On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt Agreements were signed, ending the First Chechen War. Journalist Olesya Emelyanova found participants in the First Chechen Campaign and talked with them about the war, their life after the war, Akhmat Kadyrov and much more.
Dmitry Belousov, St. Petersburg, senior warrant officer of the riot police
In Chechnya there was always a feeling: “What am I doing here? Why is all this needed?”, but there was no other work in the 90s. My first wife told me after my first business trip: “It’s either me or the war.” Where will I go? We tried not to leave our business trips; at least we paid our salaries on time - 314 thousand. There were benefits, “combat” pay - it was pennies, I don’t remember exactly how much. And they gave me a bottle of vodka, without it I felt nauseous, in such situations it doesn’t make you drunk, but it helped me cope with stress. I fought for wages. We have a family at home, we had to feed them something. I didn’t know any background to the conflict, I didn’t read anything.
Young conscripts had to be slowly soldered off with alcohol. They are just after training, it is easier for them to die than to fight. Their eyes run wide, their heads are pulled out, they don’t understand anything. They see the blood, they see the dead - they cannot sleep.
Murder is unnatural for a person, although he gets used to everything. When the head doesn’t think, the body does everything on autopilot. It was not as scary to fight with the Chechens as with the Arab mercenaries. They are much more dangerous, they know how to fight very well.
We were prepared for the assault on Grozny for about a week. We - 80 riot police - were supposed to storm the village of Katayama. Later we learned that there were 240 militants there. Our tasks included reconnaissance in force, and then the internal troops were supposed to replace us. But nothing worked out. Ours also hit us. There was no connection. We have our own police radio, the tankers have their own wave, and the helicopter pilots have their own. We are passing the line, the artillery is hitting, the aviation is hitting. The Chechens were scared and thought they were some kind of fools. According to rumors, the Novosibirsk riot police were initially supposed to storm Katayama, but their commander refused. That's why they sent us from reserve to the assault.
I had friends among Chechens in opposition areas. In Shali, for example, in Urus-Martan.
After the fighting, some people drank themselves to death, others ended up in a mental hospital - some were taken straight from Chechnya to a mental hospital. There was no adaptation. The wife left immediately. I can't remember anything good. Sometimes it seems that it is better to erase all this from memory in order to live on and move forward. And sometimes you want to speak out.
There seem to be benefits, but everything is only on paper. There are no levers on how to get them. I still live in the city, it’s easier for me, but for rural residents it’s completely impossible. There are arms and legs - and that’s good. The main trouble is that you rely on the state, which promises you everything, and then it turns out that no one needs you. I felt like a hero and received the Order of Courage. It was my pride. Now I look at everything differently.
If they offered to go and fight now, I would probably go. It's easier there. There is an enemy and there is a friend, black and white - you stop seeing the shades. But in peaceful life you have to twist and bend. It's tiring. When Ukraine began, I wanted to go, but my current wife dissuaded me.
Vladimir Bykov, Moscow, infantry sergeant
When I came to Chechnya, I was 20 years old. It was a conscious choice; I applied to the military registration and enlistment office and left as a contract soldier in May 1996. Before that, I studied at a military school for two years, and at school I studied bullet shooting.
In Mozdok we were loaded into a Mi-26 helicopter. It felt like you were seeing footage from an American movie. When we arrived in Khankala, the soldiers who had already served for some time offered me a drink. They gave me a glass of water. I took a sip, and my first thought was: “Where should I throw this out?” The taste of “war water” with bleach and pantocides is a kind of point of no return and the understanding that there is no turning back.
I didn’t and don’t feel like a hero. To become a hero in war, you must either die, commit an act that becomes public knowledge, or be close to the commander. And commanders, as a rule, are far away.
My goal in the war was minimal losses. I didn’t fight for the Reds or the Whites, I fought for my guys. In war, a reassessment of values occurs; you begin to look at life differently.
The feeling of fear begins to disappear after about a month, and this is very bad; indifference to everything appears. Each of them came out differently. Some smoked, some drank. I wrote letters. He described the mountains, the weather, the local people and their customs. Then he tore up these letters. It was still not possible to send.
It was psychologically difficult, because it is often not clear whether you are a friend or an enemy. It seems that during the day a person calmly goes to work, and at night he goes out with a machine gun and fires at checkpoints. During the day you are on normal terms with him, and in the evening he shoots at you.
For ourselves, we divided the Chechens into lowland and mountainous. Lowlanders are more intelligent people, more integrated into our society. But those living in the mountains have a completely different mentality; a woman is nothing to them. Ask a lady for documents for verification - and this may be perceived as a personal insult to her husband. We came across women from mountain villages who didn’t even have passports.
One day, at a checkpoint at the intersection with Serzhen-Yurt, we stopped a car. A man came out with a yellow ID card in English and Arabic. It turned out to be Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov. We talked quite peacefully household topics. He asked if there was anything he could do to help. At that time we had difficulties with food; there was no bread. Then he brought us two trays of loaves of bread to the checkpoint. They wanted to give him money, but he didn’t take it.
I think that we could end the war in such a way that there would not be a second Chechen one. It was necessary to go to the end, and not conclude a peace agreement on shameful terms. Many soldiers and officers then felt that the state had betrayed them.
When I returned home, I threw myself into my studies. I studied at one institute, at the same time in another, and also worked to keep my brain occupied. Then he defended his Ph.D. dissertation.
When I was a student, I was sent to a course in psychosocial support for survivors of hot spots, organized by a Dutch university. I then thought that Holland did not fight with anyone in Lately. But they answered me that Holland took part in the Indonesian war in the late 40s - as many as two thousand people. I suggested showing them a videotape from Chechnya as educational material. But their psychologists turned out to be morally unprepared and asked not to show the recording to the audience.
Andrey Amosov, St. Petersburg, SOBR major
I knew that I would be an officer from the third or fourth grade. My dad is a policeman, now retired, my grandfather is an officer, my brother is also an officer, my great-grandfather died in Finnish war. At the genetic level, this has borne fruit. At school I played sports, then there was the army, the group special purpose. I have always had a desire to give back to my homeland, and when I was offered to join a special rapid response unit, I agreed. There was no doubt whether to go or not, I took the oath. During my military service I was in Ingushetia, it was clear to me what kind of mentality awaited me. I understood where I was going.
When you go to SOBR, it’s stupid not to think that you could lose your life. But my choice was conscious. I am ready to give my life for my homeland and for my friends. What doubts are there? Politics should be handled by politicians, and military structures should carry out orders. I believe that the introduction of troops into Chechnya both under Yeltsin and under Putin was correct, so that the radical theme would not spread further on Russian territory.
For me, the Chechens have never been enemies. My first friend at the technical school was a Chechen, his name was Khamzat. In Chechnya, we gave them rice and buckwheat; we had good food, but they were in need.
We worked on the leaders of gangs. We captured one of them in battle at four o'clock in the morning and destroyed it. For this I received a medal “For Courage”.
On special missions we acted coherently, as a single team. The tasks were set different, sometimes difficult to achieve. And these are not only combat missions. It was necessary to survive in the mountains, to freeze, to take turns sleeping near the stove and to warm each other with hugs when there was no firewood. All boys are heroes to me. The team helped overcome fear when the militants were 50 meters away and shouted “Surrender!” When I remember Chechnya, I more imagine the faces of my friends, how we joked, our unity. The humor was specific, on the verge of sarcasm. I think I underestimated this before.
It was easier for us to adapt because we worked in the same department and went on business trips together. Time passed, and we ourselves expressed a desire to go to the North Caucasus again. Physical factor worked. The feeling of fear that adrenaline gives had a strong influence. I regarded combat missions as both duty and relaxation.
It would be interesting to look at modern Grozny. When I saw it, it looked like Stalingrad. Nowadays I periodically dream about the war and have disturbing dreams.
Alexander Podskrebaev, Moscow, GRU special forces sergeant
I came to Chechnya in 1996. We didn’t have a single conscript, only officers and contract soldiers. I went because adults should defend the Motherland, not young puppies. In our battalion we had no travel allowances, only combat allowances; we received $100 a month. I didn’t go for money, but to fight for my country. “If the homeland is in danger, then everyone should go to the front,” Vysotsky also sang.
The war in Chechnya did not appear out of the blue; it was Yeltsin’s fault. He himself armed Dudayev - when our units were withdrawn from there, all the warehouses of the North Caucasus Military District were left to him. I talked to ordinary Chechens; they saw this war in their graves. They lived normally, everyone was satisfied with life. It was not the Chechens who started the war and not Dudayev, but Yeltsin. One complete setup.
The Chechens fought, some for money, some for their homeland. They had their own truth. I didn't have the feeling that they were completely evil. But there is no truth in war.
In war you are obliged to follow orders, there’s no escape, even criminal orders. Afterwards you have the right to appeal them, but first you must comply. And we carried out criminal orders. That's when, for example, they brought the Maikop brigade into Grozny under New Year. The scouts knew that this could not be done, but the order was from above. How many boys were driven to their deaths? This was betrayal in its purest form.
Take, for example, the cash-in-transit KamAZ with money, which was standing near the headquarters of the 205th brigade when the Khasavyurt agreements were signed. Bearded guys came and loaded bags of money. The FSB allegedly gave money to the militants for the restoration of Chechnya. But we didn’t pay wages, but Yeltsin gave us Zippo lighters.
For me, the real heroes are Budanov and Shamanov. My chief of staff is a hero. While in Chechnya, he managed to write scientific work about the rupture of an artillery barrel. This is a person through whom the power of Russian weapons will become stronger. The Chechens also had heroism. They were characterized by both fearlessness and self-sacrifice. They defended their land, they were told that they were attacked.
I believe that the occurrence of PTSD greatly depends on the attitude of society. If they constantly say to your face, “You’re a murderer!”, this can traumatize someone. There were no syndromes during the Great Patriotic War, because the homeland of the heroes greeted us.
We need to talk about the war from a certain angle so that people don’t do stupid things. There will still be peace, only part of the people will be killed. And not the worst part. This makes no sense.
Alexander Chernov, Moscow, retired colonel, internal troops
In Chechnya, I worked as the head of a computer center. We left on July 25, 1995. There were four of us traveling: me as the head of the computer center and three of my employees. We arrived in Mozdok and got off the plane. The first impression is wild heat. We were taken by helicopter to Khankala. By tradition, in all hot spots the first day is a non-working day. I brought with me two liter bottles of White Eagle vodka and two loaves of Finnish sausage. The men put out Kizlyar cognac and sturgeon.
The internal troops camp in Khankala was a quadrangle surrounded by barbed wire. At the entrance there was a rail in case of artillery attacks to raise the alarm. The four of us lived in a trailer. It was quite convenient, we even had a refrigerator. The freezer was filled with bottles of water because the heat was unbearable.
Our computer center was engaged in collecting and processing all information, primarily operational information. Previously, all information was transmitted via ZAS (classified communication equipment). And six months before Chechnya, we got a device called RAMS - I don’t know how it stands for. This device made it possible to connect a computer with the ZAS, and we could transmit secret information to Moscow. In addition to internal work such as all sorts of certificates, twice a day - at 6 am and 12 midnight - we transmitted operational summary to Moscow. Despite the fact that the volume of files was small, the connection was sometimes poor, and the process took a long time.
We had a video camera and filmed everything. The most important footage is the negotiations of Romanov (Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia, Commander of the Internal Troops Anatoly Romanov) with Maskhadov (one of the separatist leaders Aslan Maskhadov). There were two operators at the negotiations: from their side and from ours. The secretaries took the tape from us, and it future fate I don't know. Or, for example, a new howitzer appeared. Romanov told us: “Go and film how it works.” Our cameraman also filmed the story of how the heads of three foreign journalists were found. We sent the film to Moscow, they processed it there and showed the story on television.
May 1996, airfield of the military base in Khankala
The war was very unprepared. Drunk Grachev and Yegorov sent the tankers to Grozny on New Year’s Eve, and they were all burned there. Sending tanks to the city is not entirely the right decision. And the personnel were not prepared. It got to the point that the Marines were removed from Far East and they threw it there. People need to be trained, but here the boys were almost straight out of training and thrown into battle. The losses could have been avoided; in the second campaign there were an order of magnitude fewer of them. The truce provided a short respite.
I am sure that the first Chechen war could have been avoided. I believe that the main culprits of this war are Yeltsin, Grachev and Yegorov, they unleashed it. If Yeltsin had appointed Dudayev deputy minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and entrusted him with the North Caucasus, he would have restored order there. The civilian population suffered from the militants. But when we bombed their villages, they rose up against us. Intelligence during the first Chechen war worked very poorly. There were no agents, they lost all the agents. Whether there were militants in the destroyed villages or not, it is impossible to say for sure.
My friend, a military officer, with orders all over his chest, took off his shoulder straps and refused to go to Chechnya. He said that this is the wrong war. He even refused to apply for a pension. Proud.
My illnesses have worsened in Chechnya. It got to such a point that I couldn't work on the computer. Another mode of operation was that I slept only four hours plus a glass of cognac at night to fall asleep.
Ruslan Savitsky, St. Petersburg, private of internal troops
I came to Chechnya in December 1995 from the Perm region, where I had training in an operational battalion. We studied for six months and went to Grozny by train. We all wrote petitions so that we would be sent to the combat area and not be forced. If there is only one child in the family, then he could easily refuse.
We were lucky with the officers. These were young guys, only two or three years older than us. They always ran ahead of us and felt responsibility. Of the entire battalion, we only had one officer with combat experience who had served in Afghanistan. Only riot police were directly involved in the clean-up operations; we, as a rule, held the perimeter.
In Grozny, we lived in a school building for six months. Part of it was occupied by a riot police unit, about two floors were occupied by us. There were cars parked around, the windows covered with bricks. In the classroom where we lived there were potbelly stoves and they were heated with wood. We washed ourselves once a month and lived with lice. It was undesirable to go beyond the perimeter. I was taken out of there two weeks earlier than the others for disciplinary violations.
It was boring hanging around at school, although the food was normal. Over time, out of boredom, we started drinking. There were no shops, we bought vodka from the Chechens. It was necessary to go outside the perimeter, walk about a kilometer around the city, come to the usual a private house and say that you need alcohol. There was a high probability that you would not return. I walked around without a weapon. Just one machine gun could get you killed.
Destroyed Grozny, 1995
Local banditry is a strange thing. It seemed like a normal person during the day, but in the evening he dug out a machine gun and went to shoot. In the morning I buried the weapon and was back to normal.
The first contact with death was when our sniper was killed. He shot back, he wanted to take the weapon from the dead man, he stepped on a tripwire and blew himself up. In my opinion, this is a complete lack of brains. I had no sense of the value of my own life. I wasn't afraid of death, I was afraid of stupidity. There were a lot of idiots around.
When I returned, I went to get a job in the police, but I did not have a secondary education. I passed the exams as an external student and came back again, but they gave me a ride again because I developed tuberculosis in Chechnya. Also because I drank a lot. I can’t say that the army is to blame for my alcoholism. Alcohol was present in my life before. When the second Chechen war began, I wanted to go. I came to the military registration and enlistment office, they gave me a bunch of documents, this discouraged me a little. Then a criminal record appeared for some bullshit, and my service in the army ended. I wanted courage and excitement, but it didn’t work out.
Daniil Gvozdev, Helsinki, special forces
I ended up in Chechnya by conscription. When the time came to join the army, I asked my coach to place me in good troops - we had a special purpose company in Petrozavodsk. But at the assembly point, my name was heard with those who are going to Sertolovo to become grenade launchers. It turned out that the day before, my coach had left for Chechnya as part of a combined special forces detachment. I, along with the whole “herd,” got up, went to the train, and was in the training unit for three months. Nearby there was part of the paratroopers in Pesochny, I wrote applications there several times to be accepted, and came. Then I realized that everything was useless, I passed the exams to become a radio operator of the 142nd command and staff vehicle. At night, our captain and officers raised us. One walked around in tears, saying how much he respects and loves us all, the second tried to warn. They said that we were all leaving tomorrow. The next night it was so interesting to look at this officer, I still didn’t understand why he shed tears in front of us, he was younger than I am now. He cried: “Guys, I’m going to worry about you so much!” One of the guys told him: “So get ready and come with us.”
We flew to Vladikavkaz via Mozdok. We had three months of active training, and they gave me the 159th radio station on my back. Then I was sent to Chechnya. I stayed there for nine months, I was the only signalman in our company who more or less understood something about communications. After six months, I managed to knock out an assistant - a guy from Stavropol who did not understand anything, but smoked a lot, and for him Chechnya was a paradise in general.
We performed different tasks there. One of the simple ones - they can dig up oil there with a shovel and they installed the following devices: a barrel, under it there is a gas or diesel heater, they drive the oil to a state where in the end gasoline is obtained. They sell gasoline. Huge convoys of trucks were driving. ISIS, banned in Russia, is doing the same thing in Syria. Some won't come to an agreement, they hand him over to their own people - and his barrels will burn, but some will calmly do what is needed. There was also constant work - we guarded the entire leadership of the North Caucasus Military District headquarters, we guarded Shamanov. Well, reconnaissance missions.
We had a task to capture a militant of some kind. We went out into the night to search on the outskirts of the village, and saw that cars were approaching there and draining gasoline. We noticed one comrade there, he was constantly walking around, changing the heating under the barrels, he had a machine gun, well, since a machine gun means an action movie. He had a bottle, he would come over, take a sip and hide it, well, we were lying there, watching with a friend, he said: “He has vodka, they are Muslims, you can’t drink it, so he comes here, drinks it and hides it.” The task of capturing the tongue has faded into the background; we must first grab the vodka. We crawled around, found a bottle, and there was water! This angered us and took him prisoner. This militant guy, so thin, was sent back to us after interrogation by the intelligence department. He said that he used to do Greco-Roman wrestling and did a handstand with a broken rib, I respected him greatly for that. He turned out to be the field commander’s cousin, so he was exchanged for two of our soldiers. You should have seen these soldiers: 18-year-old boys, I don’t know, their psyche is clearly broken. We wrote to this guy on a green scarf: “Nothing personal, we don’t want war.”
He asks: “Why didn’t you kill me?” We explained that we were wondering what he was drinking. And he said that they had only one Russian left in the village, they didn’t touch her, because she was a witch, everyone went to her. Two months ago she gave him a bottle of water and said: “They can kill you, drink this water and you will live.”
We were permanently located in Khankala and worked everywhere. The last time we had a demobilization chord was when Bamut was liberated. Have you seen Nevzorov’s film “Mad Company”? So we walked with them, we were on one side along the pass, they were on the other. They had one conscript in the company and it was he who was killed, but all the contract soldiers are alive. One day I was looking through binoculars, and there were some bearded people running around. The company commander says: “Let’s give them a couple of cucumbers.” They asked on the radio station, they told me the coordinates, I looked - they were running around, waving their hands. Then they show a beluga whale - what they wore under camouflage. And we realized that they were ours. It turned out that their batteries did not work for transmission and he could not transmit, but he heard me, so they started waving.
You don't remember anything in battle. Someone says: “When I saw this man’s eyes...” But I don’t remember this. The battle is over, I see that everything is fine, everyone is alive. There was a situation when we got into the ring and caused fire on ourselves, it turns out that if I lie down, there is no connection, and I need to adjust so that we don’t get hit. I wake up. The guys shout: “Good! Lie down." And I understand that if there is no connection, they will shut down their own people.
Who came up with the idea of giving children weapons at the age of 18, giving them the right to kill? If you give it, do it so that when people return they will be heroes, but now it’s Kadyrov’s bridges. I understand that they want to reconcile the two nations, everything will be erased in a few generations, but how can these generations live?
When I returned, it was the wild nineties, and almost all my friends were busy with something illegal. I found myself under investigation, a criminal record... At some point, when my head began to clear of the war fog, I waved my hand at this romance. Together with the veteran guys, we opened a public organization to support combat veterans. We work, help ourselves and others. I also paint icons.
In Chechnya, Russian troops fought under the tsars, when the Caucasus region was just part of Russian Empire. But in the nineties of the last century, a real massacre began there, the echoes of which have not subsided to this day. The Chechen war in 1994-1996 and in 1999-2000 are two disasters for the Russian army.
Prerequisites for the Chechen wars
The Caucasus has always been a very difficult region for Russia. Issues of nationality, religion, and culture have always been raised very sharply and were resolved in far from peaceful ways.
After it collapsed in 1991 Soviet Union, in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, on the basis of national and religious hostility, the influence of separatists increased, as a result of which the Republic of Ichkeria was self-proclaimed. She entered into confrontation with Russia.
In November 1991, Boris Yeltsin, then the President of Russia, issued a decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic.” But this decree was not supported in the Supreme Council of Russia, due to the fact that most of the seats there were occupied by Yeltsin’s opponents.
In 1992, on March 3, Dzhokhar Dudayev said that he would enter into negotiations only when Chechnya received complete independence. A few days later, on the twelfth, the Chechen parliament adopted a new constitution, self-proclaiming the country as a secular independent state.
Almost immediately all government buildings, all military bases, all strategically important objects were captured. The territory of Chechnya completely came under the control of the separatists. From that moment on, legitimate centralized power ceased to exist. The situation got out of control: the trade in arms and people flourished, drug trafficking passed through the territory, bandits robbed the population (especially the Slavic ones).
In June 1993, soldiers from Dudayev's personal guard seized the parliament building in Grozny, and Dudayev himself proclaimed the emergence of a “sovereign Ichkeria” - a state that he completely controlled.
A year later, the First Chechen War (1994-1996) will begin, which will mark the beginning of a whole series of wars and conflicts that have become, perhaps, the bloodiest and most brutal throughout the entire territory of the former Soviet Union.
First Chechen: the beginning
In 1994, on the eleventh of December, Russian troops in three groups entered the territory of Chechnya. One entered from the west, through North Ossetia, another - through Mozdok, and the third group - from the territory of Dagestan. Initially, command was entrusted to Eduard Vorobyov, but he refused and resigned, citing complete unpreparedness for this operation. Later, the operation in Chechnya will be headed by Anatoly Kvashnin.
Of the three groups, only the Mozdok group was able to successfully reach Grozny on December 12th - the other two were blocked in different parts Chechnya by local residents and partisan detachments militants. A few days later, the remaining two groups Russian troops approached Grozny and blocked it from all sides, with the exception of the southern direction. Until the start of the assault from this side, access to the city would be free for militants; this later influenced the siege of Grozny by federal troops.
Storm of Grozny
On December 31, 1994, the assault began, which claimed many lives of Russian soldiers and remained one of the most tragic episodes in Russian history. About two hundred units of armored vehicles entered Grozny from three sides, which were almost powerless in the conditions of street fighting. There was poor communication between the companies, which made it difficult to coordinate joint actions.
Russian troops are stuck on the streets of the city, constantly falling under the crossfire of militants. The battalion of the Maykop brigade, which advanced the furthest to the city center, was surrounded and was almost completely destroyed along with its commander, Colonel Savin. The battalion of the Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment, which went to the rescue of the “Maikopians”, after two days of fighting consisted of about thirty percent of the original composition.
By the beginning of February, the number of attackers was increased to seventy thousand people, but the assault on the city continued. It was not until the third of February that Grozny was blocked from the south and encircled.
On March 6, part of the last detachments of Chechen separatists was killed, others left the city. Grozny remained under the control of Russian troops. In fact, little remained of the city - both sides actively used both artillery and armored vehicles, so Grozny was practically in ruins.
In the rest of the area there were continuous local battles between Russian troops and militant groups. In addition, the militants prepared and carried out a series (June 1995) in Kizlyar (January 1996). In March 1996, militants made an attempt to recapture Grozny, but the assault was repelled by Russian soldiers. And Dudayev was liquidated.
In August, the militants repeated their attempt to take Grozny, this time they were successful. Many important facilities in the city were blocked by the separatists, and Russian troops suffered very heavy losses. Along with Grozny, the militants took Gudermes and Argun. On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt Agreement was signed - the First Chechen War ended with huge losses for Russia.
Human losses in the First Chechen War
The data varies depending on which side is doing the counting. Actually, this is not surprising and it has always been this way. Therefore, all options are provided below.
Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 1 according to the headquarters of the Russian troops):
The two numbers in each column indicating the losses of Russian troops are two headquarters investigations that were conducted a year apart.
According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the consequences of the Chechen war are completely different. The number of people killed there alone is about fourteen thousand.
Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 2) of militants according to Ichkeria and a human rights organization:
Among the civilian population, Memorial put forward a figure of 30-40 thousand people, and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A. I. Lebed - 80,000.
Second Chechen: main events
Even after the signing of the peace agreements, Chechnya did not become calmer. Militants were in charge, there was a brisk trade in drugs and weapons, people were kidnapped and killed. There was anxiety on the border between Dagestan and Chechnya.
After a series of kidnappings of major businessmen, officers, and journalists, it became clear that the continuation of the conflict in a more acute phase was simply inevitable. Moreover, since April 1999, small groups of militants began to probe weak spots defense of Russian troops, preparing for the invasion of Dagestan. The invasion operation was led by Basayev and Khattab. The place where the militants planned to strike was in the mountainous zone of Dagestan. There, the small number of Russian troops was combined with the inconvenient location of the roads, along which reinforcements could not be transferred very quickly. On August 7, 1999, militants crossed the border.
The main striking force of the bandits were mercenaries and Islamists from Al-Qaeda. The fighting continued for almost a month with varying success, but finally the militants were driven back to Chechnya. At the same time, the bandits carried out a number of terrorist attacks in different cities of Russia, including Moscow.
As a response, on September 23, a powerful shelling of Grozny began, and a week later, Russian troops entered Chechnya.
Human losses in the Second Chechen War among Russian military personnel
The situation changed, and Russian troops now played a dominant role. But many mothers never saw their sons.
Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 3):
In June 2010, the commander in chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs cited the following figures: 2,984 killed and about 9,000 wounded.
Militant losses
Losses in the Chechen War (table No. 4):
Civilian casualties
According to officially confirmed data, as of February 2001, over a thousand civilians were killed. In the book by S. V. Ryazantsev “Demographic and migration portrait North Caucasus"the losses of the parties in the Chechen war are said to be five thousand people, although we're talking about already about 2003
Judging by the assessment of the Amnesty International organization, which calls itself non-governmental and objective, there were about twenty-five thousand civilian deaths. They can count for a long time and diligently, but when asked: “How many actually died in the Chechen war?” - hardly anyone will give an intelligible answer.
Results of the war: peace conditions, restoration of Chechnya
While the Chechen war was going on, the loss of equipment, enterprises, land, any resources and everything else was not even considered, because people always remain the main ones. But the war ended, Chechnya remained part of Russia, and the need arose to restore the republic practically from ruins.
Huge amounts of money were allocated for Grozny. After several assaults there were almost no entire buildings left there, and on this moment it is a big and beautiful city.
The economy of the republic was also raised artificially - it was necessary to give time for the population to get used to the new realities, so that new factories and farms could be built. Roads, communication lines, and electricity were needed. Today we can say that the republic has almost completely emerged from the crisis.
Chechen wars: reflected in films, books
Dozens of films were made based on events that took place in Chechnya. Many books have been published. Nowadays it is no longer clear what is fiction and what is real horrors war. The Chechen war (like the war in Afghanistan) claimed too many lives and swept through an entire generation, so it simply could not remain unnoticed. Russia's losses in the Chechen wars are colossal, and, according to some researchers, the losses are even greater than during the ten years of war in Afghanistan. Below is a list of films that most deeply show us the tragic events of the Chechen campaigns.
- documentary film of five episodes "Chechen Trap";
- "Purgatory";
- "Cursed and Forgotten";
- "Prisoner of the Caucasus".
Many fiction and journalistic books describe the events in Chechnya. For example, the now famous writer Zakhar Prilepin fought as part of the Russian troops, who wrote the novel “Pathologies” specifically about this war. Writer and publicist Konstantin Semenov published a series of stories "Grozny Stories" (about the storming of the city) and the novel "We were betrayed by our homeland." Vyacheslav Mironov’s novel “I Was in This War” is dedicated to the storming of Grozny.
Video recordings made in Chechnya by rock musician Yuri Shevchuk are widely known. He and his group "DDT" performed more than once in Chechnya in front of Russian soldiers in Grozny and at military bases.
Conclusion
The State Council of Chechnya published data from which it follows that almost one hundred and sixty thousand people died between 1991 and 2005 - this figure includes militants, civilians, and Russian soldiers. One hundred sixty thousand.
Even if the numbers are exaggerated (which is quite likely), the volume of losses is still simply colossal. Russia's losses in the Chechen wars are a terrible memory of the nineties. The old wound will ache and itch in every family that lost a man there, in the Chechen war.
“If they had started to have a normal dialogue with Maskhadov and Dudayev, I think such bloodshed would not have happened.”
“You don’t expect beautiful stories from me about the Chechen war,” my interlocutor begins. - I don’t know how to tell them. And war is dirty. How can you talk about dirt beautifully? War is also pain. Is there romance in pain?
I agree with him. We need to talk about the war simply and honestly. Or remain silent. However, no, you cannot remain silent. And now, after dozens of films have been made about the Chechen war, hundreds of books have been written, we are remembering it again. Including in order to find out whether all the wounds have been “licked”? Who are the Chechens today for the “Chechens” (soldiers who went through the war)?
Deputy commander of one of the reconnaissance units of the Airborne Forces, Valery YURIEV, went through both Chechen campaigns from beginning to end. His unit lost 46 fighters, 11 received the title of Hero of Russia (in total there were more than 800 people).
HELP "MK"
Valery Yuryev was born in 1957 in Mariupol. Reserve Guard Colonel. Military service served in reconnaissance Airborne troops and in the GRU General Staff. He was the commander of a reconnaissance platoon, company, parachute battalion, chief of staff of a parachute regiment, teacher at the Military Diplomatic Academy, etc. Participated in combat operations in Afghanistan, in two Chechen campaigns, in Dagestan; in resolving interethnic conflicts - in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh; V peacekeeping operation- in Bosnia and Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia). He was awarded two Orders of the Red Star, two Orders of Courage, the Order of Military Merit, the Medal for Military Merit and other medals, and personalized firearms.
“Novorossiya reminds me of Chechnya”
“You’ve probably asked yourself more than once: could this war have been prevented?” Found the answer?
— I didn’t ask because I always knew it was possible. The leaders of Chechnya, Dudayev and Maskhadov, were professional military men. One is a general, the other is a colonel. Literate people, not religious fanatics, not Nazis. If they had started a normal dialogue with them from the very beginning, then I think such bloodshed would not have happened. But they were simply ignored, just as the Donetsk and Lugansk republics were ignored in Ukraine now.
—Aren’t you afraid to draw such historical parallels?
- No. If the Ukrainian authorities in Donetsk and Lugansk would allow them to speak Russian, they would give them some kind of independence, and there would be no war. But the leadership of today's Ukraine did not make concessions. And this is what is happening now...
A similar situation existed then with Chechnya. If Yeltsin and his entourage had entered into a dialogue (it’s no secret that Chechnya is now better funded than many regions, so why not give it money from the very beginning?), they would not have given rise to such popular resistance.
— Tell us how Chechnya greeted you then, 20 years ago.
— About a month and a half before the start of hostilities, our unit was concentrated at the airfield in Mozdok (North Ossetia). I, as deputy unit commander, was responsible for combat training. And despite all the prohibitions (it was forbidden to shoot there), I organized shooting with all types of weapons, except heavy machine guns. Taught the guys tactics. I knew what war was, and I trained soldiers seriously. But we did not have any specific tasks.
The reconnaissance groups of our unit by that time, of course, were already on the territory of Chechnya. That is, before the official entry of troops (this date is considered to be December 11, 1994).
-What were they doing there?
— The main task was to understand whether there would be resistance from the local population and, if so, to what extent.
- So you had hope that everything would work out?
- Yes! We didn't believe there would be a big confrontation. But then intelligence reported that the situation was serious. My subordinates talked with the leaders of the gangs - they unequivocally said that they would go to the end.
— Have you personally communicated with local residents? What did they say?
- You see, I communicated with them when this war had already broken out. The first Chechen campaign began with the assault on Grozny, the massive use of troops, when everyone was mixed up in a bloody mess - both the Chechens and ours. There's no time for talking here.
Photo from personal archive
But in the second Chechen campaign there was time for this. Our unit was part of the “Vostok” group, it was headed by Gennady Troshev, who himself lived in Grozny at one time and knew the Chechen language. And his main course was not to suppress the separatists, but to dialogue. Then meetings were held with local residents (especially with elders). We persuaded them that armed resistance was pointless, because it would only lead to the destruction of cities and the death of people. The elders were understanding and did everything to ensure that the gangs left the settlements that our troops occupied. Sometimes even without a fight. I think it was thanks to the elders that Akhmat Kadyrov came over to our side.
— Military historians believe that the first soldiers of the first Chechen war were just cannon fodder. Do you agree?
— Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is a former paratrooper himself. In Afghanistan, he severely punished commanders who suffered casualties. But politics intervened here. And mistakes followed one after another. And each one cost lives. Just one example. From the servicemen of the Kantemirovskaya and Taman divisions, supposedly volunteer tank units were formed, which entered Grozny without any cover. It was unclear why they even entered there?! I'm sure it was a well-thought-out provocation. As a result, they were surrounded by local formations, captured, and most of the people were killed.
— Is it true that the troops were often commanded by the special services, and not by the Ministry of Defense?
- To a certain degree. The deployment of troops should be handled by the army command, but sometimes it was not they who were involved, but someone who didn’t know. Everything was organized stupidly and poorly. And this was visible even in the smallest details. One day I was returning from one operation and noticed a flare in the sky. I approached and saw the following picture: one Russian soldier was standing at his post, unhappy, frightened, not understanding anything. He allegedly guards a small group of military personnel who sleep there. The militants didn’t even need 5 minutes to kill them all! Well, who fights like that?! What kind of preparation is this?
— But when you went to Chechnya, you had no illusions about the political situation? Were you not afraid because the orders coming from above were completely ill-conceived or even criminal?
- Not scary. Until they start shooting, many people think that this is not happening to them.
And there is no discussion about following orders in the army. And killing a person is essentially a crime. And we all went to kill. You see, since Afghanistan, where I was a reconnaissance company commander, I’m used to carrying out even stupid orders from my superiors with the highest quality and with minimal losses. They told me: go straight and capture this settlement. I told them “yes!” and did not go straight, but to the left, but captured. The task is eventually completed, and the winners are not judged.
— Yes, our company took part in this operation, but I personally, unfortunately, was on vacation. When our losses began - four people in my unit were wounded - I returned on my own initiative: I deceived my wife, said that they were calling me, boarded a plane and arrived.
The assault was completely unprepared, and it was not so much the military that was to blame as the politicians. It was they who gave the unexpected command to occupy Grozny, no matter what. Due to the rush, the units were even staffed by sailors from the ships! A hodgepodge, roughly speaking. Plus it was the end of 1994, the army was in moral decline after all the coups. In those years, if an officer walked along a Moscow street in uniform, he could be caught and beaten. Why do you think the Ministry of Defense later allowed officers to go to work in civilian clothes?
We in Chechnya did not understand how we should act in this or that situation. I once listened to negotiations and learned that our convoy of 200 cars in one of the settlements was stopped by the local population. The commanders ask: “What should we do? We are not riot police, we do not have the means to disperse a demonstration.” As a result, the column turned around. The task was disrupted.
And against the backdrop of all this, Grozny is being stormed...
Grozny during the Chechen war. Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
"The maps were old and the soldiers were too young"
—What shocked you in this war?
— The fact that individual Chechens acted like savages: they cut throats, cut off ears, fingers. I am sure that a mentally normal person cannot do this. They used all this for one purpose - to intimidate. You know, I am glad that none of my soldiers were captured or tortured. All 46 people I lost died in battle.
— But at the same time, the Chechens fought competently and professionally?
- Well, how can a peasant fight competently? Of course, nothing like that happened, especially at the initial stage. But they had advantages. Here again I will give a parallel with Afghanistan. Everyone said: they say, Afghans are more resilient and excellent warriors. We fought with them in mountainous area, each carried 40 kg of weapons and equipment. And the Afghan carried a maximum of 5 kg: a machine gun, thin pants and a T-shirt, a handful of nuts, a flask of water. Which of us will be more resilient? So it is here. The Chechens fought on their own territory. But we didn’t understand where we were going because the maps were old.
But the main thing is that the Chechens had higher motivation, they knew what they were fighting for. And we were simply following orders. Our fighters are conscripts, young people. What about them? Grown bearded men who are not afraid to die.
“But we had quite a few contract soldiers who went to kill for money.”
— In the first campaign there were practically none. And it would be wrong to say unequivocally that the contract soldiers were there for the money. And was it really a lot of money? On average 15-18 thousand. Mercenaries at any time foreign army they pay ten times more. There were many who fought for the idea.
- Which one?!
— The idea appears when your comrade is killed before your eyes. Then the desire for revenge is born. I knew those who were conscripts during the first campaign, and came to the second as a contract soldier, and precisely because they wanted to get even for their murdered friend.
And now I’ll tell you another case “about money”. Andrei Nepryakhin worked in the security service of Lukoil, received huge amounts of money, and then went to fight in Chechnya. Why? Because he wanted to save the youth - he had experience, he was the deputy battalion commander. As a result, he led one of our groups near Gudermes. She was the first to arrive at the site of the death of the 6th company, ensured the evacuation of the survivors, and then removed the bodies of the dead. During another operation he was wounded, but he remained to cover his group. Received the title of Hero of Russia.
— Were the Chechens trained by foreign intelligence services during the second campaign or is this a “duck”?
- Yes, but not as massively as they are trying to present. These were intelligence services mainly from the Middle East, Arab. And during the war, the Chechens learned from their own experience; accordingly, the tactics of their actions were constantly improved, based on the experience they received.
— How did you prepare your soldiers?
- Until the seventh sweat. A soldier should not be pitied at all during training; this will save his life in battle. He must know what maneuver to do in what situation. When to shoot, when to lie down, when to run and where. Only in this case does he have a chance to survive. When the shooting starts, it is useless to command. You won’t finish shouting. My voice is hoarse, why do you think? From screaming.
Let me give you another example. For the machine gun - 450 rounds, each weighing 10 grams, totaling 4.5 kg. I ordered to carry two rounds of ammunition, that is, 9 kg each. Hard. But I knew: the fighter would definitely have enough for the fight. It’s bad when individual commanders, supposedly caring about their subordinates, say: oh well, don’t take a lot of ammunition with you. And, as a rule, if they are surrounded, they run out of ammunition within 10 minutes.
- What about discipline between them and us? I once talked to a man who went through two Chechen campaigns. He talked about the drugs they had. About the drinking parties that took place before the fight to gain courage.
- In our reconnaissance company this was excluded, but in other units everything could have happened. I remember that in Afghanistan, the Americans used tactics such as free distribution of heroin to discredit and disintegrate our army. The whip boys ran along the barbed wire and for a can of porridge, for gloves they gave our soldiers a package like a package of ascorbic acid. The main task, of course, was not to make money, but to spread this poison.
As for alcohol, we weren’t allowed any combat 100 grams. But in the markets, Chechens sold alcohol; there was an opportunity to buy and get drunk. And yet I won’t say that there was some kind of continuous drunkenness. The soldiers were under strong control.
- A Chechen fighters went into battle while high?
“Once we arrived in Khasavyurt, a day or two before there was a bloody battle, and I saw: the corpses of militants were lying, and syringes were lying around.
“However, their leadership thought more than sensibly. What was the Khasavyurt agreement worth... By the way, how was it signed?
“A special detachment of our unit ensured the safety of the delegation headed by Alexander Lebed. There were 10 of our military men, and they were practically going to their death. We understood that we could be shot at any moment. They drove in Niva jeeps; in each car there was one authoritative Dagestani as a guarantor of safety. But it was more likely a formality - his presence would hardly have saved.
The agreement was signed on enslaving terms, that’s true. We pledged to withdraw troops, but most importantly, in fact, after 5 years, Chechnya was supposed to separate from Russia.
Unfortunately, there was betrayal both in political circles and in the military. Throughout the campaign, secret information was leaked to the Chechens. I think for money. For crazy money. Who paid? Arabs mostly. But the Americans also took part in this, and where would we be without them, our “relatives”...
— Did the Chechen commanders give a reward for your head?
- No, as far as I know. But they threatened our families with violence. Our wives and children then lived in a military town - I won’t name the place - and they were heavily guarded. Nothing happened to anyone.
— And now the Chechens are enemies for you? How do you generally feel about the current leadership of Chechnya?
- No, not enemies. They are part of our people, and that’s how I treat them. With my own quirks, of course. But what nationality doesn't have them? I have a close friend who is Chechen. And the Chechens are now “more Russian than the Russians themselves,” and this is the merit of the current leadership of Russia and Chechnya.
— Have you been to Chechnya after the war?
- No never. I would probably like to see modern Grozny. But I see what he has become on TV. Sometimes I can't even believe it. In my memory, this is a city where devastation, blood, pain, tears reign...
The program is hosted by Andrey Shary. Participants: Chairman of the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia Valentina Melnikova, presenter of the Radio Liberty "Caucasian Chronicles" program Oleg Kusov, RS correspondents Musa Khasanov and Lyubov Chizhova.
Andrey Shary: According to the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia, since the fall of 1999, almost 11 thousand military personnel have died in Chechnya. However, according to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, losses in Chechnya are much lower. Oleg Kusov worked on the topic:
Oleg Kusov: Russian authorities claim that since the beginning of the second military campaign in Chechnya, 4.5 thousand military and police personnel have been killed. Some public organizations decided to make their own calculations. The degree of trust in official statistics in our country is low, especially when it comes to Chechnya. For example, it is still unknown how much money from the federal budget has already been spent on the so-called counter-terrorism operation, how much weapons and equipment have been allocated and lost, and where Chechen oil and non-ferrous metals are going. On the eve of the presidential and parliamentary elections in Russia, it is difficult to trust official data on casualties. Not long ago, the state news agency ITAR TASS reported that almost 5 thousand military personnel were killed in Chechnya last year alone. But immediately after this, the Ministry of Defense offered its official data. The numbers turned out to be three times less. The Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia keeps its own statistics of victims of the second Chechen campaign. The head of the union, Valentina Melnikova, says:
Valentina Melnikova: According to our estimates, since August 1999, about 11.5 thousand military personnel died on the battlefield, died from wounds in hospitals, and then died during the insurance year. This, naturally, applies to all types and branches of the military, and, of course, this includes both officers and police. More than 30 thousand wounded and injured. The official figures there are absolutely ridiculous, the last time they said that it was 4700, this does not stand up to any criticism, I never even rely on these figures. We count people as everyone who died or something happened to them in connection with the war. You have to imagine all the consequences, and there are a lot of wounded. After all, there are a lot of shell-shocked people, a lot of guys with burns and frostbite - they don’t even count according to any statistics. If he didn’t go to the hospital, this is not recorded anywhere, and now we are faced with terrible stories like this: the guy fought, he had a shell shock, and sometimes more than one, of course he was not in the medical unit, he was not in the hospital, he goes away six months after his dismissal, he begins to have headaches, he begins to binge drink, he begins to vagrancy, and the guys sometimes commit suicide. And only when the family comes to their senses and the person is taken to be examined, the doctors see that he has the consequences of a shell shock - this will last a lifetime, it can always affect him. This secrecy, latency leads to people suffering and dying.
Oleg Kusov: IN last years According to unofficial sources, up to 10 military and police officers are killed every day in Chechnya. As a rule, people are blown up by mines. The topic will be continued by my colleague Musa Khasanov:
Musa Khasanov: There have been no front-line battles in the Chechen Republic for a long time. And the front itself has not been here for a long time. Apparently, based on this, the Russian authorities adhere to the point of view that the war in Chechnya is over, and on their agenda it is no longer so much the power issue as the economic issue. But can we consider that military operations in Chechnya are over if every day people, civilians, fighters of the Chechen resistance forces die here and Russian security forces suffer losses?
The 42nd Motorized Rifle Division of the Russian Ministry of Defense is the largest military formation stationed in Chechnya, on the territory of the central base of the Joint Group of Russian Forces in Khankala. According to an informed source from the headquarters of this division, during the period from October 2002 to February of this year, the 42nd division lost about two hundred servicemen killed and wounded. Most of them were damaged as a result of mine-explosive activities on the territory of Grozny.
Lightning-fast victorious war in Chechnya, which was promised Russian generals the Kremlin leadership did not succeed. Hazing relations between Russian military personnel in the republic, where there are many uncontrolled weapons and no clearly organized interaction between security forces, have become widespread. In army units and among Russian employees law enforcement There are often cases when fights between contract soldiers and conscripts turn into armed confrontation. Usually, the Russian military commanders who are killed in such clashes are counted among the losses that occurred during military clashes with Chechen fighters. Russian security forces stationed in the mountainous regions of Chechnya suffer the greatest losses due to explosions in minefields laid by the military during the first Chechen campaign in order to protect their temporary locations from attacks by detachments of Chechen armed formations. Most of these minefields, scattered throughout the territory of the republic, were laid by the Russian military without mandatory maps for placing explosive devices.
The main factor in the death of Russian military personnel and police officers remains acts of sabotage carried out by Chechen fighters in all populated areas republics. How to resist Chechen saboteurs? The practice of the world's intelligence services shows that there is only one way: to know in advance about sabotage and prevent it, but for this it is necessary to cover the entire territory of the republic with an agent network, which is practically impossible for specialists of the Russian intelligence services, who are in large numbers in Chechnya. This means that it is easy to assume that, contrary to the statements of the Russian authorities about the end of hostilities and the onset of some stability in the republic, the onset of peaceful life on the long-suffering Chechen land is still far away.
Oleg Kusov: The head of the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia, Valentina Melnikova, believes that throughout the entire period of the second campaign in Chechnya, the authorities are trying to hide the real data about the dead soldiers, but public organizations use their own methods for counting the dead, wounded and missing:
Valentina Melnikova: In 2000, they completely closed all the figures, stopped publishing them altogether, and in general, even in reports from Chechnya, they stopped citing the death toll, because this idiocy of the criminal war leads to what the state is trying to do good view that nothing happens, that soldiers do not die, officers do not die, civilians do not die. This is the Soviet approach - to close everything and force everyone to say that we do not have a war.
Lyubov Chizhova: How do you get your data?
Valentina Melnikova: Our colleagues in regional organizations also have their own lists; they are given lists by military personnel from military units, which stand there, because in fact now in all regions our committees are making so-called memory books. And at the congress in the spring of 2002, according to the lists, there were about 11 thousand dead. What happens inside the country cannot be called war. The legal term that we use is internal armed conflict, because the anti-terrorist operation, if it were carried out according to the law. would have been on a completely different scale, other services would have been involved, there would have been no army, the functions of the Internal Troops would have been completely different, and, of course, there would not have been such losses on the federal side, and there would not have been this horror - the dead , missing, burned civilians. In any case, simply withdrawing troops does not solve the problem. Naturally, this is impossible, because Putin will never go against the generals. It is simply necessary to look for ways to peace. It is necessary that people at least realize the need to stop the massacre there.
Oleg Kusov: It seems that even in the pre-election year the authorities are not concerned about the large number of people killed in Chechnya. Apparently, politicians do not yet intend to end the war.
in the photo: one of the last Russian residents of Grozny meets the Russian army
Perhaps the most authoritative expert on civilian casualties in Chechnya today is Sergei Maksudov, the author of the book “Chechens and Russians: Victories, Defeats, Losses,” the presentation of which took place last summer in Moscow. Alexander Babenyshev (Maksudov is his pseudonym) now lives in the USA, but, as they say, a man in the subject - this is far from his first professional book about the Chechen wars. After its publication, the author was condemned by some human rights organizations, and some, on the contrary, supported him. Regardless of political leanings, the book “Chechens and Russians” is perhaps one of the most complete summaries of data on those killed in Chechnya.
I used various data to write the book. Both the official ones - from all the warring parties, and the research of the Memorial society,” Alexander Babenyshev commented on the documentary sources of his work. - However, I don’t always consider the latter to be the most objective. The story here remains to be sorted out.
Nevertheless, Babenyshev was able to analyze information about the number of Chechen people from early XIX centuries to the present day. And the officially registered number of Chechens at the beginning of the 19th century was 130 thousand people. Let's remember this number...
A little more arithmetic. The estimated number of Chechens in 1859 is already 172 thousand (natural population growth is comparable to similar indicators in European Russia, Stavropol region and Georgia). Their losses during the Caucasian War over 16 years (from 1859 to 1875) amounted to 27 thousand people, another 23 thousand emigrated to the Ottoman Empire. From 1816 to 1864, the Russian army lost 23 thousand killed, 62 thousand wounded and 6 thousand died from wounds in the Caucasus. The highlanders suffered greater losses than regular troops - due to artillery fire, infantry square tactics, and the bayonet was preferable to the saber in close combat.
We continue to work with the calculator. The 1926 census already speaks of a population of 395,248 people. By 1943 there were already 523,071. In 1958 - 525,060. The years from 1944 to 1948, when losses, including from deportation and participation of Chechens in war and uprisings (there were such things), went into minus. exceeded the birth rate.
Well, the most interesting part of Sergei Maksudov’s research is the period from 1991 to 1997, which included the first war and the massive outflow from the republic (and partly the destruction) of the Russian-speaking population. Before 1994, there were facts of Russians being forced to leave Chechnya. With robberies, murders and rapes. There are several hundred of them in the book. “No one was specifically engaged in collecting such information,” writes Alexander Babenyshev. “The list contains data from various publications, which do not pretend to be complete; these are just individual examples, random elements of the overall picture... However, it can be assumed that the sample fairly reflects the typical situations in which Russian residents found themselves during that period.”
Then the Russians became slaves - more than 10 thousand throughout Chechnya. The slave trade in the center of Grozny was a common occurrence, which the Chechen authorities turned a blind eye to. The road to Georgia through Itum-Kale (between the first and second Chechen wars) was built by Russian slaves. According to some estimates, there were 47 thousand of them!
November 26, 1994, when the Russian army entered Grozny, was not yet the infamous New Year's assault. The nightmare of the Chechen war was a little over a month away... But it was a nightmare for the Russian army, for Russian speakers in Chechnya. The losses of Chechen civilians were incomparably smaller!
At the beginning of the first Chechen war, Memorial human rights activists counted 25 thousand dead civilians in Grozny and, extrapolating these data to the whole of Chechnya, began to talk about 50 thousand dead. In Western publications, this figure rose to 250 thousand Chechens killed in two wars (of which supposedly 42 thousand were children). The speaker of the Chechen parliament, Dukhvakha Abdurakhmanov, once claimed that 200 thousand people were killed and another 300 thousand were missing. According to Babenyshev’s calculations, for every 200 thousand killed there should be 600,000 wounded - the average ratio for military operations - which means that every Chechen should have been either killed or wounded!
Memorial’s calculations, according to Babenyshev, are, to put it mildly, unconvincing. The author of the book estimates the military losses of the Chechens at 20 thousand people, another 8 thousand - civilians. The losses of Russian military personnel and police officers are approximately the same - 25 - 30 thousand.
These figures were calculated mostly mathematically, admits Babenyshev. - But it seems to me that they are close to the truth.
WHO WON THE LAST CHECHEN WAR?
What are the results of these considerable losses? The political goals that Russian and Chechen leaders set for themselves have been practically achieved, although all participants find themselves in a noticeably worse position than before the conflict began. Russia kept Chechnya within its borders, but received a black financial hole swallowing up huge cash. Xenophobia is growing in Russia due to the fact that the younger generation of Chechens, raised in the last two wars, suddenly began to spill out aggressively into Russian cities.
But Chechnya received completely different results - it became de facto free. Freed from the Russians. The Russians were not only driven out from the ethnographic territories of Chechen settlement, they were driven out from the ancestral Cossack lands - the plains along the left bank of the Terek. Russian-speaking citizens are eliminated from political, social and even city life. Full Chechen control has been established in the republic - now under the auspices of Ramzan Kadyrov.
Chechnya has established a unique relationship with Moscow. Chechens are not drafted into the Russian army, they pay virtually no taxes. Russia pays all Chechen expenses, supplies gas and electricity, at its expense they build and restore buildings in Chechnya, reconstruct roads (luxurious!), pay salaries to officials, police, teachers and doctors. They pay pensions, scholarships, benefits... It is noteworthy that with all this, the residents of Chechnya do not feel a sense of gratitude, considering the huge money coming to them free of charge from Russia, almost as an indemnity due to the winners, or compensation for recent (or centuries-old) suffering
