Demyanovsky Cauldron map of military operations. Demyansk operation. A few words about the operation

DEMYANSK BOILER

On the northern flank of the Eastern Front, von Leeb did not have sufficient forces to conduct maneuver operations, just as General Oberst Küchler, who replaced him on January 17, did not have them. The northern group of German troops switched to positional defense on September 12, 1941, having lost, by order of Hitler, 5 tank and 2 motorized infantry divisions, as well as 8 air corps. According to the canons of military science, positional defense is the most effective form of combat if the defending side has enough forces and means to organize deeply echeloned defensive formations. A stretched front is a harbinger of imminent collapse.

In the winter of 1941–1942, Army Group North included Georg Lindemann's 18th Army and Ernst Busch's 16th Army. The SS Division "Totenkopf" fought defensive battles as part of the 10th Motorized Corps on the Valdai Hills between lakes Ilmen and Seliger. On the night of January 7-8, 1942, the 1st Shock, 11th and 34th Russian armies attacked the southern flank of Army Group North. In the direction of the main attack of the Red Army were the neighbors on the right of the Totenkopf SS - the 30th and 290th Infantry Divisions of the Wehrmacht. They practically ceased to exist a day after the start of the offensive, and the Russian armies wedged 30 km deep into the German defense. On January 9, 11 the army made its way to Staraya Russa. At the same time, another Russian army (16th shock) struck west of Lake Seliger and turned north to the Lovat River to connect with the I and 1st shock armies. If the Soviet high command had managed to carry out this operation, then the 16th Army of General Oberst Bush would have been surrounded.

Despite Eike's objections, his division's forces were dispersed. By order of the commander of the 16th Army, several SS battalions were transferred to the least protected areas: the infantry reconnaissance battalion was ordered to advance to Staraya Russa and hold the strong point at all costs, and in the Demyansk area the left flank of the 16th Army was covered by two Totenkopf SS infantry standards.

Fierce fighting ensued. At the cost of huge losses, the 18th motorized division of the Wehrmacht, reinforced by the Death's Head reconnaissance battalion, held its positions near Staraya Russa. But after 3 weeks - on February 8 - the steel jaws of the Russian trap finally slammed shut. 15 fresh Russian divisions, reinforced by ski battalions and armored units, surrounded the 2nd and 10th German corps in the Kholm-Demyansk area. The battered regiments of the 12th, 30th, 32nd, 123rd and 290th infantry divisions and what was left of the “Dead Head” were cut off from the main forces 40 km west of Demyansk on the eastern bank of the Lovat - in total 95,000 people and 20,000 horses.

They say that a wise man learns from the mistakes of others. Hitler learned from his own people. He borrowed the recipe for holding positions at any cost from the Russians. Stalin's "Not One Step Back" order halted the German offensive, but nearly cost the Soviets their entire army, and was subsequently abandoned by the Soviet command during the German summer offensive of 1942. Now the Führer was reaping the fruits of his own stubbornness.

Hitler gave Goering personal responsibility for providing the encircled group with food, medicine and ammunition. The minimum supply requirement for all kinds of divisions caught in the cauldron reached 200 tons per day. The Luftwaffe pilots did for the besieged Demyansk what they could not do for the encircled Stalingrad. On some days, it was possible to transport over 300 tons of cargo via the air bridge. Thanks to the efficiency of the quartermaster services, the SS men of the “Dead Head” received sets of winter uniforms even before the Russians cut communications. And this was the only difference that set them apart from the rest.

The commander of the besieged group, General Count Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, once again divided the remnants of the Death's Head division into two battle groups. The largest of them was headed by Eike and, with the support of army units, began patrolling the southwestern sector of the pocket on the eastern bank of the Lovat River. The second battle group, under SS Oberführer Max Simon, took up positions in the northeast. The Soviet command attempted to dismember the besieged group and, after many days of fighting, broke through the Eike defense line in several directions. The common boiler was divided into several sectors isolated from each other. Russian and German positions looked on the headquarters map like a hastily put together patchwork quilt. The SS men of Eike found themselves in one of the newly formed cauldrons. For several days, difficult weather conditions did not allow the Luftwaffe to transport reinforcements, ammunition and weapons to the besieged. In thirty-degree frost and waist-deep snow, under artillery fire and bombs from Russian attack aircraft, they fought bloody battles for every inch of land. By mid-February, under the command of Eike, there were 1,460 soldiers and officers left capable of holding weapons in their hands. After a few weeks of fighting of such intensity, there would not be a single person left from the “Dead Head”. Finally, Himmler ordered the transfer of reinforcements by air. On March 7, fresh Totenkopf companies arrived - several hundred volunteers. The Soviet command sought to liquidate the cauldron before the onset of the thaw and threw more and more units into battle. Both the Russians and the Germans suffered brutal losses: by mid-March, Red Army casualties totaled some 20,000 soldiers, and the SS Totenkopf Division alone lost at least 7,000 men killed. But if the Russians did not experience any problems with reinforcements, then instead of seven thousand who were out of action, the “Totenkopf” received only five thousand reservists.

Meanwhile, near Staraya Russa, the commander of Army Group North, Georg von Küchler, began forming a strike force as part of Operation Outboard Gangway. On March 21, 1942, the 122nd, 127th and 329th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 5th and 8th Light Divisions under the command of Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach began an operation to relieve Demyansk. The Death's Head division made a breakthrough to connect with Seydlitz. Under fire, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, the division covered up to one and a half kilometers a day. On March 20, the SS Totenkopf anti-tank destroyer company broke through to the eastern bank of the Lovat River and captured the bridgehead. On April 22, 1942, the advanced units of Seydlitz linked up with the SS men who had fought their way out of encirclement. And after 73 days the blockade was finally broken. On May 2, the Germans gained a foothold in their positions, and soon the first ground transport arrived in Demyansk. On May 5, 1942, the 122nd Wehrmacht Infantry Division released the 5,000-strong garrison of Kholm under the command of Lieutenant General Scherer. After a 103-day siege, Scherer lost 1,600 soldiers and officers killed and 2,200 wounded.

DEMYANSKY PROCESS

The partial success of the Death's Head division could not solve the problems of Demyansk. After breaking through the encirclement, this section of the German front began to be referred to in official OKW reports as the “Demyansk ledge.” Eike hoped that his bloodless division would be sent to the rear for replenishment and a well-deserved rest. However, Berlin decided otherwise, sending 3,000 reservists to Demyansk and promises from the Reichsführer SS to “resolve the issue as soon as possible.” Eicke was appointed commander of the SS and Wehrmacht forces of the western sector of the salient, and the forces entrusted to him were given the status of a corps, although in number they would barely amount to half a division.

In May, the Soviet command made a number of attempts to cut the Demyansk corridor, and in mid-June Eicke was summoned to Fuhrer Headquarters for a report. Hitler awarded him the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross, promised to withdraw the division from Demyansk, reorganize it into an SS motorized infantry division, and granted Ike a short leave. Acting SS Totenkopf commander Max Simon repelled massive attacks by the Red Army with heavy losses until mid-July. The crisis came on July 18, when the Russians drove Totenkopf from their established positions and, supported by air power and artillery, rushed forward. On July 30, the front ceased to exist, and, as it had already happened in the winter, it was divided into separate sectors - squad against squad, platoon against platoon... Eike obtained an audience with Hitler and demanded that the remnants of the division be withdrawn from Demyansk or be given the opportunity to die next to his soldiers. Hitler refused.

The “Dead Head” was truly on its last legs. No more than 7,000 soldiers remained in the ranks, and even those were mercilessly decimated by pneumonia and dysentery. The Russians had completely seized the initiative and on August 6, with the support of front-line aviation, they were preparing to strike at the right and left wings of the corridor with the forces of the 11th Army and the 1st Guards Corps. The Totenkopf SS division could no longer withstand this. By August 12, the last reserves were exhausted: headquarters officers, clerks, grooms, doctors and cooks went into battle. Quite unexpectedly, the weather came to the aid of the SS men: heavy rains made the country roads completely impassable. Russian aviation also could not take off. The Germans regrouped their forces, strengthened their defenses and averted the threat of a breakthrough. Fights local significance continued with varying success until the end of August. So, on August 25, after just a few hours of battle, the “Death’s Head” lost 1,000 people killed, but the positions were held. Only after the start of the autumn German offensive, when parts of the Red Army were thrown far to the east, Totenkopf was recalled from the front line. In October 1942, 6,400 SS soldiers who survived the battle were sent to Germany for reorganization and rest.

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The Northwestern Front had to go on the offensive in the Old Russian direction, defeat the troops of the 16th German army, located south of Lake Ilmen, and reach the flank and rear of the Novgorod enemy group. At the same time, the front troops were supposed to advance on their left wing in the direction of Toropets, Velizh, Rudnya in order to assist the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts in defeating the main forces of the German Army Group Center.

Demyansk operation 1942, 7.1-20.5, troops of the North-Western Front (Len.-L. P.A. Kurochkin). The goal is to encircle and destroy the German group of troops in the Demyansk area. Advancing in forested and swampy terrain with deep snow cover, Soviet troops on 25.2 completed the encirclement of 6 divisions of 16A. Their liquidation was delayed due to lack of strength. The enemy managed to break through the encirclement front on April 23 and form the so-called. Ramushevsky corridor. Further attempts by Soviet troops to eliminate the Demyansk group were unsuccessful. During the Demyansk operation, the enemy suffered significant losses. Soviet troops pinned down a large group of troops and thwarted the enemy's plans to attack Ostashkov towards another group that had the task of attacking from the Rzhev area. The long struggle in the Demyansk region was distinguished by exceptional tenacity and tension.

The Northwestern Front had to go on the offensive in the Old Russian direction, defeat the troops of the 16th German Army, located south of Lake Ilmen, and go to the flank and rear of the Novgorod enemy group. At the same time, the front troops were supposed to advance on their left wing in the direction of Toropets, Velizh, Rudnya in order to assist the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts in defeating the main forces of the German Army Group Center.

To solve the problems set by Headquarters, the commander of the Northwestern Front created two strike groups. On the right wing of the front, he concentrated the 11th Army, consisting of five rifle divisions, ten ski and three tank battalions. The army was supposed to strike in the general direction of Staraya Russa, Soltsy, Dno and, together with the troops of the left wing of the Volkhov Front, defeat the Novgorod enemy group. The troops of the left wing of the front, as part of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, were given the task of striking from the Ostashkov area in the general direction of Toropets, Rudnya and, in cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the Kalinin Front, deeply enveloping the main forces of the enemy Army Group “Center” from the west. .

The front commander entrusted the troops of the 34th Army (five rifle divisions), operating in the center of the Northwestern Front, with the task of pinning down the enemy in the center of the army’s action zone and simultaneously delivering two attacks with their flank divisions: on the right flank - in the direction of Beglovo, Svinora, on the left - on Vatolino with the aim of encircling the enemy group in the Demyansk area.

The breakthrough near the southeastern shore of Lake Ilmen was intercepted by the Germans in a westerly direction in the area of ​​Staraya Russa, but was a complete success in a southern direction. Large Russian forces, to which the 16th Army could hardly oppose anything, made their way south west of the Lovat River valley and, together with forces advancing from the area of ​​​​the city of Kholm to the north, encircled six divisions of the 2nd and 10th Army on February 8 buildings, forming the Demyansk cauldron. About 100 thousand people, whose minimum daily need for food, ammunition and fuel was approximately 200 tons, now found themselves surrounded, and for several months they had to be supplied only by air. The Russians acted here in the same way as before against the 9th Army: they stubbornly sought to compress the encirclement ring with continuous attacks with the introduction of large forces and destroy the troops located in it. Despite the reduction in food supply by half, the extreme physical stress caused by low temperatures reaching 50° below zero, and the continuous attacks of the enemy, who in several places managed to break through the stretched to the limit battle formations German troops and fought inside the cauldron; the surrounded divisions withstood the enemy's onslaught. They retreated quite a bit. The Death's Head division was transferred to the western edge of the perimeter, where it plugged the breakthrough of the 34th Soviet army. "Death's Head" repulsed all Russian attacks and destroyed the elite 7th Guards Division.

During the winter and spring offensive of 1942, the troops of the North-Western Front, the 55th Infantry Division inflicted a heavy defeat on the SS Division "Toten's Head". Subsequently, two regiments of the 55th Division, including the 107th Infantry, which took the lead, found themselves cut off from the main forces of the army. And in the summer of the same year, with a stubborn defense south of Borota Suchan, this division continued to pin down the enemy. In the fall, part of the front forces launched an attack on the Demyansk bridgehead, in which regiments of the 55th division took part. Our infantry again had to advance without proper artillery preparation, without the support of tanks and aircraft. The fighting became protracted and lasted for more than a month on the territory of Polavsky (now Parfinsky district).

The 370th Siberian Division was also involved in this task. She went on the offensive south of Pola station along the eastern bank of the river of the same name. For many months, the 370th Division fought in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Topolevo, Gorchitsy, Kurlyandskaya, Strelitsy, Bolshaya Ivanovshchina in the Parfinsky region, exhausting the enemy and causing him great damage. To the right of the 370th division in the Parfinsky region in 1942, the 282nd Siberian Rifle Division, formed in Omsk in the winter of that year, fought. Just like the 370th Infantry, the 282nd, with its arrival on the North-Western Front, led active fighting to eliminate the Demyansk bridgehead of the Germans.

One of these days our army will resume its offensive. The headquarters and the front confirmed the task of encircling the Demyansk group consisting of six to seven divisions of the 16th German Army. The army of General Morozov, neighboring to us, continues to fight for Staraya Russa. On its left flank, the front commander introduces the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Corps and the 1st Shock Army that have arrived at our front. These troops will strike from the Parfino region to the south along the banks of Lovat and Redya, cut through the enemy’s front and separate his Old Russian group from the Demyansk one. Together with Morozov's army, they will create an external encirclement front, and together with our army - an internal one, directly around the Demyansk group.

The troops of the left flank of our army, Berzarin continued, broke through the enemy’s defenses on January 9, advanced over forty kilometers and are now fighting for Vatolino and Molvotitsy. They again go on the offensive in the general direction of Zaluchye and Korovitchino. Somewhere here, on the banks of the Lovat,” the general showed on the map, “there should be a meeting with the troops of the 1st Guards Corps.” Your division will advance on the right flank of the army together with Colonel Shtykov's 202nd Rifle Division. She is given a serious task - to cross the Neviy Mokh swamp, break through the enemy’s defenses and develop success in the direction of Lyubetskoye, Vereteyka, Gorchitsy. On the banks of the Pola River, you should link up with the troops of the 1st Guards Corps, and maybe even with the troops of the army's southern shock group.

On January 19, 1942, after a month in the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, units of the 8th Guards Division were transferred by rail to the Bologoe station area, where they became part of the newly formed 2nd Guards Rifle Corps. On February 3, she began a heroic raid on the rear of the 16th German Army in the direction of Staraya Russa - Kholm. Breaking the fierce resistance of the enemy, units of the division without tank and air support on February 6 approached Sokolovo - the junction of the Staraya Russa - Kholm and Demyansk - Dno highways. On February 19, 1942, in the battle for the village of Sutoki, a reconnaissance group under the command of junior lieutenant Dmitry Valgankin and junior political instructor Rashid Dzhangozhin fought an unequal battle for 4 hours with a fascist unit trying to break into the city of Kholm. During 20 days of heroic fighting, the division liberated dozens of settlements and reached the Kholm area, Loknya

In order to free the encircled divisions, German troops launched an offensive from the area southwest of Staraya Russa. Küchler formed five special shock divisions at Staraya Russa (5th, 122nd, 329th Infantry Divisions) under the command of Lieutenant General Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach and sent them into battle on March 21. Having made our way through five lines of defensive structures and during battles that lasted several weeks, we made our way to the western end of the cauldron through a 40-kilometer corridor stubbornly defended by the enemy. On April 20, contact with the encircled divisions was restored.

The city of Kholm, in which the 281st Division was captured on January 21, also surrounded and supplied by air, held out for several months, perhaps in an even more difficult position, being the only German stronghold between the Demyansk cauldron and Velikiye Luki. In Kholm, a garrison of five thousand was surrounded by troops of the 3rd Shock Russian Army. Only on May 5 did the 122nd Infantry Division break through to the city.

On February 8, 1942, Soviet troops encircled the 2nd Army Corps in the small town of Demyansk, located 160 km northeast of the town of Kholm. Units of the 12th, 30th, 32nd, 223rd and 290th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 3rd SS Division, fell into the cauldron. They were commanded by General Count Brokdort Alfeld.

The garrison was fully supplied and supported by Luftwaffe forces. The encirclement was broken through on April 21, 1943. Of the approximately 100,000 people who were surrounded, 3,335 were killed and about 10,000 were wounded. For his successful command, SS General Theodor Eick was awarded the Oak Leaves award to the Knight's Cross.

On February 20, 1942, the 7th Guards Rifle Division, as part of the 1st Guards Rifle Corps, reached the area of ​​the village of Zaluchye, where there was a meeting with units of the 34th Army, advancing towards Ramushevo from the south. The Demyansk “cauldron” turned out to be slammed shut.

Without a pause, Soviet troops began to expand the breakthrough zone and eliminate the encircled enemy group. However, the rapid offensive did not work out for a number of reasons. In March, the Nazi command, using fresh reserves and superiority in aviation, organized a powerful offensive with the aim of releasing its encircled troops in the Demyansk area.

The Northwestern Front, headed by General P.A. Kurochkin, was faced with the task of defeating enemy troops in the Demyansk ledge. It was necessary to complete the encirclement of the enemy's Demyansk grouping with two strikes (from the north - by the 11th Army and from the south - by the 1st Shock Army), and then, with the rest of the front troops going on the offensive, to completely destroy it.

The 130th Rifle Division was formed from Moscow militias. She arrived on the North-Western Front from near Moscow. The first battles on Novgorod land took place in February 1942 in the Molvotitsky region, that is, south of Demyansk. It was located on the southern face of the Demyansk “cauldron” until its liquidation. In May, she continued to wage heavy offensive battles. area of ​​​​the settlements Bel 2-ya and Bel 1-ya, Bolshoye and Maloye Vragovo. In the area of ​​these settlements, Georgy Pavlovich Vdovin died while performing a combat mission.

As a result of the active actions of the Soviet troops on the Demyansk bridgehead, not only were large forces of the 16th German Army pinned down, but also serious losses were inflicted on many of its formations.

To repel attacks by Soviet troops, the enemy transferred part of the formations of the 18th Army to the Demyansk area, and also used a large number of transport aircraft to supply the 16th Army to the detriment of the interests of its main group advancing in the south of the Eastern Front. Fighter aviation of the 6th Air Army, commanded by General D.F. Kondratyuk, took an active part in the fight against German transport aviation and shot down several dozen aircraft.

The actions of Soviet troops near Leningrad and in the Demyansk region in the spring of 1942 deprived the German command of the opportunity to transfer the forces of Army Group North from these areas to the south. Moreover, the enemy was forced to replenish his group on the Leningrad sector of the front in order to resume the assault on Leningrad, planned for the autumn of the same year.

Significant assistance to the enemy's ground forces was provided by his aviation, which during this time flew about 2 thousand sorties, while the aviation of the North-Western Front made a little more than 700 sorties. All this, together with shortcomings in the organization and conduct of the offensive, led to failure.

The Siberian 384th Rifle Division, during the period of the powerful onslaught of fascist German troops in March-April 1942, with the aim of unblocking the Demyansk bridgehead, fought heavy battles north of the village of Ramushevo in the Starorussky district. Here we note that after closing the ring around the Demyansk “cauldron”, the troops of the North-Western Front launched an offensive not only against the encircled German group, but also to expand (immediately after February 25) the breakthrough zone of Soviet troops west of the village of Ramushevo. Our advancing units met fierce resistance from the enemy, and his aviation was especially active. And, nevertheless, the troops of the 2nd and then the approaching 1st Shock Army managed to liberate a large territory of the Starorussky region from the invaders. The 384th Division fought for every meter of the Staraya Russa - Demyansk road.

During fierce attacks, German troops managed to break through the encirclement ring in the early 20s of April. This happened south of Staraya Russa in the area of ​​the village of Ramushevo. The corridor, whose width was 6-8 kilometers, was named Ramushevsky. On the southern side of the Ramushevsky corridor in April 1942, at the line Velikoye Selo-state farm "Znamya" stood the 7th Guards Division. The enemy was unable to get through her battle formations.

The offensive began on May 3. The front received 5 rifle divisions, 8 rifle and 2 tank brigades for reinforcement from the Headquarters reserve. However, despite the availability of sufficient forces and means, the offensive of the North-Western Front, which continued throughout May, ended in vain. The German command figured out the plan of the operation and transferred reinforcements from other sectors to the area of ​​the Ramushevsky corridor, through which the Demyansk group had contact with the main forces of the 16th German Army.

235th Infantry Division.

The division had the task of attacking the village of Kulotino on May 20 and capturing this settlement. The division is fresh, full-blooded, sufficiently trained - into battle for one village! It seemed that the task was not very difficult. In reality, everything turned out to be much more complicated; and the village of Kulotino was not liberated by the division either in May or in the following weeks and months. It is not the soldiers and sergeants who are to blame for this. They, on the contrary, acted boldly and decisively, going towards the enemy with pure Siberian acumen. The division command made many miscalculations and mistakes during the attack on Kulotino when making the decision to attack, as well as those who approved this decision.

The division regiments, according to the decision of the 235th division commander, were to attack Kulotino one by one, that is, according to pre-war tactics. In practice, it looks like this: the enemy “knocks out one unit with concentrated fire, then the second, and so on. The enemy was not sufficiently studied, and an artillery offensive was not organized to suppress the enemy’s fire weapons, etc. For all the miscalculations of the command, they had to pay with blood and lives - numerous lives - fathers, brothers and sons from many villages, towns and cities of the Novosibirsk region, including Berdsk residents.

The first to attack Kulotino on May 20 was the 806th Infantry Regiment. The regiment's advance continued from six o'clock in the morning until dark. Due to the destructive fire of the enemy, the advance of the regiment's units was insignificant. The regiment did not reach Kulotino.

The next day at 8:00 am the 801st Infantry Regiment went on the offensive. The soldiers and junior commanders from this regiment acted selflessly. More than once or twice a day they resolutely launched an attack on the enemy, but each time they were forced to lie down due to the all-destroying enemy fire.

The 732nd Infantry Regiment was the third to enter the battle for Kulotino. And the attacks of this regiment, due to strong unsuppressed enemy fire, produced nothing but casualties. From May 20 to May 25, 1942, Mikhail died in the battles for the village of Kulotino. Dmitrievich Ganin, Timofey Iosifovich Davydenko, Ivan Fedorovich Kirin, Ivan Vasilievich Simonov and Sergei Eremeevich Smolentsev. They, who selflessly loved their Motherland, their native Berdsk, were defeated by enemy metal in an impulse to liberate another village, Russian on ancient land. From July 19 to July 23, 1942, the 235th Rifle Division carried out another offensive to liberate the village of Kulotino.

This time the 732nd Infantry Regiment was the first to attack. The enemy again offered stubborn resistance. Despite heavy enemy fire, the units stubbornly moved forward. The 8th company from the 3rd rifle battalion managed to break into the enemy trench. The enemy opened concentrated fire on it, because of which the company was forced to retreat and lie down not far from the enemy’s front line. During the repeated attack of the 3rd battalion, the fighters again reached the enemy trench and managed to recapture two enemy bunkers... - this was on the right flank of the regiment. The left flank of the regiment was not successful. On this June day, the commander of the 732nd regiment himself went on the attack with the regiment’s battle banner to inspire the attackers. However, this heroic act of the regiment commander did not help break the enemy’s defenses. That day, rifle units were again left alone with the defending enemy, since the tanks allocated for support remained in the enemy minefield. Despite the brave actions of the soldiers of the 732nd regiment, this time Kulotino remained impregnable. In those days, Sergei Evdokimovich Zubkov, Stepan Stepanovich Kresan, Vasily Nikolaevich Lisikhin, Georgy Valerianovich Ovchinnikov, Grigory Danilovich Ukrainian died a heroic death.

In subsequent battles in the same area, Pyotr Ivanovich Morozov, from the 801st regiment, died. After unsuccessful battles in the spring and summer in the Marevsky district, the 235th Infantry Division was redeployed to the Starorussky district, to the southern section of the Ramushevsky corridor.

In the summer, troops of the Northwestern Front tried to destroy the Demyansk group by organizing offensive operations in the area of ​​the so-called Ramushevsky corridor, which connected this group with the main forces of the 16th German Army. Due to insufficient preparation of the operation and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, it was not possible to eliminate his group on the Demyansk bridgehead (the length of the front line inside it was 150 km). The German command transferred significant reinforcements from other sections of the Demyansk ledge to the corridor area, but left only about five divisions inside it. Nevertheless, the offensive actions of the Northwestern Front in the Demyansk area had a significant impact on general progress struggle in the northwestern direction and weakened the enemy. The enemy command was unable to launch the planned attack on Ostashkov to meet its other group, which had the task of attacking from the Rzhev area.

Demyansk cauldron. In memory of E.M. Milovanov and other heroic sailors 1. It was no coincidence that former conscript sailor of the Pacific Fleet Egor Mikhailovich Milovanov was called up to marines to the North-Western Front during the most severe period of the war - the autumn of 1941, when Leningrad found itself under an enemy blockade, when the Germans approached Moscow itself. The Red Army suffered heavy losses in brutal, bloody battles. The front required more and more reinforcements. On October 18, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted a special resolution on the formation of naval rifle brigades. In two months, 25 of these naval units were formed and sent to the front. The Navy sent more than 39 thousand sailors to land to form them. For defense besieged Leningrad The headquarters of the Supreme High Command attracted troops from the Northwestern Front and part of the troops from the Northern Front, uniting them into the Luga Operational Group. A defensive line was built along the Luga River from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ilmen, called the Luga Defense Line. In those dangerous days for the USSR, to help our ground forces The Baltic Fleet sent its marines. Heavy guns were removed from the ships stationed in Kronstadt and Leningrad and installed at the firing positions of coastal batteries. Through the joint efforts of infantrymen, sailors, tank crews, pilots, and militias, the enemy was stopped. By winter, all large ships were transferred from Kronstadt to Leningrad under protection anti-aircraft installations . Having survived and attracted large forces of the fascists, the northern capital now helped Moscow. In November 1941, Leningraders transported a lot of military equipment and ammunition by plane to the northwestern front of the defense of Moscow. Marines were placed at the disposal of the command of the 11th Army of the Northwestern Front in the area of ​​Staraya Russa in order to divert as much of the Nazis’ attention from besieged Leningrad through their active actions. On December 5, 1941, a counter-offensive began by strike groups of the Kalinin Front, and the next day by the Western and South-Western Fronts. As a result of successful battles, by mid-December the fascist troops were driven back 100 - 250 kilometers. Thousands of villages, towns and cities in the Moscow region were liberated. The counteroffensive near Moscow developed into a general offensive of the Red Army. At the beginning of January 1942, troops from nine fronts took part in it. Particularly fierce and decisive military operations were carried out in the northwestern direction - near Tikhvin, Leningrad and Novgorod, in the western direction - near Rzhev, Vyazma and Yukhnov, and in the southwestern direction - near Rostov. On January 7, 1942, the Demyansk operation of the troops of the North-Western Front began under the command of Lieutenant General P. A. Kurochkin. Simultaneously with the troops of the Volkhov Front, which attacked the Old Russian and Demyansk directions, the 11th and 34th Armies, reinforced by the 1st Shock Army and two Guards Rifle Corps. The enemy sought at all costs to hold on to the Demyansk bridgehead, which was extremely important for the attack on Moscow. Five naval brigades took part in the battles on Novgorod land, which was then part of the Leningrad region. From January 19, 1942, the 154th Separate Naval Rifle Brigade took an active part in the winter offensive of the front as part of the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies. It was formed from sailors from the Moscow and Yaroslavl naval crews, the security battalion of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, and other special naval units and arrived on the North-Western Front after participating in the famous parade of Soviet troops on Red Square in Moscow. It was hard for everyone at that time: sailors and infantrymen, tank crews and pilots. A little later, at the beginning of the harsh spring of 1942, somewhere here, in the forests near Demyansk, deep behind enemy lines, the plane of Senior Lieutenant Alexei Maresyev would fall, shot down in an air battle. Survivor, seriously wounded, he will walk more than thirty kilometers to the front line, with difficulty moving his legs crushed during the fall of the plane and, already exhausted, crawling through deep snow. Eighteen days, without food and fire, in a deep forest, with broken legs frostbitten in the severe cold, with three cartridges in a pistol, he will get out to his people. And he will get there, barely alive, and survive, and without legs he will return to fighter aircraft, again he will fly and shoot down the Nazis. 2. By the end of 1941, the Nazis sought to reach the October Railway and cut this most important transport route for the country, and also to go to Ostashkov to meet another group of fascist troops advancing from the Rzhev area. In the winter of 1942, on the banks of the Lovat and Pola rivers under the ancient In the Russian city of Demyansk, in a forested and swampy area with deep snow cover, fierce bloody battles unfolded. The Germans had a noticeable superiority in technology, weapons and ammunition; they built powerful defensive structures, in harsh winter conditions, in -50 degree frost, which turned into impregnable ice ramparts and slides. Under heavy enemy fire, the Red Army and Red Navy men who attacked him understood that they were heading to certain death. But from somewhere they got strength and determination. After the command “Attack!” with words from the song: “Our proud Varyag does not surrender to the enemy!” they rose from the trenches and moved forward, capturing enemy fortifications at the cost of their lives. This was the madness of the brave, but also the madness of the command, who gave orders that had to be carried out at any cost: with continuous frontal attacks to compress the encirclement ring and destroy the fascist troops located in it. Our losses in manpower were colossal. The division that attacked first virtually all remained on the battlefield. From going into battle rifle regiment out of a thousand people, only a few wounded soldiers were returning, so there was simply no one to bury the fallen. That is why their unburied remains still lie in the local forests and swamps. By the end of February 1942, together with soldiers of the 42nd Rifle Brigade, the Marines in the area of ​​​​the village of Zaluchye met with units of the 1st Shock Army advancing from the north and completed the encirclement of a hundred thousand German group near Demyansk. True, they did not intend to specially create a “cauldron” for the Germans near Demyansk. The goals of the offensive were much larger. Firstly, the armies of the right wing of the front were supposed to reach the Pskov region, and then strike in the rear of units of the German Army Group North in the Leningrad-Novgorod direction. Secondly, at the same time, with its right wing, the front troops were involved in deep coverage of the German Army Group Center from the north. In the center of the front, the troops of the 34th Army had only to “pin down the enemy’s 16th Army in the Demyansk direction.” In the absence of a continuous line of German defense, front formations managed to penetrate the enemy’s operational rear. However, then the pace of the successfully launched offensive began to slow down. The Northwestern Front simply did not have enough forces to simultaneously solve two tasks of an operational-strategic scale. During this period, the enemy significantly strengthened the Demyansk group and created a network of resistance nodes, saturated with firepower and engineering structures. As a result, the Germans managed to stop the advance of the Soviet armies. Without support and reserves from Headquarters, the front troops went on the defensive. By February 25, six divisions of the 16th Army of the Wehrmacht were surrounded in the rear of our Northwestern Front, in the Demyansk area. In the “cauldron” found themselves parts of the 2nd Army Corps - about one hundred thousand people (12th, 30th, 32nd, 223rd and 290th infantry divisions, as well as the motorized SS division "Totenkopf" under the command of General W. von Brockdorff-Allefeld, transferred to the western edge of the perimeter of the “cauldron”, where it plugged the breakthrough of the 34th Red Army). Although the last communications of the fascist group were cut off on February 8, but to eliminate the first large “cauldron” of the Great Patriotic War It didn't work out that way. This did not succeed either in the spring of 1942 or for the whole subsequent year. The battles to eliminate enemy troops on the Demyansk bridgehead dragged on. The enemy airlifted reinforcements, ammunition and food into the “cauldron”. In addition, in March, the Germans, with counter strikes from units of the Seydlitz group and internal troops under the command of General Bush, began an operation to relieve the blockade of the encircled troops and, after a month of stubborn fighting, managed to break the encirclement. By the end of April, the “Ramushevsky Corridor” emerged - after the name of the village of Ramushev - with a length of 8 by 20 kilometers. The Germans themselves called it the “corridor of death.” All attempts by the Red Army to cut the corridor and re-close the encirclement were unsuccessful due to insufficient preparation of the operation and stubborn enemy resistance. The Germans were well equipped with equipment, tanks, ammunition and food; they carried out 180 sorties a day and transferred reinforcements from other areas to the Ramushevsky corridor area. Our aviation made three times fewer sorties. And the soldiers in the numerous swamps that had thawed out and flooded in the spring had difficulty melting down guns on rafts, and on land they couldn’t even really dig in: they dug the ground with a bayonet or two, and there was already water there. The summer attempt of our troops to eliminate the enemy group in Demyansk also ended in failure. Only on February 15, 1943, the troops of the Northwestern Front under the command of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko launched a new decisive offensive. In eight days of fighting, 302 settlements were liberated and the enemy’s Demyansk bridgehead was eliminated. So, since the autumn of 1941, the soldiers of the North-Western Front, in the most difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain and difficult weather conditions, fought tooth and nail with the Nazis armed to the teeth and did not allow them to advance to the city of Valdai and the Bologoye railway station in the Oktyabrsky direction. The losses of Soviet troops in the two Demyansk offensive operations amounted to about 280 thousand people. For a year and a half, local battles were fought, during which military units on both sides were crushed day after day with amazing tenacity. New reinforcements were sent to replace the killed and wounded soldiers, and there was practically no chance of survival from start to finish for the participants in both operations. The fighting in the Demyansk area was extremely intense, and it was not for nothing that the Germans called this city a “reduced Verdun” during the First World War. 3. Like the whole winter, February 1942 turned out to be snowy and frosty. All this time, from January to February, soldiers of the 154th Separate Marine Rifle Brigade under the command of Colonel A.M. Smirnov fought heavy bloody battles with the Germans southwest of the city of Demyansk. Divided into battalions, the sailors of the brigade knocked out the German garrisons concentrated in the local villages. The commander’s eyes were already dazzled just by looking at a map of the area indicating numerous small settlements, the distance between which was sometimes no more than two kilometers. Standing outside the outskirts of one village, one could see the peaked roofs of the houses of the neighboring village behind the trees. From Molvotitsy, the sailors walked north through forest thickets and swampy off-roads, unlike the Germans, not having heavy weapons and military equipment to attack enemy garrisons in the villages. Fighting with only one small arms , they suffered significant losses in battles. There were not enough weapons and ammunition, and therefore sailors going into battle often had to conquer enemy positions hand-to-hand, with bayonets and butts of weapons. Walking with battles along the bed of the Pola River, they came to a strategic road that led to Zaluchye - to the intended place of their meeting with units of the 1st Shock Army advancing from the north. Left behind were Lyubno, Novosel, Narezka, Privolye - villages that went to the sailors at great cost and with considerable losses. But a new order was received from the command to drive the Germans out of the village of Khmeli at the confluence of the Okhrinka River with the Pola. The village itself was located on the elevated left bank of the Pola River, on the opposite bank of which the village of Pogorelitsy could be seen. From the west, the forest approached almost the Khmels themselves. The road to the Great Sunset went to the north, and to the south to the neighboring village of Okhrino. On February 19, our airborne assault force was expected to drop in the vicinity of Ohrin, and therefore the army command decided to take these two settlements on the same day. Although it was quite difficult and risky to attack the well-fortified Khmeli with one battalion of marines without the support of artillery and tanks. Along the edge of the village along the steep bank of the Pola, the Germans built strong, long-term defensive structures, and on the other three sides the village was surrounded by barbed wire, behind which the hands of local residents dug trenches and crevices for the Germans. On both sides of the road at the entrance to Khmeli there were observation towers and artillery guns camouflaged with spruce branches. But the order to capture the village had to be carried out at any cost. Airborne planes waited near the village of Okhrino in the late afternoon so that the setting sun would shine in the Germans’ eyes and, blinding them, help our fighters attack both villages from the west. Concentrating on the forest edge, opposite Hops, the sailors with weapons at the ready frowned at the cloudy sky covered with lead clouds and listened impatiently. Not only was there no setting sun, but early winter twilight was already falling, although they could have helped the sailors during the assault on the village. And as the night progressed, the frost began to creep in, fierce, crackling, freezing my arms and legs. And across a field covered with deep snow, it’s not particularly easy for a fighter with a machine gun in his hands and a backpack, which contained two spare disks, a supply of ammunition and several grenades, to run away. But finally, somewhere in the sky a heavy rumble was heard, and some time later a red rocket took off from Okhrin and strong machine gun and machine gun fire was heard. This served as the signal for the sailors to attack Khmeli. Scattered across the field, in naval style, at full height, sailors, dressed in quilted jackets with unbuttoned collars, were running towards the village, from under which striped vests were visible, and white camouflage coats were worn over the quilted jackets. Having sorted themselves into squads, the Marines outlined their targets as they raided, and each of them knew his duty in battle. Front-line training, military training and the high morale of the sailors had an effect. 4. The next day, during the lull after the capture of the village of Khmeli, the brigade commissar, who had turned gray early at forty years of age, with tired gray eyes, sat at the table in the village hut, one of the few that had survived the assault, and compiled lists of the irretrievable losses of the 154th separate naval rifle brigade. Based on the reports submitted to him by the commanders of companies, platoons and squads, he sent funerals of those killed in the last battle, notices of missing persons, information about the wounded and evacuated to the field medical battalion to the relatives of his colleagues at their place of residence. Just yesterday the commissar's hand held tightly military weapon and struck down more than one fascist on the spot, and today she had difficulty writing on a piece of paper the painfully familiar names of fellow soldiers: killed in battle on February 19, 1942 near the village of Khmeli, Demyansky district, Leningrad region: Fedin Sergey Alekseevich, foreman 1st article , squad leader, Moscow region. Zolotovo village, 35. Alexey Vladimirovich Yevtushenko, Red Navy man, gunner, Moscow, Bolshaya Bronnaya, 5. Mikhail Nikitovich Novikov, Red Navy man, gunner, Moscow, Nikitsky Boulevard, 13. Mikhail Timofeevich Koptilin, Red Navy man , shooter, Kaluga region, Nizhnyaya Gorka village. Liferov Semyon Ivanovich, Red Navy man, shooter, Moscow, st. 25 October, no. 5. Smirnov Alexey Danilovich, Red Navy man, shooter, Moscow, Leningradskoye sh., no. 30. Frolov Nikita Sergeevich, Red Navy man, shooter, Tambov region, Novo-Yuryevo village. Kashkin Mikhail Fedorovich, chief foreman, Moscow region, Elektrostal, st. Krasnaya, 54. Vasily Timofeevich Bodrov, chief foreman, Moscow region, Tushino village. Gerasimov Nikita Andreevich, chief foreman, Moscow, Yaroslavskoe sh., no. 1. Milovanov Egor Mikhailovich, chief foreman, Moscow region, Lyublino, st. Oktyabrskaya, 18. Kazko Vasily Iosifovich, Red Navy man, shooter, Moscow, 7th ray. pr., no. 4, apt. 36. And - more than a dozen sailors, brothers, strong, young, heroes who died on the battlefield. “So by the end of the month,” the commissar sitting at the table thought bitterly, “after such battles there will be no battalion or company left, and you won’t be able to recruit a battalion from the brigade itself.” For a long time, the gray-haired brigade commissar wrote out names and addresses on pieces of paper in handwriting that was unsteady from excitement. At the end of the hour, he threw his pen and ink pen onto the table, littered with papers containing the brigade personnel, reached into his pocket for a tobacco pouch with shag, twisted a cigarette and, throwing a pea coat over his shoulders, walked out of the hut onto the porch. There, in the fresh frosty air, he smoked greedily, taking deep and nervous puffs, and looked into the gray sky covered with heavy clouds. The commissar’s soul was also heavy. Burning his fingers, he threw the smoked bullock almost to the ground into the snow, returned through the dark hallway to the hut to his table and again set about the joyless task of his duty. The commissar would not have been able to deal with him until the evening if the young political instructor of the company, Sergei Vasiliev, who came into the hut on his own business, had not helped him. Together with him, they quickly completed all the necessary lists of dead and wounded soldiers and briefly discussed the command’s future plans. Tomorrow morning it was necessary to weigh anchor in the village of Khmeli, which they occupied, and go further along the road to the north - to knock out the Germans from neighboring villages, creating a “Demyansk cauldron” for them. And here, in Khmeli, in a day or two, funeral teams will come, gather along the surrounding roads, fields and forests the Red Army and Red Navy soldiers who died in the last battles, bloodied, tortured, and bury them in the frozen ground, digging a huge ditch somewhere on the outskirts of the village . But before that, they will collect medallions from lifeless bodies and send them to headquarters, and there they will decide whether to publish them or hide the huge human losses from the public. And less than half of the surviving names of the one and a half thousand of our soldiers buried in it will remain in the next mass grave near the village of Khmeli. 5. A day later, in the village of Verkhnyaya Sosnovka, taken by the sailors, after another fierce battle with the Nazis, the brigade commissar compiled new lists of irretrievable losses in the brigade. Returning from the field medical battalion with his head bandaged, he wrote, among other things, about how, in a battle near the village of Verkhnyaya Sosnovka, the company political instructor Sergei Nikolaevich Vasiliev replaced the wounded company commander, himself received three wounds and, having led one of the attacks, led the sailors on a decisive assault and was among the first to break into the enemy position. Already at the end of the battle, an enemy fragment killed the brave political instructor. S. N. Vasiliev, who died a heroic death in battle, was posthumously nominated for the title of Hero Soviet Union. In those heavy battles at the end of February 1942, one of the battalions of the 154th Naval Brigade was tasked with cutting an important German road near the village of Tsemena. Fulfilling this combat order, the battalion's fighters, with a swift night attack, the day before, defeated the fascist garrison in the villages of Bolshoye and Maloye Knyazevo and on the night of February 23rd launched an attack on the village of Tsemena. Hitler's troops, concerned about the loss of several of their important strongholds on the approaches to the central rockade, which fed the entire Demyansk enemy group, were well prepared for the upcoming battle. To help the infantrymen from the 290th Infantry Division, they transferred two companies of “special forces” from the SS division “Totenkopf”, reinforced with several assault self-propelled guns. Despite this powerful fire resistance, the attacking sailors still managed to fight their way into the streets of the village. With shouts of “half-hearted,” they clashed with the SS men in hand-to-hand combat. But the enemy turned out to be much larger, and he had heavy weapons, which the sailors did not have. In that night battle, despite the heroism shown, the battalion of sailors was almost completely killed. Near Tsemeny, the 154th Brigade lost 210 soldiers killed, and the Nazis finished off about 60 wounded and helpless sailors right on the battlefield. The snowy field outside the village was completely strewn with the bodies of dead sailors... In less than six months, the 154th Naval Rifle Brigade, greatly reduced in battles on the North-Western Front and equipped with new reinforcements, will be urgently transferred to the Stalingrad Front, where, together with other land and naval units will take up tough defense on the banks of the Don to prevent the Nazis from breaking through to Stalingrad. Already on July 17, having started battles with huge, superior enemy forces, our units, and among them the glorious sea brothers, will stand in positions to the death, anticipating with their heroism the sadly “famous” order of Stalin No. 227 “Not a step back!”

February 9th, 2015

I.M. Sopov, mortarman of the 1st rifle company of the 806th regiment of the 235th rifle division:

“In April, while moving to the front line (1942), we met many corpses on the road. No one removed them. The unit that we replaced at the front line consisted of only 15 people.
Our mortar platoon was assigned a position 400 meters from the enemy, behind a small hill. On the same day, we carried out sightings on the first and second enemy trenches.
On the night from May 1 to May 2, rifle units in groups occupied our first trench in order to attack the enemy in the village of Kulotino in the morning. As soon as it began to get light, our artillery opened fire on the enemy. We, the mortar men, also took part in the artillery preparation. We did not fire for long, only 20-25 minutes - this was clearly not enough.
Our rifle units attacked 3 or 4 times, but each time they were forced to retreat with heavy losses. The wounded walked past us to the rear in whole columns. Our rifle companies carried out attacks on enemy positions until 17:00.
In between attacks, our mortar platoon fired at enemy positions. There were attempts to capture Kulotino later, but they all ended in vain due to the heavy losses suffered by our units. But we also inflicted great damage on the Germans.


So, one day, I was observing the enemy from an observation post set up on a pine tree. I managed to spot a column on the road moving in our direction. I immediately gave the coordinates (and our entire area was targeted), and our mortars mixed the entire column with the ground. Our regimental mortarmen also dealt with a large enemy concentration using their 120 mm mortars.
In winter, our regiment crossed the Lovat River. We were given the task of capturing the village and then taking possession of the edge of the forest. There were about forty of us - they were officers of the regimental headquarters and rear units. We, the mortar men, also advanced without mortars like riflemen.
The Germans fired heavily, but our artillery supported us with its fire. We fired several salvos and fired Katyusha rocket launchers. The last salvo “hooked” us too - it was unpleasant.
During Lovati's crossing of the ice, they also experienced the brunt of additional losses from ice fragments scattered in large numbers after the explosions of German shells and mines. Cold water also had a strong effect on us. While moving through the Lowlands, I was wounded in the head. At first I felt weak and then lost consciousness."


K.A. Sizov - a fighter from the reconnaissance unit of the 235th Infantry Division:

“In the summer of 1942, we were suffocating from the smell of corpses. In front of our positions in no man’s land, since the winter battles, dead skiers in white camouflage suits lay dead. There were many corpses. Our units tried many times to knock the Nazis out of their positions, but all attacks ended in vain.
The enemy created a powerful fire system. They had every bush targeted, and as soon as they moved this bush, mines and shells exploded with great precision and machine guns fired viciously. Their aircraft gave no rest. At that time we did not yet have enough means to destroy their heavily fortified positions and destroy the fire system."

V.N. Bakharev - rifleman of the 806th Infantry Regiment of the 235th Division:

“We were given the task of recapturing the village of Kulotino from the Germans. After a night march, before the morning we took up the starting positions for the attack. Ahead there was a small forest - open forest, bushes, there were no trenches or trenches at our position. So, without digging in, we went to offensive
They rose to attack together, at the signal of the rocket. There was no artillery preparation, although during the formulation of the task we were told that there would be one.
In the forest we came across an enemy minefield. The first dead appeared. My assistant (I was a light machine gunner) was wounded in his leg by a blast. I bandaged him and sent him to the rear. Then the hem of my overcoat was torn off.
Later I had to operate the machine gun alone. After the boron, an open field opened up in front of us, on which a hillock rose. As soon as we reached it, the Nazis opened hurricane fire from mortars and machine guns. They beat the sniper terribly. We suffered losses. We went to bed.
Then we went on the attack 3 or 4 more times and each time we were forced to lie down due to heavy enemy fire. I fired methodically from a machine gun, but not aimed.
We lay under enemy fire until nightfall, and the “cuckoos” really bothered us. At night, already before the morning, we were first taken to a ravine, and then further to the rear for a kilometer and a half.
We had to attack Kulotino more than once. During one of the attacks, a German sniper’s bullet hit the butt of a machine gun - this saved my life. I was just wounded then. The squad commander bandaged me on the battlefield and dragged me to the medical unit.
After the unsuccessful spring battles for Kulotino, we stood on the defensive. It was hot in the summer. Our observers discovered large group bathing Germans. We prepared the data for the shooting and very successfully covered the swimmers with mortar fire. Then our attack immediately followed. Only one German cook was found alive."

German soldiers with transport containers on a village street in the Demyansk Cauldron.

A local resident helps the Germans carry a transport container dropped by the encircled Demyansk cauldron.

German soldiers are carrying weapons and ammunition to the transport plane, destined for the encircled units in the Demyansk cauldron.

Soldiers of the SS division "Totenkopf" deliver ammunition on a drag in the forest in the Demyansk pocket.

I.I. Ivlev - signalman from the 806th Infantry Regiment of the 235th Division:

“Our fresh division arrived in the Demyansk area. And immediately, without enemy reconnaissance, it was sent into battle. Our losses were heavy, many people were killed. On the first day, the regiment tried three times to attack the village of Kulotino and all without success. We then held the defense.
One day the connection was lost. The soldiers who left one by one did not return to restore contact. Then they gave me two soldiers to help me and ordered me to check the communication line. The wire was laid through the forest, and we, realizing that something was wrong here, walked very carefully.
The wire was held in hands the entire time, pulling it. Suddenly the wire became loose. We pulled him towards us and thus pulled him away from the German ambush. The Germans gave themselves away.
In a short battle, we destroyed four Germans and captured two wounded. We have restored contact. They also found two of our signalmen - they had been stabbed to death by the Germans. For completing a combat mission I was awarded the order Red Star."

N.M. Eremin - mortarman of the 732nd Infantry Regiment of the 235th Division:

“On foot, having covered about 60 kilometers through forests and swamps, we advanced to the village of Kulotino in the Demyansk region. The division began the offensive with almost no preparation. However, a short halt was made in a small clearing. We took hot food.
Then, a meeting took place, at which each soldier vowed to destroy at least 15 Nazis. Some vowed to kill up to 50 fascists.
Repeatedly, the division's regiments tried to take the village of Kulotino, but each time, having suffered heavy losses, the units retreated back - the Nazis held the defense too tightly so as not to "burn out" in the Demyansk "cauldron". A ski battalion was advancing on Kulotino ahead of us. He died all over. The corpses were not removed. There was a stench.
In the fall of 1942, our division was redeployed to the Starorussky district. Throughout March 1943, we fought our way to the Lovat River. We had already covered a considerable distance when, in a clearing in front of a small river, a German pinned our riflemen to the ground, firing heavily from a machine gun.
We destroyed both the machine gun and its crew with several mortar shots. For this I was awarded the medal "For Courage". My photograph with a signature was published in the division newspaper.
I remember well the battle near the village of Olgino. Not reaching 15 kilometers to Lovat, another river blocked our path. We lost many people on the field in front of this river and during the crossing.
Another unit was advancing here ahead of us and also suffered heavy losses - there were many corpses on the ice, they had already begun to decompose.
Nevertheless, we overcame the river and overcame the climb, which was steep and long. But at the crest of the climb, the enemy treated us with torrential fire. We were moved to the south, bypassing the village located beyond the ridge.
One day in March, we spent two days under enemy fire, hiding behind a snow bank. On the second day our chains rushed at the enemy, who this time retreated without much resistance.
The first time I forced Lovat on the ice - our team consisted of 30 people. On the left bank of the river the enemy met us with heavy fire, and we returned back.
On the 2nd day, the Germans methodically broke up all the ice on the river with artillery fire. We had to cross Lovat up to our chests and necks in icy water. We nevertheless captured the bridgehead and held it."



G.P. Kirillov:

“I commanded a rifle platoon in the 1230th rifle regiment of the 370th division from March 1942 to December 1943. The regiment occupied the defense on the outskirts of Staraya Russa, the place was called Gorodskaya Sloboda.
Lovat was forced in June 1943. They prepared for the crossing for about ten days: they built rafts and made boats. My platoon, reinforced with machine gunners (three heavy machine guns) and sappers - about 60 people in total - crossed the river in rubber boats. All pre-prepared crossing means were brought to the water's edge by hand.
The work went smoothly. On command, we quickly took our places in the boats, crossing the river began under enemy fire - we were unable to take him by surprise. When they landed on the enemy shore, only 12 people remained alive.
With this handful of fighters, we clung to the edge of the coastline along the front for about a hundred meters. Staying in place meant certain death, and we began to move forward, firing.
The Germans surrounded the entire shore with barbed wire. In a short time we crossed 6 or 7 rows of wire under deadly enemy fire.
The Germans tried three times with their counterattacks to throw us into Lovat, but each time we forced the enemy to roll back with our decisive actions. This went on for about four hours.
The small bridgehead we captured allowed the 2nd echelon of the division to land on it. Those who landed immediately attacked the enemy. In the initial period, we supported our attacking chains with our fire - after all, we had already managed to study the enemy’s main fire weapons.
At some point in the intense battle, the Germans launched a counterattack on us with superior forces. And then we called in Katyusha fire.
The missiles flew over our heads, as if they were exploding in the chains of the attacking enemy. Here the Germans suffered heavy losses, their units were exsanguinated. Eventually the Germans retreated. So, overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, we advanced 15 kilometers to the west, breaking through his first and second lines of defense."

K. D. Vorobiev:

“Our 363rd separate machine-gun and artillery battalion from the 52nd fortified area took up defense on the first of May 1942 on the eastern front of the Demyansk bridgehead. We defended the Demyansk-Valdai highway.
Our positions were in the area of ​​the village of Lobanovo, the Germans occupied the village of Ivanovo. In June, the Germans attempted to break through our defenses. Their attack on our positions was repulsed with heavy losses.
For a whole month after that, the Germans fired methodical artillery fire at our positions every day, from morning to evening - it was very exhausting.
I, as deputy battalion commander, turned to the higher command with a request to suppress the German artillery. This was not done with us.
In August, our battalion was redeployed further south, to the area of ​​Lake Velje. At the new location, the area turned out to be very swampy. We had to do a huge amount of work to create a strong defense. And we created it. We had reliable shelters built, including two concrete pillboxes.
Ahead of our positions, we installed wire barriers, to which we moved electricity with a voltage of 300 volts. In order not to be taken by surprise, we constantly conducted reconnaissance of the enemy. And the Germans never dared to test the strength of our defenses.



Well, let me give you an example of how we “got it” from the area. Our battalion’s supply points were directly located about six kilometers away, but these kilometers were completely impassable. Therefore, the foreman made a daily detour along a 50-kilometer route.
However, not a single horse could withstand this detour. In the evening, the foreman was met by a group of soldiers, and they carried the food on themselves the rest of the way.
At the beginning of February 1943, after the march, our unit was placed on the defensive near the village of Bely Bor. By this time the village was liberated by our troops. Locality there was no such thing - everything was burned and destroyed.
Our battalion was tasked with taking a wooded height called the “glove” - it, indeed, was shaped like a human hand.
We recaptured this height from the Germans, but not immediately, since the Nazis had thoroughly gained a foothold on it. During this very difficult section of the defense, I did not sleep for three days. On the fourth day I was allowed to rest.
I had just begun to wash myself when I was informed of a state of emergency in one of the battalion’s platoons. The fatigue has gone away somewhere. In the course of clarifying the circumstances of the “emergency”, we established the following.
The Germans apparently became aware of the change of units in front of their positions. They decided to conduct reconnaissance in force. First, the Germans launched a massive artillery attack on one platoon stronghold. The artillery barrage was followed by an attack by German infantry.
This was done very quickly, since there were only fifty meters from the enemy’s forward guard to the platoon stronghold. The Germans managed to break into the platoon's combat positions. Our machine gunners from the embrasure of the pillbox - by this time we already had a well-organized fire system, and then the artillerymen opened destructive fire on the German infantry. The enemy ran.
At the position of our platoon, out of 18 people, only one fighter remained alive. He was severely shell-shocked. The platoon commander was killed. We were missing an assistant platoon commander at that time. At the platoon stronghold, everything was destroyed, and the two anti-tank rifles in the platoons were damaged beyond recognition.
We later collected about 80 German corpses from the battlefield. The corpse of our senior sergeant-platoon commander was also found. A knife stuck into his chest; he managed to inflict a fatal blow on himself while the Germans were dragging him into captivity.



We didn't have to stand on the defensive for long. On February 18, we launched the final offensive against the enemy’s Demyansk group. We didn’t have to take Demyansk: they were ahead of us.
During the offensive, we liberated the village of Chernye Ruchi. In the church of this village we found a warehouse with military equipment - everything was mined, even the walls. There were about 200 carts around the church - the spokes on all the wheels were broken.
Local residents told us that a German shot a 12-year-old boy for his joyful cry: “our planes!” The killer saved his own skin by fleeing, abandoning his favorite creation - a personal album with photographs. On one page of this “good” there was a photograph depicting a Soviet prisoner of war. The Germans burned a five-pointed star into the entire forehead of this hero.
During the offensive, our battalion destroyed more than 310 Germans and captured 106. After the liquidation of the Demyansk "cauldron" we were included in the 312th Infantry Regiment of the 26th Infantry Division.

It was near Staraya Russa. One day, our rifle battalion was personally given an offensive combat mission by the division commander. The task boiled down to capturing three enemy trenches at night. Why were three attacking groups created? The first group captures the first trench and gains a foothold, the second group remains in the second trench and lets the third group forward.
The first group was led by Senior Lieutenant Popkov. He acted in accordance with the order of the division commander: he and his group recaptured the first trench from the enemy and began to gain a foothold in it, allowing the second group led by company commander Golimov to pass.
Golimov's company captured the enemy's second trench. And then the company commander violated the order of the division commander: he led the company to the enemy’s third trench, and thereby ruined the entire offensive plan, and, worst of all, the company. Later, only one fighter from this company came out to join his own forces.
He, ragged, emaciated, overgrown, saw his company commander with his arm broken to the elbow. The soldier did not remember anything else from this battle.
The 26th Infantry Division nevertheless captured the foreland in front of the city of Staraya Russa. Its further offensive was stopped by the powerful defensive system of the enemy. So, in front of us was a German pillbox with many machine gun and cannon embrasures. A branched system of passages using the metro method extended from it for many kilometers. We received orders to conduct active defense."

Demyanskaya offensive 1942

Offensive operation of the troops of the North-Western Front to encircle and destroy a group of Nazi troops in the area Demyansk, conducted from January 7 to May 20, 1942.

During the offensive of the Soviet troops in the winter of 1941/42, the North-Western Front (3rd and 4th shock, 11th and 34th armies, air Force front) under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Alekseevich Kurochkina was supposed to attack with the main forces in the Staraya Russian and Toropets directions, and with the 34th Army to encircle and destroy the enemy’s Demyansk group.

The front troops outnumbered the enemy (8 divisions of the 16th German Army) in strength and equipment by 1.5-2 times. However, the 34th Army, intended to directly encircle and destroy the Demyansk group, did not have such superiority. Against the 5th division of this army, the Nazi army had up to 4 divisions in the first line alone. The wooded, swampy terrain and deep snow cover created great difficulties in carrying out the offensive. According to the plan of the operation, the 34th Army was supposed to pin down the main forces of the Demyansk enemy group from the front, and with its flank divisions, together with part of the forces of the 11th and 3rd Shock Army, to strike the flanks of the enemy group located in the area Demyansk, surround and destroy it.

The offensive of the troops of the North-Western Front began on the right wing on January 7, and on the left wing on January 9, 1942. At first, the 11th Army achieved success, and by the end of January 10, its troops captured Staraya Russa from the north, northeast and east. Subsequently, however, the battles for the city became protracted. The formations of the right flank of the 34th Army also advanced slowly, trying to cut the line railway on the site Lychkovo, Pola.

On the left wing of the front, most of the formations of the 34th and right flank of the 3rd Shock Army in the very first days of the operation became involved in protracted battles to capture enemy strongholds. The 4th Shock Army successfully advanced in the Toropets direction. On January 22, the Supreme High Command Headquarters included the 3rd and 4th shock armies, aimed at defeating the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping of the enemy, into the Kalinin Front. Part of the forces of the 3rd Shock Army was transferred to the 34th Army.

By mid-January, the troops of the Northwestern Front covered Demyansk group from the north and south and created favorable conditions for the successful completion of the operation. Taking this into account, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command clarified the task for the North-Western Front (11th, 34th armies and the 1st Shock Army, 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, which arrived from the Headquarters reserve). The idea of ​​the operation was to encircle and destroy the enemy on the Demyansk bridgehead with strikes from the Staraya Russa area in the southern direction and from the Molvotitsa area in the northern direction.

On January 29, Soviet troops resumed the offensive and, in conditions of impassability and deep snow cover, broke the resistance of the Nazis, and on February 25, units of the 1st Guards Rifle Corps, advancing from the north towards Ramushevo, united with the 42nd Rifle Brigade of the 34th Army, which struck from south. The 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, without encountering serious enemy resistance, reached the approaches to the city of Kholm by the end of February. As a result of the offensive of the 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, the Old Russian and Demyansk enemy groups were separated and the latter, consisting of 6 divisions of the 16th Army, was surrounded.

The Soviet troops were faced with the task of eliminating the encircled enemy as quickly as possible. However, the fight dragged on. The enemy, relying on numerous strongholds, forced Soviet troops to disperse their efforts into separate centers of struggle and, by delaying their advance, gained time to organize a strong defense. In addition, the encircled group could not be firmly blocked from the air, which allowed the enemy to transfer reinforcements, ammunition, food to the encircled troops by plane and evacuate the wounded. Only during March 1942 did German transport aircraft enter the area Demyansk over 3,000 aircraft flights, replenishing up to 10 battalions and a large amount of ammunition and food.

By March 20, the situation on the Northwestern Front had sharply worsened. The fascist German command, taking advantage of the relative stabilization of the front, created on March 19 in the area south of Staraya Russa the Seydlitz corps group consisting of 5 divisions under the command of Lieutenant General Seydlitz-Kurzbach. On March 20, she struck in the direction of Ramushevo at the junction of the 11th and 1st shock armies. The offensive was supported by large air forces. Later, the encircled enemy troops launched a counter-attack north of Zaluchye, also in the direction of Ramushev. As a result of the ensuing battles, accompanied by massive strikes by fascist aviation, the enemy, at the cost of heavy losses, managed to break through the encirclement front and form the so-called Ramushevsky corridor up to 4 km wide and on April 23 connect with the encircled group. Subsequently, a fierce struggle unfolded in the zone of this corridor, which by the end of April was expanded by the enemy to 6-8 km.

From May 3 to May 20, 1942, the troops of the North-Western Front launched an offensive with the aim of eliminating the enemy’s Demyansk group, but due to poor training of the troops, it did not produce significant results. The Ramushevsky corridor was never eliminated. However, offensive actions in the area Demyansk provided positive influence on the general course of military operations in the northwestern direction of the Soviet-German front. The fascist German command was unable to launch the planned attack on Ostashkov to meet another group that had the task of attacking from the Rzhev area. The long struggle for the Demyan bridgehead was distinguished by exceptional tenacity and intensity. The command of the front and armies, having no experience in conducting encirclement operations, made a number of miscalculations. Strikes against the enemy were carried out by dispersed forces on a wide front, simultaneously in many directions, without sufficient means of reinforcement, and enemy reconnaissance was poorly organized.

Demyansk offensive operation 1943

Offensive operation of the troops of the North-Western Front to eliminate the Demyansk bridgehead on February 15 - 28, 1943.

At the end of January 1943, the Supreme High Command Headquarters set the task for the front (27, 11, 34, 53, 1st Shock and 6th Air Armies, which included 28 rifle and 5 air divisions, 17 rifle and 3 tank brigades) to defeat the troops of the 16th fascist German army (15 divisions, including 1 motorized), defending Demyansk bridgehead, and go out as a mobile group to the rear of enemy troops operating against the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts.

According to the plan of the front commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, the 27th and 1st shock armies were to cut the Ramushevsky corridor with converging blows, and then, in cooperation with the 11th, 34th and 53rd armies, destroy the troops located in Demyansk cauldron. A group of troops concentrated by February 16 south of Zaluchye under the command of Colonel-General Mikhail Semenovich Khozin (1st Tank and 68th Armies) was supposed to be introduced into a breakthrough in the zone of the 1st Shock Army in order to develop an offensive towards Soltsy and further to Luga .

The defeat of Hitler's troops at Stalingrad and the futility of further defense of the Demyansk bridgehead forced the fascist German command to take measures already in early February to prepare for the withdrawal of their troops from the Demyansk area. The offensive of the Soviet troops, which began on February 15, accelerated the withdrawal of troops of the 16th Army from the Demyansk bridgehead and the strengthening of the defense of the Ramushevsky corridor. Soviet intelligence promptly discovered the enemy's retreat. The Supreme High Command headquarters demanded that the rest of the armies go on the offensive faster. The main strike force of the North-Western Front went on the offensive: the 27th Army on February 23, and the 1st Strike on February 26, when the base of the bridgehead ( Ramushevsky corridor) was already significantly strengthened by the enemy due to the withdrawn formations of the Demyansk group.

Pursuing the retreating enemy, the troops of the North-Western Front, advancing from the east, reached the river by the end of February 28. Lovat and completed the liquidation of the enemy’s Demyansk bridgehead, which he held for 17 months. However, the Soviet troops were unable to fully complete the task. The enemy managed to withdraw his troops from the Demyansk cauldron and avoid their complete defeat. The changed situation on the Soviet-German front, as well as the onset of the spring thaw, forced the Soviet command to abandon the planned deep strike of Colonel-General Khozin's group of troops in the north-west direction to the rear of the 18th German Army.

Demyansk operations were carried out in difficult conditions. It was extremely difficult for Soviet troops to use their superiority in weapons and military equipment in wooded and swampy areas in the absence of roads. In addition, they were insufficiently provided with ammunition and engineering means. Carrying out assigned tasks, Soviet soldiers during Demyansk operations showed massive heroism. Although at the beginning of 1943, Soviet troops failed to fully achieve their goals in the Demyansk area, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to strengthen its groups on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front at the expense of Army Group North.

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