The defense of Sevastopol is one of the large and extended military operations of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War.
Background and position of the troops
Ukraine was an important point for the Germans, the capture of which would allow the fascist troops to open the way to Moscow from the south, as well as secure supplies of food and coal for the continuation of hostilities in the winter. By the end of September 1941, Hitler's troops were already able to capture Smolensk and. Leningrad was taken into the ring, significant success was also achieved in the South-Western direction - most of the Soviet troops in this direction were defeated, and the south-western part of Ukraine was already under the control of the German command. In mid-September, the fascist troops approached the Crimea - another important point in the course of the conquest of Ukraine.
The Crimea was necessary for the Germans, as it was one of the routes to the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus. Moreover, aviation was based in Crimea, with the loss of the peninsula Soviet army would lose the opportunity to raid Romania (it was under the control of Hitler), and the Germans themselves would be able to bomb the Caucasus. It was because of the importance of Crimea that the Soviet command decided to abandon and redirect troops from the city to the peninsula.
At the time of the beginning of the defense of Sevastopol, the forces of the opponents were approximately equal.
The course of the defense of Sevastopol
Since the operation was very lengthy, several main stages can be distinguished in it:
- the first German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from November 11 to November 21, 1941;
- the second German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from December 17 to December 31, 1941;
- relative calm, which lasted from the beginning of January to May 31, 1942;
- The third German offensive on Sevastopol lasted from June 7 to July 4, 1942.
On October 25, German troops broke through the defenses of the Soviet army at the Ishun positions and broke into the Crimea - seven divisions and two Romanian detachments were supposed to occupy the peninsula in the shortest possible time. The Soviet command, seeing the pressure of the Germans, decided to retreat towards Kerch, later this part of the army went to the Kuban. A smaller part of the Soviet troops began to retreat towards Sevastopol through the mountain passes of the Crimea, and then along the coast. Both parts of the army were pursued by German troops, and a separate detachment of two German divisions directly headed towards Sevastopol to capture the city.
As a result, by November 1941, there were about 20 thousand Soviet troops in Sevastopol. On November 5, clashes began between Soviet and German troops on the outskirts of the city.
First attack on Sevastopol
On November 11, several German divisions attacked the Soviet troops on the approaches to the city, the fighting continued until November 21. The Germans managed to advance several kilometers to the south and east, and the front line was established 12 km from Sevastopol. At the same time, the fighting subsided, both sides began to strengthen their armies, the Soviet received reinforcements in the form of soldiers and ammunition.
While the Soviet command in Sevastopol was engaged in strengthening the defense, the German troops continued to seize the Crimea, and as a result, by November 16, the entire peninsula, except for Sevastopol, was occupied by the Germans. The remaining forces of the Nazis reorganized and headed towards the city in order to break the last stronghold of the Soviet defense.
Second offensive on Sevastopol
Initially, the next attack on the city was planned for November 27, but due to a delay, the offensive began only on December 17, 1941. During a fierce battle, the Germans again managed to suppress Soviet resistance and significantly move inland to the north.
On December 19, Admiral Zhukov reported that the front without support would not last even until the 20th, but contrary to forecasts, the soldiers were able to hold back the Germans until December 21, after which reinforcements arrived in Sevastopol.
As a result, in two weeks of fighting, the Germans managed to advance to the city by an average of 10 km. The offensive stopped on December 31 due to the heavy losses suffered by the German army during the battles with the Soviet defensive detachments.
January-May 1942
In early January, reinforcements again arrived in Sevastopol, and the German army, on the contrary, thinned out, as a significant part of it went to the east of Crimea. In January-February 1942, only minor skirmishes took place between German and Soviet troops. In general, this period can be considered relatively calm. Until May, the Soviet army was regularly replenished with new detachments.
Third offensive on Sevastopol
On May 18, after the Germans managed to defeat the Soviet army in the east of Crimea, the German command again concentrated on Sevastopol: an assault on the city was planned, for which the Germans drove to the borders a large number of heavy artillery.
On June 2, German artillery and aviation began to deal heavy blows to Soviet troops in Sevastopol. On June 7, several German divisions went on the offensive from the land, and the Romanian army distracted Soviet soldiers by fighting in the east.
By June 17, the north of the defense of Sevastopol was actually captured, the Germans advanced significantly to the south. Although reinforcements were actively sent to the Soviet troops, this did not help. On June 29, 1942, the Germans entered Sevastopol.
On July 1, Sevastopol was completely occupied by the Germans, and the remnants of the Soviet troops left for Chersonese, where fighting continued for some time. The Soviet soldiers waiting for the evacuation did not wait for her and were taken prisoner.
The results of the defense of Sevastopol
The defense of Sevastopol went down in history as one of the most difficult and lengthy defensive operations in which Soviet troops suffered heavy casualties. In addition, the surrender of Sevastopol was the last stage in the conquest of the Crimea by the Germans, which opened up a number of new directions and opportunities for Hitler.
Turned into colossal losses for the Red Army, ended with the retreat of our troops. The summary of the Soviet Information Bureau noted "selfless courage, fury in the fight against the enemy and the dedication of the defenders." The first years of the war were not easy for us, not everyone could even believe in the reality of everything that was happening - it seemed like a terrible dream. The stoic defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942 entered the history of the country all the brighter, but at the same time more tragic. The heroism and courage of all those who were involved in the events of those days are immeasurable.
Surrender Odessa, but keep Crimea
By September 12, 1941, the Germans came close to the Crimea. The peninsula was of strategic importance both to us and to the invaders. From here, a direct air route opened to the oil-industrial points of Romania, which supplied the Wehrmacht troops with fuel. With the loss of these routes, our aviation was deprived of the opportunity to destroy the fuel reserves of the Germans by bombing, and they, in turn, could receive not only Romanian oil products, but also Soviet ones - the road to the Caucasus, to our reserves, was opened for them. The headquarters of the Red Army understood the importance of free flights of aviation of the opposing sides, so it was decided to transfer additional units to the Crimea, recalling them from Odessa. Thus, to save the peninsula, an entire city had to be sacrificed. The battle for Sevastopol, which had to be held by any means, was carried out from water, air and land.
By the end of September, Kyiv and most of Ukraine, Smolensk, all approaches to Leningrad were under the Germans, it was scary to think about the blockade of which. In addition, the proximity of the enemy army and its too rapid advance inland spoke of a protracted and difficult war. By September, in the battles near Uman and Kiev, units of the Southwestern Front were utterly defeated, now it has come to the Crimea Great War. The defense of Sevastopol became that last frontier on the peninsula, the successful defense of which could, albeit a little, but hold back the offensive breakthrough of the German army.
Along the Perekop Isthmus
The only land route through which it was possible to get to the Crimea was the Perekop Isthmus. The 11th Army of the Wehrmacht opposed the 51st Separate Army formed in August, which was entrusted with the defense of the peninsula. The Soviet troops were commanded by Colonel-General f. I. Kuznetsov, German - commander Erich von Manstein. To the credit of the enemy, it is worth noting that one of Hitler's most talented military leaders spoke on the enemy side. Unfortunately, on both sides of the front, sometimes against each other, quite worthy people fought, who could compete in professionalism in peacetime, if the Great Patriotic War had not made them mortal enemies. Sevastopol and the defense of the Crimea in this regard can serve as an indicator of the competence of the military leaders of the opposing armies.
To the 51st Separate Army included three rifle divisions: the 276th under the command of Major General I.S. Savinov, the 156th, commanded by Major General P.V. Chernyaev, and the 106th, under the command of Colonel A.N. Pervushin. Savinov was supposed to defend the Chongar Peninsula and the Arabat Spit. Chernyaev was faced with the task of holding the Perekop positions directly to the last, and Pervushin’s division, stretched along the southern coast of the Sivash for 70 km, had to block the road of the German army on its way to Sevastopol on its sector of the front. The year 1941 became indicative for not only in terms of the defense of the Crimea, but also in the degree of preparation for the war in general.
In the battles for Perekop
In addition to rifle divisions, the 51st Army also included cavalry divisions, there were also three of them: the 48th under the command of Major General D.I. Averkin, the 42nd Colonel V.V. Glagolev and the 40th Colonel F.F. . Kudyurova. All three units of the 51st Army, plus the 271st rifle division under the command of Colonel M. A. Titov, they were supposed to hold back tank attacks on the Perekop Isthmus and not let the enemy deep into the peninsula, where the battle for Sevastopol was already brewing. Four Crimean divisions: 172nd, 184th, 320th and 321st - guarded the coast. They were commanded, respectively, by colonels I. G. Toroptsev, V. N. Abramov, M. V. Vinogradov and I. M. Aliev.
On September 24, the Germans went on the offensive. Two infantry units, supported by artillery and aircraft, made an attempt to break through the Perekop isthmus. By September 26, they stormed the Turkish Wall and captured the city of Armyansk. Thrown to defend the city, two rifle and one cavalry divisions, organized by the commander task force Lieutenant General P.I. Batov, did not create any special obstacles for the German army - their offensive was so powerful. By September 30, Soviet troops left their previous positions and retreated.
Departure to the Taman Peninsula
Having entrenched themselves in the Ishun positions, by October 18, when the 11th German Army launched a new offensive, the 9th Rifle Corps and several separate units of the Black Sea Fleet regrouped and prepared to adequately meet the enemy’s blow. Of course, the forces were not equal. The leaders of the defense of Sevastopol understood that without reinforcements they would not be able to restrain the advance of the German army, but fierce battles were going on along the entire front, and there was no way to transfer additional units under the Ishun positions.
The battle went on for 5 days, during which the enemy pushed the Soviet troops even further deep into the peninsula. The arrival of the Primorsky Army did not save the situation either. Manstein, having fresh forces at his disposal, threw two infantry divisions to the front line, which on October 28 broke through the defenses. Parts of the Red Army were forced to withdraw near Sevastopol. The history of the city was replenished with new, most tragic pages for all the years of its existence.
It was not easy near Kerch, where our troops also retreated. All the mountainous terrain in the district served as one battlefield. All attempts by the Red Army to gain a foothold on the Kerch Peninsula were unsuccessful - the 42nd German Army Corps of three divisions defeated the main forces of our 51st Army, and on November 16, its surviving battalions were evacuated to the Taman Peninsula. The future Hero Cities of Sevastopol Kerch experienced the full power of the Wehrmacht. In order to break through to the southern coast of Crimea, the German army was replenished with the 54th Army Corps, which included two infantry divisions and a motorized brigade, and the 30th Army Corps, also consisting of two infantry divisions.
On the way to Sevastopol
The impenetrable power at the beginning of the war was the Sevastopol Defensive Region (SOR), which was perhaps the most fortified place in European territory. This included several dozen gun positions fortified with pillboxes, forts armed with large-caliber artillery, or, as they were called in those years, armored turret batteries (BB). The defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942 dragged on for several months, largely due to the very fortified defensive area.
Throughout November 1941, fighting continued on the distant approaches to the city. The defense was held by the infantry of the Black Sea Fleet, since by that time there were practically no ground forces of the 51st Army on the peninsula - they were evacuated. Separate anti-aircraft, artillery and training units, as well as coastal batteries, helped the infantry. The remnants of Soviet divisions scattered along the coast also joined the ranks of the city's defenders, but they were negligible. So we can safely say that the heroic defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942 was carried out exclusively by the forces of the Black Sea.
By November, the Soviet grouping numbered about 20 thousand sailors. But at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, they understood how important it was to keep this last frontier of the Crimea, and the Sevastopol garrison was reinforced by units of the Primorsky Army, which had previously defended Odessa, commanded by Major General I.E. Petrov.
Reinforcements were transferred by sea, since there was no other way. The defensive garrison was replenished with 36,000 manpower, several hundred guns, dozens of tons of ammunition, tanks and other weapons. From November 9 to 11, the Wehrmacht army managed to completely surround Sevastopol from land, and in the next 10 days wedged into the defense line in several places. Then there was a pause in the fighting.
united front
The hero-cities of Sevastopol Kerch in those difficult days of the war for the country received their immortality at the cost of the death of thousands of their defenders, who found the strength to resist more powerful army enemy. After a short lull, the fighting in the Crimea resumed with particular ruthlessness in the first days of January 1942. In Evpatoria, occupied by that time by the Romanians, an uprising broke out, organized by the local population and the partisan formations that had rushed to it. On January 5, units of the Black Sea Fleet that landed on the coast were transferred to the city.
The first battles brought a small victory to the united Soviet troops - the Romanian garrison was driven out of the city. But the superiority of the defenders was short-lived: on January 7, having pulled up reserves, the Germans defeated the landing units. Many of our soldiers were taken prisoner. The weapon was also lost. At the turn of Alushta - Sevastopol, which long time held by defensive troops, the Germans were now also in charge. From now on, all hopes were turned to the coast, where the defense of Sevastopol was reliably carried out for a long time. There were practically no days of silence, shelling of the city was carried out constantly.
Under the blows of the Luftwaffe
On the city, in addition to artillery, Manstein threw his striking forces - the Luftwaffe. Army Group "South", which consisted of two air corps, which numbered about 750 aircraft, was also supported by the German fleet. For the complete capture of the Crimean peninsula, Hitler spared neither equipment nor manpower. The fifth air corps of the Luftwaffe was deployed near Sevastopol just at the beginning of the winter of 1941, and already in May of the 42nd, this deadly equipment was able to provide tangible support for the ground operation conducted by Manstein. The defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942, despite the resilience and courage of the Black Sea sailors, did not last long after enemy aircraft attacked the city. Moreover, just in the spring, the eighth air corps, commanded by V. von Richthoffen, was transferred to this sector of the front. Hitler assigned one of his best military leaders to the most complex and responsible ground operations.
The heroes of the defense of Sevastopol, who survived and remained alive after those fierce battles, shared their memories of the ongoing bombing of the city. Every day, Luftwaffe planes dropped tons of high-explosive bombs on Sevastopol. Our military recorded up to 600 sorties daily. In total, more than two and a half thousand tons of bombs were dropped, including large-caliber ones - up to a thousand kilograms each.
All German power - to storm the city
The conquerors paid tribute to the artillery forts of Sevastopol. For so long, it was possible to resist the many times superior forces of the opponent only if there were long-term defensive structures, which were exactly in the Crimea. To destroy them, the Germans had to use siege artillery large calibers. Over two hundred batteries, which consisted of heavy guns, Manstein placed along a line 22 kilometers long. In addition to heavy 300 mm and 350 mm howitzers, super-heavy 800 mm siege guns were also used.
From Germany, secretly, specifically for a breakthrough in the Sevastopol direction, a gun with a total mass of over a thousand tons was delivered. It was placed in the rocks not far from Bakhchisaray. It was impossible to resist such power. Participants in the defense of Sevastopol said that not a single weapon had such a deafening roar and destructive power.
For a long time, the German troops could not start an assault on the city - the partisans, the weather and the lack of a clearly developed offensive plan interfered. But by the spring of 1942, everything was ready. For the summer assault, the German 11th Army was reinforced with six new corps: the 54th, 30th, 42nd, 7th Romanian, 8th Romanian and 8th Aviation Corps. As can be seen from the description of the corps, they had both ground troops and air forces.
In the ring of fire
The 42nd and 7th corps were located on it, they were planned to be used for ground operations and brought into battle only to replace the defeated divisions. The 4th Mountain and 46th Infantry were to enter at the last stage of the battle, so that the enemy had four divisions with relatively fresh forces for the final capture of the city. So in the end it turned out - under the powerful onslaught of German units, the multi-day defense of Sevastopol ended. The Second World War lasted only a year, there were three more ahead, and the losses of Soviet troops on the Crimean sector of the front alone were colossal. But no one thought to surrender to the superior forces of the enemy - they stood to the last. They understood that the decisive battle would be fatal for the majority, but they did not see a different fate for themselves.
The Wehrmacht was also preparing for heavy losses. The command of the 11th Army, in addition to the reserve hidden on the outskirts of Sevastopol, requested from the headquarters an additional three infantry and several anti-aircraft artillery regiments. Three divisions of self-propelled guns, a separate tank battalion and deployed batteries of super-heavy guns were waiting in the wings.
Many years later, when WWII researchers summed up the results of the battle, which went down in history as the Defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942, it turned out that Hitler did not use such a massive use of aviation and artillery throughout the Second World War.
As for the ratio of manpower, at the beginning of the defense, according to experts, it was almost equal, both on one side and on the other side of the front. But by the summer of 1942, the numerical superiority of the German army was undeniable. The decisive assault on Sevastopol began on June 7, but for almost a month the Soviet troops held the line.
Last Assault
Stubborn confrontation did not subside for almost the entire first week. Perfectly protected in pillboxes and forts, the Black Sea sailors put up mortal resistance - a lot of Wehrmacht soldiers died on the outskirts of Sevastopol.
The decisive battle, which changed the course of the confrontation, took place on June 17 in the southern sector. The Germans took up a position known in history as the "Eagle's Nest" and approached the foot of the Sapun Mountain. By that time, the fort "Stalin", which held the defense on the north side, had already been captured by German soldiers. The Mekenzian Height was also in their hands. By evening, several more forts passed to the advancing, among which was Maxim Gorky-1, as the Germans called it, with a BB-30 battery. The entire North Bay could now be freely fired upon by German artillery. With the loss of the BB-30 battery, the defenders lost contact with the regular Red Army on the other side of the front. The delivery of ammunition and the approach of reinforcements became impossible. But the inner ring of defense was still dangerous for the Germans.
The southern coast of the Northern Bay was fortified quite strongly, and Manstein did not dare to storm it on the move. He gambled on the surprise factor to avoid losing too much. On the night of June 28-29, on almost silent inflatable boats, the advanced units of the 30 Corps approached the bay unnoticed and began the assault. By the evening of June 30, Malakhov Kurgan was captured.
The defenders were running out of ammunition and food, at headquarters they decided to evacuate the highest and senior command staff of the defense forces of Sevastopol, as well as the party activists of the city. There was no talk of rescuing sailors, soldiers, including the wounded, as well as lower officers ...
Terrible loss figures
It was possible to carry out with the use of aviation, submarines and light watercraft, which are in the assets of the Black Sea Fleet. In total, about 700 people of the top leadership of the troops were taken out of the peninsula, aviation delivered about two hundred more people to the Caucasus. Several thousand sailors were able to escape from the encirclement on light ships. On July 1, the defense of Sevastopol was practically stopped. At some lines, the sounds of shots were still heard, but they were of a local nature. Abandoned by the commanders, the Primorsky Army withdrew to where for another three days it also stubbornly resisted the enemy. In an unequal struggle, thousands of Crimean defenders died, the rest were taken prisoner. Established in memory of those events, the medal for the defense of Sevastopol was received by a few survivors. As the German command reported to its headquarters, at Cape Khersones they managed to capture over a hundred thousand Soviet soldiers and sailors, but Manstein denied this information, declaring only forty thousand prisoners. According to Soviet data, the army lost 78,230 captured soldiers from the survivors. Information about weapons is fundamentally different from those provided by the Germans to their command.
With the loss of Sevastopol, the position of the Red Army deteriorated significantly, until the days when our troops entered the city as victors. It happened in the memorable year 1944, and there were long months and miles of war ahead ...
The fighting of the Black Sea Fleet, the Primorsky Army and the population of the city in the defense of the main naval base of Sevastopol from October 30, 1941 to July 2, 1942 is an important stage in the struggle of Soviet troops for the Crimea during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.
Sevastopol was among the first cities of the USSR on the first day of the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941 at 03:15 was attacked by fascist aircraft.
The Soviet command used this time to strengthen the defense. The SOR troops were replenished with marching units. The composition of the Primorsky Army was brought up to five divisions, two brigades marines and two separate rifle regiments. Due to the guns taken from the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, eight additional stationary batteries were built.
The German command also strengthened its troops. For the second offensive, it had seven infantry divisions and two mountain rifle brigades, about 1.3 thousand guns and mortars, over 150 tanks and up to 300 aircraft. To destroy the fortifications and fight against coastal batteries, several batteries of heavy artillery, including 360-mm caliber guns, were brought up. The fascist German troops had a significant superiority in men and equipment. The idea to capture Sevastopol was to simultaneously deliver a series of strikes in several directions.
The second offensive of the Nazi troops began at dawn on December 17th. The main blow was delivered by four infantry divisions from the Duvankoy area along the Belbek River to the northeastern tip of the Severnaya Bay, a distracting blow was delivered by two infantry divisions and a mountain rifle brigade from the area southeast of Chorgun along the Chernaya River to Inkerman. In the area of the Mekenziev Mountains, the enemy wedged into the location of the Soviet troops and created the threat of a breakthrough to the Northern Bay. The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief reinforced the SOR troops with an infantry division, a marine brigade and several marching battalions. With the support of the fleet and aviation, the troops of the SOR launched a counterattack on December 22 and restored the situation in the main direction. By the end of December, the fascist troops captured the Mekenzievy Gory platform, but they failed to reach the Northern Bay.
The Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation (1941-1942), which began on December 26 and forced the Nazi command to withdraw part of its forces from Sevastopol and on December 31 to stop the offensive, played an important role in repelling the enemy offensive. On January 1-4, the Soviet troops with counterattacks forced the enemy to retreat to their original positions almost everywhere.
In May 1942, as a result of the abandonment of the Kerch Peninsula by the Soviet troops and the failure of the Kharkov offensive operation the situation in Sevastopol deteriorated sharply. On May 21, the Nazis began an air and artillery bombardment of the city, artillery positions and rear areas, and on June 2 they switched to powerful artillery and aviation preparations for the offensive, which lasted five days. At the same time, the Nazi troops strengthened the blockade of Sevastopol from the sea. They concentrated 10 infantry divisions (of which three are Romanian), one motorized brigade and three regiments, totaling over 200 thousand people, including 175 thousand combat personnel, 450 tanks, 1325 guns, 720 mortars, 1060 aircraft. The SOR had seven rifle divisions (50% equipped, except for one), four brigades and three regiments of marines, which amounted to 106 thousand people, including 82 thousand combat personnel, 38 tanks, 606 guns, 918 mortars, 116 aircraft .
On June 7, the fascist German troops went on the offensive, inflicting the main blow from the north and northeast on the Mekenzievy mountains with the aim of reaching the Severnaya Bay and auxiliary ones on Sapun Mountain and Balaklava. German aviation made 800-1000 sorties daily, dropping 4-4.5 thousand bombs. The defenders of Sevastopol heroically defended their positions to the last opportunity. Only when there were no combat-ready defenders and ammunition left in the defensive positions, the enemy managed to occupy them. Some assistance was provided by the 138th Rifle Brigade, deployed on June 13 on destroyers.
On June 18, at the cost of heavy losses, the Nazis managed to break through to the coast of the Northern Bay. The small garrisons of the 30th coastal defense battery, the Northern fortifications, engineering piers, Mikhailovsky and Konstantinovsky ravelins that remained on the North side heroically defended themselves until June 22-24. The forces of the defenders were melting, ammunition was running out.
In connection with the reduction of the dark time of the day and the dominance of enemy aircraft, the supply of Sevastopol on surface ships became extremely difficult, and after the capture of the North Side by the enemy, it became impossible. On June 17, the last Bialystok transport arrived in Sevastopol. On June 26, the last of the large surface ships, the leader of the Tashkent, broke through the blockade. The supply of supplies by submarines and aircraft did not satisfy the needs of the defense. By the end of June, 300-400 people remained in divisions, and 200 combat personnel in brigades.
On the night of June 29, the Nazis crossed the Northern Bay and on the same day captured Sapungora. On June 30, fascist German troops broke into the Ship Side, where stubborn battles for Malakhov Kurgan went on all day. The rest of the units retreated in separate groups to the Chersonese peninsula.
Organized resistance and evacuation of the city's defenders continued until July 2, 1942. The defenders of Sevastopol continued to fight heroically on the Khersones Peninsula in the area of the 35th coastal defense battery until July 4th. Of the troops remaining in Sevastopol, only a few groups managed to fight their way into the mountains to the partisans.
In the defense of Sevastopol, residents played who participated in the construction of defensive structures, made weapons and ammunition for the front, and provided assistance to the wounded. Over 15,000 Sevastopol residents joined the people's militia.
In the struggle for Sevastopol, the enemy lost up to 300 thousand people, the irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to about 157 thousand people.
The soldiers of the Primorsky Army and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet showed mass heroism and stamina. 37 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
On December 22, 1942, the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol" was established to commemorate the feat of Sevastopol, which was awarded to over 50 thousand people.
In 2014, the Memorial to the Defenders of the Fatherland, who fell and went missing during the liberation of Sevastopol during the Great Patriotic War, was opened in the Victory Park in Sevastopol.
On May 8, 2015, a memorial stele dedicated to the heroes of the defense and liberation of Sevastopol was unveiled in the city Victory Park.
The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources
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The second defense of Sevastopol lasted 250 days and largely determined the further development of all military operations: the enemy was unable to continue the offensive, and the Soviet troops managed to concentrate and give the enemy a fierce rebuff. Second World War once again proved the important geopolitical and strategic importance of the Crimean peninsula and Sevastopol, which was of strategic importance for both sides.
Crimean aviation had the ability to strike at the oil fields of Romania, causing serious damage to the enemy. For the Germans, the peninsula was the main obstacle on the way to the Caucasus and the Volga, a springboard for a further offensive.
By the beginning of the war, the Sevastopol defensive area was one of the most fortified places in the world and included dozens of gun positions, minefields, two coastal armored turret batteries (BB) (there is a memorial complex on the site today), armed with large-caliber artillery. Knowing this, the Germans threw their best forces against the defenders of the city.
The course of the second defense of Sevastopol
The attack on Sevastopol began after a powerful bombardment on November 2, 1941. The enemy completely surrounded the city, the battles went along the entire perimeter, but in 10 days the offensive did not bring any special results.
Air raids did not stop day or night and, according to eyewitnesses, day after day they became more powerful.
A second assault was made on 17 December. To suppress the fire of the Soviet troops, the Germans carried out massive artillery preparation, in which heavy-duty large-caliber mortars and howitzers were used, including the legendary Dora cannon.
The city was practically razed to the ground, but the enemy again could not move forward and was repulsed. Having suffered heavy losses, the Wehrmacht troops were forced to stop.
After that, there was a relative calm, although air strikes did not stop. Soviet artillery was partially destroyed, so enemy planes were constantly hovering over the city.
The last assault on Sevastopol began on June 7, 1942. For 10 days there were fierce battles around the entire perimeter of the area, but in the end, by the 17th, the Nazis captured a number of important positions - the Eagle's Nest at the foot, Fort Stalin and the fortification of BB-30. In fact, the city was taken.
On June 30, the military command announced the evacuation of the senior and senior staff of the army and navy. Under the cover of darkness on submarines, the command and party leadership left the city. Major General Novikov was left at the head of the remaining units in the city.
Troops flocked to Cape Khersones for evacuation. As a result, 78,230 Soviet servicemen, who had almost no ammunition, turned out to be in the BB-35 area.
Retreating through the casemates and dungeons, the fighters fought to the last bullet, defending every room and refusing to lay down their arms.
The hiding soldiers were smoked out with asphyxiating gas... The forces were not equal, after several days of fighting, almost all the defenders of the city were either destroyed or captured. A significant part of the garrison and local residents were shot by the Nazis on the spot, immediately after the capture of the city.
Having lost the Crimea and Sevastopol, the Soviet army lost a strategically important sector, the way for the further German offensive into the Caucasus was opened.
However, the huge losses suffered by the Wehrmacht army made this offensive almost impossible.
The second defense of Sevastopol largely decided the outcome of all further hostilities and did not allow the Germans to realize their plan. Having stopped the Germans in the Crimea, the Soviet troops were able to concentrate their forces for a retaliatory strike and turn the tide of hostilities.
Heroes of the second defense of Sevastopol
For 250 days, the heroes of Sevastopol held back the superior enemy forces and, at the cost of their lives, stopped the advance of the Germans to the Caucasus and the Volga. Let's talk about just a few of them.
Noah Adamia (1917-142) - commanded a platoon of machine gunners and was a sniper instructor in the 7th Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet, personally destroyed more than 200 enemies in battles and knocked out two tanks. June 21, 1942 was surrounded by 11 submachine gunners.
After a fierce battle with the enemy, he managed to break through the ring and get to his own. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, but never received the award - he went missing on July 3, 1942.
Ivan Bogatyr (1919-1982) - On June 7, 1942, in the Balaklava region, Ivan, after a long battle, was the only one of the defenders left alive. Despite being seriously wounded, the soldier continued to hold back the enemy for 5 hours, until reinforcements arrived. For courage and courage he was awarded the Order of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
Ivan Golubets (1916-1942) - on March 25, 1942, he saved ships from destruction in Streletskaya Bay. The sailor saw how two shells hit a patrol boat standing near the shore, on board of which there were deep mines.
Without thinking, he rushed to the flaming ship. Together with a friend, they managed to throw almost all the shells into the water, but they themselves did not escape. For his courage he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Filipp Sergeevich Oktyabrsky (1899-1969) - from March 1939 - commander of the Sevastopol defensive region. He led the defense up to the receipt of the order to evacuate. In 1944 he made a significant contribution to the liberation of the Caucasus and the Crimean Peninsula, for which he received the rank of admiral.
After the end of hostilities, he continued to command the Black Sea Fleet until 1948. Then he was the 1st Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces. From 1957 to 1960 - Head of the Black Sea Higher Naval School named after P.S. Nakhimov. For the skillful leadership of the fleet in 1958 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
The second defense of Sevastopol 1941-1942 - memorable dates
October 27, 1941
- the Germans broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops at Perekop and broke into the Crimea
November 11-21, 1941
- the first planned attack on Sevastopol. The invaders attacked the city along the entire perimeter, but advanced only 12 km.
December 17, 1941
- the second assault.
May 18, 1942- the number of German troops in Sevastopol was increased to 150 thousand people.
June 7, 1942- the third assault on the city. By the 17th, German troops had practically captured the northern defense spectrum of Sevastopol.
June 30, 1942- at a meeting of the military council of the Black Sea Fleet and the PA, the decision of the Supreme High Command to leave Sevastopol was announced.
July 4, 1942- the cessation of the organized defense of Sevastopol.
From the Soviet Information Bureau, May 9, 1944:
Having broken the stubborn resistance of the enemy, our troops at night, a few hours ago, stormed the fortress and the most important naval base on the Black Sea - the city of Sevastopol. Thus, the last center of German resistance in the Crimea was liquidated, and the Crimea was completely cleared of the Nazi invaders.
A new super project of a leading military historian.
From Manstein's breakthrough through the Perekop positions to the failure of the first assaults on Sevastopol, from the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation and the unsuccessful offensive of the Crimean Front to the Kerch disaster and the fall of the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet, from the long German occupation of the peninsula to the rapid (in just a month) liberation of the Crimea in the victorious spring of 1944, when our advancing troops lost four times less than the defending enemy - this book analyzes in detail all operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in the struggle for the Crimea.
Separately considered are the actions of our ground forces - tankers, infantry, artillery - and the combat work of the Soviet Air Force and the Black Sea Fleet.
Sections of this page:
The task of defeating the Soviet troops in the Crimea was first set on February 12, 1942 in the "Order on the conduct of hostilities on the Eastern Front after the end of the winter period" of the German Ground Forces High Command. It said the following: “Along with the liquidation of the enemy’s breakthrough west of Izyum, the immediate task of the army group [South. - A.I.] - a quick return of the Kerch Peninsula and the capture of Sevastopol is possible in order to free up forces for a further offensive.
Moreover, even before the start of the first offensive of the Crimean Front, E. von Manstein, in his report to the GA "South" on February 21, 1942, wrote in plain text: "The special danger of crises in the Crimea is combined with an exceptional chance of success."
Moreover, the commander of the 11th Army revealed this idea in his report on February 19: “In this part of the Russian front, in connection with the massing of forces by the enemy in a narrow space, in the rear of which the sea is located, a chance for success looms. There is no such chance on any other sector of the front - at least this spring. Even then, Manstein spoke of the need to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula before the assault on Sevastopol.
The commander of the 11th Army proposed "a quick breakthrough to the harbors and the destruction of both armies located on the peninsula." In addition to the 22nd TD already promised to him, Manstein asked for a decisive success to allocate for the operation in the Crimea one more tank division from the 1st TA, as well as large aviation forces. True, at that stage of planning an attack on Soviet troops on the Parpach Isthmus, he intended to use aviation mainly to influence supply ports - Kerch and Kamysh-Burun.
At a meeting on March 28, 1942, F. Halder wrote down in his diary Hitler's main statements, in which Crimea was given priority even then: “Actions should begin in the south - in Crimea” and “Crimea. Kerch is the concentration of the main aviation forces. Soon these ideas were formalized in Directive No. 41 signed by Hitler on April 5, 1942. It defined the main goals of the 1942 campaign - the Caucasus and Leningrad. To release the large forces of the 11th Army, bogged down in positional battles on an isolated sector of the front, Directive No. 41 set the task of "clearing the Kerch Peninsula from the enemy in the Crimea and capturing Sevastopol." At a meeting with Hitler in April 1942, Sonderstern and Manstein presented a plan for an operation to defeat the Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula. The operation was codenamed Bustard Hunting (Trappenjagd).
The plan was in many ways reminiscent of the "sickle strike" with which the Allies in the West were defeated two years before the events described, in May 1940. The main attack was supposed to be carried out by the forces of XXX AK with three infantry divisions in the first echelon: 132nd Infantry Division ( on the right), 28th lpd (in the center) and 50th pd (on the left). Further, it was supposed to bring the 22nd TD into battle in the Arma-Eli area and envelop the maneuver in relation to the northern wing of the Soviet grouping on the Parpach Isthmus.
German scheme of attacking the Parpach positions of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division with landings from assault boats.
One of the widespread misconceptions about the events of May 1942 in the Crimea is the belief in the quantitative superiority of Soviet troops over the German strike group. It is a consequence of an uncritical assessment of the data of E. von Manstein, who wrote in his memoirs about the offensive "with a balance of forces of 2.1 in favor of the enemy" . Today we have the opportunity to turn to the documents and not to conjecture, together with Manstein, the "hordes of Mongols." As you know, by the beginning of the decisive battle for the Kerch Peninsula, the Crimean Front (with part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla) numbered 249,800 people. In turn, the 11th Army on May 2, 1942, based on the number of "eaters", totaled 232,549 (243,760 on May 11) military personnel in army units and formations, 24 (25) thousand people of the Luftwaffe personnel, 2 thousand . people from the Kriegsmarine and 94.6 (95) thousand people of the Romanian troops. In total, this gave over 350 thousand people of the total strength of Manstein's army. In addition, several thousand personnel of the Imperial Railways, the SD, the Organization of Todt in the Crimea and 9.3 thousand collaborators, referred to in the German report as "Tatars", were subordinate to her. In any case, there was no question of any significant numerical superiority of the Crimean Front over Manstein's troops aimed at it. Strengthening went in all directions. The 11th Army was transferred to the VIII Air Corps, specially trained for interaction with the ground forces by the Luftwaffe air force. In early May 1942, 460 aircraft arrived in Crimea, including a group of the latest Henschel-129 attack aircraft (15 aircraft).
It is traditionally argued that the defensive grouping of the troops of the Crimean Front was not created, the troops were in offensive formation, no reserves were allocated, which prevented the Soviet troops from effectively defending themselves. Documents now available indicate that the Crimean Front at the turn of April - May 1942, without any doubt, was preparing to defend itself. Moreover, in relation to the strip of the 44th Army, quite reasonable assumptions were made about the possible directions of enemy attacks: from Koi-Asan to Parpach and further along railway and along the Feodosia highway to Arma-Eli. The Germans in "Hunting for bustards" chose the second option and advanced in May 1942 along the highway to Arma-Ely.
The entire strip, defended by the troops of the front, was fortified. Thus, during negotiations between the commander of the 47th Army and the headquarters of the front on May 3, 1942, Kolganov reported: “There is a continuous minefield in front of the front of the 47th Army [...] West of Tulumchak and south of Korpecha there is a second minefield. To cover the OP artillery, the advanced units were issued 50 anti-tank hedgehogs and 500 mines are issued. At the same negotiations, possible counterattacks of the 55th brigade were discussed.
If we talk about the position of the troops of the Crimean Front as a whole, then seven of its rifle divisions were in the first line on the front for about 22 km, seven rifle divisions at a distance of 3–12 km in depth were in army reserves, including two divisions on Ak- Monai positions. In the northern part of the peninsula, 20–25 km from the front, there were three rifle brigades (12th, 143rd Rifle Brigade, 83rd Motorized Rifle Brigade). Further to the east there was one cavalry division of front subordination (72nd cd), and on the eastern tip of the peninsula there was one rifle division (156th rifle division) also of front subordination.
By the beginning of the German offensive in the 44th Army, the 63rd Guards Rifle Division and the 276th Rifle Division were in the first line, and the veterans of the battles on the Parpach Isthmus, the 404th and 157th Rifle Divisions, were withdrawn for resupply to the rear, being at the same time an army reserve . The winter direction of the Headquarters on the mandatory occupation of the Ak-Monai positions was carried out, they were occupied by the 396th rifle division with three companies of high-explosive flamethrowers. That is, it is still incorrect to talk about the absence of reserves. Another purely defensive measure was the arrival on the Parpach Isthmus literally at the beginning of May of parts of the 151st fortified area (UR), intended to occupy the Ak-Monai positions together with the 396th Rifle Division (in the 44th A lane) and the 224th Rifle Division ( in lane 51st and 47th A). The UR was well staffed (2967 out of 2949 in the state), but poorly equipped with weapons. On April 29, 1942, out of 128 heavy machine guns, the 151st UR did not have a single one, and not a single one out of 32 45-mm guns. True, of the 32 76-mm guns, all were available. Moreover, it is curious that it was in the 343rd OPAB, which soon found itself on the path of the German strike force, that the vehicles allocated by the ABTU of the front were used in early May 1942 for their intended purpose, for the delivery of guns and ammunition.
Training German command operations during a long operational pause made it possible to select a vulnerable sector of the defense of the Crimean Front. It was the strip of the 44th Army adjoining the Black Sea, more precisely, its left flank. It is interesting to note that back in February 1942, the chief of staff of the engineering troops of the spacecraft, Major General I.P. Galitsky, in a report on the development of the Ak-Monai positions, designated the enemy’s strike along the coast of the Feodosia Gulf as “not promising success, since the Black Sea Fleet is a strong obstacle to this offensive action.” In fact, the Black Sea Fleet did not become a hindrance, one might even say, did not have any effect on the German offensive.
In the direction of the planned main attack of the Germans was the 63rd Guards Rifle Division. The national composition of the division was very heterogeneous. Summary data on the national composition of the compounds of the 44th A are shown in Table. 1. According to the data presented, it can be seen that the share of the peoples of the Caucasus in the 63rd Guards Rifle Division was quite significant, although not dominant. At the same time, one cannot fail to note the deployment of the Azerbaijani 396th Rifle Division, which had no experience in serious battles, to the Ak-Monai positions.
The state of defense of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division was not brilliant. An inspection carried out in the division for the execution of order No. 143 on strengthening the equipment of positions a few days before the German offensive (the report is dated May 7) showed: “the trenches and communication passages were made very narrow and small in places”, parapets were not decorated, there were primitive loopholes only some fighters.
In general, the 63rd Guards Rifle Division was one of the weakest formations of the Crimean Front. At the same time, it cannot be said that she was a completely outsider in terms of weapons. Weak staffing with 45-mm guns was common problem Soviet troops in the Crimea in the spring of 1942, their number in divisions ranged from 2 to 18 per division, with an average of 6–8 units. As of April 26, out of 603 "forty-five" guns laid down in the state, the Crimean Front had only 206 guns of this type, out of 416 divisional 76-mm guns - 236, out of 4754 anti-tank rifles laid down in the state - 1372. It cannot be said that a quick solution to this problem was expected. According to the certificate of the chief of artillery supply, in the first decade of May, only 48 45-mm guns were expected to arrive (which is significant, all of them were intended for the 151st UR) and 1100 anti-tank guns. Approving the defense plan of the 44th Army, on April 26, the Military Council of the front additionally ordered: "Provide all units of the first and second echelons with bottles of KS to fight tanks." The allocation of a mobile reserve of engineering units was also recommended, but these were measures of limited effectiveness. The main opponent of tanks was still artillery.
The problem of anti-tank defense was somewhat alleviated by the presence of four regiments of 76-mm SPM guns in the Crimean Front, but they still had to be at the right time in the right place. This was especially true, given the horse-drawn traction of the SPM regiments. In the general case, a massive enemy tank attack would be a big problem for any division of the Crimean Front. It is often forgotten that in 1942 the Red Army was on starvation rations, both in terms of weapons and ammunition. It was very difficult to reproduce in the Crimea in May 1942 the defense on the Kursk Bulge of the July 1943 model with four 45-mm guns and 29 Maxims of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division.
Tanks, primarily the T-34 and KV, could and did become the backbone of the defense of the Crimean Front. From April 12 to May 1, 1942, 82 tanks were repaired from among those previously disabled. State tank troops Crimean Front is shown in the table. The KV tanks remained the core of the tank forces of the Crimean Front (see Table 2).
Tanks 38(t) of the 22nd TD on the march, May 1942
In the event of an enemy attack in the 44th Army, a plan of counterattacks was developed according to three options, finally recorded in combat order No. 028 of April 28, 1942. The first option was developed in case of an enemy attack in the 51st Army along the railway Vladislavovka, st. Ak-Monai, the second - in case of a strike along the Feodosiya road to Arma-Eli, the third - in the event of a breakthrough in the area of st. Ak-Monai and development of impact further along the railway. (actually the development of the first version). All three options included art. support from the RGC regiments.
As mentioned above, the 2nd option turned out to be relevant. He assumed the formation of two shock, "tank groups":
a) 56th brigade, 157th brigade, 13th mtsp-th and 124th brigade (counterattack from the area of heights 63, 8 to the south-west);
b) 39th brigade, 404th rifle division and 126th brigade (counterattack from the Arma-Eli region to the south-west on As-Chalula).
The task was "to eliminate the broken pr-ka and restore the previous position of the left flank of the 44th army". An additional tank reserve was the 124th brig. Nevertheless, the Crimean Front did not have a full-fledged mechanized formation (tank corps) for delivering counterattacks. Several armored brigades and a motorcycle regiment were not a full-fledged equivalent of such a formation, neither in terms of numbers, nor in terms of weapons.
It is curious to note that later Colonel S.I. Chernyak in G.M. Malenkov wrote in November 1942: “I gave an order in the area where the division was located to prepare a defensive line and bury all the troops in the ground, to have a preparatory line in the depths.” However, as Chernyak describes the situation, he saw D.T. Kozlov inflicted a dressing and ordered "to give people a rest and prepare them for the offensive." In the light of the above combat order No. 028, this is not surprising, the formations were preparing for counterattacks.
At the same time, the practice of withdrawing to the rear on the Crimean Front had one significant drawback. The formations were withdrawn to the rear for resupplying with the preservation of their artillery regiments at the front. So, the artillery of the 404th and 157th rifle divisions, withdrawn to the rear by May, was in positions to support the 63rd Guards Rifle Division and the 276th Rifle Division. This created the prerequisites for the entry of divisions withdrawn into the reserve without artillery, as subsequently happened. It should not be thought that this was a decision characteristic only of the 44th Army. The same practice took place in the 51st and 47th armies. This made the artillery grouping of the Crimean Front, on the one hand, a strong enemy in the first line, but very vulnerable when breaking through this line.
At the same time, theoretically, the Crimean Front could repeat the success of March 20, 1942 with a tank counterattack, but only if the qualitative composition of the enemy grouping did not change. It was she who underwent changes that had fatal consequences for the Soviet troops in the Crimea. The German command reinforced the armored vehicles in the Crimea qualitatively. The 22nd TD received 12 newest Pz.IVs with a 75-mm long-barreled gun, 20 Pz.IIIs with a 50-mm long-barreled gun and Marder self-propelled guns with a 76.2-mm gun to the anti-tank division. In total, as of May 1, 1942, the 22nd TD consisted of 42 Pz.II, 120 Pz.38 (t), 20 Pz.III, 30 Pz.IV, and a total of 212 tanks. Two companies of the formation were equipped with armored personnel carriers, one in each motorized infantry regiment. Thus, the 22nd TD entered the battle in Operation Bustard Hunting in a much better condition than in the counteroffensive on March 20, 1942, despite the losses incurred. The 190th assault gun battalion also received new equipment - 6 self-propelled guns with a 75-mm long-barreled gun. In general, a fairly strong armored “fist” was assembled in XXX AK (as of May 7, 1942):
- The 132nd infantry division was attached to the 249th battalion of assault guns and the battery of the 197th battalion (a total of 22 "Sturmgeshyutz");
- The 28th lpd was attached to the 190th battalion of assault guns (15 self-propelled guns with a short barrel and 6 with a long one), as well as the 223rd company of captured tanks, consisting of 16 light and 2 medium tanks;
- The 50th infantry division was attached to the 197th battalion of assault guns (14 "Sturmgeshyutsev").
In early April 1942, Ion Antonescu was inspecting his troops in the Crimea. Taking the opportunity, Manstein asked the Romanian dictator for Romanian units, and the marshal soon sent the Romanian VII Corps to the Crimea, consisting of two divisions (19th infantry division and 8th infantry division). The commander of the 11th Army placed this corps on his left flank, in the zone of the Soviet 51st Army. There was a certain risk of a collapse of the front in the event of a Soviet offensive, just as it happened on February 27, 1942.
Self-propelled guns "Marder" of the early production series with a 76.2-mm gun. These self-propelled guns became one of the Germans' responses to the new Soviet armored vehicles.
The High Command turned a deaf ear to all Manstein’s requests for a second tank division (“headquarters of a tank corps with another TD from the 1st TA”), which he requested in his reports in January and February 1942. As a tank commander who had driving experience motorized corps in the summer of 1941, Manstein realized the need to use exactly two mechanized formations on the Kerch Peninsula: one to encircle the Soviet troops, and the second to strike in depth, to Kerch. Based on his experience in the Crimea in 1941, Manstein formed a battle group similar in tasks to the Ziegler brigade, but more numerous and better armed. It included the reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd infantry division, the battalion of the 391st infantry regiment, the 560th tank destroyer battalion, the 154th division (twelve 150-mm sFH37 (t)), a battery of 10-cm K18 guns (4 guns), a battery of assault guns of the 197th battalion, a company of Brandenburg saboteurs, a battery of rocket-propelled mortars, anti-aircraft guns, sappers and the Romanian 3rd motorized cavalry regiment Cornet. The battle group was headed by Colonel K. von Groddek. In addition to the Groddek brigade, the Muller battle group was formed from the infantry of the 401st infantry regiment and a battalion of the 105th regiment, mounted on trucks, reinforced by the 223rd tank destroyer battalion, a battery of assault guns and Romanian artillery. As a result, the mobile forces of the 11th Army (in addition to the 22nd TD) grew to five infantry battalions reinforced by artillery, which was already close enough to a tank division. R. Fortsik claims that Muller's group was subordinate to Groddek, but this fact is not traced according to the documents of the 11th Army. Rather, we can talk about two independently operating battle groups with a common task.
Mindful of the negative experience of the counterattack of the 22nd TD on March 20, for Operation Bustard Hunting, the Germans undertook a thorough study of the anti-tank ditch of the Ak-Monai positions, both with the help of aerial reconnaissance and through targeted interviewing of prisoners. It really was a serious engineering structure with a depth of 2-3 meters, a width of 4-4.5 meters on the surface and a width of 3 meters at the bottom. Particular attention was paid to the study of crossings across the ditch (which the Soviet troops needed to bring troops and supplies from the depths). However, these crossings were so seriously protected with mining approaches to them that it was concluded: "The anti-tank ditch should therefore be crossed away from these crossings." It is not surprising, because the prominent Soviet engineer I.P. had a hand in improving the defense of the Ak-Monai positions. Galitsky, who worked on the Crimean front from February to April 1942.
The 306th Artillery Command, headed by Lieutenant General J. Zukertort, was allocated to control the artillery collected for Operation Bustard Hunting. I must say that the Germans as a whole quite highly appreciated the artillery of the Crimean Front. One of the reports written at the end of the operation directly admits: “Due to the constant change of positions by enemy artillery and the large number of these positions, it could only be a question of deterring enemy artillery by setting up smoke screens and firing explosive shells over areas.” That is, the emphasis was placed on blinding observation posts in order to reduce the effectiveness of artillery countermeasures. J. Zukertort also noted one feature of the actions of the Soviet artillery, which it was decided to use: “The Russians always open fire from the bulk of their guns about half an hour after the start of the attack; thanks to this, it is possible at first to support the infantry attack with the help of all our artillery. Artillery activity also became for the 11th Army a means of misleading the Soviet command about the direction of the main attack. There was no artillery preparation, counter-battery firing, firing at fortifications, sighting in the XXX AK zone. On the contrary, in the zone XXXXII AK, already 10 days before the start of the offensive, a systematic counter-battery fight and shooting at various targets was carried out.
Apparently, this disinformation campaign had a certain impact on the assessment of the situation by the Soviet command. According to available data, the German offensive was expected against the "center and right wing of the armies of the Crimean Front". It cannot be emphasized here that the task of determining the direction of the enemy's strike is in itself very difficult. Even in the classic example of a successful deliberate defense Central Front in the summer of 1943, on the Kursk Bulge, the Germans struck at the weakest 15th rifle division V.N. Dzhangavs and hacked its defenses on the first day of the battle. It was hard to expect a better decision from the Crimean Front in May 1942 than K.K. Rokossovsky in the summer of 1943
Tank Pz.IV with a 75-mm long-barreled gun in the Crimea. May 1942 Crimea became a testing ground for new German armored vehicles.
On the whole, there is no doubt that the command of the Crimean Front considered the possibility of the enemy going over to the offensive. The German strike was expected, paying attention to the supply of all types of supplies and the activation of the Air Force. In the ZhBD of the Crimean Front in early May 1942, the conclusion was recorded that the enemy was preparing "for active operations in the Kerch direction." Moreover, the first, yet false alarm rose literally in the first days of the month. At the negotiations S.I. Chernyak with D.T. Kozlov, on the night of May 3, mentioned the cutting of wire by the Germans, and the conclusion was made: “with dawn it can go on to active operations.” In the same conversation, the front commander recalled the need to be ready to switch to radio communications.
One of the last "bells" about the upcoming German offensive was the flight to the Soviet side of the Croatian pilot Nikolai Vucina on the morning of May 4, 1942, who was interrogated personally by Marshal S.M. Budyonny. N. Vucina bluntly said that in the Crimea "the Germans are thinking of advancing between May 10-15."
One of the first who began to advance to attack Soviet positions on the Parpach Isthmus was the reinforced company of the 436th Infantry Division, intended for tactical landing in the rear of Soviet positions, behind the anti-tank ditch. Traditionally, this landing is called "boat", but he landed with the help of sapper assault boats with an internal combustion engine. They were originally intended to force rivers. The landing was carried out, respectively, by the forces of the engineering unit: the 902nd assault boat team. The difference between such boats and boats was the high speed of movement.
Since the harbor of Feodosia was crammed with mines, the landing of infantry landing on boats was carried out from 20.30 on May 7 at Cape Ilya (empty boats with a small draft could pass through the harbor without interference). The landing was almost thwarted due to the appearance of the silhouette of the ship, identified by the Germans as torpedo boat. However, this did not have any consequences, at 1.45 am on May 8 the silhouette disappeared and at 2.30 am the assault boats began to move in conditions of excitement of 3 points (which forced two people to hold the engine). The disruption of this enterprise, bordering on an adventure, could be carried out by the weakest forces of the Black Sea Fleet boats, but the Germans did not encounter any interference from the Soviet fleet. From the air, the landing was covered by fighters, they are mentioned in the German report.
At 4.00 am Berlin time on May 8, the boats leave for the designated area and at 4.15 am, deployed in a deployed formation at a speed of 25 km / h, go on the attack. At 1 km from the shore, boats with landing forces come under fire from Soviet artillery, but overcome it, and 500 meters from the shore they begin to be hit by infantry weapons. As a result, 11 boats are disabled, 4 more are turned over, and landing is carried out from 28 boats. On the shore, the landing party encounters a field of FOGs (high-explosive flamethrowers), but according to the German action report, losses from flamethrowers were insignificant and the minefield of FOGs was quickly cleared. The landing was an unpleasant surprise that aggravated the situation on the left flank of the 44th Army. As indicated in the report of the reconnaissance department of the 44th Army, the landing force occupied the pillbox, “cutting off our units defending in the west. slopes of the city of As-Chalule ". It must be said that in the report in hot pursuit of the events, the estimate of the size of the landing force was quite realistic - 150 people.
As early as eight in the evening on May 7, 1942, when there were several hours left before the German offensive, the headquarters of the artillery of the Crimean Front had strong information about the impending transition of the Germans to the offensive. With the sanction of the front command, a decision is made at 4.00 on May 8 to conduct counter-training and an order is issued for counter-training. The beginning of the counter-preparation actually coincides with the enemy's artillery strike. The author failed to find any mention of Soviet counter-training and the effect it produced in German operational documents. There is only the phrase "Russian artillery fire is weak" in the 11th Army ZhBD, but it is not clear to which time interval it refers.
Tanks of the 22nd TD in the Crimea. The pear-shaped muzzle brake of 75-mm long-barreled guns of the early type is clearly visible on the right side of the image.
German artillery preparation begins at 3.15 Berlin time on May 8 with a powerful, but very short, only 3 minutes, fire strike. One of the means of achieving success for the Germans was 150-mm rocket-propelled mortars, which made a strong impression on the 77th Rifle Division in March 1942. On the morning of May 8, they acted with highly concentrated fire, which was provided by six batteries at once. Also on May 8, the impact of 150-mm mortars was reinforced by 280-mm and 320-mm rockets. The anti-tanker G. Biderman from the 132nd Infantry Division later wrote in his memoirs:
"Battery of six rocket launchers could fire 26 projectiles flying with destructive nervous system roar, with a terrible effect. The fragments from these shells did not produce the same impression as fragments from artillery shells, but the explosion of the shell on detonation in a confined space or at close range led to the rupture of blood vessels from the shock wave. Enemy soldiers in close proximity to the site of the explosion were soon demoralized by eardrum tearing ruptures, and the usual, instinctive fear quickly gave way to horror and panic. Stoic Russian soldiers, usually insensitive even to raids by "pieces", often became helpless under such shelling.
It is not surprising that this weapon made a strong impression on not the strongest division of the Crimean Front, i.e., the 63rd Guards Rifle Division. As stated in the report on the use of rocket-propelled mortars: “The breakthrough of the 49th bp at 6.00 in the morning into the anti-tank ditch was facilitated (perhaps, in principle, provided) by the moral impact on the enemy (the direct physical impact on the enemy who was in deep trenches is much less)”. Indeed, the infantrymen of the 28th Infantry Division reached the anti-tank ditch already at 4.00 in the morning.
A key role in the success of the German offensive was played by the speed of action and powerful artillery and air strikes in the first hours of the operation. The report on the actions of the 28th lpd stated: “Shortly after that [reaching the line of the ditch. - Auth.] begins a pre-agreed strike of "pieces", which occurs as timely as possible. The enemy on the main line of defense gets hit just at the moment when the advancing infantry has reached the anti-tank ditch. At the same time, artillery from all available barrels opens the strongest fire at the designated breakthrough site. As a result, the advanced companies of the 28th LPD manage to break into the anti-tank ditch south of the road. As a result, already in the first hours of the operation, the 132nd Infantry Division and the 28th Infantry Division formed bridgeheads to the east of the anti-tank ditch. Moreover, the 132nd Infantry Division is advancing 3 km east of the moat. Not only parts of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division were crushed, but also the left-flank 343rd opab of the 151st UR, its commander, Captain Mikhailov, was seriously wounded.
In fairness, it should be noted that not everywhere it was possible to make a strong impression on the Soviet infantry. The 50th Infantry Division on the left wing of XXX AK was not successful. The same report on the actions of rocket-propelled mortars stated: “Two fire strikes (117 explosive and 54 incendiary shells) failed to destroy the enemy, dug in at a narrow height of 69.4, 1.5 km east of Koi-Asan in a trench up to half a meter wide and deep up to 3 meters (powerful attacks of the "pieces" also turned out to be ineffective) ". The more experienced 302nd Rifle Division of the 51st Army was defending here. Also, at first, the 276th Rifle Division of the 44th Army held its positions.
It should be noted that the consumption of ammunition by the 11th Army on the first day of the Bustard Hunt was very high: 1718 tons. For comparison, even in the most intense days of the assault on Stalingrad, Paulus's army did not shoot more than 1000-1300 tons. Given the small space that the artillery of the 306th command hit, the effect of the German artillery preparation was obviously above average.
The scheme of countering the Soviet artillery from the 306th command was based on the blinding of observation posts. Also, the shelling of the areas of observation posts led to a rupture of wires and loss of control. As later noted in the report of the 11th Army on the breakthrough of the Parpach positions: “According to the prisoners, the enemy’s telephone network was damaged so badly that the Russian command had confusion.” In general, this was a fairly typical phenomenon, the loss of communication due to massive artillery strikes. The report of the 306th command also stated: "The enemy fired little (from individual guns or platoons, rarely batteries) and completely chaotically and at random."
However, this assessment does not fully reflect the impact of Soviet artillery on the course of the battle, at least in the morning of 8 May. The construction of bridges across the ditch was under fire from the 457th and 53rd artillery regiments of the RGK, and the artillery of the 276th rifle division also worked on targets in the 63rd Guards Rifle Division. The Soviet rocket artillery participated in repulsing the enemy offensive from 4.42 by one division of the 25th GMP, and from 5.30 by the entire regiment. This impact has not gone unnoticed. The report on the actions of the 28th lpd stated:
“After wedging in, enemy infantry fire in the immediate vicinity of the wedging area is not very strong, but Russian artillery is becoming more and more active. Batteries of small and medium caliber are shelling the area on both sides of the anti-tank ditch. One or more batteries salvo fire carry out sighting and begin to fire at the crossing over the ditch.
Soviet heavy tank KV, shot down on the Kerch Peninsula. May 1942
Moreover, the report of the 28th LPD directly indicates the rather serious impact of the Soviet artillery regiments on the course of hostilities: “Under heavy enemy artillery fire, the commander of the short-range artillery regimental group that supported the advancing regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Klose and his adjutant, die. For some time, the leadership of the artillery was beheaded, valuable time was lost and not used to continue the offensive.
However, soon a turning point in the hostilities occurs, not in favor of the Soviet troops. By about 10:00 on May 8, the artillery of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division east of the moat was suppressed. The 53rd Artillery Regiment, having used up ammunition, at about 11.00 retreats to spare base points in the area of the city of Kabush-Ube. In the meantime, by noon, German sappers are completing the construction of a bridge over the ditch, assault guns are being transported across it, and the regrouping of artillery is also being completed. The task of the advancing was facilitated by the preservation of part of the existing crossings. The report on the actions of the 197th battalion of assault guns directly states: "Unharmed part of the crossings built by the enemy across the ditch fell into our hands." However, in addition to this, the walls of the ditch were used to undermine the passage of self-propelled guns. This gives new impetus to continue the offensive. As noted in the report on the actions of the 28th lpd: "The Russians soon lose their stability and begin to retreat everywhere."
Another angle of the same car. Pay attention to two holes in the stern of the tank. Presumably these are holes from 75-mm armor-piercing shells.
In general, a breakthrough in the first line of Soviet defense became possible due to the well-functioning interaction of infantry, artillery and sappers. The report of the 197th assault gun battalion states: “Interaction with the infantry and sappers was excellent. Despite the strongest mining and active enemy defense (artillery, anti-aircraft defense, mortars, anti-tank missiles, snipers), the Parpach ditch was overcome by noon on the first day of the offensive. The battalion later even starred in the OKH training film Assault Guns and Sappers.
Soviet artillery, located to the west of the anti-tank ditch of the Ak-Monai positions, during the battle from 5.00 to 14.00 on May 8, almost all were out of order, with the exception of four guns of the 766th ap. In the front-line report on the activities of artillery, it was especially emphasized: "The overwhelming majority of the means of thrust were destroyed by aviation fire." A long operational pause at the front allowed the Germans to prepare well for an attack on the Parpach positions.
An attempt to bring the tanks of the 44th Army into battle for a counterattack was carried out with a great delay. The first to enter the battle at about 11.00 was the 126th OTB on T-26 tanks in the lane of the 276th rifle division, counterattacking from the Arma-Eli state farm to the southwest. The battalion lost 4 T-26s burnt out and 8 T-26s knocked out. It was impossible to break the bridgeheads occupied by the German infantry to the east of the ditch by a small group of light tanks.
The main body of the tank troops of the 44th Army entered the battle only in the afternoon. That is, when the Germans had already transported assault guns across the ditch. Being alerted at 4.15 in the morning, the 39th brigade was inactive until 12.00 on May 8, which gave the enemy the opportunity to break through deep enough into the formation of the army of S.I. Chernyak. Only in the afternoon, a brigade consisting of 2 KV, 1 T-34 and 14 T-60 began to move forward and collided with the enemy on the march at the heights. 50, 6 to the east of the Ak-Monai positions. In a few hours of battle, the 39th brigade lost both of its KVs and 5 T-60s, 1 T-34 was damaged (it was in service until May 16).
The expansion of the bridgehead, the construction of crossings and the reflection of tank counterattacks allows the 28th infantry division to enter the 83rd infantry division in the footsteps of the advancing vanguard and use them against height 63.8. From this height, as stated in the report of the 28th LPD, "the enemy is again conducting strong flanking fire." The height was held by the 819th Rifle Regiment of the 396th Rifle Division, which was knocked out of position at about 1600, which forced the 276th Rifle Division to begin retreating to the line of height. 63, 2, Mount Mezarlyk-Oba. This withdrawal, in turn, forces the artillery of the northern sector, which occupied positions on the heights, to withdraw. 63, 8, further to the northeast, also in the area of high. 63, 2 and mountains Mezarlyk-Oba.
At this moment, hopelessly late for the turning point of the battle, the 56th brigade of the 44th army enters the battle. For unknown reasons, the brigade's order to advance was given even more late than to other units, only at 16.00 on May 8. The brigade was ordered to act according to option No. 2 in two groups, holding down and shock. The 13th MCP operated with the brigade. She spoke at 17.00 and until 23.00 fought in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 63.8 and the Feodosia highway. However, the opposition of the attackers was stronger than expected. Assault guns, including a new model, became the enemy of Soviet tankmen. As a result, all 7 tanks of the KV brigade were disabled, and in total it lost 17 vehicles. In fact, the process of gradual grinding by the enemy of the KV and T-34 of the Crimean Front, capable of counteracting the enemy’s tank attack, began.
It should be noted that the Germans also have considerations regarding unrealized opportunities. The report of the 28th LPD on the results of the battles stated: “In order to use the favorable situation, the division command suggests the corps command to send at least part of the forces of the tank division into battle in order to complete the enemy’s confusion and prevent him from equipping a new line of defense in depth. However, due to lack of time, it is no longer possible to bring a tank division into battle. A certain reinsurance with the introduction of the 22nd TD following the failure on March 20 somewhat slowed down the pace of development of the success of the 11th Army. The situation for the introduction of a tank division into battle was indeed quite favorable.
By the end of the day on May 8, a huge gap gaped in the formation of the 44th Army. The 63rd Guards Rifle Division was overturned, the 276th Rifle Division withdrew to the northeast, and there was practically no solid front. One of the first in the direction of the breakthrough was the 72nd Cavalry Division of the hero civil war Major General V.I. Books (4684 people, 7 BA-10, 12 BA-20, 12 76-mm and 18 45-mm guns). She was alerted already on the morning of May 8, and at 20.00 an order was received to take up defensive positions in the rear of the 44th Army. Division V.I. Books came out at midnight and by 5.00 reached the line in the Uzun-Ayak area. Of course, it was a rather weak barrier. Nevertheless, at that time the front command still had a fairly strong tank "fist" (see Table 3).
In a brief report on the actions of the 44th Army, prepared in June 1942 on the basis of the results of the battles by Major A. Zhitnik, it was indicated that the order of the front on the new outfit of forces was indeed received and deciphered at 4.30 am on May 9, 1942. It stated that The 390th Rifle Division, the 83rd Regiment and the 56th Tank Brigade are not included in the 44th Army, but are transferred to the commander of the 51st for a counterattack. At this moment, S.I. Chernyak showed arbitrariness and decided not to give up the 390th Rifle Division, but to use it for the planned counterattack (notifying V.N. Lvov in encryption). However, as A. Zhitnik writes, at 0600 the 390th Rifle Division began to retreat to the 51st Rifle Division without warning. In turn, this retreat led to the retreat of neighboring divisions.
Information about the withdrawal is indirectly confirmed by the report of the 229th detachment. The KV battalion concentrated to attack together with the 390th Rifle Division, but at 5.30 a representative of the 51st Army arrived at the location of the battalion and, as a result, the tank fist from the 8th KV was ... withdrawn back to the Kiyata area, where it was for the entire first half of the day on May 9 . It is impossible not to recognize the rather serious disorganization of the already practically prepared counterattack.
Commander of the 72nd Cavalry Division, hero of the Civil War, Major General V.I. Book.
The Germans actually got several hours to pull up artillery through the passage in the ditch and systematically bring the 22nd Panzer Division into battle. It must be said that, compared with the dynamically developing events of May 8, the next day the parties rather slowly moved on to active actions. Having crossed the moat, the 28th Infantry Division, meanwhile, turned its front to the north, covering the eastern flank with a bicycle battalion. It was counterattacked by tanks around 08:00–09:00, it was a fresh 124th detachment on the T-26, which lost 5 tanks in the attack. However, the general counterattack in the first half of the day did not take place. The 40th brigade, on the morning of May 9, went to the area east of Parpach, stood still all day. The 56th brigade and the 13th MCP also remained in place.
In the morning of May 9, V.N. Lvov is trying to organize a counterattack against the enemy grouping, advancing from Arma-Eli to the north, to the rear of his army. The slow gathering of forces can be explained by the desire of the Soviet command to deliver a strong enough counterattack to influence not only the Arma-Eli area, but also the enemy troops that had broken through to the west in the 44th Army zone. According to the plan of V.N. Lvov, outlined in order No. 0025 / OP dated 0.10 May 9, an attack was supposed in the direction of the city of Mezarlyk-Oba, height. 63, 8, As-Chalule, i.e. to the seashore. However, time, of course, worked against the Crimean Front. Any delay only exacerbated the situation.
Around noon, after pulling up artillery, the 28th Infantry Division resumed its offensive and captured Arma-Ely. It must be said that in the report of the formation, the resistance of the Soviet troops is not regarded at this moment as weak: “Powerful artillery fire, including multiple launch rocket systems, is being fired by the enemy from the north and northwest. Losses cannot be avoided." According to Soviet data, the 456th and 457th Ap RGCs operated here. The advance of the enemy in Arma-Ely forces Soviet artillery from 14.00, step by step, move further north to the area of \u200b\u200bMount Kaiman, the mound Syuruk-Oba.
On the afternoon of May 9, rain poured down, which eroded the soil and worsened the conditions for the movement of troops. It should be noted here that in the May offensive, the changeable Crimean weather turned out to be on the side of the Germans. They managed to achieve a turn in their favor before the rains poured down. As stated in the report on the actions of the 28th lpd: “If the period of bad weather had begun a day earlier, the success of the breakthrough - a prerequisite for the success of the entire operation - would have been in question. The transfer of artillery and heavy weapons, their effective and necessary support for the advancing infantry would become impossible.
In conditions of worsening weather, the 22nd Panzer Division joins the German offensive. It should be noted that the first entry for May 9 in the ZhBD of the 22nd TD reports the shelling of the route of the formation’s advancement at 2.20–2.30 am by a “Russian warship”. However, nothing is said about the effect of the shelling. The advance of the tank division takes place through the lane of the 132nd Infantry Division.
With the general slowness of the gathering of forces by both sides, the Germans nevertheless made the first move, introducing the 22nd tank division into battle around 16.00–17.00. As indicated in the report of the 229th brigade, the commander of the 51st Army personally (General Lvov was true to himself and controlled from the front line) sets the battalion the task of counterattacking the enemy moving from Arma-Eli to the Kara-Oba and Syuruk-Oba mounds. These were already two columns of tanks of the 22nd TD. At that moment, the 229th detachment had 8 KV in service. The infantry of the 236th Rifle Division began to retreat under the blows of enemy tanks. The situation as a whole was similar to the German offensive on March 20, but with regard to technology, the balance of power has fundamentally changed.
In the tank battle that began at about 16.45 at Arma-Eli on May 9, 1942, the 229th registrar immediately lost 5 KV. At the same time, the tankers of the battalion claimed to destroy 28 enemy tanks, including 6 tanks destroyed by the company commander, Lieutenant Timofeev, who died in this battle. The actions of the tanks managed to somewhat stabilize the situation, but only in the form of holding back the advance of the enemy. The non-simultaneous entry into battle of Soviet tank units also played a negative role. Later, the 40th brigade received a reproach for the passivity of actions on the afternoon of May 9th. The report of the brigade indicates its participation in the counterattack after 19.30, without its losses, but this was already a few hours after the 22nd TD entered the battle.
The Germans managed to knock out the Soviet heavy tanks that found themselves on the battlefield with much greater efficiency than on March 20. As stated in the report of the headquarters of the 11th Army on the results of the breakthrough of the Parpach positions: “The successes of the 22nd TD in breaking through the Parpach position and advancing through Arma-Eli to the north were largely determined by the presence of new weapons. Thanks to this weapon, the soldiers had a sense of superiority over the Russian heavy tanks. Soviet sources confirm a qualitative change in the situation: “Among the new means used by the enemy, the presence of shells that pierce the armor of the KV and set it on fire attracts attention.” Therefore, it was not possible to turn parts of the 22nd TD into flight with a KV strike.
As reported by the headquarters of the Crimean Front S.M. Budyonny at 5.00 on May 10, the enemy preempted the strike group of the 51st Army in terms of the start of the offensive, the 390th Rifle Division was thrown back, and the front was opened. It should be noted that the front command personally observed what was happening. In negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky D.T. Kozlov said that together with L.Z. Mehlis on the 9th "we observed a fierce battle between our infantry, artillery and enemy tanks." The advancing 236th Rifle Division and the 157th Rifle Division were forced to engage in battle until they were completely concentrated. At the same time, the advance of the 22nd TD and 28th LPD on the evening of May 9 was limited to an area about 3 km north of Arma-Eli. The low pace of the German offensive so far made it possible to maintain relative order and retreat in an organized manner. Several regiments of artillery operating in the Arma-Eli area, on the night of May 11, withdrew to the Kiyata area.
The actions of the Germans in the zone of the 44th Army were much more like a "blitzkrieg". As indicated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army, the Groddek brigade, without encountering resistance (and shelling from the Black Sea Fleet from the sea), advanced along the coast into the depths of the Kerch Peninsula. Already in the morning of 8.30 on May 9, she passed Seitjeut. As noted in the ZhBD of Manstein's army, the still surviving artillery of the 44th Army became a victim of the offensive: "Groddek's forward formation destroyed several enemy batteries." In the conditions of the collapse of the front, even infantry formations quickly moved forward. At 17.30 on May 9, the headquarters of the 44th Army in the Uzun-Ayak region was hit by units of the 132nd Infantry Division, "forcing the squadron to destroy documents and withdraw under direct fire from tanks and submachine gunners of the pr-ka." As a result, the already extremely difficult situation was aggravated by the loss of control.
In one of the orders issued on the evening of May 9, P.P. Vechny wrote: “The military council of the front near Lvov. I have no connection with him." On the one hand, the practice of front-line management had unconditional positive features. It was used by such recognized masters of their craft as G.K. Zhukov, V. Model, E. Rommel. On the one hand, D.T. Kozlov and L.Z. Mehlis can be understood, the counterattack of the 51st Army decided a lot. On the other hand, in conditions of unstable communication, this led to untimely decisions in other areas.
"Death Road" Abandoned on the road leading to Kerch, Soviet vehicles.
On the chief of staff of the front, Major General P.P. On the eternal afternoon of May 9, there was a great burden and responsibility in decision-making. He was by no means sitting idly by. It was on May 9 that he made an attempt to restore the integrity of the left wing of the front. So, in the middle of the day, the 12th and 143rd brigade were transferred from the reserve to the 44th army. Moreover, the first was subordinate to S.I. Chernyak right at its location, in the Agibel area, Kr. Shar, and the second made a march to the Adyk region with access to the designated area by 4.00 on May 10. The size of the brigade, however, left much to be desired; on April 23, the 143rd brigade consisted of 2208 people, significantly less than the staff. To the south, in the region of Bash-Kyrgyz, Mavlyush, the 72nd cd was advanced. However, these forces failed to build a continuous line of defense. The front from the Parpach positions expanded like a funnel. As a result, from the left flank of the 72nd cd near Mamlush to the sea, there was space, covered only by the remnants of the 404th rifle division and the 63rd guard division, the 54th infantry regiment and junior lieutenant courses. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the German command also sent reserves into battle, in this case the 170th infantry division of XXX AK. She aimed at Agibel, shackling the collected P.P. Eternal reserves. Moreover, the Groddek brigade, moving along the seaside road, meeting weak resistance, by the evening of May 9, reached the area of the Kenegez state farm. That is, it turned out to be literally a stone's throw from the Turkish Wall. The front, which was still being built up by the command, turned out to be deeply outflanked.
"Abkhazia" in Sevastopol. May 1942
On the evening of May 9, an order was issued by S.M. Budyonny to the “strike of the Lvov group in the direction of the Peschanaya gully”. However, at the negotiations held at 3.00 am on May 10, L.Z. Mehlis and D.T. Kozlov with I.V. Stalin shows a refusal to try to turn the tide in his favor by decisive actions in favor of withdrawing to a new line of defense. The command of the Crimean Front already doubted the advisability of continuing the offensive: "tanks will not pass." As a result, Stalin bluntly said: "If you manage and have time to detain the enemy in front of the Turkish Wall, we will consider this an achievement."
By that time, measures had already been taken to fill the defensive line of the Turkish Wall. By order of the headquarters of the Crimean Front, the 156th Rifle Division was advanced from the reserve to the Turkish Wall, which was ordered "by the end of 10.5 to complete the exit for the defense of the Turkish Wall line [at] the Natashino, Bikech front." This front was about 20 km long and did not completely cover the Turkish Wall. As of April 23, the 156th Rifle Division had 10,603 personnel and had 131 light and 59 heavy machine guns. This was a good indicator, but the 20 km front was twice the authorized norm. The right flank of the 156th Rifle Division, adjacent to the Sea of Azov, was to be covered by retreating units, and on the left flank from Bikech to Uzunlar, prefabricated units from the front reserve were advanced. These were four reserve rifle regiments, courses for junior lieutenants, two battalions of front-line courses. In negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky on the night of May 11 D.T. Kozlov expressed concern that the 156th Rifle Division was "almost 50% staffed by Dagestanis." Looking ahead, it must be said that the division, taking into account the situation, showed itself well.
Later, Manstein wrote in his memoirs: "If the enemy succeeded, after he left the Parpach position, again take up defensive positions somewhere, our offensive would have bogged down." In this, on the one hand, there was an element of dramatization of the situation. On the other hand, it was precisely to prevent the occupation of intermediate positions that the commander of the 11th Army sent the Groddek brigade to the Turkish Wall. It was, rather, about conducting the operation "Hunting for bustards" at the highest possible pace. Moreover, it should be noted that it was on May 10 that Manstein gave a certain head start to his opponents by sending the Groddek brigade to the north, "in order to block the roads leading through Marfovka and Sultanovka as soon as possible." In a sense, such a turn can be justified by the desire to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet units from occupying the Turkish Wall.
The turn of the Groddek brigade to Marfovka on May 10 was traditionally described in domestic works as an airborne assault followed by a landing. As such, he was designated in the report of the front headquarters of May 12. V.S. Abramov rightly noted that parachutes of supply containers could be mistaken for landing.
Despite the rather skeptical attitude of the front command to the counterattack of the 51st Army, it continued on the afternoon of May 10th. In essence, it became a means of withdrawing the troops of the 51st and 47th armies from the planned encirclement. Realizing the growing crisis, the front command throws into battle its last reserve - the 55th brigade of M.D. Sinenko, seized from the right flank of the front. She received an order at 20.00 on May 9 (still from K.S. Kolganov) to concentrate in the Oguz-Tobe area. Due to the sagging of the roads, the advance was slow and ended only by 8.00 on May 10. Here, to Oguz-Tobe, the 77th Guards Rifle Division of Colonel M.V. Volkov. Order for a counterattack by M.D. Sinenko received it belatedly, as a result, the counterattack scheduled for 11.00 followed only in the afternoon of May 10.
Chaos disaster. Abandoned equipment on the shore in Kerch. May 1942
As a result, the counterattack of the 51st Army began with attacks from the 40th Tank Brigade, which had been inactive the previous day, with the 650th Rifle Regiment of the 138th Rifle Division. In view of the muddy ground, 6 KV and 3 T-34s from the brigade go into battle, met with heavy fire on the southern slopes of the Syuruk-Oba barrow. As a result, 3 KV and 1 T-34 were burned. The report on the actions of the 28th LPD notes "the strongest enemy fire from the western flank" and writes about the need to "repel several strong enemy attacks, including with tank support." However, in the direction of the main attack, the Germans manage to take height by 14.30. 66, 2. Only after 16.00 the brigade of M.D. Sinenko went into battle and collided with the 22nd TD in the Oguz-Tobe area, when the encirclement was already almost closed. The counterattack was not successful, 5 were burned and 2 KV tanks of the 55th brigade were knocked out, 2 more were out of order for technical reasons. The fact of a tank battle is confirmed by the ZhBD 22nd TD, the Germans claimed 20 wrecked Soviet tanks. Indeed, the 55th brigade also lost 11 T-26s and T-60s. Already after 19.00, the 229th brigade took part in the battle, losing one KV. According to the front-line report, it was the only serviceable KV at that time. Thus, quite in the spirit of the scattered attacks of the previous days, the Soviet tank units attacked sequentially, allowing the enemy to gradually knock out the most dangerous KV and T-34s for them. The ZhBD of the 11th Army stated: “The attempts of enemy tanks to prevent encirclement by counterattacks from the north on Oguz-Tobe were thwarted by the actions of the 22nd TD and VIII Air Corps. Many enemy tanks have been destroyed."
The reports of tank units and formations almost unanimously note the appearance of a new highly effective weapon in the enemy's hands. The report of the 55th brigade reports: “The enemy uses a new system of anti-tank guns mounted on a tank or attached to a tank, which, in the presence of a high initial velocity of the projectile, pierced armor 140 mm thick in the frontal part of the KV tank for departure.” Moreover, it should be noted that the document states: "The size of the hole is up to 80 mm." This indicates the hit of a caliber armor-piercing projectile. Subsequently, with the widespread use of the latest 75-mm guns on the Soviet-German front, until 1943 they were more often used by the Germans with cumulative shells (as they were called in the Red Army, "termite"). In the Crimea, the latest technology of the Wehrmacht used the most effective caliber armor-piercing shells that pierced the armor and exploded inside the tank. The report of the 229th detachment reads: “The enemy used shells against our KV tanks, which pierced the KV tanks from 4-5 shots. When breaking through the armor, the KV tank ignites inside. The phrase "from 4-5 shots" probably refers to shooting at long distances, according to German sources, shooting at HF from a distance of up to 1800 meters is noted with defeat from the 4th shot.
The battlefield was left to the Germans, and they had the opportunity to inspect the wrecked vehicles. The conclusion was expected: "The bulk of the KV and T-34 was unambiguously destroyed by shells of 7.62 and 7.5 cm" . Accordingly, the 140th anti-tank division of the 22nd TD, re-equipped with self-propelled guns caliber 76.2 mm on the chassis of the tank 38 (t), announced the destruction of 24 Soviet tanks, including about 10 KV and 2-3 T-34s, and the 204th TP 22nd TD (12 Pz.IV with KwK40 , 20 Pz.III c KwK39) claimed to destroy "about 50 Russian" tanks, including 12 KV and 2-3 T-34s. Regarding the 6 new assault guns, it was indicated that they “destroyed an average of 3 Russian tanks” (without specifying the type, 15–20 vehicles, some, obviously, KV or T-34). According to Soviet data, 27 KV and 3 T-34s were lost in the May battles, hit by enemy artillery fire. In this regard, the Soviet and German data converge quite well - most of the KV and T-34 fell victim to new types of guns. Of course, the battles did not take place with a “dry score” - the Germans admit the irretrievable loss of 21 tanks from the 22nd TD in the May battles, including 2-3 Pz.IV with KwK40, 2-3 Pz.III. The total losses can be estimated from the division's report dated May 28, 1942, according to which there were 10 Pz.II, 50 Pz.38 (t), 6 Pz.III, 6 Pz.IV (with a short 75-mm cannon) and 4 Pz.IV (with a long-barreled gun), that is, there were 76 vehicles in service from those available on May 1, 1942 212.
As for the impact on Soviet tanks from the air, Soviet data do not confirm the great success of the Khsh-129 anti-tank attack aircraft. According to the documents of the BT and MV of the Crimean Front, only 15 tanks fell victim to air strikes, mainly T-26 from 126 rebates. In his report and actions of the 55th brigade M.D. Sinenko directly denied significant impact from the air, according to him, his units reached Oguz-Tobe "without losses in personnel and materiel from the bombardment."
The light cruiser "Molotov" enters the Northern Bay of Sevastopol. 1942
As a result of unsuccessful tank battles for the Soviet side in the afternoon of May 10, 1942, the encirclement ring of the main forces of the 51st and 47th armies was actually closed. Only a narrow corridor along the shore of the Arabat Bay remained at the disposal of the Soviet units. The report on the actions of the 28th LPD admitted: “Only in the very north near the sea, north of the heights of Oguz-Tobe, where the tank division could not quickly break through, large enemy units retreat. However, they are forced to leave their heavy equipment and weapons stuck in muddy soil. Typical of military disasters was the transformation of important highways into a "road of death." The road Parpach - Sultanova - Kerch was packed in four rows and was subjected to devastating enemy air raids.
Early in the morning, at 4.30–5.00 am on May 11, the German advance northward from Arma-Ely continued. The 138th and 77th Guards Rifle Divisions and partly the 236th Rifle Division came under attack. The Germans managed to capture the village of Oguz-Tobe and the slopes of Mount Oguz-Tobe. Thus, they were able to control the breakthrough along the coast with fire.
On the same morning, at 11.30, from a raid by German aircraft on a command post located on Mount Konchi, the commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov. The army was headed by the chief of staff, Colonel G.I. Kotov. Despite the growing chaos, the body of V.N. Lvov was taken out and on May 13, 1942, sent by PS-84 aircraft to Tbilisi. General Lvov enjoyed great respect and authority, was an active and energetic commander.
The death of the commander, of course, worsened the position of the 51st Army. There was also another unfavorable operating factor. In his report, L.Z. Mehlis from 13.40 on May 11, acting Commander of the 51st Army Kotov wrote: "The Military Council of the Army does not have a plan and instructions from the front on the further actions of the 51st A units." At the same time, there is an order signed by the chief of staff of the front P.P. Vechny, dated May 10 and instructing the 51st Army: "Begin the withdrawal on the night of 11.5". The withdrawal was supposed to be beyond the line of the Turkish Wall. Orders similar in content existed to the 44th and 47th armies. At the same time, neither in the description of the actions of the 44th Army by A. Zhitnik, nor in S.I. Chernyak does not mention such an order. All the above-mentioned orders are written by hand on the letterhead of the chief of staff of the front (apparently, personally by P.P. Vechny), but they have neither numbers, nor signatures of the Military Council of the front, nor marks of dispatch. This leads to the conclusion that the orders were not issued and sent to the troops. Thus, almost a day of precious time was lost.
On May 11, the command of the 51st Army saw the withdrawal of the 138th, 302nd, and 77th Rifle Divisions from the semicircle. As reported by the acting Commander of the 51st Army Kotov Mekhlis, this was achieved "thanks to the exceptional heroism of the 77th Rifle Division." The remnants of the 55th brigade also took part in the battle, including immobilized KV tanks that fired from a place. All this together allowed the 138th and 304th divisions to break out of the "boiler". Accordingly, the 236th and 390th Rifle Divisions, and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Brigade remained on the outer front of the encirclement, waiting for a breakthrough. As Kotov noted in the same report, a planned withdrawal was possible, “but the 390th Rifle Division failed again. Her two regiments fled from the front.
The fate of those who remained surrounded was unenviable. One of the last means of influencing the encircled was volleys of rocket-propelled mortars, the report on their actions emphasizes "the decisive importance of May 11 in striking the enemy, crowded at the Ak-Monai station." According to the documents of the opposite side, by the evening of May 11, the position of the “cauldron” was already close to disintegration and defeat. As noted in the ZhBD of the 11th Army, "the resistance of the enemy is weakening." When summing up the results of the day, Manstein’s army railway department stated: “According to incomplete data, so far 26,710 people have been captured, 223 guns, 14 anti-aircraft guns, 2 multiple rocket launchers, 88 anti-aircraft guns, 137 mortars, 173 tanks, 66 aircraft and huge mass hand weapons, equipment and stocks of various property ".
V.S. Abramov, in his book, expresses doubts about the size of the "cauldron" under Ak-Monai. However, the encirclement of large forces of the Crimean Front did take place. The Germans already announced in a report at 0.20 on May 12 (apparently, after clarification) about 40,260 prisoners, captured as trophies 402 guns, 41 anti-aircraft guns, 197 tanks, 153 anti-tank guns, 210 mortars, 66 aircraft, 2000 machines of all types. This, of course, is not the highest figure in the series of "boilers" of 1941-1942. In 1941, at least 2-2.5 times more prisoners were declared in the encirclement near Uman and Melitopol. Nevertheless, this was a serious blow for the Crimean Front.
Heavy artillery is drawn to Sevastopol. On the march, a barrel wagon of 420-mm Czech-made mortars.
Meanwhile, S.I. Chernyak discovered the fact of the deep coverage of the flank of the newly restored front of his army. On May 11, he tries to organize a counterattack on the flank and rear of the “Kenegez group of the pr-ka” (i.e., the Groddek brigade) from the Kara area with the forces of the remnants of the 404th SD, withdrawn from the second echelon of the 276th SD and the 190th Cavalry Regiment of the 72nd i cd . However, the 276th Rifle Division did not reach Kara at the appointed time, and the attacks of the 404th Rifle Division were unsuccessful. The remaining units of the 44th Army were pinned down from the front by XXX AK infantry.
In the ZhBD of the 11th Army there is an entry relating to the evening of May 11: “Groddek’s brigade, after breaking through the enemy’s positions on the Tatar ditch, is fighting with large enemy forces just southwest of Saraimin.” The fact that the enemy had crossed the line of the Turkish Wall already on May 11 is confirmed by Soviet documents. In the evening operational report of the 156th Rifle Division, it is indicated that its 530th Rifle Regiment is fighting in the area south-west of Sayramin. This sharply worsened the position of the Crimean Front. While the main forces of the 51st and 47th armies were still fighting in the encirclement in the Ak-Monai area, the saving line of the Turkish Wall had already been broken through by the advancing enemy.
Carriage of 210-mm mortars on the march in the Crimea. Heavy artillery systems were dismantled and brought into position for firing already in position.
It is impossible not to emphasize the curious, from the point of view of the historian, fact that the orders of L.Z. Mehlis in the last days of the Kerch catastrophe were preserved in the personal belongings of the headquarters officer of the 10th sk, Major Pashchenko, who died already in 1944, and were transferred to the archive after his death. At 5.20 on May 12, the Military Council of the Crimean Front orders the 51st Army (actually again) "to withdraw units by the end of 13.5.42 beyond the defensive line of the Turkish Wall to the Sultanovka area and to the north." It was ordered "not to get involved in major battles with the enemy west of the Turkish Wall line." In pursuit of the order of the front headquarters at 6.00 on May 12, L.Z. Mekhlis hurries Kotov (who has become commander of the 51st A) with a separate note in which he emphasizes the significance of his actions: “The main thing is to save manpower and equipment and arrive in time for the Turkish Wall.” The 51st Army was ordered to go to the Alekseevka-Sultanovka area. This was one of the main claims against the front command: a two-day delay with orders to withdraw troops to the Turkish Wall (the conversation with I.V. Stalin took place on the night of May 10, and the listed orders were given in the early morning of May 12).
According to these instructions, it is clear that the front headquarters already had a very rough idea about the real state of the units pressed to the sea in the "boiler". On the morning of May 12, the ZhBD of the 11th Army recorded: "The battles for cleaning the boiler around Ak-Monai, which were fought jointly by XXXXII AK and VII Romanian AK, have been completed." That is, the defeat of the encircled troops of the two armies of the Crimean Front has already become a fait accompli.
The reaction of the front command to the breakthrough of Groddek was the directive No. 022 / OP issued at 23.30 on May 11 to the troops of the 44th Army "to continue the withdrawal in the direction of Sultanovka". In the report on the actions of the 44th Army, it is not mentioned; moreover, attention is drawn to the fact that there was no communication with the front headquarters. At the same time, it is impossible not to pay attention to the phrase “continue to withdraw”. In fact, the troops of the 44th Army were indeed already retreating. Already at 18.00 on May 11, the 72nd cd received an order to withdraw with access to the line adjacent to the Turkish Wall in the Marfovka area. Also in the report of the commander of the 72nd cd V.I. The book indicates that at 3.45 on May 12, he received an order from the headquarters of the 44th A to withdraw to the line from the Turkish Wall to Sayramina and Orta-Eli. That is, in essence, a line was built from the shaft to the lake. Tabechikskoe, covering Kerch.
Nevertheless, the headquarters of the 44th A really retreats to Sultanovka, where at 6.00 on May 12 S.I. Chernyak meets with D.T. Kozlov and L.Z. Mehlis at the headquarters of the 156th Rifle Division (i.e., already after the order given to the 72nd Rifle Division to withdraw beyond the Turkish Wall). Here the commander of the 44th Army personally receives an order to "immediately withdraw all units of the army behind the Turkish Wall." At the same time, the 157th Rifle Division, the 72nd Cavalry Division and the 12th Rifle Regiment were withdrawn from him into the reserve of the front, leaving the 44th Army of the 143rd Rifle Regiment, the remnants of the 404th, 276th and 396th Rifle Divisions under the control of the 44th Army. Accordingly, on the afternoon of May 12 and on the night of May 13, units of the 44th Army retreated to the Turkish Wall and beyond it. By 15.00 on May 12, the 72nd Cavalry Division entered the area from Sairamina to Orta-Eli, setting up a barrier to spread the Groddek group further to Kerch.
Meanwhile, the German command deploys the forces released after the liquidation of the "cauldron" to the east and the mobile units attack in the direction of Sultanovka. The defense on the Turkish Wall receives another gap, this time near Sultanovka, where units of the 22nd TD (excluding the tank regiment) and Muller's advance detachment break through. Mekhlis even considered it necessary to report to S.M. about this event (the 143rd brigade "left the occupied line") Budyonny.
Already a few units of combat vehicles of brigades and battalions withdrew to Kerch. The 229th brigade lost the last 2 KV on the Turkish shaft in an unsuccessful attempt to hold on to it. According to inaccurate data, by the evening of May 12, 1942, 1 T-34, 27 T-26, 7 KhT-133 and 10 T-60 remained on the move.
At 2.00 am on May 14, directive No. 01051 of the headquarters of the Crimean Front follows with an order to take up the defense of the Kerch bypass. The flanks of the bypass relied on the lake. Chokrakskoye, oz. Churubashskoye and Kamysh-Burun, and it passed through Bagerovo and the dominant heights to the west of Kerch. As A. Zhitnik later wrote in his report on the actions of the 44th Army: “This line did not have any pre-prepared defensive structures.” The army also lost a significant part of its artillery. In the meantime, on the afternoon of May 14, German troops reached the approaches to Kerch and broke through the city's defense bypass. The ZhBD of the 11th Army noted: "The enemy desperately defended himself with the support of numerous tanks, but our soldiers broke through the inner defensive belt of the city." It is not entirely clear what numerous tanks we are talking about, because, according to Soviet data, Kerch was defended by the remnants of the 39th brigade represented by 5 T-60s and 1 T-26 and the armored division (armored vehicles) of the 72nd cd.
600-mm "Karl" on the march. The self-propelled carriage distinguished the Karl from a series of archaic heavy guns from the First World War.
In addition to tanks, from May 14 to May 18, 1942, armored train No. 74, built at the plant named after. Voikov. He acted on the site from the plant to the Kerch station. On May 18, the railway track was destroyed, and the armored train was destroyed. At that moment, fighting was already underway on the territory of the plant. Voikov.
On the night of May 15, the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 170385, addressed to D.T. Kozlov, which began with the words: “Do not surrender Kerch, organize defense like Sevastopol”. However, given the events of the past day, this instruction was hopelessly late - the Germans were already on the territory of Kerch.
Officially, the evacuation of the troops of the Crimean Front began on May 14 in accordance with the order of I.V. Stalin at 3.40 am: “Start the withdrawal of the troops of the Crimean Front to the Taman Peninsula ...” The evacuation was carried out from the port of Kerch, from the piers of the KVMB, the plant named after. Voykov, Traps, Enikale, Zhukovka. At first, according to the order, only the wounded, the secret materiel (Guards mortars), and RGK artillery were transported. There was no longer any talk of any evacuation of tanks, tractors and even vehicles from Kerch and Yenikale. About 300 cars, tractors and motorcycles were burned at the crossing, first of all people were rescued. Of the 6789 people of the personnel of the tank units and formations of the Crimean Front, 3022 people, 44.5%, were evacuated from the Kerch Peninsula. According to the report of the head of the sanitary department of the front, a military doctor of the 1st rank N.P. Ustinov managed to withdraw 42,324 wounded, of which 4,919 were seriously wounded. Ustinov emphasizes "all the wounded", but, apparently, he means the wounded who managed to enter the hospitals.
For the crossing of the Kerch Strait of guns, only the so-called "bolinder" was used, which was inactive at night, as a result of which the chance to save a significant part of the artillery that had retreated to the Kerch region was missed. As a result, only 7 guns and 7 tractors of the 457th AP RGK and 29 GMCh installations were transported to the Chushka Spit (according to other sources). According to the report of the artillery headquarters of the SCF, compiled in the wake of the events in June 1942, the Crimean Front lost 157 76.2 mm mountain guns, 67 76 mm guns of 02/30, 210 76 mm divisional guns of 39, 25 107-mm guns 10/30, 24 122-mm guns mod. 31 and 31/37, 257 122 mm howitzers different types, 21 152 mm howitzers and 103 152 mm howitzer guns mod. 37 y. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in the calculation of trophies by the Germans following the defeat of the Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula, the absence of optics in 98% of the guns was especially noted, although 15% of the guns they got in good condition. In total, the Germans claimed to capture or destroy 1450 vehicles, 154 tanks, almost 800 guns.
To cover the evacuation, a defense is organized based on advantageous positions. The offensive of the units of the 28th Infantry Division on the western tip of the Yenikalsky Peninsula collides in the middle of the day on May 16 at an altitude of 175.0 (Mount Khroneva on the then maps) "with very dense and accurate fire from the defenders, entrenched in rocky shelters and firing from rifles and machine guns." The German infantry lie under fire, despite the vigorous support of the assault guns, which have shot all the ammunition, the attacks are not successful.
In the last days of the fighting on the Kerch Peninsula, the defense of the remnants of the Crimean Front broke up into several pockets of resistance pressed against the shore. At Gleika, Mayak and the lighthouse itself (Yenikalsky Mayak), Soviet soldiers and commanders took up defensive positions on a steep bank. As a result, the German artillery attack on May 18 on the lighthouse area hit an empty place, and the subsequent attack ran into a flurry of fire. As noted in the report on the actions of the 28th LPD: “Artillery is not able to support the attack due to the small distance separating our attacking units from the enemy. In addition, the trajectory of the projectiles does not allow covering enemy positions located on a steep bank. The support of assault guns and the use of flamethrowers also did not bring results to the attackers. The Germans managed to turn the tide with the massive use of mortars (judging by the context and the report on the use of Nebelwerfers - 280-mm rocket launchers) on the morning of May 19th. As emphasized in the report of the 28th lpd: "In stubborn hand-to-hand combat, one has to capture a very rugged rocky area." The Germans announced the capture of 8250 prisoners, a third of whom were wounded and the discovery of about 1400 dead.
In the same period, on May 18–19, a tense struggle for the Yenikale region unfolded. Consolidated detachments from the remnants of the 77th Guards Rifle Division, the 302nd, 404th Rifle Divisions and the 95th Border Regiment ensured the evacuation of the remnants of the troops of the Crimean Front. Defense here at the front Dangerous, high. 102, 0 (dominating on the outskirts of Yenikale), Kapkans kept about 3,500 people armed only with rifles, PPSh, light machine guns and grenades. They no longer had mortars and artillery. The detachments were commanded by colonels M.V. Volkov, M.K. Zubkov, N.I. Ludwigov. Stubborn defense made it possible to transport 18-20 thousand people across the strait to the Taman Peninsula during the night of May 18-19 alone. It was here, in the Yenikale region, that L.Z. Mekhlis, who returned back from Taman. Those who saw Mekhlis in Yenikal said that he persistently sought death. In the middle of the day on May 19, he left the Kerch Peninsula.
On May 19, the 132nd Infantry Division attacked Fort Totleben with the support of 280-mm rocket launchers (440 shells were fired). Bulky installations with a short range of fire required special conditions of use, and here they were available: the defenders of the plant had no artillery left. According to German data, after the impact of rocket mortars, the Totleben fort was occupied by the 132nd Infantry Division with the loss of 5 people. It should be noted that the consumption of ammunition by the 11th Army on May 19 was the maximum for the entire period of the struggle from May 11 until the end of the operation - 536 tons. Despite this, as emphasized in the ZhBD of the 11th Army: "It is only with great effort that the enemy succeeds in recapturing every inch of land."
"Self-propelled mine" - wedge "Goliath", controlled by wire.
Another representative of the “wonder weapon”: the Borgward B.IV radio-controlled wedge. Their use in the conditions of Sevastopol was not very successful. Regularly, the tankette drove up to the target and unloaded a box of explosives in front of it.
At 3.45 am on May 20, 1942, the crossing from the Kerch Peninsula ended. However, fighting continued throughout the day on 20 May. One of the nodes of resistance of the Soviet troops in the Kerch region remained the metallurgical plant named after. Voikov, who unsuccessfully stormed the 170th Infantry Division. As a last resort, 580 280mm rockets were fired at the ruins of the factory. The impact of rockets broke the resistance of the plant garrison. However, combing the territory of the plant continued until the evening of May 20. According to German data, the loss of Soviet units at the plant. Voikov, 1800 people were killed, and 4400 fighters and commanders were also taken prisoner here.
In the early morning of May 20, the 46th Infantry Division captured the fort and locality Yenikale, and then moved from east to west of the peninsula. According to German data, in the region of Yenikale and the dangerous losses of the Red Army amounted to 3,000 killed and 5,440 captured. The losses of the 28th LPD, 46th and 170th Infantry Division for May 20 amounted to 186 killed, 17 missing and 522 wounded. In total, in the period from May 8 to May 19, 1942, the Crimean Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the AVF lost 162,282 people irretrievably and 14,284 people wounded in the period from May 8 to May 19, 1942, a total of 176,566 people.
The total losses of the Manstein army in Operation Bustard Hunting are shown in Table. 4. According to the data presented, it can be seen that the 28th Infantry Division suffered the greatest losses, advancing in the direction of the main attack during the breakthrough of the Parpach positions and ensuring the introduction of the 22nd Panzer Division into the breakthrough. In second place in terms of losses was the 132nd Infantry Division, which also participated in the breakthrough of the Parpach positions and intense battles in the east of the Kerch Peninsula. It should be noted that the data of the medical service are somewhat different from the figures given by Department IIa. The medical service of the 11th Army reported 1,412 killed, 291 missing, and 5,885 wounded during the time interval of May 8–22, 1942, excluding Romanian units. However, these data appear to be incomplete due to the poor matching of the reports of the medical service with the personal records of the dead and wounded officers. In general, the losses of the 11th Army in Operation Bustard Hunting must be recognized as sensitive, but moderate.
TABLE 4
After the Germans occupied the smoking region of Kerch and Yenikale, soldiers and commanders of the Red Army still remained on the peninsula to fight in the Adzhimushkay quarries. The defeat of the Crimean Front was the first of a series of catastrophes in the spring and summer of 1942. One of the most difficult periods of the war began for the Soviet troops. A long year and a half remained before the start of the liberation of the peninsula.
Summing up the results of the confrontation between the Crimean Front and the German 11th Army, it is advisable to provide data on the consumption of ammunition by the parties. According to the statements of the GAU KA, for the first half of 1942, the Crimean Front used up 258.6 thousand rounds of 76-mm divisional guns, 211.9 thousand rounds of 76-mm mountain guns, 49.0 - 107-mm cannon, 33.3 thousand - 122-mm cannon, 216.6 thousand - 122-mm howitzer, 30.7 thousand - 152-mm howitzer and 92.2 thousand shots for 152-mm howitzer cannons. The Crimean Front was the absolute leader in spending 107-mm shots - it accounted for almost a quarter of the entire consumption of shots of this type by the Red Army. In terms of 152-mm rounds for howitzer-cannons, the share of the Crimean Front accounts for 13.7%. In total, the Crimean Front accounted for 10.7% of the consumption of all ground artillery shots of the entire Red Army in January-June 1942 (although in June 1942 the Crimean Front had already ceased to exist).
Also, the Crimean Front during its existence in 1942 used up 758.5 thousand 82-mm mortar mines, 37.8 thousand 107-mm mortar mines and 46.9 120-mm mortar mines. At the same time, the share of the Crimean Front accounts for 17.4% of the consumption of 82-mm mines by the entire Red Army. He was the absolute leader in the use of this type of weapon, and by a wide margin.
Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 155452 of June 4, 1942, with the analysis of the defeat of the Crimean Front, simultaneously determined the punishment of its command, including the representative of the Headquarters. Army commissar 1st rank L.Z. Mekhlis was removed from the post of deputy people's commissar of defense and head of the Main Political Directorate of the spacecraft with a reduction in rank to corps commissar. The command of the front and the armies was removed from office and demoted in rank with the wording "to test him in another, less difficult military job." D.T. Kozlov was demoted to Major General. Army commanders S.I. Chernyak and K.S. Kolganov was demoted to the rank of colonel. The exception was P.P. Eternal, sent to the disposal of the head of the General Staff of the spacecraft. This was a kind of recognition of his efforts to stabilize the situation in the last days of the existence of the Crimean Front.
Romanian infantry on the march. Crimea, 1942
Conclusions. The first analysis of the defeat of the Crimean Front was made by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 155452 of June 4, 1942, signed by I.V. Stalin and A.M. Vasilevsky. However, in this document, written in the hot pursuit of events, the analysis of what was happening is given hastily and without taking into account enemy data. Nevertheless, this directive of the Stavka to this day remains the basis of criticism of the command of the Crimean Front. Therefore, it is advisable to discuss what happened in May 1942 on the Kerch Peninsula, starting from the claims formulated in it. The thesis stated at the beginning of the directive "The Crimean Front had a great superiority over the enemy in infantry and artillery" was analyzed at the beginning of the section, this statement is not supported by the documents of the parties.
The directive goes on to state the facts with references to the "experience of modern warfare". First of all, it is stated that “the command of the Crimean Front stretched its divisions into one line” and “one division accounted for no more than two kilometers at the front.” Operational documents of the Crimean Front show that this is not so, and even not so at all. Firstly, one division in the first line accounted for 3.1 km of the front. Secondly, two divisions of the second line occupied Ak-Monai positions. Thirdly, the armies had a second echelon whose task was to launch counterattacks. In addition, there were formations in the depths of the formation of the troops of the front, which were in reserve, which could be used to restore its integrity and launch counterattacks. These are the 72nd cd, the 390th rifle division (formally under army command), the 12th and 143rd brigade, and the 83rd brigade. Actually, they were used during the defensive battle, actually building a new defense front, but they were pinned down by the enemy infantry strike from the front and outflanked by the Groddek brigade. The command of the Crimean Front can be reproached for relying on counterattacks, which involved the advancement of reserves and their use outside equipped positions. In the conditions of the massive use of the Air Force by the enemy, this became almost impossible.
The second reproach from the Headquarters was the assertion: "the command of the Crimean Front in the very first hours of the enemy's offensive let go of command and control of the troops." On the one hand, the loss of control of the troops, of course, took place. Radio communication, despite all the admonitions of the front headquarters, was not a strong point of command and control in the Crimea. However, the statement “in the very first hours” is still not entirely true. Really serious problems arose already as chaos and destruction increased.
Another claim of the Headquarters was the reproach of the “bureaucratic and paper method of commanding the troops by the front command and comrade. Mehlis". It was alleged that "instead of personally influencing the course of the operation, they spent time at many hours of fruitless meetings of the Military Council." This reproach looks doubly strange in view of the fact that I.V. Stalin personally forbade D.T. Kozlov and L.Z. Mekhlis to be at the headquarters of V.N. Lvov May 10. The front commander, and this is documented, went to the troops with the aim of influencing the course of the counterattack of the 51st Army. This counterattack really decided the fate of the main forces of the troops entrusted to him. Personal presence at the venue seems to be more than justified. The recommendation at the end of the directive to visit "more often in the troops, armies, divisions" in relation to D.T. Kozlov and L.Z. Mekhlis, and even more so V.N. Lvova looks ridiculous. However, this did not help the Crimean Front.
More meaningful is another claim in the directive of the Headquarters: “the command of the front and comrade. Mekhlis did not ensure the execution of the order of the Stavka in a timely manner, they began the withdrawal with a delay of two days, and the withdrawal took place in an unorganized and disorderly manner. Indeed, there was a delay in the retreat to the line of the Turkish Wall. The 51st Army did not receive the order to withdraw in time. At the same time, it is impossible not to note the conditions for the withdrawal: the sagging of roads and the impact of enemy aircraft, which complicated the movement of troops in the daytime. In addition, the loss of the tank battle at Arma-Eli predetermined the encirclement and defeat of a considerable part of the forces of the Crimean Front and the technical impossibility of withdrawing them to the Turkish Wall.
E. von Manstein was an experienced military leader who understood well the principles of using mechanized units. Actually, the Crimean Front had essentially nothing to oppose to the two mobile formations of the 11th Army - the 22nd Panzer Division and the Groddek brigade. The troops of the front were preempted in reaching the Turkish Wall already on the second day of Operation Bustard Hunting. The “sickle strike” of the 22nd TD and the fast breakthrough of the Groddek brigade to the Turkish Wall were already almost impossible to parry at the same time.
In essence, the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 155452 bypassed, if not the main, then one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Crimean Front: the absence of a full-fledged independent mechanized unit in its composition in the presence of such a unit in the 11th army of the enemy. Manstein actually had the equivalent of two such formations, including Groddeck's brigade and Müller's forward detachment. In turn, the fact of the absence of this connection was a direct consequence of the abandonment of tank divisions in August 1941. The restoration of such structures began in May 1942 (the formation of tank corps) and the Crimean Front was not affected. Exactly tank corps became the most important means of conducting defensive operations in the large bend of the Don in July 1942 and on the Kursk Bulge in July 1943.
420-mm mortar "Gamma" in position.
Atypical for other directions was the use by the Germans in the Crimea of massively new models of anti-tank weapons, including tanks and self-propelled guns with long-barreled guns. It was they who became the decisive factor in May 1942, predetermining the catastrophe of the Crimean Front and the failure of its tank forces in the defense of the Kerch Peninsula.
On the whole, the Crimean Front became a victim of massing by the German command of forces and means, including the latest models of weapons and equipment. At the same time, the front itself was not in the best position in terms of weapons, and the national factor had a tangible effect on the combat effectiveness of the formations. In the critical situation of May 1942, the national factor manifested itself to a much greater extent. The need to use formations from the depths led to the introduction of national formations into battle, and they did not always show themselves with better side. This primarily concerns the 390th Rifle Division, as well as the 396th Rifle Division in the Ak-Monai positions. At the same time, on the whole, the 77th Guards Rifle Division with a mixed and diverse national composition showed itself well.
