correct the situation. At the same time, the outdated riveted design for installing armor plates also did not increase the combat effectiveness and survivability of the vehicles. When a shell hit the armor, the rivets flew off and even if the armor was not penetrated, they could hit the equipment and crew of the combat vehicle. The situation was not helped by a three-man turret with a commander's cupola, which made it possible to relieve the load on the commander, who was able to lead the battle without being distracted by other tasks.

A worthy response to the Soviet T-34 tanks could be the third version of the Turan modernization, designated 43.M Turan III. But this tank, armed with a long-barreled 75 mm cannon (barrel length 43 caliber), with frontal armor reinforced to 75 mm, was presented only in a couple of prototypes; it was never mass-produced. In reality, when meeting with Soviet armored vehicles, which were presented in 1944 not only with the new T-34-85 and IS-2, but also with various self-propelled artillery, the Hungarian Turan tanks quickly moved from the category of combat vehicles to the category of scrap metal and a mass grave for a crew of five.

The Germans, however, refused to sell them a license but offered to use Skoda’s developments and take as a basis the unfinished Czech model S-II-c, better known in our country as the T-21.

At the beginning of June 1940, the tank arrived in Budapest. During sea trials, the Š-II-c demonstrated excellent results: with a mass of 16.5 tons, it reached a maximum speed of 50 km/h on hard road surfaces. There were also no problems with cross-country ability, but the Hungarians, for some reason not being satisfied with these qualities, sent the tanks for modification to Manfred Weiss.

The company was recommended to increase the frontal armor to 35 mm, in accordance with German views on the tactics of using tanks, which served as a model for the Hungarians at that time, to increase the number of crew members in the turret from two to three and install a commander's cupola, as well as make a number of minor changes. Instead of the Czechoslovak 47-mm cannon, the Hungarian 40-mm 41.M was already installed during testing. In addition, it was decided to replace the machine guns and tank engine with Hungarian models.
In total, more than 200 different changes were made to the design of the tank, and on November 28, 1940, the modified tank was adopted by the Hungarian Army under the designation 40.M. The tank also received its own name - “Turan”, in honor of the historical ancestral home of the Hungarians, who once lived on the territory of modern Kazakhstan.

The first prototype of a medium Hungarian tank, albeit made of non-armored steel, was ready in August 1941, and its mass production began two months later. The troops began to receive Turans in May 1942.
Turan had anti-ballistic differentiated armor. The armored hull and Turan turret were assembled from rolled sheets and plates of homogeneous armor steel, on a frame using bolts and rivets. All vertical armor plates of the Turan were installed vertically or with slight angles of inclination to the vertical; the thickness of the vertical armor of the forehead of the hull and turret was, according to various sources, from 50 to 60 mm; sides and stern - 25 mm. The thickness of the bottom armor plates was 14 mm, and the thickness of the hull and turret roof was 14 mm. different parts varied from 8 to 25 mm. Since 1944, Turans began to be equipped with a set of 8-mm onboard anti-cumulative screens modeled on the German ones, but they did not manage to equip all tanks with them until the end of hostilities.
Eight-cylinder carburetor V-shaped engine Manfred Weiss-Z with a power of 265 hp. at 2200 rpm allowed a tank weighing 18.2 tons to accelerate to a maximum speed of 47 km/h. The capacity of the fuel tanks was 265 liters, the range was 165 km.
The Turan's transmission consisted of a multi-disc main dry friction clutch, a planetary 6-speed (3+3) gearbox, a planetary turning mechanism and final drives. The transmission units were controlled using a pneumatic servo drive. There was also a backup mechanical drive.
The chassis was generally similar to the chassis of the Czechoslovak light tank LT-35 and consisted of eight rubberized dual road wheels on each side. The rollers were interlocked in pairs into two bogies, each of which was suspended on two semi-elliptical leaf springs. One double roller was installed between the front bogie and the guide wheel, which had a gear ring, making it easier for the tank to overcome vertical obstacles. The drive wheel was located at the rear. The upper branch of the caterpillar rested on five dual rubberized support rollers. The design of the chassis provided the tank with a smooth ride without strong vertical vibrations or swaying.
The main armament of the Turan was a 40 mm cannon. This 40 mm semi-automatic gun 41.M 40/51 was developed by MAVAG based on 37 mm anti-tank guns - the German PaK 35/36 and the Czechoslovak A7 - and had a barrel length of 51 calibers. The initial speed of its armor-piercing projectile was 800 m/s, and the mass of the fragmentation projectile was 0.96 kg. The gun had a rate of fire of 12 rounds per minute.
The gun was placed in the front part of the turret on axles in an installation that allowed vertical aiming in the range from −10 to +25°. Targeting was carried out using a telescopic sight. The gunner had an optical rangefinder. The gun's ammunition load was 101 unitary rounds with armor-piercing and fragmentation shells. The gun could also use ammunition from the Czech Bofors.
Auxiliary weapons Turan

and there were two 8-mm 34/40AM Gebauer machine guns.
The Turan crew used rotating periscope prism viewing devices as a means of observing the terrain in combat conditions. The driver, gunner-radio operator, gunner and loader each had one device, and the tank commander had a commander's cupola with two viewing devices. The driver-mechanic, in addition, had a viewing slot with protective triplex glass in the upper frontal sheet of the hull.
Already in the summer of 1941, it became obvious that the 40-mm gun was unable to fight medium and heavy Soviet tanks
And
. Even the old one
turned out to be too tough for this little furry. And with the defeat of the infantry, things were no better for this gun - a weak high-explosive fragmentation projectile could not cause any harm to the field fortification. Therefore, the Hungarians decided, leaving the armor unchanged, to re-equip the Turan with a more powerful 75-mm caliber gun. The most suitable option turned out to be an Austrian 75-mm mountain gun with a barrel length of 25 calibers. Its shell made it possible to fight light field fortifications, and the gun itself had a very small recoil, which was important given the very cramped turret, into which the Hungarians were never able to fit the German KwK 37, which had similar characteristics.
Production of the improved tank began only in 1943, and of the 322 units ordered, only 139 were manufactured. 15 tanks from this series were equipped with an additional FuG16 or R-4T radio station, and some units had armored side anti-cumulative shields. Tanks of this modification received the full official name 41M Turan 75 rovid, but in modern publications they are most often referred to as Turan II.

Turan II

Until the spring of 1944, neither the first nor the second modification of Turan tanks appeared at the front. Forward

Most of them were used as part of the 2nd Hungarian Tank Division, which entered the battle on April 17, 1944, counterattacking the advancing Soviet units near Kolomyia. The tank attack on difficult wooded and mountainous terrain was unsuccessful, and by April 26 the Hungarian counterattack was successfully repulsed. At the same time, the Hungarian losses amounted to 30 tanks. In September, the division took part in the battles near Torda, suffered heavy losses and was withdrawn to the rear. Another unit equipped with Turans was the 1st Cavalry Division. In the summer battles in Galicia, she lost all her tanks and returned home in September. The 1st Tank Division, also equipped with Turans, entered into battle with our troops already in September on the territory of Transylvania, taken by the Hungarians from Romania in the Vienna Arbitration in 1940.
On October 30, the battle for Budapest began and lasted four months. The 2nd Panzer Division was surrounded in the city itself, while the 1st Panzer and 1st Cavalry divisions fought to the north of it. In the brutal battles near Lake Balaton in March-April 1945, the Hungarian tank forces ceased to exist. At the same time, the last Turany. One of them still stands in Kubinka. It is a rather rare example of the Turan modification II , having side and turret anti-cumulative screens.

Turan II in Kubinka

See also:

Rating of countries in the world by the number of armed forces

Who sold Alaska and how

Why we lost the Cold War

The mystery of the 1961 reform