Dates Afghanistan war 1979 1989. Afghan war. Southern territorial zone of military operations

The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events of the Cold War, which provoked a crisis of the communist system, and after it the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15 thousand Soviet military personnel, the appearance of several tens of thousands of young military invalids, aggravated the already severe socio-economic crisis in which the Soviet Union found itself in the second half of the 1970s, made the burden of military expenditures exorbitant for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.

The real reasons for the war were the inability Soviet leadership timely and correctly assess the major dynamic changes in the Greater Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, the emergence of adventurous regimes that relied on armed conflicts (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya) , economic polarization, population growth due to the younger generation, dissatisfied with their financial situation.

In the region, from the second half of the 1960s, new centers of influence, alliances and lines of tension began to form, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and the arms trade, which in abundance began to spread everywhere. The political divide in the region did not run along the “socialism-capitalism” axis, as Moscow mistakenly imagined, but along religious lines.

The introduction of troops and war could not be the answer to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow still viewed the Middle East region through the prism of its confrontation with the United States, as the arena of some kind of “big” zero-sum superpower game.

The Afghan crisis is an example of Moscow’s lack of understanding of its national interests, an incorrect assessment of the situation in the world, the region and in its own country, ideological narrow-mindedness, and political myopia.

In Afghanistan, the inadequacy of the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy with the real state of affairs in the world was revealed.

The middle and second half of the 1970s were marked by increased instability in the Middle East, which was a consequence of the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950s and 60s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the awakening of Islam. The year 1979 turned out to be especially turbulent: the leader of the Arab world, Egypt, concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, which causes a storm of indignation in the region; revolution in Iran brings ayatollahs to power; Saddam Hussein, who led Iraq, is looking for a reason for an armed conflict and finds it in the war with Iran; Syria, led by Assad (the elder), provokes a civil war in Lebanon, into which Iran is drawn; Libya, under the leadership of Gaddafi, sponsors various terrorist groups; The center-left government in Turkey resigns.

The situation in peripheral Afghanistan is also becoming radicalized. In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan came to power here, declaring its desire to build socialism. In the political language of that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a “client” of the USSR in anticipation of financial, economic and military assistance.

With Afghanistan Soviet Union good, even excellent relations since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendly ties with Soviet Russia. For all the decades that have passed since then, one cannot find in Soviet history mentioning Afghanistan in a negative context. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that it was in the informal sphere of influence of the USSR. The West tacitly recognized this fact and was never interested in Afghanistan. Even the change from monarchy to republic in 1973 as a result of a palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.

The April “revolution” of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. In Moscow, the leaders (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) and many participants in the coup were well known - they often visited the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Service) closely communicated with them and worked with them. foreign intelligence).

It seemed that Moscow had lost nothing from the regime change. However, the “socialists” repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, and repressive measures caused resistance from the population. Throughout 1978, the social base of the “socialists” steadily narrowed. Neighboring Iran and Pakistan took advantage of the situation and began sending groups of their military personnel in civilian clothes to Afghanistan, as well as supporting the opposition with weapons. China has shown activity. At the same time, the historical and previously existing contradictions between the leaders of the “socialists” intensified.

As a result, just a year later, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new government - it was on the verge of collapse. Only the capital and 2 more of the 34 provinces remained under its control.

March 18, 1979 Taraki in a long telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government A. Kosygin explains the current situation and persistently asks to send troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. pro-Soviet government. In every word of Taraki one can see despair, a consciousness of hopelessness. He returns every question from the Soviet leader to the same urgent request - send in troops.

For Kosygin, this conversation becomes a revelation. Despite a large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership are not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin is perplexed as to why you cannot defend yourself. Taraki admits that the regime has no support among the population. In response to Kosygin’s naive, ideologically driven proposals to rely on the “workers,” Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand of them. The Soviet prime minister proposes, as it seems to him, a reasonable solution: we will not give troops, but we will supply equipment and weapons to required quantity. Taraki explains to him that there is no one to control the tanks and planes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls the several hundred Afghan officers who were trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them went over to the side of the opposition, and mainly for religious reasons.

Shortly before Taraki, Amin called Moscow and told almost the same thing to the USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov.

On the same day, Kosygin informs his Politburo colleagues about the conversation that took place at a meeting specially convened for this purpose. Members of the Politburo express seemingly common-sense considerations: they underestimated the religious factor, the regime has a narrow social base, there is interference from Iran and Pakistan (and not the United States), the introduction of troops will mean a war with the population. It seems that there is a reason to review or at least adjust the policy in Afghanistan: start contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, find a common basis for reconciliation, form a coalition government, etc. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the more than strange line that Kosygin proposed to Taraki - they are ready to supply weapons and equipment (which there is no one to control), but we will not send in troops. Then the question had to be answered: what to do in the event of the imminent fall of the regime, which is what the regime itself warns about? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is transferred to the plane of wait-and-see and situational decisions. There is no strategy.

Three groups are gradually being identified in the Politburo: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, who, in the end, insist on the entry of troops, 2) Kosygin, who opposes this decision to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who silently or inactively support the entry troops. The sick Leonid Brezhnev rarely participates in Politburo meetings and has difficulty focusing on the problems that need to be solved. These people are members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, making relevant decisions.

Throughout the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin increased pressure on the Soviet leadership with requests to help with troops. The situation is becoming so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - the ambassador, representatives from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.

By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves, Taraki and Amin, was heating up. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Amin occurs in Kabul, as a result of which he seizes power and removes Taraki, who is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.

Since then, Moscow has set itself the goal of eliminating Amin, whom it does not trust, bringing “its” man, Karmal, to power and stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Amin gives reasons: realizing that his survival now depends only on himself, he enters into dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these in themselves reasonable actions, but carried out without coordination and secretly from the Soviet side, are viewed as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to remove Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.

Around October-November, issues of a special operation by Soviet forces against Amin are being worked out, the cover for which should be a second, parallel and subordinate operation to the first operation of introducing a “limited” contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be to ensure order in case of another miscalculation with Amin’s support among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul, all the main Soviet representatives, whose activities caused growing displeasure in the Kremlin, were replaced with new ones.

By December 1, the work on the issues is completed, and Andropov gives Brezhnev a note to this effect. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the deployment of troops is made.

Before the final decision was made, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. Ogarkov, actively resisted him. It came to the point of his open clashes and wrangling in raised voices with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogarkov pointed out that the army would have to go to war with the population without knowledge of traditions, without knowledge of the terrain, that all this would lead to guerrilla warfare and large losses, that these actions would weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogarkov warned about everything that eventually happened.

The operation began on December 25, 1979. On that day alone, 215 transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, Il-76) landed at Kabul airport, delivering the forces of about one division and a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of ground troops concentrated on the Soviet-Afghan border or crossing the border either on December 25 or in the following days. On December 27, Amin was removed and Babrak Karmal was brought to power. Troops gradually began to be brought in - more and more.

And the republican system was established. This was the impetus for the start of the civil war between various socio-political and nationalist forces in the country.

In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) came to power in Afghanistan. The radicalism of the new Afghan leadership, the hasty destruction of the centuries-old traditions of the people and the foundations of Islam, strengthened the population's resistance to the central government. The situation was complicated by foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USSR and some other countries provided assistance to the Afghan government, and NATO countries, Muslim states and China provided assistance to the opposition forces.

The commissioning and deployment of OKSV in the DRA began on December 25, 1979. By mid-January 1980, the introduction of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Three divisions (two motorized rifle and one airborne), an air assault brigade, two separate regiments and other units were introduced into Afghanistan.

Subsequently, the combat strength of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was constantly updated in order to strengthen it. The largest number of OKSV (1985) was 108.7 thousand people, including 73.6 thousand people in combat units. The composition of the OKSV mainly included: the command of the 40th Army, three motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, nine separate brigades and seven separate regiments, four front-line regiments and two army aviation regiments, as well as rear, medical, repair, construction and other units and divisions.

The general management of OKSV was carried out by the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was headed by Marshal of the USSR Sergei Sokolov, and since 1985 - Army General Valentin Varennikov. Direct control of the combat and daily activities of the OKSV was carried out by the commander of the 40th Army, subordinate to the command of the TurkVO troops.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded and defended national economic facilities, airfields, and roads vital for the country, and carried out transport convoys with cargo through the territory under the control of the armed opposition.

To reduce the military activity of the opposition, OKSV conducted active military operations of various scales using the entire arsenal of conventional weapons, and carried out air strikes on opposition bases. In accordance with the decision of the political leadership of the USSR, Soviet troops, in response to numerous attacks on their garrisons and transport columns by opposition units, began to carry out military operations together with Afghan units to search for and eliminate the most aggressive armed groups of the enemy. Thus, the Soviet troops brought into Afghanistan found themselves involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the country's government against the opposition forces, to whom Pakistan provided the greatest assistance.

The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activity conditionally divided into four stages.

Stage 1: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of protection of deployment points and various objects.

Stage 2: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and engineer units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

Stage 4: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

Even after the deployment of troops to Afghanistan, the USSR continued to look for opportunities political permission intra-Afghan conflict. Since August 1981, he tried to ensure the negotiation process of the DRA with Pakistan and Iran, and since April 1986, to promote a systemic policy of national reconciliation.

On April 14, 1988, in Geneva (Switzerland), representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA signed five fundamental documents on the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan. These agreements regulated the process of withdrawal of Soviet troops and declared international guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the republic, the obligations of which were assumed by the USSR and the USA. Deadlines for the withdrawal of Soviet troops were set: half of the limited contingent was withdrawn by August 15, 1988, the remaining units - after another six months.

On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of OKSV began, which was completed on February 15, 1989. The withdrawal of troops was led by the last commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

About 620 thousand military personnel completed military service in Afghanistan, including 525.2 thousand people in the OKSV.

The losses of the 40th Army personnel were: killed and killed - 13,833 people, including 1,979 officers and generals, wounded - 49,985 people. During the fighting on the territory of Afghanistan, in addition, 572 military personnel of state security agencies, 28 employees of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as 190 military advisers, including 145 officers, were killed. Due to injuries, 172 officers stopped serving in the Armed Forces. 6,669 Afghans became disabled, including 1,479 people disabled in the first group.

For military and other merits, over 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 86 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 28 of them posthumously.

(Additional

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1979-1989

Place

republic of afghanistan

Cause

Defense of the southern borders

Bottom line

Withdrawal of Soviet troops

Opponents

USSR DRA

Afghan Mujahideen Foreign Mujahideen

Commanders Strengths of the parties Losses

Various in scale, goals, composition of participants - ground, air-ground planned combined arms operations of units and formations of the 40th Army (Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan, OKSVA) during the Afghan War (1979-1989) involving significant forces and means.

Army, divisional, private (brigade, regiment, battalion), military operations were carried out by OKSVA units and formations in various provinces of Afghanistan, with the aim of stabilizing the military-political situation and strengthening state power DRA.

They began with a military operation in the Nahrin district of Baghlan province in early January 1980, where units of the 186th separate motorized rifle regiment, which had barely entered the DRA, suppressed an armed rebellion of the 4th artillery regiment of the DRA army.

• 1 Military operations in Afghanistan (1979-1989)
• 2 History and course of military operations
  • 2.1 Forces and means of military operations
  • 2.2 Nature and objectives of military operations
  • 2.3 The first military operation in Nahrin district. MUTINY OF THE ART REGIMENT
• 3 Types and scale of military operations
  • 3.1 Independent (private) military operations
  • 3.2 Joint military operations
• 4 Periods of military operations
  • 4.1 First period
  • 4.2 Second period
  • 4.3 Third period
  • 4.4 Fourth period
• 5 Combat activities of the Afghan Mujahideen
  • 5.1 Ambushes and raids
• 6 Territorial zones of military operations
  • 6.1 Northern territorial zone of military operations
  • 6.2 North-eastern territorial zone of military operations
  • 6.3 Western territorial zone of military operations
  • 6.4 Central territorial zone of military operations
  • 6.5 Eastern territorial zone of military operations
  • 6.6 South-eastern territorial zone of military operations
  • 6.7 Southern territorial zone of military operations
• 7 The most famous military operations of Soviet troops in Afghanistan
• 8 Areas of responsibility and deployment of OKSVA units and formations
  • 8.1 103rd Vitebsk Guards VDD
  • 8.2 108th Nevelskaya MSD
  • 8.3 5th Zimovnikovskaya Guards. MSD
  • 8.4 201st Gatchina MSD
  • 8.5 Separate brigades within OKSVA
  • 8.6 Individual regiments within OKSVA
  • 8.7 GRU special forces brigades
• 9 OKSVA military operations by year
  • 9.1 1979
  • 9.2 1980
  • 9.3 1981
  • 9.4 1982
  • 9.5 1983
  • 9.6 1984
  • 9.7 1985
  • 9.8 1986
  • 9.9 1987
  • 9.10 1988
  • 9.11 1989
• 10 Combined arms operations to capture fortified areas
• 11 See also
• 12 Notes
• 13 Links
• 14 Links

Military operations in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

“The research and improvement of forms of combat activity of the army occurred throughout the war. The following forms of combat activity of the 40th A finally emerged:

• conducting operations to defeat the most dangerous armed opposition groups;
• defense of communications, sensitive zones, important national economic facilities;
• ambush combat operations of units and subunits in the general system of surprise and covert attacks by army troops;
• combat operations to implement intelligence data by forces and means of the army on duty;
• combat operations to conduct convoys with material and technical means in particularly dangerous directions;
• covering the state border.

Analysis of the forms of combat activity, types of operations, methods of conducting them and defeating individual enemy groups made it possible to identify their structural and logical dependence. connection with the creation of large formations by the armed opposition, their improvement of methods of warfare, the use of unexpected tactics, effective ways combating aviation, mine warfare in the main areas of action of the 40th A, receiving automatic weapons, artillery systems, modern MANPADS and communications equipment, by the end of 1980 a qualitatively new form of combat activity of the 40th A began to take shape - the conduct of army operations.

The essence of operations 40-A to defeat particularly dangerous rebel groups was a combination of coordinated and interconnected:

Goals, objectives, area and time of combat and reconnaissance and search operations, strikes and maneuvers of formations and units of ground forces, aviation, missile forces and artillery, helicopter landings, outflanking, raid and assault detachments, armored groups, formations, formations and units of the Afghan army carried out both simultaneously and sequentially.

In scale, these could be either large-scale operations or military operations in a limited area. in turn, depending on the forces and means involved, it is advisable to divide the operations as follows.

Large-scale operations were divided to: independent combat operations; joint combat operations with formations, formations and units of the Afghan army; support for combat operations of associations and formations of the Afghan army.

Fighting in a limited area were divided into: private military operations; implementation of intelligence data; ambush and search and reconnaissance actions.

According to the nature of the hostilities, they were distinguished three types of operations:

1. air-ground to defeat large enemy groups and their base areas;
2. offensive with the aim of breaking through the enemy’s defenses and ensuring the combat activities of the encircled points of permanent deployment of formations and units of the 40th Army and Afghan troops;
3. defensive on main road directions, especially during the period of troop withdrawal.

Analysis of the operations performed made it possible to divide them into two types - planned and unscheduled. A total of 426 planned and 47 unplanned operations were performed. They differed from each other in tasks, methods and levels of planning, and the forces and means involved.

Planned operations - actions of troops to defeat large enemy groups, provided for in the combat plans of the army headquarters and the office of the chief military adviser in the armed forces of Afghanistan for a month, in large areas, with the involvement of significant forces and means, or for solving tasks that must be carried out within for a long time. In addition, in a war without a front line, the enemy created large armed detachments in the most important areas, the decision to destroy which must be made in short time in order to quickly disrupt the plans of the rebels.

Thus, unplanned operations are military operations to immediately destroy precisely identified enemy units, whose actions could lead to dangerous consequences. Due to the increase in the activity of the enemy, the role of unscheduled operations has increased, which required having formations and units in readiness capable of solving suddenly arising problems.

Experience shows that, according to the special conditions of conducting operations, it is advisable to divide them into operations in mountainous areas, operations in valleys with green and village zones, and operations in populated areas.

Independent combat operations were typical for the first period of the war, when the Afghan army had not yet been fully formed organizationally, the command and troops had no combat experience, and the personnel had low morale. At this stage, the troops of the 40th A had to bear the main burden of combat operations; the main efforts were concentrated on defeating rebel groups along the main communications, in the most threatened areas that make up the bases of the counter-revolutionary forces.

The increased activity of armed opposition formations, their better equipment, as well as the completion of the creation of the Afghan army made it possible to move on to joint operations in the second stage of the war.

Evolution of forms and methods of conducting combat operations of the OK SV (1980-1984) Joint military operations were carried out to defeat the largest enemy groups in the most important areas, in order to achieve more significant goals. They were carried out by formations and units of the OK North, the Afghan army together with units of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At first, combat operations were carried out in a certain area, with the mastery of which the goal of the action was achieved, then they took on the character of a small military operation.

Due to political changes in the general strategy of the opposition leadership in 1982, changes were made to the tactics of conducting armed struggle. The main efforts of the Afghan opposition were focused on maintaining and expanding the sphere of their territorial control. Work was actively carried out on the reorganization of armed formations based on the introduction of a clearer organizational structure, close to the army.

The current situation in the country required decisive action to eliminate the anti-government underground and destroy enemy units.

The 40th A, in cooperation with Afghan forces, conducted a number of large-scale planned and unplanned operations.

The most characteristic operations of the second stage were the Pandzher and Kunar operations.

In 1984, in connection with the decision by the opposition leadership not to reduce activity in the winter, a new approach to conducting joint large-scale operations was required. The average duration of the operation was about 10 days. The number of troops involved has increased from the 40th A (up to 30 battalions) and the RA Armed Forces (up to 19 battalions). The geography of military operations also expanded, their number in the green zone increased, and more military operations took place at night. An example of the most large-scale operations can be the operations carried out in the winter of 1984 in the province of Paktika (Urgun region), in the summer - in the Panjer and Andarab valleys.”

History and course of military operations

Forces and means of military operations

“The composition of forces and means for carrying out each operation was determined based on its scale, position, the nature of the enemy’s actions and the chosen method of defeating him, as well as the characteristics of the terrain. It was taken into account that the partisan nature of the actions of the armed opposition forces in the mountains required the involvement of much more forces and means than to perform the same task under normal conditions. This led to the participation in a number of operations of four or five or more combined arms formations and a number of units of various types of troops and special troops army"

Nature and objectives of military operations

“Due to the nature of the tasks being solved, the operations were carried out with the aim of defeating large enemy groups in areas controlled by them, protecting military and national economic facilities, ensuring the passage of transport convoys, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Operations to defeat large enemy groups in areas controlled by them were offensive in terms of the type of troop actions, although defensive actions could also be carried out in certain directions. In terms of organization and practical implementation, these operations were among the most complex. At the same time, the expenditure of effort and money was not always adequate to the results obtained. Nevertheless, the Soviet command, deprived of the opportunity to effectively influence the military-strategic situation in the country in other ways, was forced to carry out such operations."

The first military operation in Nahrin district. MUTINY OF THE ART REGIMENT

To suppress the anti-government protest of the 4th Artillery Regiment of the Afghan Armed Forces, the 2nd MSB of the 186th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment, reinforced by a tank company, an artillery division of the regiment, the 2nd MSB of the 1st MSB with a tank platoon and a mortar battery of the battalion were used.

On January 9, 1980 at 9.00 (local time) the battalion passed the starting point at elevation. 525.0 and began moving along the route: Kunduz airfield, Ishakun, Ishkashim, Burka, Nahrin. The 2nd MRR began moving at 11.00 on January 9, 1980 (two hours later) along the route: Baghlan, lane. Shehjamal, Nahrin.

The head marching outpost of the 2nd MSB, having passed 4 km after the starting point, was fired upon by a group of horsemen numbering 100 people. Those accompanying the column combat helicopters scattered the rebels. However, the matter did not end there. GPZ of the 2nd SME by 10.30 a.m. The village of Ishakchi met resistance from a group of rebels numbering up to 150 people. (with three guns), whose firing positions were located on the southern outskirts of Ishakchi. With organized fire from the GPZ, a tank platoon and with the support of helicopters, the rebels retreated into the mountains and suffered losses of up to 50 people. killed. All three rebel weapons were destroyed.

1. By 11.30 the 2nd MSR reached the Shekhjamal pass, where they encountered a blockade covered by a group of rebels with two mountain cannons. Having destroyed up to 15 soldiers and both guns, the company, having cleared the rubble, continued its advance.
2. By 15.00 on January 9, 1980, the GPZ of the 2nd MSB again met a group of horsemen numbering up to 50 people on the northern outskirts of Bourke. The company turned around and, together with an Afghan infantry company, attacked the rebels and by 16.00 reached the southern outskirts of Bourke. 17.00 The 2nd MSB reached the Tovamakh pass (3 km north of Nahrin), where it encountered a rubble. It was not possible to cross the pass straight away. Only after clearing the rubble the battalion continued its advance.
3. By this time, the 2nd MSR had reached the Avsari area. Without encountering resistance, the 2nd MRB from the north and the 2nd MSR from the west reached Nahrin by 21.00 and blocked the roads from the city, surrounding the military camp of the 4th AP of the Afghan Army. During the night, the units were in readiness in case of repelling an organized attack by the rebels of the 4th ap.
4. From 10.00 on 10.1 the artillery deployed to firing positions in readiness to open fire on the Afghan military camp. Under the cover of fire from combat helicopters, Soviet units in infantry fighting vehicles quickly moved to the barracks of the 4th AP, dismounted and disarmed the garrison.

The losses of the 4th artillery regiment were: up to 100 people killed, 7 guns and 5 vehicles destroyed. Losses of Soviet troops: killed - 2 people, wounded - 2 people, one infantry fighting vehicle fell into a cliff at the pass. Trophies: 76 mm guns – 15 pcs., ammunition for 76 mm guns – 500 boxes, for 122 mm howitzers – 75 boxes, for 82 mm mortars – 60 boxes, cars – 20, armored personnel carriers – 2, 57 mm guns – 3 pcs.

The suppression of the rebellion in the city of Nahrin, Baghlan province, was the first organized battle of the 40th Army in the almost ten-year Afghan War (1979-1989).

Types and scale of military operations

“To solve large-scale problems of armed struggle, the command of the 40th Army prepared and carried out combined arms operations. According to the nationality of the troops involved, they were divided into independent and joint, and according to the number of forces and means - into army and private.”

Independent (private) military operations

“At the same time, during the war, small-scale private operations often took place. To carry them out, by decision of the army command, part of the forces of one or more combined arms formations, reinforced by units and subunits of the military branches and special troops of army subordination, was involved. In addition, aviation was widely used in operations of all sizes. Its quantity was determined depending on the areas where enemy targets were located, the state of its air defense, the time of year and day.

Independent operations were especially common in the second period of the war. They were carried out exclusively by the troops of the 40th Army according to plans and under the leadership of its command. In total, during the stay of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, about 220 independent operations were carried out."

Joint military operations

“To solve large-scale problems of armed struggle, the command of the 40th Army prepared and carried out combined arms operations. According to the nationality of the troops involved, they were divided into independent and joint, and according to the number of forces and means - into army and private.

Joint Operations were widely practiced in the third and fourth periods of the war. They were carried out according to plans developed by the Soviet command, but with the participation of not only Soviet, but also Afghan government troops. In total, more than 400 such operations were carried out during the war in Afghanistan.

Based on the nature of the military-political tasks being solved and the characteristics of the armed struggle, the combat operations of Soviet troops in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into four periods.”

Periods of military operations

First period

“Based on the nature of the military-political tasks being solved and the characteristics of the armed struggle, the military operations of Soviet troops in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into four periods. The first period (December 1979 - February 1980) included the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of security and defense of permanent deployment points and the most important military-economic facilities, as well as the conduct of combat operations to ensure solutions to these problems.

The first period (December 1979 - February 1980) included the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of security and defense of permanent deployment points and the most important military-economic facilities, as well as the conduct of combat operations to ensure solving these problems... The winter of 1980 was difficult for Soviet soldiers. The hopes that the main tasks of the armed struggle against the opposition would be carried out by the Afghan army were not justified. Despite a number of measures to increase its combat readiness, the government army remained weak and incapable of combat. Therefore, Soviet troops bore the brunt of the fight against armed opposition units. The rebel formations acted against the Soviet troops with relatively large forces and did not shy away from direct conflict with them. This made it possible to defeat large counter-revolutionary groups in the areas of Faizabad, Taliqan, Takhar, Baghlan, Jalalabad and other cities.”

Second period

“The second period of OKSV’s stay in Afghanistan (March 1980 - April 1985) is characterized by the introduction of active large-scale combat operations mainly on its own, as well as together with Afghan formations and units....The opposition, having suffered a number of major military defeats in the first period war, moved the main groups of its troops to inaccessible mountainous areas, where to use modern technology it became almost impossible... In addition, they skillfully began to hide among the local population. The rebels skillfully used various tactics. Thus, when meeting with superior forces of Soviet troops, they, as a rule, avoided battle.

The rebels skillfully used various tactics. Thus, when meeting with superior forces of Soviet troops, they, as a rule, avoided battle. At the same time, the dushmans did not miss the opportunity to strike a sudden blow, mainly using small forces. In fact, during this period, armed opposition units abandoned positional warfare and maneuver actions were widely used. And only in those cases when the situation forced it, battles were fought. This happened during the defense of bases and base areas, or when the rebels were blocked and had no choice but to take the fight. In this case, the blocked units engaged in close combat, which practically excluded the use of aviation and sharply narrowed the possibilities for using artillery, especially from indirect fire positions.”

Third period

“In the third period of their stay in Afghanistan (April 1985 - January 1986), the troops of the 40th Army set out with the largest number of troops. Their ground force grouping included four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments and six separate battalions. These forces included about 29 thousand units of military equipment, of which up to 6 thousand were tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles. To support air operations, the commander had four aviation and three helicopter regiments at his disposal. The total number of OKSV personnel reached 108.8 thousand people, including 73 thousand in combat units. This was the most combat-ready group for the entire period of Soviet troops’ stay in Afghanistan, but views on their use have changed significantly.”

The fourth period

“The fourth period began in December 1986 with the Extraordinary Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee, which proclaimed a course towards national reconciliation. By this time, it became clear to sensible people that there was no military solution to the Afghan problem. The adoption of the course of “national reconciliation” reflected the real situation in the country, when it was impossible to achieve an end to the war by military means. However, the implementation of the policy of reconciliation became possible only after a whole set of preliminary measures were carried out at the initiative of the Soviet Union, which created the necessary ground for this. The main and decisive step was the decision of the USSR government, agreed with the Afghan leadership, to begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, subject to the cessation of armed assistance to the Afghan rebels from Pakistan and other countries.”

Combat activities of the Afghan Mujahideen

“The main force of the rebels were regional groups and detachments. Their goals organizational forms and the tactics of combat operations were determined by local tribal and religious authorities - “field commanders”, and the zone of action was limited to areas where the Mujahideen lived. These formations, as a rule, did not have a permanent composition and organization. In case of danger, the dushmans disappeared among the local residents, which made their identification almost impossible. The composition of detachments and groups in socio-ethnic terms was heterogeneous. Such formations included residents of the same national-ethnic group. In most cases, their commanders did not have constant contact with foreign organizations of the Afghan counter-revolution, but the main advantage was the active support of the local population.”

“During the armed struggle, opposition forces used various methods of combat operations, the main ones being ambushes, raids, and shelling. Mining, sabotage and terrorist activities, and military operations related to the escort of caravans were also widely practiced. The ambush operations were carried out with the aim of disrupting the supply of national economic and military cargo, seizing material assets, weapons, ammunition, as well as the physical destruction of military personnel. Cases of their device were especially frequent.”

Ambushes and raids

“The ambush was most often carried out by a small group of 10-15 people. Its battle formation consisted of observers and three or four subgroups. Observers created observation posts in the mountains or moved to the likely routes of enemy columns. In the latter case, they did not have weapons and pretended to be civilians (shepherds, peasants). There have been cases of children being used as observers.”

“The basis of the ambush was a fire subgroup, which included the main forces and fire weapons of the dushmans. It was usually located in the center order of battle in close proximity to the enemy's affected area and was carefully camouflaged. The rebels were usually located along the road at a distance of 150 to 300 m from the roadway. On the flanks there were grenade launchers, machine gunners, and snipers. At commanding heights, DShKs were installed, capable of firing at ground and air targets.”

“So, in just three years (from 1985 to 1987) more than 10 thousand ambushes were recorded. Ambushes, as a rule, were set up on roads passing through passes, gorges and other narrownesses. In the mountains, ambush positions were set up on slopes or on the ridges of heights, the entrance or exit from the gorge, on pass sections of roads. “green zones" they were organized in places where government and Soviet troops were likely to rest or in the directions of their expected actions. At the same time, defeat was inflicted by fire from both the front and the flanks. place of ambush, which were set up at several lines as troops advanced both in columns and in battle formations. In populated areas, ambushes were carried out behind adobe fences, in houses in such a way as to lure the enemy into a “fire bag” by deceptive actions.

Territorial zones of military operations

Excerpts from Valentin Runov’s book “The Afghan War. All combat operations":

“Due to the nature of the tasks being solved, the operations were carried out with the aim of defeating large enemy groups in areas controlled by them, protecting military and national economic facilities, ensuring the passage of transport convoys, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.”

“There were frequent actions by formations and units in their areas of responsibility. This method was used in cases where the enemy group was located over a large territory in relatively small detachments occupying populated areas, gorges, and mountains, which did not allow it to be encircled. Then the entire region was divided into zones, in each of which a division or regiment operated independently. Aviation at this time, according to the commander’s plan, provided support to those troops that needed it most, and also blocked the entire area of ​​​​operation.”

“The entire combat zone in Afghanistan was conditionally divided into four areas, which were controlled by army aviation units and partly by troops:

• In the north of the country these are areas of the cities: Kunduz, Khanabad, Faizabad, Puli-Khumri, Tashkurgan, Mazar-i-Sharif
• In the east: Khost, Asabad, Jalalabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Kabul, Bagram
• In the south: Munarai, eastern and southern border area with Pakistan, Kandahar, Lashkar Gah
• In the west - the regions: Faraha, Shindanda and Herat"

Northern territorial zone of military operations

Provinces, counties, surrounding cities and settlements provinces Democratic Republic Afghanistan - the zone of the most active confrontation between the armed Afghan opposition (Afghan Mujahideen) and the Limited contingent of Soviet troops during the period (1979-1989)

"Northern territorial zone"- includes the provinces: Balkh, Samangan, Sari-Pul, Faryab, Jawzjan

• Balkh: Alburz, Kaflandara, Chashmayi-Shafa, Marmol, Dzhangali, Alakjar, Baghi-Pakhlavan, Kuland, Kurbaka-khana, Baluchi, Sari-Asia, Khoja-Iskander, Tajikoilton, Agarsay (Agirsai), Tashkanda, Alagan, Dakhnayi-Karnai , Sari-Mang, Paykamdara, Tangimarmol, Kishinda-Payin, Toragai, Julga, Akkupruk, Bogosht, Chashmayi-Soval, Bauragai, Baygizi, Balanddarik, Tukzar, Langari-Shah-Abdullah, Navabad, Sokhtayi-Sufla, Bayramshah, Shorcha, Mui -Mutorak et al.
• Samangan: Tashkurgan, Aibak, Naibabad, Akmazar, Lorgan, Daulatabad (Davlatabad), Pirnakhchir, Dehi-Nau, Darayi-Suf, Kuli-Ishan, Rabotak, Daulati-Koh (Kuh), Khojapraishan, Sayad, Chakmakli, Kokjar, Hasankheil, Kokhnasamangan-Kalan, Juyi-Zindan, Mangtash, Zorget, Chogai, Sheikhala, Kochnehal, Kokjar, Delhaki, etc.
• Faryab, Jawzjan: Andkhoy, Zarshoy, Karamkul, Charmgarkhana, Belchirag, Katakala, Babavali, Kaisar, Darband, Darzab (Derzab), Mugul, Sardara, Belarsay, Tirgali, Pirgarib, Almar, Dzhigilda, Khoja Pogakli, Baragani-Kalan, Khojadokoh ( Khojadokukh), Akcha, Haval, Pasnay, Khanedan, Gandzhia, Jargan, Dekhi-Surkh, Bedistan, etc.

“Northern territorial zone” - the territories of the so-called lands: “Afghan Turkestan” and “Hazarjat”. The peoples inhabiting this territory have historical, cultural, and family ties with the peoples of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics. Populated by: Tajiks (majority); Uzbeks (tribes: Kattagans, Sarais, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais, Durmens, Mings, Yuzes, Barlases, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kanglys, Chagatais, etc.); Hazaras - (in equal shares); Pashtuns (at different times settled by Afghan rulers - tribes: Shinvari, Safi, Mangal, Salarzai, Jaji, Chitrali, Turi, Afridi, etc.); Turkmens (tribes: Ersar(s), Ali-Eli, Saryka, Salors, Tekins); also Kazakhs; Arabs, etc.

North-eastern territorial zone of military operations

"North-eastern territorial zone" includes the provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Badakhshan

• Kunduz: Kunduz, Chahardara (Chardara), Madrasa, Aliabad, Khanabad, Mullah Ghulam, Bala Hisar, Imam Sahib, Dasht-i-Archi, Asiaabad, Qalai-i-Zal, Alchin, Zaheil, Isahail, Katahail, Alikheil , Chugayi-Sufla, Umarkheil, Mullaheil, Mahajirin (Makhidzhirin), Ibrahimheil, Chinzai, Musazai, Kulabi, Jangalbash, Murshek, Chimtana, Arab, Arabha, Khushka-Dara, Dara-e-Bachi, Dam-e-Yankala, Basiz, Kubak, Derzan, Tundai-Kalai, Kyzyltash, Munkhesh, Shinkamysh, Begalak, Dzhunguli, Khojapista, Garuchi, Chaharsavi, Abaka, Shah-Ali, etc.
• Baghlan: Nahrin, Banu, Chaugani, Logaryan, Fuloli, Shafiheil, Lakanheil, Tarakheyl, Burka, Seyid, Khost-O-Fereng, Shamark, Andarab, Malhan, Doshi, Khinjan, Buzdara, Tilkhana, Dakhana-Gori, Lagai, Baghlan- i-Jadid et al.
• Takhar (aka Takhor): Talukan (Talikan, Tulukan, Talekan), Bangi, Chakh Ab (Chakhi Ab), Varsaj, Dargad, Khazar Sumuch, Chal, Majir, Mugul, Ishkamysh, Farhar, Nahrin, Mirheil, Shastdara, Yafsaj, Jarav, Dehmiran, Yangi Kala, Kalafgan, Darra-Kalan, Khojagar, Khavadshah Bahaudin (Khoja Bakhautdin), Balajari, Lashi-Javayi, Chinzai, Ishanan, Shafak, Gaoharsang, Zardalu-Darai-Pine and others.
• Badakhshan: Faizabad, Kishim, Baharak, Shaesta, Yavarzan, Balajara, Ishkashim, Kufab, Saygan, Zardev, Varzhdud, Gulkhana, Artynjilau, Rustak, Pasha-Dara, Busht, Dahan-Spingav, Mangu, Gavaki, Dekhi-Basi, Gorji, Suskan, Uzunkul, Tashnap, Gurisang, Vojib, Porani, Karamugul (Karamugol), Guzyk-Dara, Baghi-Shah, etc.

"North-eastern territorial zone", historically - the lands of "Kattagan and Badakhshan". Populated by: Tajiks (evenly distributed); Pashtuns - mainly in the provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan (tribes - Ghilzai, Shinwari, Safi, Mangal, Salarzai, Jaji, Chitrali, Turi, Afridi, etc.); Uzbeks - mainly in the provinces: Takhar, Kunduz (tribes: Kattagans, Sarais, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais, Durmens, Mings, Yuzes, Barlas, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naiman, Kangly, Chagatai, etc.); Hazaras - in the provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan; also by Arabs; pashay; Kazakhs in the provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan. Badakhshan provinces live: Ismaili Tajiks; various Pamir peoples: Rushans (Rykhen, Rukhni), Ishkashims (Ishkoshumi, Ishkoshimi), Wakhans (Wakhi, Khik), Sanglits, Zebaks, Munjans, Shugnans (Khugni), Darvazians, etc.; Afghan Kyrgyz live in the highlands of the extreme northeast of Afghanistan in the area (Wakhan corridor) of the same province.

In the period from the beginning of 1918 to the beginning of the 1940s, the districts of the provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, Faryab, Badghis were an outpost and transshipment base for thousands of armed formations of the Basmachi and their leaders “kurbashi” - Ibrahim-Bek, Madamin-Bek, Muetdin-bek, Mahmud-bek, Junaid-khan, Utan-Bek, Kurshirmata, Abdul Ahad Kara, Katta Ergasha, Kichik Ergasha, Seyid-Mubashir-Khan Tirazi, Enver-Pasha, Jafar-Khan, D.Sardar, Nurmamad, Kizil -Ayaka and others, during the long-term armed confrontation, the Basmachi detachments were either destroyed or pushed out by detachments of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army beyond the borders of "Red Turkestan" into adjacent territories - into the Emirate of Afghanistan. A significant part of the survivors - active, irreconcilable members of the Basmachi movement - settled in the districts of the northeastern provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan and integrated into Afghan society. in the early 1990s, strongholds and transit bases of the “irreconcilable Tajik opposition” were located in this territory.

Western territorial zone of military operations

"Western territorial zone" includes the provinces: Herat, Badghis, Ghor, Farah - (it also includes: northwestern, southwestern parts of Afghanistan)

• Herat: Herat, Shindand, Sharshari, Karwangah, Siyah-Kort, Zinjan, Cherdobag, Sangi-Syah, Amrud, Dargara, Karyani, Bartakht, Khushnak, Karezi-Ilyas, Islamkala, Adraskan, Rabati-Mirza, Karyayi-Gukhar, Kafasan, Khoja-Galten, Tangitanchi, Toragundi (Turagundi), Karakishyan, Takhti-Safar, Shevan, Karukh, etc.
• Badghis: Kalai-Nau et al.
• Gor (aka Gur): Surkhakan, Chagcharan, Pasaband, etc.
• Farah: Anardara, Bidikash, Lurkoh, Farakhrud, Kohi-Yakadara, Suji (Sudzhik), Khaki-Safed, Tarnakrud, Khuji, Kale-Amoni, etc.

“Western territorial zone”, historically - the lands of the Persian “Khorasan”, a territory that was previously part of the Persian Empire. Populated primarily by Tajiks (some of whom are Shiites), there are also Farsivans (Persians), Charaimaks, Pashtuns (tribes: Nurzais, Achakzais, Isakzais, etc.); qizilbashi; Afshars; Turkmens (tribes: Ersar(s), Ali-Eli, Saryka, Salors, Tekins); Uzbeks (tribes: Kattagans, Sarais, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais, Durmens, Mings, Yuzes, Barlases, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kanglys, Chagatais, etc.); Hazaras; Talysh; Kurds; firuzkuhi; teymuri; taymon; Jamshids, etc. The population of this region has ancient historical and cultural ties with neighboring Iran. For many years, the Iranian government has provided political and financial support to the region.

Central territorial zone of military operations

"Central Territorial Zone" includes the provinces: Kabul, Wardak

• Kabul, Wardak: Kabul, Kattaheil, Jun-Zindan, Qala Atamukhamed-Khan, Paghman, Surubi, Mirbachakot, Maidanshahr, Shamali, Shakardara, Karabag, Mukur, Yakdara, Istalif, Guldar, Sarpul (Surpul), Hosseinkot, Kofi-Safi, Kuz-Myakheil, Hayrad-khana, Dehsabab (Dehsaba), Husseinheil, Mizan, Wah, Waka, Sheikhabad, Saidabad, Mahalla, Karezi-Mir, Dehi-Kazi, Dehi-Sabz, Luku, Chakhorasiab, Cha-Khordegi, etc.

The “Central Territorial Zone” is populated by: Tajiks (the majority), Pashtuns of the “Ghilzai” and “Karlani” tribal unions, Hazaras, Qizilbash, Indians, etc. The outskirts of Kabul and the Wardak province are also inhabited by Pashtun tribes: Dotani, Mullahail, Babrakhail, etc.

"Central territorial zone, including the Panjshir Gorge" includes the provinces: Bamyan, Parwan, Panjshir, Kapisa (places of compact residence of Panjshir Tajiks Panjshir - Afghan Panjeri) and Hazaras (Khazars) - Bamyan, the historical and cultural capital of the Hazaras, the so-called “Hazarjat”.

• Bamyan: Sokhdara, Bamiyan, Qalain-Talib, Lalahail, Sheray, Taibouti, Kalai-Mulla, Dehi-Hazara, Duabi, Munara, Hawal, Selkash, Chahardeh, Munari, Shashpul, Akhangaran, etc., inhabited by Hazaras (Afghan Hazaras) .
• Parwan; Jabal-Us-Sarraj, Charikar, Bagram, Durmala, Shinaraheil, Karabakh, Qatali, Ayeli-Kazi, Dilak, Dani-Rivat, Qalatan (Kalatak), Astana, Gyakhheil, Sangsulak, Khijani-Belandi, Ferenjal, Kishi-Charikar, Dekhinau , Naddeh and others, inhabited by: Tajiks, Hazaras, Pashtuns (tribes: Shinwari, Ahmadzai, Momand).
• Panjshir: Ghorband, Rukha, Bazarak, Hazara, Shutul, Pishgor, Pasi-Shahi-Mardan, Anawa, Mahmudraki, Gulbahar (Gulbahor), Dehi-Hazara, Kijol, Pini, Piavusht, Taveh (the administrative and spiritual center of the Hazaras and others inhabited by Panjshir Tajiks (Afghan "Panjsheri"), partly Hazaras.
• Kapisa: Nijrab, Shatori, Tagat, Hasankhanheil, Hisarab, etc., populated by: Tajiks, Sunni Hazaras, Pashtuns, etc.

Eastern territorial zone of military operations

"Eastern territorial zone" includes the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman

• Nangarhar: Hisar, Parachinar, Khyber, Narai, Marulgad, Saidoni-Fuvladi, Shibokan, Aukaf, Birinjau, Mamaheil, Bandu, Hada, Ada, Charbagh, Huwaizi, Shakidan, etc., inhabited by Pashtun tribes: Mohmand, Khugyani, Orakzai, Masud , Vaziri, Zaimukhti, Bajauri, Diri, Swat, Bunerami, Shinwari, Afridi, etc.
• Kunar: Asadabad, Asmar, Ganjgal, Sangam, Daridam, Pajigal, Maravara, Birkot, Khara, Votapur, Perone, Shamirkot, Cognac, Shawl, Gola, Bar-Narang, Sarkani, Damdara, Shpelai, Bargundai, Loya-Bacha, Dalikandao, Mukur, Bar-Mangish, Alatrol, Zangboshakhuna, Vutolanta-Gai, Tangai, Shahid, Mangwal, Sarband, Shaunkrai, Shigal, Binshaikandao, Lobkam, Kacha, Nava, Spinatsuka, Baruga, Janshagal and others.
• Laghman: Alishang, Mehterlam, Surkhrud, Rodbor, Birkot, Khairokheil, Sangi-Daulatkhan, Shahidan, Shahi, Shukundurbab, etc.

The “Eastern territorial zone” is inhabited by tribes of the Pashtun union Karlani (Karrani), the largest of which is the Safi tribe (Gandari clan), also by the tribes: Mohmand, Gigiani, Shinvari, Khugyani, Tarklani, Myshvani, Sarkani, Safi, Vaziri, etc.; various Nuristani peoples. This territory has always been a zone of absolute influence of the Pashtun tribes - historically using their geographical location for military and economic purposes from the times of “Western India” and the Anglo-Afghan wars to the present day.

South-eastern territorial zone of military operations

"Southeastern territorial zone" includes the provinces: Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Zabul

• Ghazni: Kunsaf, Kulidjana, Auqaf, Birinjau, Bandu, Mamheil, Sheikhabad, Duranay, Drusarugar, Abdara, Durinay, Wuluswali, Safedsanga, etc.
• Logar: Baraki-Barak, Dubandai, Dehi-Manaka, Wagjal, Chaunay, Vali-Sufla, Nave-Kala, Charkh, Mazgin, Aushar, Abchakan, Tandan, Dobari, Kalabahadur, Gardezheilutir, Bedak, Surkhob (Surhab), Sepest, Naikaray , Altamur, Mulla-Bahadur, Shikarkaladak, Muhameddaga, Kalatajkhan, Mamaheil, Puli-Alam, etc.
• Paktia: Gardez, Muhammadaga, Chamkani, Shaboheil, Aliheil, Daj, Sufla, Urgun, Kvash, Nazarjay, Gurbaz, Barankalai, Safidsang, Padhabi-Shana, Shasti-Saidabad, Puli-Kandahari, etc.
• Paktika and Khost: Vazakhvay et al.
• Zabul (aka Zabol): Kalat, Jilavur, Loy Manar, Shukurkalai, Apushello, Shekude, Duri, etc.

The “Southeastern territorial zone” is inhabited by Pashtuns of two large tribal unions: The first is “Ghilzai”, which includes: Suleimanheil, Kharoti, Khatoki, Tokhi, Nasir, etc. The second is “Karrani” (Karlani), which includes: Jadran, Jaji, Tani, Waziri, etc. The Pashtun tribes inhabiting the territories of the provinces: Paktika, Paktia, Khost, Zabul include the tribal union "Karlani" (Karlanri, Karrani), consisting of the tribes - Jaji, Jadran, Mangal, Makbil, Chamkani, Vaziri, Gurbuzi , Mandozai, Sabri, Thani, Turi, Orakzai, Shinwari, Khugyani, etc. Tribes: Orakzai, Shinwari, Khugyani, also belonging to the Karlani union, live mainly in the “Eastern Territorial Zone” in the provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar. The territory of Kalat-i Ghilzai, the Ghazni-Kandahar plateau is the place of traditional settlement of the “Pashtun-Ghilzais” of the tribal “Hotaki clan”, the territories to the north are inhabited by the tribes of “Pashtun-Ghilzais”: Tokhi, Kharoti (Kharuti), Taraki, Andari, Suleimankhail, Ahmadzai and in other provinces of Ghazni and Logar there are settlements of Pashtun tribes: Dotani, Mullaheil, Babrakheil, etc. Ormuri and Parachi also live, and in other provinces of Ghazni and Paktia many Uzbeks live (tribes: Kattagans, Sarais, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais , Durmens, Mings, Yuzes, Barlases, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kanglys, Chagatays, etc.).

This territory, as well as the “Eastern Territorial Zone”, has always been a zone of absolute influence of the mountain Pashtun tribes - historically using their geographical location for military and economic purposes since the times of “Western India” and the Anglo-Afghan wars to this day.

Southern territorial zone of military operations

"Southern Territorial Zone" includes the provinces: Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan - (it also includes the southwestern part of Afghanistan)

• Kandahar: Kandahar, Nagahan, Sinjaray, Santaray, Shinaray, Torshikot, Mahajiri, Spinehun-Tana, Payi Mulu, Islamdara, Khusravi-Sufla, Gundshan, Kishkinahud, Nagahan, Mahajiri, Spinehun-Tana, Spinbuldak, Spinahula, Anizani, Anizamal, Arghandab , Haji-Razmuhammed, Pasab, Palmukhamed, Zakiri-Sharif, Kara, Gulyamuddinhan and others.
• Nimroz: Dilaram, Bagar, Karyati-Chara, Kotalak, Chakhansur, Khushhadir, etc.
• Helmand (aka Helmand): Girishk, Lashkargah, Kajaki-Sufla, Shinkarai, Nikazi, Sangin, Musa-Qala, etc.

The “Southern Territorial Zone” is inhabited by Pashtuns of two large tribal unions, one of which is “Durrani” or (Abdali). It consists of two branches - "Zirak", tribes: Popalzai, Sadozai, Alikozai, Barakzai, Muhammadzai, Achakzai; and also the “Panjpai” branch: Nurzai, Alizai, Ishakzai, it includes: Mohamedzai, Yusufzai, Nurzai, etc.... The second major tribal union is the Ghilzai. It consists of branches - “Turan”, it includes the tribes: Hotaki, Tokhi (Toki), Haroti (Kharuti), Nasir (Nasir);…..And “Burkhan”, it consists of the tribes: Ibrahimheil, Suleimanheil, Aliheil, Sahak, Andarheil, Nasar, Tarakheyl, etc.; also the “Musa” branch, consists of the tribes: Ahmadzai, Andar, Taraki, Sahak, etc. The south of Afghanistan is also inhabited by: Baluchis, Brahuis, Qizilbashs, Tajiks, Afshars, Hazaras, etc. This territory has always been a zone of absolute influence of Pashtun tribes Durrani and Ghilzai - historically using their geographical location for military and economic purposes from the times of "Western India" to the present day.

Notable military operations- “Mountains-80”, “Spring-80”, “Autumn-80”, “Strike-1,2”, “Volley”, “Maneuver”, “Trap”, Operation “Highway”, “Granite”, “Thunderstorm” "(in the province of Ghazni), "Jawara", "South" (Kandahar), "Typhoon", etc.

Memoirs of Army General V.I. Varennikov about military operations carried out :

During my stay in Afghanistan, a number of interesting and complex operations were carried out. Of course, the operation of the operation is discord. Some left no memories. Others will never fade. Particularly memorable for me are the operations in the Kunar Gorge, during the assault on the Javara base, on the Parachinar ledge, in the Kunduz region, west of Herat to the Kokari-Sharshari base on the Iranian border in the Lurkoh mountain range, in the Lashkar Gah region, in the province of Kandahar and directly beyond Kandahar .

From the memoirs of Army General V.I. Varennikov.

The result of “major combined arms operations” was the defeat of numerous well-organized formations of the Afghan Mujahideen throughout Afghanistan, the capture of important strongholds (fortifications) and transshipment bases, with a wide arsenal of weapons, ammunition and intelligence documentation.

Areas of responsibility and deployment of OKSVA units and formations

Government tasks to protect the southern borders of the USSR and provide international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan by a limited contingent of Soviet troops were carried out to a greater extent by the forces and means of the following units and formations:

• DIVISIONS: three “motorized rifle”, one “airborne”
• SEPARATE BRIGADES: two separate motorized rifle, one air assault, (since 1985) two special purpose GRU General Staff, material support
• SEPARATE REGIMENTS: two motorized rifle, one parachute, one engineer, one rocket artillery
• REGIMENTS and SQUADRILS of Air Force units OKSVA and KSAPO

The deployment of formations on the territory of the DRA assigned each zone of responsibility, taking into account the characteristics (section) of the terrain, the concentration of military tension, and the political and military tasks at hand.

“In connection with the transition of the rebels to constant tactics of sabotage, terror, shelling of troops, capture of outposts, formations and units of the 40th A were forced to defend the most important communications connecting Afghanistan with the territory of the USSR: Termez-Kabul-Jalalabad; Kushka-Herat-Kandahar; Mazar-i-Sharif-Kunduz-Fayzabad with a total length of more than 2 thousand km. The purpose of the defense of communications was to defeat rebel groups along the road, disrupt their sabotage, and ensure the unhindered movement of Soviet and Afghan columns. The defense was carried out by divisions, regiments, battalions and companies. The zone of responsibility in defense was along the front: 108 MSD - 420 km; 5 MSD - 640 km; 201 MSD – 400 km. The battalions defended an area on average of 30-40 km. Thus, the defense front of the 177th MRR of the 108th MRD in a particularly dangerous section of the Salang Pass was up to 120 km. In total, the defense of communications and sensitive zones was carried out by about 1,000 outposts set up by formations, units and subunits of the 40th Army.”

103rd Vitebsk Guards VDD

The capital of Afghanistan - the city of Kabul, the airport, airfield, and other strategic objects of the capital were assigned to the 103rd Guards Vitebsk Airborne Division (Guards Paratroops: 317th, 350th, 357th; 1179th Guards Artillery - airborne regiments and other parts of the division).

In various periods from 1979-1989, the forces and assets of the 2nd and 3rd (PDB) parachute battalions of the 103rd Guards units. The airborne forces were stationed at a distance from the main forces' PPD - in the Afghan provinces:

• Panjshir (Anawa) - 2nd PDB 345th OPDP
• Bamiyan 2nd RPD - 345th OPDP, 357th RPD
• Kandahar 3rd PDB 317th RPD from 03.1980-03.1981, later transferred to Dilaram, then to Lashkar Gah
• From Lashkar Gah, Helmand province, the 3rd PDB of the 317th PDP was redeployed to Shahjoy, Zabul province from 03.1985
• In Helmand (Girishk), the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the 350th Infantry Division was also stationed

The control of these PDBs during large-scale planned combined arms operations in the areas of the provinces: Farah, Helmand, Kandahar was carried out under the general control of the commanders of the formations of the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division and the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade and close interaction of troops.

Units of the 103rd Guards. Airborne Forces (Kabul) participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from the points of permanent deployment in the provinces: Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, etc. in divisional and private combat operations and raids, in implementation of intelligence data and ambush operations in the immediate area of ​​​​responsibility (Kabul, Parwan, Panjshir, Kapisa, etc.).

108th Nevelskaya MSD

The 108th Nevelsk Motorized Rifle Division is the largest formation of OKSVA: motorized rifle (MSR):

• 177th (Jabal UsSarraj);
• 180th (Kabul) - reserve of the 40th Army; 181st (Kabul);
• 682nd (Rukha, formed on the basis of the 285th tank regiment);
• 1074th Artillery - regiments,
• The 781st separate reconnaissance battalion and other parts of the division were responsible for the situation: around Kabul, Bagram, in the area of ​​“South Salang”, “Panjshir Gorge”, on the routes: “Jabal Us-Sarraj - Kabul”, “Kabul - Jalalabad” ( Provinces: Parwan, Kapisa, Wardak

Units of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division (Bagram) participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from permanent deployment points, in the provinces: Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan and others, in divisional and private combat operations and raids, in the implementation of intelligence data and ambush operations in the immediate area of ​​​​responsibility, provinces: Kabul, Wardak, Parwan, Panjshir, Kapisa, etc.

5th Zimovnikovskaya Guards MSD

5th Guards Zimovnikovskaya Motorized Rifle Division:

• 101st (Herat),
• 371st (Shindand) - guards
• 12th (Herat) motorized rifle
• 1060th Artillery (Shindand) - regiments
• The 650th separate reconnaissance battalion and other units of the division ensured control over the military situation in western Afghanistan, the border with Iran (provinces: Badghis, Herat, Farah, Helmand), including on the route: “Kushka - Herat - Shindand - Kandahar”

Units of the 5th Guards. MSD (Shindand) participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from points of permanent deployment, in the provinces of Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, in divisional and private combat operations and raids, in the implementation of intelligence data and ambush operations in the immediate area of ​​​​responsibility, provinces: Herat, Badghis.

201st Gatchina MSD

201st Gatchina Motorized Rifle Division:

• 122nd (Tashkurgan Samangan province)
• 395th (Puli-Khumri Baghlan province)
• 149th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (Kunduz
• 998th Artillery (Kunduz) - regiments
• 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion and other units of the division)

The division was traditionally responsible for the northeast of Afghanistan (provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan, Balkh, Samangan, Takhar), including the routes: “Hairatan - Salang Pass”, “Kunduz - Talukan - Faizabad”. provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Samangan, Balkh; In the settlements of Aibak, Banu, Doshi, Baghlan, Khanabad, Talukan, Bangi, Aliabad and others, units of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division were stationed, serving as guards and outposts.

Units of the 201st MSD (Kunduz) participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from permanent deployment points, in the provinces of Kunar, Paktia, Herat, Kandahar, Panjshir, Parvan, etc., in divisional and private combat operations and raids , in the implementation of intelligence data and ambush operations in the immediate area of ​​​​responsibility, the provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, Badakhshan, Samangan, Balkh.

Separate brigades within OKSVA

SEPARATE BRIGADES. In the east, south and southeast of the Republic of Afghanistan, along the long border with Pakistan, combat missions were carried out by: the 66th separate motorized rifle brigade (formed on the basis of the 186th motorized rifle regiment) provincial responsibility area: Laghman, Nangarhar, Kunar; 70th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (formed at the base (373rd Motorized Rifle Regiment), area of ​​responsibility of the province: Helmand, Nimruz, Uruzgan, Kandahar; 56th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade (formed before the entry of troops into the DRA at the base 351 1st Parachute Regiment), area of ​​responsibility of the province: Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, their outposts were dispersed along the strategic highways “Jalalabad - Kabul”, “Girishk - Kandahar”, “Baraki-Barak - Gardez”, respectively.

“Separate brigades” participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from permanent deployment points, in the provinces: Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kandahar, Panjshir, Kapisa, Parwan, Baghlan, Kunduz , Takhar, Badakhshan, etc., in private military operations and raids, in the implementation of intelligence data and ambush operations in the immediate area of ​​​​responsibility.

Separate regiments as part of OKSVA

SEPARATE REGIMENTS - two “motorized rifle”, “paratrooper”, “engineer-sapper”: 860th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 191st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 345th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 45th OISP were stationed in the provinces: Badakhshan, Ghazni and Parvan.

“Individual regiments” participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from points of permanent deployment, in the provinces: Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kandahar, Panjshir, Kapisa, Wardak, Parwan, Baghlan , Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, etc., in private military operations and raids, in the implementation of intelligence data and ambush operations in the immediate area of ​​​​responsibility.

GRU special forces brigades

GRU Special Forces Troops. In the spring of 1985, within the framework of the “Curtain” plan developed by the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense, the “separate motorized rifle battalions” (MSB) previously operating in Afghanistan, actually special purpose GRU General Staff: 154th (1st Motorized Rifle Battalion Jalalabad); 177th (2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade Ghazni-Pajak); 173rd (3rd Motorized Rifle Brigade Kandahar) - detachments (battalions) of the Special Forces and 459th separate company Special Forces (Kabul) six more were additionally introduced: 334th (5th Motorized Rifle Brigade Asadabad) (formed on the basis of the 500th Special Forces); 668th (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade Baraki-Barak, Sufla) - included in the 15th Special Operations Brigade, parts of which were deployed in the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan: Nangarhar, Ghazni, Kunar, Logar - respectively.

Separate detachments of the GRU Special Forces: 186th (7th Motorized Rifle Brigade Shahjoy); 370th (6th Motorized Rifle Brigade Lashkar Gah); 411th (8th Motorized Rifle Brigade Farahrud) - became part of the 22nd Guards Special Forces Brigade and were deployed in the southeastern and southern provinces bordering Pakistan: Zabul, Helmand, Kandahar (with the exception of the Special Forces detachment in Farahrud, Farah province) , he was based close to the Iranian border.

The indicated units of the GRU Special Forces were included in the 15th and 22nd “separate special purpose brigades of the GRU General Staff” with headquarters located in the cities of Jalalabad and Lashkar Gah (respectively), where planning and management of private military operations and raids in the immediate area of ​​​​responsibility were carried out . the list of tasks of these units included: reconnaissance and search, ambush operations, raids.

OKSVA military operations by year

1979

Events leading up to Operation Storm 333 and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

• April-May 1979, at the request of the Afghan leadership, the CPSU Central Committee decided to supply “special equipment” worth 53 million rubles to Afghanistan: 140 guns and mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers, 48,000 units small arms, 100 grenade launchers, 680 aerial bombs
• May 5 - TurkVO began the formation of the “Muslim battalion” of the GRU. It was staffed by persons of indigenous nationalities of the Central Asian republics.
• July - The parachute battalion was redeployed to Bagram to provide protection for Soviet transport aircraft (see photo). KGB special group "Zenit-1" began work in Afghanistan
• August 5 - mutiny in the 26th Afghan Parachute Regiment and Commando Battalion Kabul
• August 28-25 - Visit to the DRA of the Soviet military delegation led by the Commander-in-Chief Ground forces I. G. Pavlovsky
• September - KGB special group "Zenit-2" arrived in Kabul.
• November 22 - Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lieutenant General V. S. Paputin, arrived in the DRA
• December 3-14 - “Muslim battalion” (154th separate special forces detachment) of the GRU General Staff and the 3rd infantry battalion of the 345th separate detachment were transferred to Bagram air base
• Beginning of December - The opposition increased the number of its armed forces to 40 thousand people and launched military operations against the new government in 12 provinces of Afghanistan
• KGB General Kirpichenko, the first deputy, arrived in the DRA. head of foreign intelligence of the KGB.

End of 1979. Representatives of the PDPA, led by Babrak Karmal, who has been living in Czechoslovakia as an emigrant since August 1978, with the support of the intelligence services of socialist states, are creating illegal structures to fight the regime of X. Amin. Moscow is preparing for a coup in Kabul. Islamists in Afghanistan also continue their struggle. In fact, the country began Civil War. December 1979.

• At Amin’s request, two Soviet battalions were transferred to Afghanistan to strengthen the security of the residence of the head of state and the Bagram airfield. B. Karmal arrived with one of them.
• December 10 - Minister of Defense D. Ustinov informed the Chief of the General Staff N. Starkov that the Politburo had made a preliminary decision to temporarily send troops to the DRA, and set the task of preparing an approximately 75-80 thousand-strong group of troops. At the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense, D. Ustinov said that it was necessary to prepare a group of troops. Directive No. 312/12/00133 was sent to the troops.

D. Ustinov gave an oral order to N. Ogarkov on the formation of a new combined arms army in TurkVO

• December 12 - At a meeting of the Politburo, a decision was made to send Soviet troops into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. According to the memoirs of A. A. Gromyko, the decision “to bring some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of the country into the territory of the DRA in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as create favorable conditions for prohibiting possible anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states...” was unanimously adopted by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.
• December 13 - An operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General S.F. Akhromeev, a little later the group was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov. The commander of the TurkVO troops, Colonel General Yu. P. Maksimov, ordered his first deputy, Lieutenant General Yu. V. Tukharinov, to prepare troops for entry. He flew to Termez and was appointed the first commander of the 40th Army.
• December 14 - The USSR KGB special group "Grom" arrived in Kabul, reinforcing the "Zenit-2" group.
• At 22:00, the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense arrived in Termez.
• December 17 - The “Muslim battalion” moved out from Bagram and concentrated in the area of ​​​​the residence of X. Amin - the Taj Beg Palace / Kabul /.
• December 23 - Task Force The headquarters of the Airborne Forces, led by Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, General Guskov, arrived in Kabul.
• December 24 - Directive of the Ministry of Defense and National General Staff No. 312/12/001 33 defines specific tasks for the deployment and deployment of troops on Afghan territory. Participation in hostilities was not envisaged.
• December 25 - 12:00 /claim../ an order was received to cross the state border. 15:00 the entry of troops began /108 med, 103rd airborne division/.
• December 27 - USSR Ministry of Defense Directive N 312/12/002 set specific combat missions to suppress rebel resistance.

OKSVA DATA

• Irreversible losses - 86 people.
• Losses: 1 tanks, 1 armored vehicles, 6 airplanes and helicopters

1980

Military operations and general reports for 1980

• Large-scale “1st Kunar” combined arms operation to neutralize the rebel Afghan mountain infantry regiment in the Asmara Gorge by forces of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 180th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division (Bagram) and the 317th parachute regiment of the 103rd airborne airborne division. The personnel of the 3rd Parachute Battalion of the 317th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division landed by helicopter on February 28-29 in the area of ​​Asmar, and was blocked by Afghan armed forces in the Asmara Gorge. As a result, 35 Soviet servicemen were killed in the clash, 40 were wounded, and 1 serviceman went missing.
• The first combined arms operation in Nahrin district, Baghlan province.
• 1st Combined Arms "Panjshir Operation".
• August 3 - during the arrival to the rescue of units of the 149th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment fighting in the mountainous section of the Mashhad Gorge in Kishim County, Badakhshan Province - the 783rd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (783rd ORB) was ambushed and took the fight near the village of Shaesta. 201st MSD, 49 servicemen were killed (37 reconnaissance officers of the 783rd ORB and 12 guardsmen of the 149th Guards MRR), 48 were wounded.
• autumn - 2nd Combined Arms “Panjshir Operation”.
• fighting in the provinces of Kapisa, Kabul, Logar, Wardak, in the Lurkoh (Farah) mountain range - “Cleansing of Herat.”
• The first large-scale combined arms operation “Strike”-1 ~ in the central provinces.
• The rebels (oppositionists) began to equip warehouses and bases for weapons, ammunition, food in hard-to-reach mountainous areas, as well as prepare caves for winter.

OKSVA DATA

• Irreversible losses - 1484 people.
• Injuries and illnesses - 30612
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to wounds, injuries and illnesses) - 725
• Losses: tanks - 18, armored vehicles - 173, aircraft and helicopters - 40

1981

Military operations and general reports for 1981. Military operations were carried out under the code names “ARROW”, “NORTH”, “COVERAGE” and “SQUARE”, etc.

• January-February - Operational military operations to eliminate the counter-revolutionary underground in the cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, Khost
• March - “3rd Panjshir Operation”
• in eight northern provinces of Afghanistan (out of 26) there are 200 rebel detachments with a total number of 8.5 thousand people.
• early September - “Marmol operation” defeat of rebel base areas 30 km south of Mazar-i-Sharif
• from September 6 - “4th Panjshir operation” - “Canyon”.
• mid-October - “Urgun operation”
• (September-December) - 46 operations were carried out against the Mujahideen, 250 actions of duty units.
• December - military operation to defeat the large rebel base area "Darzab" in the north of the DRA

“During the year, fighting was especially active in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Nangarhar, and around Kabul. During 1981 - 4 points for collecting and sending bodies of dead personnel were organized in Shindand, Bagram, Kabul, Kunduz. According to the General Staff, over 20 thousand rebels were destroyed, 7763 were captured, up to 12 thousand small arms, 1.5 million various ammunition, 79 DShK, 22 mortars, etc. were captured...”

OKSVA DATA

• Irreversible losses - 1298 people.
• Injuries and illnesses - no data
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to wounds, injuries and illnesses) no data
• Losses: Tanks - 28, Armored vehicles - 128, Airplanes and helicopters - 26, Guns and mortars - 17

1982

Military operations and general reports for 1982

“Planned combat operations were, as a rule, large-scale, relatively long in time, and involved a large number of troops. In total, during the years of their stay in Afghanistan, our troops operated in 416 planned operations. In 1982, operations were carried out that could be included in the chronicles of the Afghan war...”

“At the end of January - beginning of February, opposition formations were defeated in a wide valley - the “green zone” of Jabal Ussaraj, Charikar, Mahmudraki. IPA groups of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan operated in this zone. They constantly fired at the Bagram airfield, garrisons and government buildings authorities, robbed civilian vehicles, committed sabotage against Soviet outposts and columns. The presence of a large IPA group near the capital had a destabilizing effect on Kabul..."

“By the end of January 25, our units suddenly blocked the area for the enemy. Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan organized filtration points. Over the next few days, the encirclement tightened, and the rebel groups that resisted were destroyed. On February 5, combing operations were completed. The enemy suffered heavy losses. The situation in the provinces of Kabul, Parwan and Kapisa has improved significantly, which has had a positive impact on the situation in the capital and on the Hairatan-Kabul highway...”

“Another example of a major military operation is the defeat of a large opposition base area in the Darzab region on the border of the provinces of Jawzjan and Faryab:

• held from February 15 to 19, 1982. But the most famous were the six operations in Panjshir.
• in (April-May) 1982, the so-called “2nd Panjshir” was carried out - the most high-profile operation in the entire history of the Afghan war ... "

“The Panjshir River Valley is one of the most geographically complex regions of the DRA. It stretches 70 km long and 12 km wide all the way to the Pakistani border. It has a huge number of caves, holes, gorges, passes, dominant heights, passages (adjacent to the main valley and giving free access to various areas and to the main highway connecting Kabul with the Soviet Union through the Salang Pass..."

“That is why Panjshir, which also has significant wealth of emeralds, rubies and lapis lazuli, was chosen to host the so-called Central guerrilla base of Ahmad Shah Massoud. He created here a well-equipped system of defense, fire and control of rebel forces operating in a vast vital territory ... "

“The fighting began on the night of May 16, 1982. Soviet units, unexpectedly for the enemy, captured all the dominant heights at the entrance to the gorge and at a depth of up to 10 km from the entrance to it. Then an airborne landing began, which divided the entire enemy group into four isolated parts...”

“Soviet and Afghan battalions moved to join the landing force on foot along the heights to the right and left of the gorge and military equipment along its bottom. During the fighting, 203 fire installations, 25 mortars, 120 heavy machine guns, about 30 warehouses with weapons and ammunition, about 100 caves adapted for defense were blown up ... "

“During the year, along with planned combat operations, private military operations were also carried out by the OKSVA command or by decisions of the commanders of formations and units. In terms of tactics, they did not differ from large operations. If the situation required, detours were used, troops were landed, the enemy was surrounded, populated areas were blocked, etc. Operations were most effective if they were carried out at a distance of no more than 10-15 km from the deployment points, with advances to areas at night. In total, more than 220 private operations of various sizes were carried out in Afghanistan...”

Continuation of large-scale military operations by Soviet troops in the provinces:

• Kandahar, Kapisa and Parwan
• January-February (especially intense fighting took place in the provinces of Parwan - in the “Green Zone” of Charikar, near Jabal Ussaraj at the entrance to the “Panjshir Gorge”, and Kapisa - near the settlement of “Makhmudraki”
• April - combined arms operation in Nimroz province
• "5th Panjshir Operation"
• May-June - large-scale combined arms operation in Logar province
• December - withdrawal of troops from Panjshir
• January, fighting in Kandahar.
• late January-early February-Combat operations in the green zone of Jabal-Ussaraj, Charikar, Mahmudraki
• operation in Nimruz province
• May 16-June, “5th Panjshir operation.” It involved 36 battalions: (20 Afghan and 16 Soviet, with a total number of about 1.2 thousand people), more than 320 armored vehicles, 155 guns and mortars, 104 helicopters and 26 aircraft. Soviet units lost 93 people killed and 343 wounded.
• August-September, “6th Panjshir Operation”

The situation around Kabul has become significantly more complicated due to the strengthening of Mujahideen detachments in the provinces of Parwan, Kapisa, Logar, Wardak, Laghman and their effective actions. Significant forces of the “Mujahideen” were concentrated in the province of Kunar. On March 1, 1982, the number of detachments in the rebel camp reached 50 thousand people.

OKSVA DATA

• Irreversible losses - 1948 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 29455
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to wounds, injuries and illnesses) - 894
• Losses: Tanks - 17, Armored vehicles - 107, Airplanes and helicopters - 40, Guns and mortars - 14

1983

Military operations and general reports for 1983

“The main small arms were Kalashnikov assault rifles made in China and Egypt, american rifles, machine guns and grenade launchers of West German, English, Swedish and Israeli production. Large-caliber DShK machine guns and mortars of 60-82 mm caliber were widely used. Since 1983, a large number of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines began to appear: Italian, American, British. The most widely used were mines and plastic casings, as well as remote-controlled mines and radio-controlled mines. Homemade surprise mines were also often used...”

• January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans kidnapped a group (16 people) of our civilian specialists. They were released only a month later, and six of them died.
• fighting in Logar province
• April - Operation to defeat opposition forces in the “Nijrab gorge” (Kapisa province). Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.

“Autumn - For the first time, opposition groups did not go on vacation to Pakistan and Iran for the winter. The creation of fortified areas and bases directly in Afghanistan began. At the end of 1983, there were a total of 212 specialized centers and rebel training centers (1178 in Pakistan and 34 in Iran), allowing for the training of over 75 thousand people per year.

For the year - in funerals they are most often named: Kunduz, Puli-Khumri, Kabul, Herat, Shindand, Kandahar ... "

OKSVA DATA

• Irreversible losses - 1446 people.
• Injuries and illnesses - 4127
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to wounds, injuries and illnesses) - 945
• Losses: Tanks-13, Armored vehicles-186, aircraft and helicopters-37

1984

Military operations and general reports for 1984

“1984-1985 became a period of maximum intensification of hostilities in Afghanistan. Essentially, OKSVA found itself drawn into a full-scale civil war that unfolded throughout the country. The political and military leadership of the USSR set two tasks for the Soviet troops: together with the government army of Afghanistan, to defeat large armed rebel formations in the base areas and to assist Kabul in strengthening local government authorities..."

"IN military history 1984 should be noted operations in the provinces of Parwan, Kapisa, Kabul, Laghman (February-March). Due to the partisan nature of the enemy’s actions, as well as serious miscalculations, not all operations achieved their goal. The year was the most tragic in terms of the number of losses suffered by our troops - 2,343 soldiers and officers died..."

“The Mujahideen have acquired a large number of Chinese-made rockets and launchers. American MANPADS “Stinger” and English “Blowpipe” appeared. As of April 20, the number of Stingers reached 47. In 1984, 62 launches of MANPADS were noted.”

• (late February - early March) Fighting in the provinces of Parwan, Kapisa, Kabul, Laghman
• from April 21 - a large-scale combined arms operation in the Panjshir Gorge. during which the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses and lost: 53 killed, 58 wounded.
• the largest “in terms of composition, involved forces and means, duration and significance” were operations in the river valleys: Panjshir, Andarab and in the “green zones” around the cities of Kabul and Herat
• December, an operation to defeat the base areas of the rebels in the Lurkoh mountains, Farah province), located in the three gorges.
• (January-May) 85 operations were carried out, of which 51 were joint with units of the Afghan army and 84 were independent, - 18 thousand rebels were destroyed, 3839 small arms, 146 DShK, 42 mortars, 101 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers were captured .

1984 is the bloodiest year in the history of the Afghan war (1979-1989)

OKSVA DATA

• Irreversible losses - 2343 people.
• Injuries and illnesses - 7737
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to wounds, injuries and illnesses) - 1388
• Losses: Tanks -7, Armored vehicles - 88, aircraft and helicopters - 66

1985

Military operations and general reports for 1985

“This year, fighting in Afghanistan has reached its peak. The fighting became increasingly fierce, and Soviet troops continued to remain the main force in the confrontation between the official Afghan authorities and the armed opposition. It was in 1985 that the largest operations were carried out against the counter-revolutionary forces in the provinces of Panjshir, Kunar, Herat, Paktia, Khost and a number of other regions of Afghanistan. The battles against the troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud in Panjshir and Kunar province were especially difficult and bloody. Parts of the limited contingent of Soviet troops, continuously participating in operations, suffered significant losses. During the year, 1,868 people died in battles in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.”

• On April 1, another military operation took place in the “Panjshir Gorge” against the formations of Ahmad Shah Massoud.
• April 21, battle of the 1st company of the 500th (later 334th) separate special forces battalion of the 15th separate brigade special forces of the GRU General Staff (5th separate motorized rifle battalion), as a result of which 28 reconnaissance officers were ambushed and killed in a gorge in the Afghan-Pakistan border zone.
• Large-scale combined arms operation involving significant forces and resources (including DRA government forces) to capture the Javara base area in Paktia province
• On April 26, a group of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war (24 people), held for several years in a special prison in the Badaber region (24 km south of Peshawar in Pakistan), made an armed uprising in order to free themselves from captivity. All died in battle with the dushmans. Main article: Uprising in the Badaber camp

• May, fighting in Helmand province
• (May-June), large-scale “Kunar Operation” - combat operations along the entire length of the “Kunar Gorge” from Jalalabad to Barikot (170 km); during the 1st stage of the operation, more than 11 thousand people landed by helicopter. (units 103rd Guards Airborne Division, 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 56th Guards Separate Air Assault Brigade, 108th Motorized Rifle Division, 201st Motorized Rifle Division, 45th Engineer Regiment, Air Force 40 1st Army) and other units of OKSVA
• On May 25, during the “Kunar Operation (1985)” - the personnel of the guardsmen of the 4th company and the attached forces of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 149th guards motorized rifle regiment fought a fierce battle near the village of Konyak near the city of Asadabad, Kunar province with a large number losses incurred (23 were killed, 19 were injured of varying severity)
• September, large-scale “Marmol operation” in Balkh province
• mid-October, large-scale military operation in the south of Baghlan province, counties (Andarab, Banu, Nahrin, Burka, Seyid)
• On October 19, during the fighting in the Panjshir gorge, as a result of an error in orientation, 5 servicemen died from hypothermia and 35 received varying degrees of frostbite
• October, fighting in the provinces: Farah, Baghlan, Kapisa, Parwan
• more than 80 operations performed
• OKSVA reached its maximum number - 105.8 thousand people.
• rebel losses amounted to 17 thousand people.
• the darkest year for our border guards - 124 dead

OKSVA DATA

• Irreversible losses - 1886 people.
• Injuries and illnesses - 8219
• Discharged from the army (due to wounds, injuries and illnesses) - 1751
• Losses: tanks - 18, armored vehicles - 185, aircraft and helicopters - 66

1986

Military operations and general reports for 1986

By the beginning of 1986, the internal political situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate. If in 1981-1983 opposition formations numbering 45 thousand people were active in the territory, then by 1986 their number was already 150 thousand.

• in February-April, a large-scale military operation was carried out in the Khost district, during which the transshipment base of the IPA of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Jawara - Wolf Pit) was destroyed.
• large-scale military operation against the Abdul Basir group in Badakhshan province
• defeat of the Marulgad transhipment base (Nangarhar)
• March, large-scale fighting in the Shekude region (Paktia)
• repeated large-scale combined arms operation in Marulgad
• large-scale combined arms operation to defeat the group of Abdul Wahed Wadud (Badakhshan)
• large-scale military operation in the area of ​​the “Apushelo gorge” (Zabul)
• April, large-scale military operation against the groups of Najmuddin (Badakhshan) and S. Mansur (Baghlan)
• April, large-scale combined arms operation in the province of Paktia (in the Khost area), the result - the defeat of the Javara base
• large-scale military operation in Baghlan province
• (May 10-25), fighting in the province of Paktia (Daj and Alikhail districts)
• June, fighting in Kandahar province
• June, large-scale combined arms operation “Maneuver” in the provinces: (Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan)
• fighting in the province of Parvan (Panjshir Gorge)
• fighting in Laghman province
• (August 18-26), large-scale combined arms operation “Trap” in the province of Herat, defeat of the base area “Kokari-Sharshari”, liquidation of the rear services of Ismail Khan’s formations.

As of July 15, the number of armed opposition reached 150 thousand people. In a year. 847 launches of MANPADS were noted. US assistance to the armed opposition amounted to $500 million.

OKSVA DATA

• Irreversible losses - 1333 people.
• Injuries and illnesses - 62,129
• Discharged from the Armed Forces (due to wounds, injuries and illnesses) - 1311
• Losses: tanks - 14, armored vehicles - 126, aircraft and helicopters - 61

1987

Military operations and general reports for 1987

“The most famous operation of 1987 was Operation Magistral. The situation in the province of Paktia, namely in the Khost district, was extremely difficult. The armed opposition units had practically completed the blockade of Khost. A critical situation with food arose, after the withdrawal of the garrison of Soviet troops from Khost a real the threat of losing the city. By the fall of 1987, the Mujahideen had restored their Javara base here, which had been destroyed by Soviet troops in the spring of 1986. The situation was further complicated by the fact that it was here that the so-called “Afghan government” was supposed to be located in opposition to the “Najibullah government.” After repeated At the request of the Afghan leadership, the OKSV command decided to plan and conduct a major military operation to break the blockade to provide the population of Khost with food and necessary material resources.This operation was successfully carried out in November 1987 - January 1988.

“After the announcement of the policy of national reconciliation, Soviet troops tried to stop active hostilities, focusing on protecting communications, but this did not succeed, and at the request of the Afghan leadership, a number of more operations were carried out against the irreconcilable counter-revolution - around Kabul, in the Kandahar region. It was necessary to conduct constant military operations against caravans delivering weapons and ammunition from Pakistan and Iran for opposition groups. Second half of January. The opposition has intensified hostilities."

• from January - February 21, large-scale combined arms operation "Strike" (Kunduz province)
• February 4 - March 11, large-scale combined arms operation "Squall" (Kandahar province)
• March 2 - 21, large-scale combined arms operation "Thunderstorm" (Ghazni).

• March 8 - March 21 large-scale combined arms operation "Circle" (Kabul, Logar)
• April 11-1, fighting in Herat province
• April 12-24, large-scale combined arms operation “Spring” in Kabul province
• May - large-scale combined arms operation "Salvo" (Logar, Paktia, Kabul provinces)
• end of May, large-scale combined arms operation “South-87” (Kandahar province, Arghandab river valley)
• (November January - 1987, 1988) large-scale combined arms operation "Magistral" to unblock the Gardez - Khost road

OKSVA DATA

• Irreversible losses - 1215 people.
• Injuries and illnesses - 56,498
• Discharged from the Armed Forces (due to wounds, injuries and illnesses) - 1472
• Losses: tanks - 7, armored vehicles - 128, aircraft and helicopters - 68

Over the year, US assistance to the Afghan armed opposition amounted to $706 million.

1988

Military operations and general reports for 1988

“After the withdrawal of Soviet garrisons from Kunduz, Talukan and Khanabad, these settlements were surrendered by government forces to Afghan armed forces virtually without a fight. President Najibullah appealed to our command with a request to provide assistance in the liberation of Kunduz. The city was captured within a short period of time.”

• With the withdrawal of a number of OKSVA units, four provinces gradually came under the control of the opposition - Kunar, Paktika, Takhar and Bamiyan. The centers of the provinces of Kandahar, Ghazni, Uruzgan, and Badakhshan were blocked. Rocket and artillery attacks on Kabul and many provincial centers of the country intensified.
• May 15 - August 1, Soviet troops left the garrisons of Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, Kandahar, Faizabad, Kunduz
• On August 7, the RA government troops, without offering resistance, fled from Kunduz. In addition to Kunduz, the rebels captured Khanabad, Talukan, Bamiyan

As a result of the combat activities of the 40th Army, more than 1,000 anti-aircraft mountain installations and more than 30,000 rockets for them, more than 700 mortars and approximately 25,000 mines were captured. From the GRU certificate: “... the volume of official US assistance to the counter-revolution exceeded $2 billion. In 1988, assistance in the amount of more than $700 million is planned...”

OKSVA DATA

• Irreversible losses - 759 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 55121
• Discharged from the Armed Forces (due to wounds, injuries and illnesses) - 1549 4.
• Losses: tanks - 22, armored vehicles - 176, aircraft and helicopters - 30

1989

Military operations and general reports for 1989

“The withdrawal of units of the 40th Army in January-February continued strictly according to plan. At the same time, communications from Kabul through the Salang pass were reliably protected from possible attacks by the Mujahideen, especially the troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud. But it was not possible to avoid a large-scale military operation.”

“January 23 - 26, a joint military operation of Soviet troops against the troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud in South Salang. On the morning of January 23, an air and artillery fire strike was carried out on Panjshir and the adjacent gorges. The area began to be combed for rebel bands and Afghan troops set up blocks on the highway. The main efforts were concentrated on the protection of bridges, galleries and tunnels. During two days of fighting, more than 600 rebels, 10 warehouses, 36 strong points, and a large number of weapons were destroyed. In the Chaugani area, a tent camp was set up to receive local residents who had left the combat area and provide them with material and medical assistance. Losses of Soviet troops - 3 killed, 5 wounded."

• February 4, 1989. Last division Soviet army left Kabul
• On February 15, the last unit of the 40th Army and with it the army commander, Colonel General B.V. Gromov, left Afghanistan. The opposition, in turn, began large-scale military operations against the Najibullah regime.

OKSVA DATA

• irretrievable losses - 53 people.
• injuries and illnesses - 93
• losses: tanks - 2, armored vehicles - 17, aircraft and helicopters - 7

Combined arms operations to capture fortified areas

Excerpt from Valentin Runov’s book “The Afghan War. Combat":

“In the areas of responsibility of large opposition groups, base areas were created, located in areas of hard-to-reach terrain near the areas of upcoming actions. they created reserves of means of armed struggle and material and technical means, organized a control, warning, air defense system, had a center for training rebels, workshops for repairing weapons and making homemade ammunition, a garage, a prison, a hospital, and rest areas for personnel. In such a base area, as a rule, up to 500 people could be present at the same time.”

“Transshipment bases were organized for temporary storage of weapons, ammunition, materiel and on caravan routes near the borders with Pakistan and Iran. They were intermediate supply bodies for groups and detachments, where the distribution and sale of weapons was carried out, an access control system, a surveillance, warning, air defense, and security system were established. Sometimes transshipment bases were combined with base areas. There were 18 large supply bases in Afghanistan, including 9 base areas, two transshipment bases and 7 transshipment points."

see also

• Afghan Mujahideen
• Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA)
• Islamic Society of Afghanistan (“IAS”)

Notes

1. OFFICIAL DATA ON SOVIET LOSSES IN AFGHANISTAN
2. Class struggle in Afghan society in the 2nd half. XX century
3. The 40th Army, whose strength is different times ranged from 100 to 120 thousand soldiers and officers. In total, the Soviet and Afghan armed forces (including military units of all security forces) did not exceed 300 thousand. See “NVO”.
4. Nikitenko E. G. Afghanistan: From the war of the 80s to the forecast of new wars. -M.: Astrel; AST, 2004. - P. 94, 110.
5. BBC: Breaking the deadlock. Ending the Afghan war turned out to be more difficult than starting it. CentralAsia. Retrieved November 20, 2009. Archived from the original on June 1, 2012.
6. David C. Isby. Russia's War in Afghanistan. - Books.google.es. - ISBN 978-0-85045-691-2.
7. V. V. Basov, G. A. Polyakov. Afghanistan: the difficult fate of the revolution. M., “Knowledge”, 1988. P. 52.
8. Antonio Giustozzi. War, politics and society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992. - Hurst, 2000. - ISBN 1-85065-396-8. Original text (English)

   A tentative estimate for total mujahideen losses in 1980-02 may be in the 150–180,000 range, with maybe half of them killed.

9. “Afghan campaign: unclaimed experience.4 Evolution of forms and methods of warfare” E.G. Nikitenko
10. 1 2 Valentin Runov “Afghan War. Combat operations»
11. AND CONFLICTS. The Afghan campaign: unclaimed experience.12" "The beginning of hostilities" by Andrei Mikhailov
12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Runov “Afghan War. Combat Operations"
13. Valentin Runov „Afghan War. Combat Operations"
14. Valentin Runov “Afghan War. Combat"
15. 1 2 3 4
16. Valentin Runov “Afghan War. All combat operations"

Links

• Book “Unique” Book.5 Part.4 author Army General V.I. Varennikov
• The book “Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan” by General A.A. Lyakhovsky
• “Wars and military conflicts (Afghanistan)” by Major General E.G. Nikitenko Magazine “Military Space Defense” (VKO)
• The book “The Hot Sky of Afghanistan” by General V. Markovsky
• Combat operations of the 40th Army
• AFGHAN DIARY
• "The Truth About the Undeclared War"
• "AFGHAN: history of war - 1986"
• Documentary film by M. Leshchinsky “The Hidden War”
• “Organization and conduct of combat operations to conduct transport convoys”
• Documentary film “Operation in Takhor Province” TV channel “Zvezda”
• “Ours in Afghanistan or how they “took” the Stinger”, A.K. Shultz (Herat intelligence post)
• Documentary film “The Truth about the 9th Company”
• Documentary film Operation “Trap” in the province of Herat (Afghanistan) 08/19-25/1986 TV show “Military Secret” No. 173 TC “Ren TV” 02/18/2013
• Operation “Maneuver” (1985-1986) veterans website kunduz.ru
• “General characteristics of Pashtun tribes”
• “Pashtun tribes want to be masters of their territories,” author Vasily Kravtsov
• "Peoples and Tribes of Afghanistan"
• "Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and others"
• “Multi-tribal Afghanistan” author Yu.O. Serdyuk
• Pashtuns - “people of honor”
• “Pashtuns are the most numerous people of Afghanistan” M. Drambyan
• "Pashtun tribes - endless war"

Afghan War (1979-1989)
Main events	Articles on the topic	Government forces	Mujahideen	Help for the Mujahideen
1979 Storming of Amin's Palace 1980-1985 Battle near the village of Khara Battle near the village of Shaest Death of the 1st battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment Panjshir operations Herat operations Baghlan operations Marmol operations Kunduz operations Takhar operations Faizabad operations Jalalabad operations Kunar operations Urgun and Alikhail operations Kandahar and Helmand operations Tashkurgan and Aibak operations Kufab Raids 1985 Death of the Maravar company Battle of the 4th company near the village of Konyak Battle near the village of Afrij Badaber uprising 1986 Assault on Jawar Battle on Mount Yafsaj Operation "Maneuver" Operation Trap 1987 Operation "Highway" 1988 Battle at height 3234 Operation Typhoon 1989 Withdrawal of Soviet troops	Heroes of the Soviet Union (Afghan War 1979-1989) Fortified areas of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) USSR Air Force aircraft losses Peshawar Seven Shia Eight Big game Anglo-Afghan Wars: 1838-1842, 1878-1880, 1919 Civil War in Afghanistan April Revolution Muslim battalions Shuravi "Black stork" Kokari-Sharshari Tora Bora Javara Islamic Society of Afghanistan Islamic Party of Afghanistan	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan B. Karmal M. Najibullah DRA Army Special service "KHAD" Soviet Union 40th Army Sergey Sokolov Vladimir Vostrov Sergey Akhromeev Valentin Varennikov Boris Gromov Victor Dubynin Yuri Tukharinov Boris Tkach Alexander Rutskoy Pavel Grachev Igor Puzanov Mahmut Gareev Boris Pastukhov Fikryat Tabeev Igor Rodionov Ruslan Aushev Valery Vostrotin Valery Evnevich Alexander Skorodumov Vladimir Isakov Lev Rokhlin	Afghan Mujahideen G. Hekmatyar B. Rabbani M. Nabi S. Mojaddedi Ahmad Shah Masood D. Haqqani Abdul Haq Ismail Khan Abdul Ali Mazari Yunus Khales Said Mansour Muhammad Omar	USA Operation Cyclone Saudi Arabia Pakistan Egypt Great Britain

Links

• “Army, units of border troops (deployment on the territory of Afghanistan)” “Main combat formations and units of the 40th Army”
• Detailed calendar of military operations of the Afghan War (1979-1989) heading “Wars and military conflicts (Afghanistan)” author Major General E.G. Nikitenko Magazine “Military Space Defense” (VKO)
• Afghan Armed Forces
• Provinces of Afghanistan
• Pashtuns
• Tajiks of Afghanistan
• Uzbeks in Afghanistan
• Turkmens in Afghanistan
• Kyrgyz in Afghanistan
• Durrani, Ghilzai, Karani, Charaimaki, Kizilbashi, Farsiwan
• Ismailis
• Sunnis
• Shiites

• 1 2 3 4 5 Pashtun tribes want to be masters of their territories
• 1 2 Pashtuns. Settlement, main activities
• “Afghan campaign: unclaimed experience.4” “Evolution of forms and methods of warfare” General E.G. Nikitenko
• 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Army, units of border troops (deployment on the territory of Afghanistan) “Main combat formations and units of the 40th Army”
• Afghan airborne reconnaissance in action. Valery Marchenko
• 1 2 Book by Valentin Runov “The Afghan War. Combat"

Military operations of the Afghan War (1979-1989) Information About

USSR War in Afghanistan 1979-1989

Completed by: Bukov G.E.

Introduction

Afghan war 1979-1989 - armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to maintain the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

Of course, this period is not the most positive in the history of the USSR, but I wanted to open a small curtain in this war, namely, the reasons and main tasks for the USSR to eliminate the military conflict in Afghanistan.

1. Reason for hostilities

The main reason for the war was foreign interference in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was a consequence of the struggle for power between the Afghan government and numerous armed groups of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”), who enjoy political and financial support from leading NATO states and the Islamic world, on the other hand.

The internal political crisis in Afghanistan was the “April Revolution” - the events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.

As a result of the April Revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), whose leader was in 1978, came to power. Nur Mohammad Taraki (killed by order of Hafizullah Amin), and then Hafizullah Amin until December 1979, who proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would overcome Afghanistan's lagging behind have encountered resistance from the Islamic opposition. In 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. Unrest in the country and infighting between supporters of the Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and protecting the Central Asian republics) pushed the Soviet leadership to introduce .troops to Afghanistan under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without a formal decision regarding this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention. But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obviousness negative consequences direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan. The number of Soviet advisers (including military) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 people in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.

The impetus for the USSR's intervention was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to official version history, CIA assistance to the mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.

December 1979 began the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take protection of important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high-mountainous Salang pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. The first to land at the Kabul airfield were the paratroopers of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.I. Shpaka.

The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar. Sending in troops is not easy; Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed during the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

Operation STORM-333

The general plan for the operation in Kabul, carried out on December 27, was developed by the dishonest efforts of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB of the USSR, led by Major Y. Semenov. The plan of the operation, codenamed “Baikal-79,” provided for the seizure of the most important objects in the Afghan capital: the Taj Beg Palace, the buildings of the PDPA Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Communications of the DRA, the General Staff, the headquarters of the military air forces and the headquarters of the Central Army Corps, military counterintelligence (KAM), a prison for political prisoners in Puli-Charkhi, a radio and television center, post and telegraph, headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense... At the same time, it was planned to blockade military units and formations of the Armed Forces located in the Afghan capital DRA forces of paratroopers of motorized rifle troops arriving in Kabul. In total, 17 objects had to be captured. The appropriate forces and means were assigned to each object, and the procedure for interaction and control was determined.

In fact, at the beginning of the operation in Kabul there were special units of the KGB of the USSR (“Thunder” - a little more than 30 people, “Zenit” - 150 people, a company of border guards - 50 people), as well as quite significant forces from the USSR Ministry of Defense: air force airborne division, 154th special forces detachment of the GRU General Staff (“Muslim” battalion), units of the 345th separate parachute regiment, military advisers (in total more than 10 thousand people). They all fulfilled their tasks and worked towards the final result of the operation.

The most difficult and important object to capture was the Taj Beg Palace where the residence of H. Amin was located and he himself was located. Of all the officers and soldiers who took part in the assault on the Taj Beg Palace, almost no one knew the full plan of the operation and did not have control over the overall situation, and each acted in his own narrow area, in fact, in the role of a simple fighter.

Therefore, for most of them, the events in Kabul focused only on their objective, and for many fighters the operation still remains a mystery. For most of them, it was a “baptism of fire” - the first real battle in life. Hence the overflow of emotions in memories, the “thickening” of colors. Finding themselves in an extreme situation, each of them showed what they were worth and what they had achieved. The vast majority completed the combat mission with honor , showing heroism and courage. Many officers and soldiers were wounded, some died.

On the evening of December 25, General Drozdov, based on the results of reconnaissance of objects, held a meeting with the commanders of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the KGB of the USSR, and determined the place of each in the capture of Taj Beg. Everyone was ready, the situation was missing only the plan of the palace.

“Grom” and “Zenith” officers M. Romanov, Y. Semenov, V. Fedoseev and E. Mazaev conducted reconnaissance of the area and reconnaissance of firing points located nearby. Not far from the palace, on a high-rise building, there was a restaurant (casino), where senior officers of the Afghan army usually gathered. Under the pretext of needing to book places for our officers to celebrate the New Year, the special forces visited there too. From there, the Taj Beck was clearly visible; all the approaches to it and the location of the storage posts were clearly visible. True, this initiative almost ended tragically for them.

By the beginning of Operation Storm-333, special forces from the KGB groups of the USSR thoroughly knew the object of capture of Haj Beg: the most convenient routes of approach; guard mode services; the total number of Amin's security and bodyguards; location of machine gun nests, armored vehicles and tanks; the internal structure of the palace labyrinth rooms; placement of radiotelephone communication equipment.

The signals for the start of the general operation “Baikal-79” should have been a powerful explosion in the center of Kabul. Special group of the KGB of the USSR "Zenith" led by B.A. Pleshkunov was supposed to blow up the so-called “well” - essentially a neutral secret communication center with the most important military and civilian facilities of the DRA.

Assault ladders, equipment, weapons and ammunition were being prepared. Under the leadership of the deputy battalion commander for technical matters, Senior Lieutenant Eduard Ibragimov, the Combat vehicles Ocular - secrecy and secrecy.

The Taj Beg Palace was located on a high, steep hill overgrown with trees and bushes, all approaches to it were mined. There was only one road leading here, guarded around the clock. The palace itself was also a difficult-to-reach structure. Its thick walls are able to withstand artillery attacks. If we add to this that the area around was shelled by tanks and heavy machine guns, then it becomes clear that it was very difficult to take possession of it.

At about six o'clock in the evening, Kolesnik was called by Colonel General Magomedov and said, “Due to unforeseen circumstances, the time of the assault has been postponed, we must begin as soon as possible,” and the operation began earlier than the set time. Literally fifteen to twenty minutes later, the capture group led by Captain M. Sakhatov left in the direction of the height where the tanks were buried. Among them were two officers each from "Grom" and "Zenith", as well as the chief of reconnaissance of the battalion, Senior Lieutenant A. Dzhamolov. The tanks were guarded by sentries, and their crews were in a barracks located at a distance of 150-200 meters from them.

When the car of M. Sakhatov’s group approached the location of the third battalion, shooting was suddenly heard there, which suddenly intensified. Colonel Kolesnik immediately issued the command “Fire!” for the soldiers and officers of the “Muslim” battalion and special groups of the KGB of the USSR. and “Forward!” Red rockets flew into the air. It was 19.15 on the clock. The signal “Storm-333” was sent over the radio networks.

The first to attack the palace, at the command of senior lieutenant Vasily Prout, were two ZSU-23-4 Shilki self-propelled anti-aircraft guns that opened fire at direct fire, bringing down a sea of ​​shells on it. Two other installations hit the infantry battalion, supporting a company of paratroopers. AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers began firing at the location of the tank battalion, preventing the crews from approaching the vehicles.

Units of the “Muslim” battalion began moving to their destination areas. The 3rd company of Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Sharipov was supposed to advance to the Taj Beg Palace; several subgroups of special forces officers from “Grom” were placed on its five infantry fighting vehicles along with the soldiers. Major Y. Semenov with the “Zenit” group on four armored personnel carriers of the platoon The 1st company of Lieutenant Rustam Tursunkulov was supposed to advance to the western part of the hill. Then, rush up the pedestrian stairs to the end of the Taj Beck, and at the facade of the building both groups had to connect and act together. But at the last moment everything got mixed up. As soon as the first armored personnel carrier passed the turn and approached the stairs leading to the end of the Taj Beg, heavy machine guns fired from the building. The armored personnel carrier where Boris Suvorov's subgroup was located was immediately hit and caught fire. The personnel immediately began to parachute, some were injured. The subgroup commander himself was hit in the groin by a ghoul, just below his body armor. It was not possible to save him - he bled to death. Jumping out of the armored personnel carriers, the Zenit fighters and the soldiers of Tursunkulov’s platoon were forced to lie down and shoot at the windows of the palace, and with the help of assault ladders they began to climb up the mountain.

At this time, the Thunder subgroups also began to advance towards Taj Beg.

When the group's machine gunner jumped out onto the platform in front of the Taj Beg, they came under heavy fire from heavy machine guns. It seemed like they were shooting from everywhere. The "Grom" employees rushed to the palace building, and the soldiers of Sharipov's company lay down and began to cover them with fire from machine guns and machine guns, and also repel the attack of the Afghan soldiers located in the guardhouse. Their actions were led by the platoon commander, Lieutenant Abdullaev. Something unimaginable was happening. A picture of hell. “Shilkas” shoot “beautifully”. Everything was mixed up. But everyone acted in one impulse, there was not a single one who tried to evade or sit in cover to wait out the assault. The number of assault groups was melting before our eyes. With incredible efforts, the special forces managed to overcome the resistance of the Afghans and break through to the palace building. The fighters of the “Muslim” battalion provided them with great help in this. All groups and fighters mixed up, and everyone was already acting at their own discretion. There was no single team. The only goal was to run faster to the walls of the palace, somehow hide behind them and complete the task. The special forces were in a foreign country, in a foreign uniform, without documents, without any identification marks, except for white armbands, there was nothing. The density of fire was such that the triplexes on all infantry fighting vehicles were broken, the bulwarks were pierced on every square centimeter, that is, they looked like a colander. The special forces were saved only by the fact that they were all wearing bulletproof vests, although almost all of them were wounded. The soldiers from the “Muslim” battalion were without body armor, since at Koslesnik’s command they handed over their body armor to the fighters of the assault groups. Of the thirty "Zenith" and twenty-two fighters from "Thunder", no more than twenty-five people managed to break through to Taj Beg, and many of them were wounded. These forces were clearly not enough to guarantee the elimination of Amin. According to Alexander Ivashchenko, who was next to Colonel Boyarinov during the battle, when they broke into the palace and met stubborn resistance from the guards, they realized that they could not complete the task with small forces. By the time the special forces entered the palace, the Shilki should have ceased fire, but contact with them was lost. Colonel V. Kolesnik sent a messenger, and “The Shilkas transferred the fire to other objects. War vehicles The infantry left the area in front of the palace and blocked the only road. Another company and a platoon of AGS-17 grenade launchers and ATGMs fired at the tank battalion, then the soldiers captured the tanks, simultaneously disarming the tankers. A special group of the “Muslim” battalion took possession of the anti-aircraft regiment’s weapons and captured its personnel. In the palace, the officers and soldiers of Amin's personal guard, his bodyguards (about 100-150 people) resisted steadfastly, without surrendering. What ruined them was that they were all armed mainly with MG-5 submachine guns, and they did not penetrate our body armor.

The Shilkas again shifted their fire, starting to hit the Taj-Bek, the area in front of it. A fire started on the second floor of the palace, which had a severe impact on the defending guards. As the special forces advanced to the second floor, the shooting and explosions intensified. The soldiers from Amin's guard, who mistook the special forces for their own rebel unit, heard Russian speech and surrendered to them. Lights were burning everywhere in the palace. All attempts by Nikolai Shvachko to turn it off ended in vain. The power supply was autonomous. Somewhere in the depths of the building, perhaps in the basement, electric generators were working, but there was no time to look for them. Some fighters shot at the light bulbs in order to somehow take cover, because they were in full view of the palace defenders. By the end of the assault, only a few anti-aircraft devices remained intact, but they were burning. The battle in the palace did not last long (43 minutes). Having received information about Amin’s death, the company commander, Senior Lieutenant V. Sharipov, also began to call Colonel V. Kolesnik on the radio to report on the completion of the task, but there was no communication. He finally managed to contact the battalion chief of staff, Ashurov, and allegorically reported that Amin had been killed. The chief of staff reported this to the battalion commander, Major Khalbaev and Colonel Kolesnik. Major Khalbaev reported on the seizure of the palace and the liquidation of Amin to Lieutenant General N.N. Guskov, and he - to the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov. After Assadul Sarvari, who arrived at the palace (he did not participate in the assault), was convinced and confirmed that Amin was really dead, the corpse of the head of state and leader of the PDPA was wrapped in a carpet... The main task was completed. Success in this operation was ensured not so much by force as by surprise, audacity and swiftness of pressure. Immediately after the capture of Taj-Bek, Drozdov reported to Ivanov on the completion of the task, and then handed over the radio station to Evald Kozlov and ordered the results of the battle to be reported to the leadership. When Kozlov, who had not yet recovered from the battle, began to report to General Ivanov, he interrupted him with the question “What’s wrong?” Oak ? Ewald began to select words to speak veiledly about Amin’s death, but Ivanov again asked: “Is he killed?” Kozlov replied: “Yes, killed.” And the general immediately interrupted the connection. It was necessary to urgently report Yu.V. to Moscow. Andropov about the completion of the main task, and the group of Captain M. Sakhatov arrived at the palace building with two tanks captured from the Afghans. He reported to Kolesnik about the completion of the combat mission and said: when we drove past the third battalion of the security brigade, we saw that an alarm had been declared there. Afghan soldiers received ammunition. The battalion commander and two other officers stood next to the road along which the special forces were passing. The decision came quickly. Jumping out of the car, they captured the Afghan battalion commander and both officers, throwing them into the car, and drove on. Some soldiers who managed to get cartridges opened fire on them. Then the entire battalion rushed in pursuit - to free their commander. Then the special forces dismounted and began firing machine guns and machine guns at the fleeing infantry. The soldiers of Kurban Amangeldyev's company, which was supporting the actions of Sakhatov's group, also opened fire. During the night, special forces guarded the palace because they feared that the divisions stationed in Kabul and a tank brigade would storm it. But this did not happen. Soviet military advisers who worked in parts of the Afghan army, and units transferred to the capital airborne troops they were not allowed to do this. In addition, the security services paralyzed the control of Afghan forces in advance. Some units of the Afghan security brigade continued to resist. In particular, we had to fight with the remnants of the third battalion for another day, after which the Afghans went into the mountains. Probably, some of their compatriots also suffered from their own: in the dark, the personnel of the “Muslim” battalion and the special group of the KGB of the USSR recognized each other by white armbands, the password “Misha - Yasha” and obscenities. But everyone was dressed in Afghan uniform, and they had to shoot and throw grenades from a decent distance. So try to keep track here in the darkness and confusion - who has a bandage on their sleeve and who doesn’t?! Moreover, when the captured Afghans began to be taken out, they also had white armbands on their sleeves. After the battle, the losses were counted. In total, five people died in the special groups of the KGB of the USSR during the storming of the palace. Almost everyone was wounded, but those who could hold weapons in their hands continued to fight. In the “Muslim” battalion and the 9th parachute company, 14 people were killed and more than 50 were wounded. Moreover, 23 people who were wounded remained in service. The battalion medic took the seriously wounded soldiers in an infantry fighting vehicle, first to the first aid station, and then to various medical institutions deployed at that time in Kabul. In the evening the seriously wounded were transported to the Soviet embassy, ​​and in the morning next day They were sent by plane to Tashkent. On the same day, December 27, the airborne units of the 103rd division and units of the 345th regiment, as well as the forces assigned to them from the border guards, the KGB of the USSR groups "Zenit" and "Grom" reached the location military units and connections, important administrative and special facilities in the capital and established their control over them. The capture of these key objects took place in an organized manner, with minimal losses.

Progress of the war

The Soviet command hoped to entrust the suppression of the uprising to Kabul troops, which, however, were greatly weakened by mass desertion and were unable to cope with this task. For a number of years, a “limited contingent” controlled the situation in the main cities, while the rebels felt relatively free in the countryside. Changing tactics, Soviet troops tried to deal with the rebels using tanks, helicopters and airplanes, but highly mobile groups of Mujahideen easily avoided attacks. The bombing of populated areas and the destruction of crops also did not produce results, but by 1982, about 4 million Afghans had fled to Pakistan and Iran. Supplies of weapons from other countries allowed the partisans to hold out until 1989, when the new Soviet leadership withdrew troops from Afghanistan.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages: stage: December 1979 - February 1980. Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects. stage: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and engineer units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place. Stage: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

afghanistan war soviet contingent

5. Conclusion Soviet wars from Afghanistan

Changes in foreign policy Soviet leadership during the period of “perestroika” contributed to a political settlement of the situation. The situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Western forecasts that the Kabul regime would fall immediately after the end of the Soviet military presence due to its complete unviability, and that a coalition government of Mujahideen groups would lead the country to peace after the expulsion of the “communist plague” turned out to be unfounded. On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the USSR, USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a phased peaceful solution to the Afghan problem. The Soviet government pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. This event did not bring peace, as various mujahideen factions continued to fight for power among themselves.

According to updated official data, the irretrievable losses of Soviet army personnel in the Afghan War amounted to 14,427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. During the war, there were 49,984 wounded, 312 prisoners, and 18 internees. St. received wounds and concussions. 53 thousand people. A significant number of people who were admitted to hospitals on the territory of the USSR died from the consequences of severe wounds and injuries. These people who died in hospitals were not included in the number of officially announced losses. The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

Consequences of the war

After the withdrawal of the Soviet army from the territory of Afghanistan, the pro-Soviet regime of Najibullah (1986-1992) lasted another 3 years and, having lost Russian support, was overthrown in April 1992 by a coalition of mujahideen field commanders. During the war years in Afghanistan, the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda appeared and groups of Islamic radicals grew stronger.

Political consequences:

In general, Soviet troops did not experience any particular difficulties in conducting military operations in Afghanistan - the main problem was that military victories were not supported by the political and economic actions of the ruling regime. Assessing the consequences of the Afghan war, it can be noted that the benefits from the intervention turned out to be negligible in comparison with the damage caused to the national interests of the USSR and Russia. The intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan caused sharp condemnation by most of the international community (including the USA, China, member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, including Pakistan and Iran, and even some socialist countries), weakened the influence of the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement, and marked the end of the “era of détente.” "The 1970s led to increased economic and technological pressure on the USSR from the West and even, to some extent, aggravated the crisis in the USSR itself.

The war in Afghanistan led to numerous casualties, wasted enormous material resources, destabilized the situation in Central Asia, contributed to the strengthening of Islam in politics, the intensification of Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism. In fact, this war was one of the factors in the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. If we talk about a lesson, then the Afghan people really taught us a lesson of courage and valor in the struggle for their age-old traditions, culture, religion, and Motherland. And all valor should be glorified and admired even in the enemy. The main conclusion drawn from the Afghan war is that fundamentally political problems cannot be solved by military means.

Information sources

1. ru.wikipedia.org - article “Afghan War 1979-1989” on Wikipedia;

History.org.ua - article “Afghan War 1979-1989” in the Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine (Ukrainian);

Mirslovarei.com - article “Afghan War” in the Historical Dictionary on the “World of Dictionaries” website;

Rian.ru - “War in Afghanistan 1979-1989.” (RIAN reference);

Rian.ru - “The statistics of losses of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan do not include those who died from wounds in hospitals in the USSR” (RIAN report).

Alexander Lyakhovsky - Tragedy and valor of Afghanistan

Psi.ece.jhu.edu - secret documents Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU related to the entry of Soviet troops and their stay in Afghanistan;

Ruswar.com - archive of war photographs and video chronicles;

Fergananews.com - “The full truth about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan has not yet been revealed” (B. Yamshanov).

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The location of Afghanistan, in the very center of Eurasia, at the junction of “South” and “Central” Asia, places it among the key regions in ensuring the stability of the military-political situation in the entire Central Asian region, where the interests of all the leading powers of the world intersect for centuries.

Soviet troops entered Afghanistan unhindered at the end of 1979. This issue contains photographs from the time of the Afghan war of 1979 - 1989.
The purpose of the entry of Soviet troops at the end of 1979 was to secure its southern borders and the USSR's desire to support the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

1. Soviet tanks near Kabul.

2. Afghan combat helicopter. Provides cover for the Soviet convoy, which supplies food and fuel to Kabul. Afghanistan, January 30, 1989.

3. Afghan refugees, May 1980. (AP Photo):

4. Mujahideen. Herat, Afghanistan, February 28, 1980.

5. Muslim insurgents with AK-47s, February 15, 1980. Despite the presence of Soviet and Afghan government troops, insurgents patrolled the mountain ranges along the Afghan border with Iran.

6. Soviet troops on the way to Afghanistan in the mid-1980s.

7. A detachment of Muslim insurgents near Kabul, February 21, 1980. At the time, they were attacking convoys moving from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

8. Soviet soldiers are observing the area.

9. Two Soviet soldiers captured.

10. Afghan partisans on top of a downed Soviet Mi-8 helicopter, January 12, 1981.

11. Before the withdrawal of Soviet troops began in May 1988, the Mujahideen had never managed to carry out a single major operation and had not managed to occupy a single major city.

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total.

12. Afghan guerrilla leader Ahmad Shah Massoud surrounded by Mujahideen, 1984.

It is curious that according to UN statistics on the demographic situation in Afghanistan, in the period from 1980 to 1990, there was a decrease in the mortality rate of the population of Afghanistan compared to previous and subsequent periods.

13. Afghan guerrilla with an American portable anti-aircraft missile system Stinger, 1987.

USSR losses are estimated at about 15,000 people.

14. Soviet soldiers leave an Afghan store in the center of Kabul, April 24, 1988.

800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government. From 3 to 8.2 billion US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget on the maintenance of the 40th Army and the conduct of combat operations.

15. A village destroyed during fighting between the Mujahideen and Afghan soldiers in Salang, Afghanistan.Rebours):

16. Mujahideen 10 kilometers from Herat, waiting for a Soviet convoy, February 15, 1980.

17. Soviet soldiers with German Shepherds trained to detect mines, Kabul 1 May 1988.

18. Mangled Soviet cars in northeast Pakistan, February 1984.

19. Mujahideen from anti-aircraft installation, July 20, 1986.

20. A Soviet plane lands at Kabul airport, February 8, 1989.

21. Our plane, cars and shell casings at the airbase in Kabul, January 23, 1989.

22. Soviet soldiers in Kabul, February 10, 1989.

23. Afghan firefighters and a girl killed in a powerful explosion in central Kabul, May 14, 1988.

24. Soviet soldiers in the center of Kabul, October 19, 1986.

25. Soviet and Afghan officers pose for the press in the center of Kabul, October 20, 1986.

26. The beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, May 1988.

27. Column Soviet tanks and military trucks leaving Afghanistan, February 7, 1989.

28. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the situation on the Soviet-Afghan border became significantly more complicated: there were shelling of the territory of the USSR, attempts to penetrate into the territory of the USSR, armed attacks on Soviet border guards, and mining of Soviet territory.