Born on July 18 (30 old style) 1898 in the village of Filippovo, Nizhny Novgorod province, Knyagininsky district, Buturlinsky volost.
Father- Ivan Vasilyevich Kazakov (1875-1931) - peasant of the village of Filippovo, Nizhny Novgorod province, Orthodox confession. He worked as a fireman in a shipping company, a janitor, and a cab driver in St. Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad.
Mother- Evdokia Andreevna Kazakova (nee Larina, 1876-1966) - peasant woman of the village of Filippovo, Nizhny Novgorod province, Orthodox confession.
Being the eighth child in the family, he began labor activity from the age of thirteen in St. Petersburg at the joint-stock company Siemens and Halske.
He served in the tsarist army from May 1916 to September 1917 as a private (Northern Front).
In the Red Army since February 1918. During the Civil War - commander of an artillery battery, participated in battles on the Northern and Western fronts.
From 1918 to 1941 went from platoon commander to chief of artillery of a mechanized corps. He devoted the entire pre-war period to an in-depth study of artillery, combining service with receiving education - general and military. Three times (in 1925, 1936 and 1939) he studied at the Artillery courses for improving the command staff of the Red Army (Workers' and Peasants' Red Army). Graduated in 1934 Military Academy them. M.V. Frunze. In 1927-1939 his fate is closely connected with the 1st Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division, where since 1933 V.I. Kazakov is the commander of an artillery regiment. Since 1939, with the rank of brigade commander, he was the chief of artillery of a division, then of a corps.
During the Great Patriotic War, Major General of Artillery V.I. Kazakov. became the chief of artillery of the mechanized corps. His talent is most pronounced in management and organization. combat use artillery appeared as the chief of artillery of the 16th Army in the Battle of Moscow, the chief of artillery of the Bryansk Front, the commander of the artillery of the Don Front in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Central Front in the Battle of Kursk, the 1st Belorussian Front during the liberation of Belarus, in the Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations. With the name V.I. Kazakov is associated with such concepts in the art of using artillery as “artillery offensive”, “double barrage”, “massive artillery strike”.
EDUCATION
- Parochial school (1911)
- Petrograd artillery command courses (1918)
- Artillery School (1925)
- Military Academy named after. Frunze (1934)
- Artillery advanced training courses for command personnel of the Red Army (AKUKS), (1925, 1929, 1936)
- Improvement courses for senior command personnel of the Red Army (KUVNAS) (1939)
Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from 1946 to 1950
PARTICIPANT
- First World War
- Civil War
- Great Patriotic War
September 1917 on the Western Front near Riga.
MILITARY RANKS
The remarkable military leader of the Great Patriotic War, Marshal of Artillery Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov, was my friend. But not only and not so much friendly feelings prompted me to write a real essay about him. Vasily Ivanovich was one of those people who, having completed their life path, thanks to their personal qualities, and most importantly, thanks to everything they have done, they continue to live, their deeds do not go away with them. The living and, above all, young people should know about them: after all, it is impossible to continue the great deeds of older generations without learning and being brought up from their rich experience.
The name and deeds of Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov are inextricably linked with the conduct of many of the most important operations of the Soviet Army against the fascist invaders, with the organization and combat use in these operations - in the Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin battles - of artillery, which was the main fire strike force of our troops. And if, evaluating the role Soviet artillery in the defeat of the fascist Wehrmacht, it was rightly figuratively called the “god of war”, then the credit for this largely belongs to its wonderful cadres, those who, with their skillful leadership, achieved the most effective use of all its capabilities. This art was masterfully mastered by Marshal of Artillery Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov, one of the outstanding organizers of the large-scale combat use of artillery during the years of the last war.
The Great Patriotic War was protracted. It lasted almost four years. But this is still not such a period of time that a major modern commander or military leader could develop and grow during it. It would be more correct to say that the last war revealed, developed and multiplied everything that had previously been achieved by the hard work and intense study of its future commanders and military leaders.
It was precisely this role in the development of Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov as a military leader that his pre-war service in the ranks of the Soviet Army played. The whole thing was a process of continuous expansion of that potential of knowledge and experience, that maturity and audacity of thought, the unquestionable will to achieve the goal, which were so brightly and fruitfully revealed in Kazakov’s activities in responsible positions in the Soviet Armed Forces during the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War.
Vasily Ivanovich and I met and became strong friends back in the 30s, when we both served in the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division: he commanded an artillery regiment, and I commanded the 3rd Rifle Regiment. Whenever possible, we tried to be together, even the two of us went to the division commander L.G. Petrovsky when he called one of us after noticing any problems. "Together again?" - Hiding a grin, the division commander said, to which Vasily Ivanovich invariably replied: “Cooperation, comrade division commander!”
First impressions last. Remembering Kazakov, I most often see him as he was in the distant 30s. Small in stature, as they say, well-cut and tightly sewn, fit, energetic, he invariably immediately aroused sympathy for himself, infecting those around him with his characteristic vitality. However, he remained almost the same in adulthood.
As usually happens between friends, we remembered the past together, shared thoughts about the future. It turned out that our biographies are very similar. We were almost the same age: Kazakov was born on July 17, 1898, and I was born a year earlier - on June 1, 1897, both came from poor peasant families, he and I were drafted into the old army in the same year, 1916, and again into the same That same year, 1918, we volunteered to join the Red Army. And in the future our destinies resembled one another. Apparently, this was how it should have been - after all, they were walking along the same road.
Already during the years of the Civil War, a military specialty was determined, or more correctly, a business to which Vasily Ivanovich devoted his entire life. In 1918, he graduated from the 2nd Petrograd Artillery Course and, commanding a battery, fought with the White Guards and interventionists on the Northern and Western Fronts.
“The civil service ended,” said Vasily Ivanovich, “and I thought: what to do next? My heart was already set on artillery, and the cat cried out of my literacy and knowledge. I began to ask to study. They sent me to an artillery school. And I suffered there! The textbooks are full of foreign terms, and at that time we didn’t understand our own, Russian ones very well. But mathematics, ballistics, calculations are different! I uprooted it, my illiteracy, like a counter at the front, where I took science by storm, where I took siege. In "I graduated from school in 1925 - it became easier. But at school I realized: if you don't study literally every day, nothing will come of you. The conclusion, as you yourself understand, is not new, but true."
This conversation took place when Vasily Ivanovich had already become a fully trained artillery commander, a man of great general erudition. Behind him was a course at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, which he graduated from in 1934. In addition, twice - in 1929 and 1936, he took advanced training courses for the command staff of the Red Army. He also served as commander of an artillery division and became commander of an artillery regiment. And really, if Vasily Ivanovich had calmed down on this, one would have thought that he was somewhat pretending to have achieved it. But even then - in the 30s - and later, having become a military leader and a generally recognized expert in the field of combat use of artillery, Kazakov did not cease the science of “where to take by storm, where to take by siege.” Constant self-education was the norm throughout his life. And now, as a parting word to young people, I can repeat his words: “If you don’t study literally every day, nothing will come of you.”
Throughout his service in the Soviet Armed Forces, Kazakov was distinguished by his deeply conscious partisanship, which became his true essence, and the desire in absolutely everything to be worthy of his belonging to the Leninist Communist Party, of which he became a member in 1932.
“I could have joined the party earlier,” said Vasily Ivanovich, “but I thought: how am I different from others? Then I realized that there is no need to be different, you just have to always be a communist in everything, not to divide life into two parts: this is for the party, here in the party way, and this is for yourself, here as you please. A communist is an integral person.
Vasily Ivanovich had an enviable ability to keep up with everything: in service, study, social life. He read a lot, found time to attend theaters and cinema, and played sports with passion. Outwardly, this ability to subjugate time seemed like some kind of innate gift. But, having looked closely, I realized: it was harsh, uncompromising self-discipline, or what we in the army usually call self-demanding.
Kazakov persistently cultivated this quality, necessary for every person and especially for a military man, among his subordinates. I remember how at one of the meetings of the command staff of an artillery regiment (sometimes we went to each other’s meetings), Vasily Ivanovich, instead of praising one of the commanders for a generally well-done task, scolded him:
You did everything well and correctly, but you spent an unreasonably long time on it.
But you didn’t indicate the deadline, and the matter was unhurried,” the commander justified himself with a hint of resentment in his voice.
The point is not in timing and haste,” interrupted the commander Kazakov. - You just need to spend the minimum amount of time necessary for each task. Better yet, find a way to reduce this minimum. We, military people, must understand this better than others. The war will set its own minimums for everything. You need to learn to turn.
And, changing his tone, Vasily Ivanovich said to the commander in a friendly and sympathetic manner:
And in general, this is also necessary for life. You will have more time, you will learn, you will feel more. They say life is short. Nonsense! It depends on the person how much he real life will invest in the time limit given to him. It's like in mathematics: ten plus ten is twenty, and ten times ten is a hundred.
Laughing, Kazakov addressed all the commanders:
So let's build life not according to arithmetic, but according to geometric progression. Then you can do more, and life will be fuller. They say about other people: “I lived two lives in one life.”
Kazakov placed the education of his subordinates at the forefront of all his work and understood it very broadly. “In the army, relationships between people must be extremely clear,” he often said, “and most importantly, no falsehood or secrecy. I must fully know everyone with whom I serve, and everyone must know me too. After all, it is very important who I am with.” “You will fight: with someone who has mastered the technique and regulations well, or with someone who also understands the need for a sense of comradeship, in whom you believe as in yourself, or at least know well what he is capable of.”
There were no trifles for Kazakov in educating his subordinates. I remember such an incident. I went in to see Kazakov when he, pacing around the office, excitedly said to the battery commander standing at attention in front of him:
I will punish the culprit. But I have to make a remark to you too. Are you proposing to impose a penalty for the offense itself, and nothing more?
What else? - the company commander asked in bewilderment.
Like “what else?” - Kazakov got excited. - Your subordinate lied to you and forced you to conduct an entire investigation to get to the bottom of the truth. You see evil only in the violation of discipline by subordinates. But I see something else, more dangerous. Lie! This is the main thing in this offense! Prepare a new draft punishment order. Focus on the insincerity of the offender.
Having released the battery commander and not having cooled down yet, Vasily Ivanovich turned to me:
I can forgive a subordinate a lot if he is sincere, but never a lie! And this commander is good! Why do his subordinates lie to him? Doesn't know them well? Didn't find contact with them? Or maybe it scares away with severity, forcing people to humiliate themselves with lies?
Are you against strictness? - I asked. - This is something new in you.
There are different types of severity,” Kazakov was still excited. - One of the interests of the matter comes from respect for people, then your subordinates do not lie to you, the other comes from formalism, from indifference to people, here lies are inevitable.
Continuing to worry, Kazakov said:
This is where I am to blame. This commander has recently arrived with us. We should ask him to help him work with people. Maybe a good commander. We need to figure it out.
Kazakov himself was distinguished by his severity, exactingness, and exactingness. Without this, you cannot be a commander in the army, or indeed lead any business. But in his severity, Vasily Ivanovich was invariably fair. Such severity does not humiliate subordinates or scare them away from the commander; on the contrary, it helps them become better and increases the commander’s authority. And naturally, at the same time, Vasily Ivanovich was sensitive, friendly to people, attentive to their needs.
All this - rigor and sensitivity, exactingness and cordiality, concentration on instilling high moral qualities in personnel, the ability to unite the most diverse people with different abilities - did a great job: the artillery regiment was a close-knit military team that lived a single life, common tasks.
And the tasks of an artillery regiment, especially in combat and political training personnel were difficult. The general educational level of fighters at that time was low. A seven-year plan was considered a luxury. And artillery equipment required a lot of knowledge from artillery fighters, which today’s soldiers acquire even before being drafted into the army - in secondary schools. The lack of education was made up for by intense study.
And here, in the regiment’s combat training, Kazakov was literally tireless. His passion for artillery was transmitted to his subordinates through some invisible currents and captivated them. Kazakov spared neither effort nor time to improve the knowledge and tactical training of commanders and did it in such a way that he infected them with his affection for artillery. I think that this circumstance played an important role in the fact that many of the commanders who served with Kazakov in the artillery regiment during the Great Patriotic War commanded artillery formations and occupied high positions in the army and front-line artillery control bodies.
“Cossack impulses” went from the commanders to the soldiers. It was pleasant to look at the soldiers of the artillery regiment when they, well-groomed, smart, dexterously and accurately worked at the guns. In exercises and testing of combat and political training, the artillery regiment was always among the best.
For his services in combat and political training of the artillery regiment, Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov was awarded the first government award in 1936 - the Order of the Red Star.
I settled on Kazakov, the commander of the artillery regiment, because he himself later often said that it is difficult for someone who has not received training in command of a regiment to command troops or occupy high commanding positions in the army. Yes it is. Regimental command in miniature contains all the elements of what a military leader needs to command large military formations and formations, to lead branches of the military on an army and front-line scale.
I must say that in this sense - in the sense of gaining experience for further more responsible activities - command of an artillery regiment turned out to be very fruitful for Kazakov. Much, very much that was characteristic of Kazakov, the commander of an artillery regiment in the 30s, later distinguished Kazakov, the commander of the artillery of the army, and then the front during the Great Patriotic War: the same, now multiplied by experience, high personal responsibility for assigned work, the ability to select and develop hardworking, energetic workers, the ability to unleash the initiative of subordinates, to put together exceptionally efficient, well-coordinated teams of assistants. And yet there is a search for the most rational and effective ways to solve new problems that arise every now and then.
While serving in the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division, Kazakov, as they say, was lucky: he worked under the leadership of Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov, an outstanding Soviet artillery commander, later the Chief Marshal of Artillery. Vasily Ivanovich was the battalion commander of the artillery regiment of this division when Voronov became the regiment commander in 1930. He quickly noted Kazakov and helped him in every possible way to form himself, develop commanding skills, and increase his knowledge. Soon Vasily Ivanovich became the commander of the training division, then the assistant regiment commander. And when Voronov was appointed chief of the division’s artillery, he recommended Kazakov to his previous position. And in the future, Voronov did not leave Vasily Ivanovich’s attention.
During the Great Patriotic War, Kazakov was lucky with many other bosses. Rokossovsky drew attention to him, nominated him and did not part with him almost throughout the war; Zhukov singled him out. But is the word “lucky” enough in this case? Does it express everything? I think no. Of course, it is lucky to serve and fight under the leadership of such outstanding military leaders and generals. However, no amount of luck can explain why Voronov promoted Kazakov and cared about his further growth, why Rokossovsky and Zhukov valued him so highly. It is appropriate to rephrase here famous saying, expressing it something like this: “Tell me who valued you, and I will tell you who you are.” The attention of Voronov, Rokossovsky, Zhukov is the highest certification of Kazakov’s extraordinary business merits and organizational abilities.
Service in the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division gave Kazakov much more than the experience of commanding an artillery regiment. Here he actively participated in experimental exercises and shootings conducted by the People's Commissariat of Defense, in military tests new designs artillery weapons. The chairman of the commission for these tests, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Tukhachevsky, who highly appreciated Kazakov, demanded that he be present at literally all stages of the tests and analysis of their results. This allowed Kazakov to better see the prospects for the development and combat use of artillery. The main thing was that Kazakov constantly communicated with Voronov, who already enjoyed great authority among the senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense, who entrusted him with important tasks. In 1932, Voronov, as part of the Soviet military mission, traveled to Italy for military maneuvers; he participated in the preparation of documents on the organization and combat use of artillery, and in the work of the statutory commission for the development of the Artillery Combat Manual. In a word, Voronov’s range of activities was significantly broader than his official duties as chief of the division’s artillery. Nikolai Nikolaevich shared his observations, doubts and thoughts with Kazakov. And this was a unique, very valuable theoretical school for Vasily Ivanovich.
Sometimes, in the evening, Kazakov would disappear and he could not be found anywhere. And after midnight he sits with the division artillery chief. And their conversations are by no means purely official. Voronov expressed to Kazakov his views on the capabilities of artillery in a future war, and tested the persuasiveness of his argument on him. And who knows, maybe it was then that the innovative principles of organization and combat use of artillery, so successfully applied during the Great Patriotic War by Voronov and his talented student Kazakov, were born and began to mature.
Vasily Ivanovich was deeply concerned by statements that appeared in our military theoretical literature in the 30s about the inevitable decline in the role of artillery in modern (for that time) war. Some theorists believed that tanks and airplanes could replace artillery with much greater efficiency. Some of them proposed directly replacing artillery with aviation when calculating the required firepower: say, one artillery battalion with one squadron of light bombers.
What substitutions could there be? - Vasily Ivanovich told me passionately. - If tanks and aviation are being developed, then artillery must be developed in every possible way!
And why? Prove it. Heat and declamation are of no use here,” I sometimes egged my friend on to listen to his arguments again.
Kazakov's arguments became more and more convincing. It was felt that he was thoroughly studying specialized literature, thinking a lot, and conversations with Voronov were useful to him, leaving a mark on his consciousness. In short, every cloud has a silver lining. The battle of opinions about the prospects for artillery clearly benefited Vasily Ivanovich. He freely operated with deeply meaningful and heartfelt considerations and data, arguments and conclusions, which in their scope far exceeded the range of knowledge and concepts necessary for the commander of an artillery regiment.
In 1934, Voronov left for a new duty station. Vasily Ivanovich became isolated for some time - apparently, he was having a hard time being separated from his beloved boss and mentor. Soon, enthusiastic artillerymen began to gather at his place, as Voronov had done in his time.
As time went. In 1936, the first thunderclaps of the war approaching the world rumbled in the West: fascism tried its fangs on Republican Spain. Many people sought to help the Spanish people and fight with them against fascism. Not everyone succeeded in doing this. I succeeded. In Spain I met Voronov, who was there as a senior artillery adviser to the command of the Republican troops. We saw each other rarely, talked even less often.
During one of the meetings, Voronov said: “How is Kazakov doing? He’s probably jealous of us. He should be here. He’s a combat commander and has a bright head. He thinks creatively and on a grand scale.” It was nice to hear such a review about a friend, and even from Voronov, whose authority was quickly growing.
When, after returning from Spain in 1937, I met with Kazakov several times, I was amazed at how much he had grown in theory, and I told him about it. Vasily Ivanovich waved his hand: “That’s because we haven’t seen each other for two years. If I were in front of you, I wouldn’t be amazed.” He asked me in detail about the progress of the war in Spain, and was especially interested in the combat effectiveness of the fascist troops, their aircraft and tanks. By the nature of his questions it was felt that they were subordinated to a single thought. Most of them concerned the interaction of military branches, the place and role of artillery in this interaction.
Questioning, Vasily Ivanovich expressed his views on the role of artillery in modern warfare, on the possibilities of its interaction with other branches of the military, and criticized outdated views and patterns. I will not be mistaken if I say that he already began to think like a major organizer of the combat use of artillery, which he became during the Great Patriotic War.
A new impetus for Kazakov’s creative quest was the resolution of protracted disagreements about the prospects of artillery. Stalin, pointing out the enormous role of artillery in modern warfare, set the task of turning it into a powerful branch of the military and creating first-class artillery equipment. But there was already another formidable impulse - the increasingly obvious threat of a new world war.
During the two pre-war years, serious changes took place in Vasily Ivanovich’s official position. In March 1939, he was appointed chief of artillery of the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division, and in the same year - in August - chief of artillery of the 57th Rifle Corps. A rhombus appeared in Kazakov's buttonholes - in 1939 he was awarded the rank of brigade commander, and a year later, in June 1940, with the introduction of general ranks in the Soviet Army - the rank of major general of artillery. In July 1940, Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov was appointed chief of artillery of the 7th Mechanized Corps.
Kazakov’s pre-war fate seemed to reflect the qualitative changes taking place in the Soviet Armed Forces at that time - they grew numerically, strengthened organizationally, they were equipped with new military equipment, and mechanized. But formidable military trials were approaching faster than these changes took place.
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War found Kazakov in Moscow. And here, far from the border, where fierce fighting had already begun, life in the troops immediately took on a front-line character. A day later, units and formations of the 7th Mechanized Corps were brought into combat readiness, and on the evening of June 24 they were sent to Belarus - to meet the enemy.
Kazakov sadly recalled the first battles of the corps. The soldiers and commanders fought steadfastly and heroically. The enemy suffered significant damage. But the outcome of the battles was determined by the overall superiority of the Nazi troops at the front. The corps suffered heavy losses, its units and formations were withdrawn to the Orsha area for formation. “We could only take comfort in the saying: “For one beaten, they give two unbeaten,” Kazakov said sadly, later telling me about his baptism of fire.
On July 21, by order of the commander of the Western Front, control of the corps was transferred to the “group of forces of General Rokossovsky.” It was believed that this was a large formation capable of solving large problems. But I was confused: why does such a connection not have its own controls? In fact, the “group of troops of General Rokossovsky” turned out to be a very solid, but improvised organization. Rokossovsky was ordered to subjugate all units and formations in the Yartsevo direction and organize counteraction to the enemy there. In a short time, a significant number of fighters and commanders of all branches of the military were assembled. There's a lot military equipment and cars. Having learned that units were being formed in the Yartsev area, which should immediately enter into battle, people continuously walked towards Rokossovsky - alone and in groups. Subunits and entire units arrived, straying from their formations. People wanted to fight and were looking for leadership. This whole mass of people had to be organized, divided into branches of the military, brought into units and units, and at the first opportunity lead them into battle. For all this, an established management apparatus was needed. This became the control of the 7th Mechanized Corps. Rokossovsky immediately noted Kazakov. Subsequently, he wrote: “The chief of artillery of the 7th mechanized corps, Major General Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov, made a good impression on me. He immediately went to the firing positions - to properly assess what we have and where we have it, what kind of personnel we have. In short, the general gave himself up business..."
In August, Rokossovsky was appointed commander of the 16th Army. In fact, there was a unification of the 16th Army, which had been greatly reduced in fierce battles in the Smolensk region, and the “group of forces of General Rokossovsky.” And although the army had its own department, Rokossovsky ensured that workers whom he had already appreciated were appointed to the main positions in this department. Kazakov became the head of the army's artillery.
In August and early September, the 16th Army occupied the defense near Yartsev. Its regular artillery regiments were well trained in peacetime and now successfully coped with combat missions in difficult conditions. Their fire caused great damage to the enemy in the first private operations. But Kazakov was not satisfied with this. Heavy battles lay ahead with the enemy, who was rushing towards Moscow. Kazakov believed that in these battles artillery should do much more than is usually expected of it.
“The enemy is strong because of his superiority in tanks,” he said. “Who will destroy them? Artillery, all kinds of artillery, not just anti-tank. It should weaken the offensive capabilities of the enemy infantry. And another thing: the enemy is superior to us in aviation. How to overcome this superiority? Artillery ". Sometimes Kazakov was objected to:
We do not have superiority in artillery either.
Numerical,” Kazakov retorted. - But in skillful hands, one weapon is worth two. It is important to organize the use of artillery correctly.
Vasily Ivanovich spent most of his time in the troops, several times he visited not only every artillery regiment, but literally every battery, and there, with some instinct unique to him, he found those in whose hands “one gun is worth two.” He also visited rifle units, which he also demanded from other artillery commanders. “Interaction is established earlier, before the fight,” he said.
Returning to army headquarters, Vasily Ivanovich deeply analyzed the results of his trips. Based on these analyses, he made proposals to the army commander on the organization and location of artillery, facilitating the most effective use of artillery fire and maximum use of its capabilities. Recalling that time, Rokossovsky noted: “I liked that my assistants, educated people who were in love with military affairs, knew how to defend their opinions.” Among these people, Rokossovsky especially singled out Kazakov. “The most valuable person turned out to be General Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov,” Rokossovsky wrote. “The general had and deep knowledge, and intuition, and the ability to work with people. That's who the troops loved!"
Who knows, maybe Kazakov and Rokossovsky were carried away by their faith in the not yet fully discovered and underutilized capabilities of artillery. In many cases, the army commander traveled to the troops and to the front line together with Kazakov, most often using OPs equipped with artillerymen, and each time he was invariably interested in the condition of the artillery.
At the end of June, a Katyusha battery arrived in the army. Kazakov wanted to immediately inspect this new and formidable weapon for that time. But the Katyushas turned out to be “touchy”: access to them was allowed only to the army commander and a member of the Military Council. Rokossovsky, a decisive man who did not tolerate formalism, took responsibility and not only allowed Kazakov to familiarize himself with the Katyushas, but also organize their salvo at the enemy.
Kazakov chose Yartsevsky Station as the target of the attack. 64 mines rushed towards the enemy. Those present clearly saw dark shells with fiery tails in the air. A few tens of seconds later, a roar followed, similar to the menacing peals of thunder in a severe thunderstorm. The shelling area was covered with caps of explosions. The effect exceeded all expectations. The Nazis even fled from adjacent areas. Our infantry units captured the station and the nearby school building without a fight. The prisoners, when asked how they liked the Katyushas, answered in monosyllables, but very clearly:
That evening at dinner the impact of the Katyusha rockets was the subject of lively conversation. Someone asked Kazakov:
Why were they called “Katyushas”? Based on the song "Katyusha", or what?
Who knows, maybe not from the song,” Kazakov answered. - I think that the fighters from the rocket launcher maintenance team came up with this idea. The brands of the units are classified, but they bear the “K” stamp of the Kompressor plant. Here's the Katyusha for you. Something else is important here: it means that the fighters are not discouraged, they are getting used to the war, they intend to fight seriously and for a long time if they give affectionate names to their favorite weapons.
Then the conversation turned to the immediate future. And they were alarming. The enemy was amassing significant forces in the Yartsevo direction. From here the path led to Moscow.
In our army’s zone, the enemy will most likely attack on the right flank, along the Minsk-Moscow highway,” Rokossovsky said. We have few tanks; fascist aviation dominates the air. In this regard, the role of artillery is increasing, although we also have few guns and mortars, even taking into account the approaching reserve regiments of the Supreme High Command and several more Katyusha batteries - we have a regiment of them. It is necessary to achieve the most effective use of the fire of all artillery in combination with the fire of infantry weapons, to find some special way to timely suppress all the most important objects in the enemy’s location. What do you say, Vasily Ivanovich?
“I’ve been thinking about this puzzle for a long time,” Kazakov answered. Allow me to report on specific proposals tomorrow.
According to the plan proposed by Kazakov, all the reserve artillery of the Supreme High Command at the disposal of the army command was moved to the probable (confirmed by intelligence) direction of the enemy’s attack - five regiments, a significant part of the artillery of the 16th Army divisions. Thus, with a general lack of artillery and the absence of aviation, the command of the 16th Army received a powerful strike force in the main direction. In other words, it was about massing artillery in a decisive area. But it was important to correctly calculate the blow of this fist with the greatest efficiency. And here Kazakov proposed to deviate from the canons. It was believed that artillery should first of all strike at the front edge of the enemy’s position and defeat his advancing troops. Kazakov proposed another solution. Later he wrote: “Having acted against all rules, we decided to begin counter-preparation with a fire raid on enemy artillery and other objects located 6 - 8 kilometers from the front edge. After this, it was planned to transfer fire from the depths along the lines in jumps every 300-400-500 meters and thus bring him closer to the fire of infantry weapons." What did this achieve? The strike on enemy artillery was, firstly, to prevent it from destroying the front line of the defense of the Soviet troops, and secondly, to disorganize the control and supply of the advancing units. And the transfer of artillery fire along the lines from the enemy’s rear to his front edge was intended to frustrate battle formations the advancing troops and significantly weaken them even before the units of the 16th Army approached the defense.
And so it happened. At dawn, Nazi troops began an offensive in the exact area where the command of the 16th Army intended, that is, along the Moscow-Minsk highway. All the guns designated by Kazakov’s plan for counter-artillery preparation immediately opened fire. Thanks to the massing and accuracy, the fire of the Soviet artillery turned out to be unexpectedly powerful for the enemy. Anti-tank batteries fired directly. A whole regiment of "Katyushas" fell in volleys on enemy soldiers who had crawled out of the trenches. A destructive barrage of artillery fire frustrated and in some places crushed the advancing enemy units. The job was completed by the infantrymen who met with heavy fire the Nazis who had broken through to the front edge of the chain. In some areas it came to hand-to-hand fighting. At noon the battle ended. Having suffered heavy losses in men and equipment, the enemy did not achieve any success in the Yartsevo direction.
Later, Kazakov had the opportunity to lead artillery in major battles with the fascist aggressors. But he remembered the battle near Yartsev forever and recalled it willingly. This was the first and successful battle where Vasily Ivanovich was able to put into practice his views on the organization and combat use of artillery.
The blow of the 16th Army near Yartsev turned out to be so strong that the enemy abandoned further attempts at active operations in this direction and began to look for workarounds. Soon, according to the order of the headquarters of the Western Front, the defense sector along with the troops was transferred to the 20th Army, the command and headquarters of the 16th Army were sent to Vyazma, from there they arrived in Mozhaisk. The new commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, who was in the city, ordered Rokossovsky to go with his headquarters to the Volokolamsk region and subjugate all units located on the front from the Moscow Sea to Ruza. Thus began the combat path of the 16th Army with a renewed composition.
Preparations for a stubborn defense were immediately launched. Kazakov was pleased with the presence of very significant artillery in the army for that time: two anti-tank artillery regiments, two cannon artillery regiments, two divisions of the Moscow Artillery School, two regiments and three Katyusha divisions. True to his principle: “equipment is strong by the people who control it,” Kazakov and members of the artillery headquarters toured all the artillery units, studying their command staff and combat effectiveness. Rallies, party and Komsomol meetings were held in all regiments and individual divisions. Kazakov visited some of them. He talked about the same thing as everyone else: Moscow must be defended at all costs. Touching on the feelings and thoughts that then dominated the soldiers of the 16th Army, Kazakov wrote after the war: “The Moscow Sea, Volokolamsk, Ruza... All these places dear to the heart became the field of a fierce battle, the war reached them! And Moscow is very, very close! "The thought was unbearably painful and forced us to act more decisively than ever. And we, despite the failures that befell us at the beginning of the war, had no doubt that we would not surrender Moscow to the enemy."
Volokolamsk direction! During the Battle of Moscow, it was mentioned almost daily in the reports of the Soviet Information Bureau. Here the 16th Army fought to its death, having won legendary glory in the battles near Moscow. The enemy concentrated up to 20 divisions in the Volokolamsk direction and began to prepare them for a breakthrough to Moscow.
The position of the defenders was difficult. There were no serious natural obstacles or anti-tank structures at the line of the 16th Army. The entire burden and responsibility for anti-tank defense fell on the artillery. Kazakov and his staff worked hard to ensure that the artillery brought maximum benefit in the upcoming battles. The main thing that worried Kazakov was the stretch of the front. The artillery that the army had could not provide sufficient density of artillery fire along the entire hundred-kilometer front. It was decided to mass the artillery primarily in tank-hazardous directions and organize its maneuvering in order to provide powerful artillery fire in the most important areas of the upcoming battles.
On the morning of October 16, enemy troops began an offensive, first on the left flank, and then along the entire front. Everywhere they suffered huge losses in men and tanks. And everywhere the success of the defense of the Soviet troops was largely ensured by massive, devastating artillery fire. On October 17, the Nazis sent up to one hundred tanks to one of the regiments of the 316th division. They managed to push back the defenders here. Trying to build on their success, they intensified the attack, but were met by artillery pulled here from other areas and retreated with heavy losses. The next day, the regiment's positions were attacked by 150 tanks and a motorized infantry regiment. The steel avalanche was stopped by moving here anti-tank artillery, cannon batteries and Katyusha rockets. Then the enemy almost immediately brought another 100 tanks into battle. And again the artillery maneuver saved the situation. And so it was day after day along the entire front of the 16th Army. The skillful control of artillery, the skill and heroism of its fighters and commanders did the seemingly impossible: the enemy had significant superiority, including in artillery, and in practice the artillery of the 16th Army acted much more effectively than the enemy and in many cases decided the outcome of continuous battles. “General Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov and his artillerymen did a lot these days,” Rokossovsky wrote.
The enemy persistently continued the onslaught. His command knew that there were few troops behind the 16th Army covering Moscow. Here, along the Volokolamsk highway, it hoped to break out to our capital and did not take into account losses. The 16th Army fought back. Its retreat was well organized, designed to exhaust the enemy, nullifying his offensive capabilities, “...deeply echeloned artillery and anti-tank defense and well-organized interaction of all types of troops,” noted Zhukov, “did not allow the enemy to break through the battle formations of the 16th Army "Slowly, but in perfect order, this army was withdrawn to lines prepared in advance and already occupied by artillery, where again its units fought stubbornly, repelling the attacks of the Nazis."
And so it went on for a long, painfully long time. One day, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command reported that the Nazis had occupied Krasnaya Polyana and were installing long-range guns there to fire at the Kremlin. The headquarters set the task: the artillery of the 16th Army to prevent shelling of the Kremlin and disable enemy long-range guns in Krasnaya Polyana. Rokossovsky made a different, maximum decision: to liberate Krasnaya Polyana. The troops secretly approached the village, and at dawn the enemy, entrenched in Krasnaya Polyana, was hit by powerful gunfire and Katyusha rockets. The enemy artillery tried to respond, but the fire superiority of the Soviet troops was undeniable. Kazakov clearly and skillfully planned the actions of the artillery. She was an active participant in the battle throughout. Eventually, Soviet tank crews, supported by artillery, broke into the city, capturing many prisoners and equipment, including guns intended to shell the Kremlin.
However, this was a special case. The painful, soul-sapping retreat continued. “You know,” Kazakov later told me, “it felt like our backs were pressed against the walls of Moscow. A few more days, and it would have been impossible to retreat. But we could already feel the closeness of change. Fresh troops began to arrive to us.”
The signs of change were quite impressive. The 16th Army was replenished with a significant number of troops. Kazakov was especially pleased. He had at his disposal more than 900 guns and mortars, 70 Katyusha launchers. At that time there was no such artillery in any army fighting near Moscow.
And finally the long-awaited came. On December 6, the commander of the 16th Army, Rokossovsky, gave the order for the army to go on the offensive along the entire front. The strength of the fighters and commanders increased tenfold. The enemy tried to counterattack. It cost him dearly: his losses were enormous. The Katyushas, which the Nazis called “cannons of death,” were especially successful. After our artillery raids, Soviet troops occupied many populated areas without encountering resistance. And who was there to resist: in locality 1000 were found in Nefedyevo, 400 corpses of enemy soldiers and in Lunev and Vladychin.
The offensive rapidly increased. While leading the artillery of the army, Kazakov, as in defensive battles, was convinced in practice of the correctness of what Voronov said even before the war, which he himself nurtured in the pre-war years: artillery can and should be used more effectively throughout the entire battle - defensive and offensive, at all their stages. However, Kazakov was not yet able to “turn around to its full extent.” There was no experience in organizing the full, all-encompassing use of artillery; it was just being acquired, and most importantly, there was not enough artillery itself, especially ammunition for it. It’s hard to believe now, but it’s a fact: at the height of the offensive near Moscow, artillery ammunition consumption standards were established, often less than ten rounds per gun per day. How skillfully it was necessary to organize the use of artillery, how much skill was required from the artillerymen in order to ensure the effectiveness of fire in conditions of such an acute shell shortage, and even on the offensive!
In the second half of January 1942, the headquarters of the 16th Army without troops was transferred to Sukhinichi, where it was supposed to take command of part of the troops of the 10th Army. Here a rather flattering incident occurred for the command of the 16th Army: the Nazis suddenly abandoned their positions and retreated seven to eight kilometers. There seemed to be no point in the enemy's actions. But later it turned out that the Nazis had heard a rumor about the arrival of the 16th Army near Sukhinichi. The name of its commander had already acquired sufficient fame among the enemy command, and it considered it best to withdraw its troops to a more prepared line.
Soon after the capture of Sukhinichi, on March 8, disaster struck: during an artillery shelling of the city, right in the army headquarters, Rokossovsky was seriously wounded by a shell fragment. Fortunately, the doctors’ efforts quickly bore fruit, and at the end of May Konstantin Konstantinovich returned to his native army. But the joy of his return did not last long. In June, Rokossovsky was appointed commander of the Bryansk Front. Kazakov was proud of his nomination combat commander. However, it was difficult for Vasily Ivanovich to part with him. He sincerely fell in love with Rokossovsky and, as he later admitted, was afraid that the new army commander would not delve into the needs of the artillery so boldly and support his, Kazakov’s, initiatives as Rokossovsky did.
However, Rokossovsky was no less attached to his military assistants. Soon he called the 16th Army and invited Chief of Staff Malinin and Kazakov to continue fighting together. Needless to say, how happy my friends were! But military destinies are swift and changeable. Before Malinin became chief of staff, and Kazakov became chief of artillery of the Bryansk Front, two and a half months later they, together with Rokossovsky, were seconded to the Don Front: Rokossovsky as commander, Malinin as chief of staff, Kazakov as chief of front artillery.
The first impressions on the Don Front stunned Kazakov. The front included 102 artillery and mortar regiments, including 50 reserve regiments of the Supreme High Command, of which 13 were anti-aircraft artillery regiments. In total, there were about 3 thousand guns and mortars and 218 Katyusha launchers at the front. Kazakov had never had to deal with such a colossus. It would be impossible to manage it without a good staff headed by experienced, energetic staff. But at first things went very badly with the artillery headquarters. Shortly before Kazakov’s arrival, Zhukov, Vasilevsky and Voronov visited the front on behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. They formed an unfavorable opinion of some of the employees of the artillery headquarters and the artillery commanders of the front. “They need to be removed,” Rokossovsky said when he met with Kazakov. But Vasily Ivanovich, impressed by the volume of work ahead, asked not to rush. “The management here was a pushover, they might not understand everything, and the situation is nervous,” he said. “I want to understand the people myself.” The front commander did not object.
Understand people yourself! This trait, always characteristic of Kazakov, became the most important principle of his activities when he began to occupy high positions in the Armed Forces. Kazakov met his future assistants, took a closer look at their work and came to the conclusion that they were all capable, conscientious workers. Later he wrote about the chief of the artillery staff of the Don Front, G.S. Nadysev: “Georgy Semenovich subsequently put together a magnificent artillery headquarters, which won recognition among the troops.”
Preparations began in October offensive operation, the purpose of which was to encircle a group of enemy troops near Stalingrad. Having received its task in this operation, the command of the Don Front developed a specific plan of preparatory measures. They provided for the regrouping of artillery and providing it with ammunition. It was necessary to move and locate artillery formations and units in designated locations, and to do this secretly from the enemy.
During this tense time, Kazakov and the workers of the artillery headquarters were constantly with the troops. Things were moving forward, but incredible difficulties were encountered. It rained and strong steppe winds blew continuously. The roads were broken, there were not enough tractors, and feed for the horses was delivered intermittently. Having traveled around several columns, Nadysev reported:
It's bad, very bad with horse traction. The horses are hungry and can barely trudge.
What about people? How do people cope with adversity? - asked Kazakov.
Nadysev said with delight that when he approached a group of fighters and asked about their mood, some joker, peeking out from under the hood of his cloak, answered cheerfully:
We are in the right mood. I just feel sorry for the horses. They are not accustomed to living without oats and hay, so they get bored. But what about us, you can’t get through us with a wind blower, we are two-core!
We just need to get to the Fritz. Then we will warm ourselves and give him some heat.
Kazakov did not, however, express satisfaction with what he heard.
It’s good that the mood is right... But you and I need to think about how to make sure that at the very first stop they can warm up and eat,” Vasily Ivanovich said harshly.
He encountered the amazing dedication of soldiers and commanders everywhere every day and every hour. That is why he treated himself more strictly as a boss and his assistants, demanding that the soldier always be the center of attention in all urgent matters. People worked without sleep or rest. Seemingly tireless, the drivers did not look up from the steering wheels for almost days and delivered hundreds and thousands of tons of cargo to the front along difficult roads in any weather. So that the reader can at least approximately imagine the work of artillery rear workers, it is necessary to provide several figures. To transport just one combat set of shells and mines for the entire front artillery, more than five thousand one and a half ton vehicles were required. And before the start of the operation, it was necessary to bring up to three combat kits - about three million shells and mines. Another inexperienced reader will ask: is three million shells a lot? A convincing answer to this question can be the following comparison: this is slightly less than half of the shells of all calibers that Russia had at its disposal when entering the first world war.
When visiting the troops, Kazakov often visited me in the 65th Army, of which I had recently been appointed commander. At our first meeting, when I arrived at the Don Front, our conversation turned out the way it usually happens after a long separation of friends - confused, uncollected. Jumping from event to event and interrupting each other, we quickly shared what we had experienced during the separation and exchanged thoughts about today's affairs. Vasily Ivanovich seemed the same, but the former - his attitude towards the role of artillery in the war, his views on its organization and combat use - seemed to have expanded in scale. It was clear from everything that the enormous responsibility, the complex responsibilities of the chief of front artillery, was on the shoulder of my friend, more than that right now he was in his element. This impression of mine was strengthened during Vasily Ivanovich’s subsequent visits to our army. And one more valuable, in my opinion, observation: the wide scope of the responsibilities of the front artillery commander did not distance Kazakov from what seemed to be minor matters for him now. He could be seen not only in artillery formations and units, but also in divisions and batteries, talking with major commanders and ordinary soldiers. In most cases, he always took away something common from his trips to the troops.
Orient your gunners towards direct fire,” he once told me. - I recognized such masters of this business. They hit like snipers. To eliminate unsuppressed enemy firing points during an offensive, direct fire is the most effective thing.
Convinced of the usefulness of something, Kazakov persistently introduced it across the entire front. It was the same with direct fire. He spared no time in talking with commanders and battery soldiers, proving to them the necessity and importance of this method of using artillery. And that’s how Vasily Ivanovich was - he knew how to infect people with his ideas. I don’t know how things were in other armies of the front, but in our 65th Army direct fire was widely used.
The closer the planned start of the operation came, the more often Kazakov visited our army, since it was she who was to deliver the main blow. And really, he knew the affairs of the army no worse than I, its commander. With Kazakov's help, much was done to ensure the high efficiency of our army's artillery fire at the start of the offensive.
And then came the early morning of November 19 - the start of the operation was scheduled for this day. The weather was extremely unfavorable. A thick fog hung over the ground. Twenty minutes before the start of artillery preparation, Rokossovsky arrived at the command post of the 65th Army. He was accompanied by Kazakov, the commander of the 16th Air Army S.I. Rudenko and other commanders, as well as staff members. When everyone had settled down and I reported that the army was ready to launch an offensive, Rudenko said sadly:
The weather is unflyable and aviation cannot operate.
“Well,” Rokossovsky answered. - The success of breaking through enemy defenses will now depend to a much greater extent on artillery, on its organization, power and accuracy of fire. Artillery preparations begin at the appointed time.
In order to achieve simultaneous opening of fire by all available artillery, some non-statutory commands were introduced, which were then used until the end of the war. Five minutes before the start of the artillery preparation, the command was given: “Promptly!”, which meant the cessation of negotiations on all communication lines. Then came the command: “Charge!”, followed by another command: “Tighten the cords!”
It was an exciting moment. Thousands of crews froze at the guns, awaiting the final command “Fire!” Twenty seconds before the appointed time, this command was sounded. It was immediately duplicated by rockets that soared into the sky. At exactly 7:30 a.m. the quiet, foggy morning was shaken by a gigantic hurricane of artillery fire. None of us had previously witnessed artillery preparation of such force. The air and earth shook from the roar of many thousands of shots and the explosions that echoed them. And there was something to shudder at: during the first fire raid, five to six thousand shots were fired every minute.
From the observation post we could see how our artillery was plowing through the enemy’s defenses. Columns of dust and earth, debris from observation posts, dugouts and dugouts flew into the air. We all looked spellbound at this enchanting picture. Approaching me, Kazakov said with delight: “You can imagine what is happening on the neighboring front, there is much more artillery there than we have.”
Yes, it was a triumph of artillery and its power! And really, it was impossible to choose another day to establish a holiday - Artillery Day. This happened on November 19th. But then, of course, none of us thought about it.
Already by the middle of the artillery preparation, many enemy units began to leave the trenches and dugouts, seeking salvation in the depths of their defense. At 8:50 a.m. the infantry went on the attack. She took the first line of enemy defense, significantly destroyed by artillery barrage, on the move. However, the withdrawn enemy units gained a foothold at a previously prepared line. The artillery was brought into action again. Heavy guns hit the enemy from closed positions. A large number of other guns were moved into infantry battle formations. The artillerymen crushed the enemy at point blank range.
Here it is, direct fire! Do you see the results? What's it like? A? - Kazakov told me admiringly. “We definitely need to popularize this matter even more widely.”
The offensive continued the next and subsequent days. The weather did not improve, aviation could not operate, and the entire burden of fire support for the infantry lay with the artillery. She destroyed enemy defenses with powerful fire attacks.
And this happened every day in all the armies of the Don Front, until, finally, the enemy group in the Stalingrad area was surrounded and pulled together by the forces of three fronts.
In the November battles, the artillery of the Don Front played a huge role. But how can we properly evaluate the scale and effectiveness of its actions? Here are some data compiled at one time by Kazakov himself. During the 12 days of the offensive, the artillery of the Don Front fired over half a million shells and mines. This is more than 5.5 thousand tons of metal and explosives. If such a quantity of ammunition were transported on one flight, then about 14 thousand one and a half ton vehicles would be required - such a convoy would stretch for 400 kilometers.
Only the recorded direct enemy losses from the artillery of the Don Front amounted to 1,300 various destroyed targets, including 570 bunkers and dugouts, 50 artillery and mortar batteries, 370 machine guns, 125 aircraft, a large number of manpower. But these figures are very, very approximate. And in general, not only physical, material results are important for assessing the actions of artillery. Artillery disrupted or significantly weakened the preparation of enemy attacks. What is important here is, first of all, the disruption of the attacks itself, and in most cases what losses the enemy suffered in this case cannot be established. The artillery carried out so-called long-range fire attacks. It struck roads and bridges and columns of troops moving along them. The direct result of these attacks is generally impossible to establish. But the enemy reserves approached the front line late and rather battered, which means that the long-range fire raids of our artillery were successful.
In mid-December, preparations began for the destruction of the enemy group surrounded at Stalingrad. This time, the main role in this operation was assigned to the Don Front, which was intensively replenished with troops and equipment. By January 10, there were more than 120 artillery regiments at the front - about 7.5 thousand guns and mortars. The number of Katyushas increased sharply, and their brothers, Andryushas, appeared, sending heavy 300-mm mines onto the enemy’s head.
Having reported these figures to me on one of his visits, Kazakov said excitedly:
This entire huge multi-caliber armada of artillery and mortars needs to be prepared for giant battle, organize clear control over it in battle.
It is necessary, it is necessary, Vasily Ivanovich. Does the scale confuse you? I asked.
A little bit. But now I believe in myself,” Kazakov said with conviction. “If I didn’t have the experience of commanding the artillery of the 16th Army in the battle of Moscow and the certificate of maturity received in November 1942 on the Don Front, I might have been embarrassed. And you, aren't you embarrassed? Your army has also become a colossus.
“And I’m like you,” I answered. - We received our matriculation certificate together.
During the period of preparation for the operation, Kazakov often visited our army, and I saw that this, as he said, huge artillery armada was capable, fully capable, of him. I admired Kazakov. He worked not just well and enthusiastically, but, I would say, creatively. Instructions coming from the front artillery headquarters also spoke about this. Some believed that Kazakov was burdening army headquarters with documents. But the majority had a different opinion. Not all formation and unit headquarters had the necessary instructions, and even they were largely outdated. Meanwhile, the course of military operations and the quantitative and qualitative growth of artillery brought forward more and more new problems and revealed new prospects in the use of artillery fire. And it can be said without exaggeration that the artillery headquarters of the Don Front was not only a control body, but also a kind of scientific laboratory, where, under the leadership of Kazakov, a lot of creative work was continuously carried out. I especially remember the instructions from the front artillery headquarters that we received in mid-December regarding the use of artillery in army offensive operations.
How right Kazakov was in his desire to comprehend the changes taking place and draw the necessary practical conclusions from this can be judged by this example. Somewhere at the end of December, Vasily Ivanovich came to me very excited. It turned out that a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the chief of artillery of the Soviet Army, Voronov, had arrived at the front headquarters. By this time, Kazakov and his staff were completing the development of an artillery preparation plan for the upcoming operation. The two generals who arrived with Voronov demanded that the artillery preparation schedule be changed from 55 minutes, as Kazakov planned, to 2 hours 30 minutes. They left the ammunition consumption the same.
What happens? - Kazakov said indignantly. “I want to knock my opponent down with one crushing blow from a heavy fist, but they offer to spend two and a half hours on weak slaps from which you can quickly recover!”
But here Voronov, one might say, is your teacher,” I answered.
That’s it,” Vasily Ivanovich worried. - After all, our plan is built on his own ideas! I don't understand anything. And these generals? The way they propose is how they fought in the First World War. But then there was little artillery. But now we have a lot of it and its quality is different. These generals are captured by old ideas. You know, I’ll go to Rokossovsky, and I’ll tell Voronov himself everything I think!
A few days later, Kazakov came to see me again, this time enlightened and even more energetic.
I visited Rokossovsky and went with him to Voronov,” he said. It turned out that the generals acted without Voronov’s knowledge. In a word, Voronov approved our plan. Let's work. You have the main direction. Here, brother, such a fist of artillery will work, the likes of which no one has ever seen.
Yes, our 65th Army had to operate in the main direction, and the main burden of the upcoming operation fell on its shoulders. In the zone of our army, for every kilometer of the front there were 135 guns and mortars, and in the areas of the planned breakthrough there were even more: up to 200 guns per kilometer. In other armies the density of artillery was much less. We had a big job to do difficult work for planning artillery fire. In addition, for the first time in our army, it was decided to support the attack of infantry and tanks with an artillery barrage. This method was known before the war. But it has not yet been used: the matter was complex and required a lot of artillery and shells. We were not afraid of difficulties, and we now had enough artillery and ammunition.
Apparently, the inexperienced reader needs to explain what this method was. Its essence was that when the attack began, infantry and tanks launched an offensive, having in front of them a reliable curtain of artillery fire. Moving sequentially, this curtain seems to lead the infantry and tanks behind it, covering it from enemy fire and counterattacks.
So that this one is very effective method gave the desired results, the most ideal organization was required, it was necessary to train the artillerymen to transfer fire on time according to signals, and the infantry to move after the barrage of fire, without fear of shell fragments. In a word, it was necessary, speaking modern language, clear synchronization of the organization of artillery fire, the actions of artillerymen and infantry with tanks. We learned all this, sparing no effort and time. Kazakov and his staff did a lot of work in the rifle units, showing how to advance behind the barrage of fire.
Kazakov and his headquarters skillfully organized the regrouping and concentration of artillery. Regrouping was carried out only at night, observing all camouflage measures. Five days before the start of the operation, Kazakov’s headquarters organized a round-the-clock methodical shelling of the depths of enemy defenses with artillery from all armies of the front. This was done both to exhaust the enemy and to deceive him, in order to hide the direction of the main attack of our troops.
Finally, the long-awaited January 10, 1943 arrived. At 7:30 a.m., front commander Rokossovsky, a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Voronov, commanders and chiefs of the military branches arrived at my command post.
At 7 hours 50 minutes, at my command, hundreds of telephone wires began to say: “Promptly! Check your watches!”, then after a pause: “Tighten the cords!”, and after another pause: “Fire!” At exactly 8:50 a.m. a simultaneous salvo of thousands of guns was heard. The enemy's position was covered with a continuous curtain of smoke and fire. It seemed as if some fantastic tornado of enormous power was bubbling there. None of those present had ever witnessed such powerful artillery fire. Voronov, who visited many fronts and observed artillery preparation there, said after the first fire raid: “I have never seen such powerful and organized artillery fire.”
Kazakov, with the permission of Rokossovsky, taking with him the heads of departments of his headquarters, moved to the nearest divisional observation post, from where the progress of the artillery preparation was even better visible. It was in the manner of Vasily Ivanovich. He did not allow himself and his workers to contemplate the rare and very spectacular spectacle during artillery preparations for long. Then the work began, to which Kazakov attached great importance: together with his assistants, he aptly noted all the successes and failures in organizing artillery fire. All these observations were then “digested” and provided very valuable material for subsequent analyzes of the results of a particular operation, to prevent mistakes in the future and generalize positive experience.
For exactly 55 minutes artillery fire raged continuously, plowing the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 4-5 or even more kilometers. The gun crews worked with enormous stress. The artillerymen took off their sheepskin coats and overcoats, despite the frost, salt appeared on their tunics, and their faces were covered with sweat.
In the last seconds, the cannonade began to move into its original position to attack the tanks. Finally, the last salvo before the attack was fired by Katyushas. Immediately the tanks rushed forward from the trenches with a resounding “hurray!” The infantrymen jumped out. The wall of artillery fire moved from the front edge 200 meters into the depth of the enemy defense. The artillery began supporting the attack with a barrage of fire. At this time, our aviation, in waves of 9-12 aircraft, began to bomb the headquarters, airfields and concentrations of troops of the encircled group of fascist troops.
All the other armies of the Don Front also advanced with greater or less success. And everywhere the enemy was crushed by powerful artillery fire. On the first day of the offensive alone, the front artillery fired about 350 thousand shells and mines. Its fire destroyed more than 100 guns and mortars, more than 200 machine guns, and destroyed 300 bunkers and dugouts. These estimates, collected by the front artillery headquarters, are, of course, inaccurate (there was no time for calculations). But the main result of the artillery’s actions was that it broke through the enemy’s defenses, significantly weakened the ability of the enemy troops to resist, and ensured the success of infantry and tank attacks.
The offensive continued. Like all of us, it was a difficult time for the artillerymen and their commander Kazakov. They organized artillery control on new frontiers, which, as the offensive was successful, had to be done repeatedly, achieved an uninterrupted supply of ammunition and fuel, and most importantly (this always distinguished Kazakov’s activities), carried out regroupings and concentration of artillery, which ensured high power and efficiency of artillery and mortar fire in the most important areas of the battle.
On January 31, the headquarters of the enemy group surrounded in the Stalingrad area capitulated. But the northern part of this group, which had no contact with its headquarters, continued to resist. Rokossovsky suggested that the captured Field Marshal Paulus give the order to the commander of this part of the troops to stop the senseless resistance, which entailed the certain death of many thousands of German soldiers and. Referring to the fact that the captured field marshal had no right to give orders to the troops, Paulus refused to do so. He also refused to send a personal letter to the commander of the resisting troops.
Convinced of the hopelessness of trying to end the matter without bloodshed, Rokossovsky ordered the offensive to be resumed on February 1. The main blow was again to be delivered by our 65th Army. The front command significantly strengthened us with artillery. Its density on our six-kilometer front was more than 170 guns and mortars per kilometer. In the sector of the 27th Guards Rifle Division, the density of artillery was brought to unprecedented levels for that time: 338 guns and mortars per kilometer.
On the morning of February 1, Rokossovsky, Voronov, the commanders and chiefs of the front’s branches of troops again gathered at the command post of our army. Kazakov beamed. “You know, for the first time I slept properly,” he explained to me his high spirits. But it was clear: he was pleased with the artillery fist created to defeat the remnants of the enemy.
At exactly 8:30 a.m., fire from thousands of guns, mortars, and Katyusha rockets fell simultaneously on the enemy.
The ground shook so much that it was impossible to observe the enemy’s position through binoculars: everything was dancing in front of the lens. After three to five minutes of such fire, the Nazis began to jump out from the dugouts and basements from under the tanks. Some ran wherever they could, others, maddened, knelt down and raised their hands to the sky. Some darted, rushing back into shelters and jumping out of them again.
The artillery raid lasted 15 minutes, and that was quite enough. As soon as the firestorm stopped, thousands of enemy soldiers began to surrender. They unanimously declared that they were captured by artillery. And one of the first prisoners interrogated, under the influence of the horror he had just experienced, said that during the fire raid, “entire battalions dropped to their knees and prayed to God, asking for salvation from Russian artillery fire.”
Although the fighting had not yet ended everywhere, it became clear that the surrounded enemy was completely defeated. Everyone warmly congratulated each other. Artillery generals, officers, and soldiers turned out to be the heroes of the day. However, the war devoted little time to joy. The headquarters of the Don Front was ordered to arrive in Yelets to form a new, Central Front. Our 65th Army was also sent to the newly formed front.
Before leaving, having met Kazakov at the front headquarters, I congratulated him on the special merits of the artillery in the offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad and the destruction of the encircled enemy group. Vasily Ivanovich joked: “The heaviest artillery fists in your army were preparing. So congratulate yourself.” But I was not the only one who congratulated Kazakov. His authority among the troops at that time rose extremely high. Later, after the war, Rokossovsky wrote: “A large role in the operation was assigned to artillery, so the main attention was paid to carefully working out all the issues of its use and interaction with infantry and tanks. These issues were mainly dealt with by the front artillery commander V.I. Kazakov and his apparatus. And they had sufficient knowledge and accumulated experience, so I had no doubt that the artillery would be used correctly and would do everything possible."
Artillery was used even more widely and comprehensively in the grandiose Battle of Kursk, in which the Central Front played a leading role.
Long before the start of the battle, the front artillery headquarters, led by Kazakov, launched extensive work: it was necessary to create an anti-tank defense. The headquarters developed a detailed plan, the implementation of which was supposed to turn the line of defense of the front troops into an insurmountable barrier for enemy tanks.
The creative thought of Kazakov and his assistants blossomed in this regard with new colors. After all, we were talking about fighting armadas of tanks, including the Tigers that had just entered service with the Nazi army. The plan provided for the maximum use of absolutely all artillery to destroy enemy tanks, including anti-aircraft (there was already experience in using anti-aircraft artillery against tanks), mortars of various systems and Katyushas, and comprehensive interaction of artillery with other anti-tank defense means.
Working on the plan and implementing it, Kazakov ensured that commanders of all levels understood in detail the specific tasks, their place and role in the implementation of what was planned. With no less persistence, he ensured that every artillery and mortar soldier “knew his maneuver well.” The front artillery headquarters developed detailed instructions for armies and artillery formations on how to organize anti-tank defense, and developed memos for division and battery commanders, which stated in detail which places of enemy tanks were most vulnerable to various calibers of guns, and also spoke about the tactics of artillery units when repelling tank attacks.
Kazakov and the officers of his headquarters were constantly in the troops, directly on the ground helping to implement the planned plan. With their participation, anti-tank strong points were created, they were united into anti-tank areas, and issues of interaction and control of artillery units and formations were worked out.
Kazakov could often be seen at party and Komsomol meetings. He spoke passionately and convincingly, without hiding the difficult trials ahead. Once, at one of the meetings, someone expressed doubt: whether the personnel were talking too much about enemy tanks, especially about “tigers,” and whether this would cause “tank fear.” Kazakov resolutely objected:
- “Tank fear” will definitely appear if we hide the truth, if we do not mentally prepare people for difficult trials. It is necessary to truthfully tell the personnel about the strength of the enemy troops, about the heavy tanks that the enemy now has. It will be worse if all this comes as a surprise to people, then it’s really not far from a moral breakdown, to “fear of tanks”. At the same time, we must explain to people that the “tiger” is not terrible when a staunch Soviet warrior, who has a strong weapon in his hands, opposes him.
Kazakov persistently pursued this idea in his speeches to the personnel, demanding that his assistants and all other artillery officers find time for such speeches, to instill in the personnel perseverance and conscious self-confidence.
And for such confidence in their capabilities, the personnel had very significant material grounds. In total, at the front by the beginning of June there were about 11.5 thousand guns, mortars and Katyusha rockets. For the front's cannon artillery alone, one combat set of ammunition amounted to about 1 million 200 thousand shells and mines. Of course, not everyone knew this data, but everyone saw that there was a lot of artillery and other weapons at the front and their number was increasing all the time. Therefore, every soldier understood that there was something to break the enemy’s strength.
Having developed an anti-tank defense plan and prepared for its implementation, Kazakov and his staff began planning artillery combat operations in the upcoming defensive battle. Disputes immediately flared up about the main target of the artillery counter-preparation. Its meaning was to forestall the enemy’s attack, deliver a powerful artillery strike on his main group and thereby disrupt or, at least, disorganize and weaken his offensive. But what should be the main target of destruction in artillery counter-preparation? Many believed that, first of all, the enemy’s infantry and tanks: after all, it was they who would attack our positions, and they needed to be suppressed. At first glance, this made sense. But Kazakov and his staff put forward their own arguments.
Without powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the enemy will not attack the previously prepared defenses. This is clear,” said Kazakov. - Consequently, in order to disrupt the enemy’s attack, it is necessary to suppress his artillery and aviation before he begins artillery and aviation preparations. As a result, we will not allow our defenses to be destroyed. And an attack on a prepared and undestroyed defense is death for the enemy. Therefore, I propose to deviate from the requirements of the regulations and, first of all, crush the enemy’s artillery, without which he will not be able to successfully advance.
They argued a lot and for a long time, but the majority agreed with Kazakov’s arguments. After studying various points of view, front commander Rokossovsky approved Kazakov's proposals. It was decided to take under fire attack all concentrations of enemy tanks and infantry, command and observation posts identified by the start of artillery preparation. But concentrate the main power of the strike on the enemy artillery, especially since its location was revealed by our reconnaissance quite completely.
An extremely important factor determining the success of artillery counterpreparation is the timing of its implementation. It is necessary to forestall the enemy's attack not in a day or two, or even in a few hours, but literally in a few tens of minutes, so that artillery fire falls on the troops already prepared for the attack. Therefore, Kazakov, as they say, “did not get off” from the scouts.
On July 2, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command warned the front command that an enemy offensive should be expected between July 3 and 5. Front-line intelligence clarified: the Nazis will go on the offensive at 3 a.m. on July 5. Relevant orders were sent to the troops. The entire front was on alert in anticipation of a fierce battle with the enemy.
By order of Rokossovsky, 20 minutes before the start of enemy artillery preparation, Kazakov gave orders to the front artillery headquarters to begin counter-preparation. In a matter of minutes the team reached each battery. At exactly 2:20 a.m. a salvo of mortars and Katyusha rockets shook the pre-dawn silence. The central front began a grandiose battle on the Kursk Bulge.
For 30 minutes our artillery continuously destroyed enemy batteries, command posts, concentrations of manpower and tanks. Having spent 50 thousand shells and mines, she just as suddenly fell silent. There was tense anticipation. After all, in 10 minutes the enemy should begin his artillery preparation. Will it start on time now? And what will it be like? After 10 and 20 minutes and then everything was quiet. Only at 4 hours 30 minutes, that is, an hour and a half late, the enemy began artillery preparation for his attack. It would not be an exaggeration to say that its beginning was pitiful: in the first minutes, only a few batteries fired, then it began to grow. At 4 hours 35 minutes, on the orders of Rokossovsky, artillery counter-preparation was repeated again along the entire planned strip. This time more than a thousand artillery systems took part in it.
The artillery counter-preparations carried out by our Central and neighboring Voronezh fronts had an impact on the entire further course of the Battle of Kursk. As you know, on the third day after the start of the battle, Goebbels said that the Soviet troops were advancing from the very beginning, and the Germans were only defending. But this was his next propaganda canard. It was necessary to somehow justify himself: Hitler promised a decisive victory, but here there was such an embarrassment - everything did not go at all as Hitler’s command had planned, the force of the strike he had prepared was significantly weakened even before the start of the offensive of the fascist troops, and it was the Soviet artillery that did it.
By five o'clock the Nazis finally managed to organize artillery and air preparation, after which their troops went on the offensive. But the powerful anticipatory strike inflicted by Soviet artillery continued to affect everything: it ensured the integrity of our defense and enabled the Soviet command to maintain control of the troops at all levels. Instead of attacking communications and command posts of the Soviet troops, enemy aviation was forced, whenever possible, to solve the problems of its significantly weakened artillery, which suffered heavy losses.
Regardless of the huge losses, the Nazi command brought more and more troops into the battle. Their main striking force was tanks. The enemy placed particular hopes on the new heavy tanks "Tigers" and "Ferdinands". Like small moving fortresses spewing fire, they seemed indestructible. But even these formidable vehicles were unable to immediately overcome the pre-prepared anti-tank defense of the Soviet troops. Faced with stubborn fire resistance, in which the leading role belonged to artillery, the fascist tanks refused frontal attacks and rushed from one area to another to find weakness in our defense. But in vain: fire barriers met them everywhere.
Kazakov and his staff were with the troops all the time and only got together at night, analyzed the situation, and developed various documents on further artillery actions. It would take many pages of work to cover the entire range of issues that during the war, especially during major battles, the front artillery chief and his staff had to decide. I will still focus on one of them. Moreover, in solving it, Kazakov was a true master. This is a wide artillery maneuver. After all, you can have plenty of artillery systems for various purposes and ammunition for them, but the efficiency of using artillery will be low. And, conversely, with smaller artillery weapons, high results can be achieved. It is very important that artillery arrives in time where it is most needed, so that the maximum massing and concentration of artillery fire is ensured exactly where the success of the battle or battle is decided,
In the conditions of the Battle of Kursk, which unfolded on a wide front and was characterized by frequent movements of the center of greatest tension in the fighting, maneuvering artillery weapons was very important and was used very widely. During the six days of fighting in the defensive period of the Battle of Kursk, most artillery brigades and individual regiments were transferred two or three times from one section of the front to another or to the center. And no matter how the enemy changed the direction of his attacks, he invariably encountered a powerful artillery barrier, blocking the path of his tanks and infantry.
Fifteen tank, infantry and motorized divisions of the Nazis waged an offensive against the troops of the Central Front for almost seven days. Exhausted and bleeding, they were finally forced to stop and go on the defensive.
On July 12, the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts launched a decisive offensive. The Central Front, linked to them by a single strategic plan, went on the offensive on July 15. Through the efforts of these three, and then from August 3, the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, one of the greatest battles of the Second World War - the Battle of Kursk, 50 days after it began, ended with the complete victory of the Soviet Army. During fierce battles, 30 selected Nazi divisions were defeated, including 7 tank. Nazi Germany could no longer make up for the losses incurred in this battle.
Artillery played a huge role in achieving victory in the Battle of Kursk. It destroyed about 60 percent of enemy tanks and caused great damage to enemy personnel and firepower.
Assessing the participation of the artillery of the Central Front in the Battle of Kursk, Rokossovsky wrote after the war:
“The artillerymen showed the greatest tenacity and excellent training. Thousands of soldiers, commanders and political workers distinguished themselves here; it is difficult to find words to describe their courage and heroism. It was their fortitude that the armored avalanche of the enemy crashed against. It was they, the artillerymen, who turned the vaunted “Tigers” and “Ferdinands” "into shapeless piles of twisted and burnt metal."
This characteristic, to a certain extent, is an assessment of the enormous work, creative search, and clarity of leadership of the front artillery commander Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov and his staff.
After the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the troops of the Central Front carried out a number of successful operations and at the beginning of 1944 transferred their operations to the territory of Belarus. Renamed the Belorussian, and then the First Belorussian, the front, together with other fronts, participated in the Belarusian operation, during which Belarus and Lithuania were completely cleared of invaders, marking the beginning of the liberation of the fraternal Polish people.
The importance of artillery continued to increase steadily. It grew quantitatively - from 4 thousand guns and mortars that the front had at Stalingrad, by the beginning of the Belarusian operation their number increased to 16.5 thousand. The art of combat use of artillery also developed.
Under the leadership of Kazakov, his headquarters was steadily searching for new, most effective ways to use artillery in operations of various natures. It increased with large and small discoveries, which were immediately tested in practice, and all the best of them became the property of the troops.
One extremely important discovery needs to be briefly mentioned. This is the development of the most advanced method for that time to support the attack of infantry and tanks - a double fire shaft. True, this method was used on a small scale by Russian artillery back in the First World War, but then it was forgotten.
The reader uninformed in military affairs will find it tedious to read about the special details of this method. So I'll limit myself to just him general characteristic. In contrast to a single barrage of fire, the artillery, using the new method, placed a fire curtain not one at a time, but simultaneously along two main lines at a distance of 400 meters from each other. To conduct a double barrage, two artillery groups were created. Both of them opened fire at the same time - each on their own line. What was achieved by this method of supporting the attack of infantry and tanks? It turned out that with the start of the attack of our troops, the enemy in the 600-meter (taking into account the defeat by shell fragments behind the outer zone of fire of the second line) front line seemed to fall into a fiery vice and was deprived of the opportunity to maneuver with manpower and fire weapons. In addition, he could not bring reserves to the line attacked by our troops or occupy a close line for a counterattack. Such a double barrage of fire was carried out in 400-meter "steps", more thoroughly clearing the way for the advancing infantry and tanks.
For the first time, a double fire shaft was used by the artillery of the First Belorussian Front during the Belarusian operation and showed exceptionally high efficiency. It turned out to be the most reliable, ensuring the least losses of the advancing Soviet troops and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Subsequently, the double fire shaft was widely used both on the First Belorussian and on other fronts.
Having met Kazakov later, I asked him:
Your idea?
No, it’s common to our entire headquarters, and the development of the method was led by Chief of Staff Nadysev. And in general, it is better to have an energetic, creative team of staff than to come up with one or two worthwhile ideas yourself. A good, creative team will always do more. Therefore, the main “idea” of any manager should be concern about personnel selection. I am proud of the personnel of my headquarters and highly value my merit in its selection.
Vasily Ivanovich began to talk in detail, I would say, with delight, about his combat assistants. The characteristics were strictly individual, labels. Listening, I thought: “Still the same. He’s not proud, he knows and loves his subordinates, believes in them, raises everyone.”
Returning to the double barrage, Kazakov said:
And if you look at it more broadly, many thousands of people took part in the development of the double fire shaft. Yes, yes, don't look at me in surprise. After all, such a method of supporting an attack is possible, as you yourself understand, only with a large saturation of troops with artillery and a significant supply of ammunition. Even at Stalingrad, the idea of a double barrage could not be realized even if it had occurred to anyone. The work of the home front, as you see, not only provides us with everything we need, but also influences the development of the art of war.
Are you philosophizing? Do you find time? - I asked.
No, there is no time for philosophy. “It’s like that, it’s just a second plan in my head,” answered Vasily Ivanovich and, perking up, said: “I think that the war has demonstrated with particular force the advantages of our system.” After all, before the war, we were still far behind Germany in economics. And at the beginning of the war we lost a lot, but now, in fact, we are superior to Hitler’s army in everything. And the rear keeps sending and sending military equipment and ammunition. Only socialism can gather so quickly, concentrate all forces and use them to the maximum, with the greatest effect. Germany could not, although the potential capabilities of its economy, together with the occupied countries, were much greater than ours. And our people! Such mass heroism and selflessness could only be brought to life by socialism.
Apparently embarrassed by this manifestation of the patriotic feelings that washed over him, Kazakov paused, and then, smiling, said:
OK. It really wasn’t the right time to become philosophical. We still need to finish off Hitler. We will philosophize after the war, when we will tell our children and grandchildren about it, but now there is a lot of work to do.
Will you be able to retire? - I asked jokingly.
And you? - Vasily Ivanovich answered the question with a question.
We both laughed. No, we didn’t even think of ourselves as pensioners in the distant future. We were not the same kind of starter, we were destined to be in the ranks all our lives - we didn’t want any other life for ourselves.
On November 14, 1944, Zhukov was appointed commander of the First Belorussian Front, and Rokossovsky became commander of the neighboring Second Belorussian Front. This circumstance, as Kazakov later said, deeply upset him. He loved and respected Rokossovsky endlessly, and hoped under his leadership, if he remained alive, to fight until the end of the war. True, it was flattering that such an illustrious commander as Zhukov would command the front.
The bitterness of separation from my beloved commander was brightened by meeting him at a gala evening dedicated to Artillery Day. As is known, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 21, 1944, in commemoration of the merits of artillery in the Great Patriotic War, a national holiday was established - Artillery Day, which was first celebrated on November 19, 1944. The news of the Decree was greeted by the troops with great enthusiasm. Kazakov and his headquarters received numerous congratulations from the armies and other units of the front.
Zhukov, who highly valued artillery, ordered the solemn day to be celebrated in all artillery units of the front. Kazakov, like all artillerymen, flattered by the high state assessment of the role of artillery in the Great Patriotic War, delved into all the details of preparing the gala evening at the front artillery headquarters. 450 people were invited to the evening - officers and generals various departments front. Kazakov really wanted Rokossovsky to be present. And although he understood that this was almost impossible, he still ordered to send an invitation card to Konstantin Konstantinovich.
On the afternoon of November 19, 1944, there was light rain, it was replaced by sleet, and by the evening it froze and ice formed on the roads. And yet, after 11 pm, almost all the guests arrived. At about 12 o'clock Zhukov arrived, which added a special solemnity to the evening. Needless to say, the artillerymen felt like happy birthday boys. How can one convey their feelings when Rokossovsky appeared on the threshold of the hall at about two o’clock in the morning! He drove several hundred kilometers at night in icy conditions to spend a gala evening with those with whom he walked for two years along the difficult roads of the Great Patriotic War.
The feast with good front-line toasts became even livelier. It was time to start dancing, and the announcement was made to “get ready to waltz.” Then two officers rose onto the stage where two 76-mm regimental guns stood. The command rang out:
Pull the cords! In honor of the gala evening dedicated to the first Artillery Day, fire!
There was a friendly laugh. No one could have thought that cannons could be fired in the hall. But a real salvo was heard: the gun barrels threw two sheaves of confetti into the hall, which were filled with blank charges. The ball was a great success, and when the dancers were tired, Rokossovsky came into the circle and danced a mazurka superbly. "And we can do something!" - exclaimed Zhukov and with ease that surprised everyone, paired with the chief of staff of the 2nd Guards tank army A. I. Radzievsky famously performed “Russian”.
Kazakov will remember this evening for the rest of his life. He often remembered it, adding new details. And indeed, this is impossible to forget.
On January 14, 1945, the troops of the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts began the Vistula-Oder operation. It began ahead of schedule, as it was necessary to help out the allies who were in a difficult situation in the Ardennes.
The premature start of the operation did not affect the actions of the artillery. Kazakov organized the work of his headquarters in such a way as to have an “emergency reserve of time.” Now this supply turned out to be very useful.
Long before the start of the operation, an artillery preparation schedule lasting 2 hours and 35 minutes was developed. At the same time, taking into account the increased power of the front artillery, artillery headquarters under the leadership of Kazakov developed a shortened schedule, according to which a powerful artillery raid was to be carried out in 25 minutes. At the direction of Kazakov, both schedules included, along with other goals, striking enemy artillery so that it could not impede the advance of our infantry and tanks. Zhukov agreed with the proposal: it was decided to conduct artillery preparation on a reduced schedule and, if successful, immediately begin the attack.
Early in the morning of January 14, Zhukov, member of the Military Council of the front K.F. Telegin, commanders and chiefs of the military branches arrived at Kazakov’s command post. Telegin writes in his memoirs: “The last minutes of waiting. Finally, the commander of the front artillery, Colonel General of Artillery V.I. rocket launchers, thousands of people froze in combat readiness. The front artillery commander, without taking his eyes off the stopwatch, asks Marshal Zhukov to give the go-ahead for the last command. At 8:20 a.m. the long-awaited “Fire!”
A blow of colossal force shook the front line of the enemy defense. Its power can be judged by the fact that the artillery of only four armies advancing in the main direction fired approximately half a million shells and mines at the enemy in 25 minutes. Later, one of the captured Nazi generals - the division commander - testified during interrogation that the artillery fire so stunned the generals who were in the fire raid zone that they could not understand anything at all. Along the entire front of the offensive, the general said, many “fire corridors” were formed into which Russian units rushed uncontrollably.
This is how the enemy perceived the advance of the advanced units behind the barrage of fire placed by the artillery of the First Belorussian Front in many areas where our units broke through the enemy defenses. This is how it really happened. Having weighed the results of the artillery raid and assessed the actions of the attacking advanced units, Zhukov ordered a reduced schedule of artillery preparation and the introduction of the main forces into battle. The artillery preparation tasks envisaged by Kazakov and his headquarters were fully completed. In a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the results of the first day of artillery action, Zhukov wrote:
“... As a result of a well-organized and successfully carried out artillery offensive, the front troops went on the offensive and, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, broke through his defenses. The bulk of the enemy’s artillery was destroyed and suppressed by our artillery fire and could not carry out massive fire raids during the day.”
The offensive of the Soviet troops developed successfully. As in previous operations, Kazakov paid main attention to artillery maneuvers. And wherever our troops encountered stubborn enemy resistance, the surviving nodes of enemy defense, or where the Nazi command tried to concentrate infantry and tanks for counterattacks, powerful artillery fists invariably appeared. They cleared the way for the advancing Soviet units, smashed the surviving enemy defensive structures and concentrations of his troops.
In the Vistula-Oder operation, Soviet troops, including artillery, for the first time had to deal with an entire system of powerful fortifications covering the eastern border of Nazi Germany. This is the city of Poznan, which had a developed system of defensive structures inside and outside the city limits, and in its northern part a powerful fortress “Citadel”, as well as the so-called “Oder Quadrangle”, or “Ostwal” (Eastern Wall), in the area of the cities of Schneidemuhl, Deutsch-Krone.
By the end of November 26, Soviet troops surrounded Poznan along the outer ring of fortifications. It was necessary to destroy the forts, which could only be done by artillery, and not just any artillery, but of great and even special power. But she was not in the Poznan area at that time. Kazakov, who arrived at the site with a group of his headquarters, made an unusual decision: not to carry out artillery preparation before attacking the forts (anyway, the artillery of the available calibers could not destroy them), but to bring down artillery fire on the forts after the infantry began to move. Kazakov reasoned as follows: during artillery raids and methodical artillery fire, the forts would not be destroyed, but their garrisons would be forced to take refuge in casemates, which would deprive them of the opportunity to use their fire weapons and allow our infantry to bypass the forts from the rear and block them. That's exactly what happened. Thanks to skillful artillery support, the infantry units blocked the forts and captured them without losses on their part.
Kazakov directly directed the actions of artillery in the battles for Poznan itself. The assault groups created in the rifle units operated with two or three guns, and other guns covered their advance along the streets. The enemy desperately resisted. He turned the multi-story buildings of this ancient city with thick brick walls into original pillboxes. Almost every large building was subjected to artillery fire, after which assault groups could take possession of it. But it was not always possible to achieve the desired effect with shells. The army's ingenuity came to the rescue. In one of the guards brigades of heavy mortars they came up with a witty and very effective method destruction of strong stone and brick buildings using M-31 rocket artillery shells.
This is how the former chief of staff of the artillery of the First Belorussian Front, Nadysev, described this method in action:
"...The assault group took possession of the houses on one side of the street, and in the house opposite, a large garrison of Nazis settled, who could not be knocked out. Then an almost six-pound M-31 rocket (92.5 kg) in a cap was brought onto the third floor and installed on window sill, aiming at the window of the opposite house. For the safety of the shooters themselves, the wire from the shell was taken out to the landing and stretched to the lower floor, where an ignition machine was installed, with which the shot was fired. The result exceeded all expectations. The floor on which the enemy garrison was located ", it was blown apart, a fire broke out in the house. A volley of two M-31 shells destroyed the entire wall of the building, and the garrison died under the rubble."
Having studied the situation and prospects for the battles for the Citadel fortress, Kazakov ordered howitzer artillery brigades, a large and separate artillery division of special power, to be transferred to Poznan. Firing from indirect positions, they destroyed large buildings and pillboxes built by the enemy in the city. They played a decisive role in the storming of the Citadel. From closed positions and direct fire, artillery of high and special power punched 14 passages through the fortress walls, destroyed 39 strong defensive structures and other important objects in the fortress itself. Assault groups rushed into the passages with artillery intended to support them. Heavy artillery and tanks began to be brought into the fortress. But its garrison was already demoralized and soon capitulated.
The fortified area "Oder Quadrangle" had a front of 60 kilometers and a depth of 20-30 kilometers. The main strip of the area consisted of long-term fortifications, the basis of which were panzerwerks buried up to 30 meters into the ground - powerful reinforced concrete structures with two-meter thick walls and ceilings. Many of them had a two- or three-tier structure with concrete floors up to 0.8 meters. In the first tier of three-tier panzerwerks there was an artillery and machine gun structure, in the second - a machine gun, in the third - a mortar or flamethrower. The thickness of the armor of armored caps in panzerwerks reached 300 millimeters. Each panzerwerk had a month's supply of food and ammunition, electric heater heating, and water supply.
The troops of the First Belorussian Front were unable to immediately capture the Oder Quadrangle. The fire of 122- and 152-mm guns when firing at panzerwerks also turned out to be ineffective. Therefore, our advancing units were forced to bypass the fortified area or infiltrate through it. As a result, the Oder Quadrangle found itself behind Soviet lines. The liquidation of its garrison could only be carried out by artillery of great and special power. And she worked diligently: the garrisons of the “impregnable” Panzerwerks capitulated.
At the direction of Kazakov, the front artillery headquarters generalized the experience of the combat use of artillery in the battles for Poznan and the Oder Quadrangle, which was then widely used in the Berlin operation, in street battles in the capital of the Nazi Reich.
Having completed Vistula-Oder operation, Soviet troops liberated fraternal Poland from five years of fascist captivity and entered German territory. The only thing left was to finish off the fascist beast in its own lair. But on the way to Berlin, the troops of the First Belorussian Front had to carry out a difficult operation against a strong enemy group that threatened the right flank of the front from Stettin (Pomerania).
Carrying out this operation required exceptional efficiency and clarity of leadership from Kazakov and his headquarters. In the shortest possible time, we had to turn a huge mass of artillery equipment almost 90 degrees, position it in new concentration areas and organize artillery operations in unforeseen circumstances. The scale of the use of artillery here can be judged by the fact that more than two million shells and mines of all calibers were expended during this operation.
End crowns the work. And the victorious end of the Great Patriotic War was very close. The Soviet Army came close to the capital of Hitler's Reich. But even in its agony, the fascist beast was still quite strong. It took a major operation of the Soviet troops, strategic in its scale and significance, for the fascist capital to be overthrown.
Much has been written about the historical Berlin operation, including about the actions of artillery in it. Therefore, I will limit myself to only telling how the artillery of the First Belorussian Front was used in this operation.
By the beginning of the operation, it was a colossal force: the front artillery included about 20 thousand guns and mortars of all calibers, including 1,500 combat installations and frames of field rocket artillery. On average for each rifle division there were five reserve artillery regiments of the Supreme High Command. The strength of the fire of the front artillery and its capabilities can be judged by the fact that just one salvo weighed 234 tons. And one front-line set of artillery ammunition amounted to almost 2 million shells and mines, weighing more than 20 thousand tons. To transport them, 7 thousand three-ton vehicles were required. In total, by the beginning of the Berlin operation, the front had more than 6 million shells and mines of all calibers and 136 thousand shells for field rocket artillery.
Such a strong artillery group, provided with a huge amount of ammunition, revealed truly unlimited possibilities for the combat use of artillery in the upcoming final operation in the war of the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany.
And it must be said that these opportunities were used to the fullest. Kazakov and his staff developed a comprehensive plan for the combat use of artillery in the Battle of Berlin. The maximum use of thousands of guns and mortars, their massing and maneuvering down to the details were included in the plan of the operation as a whole and in the particular plans of the armies and formations of the front.
According to the plan, in the army zones in the direction of the main attack of the front, the average density of artillery in the breakthrough area was 253, and in some armies more than 310 guns and mortars per kilometer. Such a strong artillery grouping and abundance of ammunition made it possible to plan the shortest artillery preparation in the history of the front, but with a very high density of fire. Only 30 minutes were allotted for it, and in some armies even 25 and 20 minutes. The time of artillery preparation was unusual - the night before dawn. This was caused by the front commander’s original and turned out to be very effective decision: to use strong searchlights in the operation, turning them on immediately after artillery preparation, and thereby blind the enemy and illuminate the path and targets for the advancing infantry and tanks. For this purpose, 143 searchlights were allocated, the distribution of which and the choice of positions for them was entrusted to the front artillery commander. The reader will be interested to know that the searchlights placed in close proximity to enemy positions were operated by our heroic girls.
The artillery support for the infantry and tank attacks was also planned unusually. It was envisaged that it would be carried out using mixed methods and to a much greater depth than in all other operations: 2 kilometers with a double barrage, 4 kilometers with a single barrage, and then with a consistent concentration of fire up to 7-8 kilometers.
Extremely busy planning and ensuring the combat use of artillery in the upcoming operations, Kazakov, even during this tense time, visited the troops, where an unprecedented upsurge reigned, rallies and open party and Komsomol meetings were held. Speaking to the artillery soldiers, Kazakov urged them to start a fight for the honor of firing the first shot at Berlin. He outlined this in the instructions sent to the troops on the combat use of artillery in the battle for Berlin. The call had a huge impact on the minds and hearts of the artillerymen.
Two days before the start of the operation, force reconnaissance was carried out along the entire front. Artillery also took part in it, including guns large calibers. Its fire turned out to be so powerful that the enemy mistook the force reconnaissance for the beginning of an offensive by Soviet troops. For Kazakov, it was important that almost all of the enemy’s artillery participated in repelling the advance of the reconnaissance groups, which made it possible to clarify the targets for artillery preparation. But, strange as it may sound, the offensive of the reconnaissance groups put Kazakov and his headquarters in a difficult position. After the war, Vasily Ivanovich, laughing, told me: “Do you understand what happened? A significant part of the well-explored first line of the enemy’s defense ended up in our hands. Therefore, in fact, we had to reschedule artillery preparation. And it’s easy to say reschedule! After all, before the start of the offensive "There were no more than ten to twelve hours left of the front. I had to turn around with my headquarters."
Artillery preparation was scheduled for 5 a.m. (Moscow time) on April 16, 1945. By 4 o'clock, front commander Zhukov, member of the Military Council Telegin and Kazakov arrived at the observation post of the 8th Guards Army.
At the set time, now for the last time, Kazakov gave the usual, but always exciting commands: “Promptly”, then “Pull the cords” and, finally, “Fire!”
At exactly 5 o'clock, an artillery preparation unprecedented in the history of war began.
“And immediately,” Zhukov wrote in his memoirs, “from the shots of many thousands of guns, mortars and our legendary Katyushas, the entire area was brightly illuminated, and after this there was a stunning roar of shots and explosions of shells, mines and aircraft bombs. The incessant roar of bombers grew in the air.
In the first seconds, several machine-gun bursts crackled from the enemy side, and then everything became quiet. It seemed that there was no living creature left on the enemy’s side. During 30 minutes of powerful artillery fire, the enemy did not fire a single shot. This indicated his complete depression and breakdown of his defense system. Therefore, it was decided to reduce the time of artillery preparation and immediately launch a general attack.
Thousands of multi-colored rockets soared into the air. At this signal, 140 searchlights, located every 200 meters, flashed. More than 100 billion candles illuminated the battlefield, blinding the enemy and snatching attack targets from the darkness for our tanks and infantry. It was a picture of enormous impressive power, and perhaps in all my life I do not remember such a sight!”
At Kazakov’s command, the artillery intensified its fire and began to accompany the infantry and tanks rushing into the attack in a double shaft. The offensive developed successfully. However, on the approaches to the Zelovsky Heights, the troops of the 8th Guards Army were forced to stop. Kazakov immediately went to the scene. It turned out that the infantry was late in the attack and was unable to take advantage of the artillery escort. By order of Kazakov, in addition to the artillery fire of the 8th Guards Army, the fire of five more artillery brigades was transferred to this area. On the morning of April 17, with a joint strike, they cleared the way for infantry and tanks. Accompanied by artillery, infantry and tanks fought for 24 hours and took the Zelovsky Heights on the morning of April 18.
On April 20, competing for the right to be the first to open fire on Berlin, many artillery units rushed to accessible distances. The first to begin shelling the enemy capital was the 1st Division of the 30th Guards Cannon Artillery Brigade. By the end of April 21, formations of the First Belorussian Front broke into the outskirts of Berlin and already on April 23-24 they were operating on the approaches to its center, waging fierce street battles.
Street battles in Berlin are described in sufficient detail in our literature. I will only say that in these battles: the capabilities of artillery and the art of its leaders were revealed even wider. Artillery (including large-caliber guns) was part of all assault groups, which bore the brunt of the fighting on the streets of the enemy capital. She also acted independently, delivering crushing blows to enemy resistance units. The use of heavy rockets became widespread based on the experience of the battles in Poznan.
Artillery had its weighty say at the final stage of the Berlin operation - the storming of the Nazi Reichstag. The assault began at 11 a.m. on April 30 after a powerful artillery attack. Early in the morning of May 1, the scarlet banner of our great Victory was already flying over the Reichstag. At 15:00 on May 2, the Berlin garrison capitulated. The fascist robber Reich was defeated. This was done by our glorious Armed Forces, relying on the powerful support of the entire Soviet people.
My story about Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov is coming to an end. I deliberately focused the readers' attention on the actions of the artillery of the 16th Army and the fronts where Kazakov was the artillery commander. After all, people are judged first of all by their deeds, by their participation in the cause they serve. A man of exceptionally great energy and rare capacity for work, Kazakov during the Great Patriotic War contributed a lot of new things in the field of large-scale use of artillery in the most important, strategic front-line operations. He has done a lot to expand the range of artillery operations, identify and make the most effective use of its capabilities in operations of the most varied nature, at all their stages. Kazakov owes considerable credit for the development of Soviet military art. The breadth of political and military knowledge did not allow him to be confined to a narrow departmental framework, to be a purely artillery commander. Kazakov was an indispensable active participant in the planning of combined arms front-line operations. All of us who had the opportunity to work with Vasily Ivanovich during the Great Patriotic War know him as a great, creatively thinking specialist in the field of planning and implementing interaction between military branches, who skillfully found the most correct use of artillery firepower in this interaction.
The party and government highly appreciated Kazakov's contribution to the fight against the fascist invaders. On October 17, 1942, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general of artillery, and a year later, on September 18, 1943, colonel general of artillery. His merits were marked by special military orders: three Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, Suvorov 2nd degree. Four times Kazakov received the highest award of the Motherland - the Order of Lenin. On the eve of the Berlin operation - on April 4, 1945, for outstanding services in the fight against the Nazi invaders and the personal courage and heroism shown, Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
After the end of the Great Patriotic War, Kazakov held high positions in the Soviet Armed Forces: he was the commander of the artillery of a group of Soviet forces in Germany, deputy, first deputy commander and commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army, chief of air defense forces Ground Forces. At these posts, he did a lot of and very fruitful work on further strengthening Soviet artillery, mastering new military equipment by personnel, generalizing and introducing into the troops the wealth of experience in the combat use of artillery during the Great Patriotic War.
The activities of Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov in these positions were highly appreciated by the party and government. On March 11, 1955, he was awarded the rank of artillery marshal.
Since 1965, Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov has carried out fruitful work as part of a group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
On May 25, 1968, Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov passed away. I will end my story about him with the same words with which I began it: Vasily Ivanovich was one of those people who, having finished their life’s journey, thanks to their personal qualities, and most importantly, thanks to everything they have done, continue to live, and their affairs do not go away with them .
1. Ceremonial portrait of Marshal of Artillery Vasily Ivanovich
2. Major General of Artillery Kazakov, summer 1941
3. Preparation of the Belarusian operation (from left to right): Varennikov I.S., Zhukov G.K. Kazakov V.I., Rokossovsky K.K. 1st Belorussian Front. 1944
4. V.I. Kazakov with his son - senior lieutenant Viktor Kazakov. Central front. Svoboda village near Kursk, 1943
5. Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov with his future wife Svetlana Pavlovna Smirnova. Early 1945
6. V.I. Kazakov with Lieutenant of the Signal Corps S.P. Smirnova. Suburb of Berlin, Strausberg. May 1945
M. PESHKOVA: On the eve of Victory Day, I met with Svetlana Pavlovna Kazakova, the widow of Marshal of Artillery Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov, an outstanding military leader of the Great Patriotic War. An artillery offensive, a double barrage of fire - these concepts are forever associated with the name of Vasily Ivanovich. How the future spouses met, what was their first meeting like, I ask Svetlana Pavlovna. How did you meet your future husband? What was your first meeting like?
S. KAZAKOVA: It was a very original meeting. My boss called me, he said: “Just now they called from the military council, they are waiting for a concert brigade, it’s stuck somewhere, it’s winter, New Year. “You have some girl playing the piano there, let’s bring her here.”
M. PESHKOVA: This is the New Year of 1944.
S. KAZAKOVA: I was terribly scared - why would I go there? The highest authorities... I won't go there. The boss immediately got angry with me and said: “Here, at attention, all around, there, etc., etc. To which I told him that let someone else go with me, how can I go alone? Well, he allowed it. They sent a car, but it was still all nearby. Our government relations department was nearby, it was a square with all the departments. And we had to drive a few minutes to the military council. We have arrived. But what was most interesting was that Rokosovsky, Malivin and Kazakov came out: “Ah, girls, we’ve arrived, hello! We undressed” - we took off our overcoats, they helped us undress. And since there was very little time left, we were immediately invited to the table. I was seated next to Kazakov. Well, the first toast, New Year... Well, I looked around this society: there were the wives of big bosses who came for the New Year, and there was only one commander of the armored forces, he was with his wife, she was a major, she was in military uniform. And it has already become easier for us that we are not the only military personnel.
M. PESHKOVA: She was, in my opinion, a front-line doctor?
S. KAZAKOVA: Yes, yes, she was a doctor. She also came from the hospital. For a very long time, Kazakov kept asking me how I got to the front, where my parents were, and who my parents were - everything was very interesting to him. Yes, and everywhere they asked me how I got there. (laughs) But I didn’t get in, but I served. I explained this. Then they asked me to play, and there was a piano there, which I hadn’t seen for several years. I also thought: how can I play and what can I do? It’s okay, at least I played “Dugout.” Everything I played, everyone praised me terribly, but I perfectly understood that intelligent people - of course, they praised me. Well, I did it as best I could. Well, we talked for a long time, he asked me all the details. “Have you been to Leningrad?” - “It was” - “Well, if it was, then tell me, where is Dunkin Lane?” I say: “You know, I just have no idea where this Dunkin Lane is.” And I say: “Do you know?” He says: “Yes, I know, I worked there as a boy,” and also told about himself - his father worked there as a janitor for the gentlemen, and he himself lived in the village with his grandmother until he was 8 years old, and then he was taken to Leningrad.
M. PESHKOVA: There were eight children in your husband’s family.
S. KAZAKOVA: Yes, there were many children in the family. Then he went to work there as a boy in a store, so he knows the alleys better than I do. And then, many years later in Leningrad, I somehow simply asked where this Dunkin Lane was? Indeed, it exists and is located where the mosque is located in Leningrad. Well, in general, as you understand, this New Year's Eve meeting lasted several hours, and he says that at six o'clock he left for the front line, we said goodbye, and he told me that “when I return, I will call you” . But in my heart I didn’t believe that he would call. Because when we were sitting there at the table and talking, they kept calling him from the artillery headquarters - they were waiting for him there. But he didn’t go, but stayed, so to speak, to talk to me. He said that he would return on January 6th, he would be on the front line with the troops for six days. Well, I came and called. He asked: “How are you doing with time? You can come?" I say: “I just changed my shift, I can come.” But even though it’s very close there, I won’t go there” - “I’ll send a car for you.” I ran headlong and fell, tearing my stockings at both knees. Tears flowed from my eyes (laughs), such a tragedy! There is nothing to change clothes. The girls started helping me out, some stockings were found - some had one, some had another. In general, the movie is real. I came to him. He met me, so smiling, he also had a house, two tiny rooms, full of cards, and all that kind of stuff. And he told me: “I have all the secret materials here, if anything happens, I will know that it was you and not someone else who was here” (laughs) I say: “Thank you for your trust.” Yes, and he gave me a bag with photographs and said that “my wife died here, these photographs, I don’t look at them now, it’s hard for me, but look.” Well, I looked. She was the head of our front-line hospital. It so happened that she came to see him for a while, and at that time the raid began. It was near Kursk. The raid began, they all went out of the house into the street, and someone said: “Get down!” And they all lay down. And she was wounded - it was a serious wound, and she died. And I told him how everyone died for me. And I was very pleased that he approached me very seriously - in what sense: war, of course, is war, but men always paid a lot of attention, for familiarity, they said all sorts of compliments, all sorts of nonsense. He was completely different. He apparently had, well, a different approach or something.
S. KAZAKOVA: Near Berlin?
M. PESHKOVA: In what place?
S. KAZAKOVA: Strausberg is a town near Berlin. Our front headquarters stood there, the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. That’s where we met on May 9, and at that moment when the surrender was signed in Karshorst, we were all sitting in our seats, waiting for the message. When this event became known, you can imagine how happy, cheerful, joyful we were. The treaty was signed, we won, the war was over. And we were the happiest in the world.
M. PESHKOVA: Did you see your future husband in those days?
S. KAZAKOVA: (laughs) Just saw each other. Very short. Because there were endless things to do, meetings, then a lot of management came from Moscow, and Zhukov...
T. KAZAKOVA: Well, he was at the signing, he was present at the signing.
S. KAZAKOVA: Yes.
M. PESHKOVA: Please tell me what you know about this, what later, subsequently, did your husband tell you? The most important artilleryman in the country was your husband.
S. KAZAKOVA: Yes, of course. War regiment - that’s how the artillery was called. But this really was the case - artillery also played a very big role in our victory. Once upon a time I finally went to sign the surrender, we were all sitting in our seats, we provided communication - the situation was very tense, serious, even though we were absolutely sure of everything, the situation was still very serious. Even Zhukov was so tense. But when this took place, and after, when I saw my husband, he told me in even more detail about this event than we knew, and said that Keitel, who signed it all, he entered the hall, he had a staff in his hand. hand, which he was supposed to have according to his position, and he carried himself with such a proud look that one might think that he came with some kind of victory. However, this pride no longer played any significant role - the signing took place. Well, then they were taken away, the Nazis, the Germans, and a reception began for our people.
M. PESHKOVA: Maybe your husband told you some details?
S. KAZAKOVA: Now so much time has passed that something has disappeared from my memory.
M. PESHKOVA: What was his mood, what did he look like that day?
S. KAZAKOVA: He looked great, he was endlessly joyful - everyone was very joyful and happy.
T. KAZAKOVA: There is such a film, “Signing of Surrender.” I went to the archive of film and photo documents in Krasnogorsk, I needed photographs for the photo album that we were releasing about dad. What was his participation at the signing? And I watched this documentary - how they enter, how they sit down at the tables, how Zhukov enters. And I look at this table, at which the entire headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front is sitting - Zhukov is sitting separately, he signs, and his comrades were, they are sitting at such a side table. Malinin, Telegin, Sokolovsky, our dad, are sitting there. They are all so tense, they are all so collected - it’s as if they are preparing for some kind of throw.
S. KAZAKOVA: But everyone was completely confident in their victory, not only were they confident, they had achieved it and were in this aura.
M. PESHKOVA: And then, when Vasily Ivanovich arrived, he invited you, Svetlana Pavlovna, for a walk around Berlin. You rode cars, right?
S. KAZAKOVA: Well, it will take a while. (laughs) To get up and go - I had to free myself from work... It was very difficult to go, because everything was in ruins, our tanks were there, broken guns, some roads had been built, and there were signs everywhere. For example, “To the Silesian Station” or somewhere else, “To the Reichstag”. Because the city is big, new to us - no one has ever been there.
M. PESHKOVA: Are the signs in Russian?
S. KAZAKOVA: Yes. Ours have already installed this. And I was also very touched by our girls traffic controllers. I still look at them with such delight and worship. It was necessary to be able to stand there and regulate traffic in this way. Unfortunately, our first commandant Berzarin, Colonel General, died there then. The first commandant of Berlin, which had just been liberated. He couldn't think of anything to do but get on a motorcycle and ride. But this is, you know, out of happiness, out of joy that we won, that the war is over.
M. PESHKOVA: Did he crash?
S. KAZAKOVA: Yes, he had an accident.
M. PESHKOVA: Kazakova, artillery marshal war, participant in the Great Patriotic War, Svetlana Pavlovna and the daughter of a military leader Tamara Vasilievna in the cycle “One Victory for All” in “Unpast Tense” on “Echo of Moscow”.
T. KAZAKOVA: They are all young. They were all approximately 40 years old in 1940. Those. they were much younger than I am now. Zhukov was 47 or 48 in 1945 - he was a young man.
S. KAZAKOVA: Yes.
T. KAZAKOVA: Our dad was 47 years old in 1945. They were young commanders.
M. PESHKOVA: And your dad already had three wars behind him.
T. KAZAKOVA: The First World War - he fought in the First World War and received a shell shock on the western front near Riga. Then there was Civil War. And already, well, the most terrible war- The Great Patriotic War.
M. PESHKOVA: Did you manage to sign on the walls of the Reichstag?
S. KAZAKOVA: Of course, it was possible. When Vasily Ivanovich suggested driving around Berlin, I called my friend from intelligence, let’s go - Nina Mironova is like that, she was a sergeant - and we drove around Berlin, along Unter den Linden, under the linden trees - the whole city was in ruins. And they drove up to the Reichstag, which looked like, frankly... they were hitting it, hitting it, hitting it, hitting it. This top, which is glazed in a semicircle - this was nothing. But the banner of victory flew. Yes, you know how many inscriptions there were, from which different places, from our huge country, from everywhere you could see how our soldiers fought, how they died in the very last minutes - it was very offensive and sad. And, indeed, this Victory Day of ours with tears in our eyes absolutely exactly corresponds to all the feelings of every participant in the war.
M. PESHKOVA: Where did you sign on the Reichstag, in what place?
S. KAZAKOVA: On one of the columns, wherever they could get it. There was a staircase there, and then these columns – that’s where we signed our names.
M. PESHKOVA: And you were also in some building where you saw a lot of orders. What was it?
S. KAZAKOVA: And we were also in the chancellery, in the Imperial Chancellery, which survived. This famous globe, according to which Hitler dreamed of conquering the whole world, was no longer there, but there was a table, a lot of papers and a lot of these orders. And there were a lot of orders for motherhood. I don’t know how to explain this, but he needed a fascist army, and obviously so that there would be a higher birth rate.
M. PESHKOVA: How did your work, your service continue after the act of surrender was signed? Did you continue to work in Berlin? Who did you communicate with?
S. KAZAKOVA: No, in Berlin, and the headquarters, which was located in Strausberg, as I said, then our headquarters was transferred to Babelsberg, and Babelsberg was located next to Potsdam. And in this Babelsberg our headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front was located, which was later transformed into a group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany, headed by Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. Our headquarters was there, we continued to work there - at that time I had already transferred to Vasily Ivanovich. He and I already lived together, and I served for another year.
M. PESHKOVA: And with whom did you communicate with Zhukov, with whom did Zhukov talk on the phone?
T. KAZAKOVA: Well, this is a very extensive list. He continued to talk with the commander-in-chief, with representatives of other districts, headquarters, with representatives of the army, but not below. Already below, no one else had such telephones, such a connection at all.
M. PESHKOVA: I see that Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Kabulov, Antonov, Voronov, Budyonny, Bulganin, Vyshinsky and others called Zhukov.
S. KAZAKOVA: This all happened right after the war. Then, basically, all those whom I named all came to Berlin.
M. PESHKOVA: What can you say about Eisenhower?
S. KAZAKOVA: He was a very interesting person, and when he came to us, he said that he dreamed of meeting Zhukov and dreamed of seeing him, what he was like. And when they met, he said the following phrase: “That’s what you are!”
T. KAZAKOVA:
M. PESHKOVA: And I know that Eisenhower presented Zhukov with an award. What did Zhukov give to Eisenhower?
S. KAZAKOVA: Zhukov reported to the Supreme Commander, there was obviously some period of reflection, and they called and informed him, and Eisenhower was also awarded our order. The reception is very large.
M. PESHKOVA: Were you at the reception?
S. KAZAKOVA: Yes, of course, we were invited to all the receptions, the receptions were quite frequent. And there, at this reception with Eisenhower - there was a room, yes, a lot of people, everyone was talking to each other, dancing, all that stuff - and Zhukov and Eisenhower left. And I talked with him for almost two hours. This served as some kind of negative, obviously, the Supreme did not like it and influenced the refusal of Zhukov - he was supposed to fly out to visit America, and Zhukov’s trip was cancelled. And we prepared a lot and were completely ready for this flight to visit. It would be a triumphant procession, of course. But it didn’t happen.
M. PESHKOVA: But the commander-in-chief came to see you in Potsdam, at the Potsdam Conference. Where did he live, where did he stay, and what was the connection with him?
S. KAZAKOVA: A mansion was prepared in Abensberg specifically for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to stay there. It was like that White House above the lake - well, in general, very close to all those houses where the entire military council lived, where we lived. From the Government Communications, our military engineer, he was instructed to install a radio telephone in Stalin’s house. He went there at the moment when Stalin himself was in the office. How he told how he was worried when he saw Stalin. And he established this radio connection, radio telephone. But everything went well, communication was established. Stalin did not ask a single question, he simply fulfilled his duties - and everything was in order. But of course, our Dobronevsky had enough of these memories for the rest of his life when he established communications in Stalin’s office. Well, the conference itself took place several kilometers away in the Cecilienhof Palace, which now houses the Museum of the Potsdam Conference. As you understand, this was a big, big event.
M. PESHKOVA: Were you and your husband already in Moscow when the Victory Parade took place?
S. KAZAKOVA: Of course, he also walked along Red Square. I was amazed and still amazes me now, how delighted I was when our front commanders, army commanders walked along Red Square in the same formation with their soldiers, who only one month ago stopped shooting and smashing the fascists. They marched in the same formation - soldiers, army commanders, front commanders. It was amazing. And then these defeated banners that were thrown at the feet of our government - I still look there, I get goosebumps: there is such a feeling of pride and retribution that this happened, that this is the great invincible army with which we, however, got separated.
M. PESHKOVA: Why did your husband receive the title of hero?
S. KAZAKOVA: You know, artillery took part in all operations, the very first thing is artillery preparation, before the troops, tanks, infantry, pilots attack, first there is always artillery preparation. And so, on April 16, 1945, the offensive against Berlin began. Naturally, it began with artillery preparation. And searchlights were connected to this artillery preparation. Spotlights illuminated the enemy offensive...
M. PESHKOVA: Enemy positions.
S. KAZAKOVA: And the first prisoners who were captured after this offensive and after being illuminated by searchlights, they were completely stunned, they were not even able to give evidence - such an impression was made by their blindness and at the same time art preparation. Tanks, infantry and everyone went forward - it was a very difficult period, because although the Germans understood that the war was lost, and that no, there was no hope, but Berlin was very well fortified, so it was very difficult for us and hard, and a lot people died. I was at these Seelow Heights, where the cemetery occupies a huge territory, and there is a wonderful monument: our soldier on a tank. And on some graves there are photographs and flowers. And I asked: how could it be that there was a whole field of dead people? It turns out that the relatives of the dead were found, and those relatives who are alive are coming. And my grandson told me that on such big holidays, on Victory Day, the consulate sends them to visit all our cemeteries in order to clean up the graves, but they almost never have to do anything, because the Germans are watching. And as many times as we visited such cemeteries, we were convinced that the graves were in order.
M. PESHKOVA: I know that the Kazakovs were friends with Marshal Rokosovsky. What was he like? Was he really so handsome, I ask Svetlana Pavlovna?
S. KAZAKOVA: Not only was he handsome in appearance, he was a man of high culture, his way of treating people, communicating with people also speaks volumes. This has always captivated me. Not everyone could do this, and not all generals are like that. Among such generals, I would also include Rotmistrov, who is also such an intellectual.
T. KAZAKOVA: Rokosovsky was also handsome in a masculine way, it was not without reason that he was played by the best Soviet actors - Davydov and then Karelskikh played him in some film. I want to say that you asked why you got the hero. We have now opened the certificate: the awarding of the Hero of the Soviet Union took place by decree of the Presidium on April 6, 1945, i.e. this is even before the start of the Berlin operation. Therefore, who nominated him for the title of hero? Well, of course, Zhukov, commander. I think that based on the totality of his merits in organizing artillery on those fronts where he commanded artillery, he was worthy of this title. After all, all the most difficult directions fell on those fronts where he commanded. This is the battle of Moscow, this is the Battle of Kursk, Battle of Stalingrad. The heaviest. Then the liberation of Belarus, the liberation of Poland and the capture of Berlin. These are the most terrible, it seems to me, directions of the fronts. And just recently, Channel One showed a full interview of Zhukov with Konstantin Simonov - this is an interview that is used in parts in many films, but here in its entirety. When I listened to it, I understood: Zhukov mentions Rokosovsky’s 16th Army near Moscow, in my opinion, eight times. They were in the most difficult direction, near Volokolamsk. And there Zhukov says that there was no one behind them - that’s how they organized the resistance near Moscow, that’s why Zhukov... they always ask him: “What do you remember most of all in the war?” - “The Battle of Moscow.” There, in this hell, was that same 16th Army, commanded by Rokosovsky, and our dad was his deputy in artillery.
M. PESHKOVA: The relationship between Zhukov and Kazakov, what were they like?
S. KAZAKOVA:
T. KAZAKOVA: I personally remember Zhukov, I remember him very well. They brought me to their dacha to play with his youngest daughter Masha - I remember already in such a completely civil state. And we came to their dacha, as far as I remember, always with my mother - let my mother tell the story.
S. KAZAKOVA: Well, when the war ended, Zhukov lived in the house where Stalin lived, in Babelsberg, in the house where Stalin lived during the Potsdam Conference. Zhukov invited us to visit and organized such meetings in his house several times, and visited both Malinin and Telegin. But I must say that this was the best period of his life. He was so smiling, he himself played the harmonica, he danced... When I started telling at a meeting how smiling Zhukov was, Army General Moiseev said: “Somehow, I’ve never seen Zhukov smiling.” I say: “And I saw him smiling and happy.” He looked like this, as if all the weight had been lifted from his shoulders. This actually happened. And so, he was so cheerful and treated very well... well, who were his guests - of course, all his deputies.
M. PESHKOVA: The widow of the hero of the Soviet Union, war veteran Svetlana Pavlovna and daughter Tamara Vasilievna remembered on the “Echo of Moscow” the closest associate of Marshal Zhukov and Rokosovsky, the country’s chief artilleryman during the war, Marshal Vasily Kazakov. This is our holiday. Happy Victory Day! Sound engineer Alexey Naryshkin, I’m Maya Peshkova, program “Unpast Tense”.
Soviet military leader, Marshal of Artillery (1955), chief of air defense of the USSR Armed Forces in 1958-1965.
Biography
Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov was born on July 6 (new style - 18) July 1898 in the village of Filippovo (now Buturlinovsky district of the Nizhny Novgorod region) into a peasant family. After graduating from parochial school, he left for St. Petersburg and worked at various city enterprises and institutions.
In May 1916, Kazakov was mobilized into the Russian Imperial Army. He began his service as an ordinary soldier in the 1890th reserve infantry regiment, then in the 1st reserve division. In November 1916 he was sent to the Northern Front, serving in the 433rd Novgorod Infantry Regiment. Took part in events.
In 1918, Kazakov volunteered to serve in. Graduated from the 2nd Petrograd Artillery Command Courses. He took part in battles as the commander of an artillery battery on the Northern and Western fronts. After the war he continued to serve in the Red Army. In 1925 he graduated from the Military Artillery School, in 1929 - artillery advanced training courses for command personnel (AKUKS), in 1934 - the Military Academy of the Red Army named after M. V. Frunze, in 1936 he re-graduated from AKUKS.
The Great Patriotic War
Major General of Artillery Kazakov met the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in the position of chief of artillery of a mechanized corps. From July 1941 he commanded the artillery of the 16th Army of the Western Front. He supervised the creation of anti-tank lines, which significantly contributed to stopping the advance of German tank units on Moscow. Kazakov was one of the leading organizers of artillery actions during the defensive and offensive stages of the Battle of Moscow. In the Volokolamsk direction alone, the artillery of the 16th Army destroyed up to 120 tanks and shot down up to 20 enemy aircraft.
In July 1942, Kazakov became the chief of artillery, first of the Bryansk, and in October of the same year - of the Don fronts. Under his leadership, front-line artillery units performed extremely successfully during the war. In February 1943, Kazakov was appointed commander of the artillery of the Central Front. He made a colossal contribution to the preparation of artillery for the decisive summer campaign, paying great attention to artillery reconnaissance by all available means. Personally inspecting combat units together with his headquarters, he correctly distributed artillery and organized its best interaction with other branches of the military. Thanks to this, artillery units reliably covered the junctions of the armies and the front with their fire, creating a tough anti-tank defense. On July 5, 1943, when information was received about the impending Wehrmacht offensive, on the orders of Kazakov, front-line artillery forces carried out a massive counter-artillery preparation, as a result of which the enemy suffered significant losses - up to 90 artillery and mortar batteries, large infantry forces. These actions radically influenced the course of operations in the Oryol-Kursk direction. The Wehrmacht introduced 7 tank, 7 infantry and 1 motorized rifle divisions, 200 aircraft into this area, but was never able to achieve significant success in accordance with the Citadel plan. The main burden of the fight fell on the artillery, led by Kazakov. In eight days of continuous fierce fighting, the enemy lost up to 1,650 tanks, up to 400 artillery and mortar batteries, and up to 86 thousand soldiers and officers.
In the second half of July 1943, front-line artillery in as soon as possible made a 100% regrouping of all forces with reinforcements over distances of 60-250 kilometers. Despite the difficult conditions, Kazakov managed to organize an uninterrupted supply of ammunition, avoiding a shell famine. Largely through the efforts of the front-line artillery commander and his subordinates, it was possible to break through the tactical depth of the German defense and launch a further offensive in Ukraine. The artillery of the Central Front operated successfully during the period.
Subsequently, Kazakov commanded the artillery of the Belorussian Front, which was later transformed into the 1st Belorussian Front. Organized the actions of artillery and mortar units during the liberation of the Byelorussian SSR and Poland, and battles in Germany. During the Bobruisk operation, he was the first in the Red Army to use the double fire shaft method. In the process, thanks to the actions of the artillery, the 1st Belorussian Front managed to break through the powerful German defenses and launch an attack on Poznan. During the fierce battles for this city, Kazakov personally supervised the actions of the artillery units. On March 2, 1945, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union, nominated Kazakov to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Post-war career
In the post-war period, Kazakov commanded the artillery of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany for five years. In March 1950 he returned to the USSR, served as deputy, first deputy, artillery commander of the Soviet Army. On March 11, 1955, Kazakov was awarded the rank of Marshal of Artillery. Supervised the creation Air defense Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and in 1958 became its first commander. In 1965, Kazakov was transferred to the Inspector General Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Published a series scientific works and memories. He died on May 25, 1968, and was buried at the Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow (site No. 6).
Kazakov is a Russian surname. Derived from the word "Cossack" or the nationality "Kazakhs". Contents 1 Known speakers 1.1 Men 1.2 Women 2 See also... Wikipedia
Marshal of Artillery (1955), Hero of the Soviet Union (04/06/1945). Member of the CPSU since 1932. Born into a peasant family, he was a worker. Since 1916 in the army,... ... Big Soviet encyclopedia
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Kazakov is a Russian surname. Derived from the word "Cossack" or the nationality "Kazakhs". Contents 1 Known speakers 1.1 Men 1.2 Women 2 See also... Wikipedia
