During the military operation in Syria, the Russian Armed Forces tested many of the latest models of Russian weapons and equipment in battle. At the same time, vehicles that had been in service for more than a dozen years were first used in battle. However, first things first.
Strategic missile carrier Tu-160 "White Swan" with Kh-101 missiles
Supersonic strategic missile-carrying bombers Tu-160 "White Swan", which in the West are called Blackjack, began to operate in 1987. However, the first combat use of "swans" took place in Syria in 2015.
Now Russia has 16 such aircraft, but soon up to 50 modernized machines are to enter service.
The formidable missile carrier, considered a nuclear deterrent, destroyed terrorists with conventional ammunition - KAB-500 air bombs and Kh-101 cruise missiles.
It is worth mentioning the latter separately, since they were also used for the first time in Syria. it cruise missiles a new generation, with a fantastic flight range of 5500 kilometers, several times more than that of European and American counterparts. The rocket is oriented in space using combined system navigation: inertial plus GLONASS. The Kh-101 flies in the altitude range from 30 meters to 10 kilometers, is invisible to radars and is very accurate - the maximum deviation from the target at the maximum range does not exceed five meters. Unlike its predecessors, the missile can also destroy moving targets. The mass of the X-101 high-explosive fragmentation warhead is 400 kilograms. The nuclear version of the missile, the Kh-102, carries a 250 kiloton warhead.
According to a number of experts, having used strategic aviation in Syria, Russia has tested a new strategy, having made a revolution in military affairs.
Small missile ships of the Buyan-M project with Kalibr missiles
Small missile ships of the project 21631 "Buyan-M" are multipurpose ships of the "river-sea" class. Their armament includes the A-190 artillery mount, machine gun mounts of calibers 14.5 and 7.62 millimeters, as well as anti-aircraft artillery complex"Duet", and anti-ship cruise missiles "Kalibr-NK" and "Onyx". The autonomous navigation of such a ship can last up to ten days.
During the war in Syria, the Kalibr cruise missiles managed not only to undergo baptism of fire, but also to acquire the status of world famous. The hits of these missiles on targets, filmed by unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as video recordings of their launches became one of the business cards Russian Navy.
Unlike foreign competitors, the Caliber can fly in a wide range of speeds from subsonic to three times the speed of sound. Guidance on the final section of the trajectory is carried out using anti-jamming active radar homing heads.
The missiles are capable of penetrating any anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense. The flight takes place at an altitude of 50 to 150 meters, and when approaching the target, the rocket drops to twenty meters and strikes that cannot be prevented. The flight of missiles is carried out along a complex trajectory with a change in altitude and direction of movement. This gives her the ability to approach the target from any direction unexpected for the enemy.
As for the accuracy of the hit, the expression "hits the bull's-eye" is appropriate. For example, the export version of the "Caliber" shoots at 300 kilometers and destroys a target with a diameter of 1-2 meters. It is clear that missiles used by the Russian Navy have even higher accuracy characteristics.
In Syria, Caliber launches were carried out from small missile ships Uglich, Grad Sviyazhsk, Veliky Ustyug, Zeleny Dol and Serpukhov (as well as from ships of other types and submarines).
Russian winged "Calibers" have already become a headache for the United States - in fact, in the anti-ship version, they are more effective than American "Tomahawks", and their placement on small-tonnage ships creates many difficulties for potential adversaries.
Guided missiles "Krasnopol"
In Syria, Russian guided artillery shells "Krasnopol" were used for the first time to eliminate terrorists. The firing range of modern modifications of Krasnopol is 30 kilometers. The mass of the explosive in ammunition of this type ranges from 6.5 to 11 kilograms.
One of the main features of the machine is its high maneuverability. In addition, the "Night Hunter" can carry out combat missions at any time of the day.
The helicopter's armored cockpit protects the crew from 20mm shells and armor-piercing bullets. Armor also protects the most important systems helicopter. The Mi-28N is equipped with a radar located above the propeller hub. The use of this complex makes it possible to effectively search, detect, recognize and defeat ground and air targets. The helicopter is armed with a 30 mm automatic cannon. It can also carry guided (anti-tank) or unguided (against infantry and light vehicles) air-to-ground missiles. The possibility of installing air-to-air missiles is also provided, which allows the Mi-28UB to destroy not only airplanes and helicopters, but also small-sized drones and even cruise missiles. The helicopter has four hardpoints and, among other things, can be used for laying minefields.
Two of these helicopters were on board the aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov" during the Syrian campaign. There Ka-52K took to the air and carried out test launches of missiles.
The Ka-52K "Katran" is a ship version of the Ka-52 "Alligator" and is intended for patrolling, fire support of the landing force when landing ashore, solving antiamphibious defense tasks at the front line and in tactical depth at any time of the day.
The ship-borne "Katran" differs from the basic version by the presence of a shortened folding wing, which has been modified to accommodate heavy weapons, and a folding mechanism for the blades, which allows it to be compactly located in the hold.
Nevertheless, despite the "miniature dimensions", the Ka-52K has a formidable weaponry. These are torpedoes, depth charges and anti-ship cruise missiles.
The helicopter is equipped with a laser-beam weapon guidance system and a Hunter video image processing system. Optical-electronic complex "Vitebsk" protects "Katran" from being hit by missiles with infrared homing heads.
Tank T-90
However, the Tu-160, Mi-28N and Admiral Kuznetsov are not the only well-known "old men" first spotted in combat in Syria.
For the first time, T-90s were used by Syrian troops in the Aleppo province in 2016.
In addition, in Syria, the secret weapon T-90 was tested for the first time - the Shtora-1 optical-electronic suppression complex, designed just to protect the tank from ATGM.
Syrian tankers highly appreciated the capabilities of the T-90. Their only drawback, they called the lack of air conditioning, which makes it difficult to fight in the desert.
Recently it became known that the tank was modernized taking into account the Syrian experience.
Armored cars "Typhoon"
The new Russian Typhoon armored vehicles were also tested for the first time in Syria. In early 2017, a Typhoon-K armored vehicle was spotted there.
K63968 Typhoon-K is a cabover multifunctional modular vehicle. In the modification for the transport of personnel, it can accommodate up to 16 people. The landing can be carried out using a ramp or through a door. The cab is protected by reinforced armor. It is also provided for the installation of an armored shield on the windshield.
Even some types of RPGs are not afraid of the new armored car. From these "tank killers" the car is saved by special attachments that reliably protect the crew from cumulative jets. The Typhoon wheels are bullet-proof and equipped with special anti-explosion inserts.
The fully equipped Typhoon weighs 24 tons, the hull length is 8990 millimeters, and the width is 2550 millimeters. 450 Horse power engines allow the armored car to move at a speed of 110 kilometers per hour.
The machine is built on a 6x6 wheel arrangement, which allows it to easily overcome off-road, snow drifts and any other types of obstacles. In Syria, Typhoons are used not only to transport personnel, but also, for example, to deliver humanitarian aid.
The Russian military operation in Syria was not only a test carried out military reform, but also a kind of "review of the achievements" of the domestic defense industry. According to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, 160 types of new and modernized weapons were tested in Syria. Most of these samples are no longer post-Soviet legacy, but have been developed and adopted in service in the past few years. Combat use forced a new look at Russian weapons traditional and potential buyers. The experience of the successful application of AME in real wars has always been an important tool for advancing to the international market, and has already led to the conclusion of additional contracts, including in the region itself.
Of the demonstrated Russian arsenal, the most violent international reaction was caused by the creation and the first combat use of a whole family of high-precision sea and air-based cruise missiles with satellite guidance. Strikes of small missile ships with the use of the "Caliber-NK" complex at a distance of over 1000 kilometers were delivered from the Caspian and Mediterranean seas... From the shores of Syria, a modification of the "Caliber-PL" was fired from a submerged position diesel submarine "Rostov-on-Don".
For the first time in the history of the Russian Navy, it was able to attack ground targets hundreds of kilometers from the coast with high-precision non-nuclear weapons. This made me take a fresh look at his role. Equipped with state-of-the-art cruise missiles, the Navy and Aerospace Forces have acquired completely new capabilities in power projection.
Previously the main purpose Long-range aviation The Russian Aerospace Forces was using nuclear weapons, which made it almost useless in local conflicts. But in Syria, she tested her new non-nuclear air-launched cruise missiles Kh-555 and Kh-101... For strategic bombers Tu-95MSM and Tu-160 Syria also became their first combat use.
Thanks to the massive deliveries of military equipment to the Aerospace Forces for several years now, all combat aircraft deployed at the Khmeimim airbase are either new or modernized. They were transferred to Syria fighters MiG-29K / KUB, Su-27SM, Su-30, Su-33, Su-35, bombers Su-24M2 and Su-34(pictured), Su-25SM attack aircraft. The main difference between all of them was the new generation of sighting and navigation systems. They endowed them with the ability to hit targets with increased accuracy, even with conventional unguided bombs. But the main advantage of the new technology was the possibility of using a new generation of Russian high-precision weapons. It was it that made it possible to turn the tide in the war with a very limited air force.
The most frequently used and most useful was the GLONASS corrected by satellites. bomb KAB-500S... Obtaining such ammunition allowed Russian aviation to reliably hit single stationary targets in all weather conditions and with high heights with minimal collateral damage even in settlements.
In addition to aircraft, more than two dozen helicopters were used in hostilities. Russian transport helicopters need no introduction in this region. They have long been the backbone of parks in Iraq and Afghanistan. But for our new attack helicopters the fight against ISIS was the first case of their combat use... Since 2014, the Mi-28NE has been intensively used in neighboring Iraq. Since the fall of 2015, four types of attack helicopters have made their Syrian debut in the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria: Mi-28N, Mi-35M, Ka-52 and Ka-52K.
Particular attention was drawn to the use of new guided missiles "Vikhr-M" from helicopters Ka-52. The range and high speed of approach to the target allow the helicopter to attack, remaining unnoticed until the last moment and without entering the zone of MANPADS operation. This gives the army aviation a significant advantage over the most common Attack missiles, which have a shorter range and warhead power.
While it is difficult to surprise someone with Russian-made planes and helicopters, Russian drones still look exotic for most foreign observers. In just five years, the number of light tactical drones in the army has increased twenty times, and their characteristics have approached the best world standards. By the end of 2016, the Russian Ministry of Defense already had almost 2,000 unmanned aerial vehicles at its disposal. aircraft.
The Russian group in Syria included about 80 drones, from light " Eleron-3SV" and " Orlan-10"To the most difficult and distant -" Outpost". Their number exceeded the total number of manned aircraft and helicopters. This grouping has radically increased the intelligence capabilities of the Russian troops.
UAVs were used for target detection and guidance of aviation, damage assessment, adjustments to Syrian artillery fire. Russian drones were also used for more peaceful tasks, from mapping the area to escorting convoys with humanitarian supplies.
Due to the limited Russian participation in ground hostilities, ground equipment was presented much more modestly. The Syrian government army was supplied mainly with obsolete weapons from storage bases. Nevertheless, one cannot fail to note the first combat use. T-90 held in this Middle Eastern country. Several dozen T-90s of early modifications were delivered to the government army. They are far from new, and therefore are not the best either in the world, or even in Russia, which, in addition to the advanced Armata tank, has already developed much more advanced modifications of the T-90 itself. However, even outdated modifications proved to be quite good, showing significantly better survivability compared to all previous models of Soviet tanks that were in service with Syria.
Of the infantry weapons, Russian-made guided anti-tank missiles have proven themselves in the best way. Their use in Syria and neighboring Iraq was massive, with thousands of units spent, from obsolete Soviet Fagots to the most powerful Cornets in the Russian arsenal.
Lessons and challenges
Any war inevitably becomes the best testing ground, weeding out bad samples and stimulating the development of the most effective weapons. The experience gained in prolonged wars cannot be replaced by exercises or tests. The conflict in Syria was no exception. Even according to official data, more than a dozen out of 160 tested new weapons were rejected (although it was not specified which ones).
Mixed results in real conditions were shown by the concept of using new digital sights for bombing with increased accuracy with conventional unguided bombs. It has proven its effectiveness in attacks against the field fortifications of militants and terrorists, their areas of concentration, and in attacks on oil infrastructure, which ISIS terrorists used to finance their "caliphate". At the same time, during combat operations typical of modern conflicts in settlements, their accuracy turned out to be insufficient. Here the use of guided high-precision ammunition has established itself as uncontested. It allows not only to minimize collateral damage, but also to hit targets with maximum efficiency.
The old concept of using attack aircraft on a modern battlefield saturated with MANPADS was also called into question. Due to the danger of being hit by anti-aircraft fire, the Su-25SM squadron transferred to Syria was used mainly as light bombers; they were engaged in navigational bombing from high altitudes instead of traditional ground attacks with unguided missiles and cannon fire.
It was not possible to fully "show the goods on the face" of the naval aviation during the campaign to the shores of Syria, the only Russian aircraft-carrying cruiser. Whatever the reason, the two planes were lost, it could damage the export prospects anyway. First of all, I recall India, which in 2017 announced a tender for the purchase of 57 carrier-based fighters for its Russian-built aircraft carrier, in which MiG will also participate.
However, this failure did not lead to serious reputational costs. In Abu Dhabi, an agreement was signed with the United Arab Emirates for the development and production of fifth-generation light fighters based on the MiG35.
The most serious challenges are faced by the developers of tanks. The proliferation of anti-tank guided missiles has demonstrated the high vulnerability of armored vehicles on the modern battlefield. Effective anti-tank systems in large numbers ended up in the hands of not only government armies, but also irregular formations, as well as terrorists. In the battles in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, not only old Soviet tanks, but also American Abrams, German Leopard and French Leclerc showed their vulnerability to modern anti-tank weapons.
This again confirmed that modern heavy armored vehicles are inconceivable without active protection systems. Russian military-industrial complex is one of the few who have competence in active protection equipment. But until they are equipped with serial tanks for their own army, one can hardly expect export success of such systems. They were not tested in Syria either.
The very experience of using ATGMs in regional conflicts shows that it has turned from a specialized anti-tank weapon into an effective and universal weapon of the infantry, its “ long arm". This necessitates the development and bulk purchases for all modern and promising ATGM missiles not only with cumulative, but also with high-explosive and thermobaric warheads.
In the conditions of the increased efficiency of aviation and its weapons, the proliferation of automation and informatization of the battlefield, it becomes clear that today the capabilities of aviation are limited by means of reconnaissance and target detection. After the introduction of a large number of UAVs in Russian army in this regard, there have already been significant changes for the better. But as a result of the operation, the need to saturate the troops not only with light tactical short-range drones, but also with heavier reconnaissance models, became obvious. The search is underway for an apparatus that will take an intermediate position between the effective but expensive 450-kilogram Forpost UAV and the cheap, but extremely limited carrying capacity of the 18-30-kilogram Orlan-10 and Granat-4.
There is still a need to continue building up the orbital constellation of reconnaissance satellites.
At the same time, the operation showed a critical flaw - the lack of attack drones in Russia. In addition to UAVs, the US coalition in Syria is already using mid-range strike drones developed by Israel, Iran and Turkey, as well as improvised ultralight drones from commercial components developed by ISIS terrorists.
It is hoped that the Syrian experience will spur the ongoing development of domestic samples of heavy and tactical attack drones. 
Impact on exports
Macro-region of the Middle East and North Africa for many years it has been the hottest spot on the planet. Now there are four major armed conflicts at once - in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Syria. The situation in Afghanistan is threatening to get out of control. Relations between Israel and its neighbors remain traditionally tense. One way or another, most of the countries of the region are involved in these conflicts, including the richest oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf.
Unsurprisingly, he is the leader in relative defense spending in the world. If the countries of Europe spend from 1 to 2% on their armies, then the total defense spending of the countries of the region in 2015 reached 7% of the regional GDP. A significant proportion of these costs are spent on the acquisition of weapons.
Their usual foreign suppliers found themselves in a difficult situation due to the political confusion that arose after “ Arab Spring". This led to embargoes and sanctions for a number of countries in the region. For the EU, an important factor has become self-restraint on the supply of lethal and offensive weapons to belligerent countries and regimes that violate human rights and the rules of war.
Until 2012, Russia's position in the regional market was weakening. The fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya and the war in Syria have deprived " Rosoboronexport»Already signed contracts worth billions of dollars. But such restrictions on competitors and Russia's demonstrated willingness to provide not only political, but also military support to its friends in the region allowed the Russian defense industry not only to return, but also to win new positions in the local market.
At the same time, the losing side was the United States, whose inconsistent policy led to a drop in confidence in them. The most striking example is Iraq. After the United States suspended the supply of weapons necessary to fight ISIS, even under the already signed contracts, the country's government was forced to turn to Russia. Our country has managed to provide the Iraqi army with weapons quickly and without excessive political demands. Apache's place was taken by the Russian Mi-28NE and Mi-35M, and the delay in the delivery of the F-16 was compensated for by the urgent sale of proven Su-25 attack aircraft.
A similar story happened with Egypt, which is one of the largest arms purchasers in the region. Accustomed to fully relying on US weapons, after the events of the Arab Spring, the country was forced to look for alternative suppliers. This gave Russia the opportunity to conclude several major contracts, including for missile defense assets.
Anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems have become the most popular commodity in the region in recent years.
Demand spurred by a buildup of local air force modern aircraft, the development of the Iranian missile program and the frequent attacks of the Yemeni Houthis on Saudi Arabian targets using ballistic missiles.
Russia managed to conclude contracts for the supply of Egypt capable of shooting down ballistic missiles complex S-300VM, and Iran, withdrawn from sanctions - S-300PMU-2... The most modern missile and artillery systems "Pantsir-S" were received by Iraq, the modernized air defense systems Buk-M2A - Algeria.
Russian helicopters remained another popular product.
Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s have already purchased up to 200 Mi-8 of various modifications. There is no doubt that the experience of their operation contributed to the conclusion of the largest contracts. recent years for percussion models produced by Russian Helicopters. Algeria has acquired a record contract for 42 Mi-28NEs. Another 15 helicopters of this type and 28 Mi-35Ms were purchased by Iraq. These deals became the first export contracts for the Mi-28. Immediately 46 Ka-52s were contracted by Egypt to form an air group of two Mistrals intended for Russia, which were resold to them by France.
Algeria and Egypt also acquired Russian aircraft. An important contract for 50 MiG-29M / M2 fighters, valued at 2 billion US dollars, was signed with Egypt. Algeria bought 14 Su-30MKA. In 2016, 10 modernized Su-24M2s were received by the Syrian Air Force, suffering heavy losses of their obsolete fighter-bombers. In 2017, plans were announced for the supply of another Su-24 squadron.
The deliveries of both aircraft and helicopters to this warring region are accompanied by accompanying contracts for thousands of weapons for them, including expensive guided missiles.
The demand for heavy armored vehicles also remains. Despite the vulnerability existing models, tanks are still indispensable on the battlefield. In 2014, Algeria bought 200 T-90SA. A major success of the Russian defense industry was the large contract announced during the IDEX 2017 exhibition in the UAE for the supply of the latest and most protected version of the T-90MS tank to one of the Middle Eastern countries. The recipient has not yet been named, but it is possible that Kuwait will act. In this case, it will be the most important return of Russian arms exports to the most monetary market in the region for the monarchies of the Persian Gulf.
It is not known how long the conflict in Syria and Russian participation in it will last. The outcome of this confrontation is also unclear. But it is already obvious that these and smaller arms contracts marked a change in the trend that existed until 2012 to oust Russian defense products from the region. In the event of a successful outcome for Syria and Russia of the current conflict, even more significant export successes can be expected both in the Middle East and around the world.
At the same time, they cannot be taken for granted. The local market continues to be an extremely highly competitive environment. All the best arms manufacturers in the world are fighting for a place on it. In addition to Russia's traditional rivals in the United States and Europe, competition from the rapidly developing Chinese and Turkish military-industrial complex is becoming increasingly sensitive. There is also a noticeable tendency to localize production. The largest buyer of weapons - Saudi Arabia has already established its own production of light armored vehicles, drones, guided weapons.
Anton LAVROV, military analyst
One week after the start special operation Of the Aerospace Forces of Russia against the terrorist group "Islamic State", the first footage of the combat use of our helicopters hit the Internet. In a video filmed on October 7 by militants, Mi-24P helicopters of the Russian Aerospace Forces provided support to Syrian troops near Al-Latamna. Later, the work of our helicopter pilots was noted in other sectors of the Syrian front. The question immediately arose why the Russian command decided to use the "oldies" of the "twenty-fourth" in Syria, and not the new Mi-35M, Mi-28N or Ka-52. In this article we will try to answer this question by considering various pros and cons.
The Mi-24P helicopter used by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Syria has been tested in combat in Afghanistan, Chechnya and South Ossetia, so it is free from childhood growing pains inherent in all new machines. Since the days of Afghanistan, the helicopter has been perfectly adapted to operations in hot climates and increased dustiness, which is extremely important in the Middle East theater of operations. The same Ka-52 has not yet taken part in hostilities in desert conditions, unlike the MI-35 and Mi-28, which are in service with the Iraqi army, therefore its first combat test in such difficult conditions, perhaps, would be associated with certain difficulties.
The Mi-24P is a transport and combat helicopter, which, if necessary, can be used to evacuate crews shot down by militants (or suffered an accident for technical reasons) aircraft. Alas, such a possibility cannot be ruled out, so the landing compartment of the "twenty-four", which can accommodate eight people or four stretchers, may well come in handy. The Ka-52 does not have an amphibious compartment, and the Mi-28N can be used for evacuation only as a last resort, because its technical compartment is not well suited for transporting people.
The main advantage of the Mi-24P over its “colleagues” is its firepower. The helicopter, in addition to the GSh-30K double-barreled gun, has six suspension points for guided and unguided weapons, on which anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), unguided aircraft missiles (NAR), bombs, as well as suspended fuel tanks (PTB) can be placed. The experience of battles with illegal armed groups in Afghanistan and Chechnya has shown that the main weapon of the helicopter is NARs, which are preferable to use against enemy personnel, especially when the attacked enemy is trying to disperse. There are not many targets for ATGMs, tk. militants are not as saturated with armored and automobile equipment as the regular army. Nevertheless, we believe that guided missiles must necessarily be on a helicopter's suspension in the amount of several pieces.
Since Russian bombers carry out bombing strikes not only on the line of contact between the Syrian troops and ISIS, but also in the rear of the Islamic State, in case of need to evacuate the Su-34 crews, it will be very useful to use the suspension tanks on the helicopter suspension. At the same time, it remains possible to use the entire range of weapons (ATGM, NAR), which will be needed to destroy militants trying to capture downed pilots.
The optimal suspension of weapons on the Mi-24P is probably as follows: several ATGMs on two pylons and NAR blocks on four pylons. If it is necessary to work at a great distance from the base, the suspension option can be as follows: ATGM on two pylons, NAR blocks on two pylons, PTB on two pylons. In any of these options, the helicopter is capable of having a serious fire effect on the enemy.
Now let's look at its competitors. That the Mi-35M, that the Mi-28N have only 4 suspension points, respectively, their firepower is weaker than on the older brother, and when working at a great distance from the base, the range of weapons will also be weakened due to the suspension of the PTB, leaving under the ATGM or NAR only two pylons. The Ka-52 has six points of suspension, like the Mi-24P, but the guided missiles for this helicopter, according to some reports, have not yet passed the entire test cycle. It seems to us that it would be unreasonable to send a helicopter to war, which is deprived of the ability to attack armored objects and fortified firing points of militants with guided weapons.
Also, the possibility of sending the Mi-28N to Syria could have been affected by the August crash of one of the helicopters of this type on demonstration flights during the Aviadarts competition. Undoubtedly, until the end of the work of the commission investigating this incident, it would be wrong to use a machine in the combat zone, possibly having problems with the serviceability of the material part.
Of course, the helicopters of the new type (Mi-28N, Ka-52) have improved the ability to work "on the ground" independently, without resorting to the help of aircraft controllers, as well as a higher probability of evading an attack using MANPADS, but it seems that Russian Ministry The defense decided that the use of a machine proven over the years, with a large number of options with a weapon suspension and large evacuation capabilities, would be preferable in this situation. Considering that until now, there has been no particular frequency of use of MANPADS by militants, perhaps there is a reason for this.
repost with el-murid
Quite an interesting text from the Web regarding an overview of the tactics of actions of the military structures of the Islamic State on the basis of the siege of Mosul. It is worth remembering that the plan for the defense of Mosul and its organization were provided with the direct participation and leadership of the former commander of the Tajik OMON, Gulmurod Halimov, who had colossal practical experience of the war in Tajikistan, as well as serious theoretical training, including in pindos.
The war of the Caliphate forces against the Iraqi army provided a lot of analytical material that allows one to assess some of the features of the strategy and tactics of warfare by the troops of the Islamic State.
The basis of the Caliphate's strategy is knowledge of the strategy and tactics of the Pindos, Iraq and Iran, knowledge of the political views of the leadership of these countries and their generals on the conduct of a full-scale war. Therefore, when preparing the units, strengths coalition forces (absolute superiority in the air, in armored vehicles, in heavy weapons) and the lack of their own ability to organize modern air defense, active means to counter the air force in most of the territory of the Caliphate.
The strategy and tactics are based not only on the lessons of the Middle East wars, but also on actions in a war with a technologically superior enemy using the lessons of the Afghan, Chechen and vietnamese wars... The war began to unfold according to a fundamentally new scenario with "non-classical tactics and strategy."
Artillery plays a serious role in war, especially its light weapons, such as recoilless guns, mortars and grenade launchers, which are easily carried from place to place by the crew or can be transported by cars (or, as in the case of BW, be installed in the back). It is also a serious threat to enemy, inflicting great damage to infantry and equipment, are howitzer artillery and MLRS different types... The problem with this type of weapon is its size and the difficulty of stealthily transporting it. Therefore, an advance preparation for the PU is made. missile systems and their missile calculations, as well as calculations of towing artillery of a network of underground tunnels, basements, first floors of buildings and shelters for stocks of weapons and personnel. Most of the launch points of unguided missile projectiles (URS) during defensive battles are determined in advance. For each individual point, for each individual launcher, data is prepared for firing from underground tunnels and shelters.
Some of the launch points are masked so that they can be reused. For this, houses damaged by shelling from enemy artillery and aircraft can also be used. Often, during such shelling, holes appear in the reinforced concrete slabs of the ceiling, sufficient for firing through them from basements, where installations like RPU-14 can be placed. After launch, such an installation is hidden under the protection of the surviving part of the roof, which greatly complicates its subsequent detection for aerial reconnaissance of the enemy. Also for defense rocket launchers, missile stocks and launch areas, concrete positions and bunkers, anti-tank weapons and mine traps are prepared in advance. In contrast to the guerrilla experience of using autonomous launchers in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, when light missiles were launched haratically, manually, without causing much damage to the enemy, IS often uses massive rocket and mortar attacks, which requires the organization of available ones. " missile forces"according to the military model.
At the same time, in order not to lose the prepared calculations, ISIS uses the tactics not of "nomadic launchers", but "nomadic launchers". This was important given the domination of the coalition aviation in the air. With a good supply of NURS, it was necessary to save the prepared calculations, which, when moving for the next launch, were not unmasked launcher... With this tactic, the application missile strikes was carried out by the rapid departure of the calculations from the shelters and the concealment of the calculation in underground tunnels immediately after the salvo. At the same time, PU or guides for NURS without changing positions were used many times.
In order to ensure the survivability of mobile launchers for launching rockets, alternating tactics of occupying the towed launcher with false and true launchers was used, hiding them immediately after launch in the opposite direction (thereby eliminating the possibility of detecting a real shelter). The technique of imitating the activity of the PU calculation at the false launch site was often used.
ISIS predominantly locate their warehouses, headquarters and firing positions within populated areas, seeking to relocate weapons and units in a way that would be little different from the migration of civilians. Part of the PU was served by local residents, and this was done in the courtyards of ordinary residential buildings. The same applies to pre-prepared VBIEDs, often waiting in the wings in the covered garages of residential buildings. As a result, the combination of prepared false and true target systems, PU simulations or missile crew activities allow ISIS to achieve a situation where Air Force strikes become much less effective than they can be. At the same time, the istishhadi themselves perform the function of an assault aircraft, causing great damage and causing confusion in the enemy's camp.
In strictly tactical terms, IS fighters managed to use three pre-prepared tactical techniques: they prevented the enemy from using helicopters with the support of infantry; created a threat to his tanks and armored personnel carriers; forced the infantry to engage in close-range combat and hand-to-hand combat, which they were not used to (as evidenced by the large losses during the attacks of the Ingimasians).
Also, the leaders of the Caliphate put into effect a previously prepared operational-strategic technique: the transfer of hostilities to the routes of supply of weapons, equipment and aviation ammunition from the places of their receipt to the front line. The technique of "exporting resistance abroad" is also used. Here it comes not about terrorist attacks against the West, but about the expansion of IS by voluntarily joining and creating vilayats in Afghanistan, Libya, Nigeria and other countries.
The war proceeded according to the scenario that IS offered to its opponents. Foreseeing that government forces, with the support of the Peshmerga, would try to make a breakthrough in the east of Mosul (moreover, pushing them towards this choice), IS prepared a zone of warfare meter by meter. The way out was not bunkers, the construction of which requires a lot of time and materials and would probably have been noticed by aviation, but the equipment of tens of thousands of trenches 50 cm wide and 60 cm deep, covered with branches that turn into additional separate shelters, as well as digging tunnels with disguised entrances connecting these trenches among themselves.
In order to limit the use of aviation, and primarily combat helicopters, combat operations were used at ultra-short distances of 50-75 meters, which did not allow the coalition to use combat helicopters due to the possible defeat of their soldiers. When the government infantry attacked, the Mujahideen would let them as close as possible and, jumping out of the trenches, struck at close range. Always operating as part of a unit, government forces found themselves disoriented during close combat. Such a battle did not allow the use of army and assault aircraft because of the risk of striking at their own. This tactic calls into question the use of helicopters: in such conditions, they cannot fire machine guns at enemy units. In addition, ISIS has no units in the full sense of the word. The enemy is met by small, well-trained and armed groups, dispersed in their places and always ready to counterattack. Therefore, helicopters prefer to stay away from enemy positions in order to minimize losses from RPGs and heavy machine guns that can be inflicted on them by the Mujahideen from ambushes.
Amirs of ISIS skillfully used the terrain and an extensive network of bunkers, underground communications and shelters, underground command posts. These command posts are often underground, well-fortified communications in villages, sometimes hundreds of meters long, with depots of weapons and ammunition, from where IS units conducted defensive actions, then suddenly firing at the enemy, then just as suddenly disappearing. In such not even bunkers, but entire underground villages, you can live autonomously for a long time without replenishing food and ammunition supplies. Hiding in the tunnels, the Mujahideen easily evaded air and artillery raids, and then, if necessary, moved from one "village" to another without any problems, creating the illusion of their large numbers, which negatively affected the morale of the enemy troops. At the same time, the coalition troops, revealing such shelters, simply blow them up, without risking using them for surprise attacks. there is a great risk of an ambush, which will invariably lead to large losses among the attackers, because numerical superiority and superiority in weapons in the conditions of cramped tunnels do not play any role.
In the front line, numerous minefields were installed, which took away time and lives from the attackers, and also forced them to move along those routes where an attack on themselves was most convenient. Moving their armored vehicles in places free of mines, government troops go out to the most trained warriors of the Caliphate, trained in guerrilla actions and armed with ATGMs to defeat armored vehicles at long distances and RPGs. A significant saturation of combat groups with machine guns helps in this, which prevents the army infantry from maneuvering on the battlefield and bypassing the positions of the Mujahideen. As always in urban battles, high efficiency shows mass use snipers. All this, combined with the sudden and deadly attacks of istishhadi, brings consistently high results in clashes with the military.
The Caliphate created an effective and multiply duplicated communication system, starting with a wire and ending with personal beepers, which made it possible to conduct accurate command and control of troops. Apparently, the tactics of decentralized leadership were used during the fighting in Mosul, which practically nullified all efforts to destroy the government. The encircled ISIS units received assistance from the nearest unit, based not on the orders received, but on the created situation, when the emirs made decisions on their own. An example of this is the battles for the al-Salam hospital, when during the day the units of the 9th armored division, together with reinforcements from the "goldsmiths", not only did not defeat the outnumbered fighters of the Caliphate, but they themselves were surrounded when help came to the Mujahideen ...
Good command and control of the squads is also one of the keys to high efficiency. Even when the coalition managed to deliver serious blows to IS, the control system functioned. For example, part of the areas of eastern Mosul was taken by the federal forces of Iraq, but even these areas of the city were not completely controlled by the military, and their losses there remained steadily high, while the IS field commanders in charge of this area of "work" did not cease to lead the actions of the Mujahideen and sent aid to the federal-occupied areas, trying, based on the situation, to evacuate as much as possible even the bodies of martyrs from the battlefield.
Mujahideen use not only the methods of guerrilla warfare, but also use the tactics of small units of the regular army. During battles, they operate in units of up to 50 people, but most often in groups of 15-20 people. Effective actions of small groups of 6-8 people who carry 5-8 ATGMs, 1-2 machine guns, and an additional supply of missiles is in well-camouflaged bunkers. These groups hit tanks and other armored vehicles of the enemy at a distance of 1.5-2 km and can operate even at night using night vision devices. ATGM is used not only against armored vehicles, but also to defeat enemy personnel occupying positions in houses and various buildings. Especially effective in the latter case is the use of old Malyutka ATGMs. Under-barrel grenade launchers are actively used to defeat manpower.
A characteristic tactical technique of the IS is the mining of roads and paths deep behind enemy lines, incl. by local underground / guerrilla forces; and by small mobile groups along the supply lines of the federal army and against government roadblocks. The tactics are simple and effective: mining the road (especially in those places where pursuit can be organized), short but powerful fire strike and withdrawal, often with further intensive mortar shelling of various calibers. In addition to material losses and casualties in people, such rear-service surprise attacks turn out to be a big psychological blow to the supply troops of the Iraqi troops, which, even in the deep rear, cannot feel safe.
As for the technique of the enemy. The Mujahideen know about the weakness of the thermal imager in the rear hemisphere of the Abrams M1A2 tanks. With a good set of weapons, this vehicle can cost $ 50 million, but it has two "dead corners" of thermal imaging cameras in the rear the last moment, that is, does not have time to react. Also, the effectiveness of the thermal imager is greatly reduced in heat, dust and heavy smoke, which is an almost invariable attribute of the war in Iraq. This made it possible to disable and destroy about ninety one only Abrams and only in Mosul, not to mention many different other equipment.
Thus, based on all of the above, a simple conclusion can be drawn: the war continues and will last for a very long time, much longer than the imaginary masters of the world would like and may well end in their defeat, but Allah alone knows whether this is destined to come true.
PS. And in addition to this text. ISIS statistics released on fighting in Iraq for 1431 Hijri (from September 2016 to September 2017). As you can see, the main losses (more than half) of the Iraqi army fell on the vilayets of the IG Ninewa, Diyala and Jazira - in fact, we are talking about the battle for Mosul. The casualties included the army, military police, peshmerga and al-Sahwa units. ISIS traditionally counts Shiite pro-Iranian proxies in a separate list, without mixing them with all the others. Here we are talking about a purely existential approach - this enemy ISIS denies the right to be considered an enemy, dehumanizing him to the level of animals. Actually, Shiites pay the same.
Russian Mi-28 near Palmyra
The Syrian experience of using military helicopters made it possible to find and work out new tactics for overcoming air defense systems, said Major General Oleg Chesnokov, head of combat training of the army aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
“The peculiarities of the use of army aviation in any local conflict, including now in Syria, are being carefully analyzed. Strengths and weaknesses are identified both in the training of flight personnel and in the operation of aviation equipment, depending on the geography of the tasks and the specifics of the situation. New tactics have been found and worked out to overcome enemy air defense systems and solve fire missions, ”he said.
Chesnokov added that on the basis of this analysis, recommendations for flight personnel are being developed at the Center for Combat Use of Army Aviation in Torzhok, which are sent to the troops and "taken into account in the course of further combat planned training," RIA Novosti reports.
In addition, he reported that newest modification helicopters Mi-28UB "Night Hunter" will begin to enter the Russian troops in 2017.
“Currently, prototypes of the Mi-28UB double-controlled helicopter with positive results have passed state tests", - said Chesnokov.
He explained that first the Mi-28UB will go to the 344th Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Army Aviation Flight Personnel in Torzhok, and then they will go to the combat aviation units of the Aerospace Forces.
“The experience of operating Mi-28N helicopters has shown the need to produce this type of helicopter with dual control, and now the pilots and instructors of the Torzhok Center have already been retrained for this modification,” added the Major General. Mi-28N "Night Hunter" (export version - Mi-28NE) is an attack helicopter designed to search and destroy tanks, armored and unarmored vehicles, as well as enemy infantry on the battlefield and low-speed air targets.
Chesnokov also said that Russian Helicopters had created a flying laboratory - a demonstrator of a promising high-speed helicopter. The main thing in the design of the PSV flying laboratory is the rotor blades. New constructive solutions during their creation allow increasing the maximum speed of the Mi-28 helicopter by 13%, and on the Mi-35 helicopters - by 30%. "
Flight tests are currently underway, in which an intermediate result has been obtained - "a level flight speed of 360 km / h was achieved in combination with a low level of vibration and loads on the structure of the flying laboratory," noted Chesnokov.
"The speed of PSV in comparison with the known models of attack helicopters will be increased 1.5 times to 400-500 km / h," he recalled.
More than 50 new helicopters, including the Ka-52 Alligator, Mi-28N Night Hunter, Mi-35, Mi-8AMTSh Terminator, Mi-26, Ansat-U, came from manufacturing plants in the army aviation unit for the first three quarters of the current year. More than 10 units of equipment will be delivered by the end of the year, reports TASS.
“All the events planned for the year, including exercises of army aviation units of various levels, aviation support for interspecific exercises, participation in international exercises and army games, mastering the newest samples of aviation equipment, improving flight skills by personnel, training young pilots, were carried out with a very good results, ”he said.
Last week, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that the operation in Syria exposed a number of design and production flaws in the Russian military equipment.
In mid-July, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, ordered by the end of the year to eliminate the shortcomings of Russian military equipment and weapons that were identified during the operation in Syria.
On April 14, during a direct line, Putin admitted that during the operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria, many shortcomings were revealed in Russian military equipment, but in general it showed itself brilliantly, which is why the demand for Russian weapons sharply increased abroad.
On May 11, presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov said that the main problem identified in the Russian Armed Forces during the operation in Syria was the operation of technology, this experience is being analyzed for its further improvement.
On May 12, Andrey Shibitov, Deputy General Director of Russian Helicopters for Production and Innovation, reported that the holding was coordinating with the Ministry of Defense a program for the modernization of combat helicopters based on the experience of their operation in Syria.
