Today, like half a century ago, this agency, subordinate to the Pentagon, is responsible for maintaining global technological superiority armed forces USA. DARPA's concerns also include the development of new technologies for use in the armed forces.
In February 2013, agency specialists began actively preparing for nuclear war. Was project launched on protection from radiation damage, including using techniques that directly affect human DNA. We are talking about new treatment methods, devices and systems that can mitigate the effects of radiation. The main goal of the agency's project is to develop technologies that will radically reduce the human body's susceptibility to high doses of radiation. For those who will be treated with latest technologies, chances of survival are high.
Today, the efforts of scientists are directed in three directions: a) prevention and treatment after exposure to radiation; b) decrease in level negative consequences and prevention of death and the development of cancer complications; c) modeling the effects of radiation on the human body through research at the molecular and system-wide levels.
The agency took up the new project because the level of nuclear threat in the world has increased and has not decreased. Today, any country may face the threat of nuclear terrorism, a nuclear power plant disaster, or a local conflict with the use of nuclear weapons.
This project, of course, did not arise out of nowhere. It is known that Barack Obama positions himself as a peacemaker. Atomic bombs like Truman, he's on foreign countries on reset. And in general, he constantly talks about reducing nuclear arsenals - not only Russian, but also his own, American ones.
This peacemaking of his went so far that very influential gentlemen turned to him with a written petition, in which they tearfully asked not to reduce the nuclear weapons of the long-suffering homeland of Republicans and Democrats.
The appeal to the president was signed by 18 people: ex-CIA director James Woolsey, ex-US representative to the UN John Bolton, former corps commander Marine Corps General Carl Mundy and others. International affairs analyst Kirill Belyaninov ("Kommersant" ) believes that such an appeal was confirmation that the White House is indeed working on plans to reduce nuclear arsenals.
According to a certain secret report, the authors of which include individuals from the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intelligence services and the US Strategic Command (in short, a complete military-secret set), the number of nuclear warheads in the country's arsenal today “far exceeds the quantity necessary to ensure nuclear deterrence,” but in modern conditions an arsenal of 1-1.1 thousand warheads is quite sufficient. But a group of influential politicians, who, of course, know this data, still demand that Obama abandon the “rash step.”
What were the 18 misters afraid of?
The authors of the petition are confident that “the growing cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran” can lead to “catastrophic changes.” And the “American nuclear triad, which guarantees strategic stability,” can restrain the aspirations of Iran and North Korea, and only it, and nothing else.
The signatories of the document believe that the threshold established by the New START treaty is critical: by 2018, the Russian Federation and the United States should leave no more than 1,550 warheads on combat duty.
However, the Obama administration intends to continue negotiations with Moscow on reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles.
The concerns of eighteen people are based more on the interests of the US military-industrial complex than on the real situation. What “catastrophic changes” can Iran cause in the world? It is absurd to assume that the American politicians and military men who signed the letter to their president were afraid of Ahmadinejad’s recent words that Iran is a “nuclear power.” Or are 1,550 warheads not enough to defeat North Korea?
Reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles, which Obama will most likely implement this time, is by no means a “workout” for the Nobel Peace Prize. The US President is facing collapse national economy: a huge public debt is also complemented by a large budget deficit, the issue of which is resolved through sequestration, cuts, layoffs, cuts to military programs and tax increases that are extremely unpopular among any class of the population. Reduction nuclear stockpiles- this is the road to savings: after all, maintaining arsenals costs a lot of money.
Tom Vanden Broek (USA Today) ) recalls that the US military budget will be reduced by $500 billion over 10 years through sequestration - the so-called “automatic reduction”. The Pentagon estimates that by the end of the current fiscal year (September 30) it will have to cut spending by $46 billion. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said the cuts would reduce America to a minor military power.
The cuts will also affect military contractors. For example, the economic losses in Texas will amount to a gigantic sum of $2.4 billion. An entire army of civil servants - 30,000 people - will lose their jobs. Their personal financial losses in earnings will amount to $180 million.
Concerning Maintenance, then those states where large warehouses are located will suffer: they will be closed in the coming months due to upcoming budget cuts. Pennsylvania, for example, has two major maintenance depots that modernize complex weapons systems, including the Patriot, for example. Texas and Alabama will be hit hard. The closure of the depot here will stop the repair of weapons, communication devices and Vehicle. The reduction in the flow of orders will affect 3,000 companies. Another 1,100 companies will face the threat of bankruptcy.
There is no up-to-date data on the expected losses of nuclear service contractors. But there is no doubt that there will be such. Obama will look for any reserves in order to reduce budget expenditures.
As for the calls to Russia, everything is clear here: reduce atomic weapons America is somehow not doing well alone. That’s why we started talking about negotiations with the Russians. Moreover, Obama swung at a major reduction: either by a third, or by half. However, these are only rumors, albeit coming from the USA.
Vladimir Kozin (“Red Star”) reminds , what about information about further reductions in strategic offensive arms? official representative White House spokesman Jay Carney said he doesn't expect any new announcements on the matter in the president's next State of the Union address. Indeed, in his message on February 13, the American president only indicated Washington’s readiness to involve Russia in the reduction of “nuclear weapons”, without indicating any quantitative parameters. However, the fact remains: reductions are planned. Another thing is in what way and by what types.
V. Kozin believes that the United States “still intends to follow the path of selective reduction of nuclear weapons, focusing only on further reduction of strategic offensive arms. But at the same time, they completely exclude from the negotiation process such important types of non-nuclear weapons as anti-missile systems, anti-satellite weapons and high-precision means of delivering a “lightning strike” at any point globe..." According to the analyst, the United States is "trying to hide behind various kinds of 'new proposals and ideas' in the field of arms control its far-reaching plans to deploy forward-based weapons in the form of tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense, destabilizing the global military-political situation and undermining the fragile military strategic parity between Moscow and Washington, which has been created over several decades.”
That is, nuclear weapons will be reduced selectively, and in parallel a European missile defense system will be created, and the first will serve as a diversionary maneuver for the second. And at the same time, it will probably free up money for this very second one. Given the budget sequestration, this is a very topical topic.
It is useless to accuse Americans of deceit or double standards: politics is politics. Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Politics at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, founder of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Chairman of the Editorial Board of the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs”, speaks , that “the idea of freeing the world from nuclear weapons is slowly fading away.”
“Moreover,” he continues, “if you trace the dynamics of the views of such famous people, like Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry, who played a role in launching the idea of nuclear zero, you will find that these famous four, in a second article published about two years after their first article, were already talking about reducing and Even the destruction of nuclear weapons was a good goal, but it really required increasing the efficiency and strengthening of the existing US military nuclear complex. They realized that the United States of America could not ensure its security without nuclear weapons. Understanding this whole situation perfectly, our leadership - both Putin and Medvedev - without blinking an eye, announced that they also advocate complete nuclear disarmament. To say otherwise would be to admit bloodthirstiness. But at the same time, we are building up and modernizing our nuclear potential.”
The scientist’s confession is also interesting:
“I once studied the history of the arms race, and since then I sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are something sent to us by the Almighty in order to save humanity. Because otherwise, if there were no nuclear weapons, the deepest ideological and military-political confrontation in the history of mankind, the Cold War, would have ended in World War III.”
According to Karaganov, Russians should thank Sakharov, Korolev, Kurchatov and their associates for the current sense of security.
Let's return to the USA. According to the 2010 nuclear doctrine, America retained the right to launch a nuclear strike first. True, it has narrowed the list of situations that lead to such use of the nuclear arsenal. In 2010, Obama announced a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such weapons - on one condition: these countries must comply with the nonproliferation regime. The strategic document also stated: “... the United States is not prepared to pursue a policy according to which deterrence of a nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.” This indicates the possible preventive use of nuclear weapons, albeit with the reservations given above.
And during cold war“, and after its conditional end, the United States and NATO did not exclude the option of using nuclear weapons against their opponents - and using them first. The 2010 doctrine narrowed the list, but did not change the right of application.
Meanwhile, China almost half a century ago announced on the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. Then India took the same position. Even North Korea- and she adheres to a similar position. One of the main objections to the adoption of the doctrine of no-first use, writes the American magazine " Foreign policy”, is based on the fact that the enemy can “act dishonestly” and strike first. However, there is no answer to the simple question of retribution. Why would the enemy create a nuclear disaster for himself? After all, the threat of assured retaliatory destruction remains a very powerful deterrent.
One can, of course, call Obama's policy logical. The same 2010 doctrine was adopted at a time of growing concerns about terrorism. What if nuclear bombs fall into the hands of terrorists? US President in 2010 said : “The Concept recognizes that the greatest threat to the United States and global security is no longer nuclear war between states, but nuclear terrorism carried out by extremists and the process of nuclear proliferation...”
Therefore, the current proposed reduction of nuclear arsenals is logically combined with the “taming” of what was called 3 years ago “the greatest threat to the United States and global security.” The fewer nuclear weapons, the Foreign Policy magazine rightly notes, the less likely it is that they will fall into the hands of terrorists.
To create a perfectly clean logical picture White House Only one point is missing. By declaring its right to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the United States is becoming like its artificially cultivated enemy, Al-Qaeda. The latter does not declare nuclear rights for obvious reasons. But, for even more understandable reasons, in case of “need” and given the appropriate opportunity, she will arrange an explosion first (we are not necessarily talking about a bomb: there is also a nuclear power plant). The right to the first, albeit “preventive”, nuclear strike puts America precisely in the ranks of those who threaten the world. Like al-Qaeda.
In 1991 and 1992 The presidents of the USA and the USSR/Russia put forward unilateral parallel initiatives to remove from combat service a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of both countries and their partial elimination. In Western literature, these proposals are known as "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" (PNI). These initiatives were voluntary, non-legally binding, and were not formally linked to the retaliatory steps of the other side.
As it seemed then, on the one hand, this made it possible to complete them quickly enough, without getting bogged down in a complex and lengthy negotiation process. The projects of some initiatives were prepared by experts in Voronezh on the basis of one research institute, for which the employees needed to rent a one-room apartment in Voronezh for several months. On the other hand, the absence of a legal framework made it easier, if necessary, to withdraw from unilateral obligations without carrying out legal procedures for denunciation international treaty. The first PNA was put forward by US President Bush on September 27, 1991. USSR President Gorbachev announced “reciprocal steps and counterproposals” on October 5. His initiatives were further developed and specified in the proposals of Russian President Yeltsin on January 29, 1992.
The decisions of the US President included: the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear warheads intended for arming ground-based delivery vehicles (nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical Lance missiles) to the territory of the United States, including from Europe and South Korea, for subsequent dismantling and destruction; removal from service of surface combatants and submarines of all tactical nuclear weapons, as well as naval aviation depth charges, storing them on US territory and subsequent destruction of approximately half of their number; termination of the development program for a short-range missile of the Sram-T type, intended for arming tactical strike aircraft. Counter steps from the side Soviet Union, and then Russia, were as follows: all tactical nuclear weapons in service with the Ground Forces and Air Defense would be redeployed to the pre-factory bases of the enterprise for assembling nuclear warheads and to centralized storage warehouses;
all warheads intended for ground-based weapons are subject to destruction; a third of the warheads intended for sea-based tactical carriers will be destroyed; it is planned to eliminate half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles; it is planned to reduce by half the stockpiles of aviation tactical nuclear weapons by eliminating them; on a reciprocal basis, it was proposed to remove nuclear weapons intended for strike aircraft, together with the United States, from combat units of front-line aviation and place them in centralized storage warehouses 5 . It seems very difficult to quantify these reductions, since, unlike information on strategic nuclear forces, Russia and the United States have not published official data on their stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons.
According to unofficial published estimates, the United States must have eliminated at least about 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons (1,300 artillery shells, more than 800 Lance missile warheads, and about 900 naval weapons, mainly depth charges). They were still armed with free-fall bombs intended for the Air Force. Their total number in the early 1990s was estimated at 2000 units, including about 500-600 aerial bombs in warehouses in Europe 6 . The general assessment of the US tactical nuclear arsenals at present is given above.
According to the estimates of a Russian authoritative study, within the framework of the NPR, Russia had to reduce 13,700 tactical nuclear warheads, including 4,000 warheads for tactical missiles, 2,000 artillery shells, 700 ammunition of engineering troops (nuclear landmines), 1,500 warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, 3,500 warheads for front-line aviation, 1,000 warheads intended for Navy ships and submarines, and 1,000 warheads for naval aviation. This amounted to almost two-thirds of the tactical nuclear warheads in service with former USSR in 1991. 7 The scale of the PNP is difficult to overestimate. First, for the first time, a decision was made to dismantle and dispose of nuclear warheads, and not just their delivery vehicles, as was done in accordance with agreements on reductions of strategic offensive arms. Several classes of tactical nuclear weapons were subject to complete elimination: nuclear shells and mines, nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, nuclear landmines 8 . Secondly, the scale of the reductions significantly exceeded the indirect restrictions contained in the START agreements. Thus, according to the current START Treaty of 1991, Russia and the United States were supposed to remove 4-5 thousand nuclear warheads from combat service, or 8-10 thousand units together. Reductions within the framework of the PNA opened up prospects for the elimination of more than 16 thousand warheads in total.
However, the implementation of the PNP encountered serious difficulties from the very beginning. At the first stage in 1992, they were associated with Russia's withdrawal of tactical nuclear warheads from the territory of a number of former Soviet republics. The withdrawal of this type of weapon was agreed upon in the fundamental documents on the end of the USSR, signed by the leaders of the new independent states in 1991. However, some former Soviet republics began to oppose these measures. In particular, in February 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk banned the export of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Only the joint demarches of Russia and the United States forced him to resume the transportation of this type of weapons. In the spring of 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn. The redeployment of nuclear weapons for strategic delivery vehicles was completed only in 1996.
Another difficulty was that in the extremely difficult economic situation of the 1990s, Russia experienced serious difficulties in financing the disposal of nuclear weapons. Disarmament activities were hampered by the lack of sufficient volumes at storage facilities. This led to overcrowding of warehouses and violations of accepted safety regulations. The risks associated with unauthorized access to nuclear warheads during their transportation and storage forced Moscow to accept international assistance on ensuring nuclear safety. It was provided mainly by the United States under the famous Nunn-Lugar program, but also by other countries including France and the UK. For reasons of state secrets, Russia refused to accept assistance directly in the dismantling of nuclear weapons. However, foreign assistance was provided in other, less sensitive areas, for example, through the provision of containers and wagons for the safe transportation of nuclear warheads, protective equipment for nuclear storage facilities, etc. This made it possible to free up the financial resources necessary for the destruction of ammunition.
The provision of foreign assistance provided partial unilateral transparency not provided for by the PNA. Donor states, primarily the United States, insisted on their right of access to sites they assisted for inspection. intended use supplied equipment. As a result of long and complex negotiations, mutually acceptable solutions were found, on the one hand, guaranteeing the observance of state secrets, and on the other, the necessary level of access. Similar limited transparency measures also covered such critical facilities as the nuclear disassembly and reassembly facilities operated by Rosatom, as well as nuclear weapons storage facilities operated by the Ministry of Defense. The latest officially published information on the implementation of the NPR in Russia was presented in the speech of Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov at the Conference to Review the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 25, 2000.
According to him, “Russia... continues to consistently implement unilateral initiatives in the field of tactical nuclear weapons. Such weapons have been completely removed from surface ships and attack submarines, as well as land-based naval aircraft and placed in centralized storage areas. One third of the total number of nuclear weapons for sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation has been eliminated. The destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, artillery shells, and nuclear mines is being completed. Half of the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of the nuclear aircraft bombs have been destroyed." 10 Assessments of Russia's implementation of the PNA are given in Table. 9. Thus, as of 2000, Russia has largely complied with the PNA. As planned, all naval munitions were moved to centralized storage facilities, and a third of them were destroyed (however, there remains considerable uncertainty regarding the removal of all such weapons from naval bases to centralized storage facilities due to inconsistent official wording). A certain number of tactical nuclear warheads still remained in service with the Ground Forces, Air Force and Air Defense. In the case of the Air Force, this did not contradict the PNA, since, according to the January 1992 initiatives of President Yeltsin, it was envisaged to remove tactical ammunition from combat service and destroy it together with the United States, which did not do this. As for the elimination of Air Force warheads, by 2000 Russia's obligations were fulfilled. In terms of air defense means, the PNAs were carried out in terms of liquidation, but not in the area of complete withdrawal from the anti-aircraft missile forces.
Thus, during the 1990s, Russia carried out PNA in the field of air force and possibly naval warheads, as well as partially air defense. IN Ground forces Some tactical nuclear weapons still remained in service and were not eliminated, although the PNA provided for their complete withdrawal to centralized storage facilities and their complete destruction. The latter was explained by financial and technical difficulties. Implementation of the NPR became one of the requirements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Their implementation became integral part The 13 Steps Plan to fulfill the obligations of nuclear powers in accordance with Art. VI Treaty. The “13 Steps” plan was adopted at the Review Conference by consensus, i.e. representatives of Russia and the United States also voted for its adoption. However, 19 months later, Washington announced a unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Russian-American Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems, which was considered the cornerstone of strategic stability. This decision was made contrary to the United States' commitments under the 13 Step Plan, which required compliance with the treaty.
The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 upset the very delicate balance of mutual obligations between Russia and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament, including with regard to tactical nuclear weapons. It is obvious that the violation by one of the NPT members of its obligations on a number of points of the decisions adopted by the 2000 Review Conference (including the 13 Steps Plan) made full compliance with these decisions by other parties unlikely. During the 2005 NPT Review Conference, no provisions on the 13 Step Plan were adopted, which in fact indicates that it has lost force. This could not but affect the implementation of the PNA. Thus, on April 28, 2003, in a speech by the head of the Russian delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, the following was stated: “The Russian side proceeds from the fact that consideration of issues of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be carried out in isolation from other types of weapons. It is for this reason that the famous unilateral Russian disarmament initiatives of 1991-1992 are complex in nature and, in addition, affect tactical nuclear weapons and other important issues that have a significant impact on strategic stability.”
Russia's official reference to the fact that nuclear weapons address, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, other important issues affecting strategic stability, clearly comes from the idea of the interconnection of the implementation of the initiatives of 1991-1992. with the fate of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. In addition, the statement that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be considered in isolation from other types of weapons is obviously an allusion to the situation that has arisen since the entry into force of the adapted version of the CFE Treaty. This agreement was signed back in 1990 and provided for maintaining the balance of power in Europe on a bloc basis across five types of conventional weapons (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters and aircraft). After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself, with the expansion of NATO to the east, it became completely obsolete.
In order to preserve the system of limiting conventional weapons, the parties held negotiations on its adaptation, which culminated in the signing of an adapted version of the CFE Treaty in Istanbul in 1999. This option took more into account the military-political realities that had developed in Europe after the end of the Cold War and contained certain security guarantees for Russia, limiting the possibility of deploying NATO troops along its borders. However, NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty under very far-fetched pretexts. In the context of the admission of the Baltic states to NATO, the increasing imbalance in conventional weapons to the detriment of Russia and in the absence of ratification of the adapted Treaty by the West, Russia in December 2007 announced a unilateral suspension of compliance with the basic CFE Treaty (despite the fact that the adapted Treaty, as a superstructure over the basic one, never came into force ).
In addition, Russia faced with new urgency the question of the role of nuclear weapons, primarily tactical ones, as a means of neutralizing such an imbalance. It is obvious that fears associated with NATO's advance to the east in the absence of adequate international legal security guarantees, in the eyes of Russia, call into question the advisability of implementing the PNA in full, especially taking into account the political and legally non-binding nature of these obligations. As far as one can judge from the lack of further official statements about the fate of the PNA, they were never fully implemented.
This fact clearly shows both the advantages and disadvantages of informal arms control regimes. On the one hand, significant reductions in tactical nuclear weapons were carried out as part of the PNA, including the destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. However, the lack of verification measures does not allow the parties to confidently assume what kind of reductions actually took place. The lack of legally binding status has made it easier for parties to effectively refuse to implement initiatives without announcing it at all.
In other words, the advantages of the “informal” approach to disarmament are tactical in nature, but in the long term it is not sustainable enough to serve as a stabilizer in the changing political and military relations of the parties. Moreover, such initiatives themselves become easy victims of such changes and can become a source of additional mistrust and tension. Another thing is that after the end of the Cold War, former adversaries could afford much more radical, faster, less technically complex and less economically burdensome disarmament agreements.
On February 5, 2018, the deadline for fulfilling the main restrictions imposed on Russia and the United States by the START-3 treaty, which they signed, expired. The full name of the signed document is the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, START III. This bilateral treaty regulated the further mutual reduction of the arsenal of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and replaced the START I treaty, which expired in December 2009. The START-3 Treaty was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague by the presidents of the two countries, Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011.
question
It is worth noting that countries started thinking about reducing strategic offensive weapons back in the late 1960s. By that time, both the USSR and the USA had accumulated such nuclear arsenals that made it possible not only to turn each other’s territory into ashes several times over, but also to destroy all human civilization and life on the planet. In addition, the nuclear race, which was one of the attributes of the Cold War, seriously affected the economies of the two countries. Huge amounts of money were spent on building up the nuclear arsenal. Under these conditions, negotiations began between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1969 in Helsinki with the aim of limiting nuclear stockpiles.
These negotiations led to the signing of the first treaty between the countries - SALT I (strategic arms limitation), which was signed in 1972. The agreement signed by the USSR and the USA fixed the number of nuclear delivery vehicles for each country at the level at which they were at that time. True, by that time both the USA and the USSR had already begun to equip their ballistic missiles with multiple warheads with individual guidance units (they carried several warheads at once). As a result, it was during the period of detente that a new, previously unprecedented, avalanche-like process of building up nuclear potential began. At the same time, the agreement provided for the adoption of new ICBMs deployed on submarines, strictly in the same quantities as land-based ballistic missiles had previously been decommissioned.
The continuation of this treaty was the SALT II treaty, signed by the countries on June 18, 1979 in Vienna. This treaty prohibited the launch of nuclear weapons into space, and it also established restrictions on the maximum number of strategic delivery vehicles: launchers ICBMs, SLBM launchers, strategic aircraft and missiles (but not nuclear warheads themselves) are below the existing level: up to 2,400 units (including up to 820 ICBM launchers equipped with multiple warheads). In addition, the parties pledged to reduce the number of carriers to 2250 by January 1, 1981. Of the total number of strategic systems, only 1320 carriers could be equipped with warheads with individually targeted warheads. The treaty also imposed other restrictions: it prohibited the design and deployment ballistic missiles based on watercraft (except submarines), as well as on the seabed; mobile heavy ICBMs, cruise missiles with MIRVs, limited the maximum throw weight for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The next joint agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons was the open-ended Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces of 1987. He banned the development and deployment of ballistic missiles with a flight range of 500 to 5,500 km. In accordance with this treaty, countries within three years had to destroy not only all ground-based ballistic missiles of these types, but also all launchers, including missiles in both the European and Asian parts of the Soviet Union. The same treaty introduced for the first time a universal classification of ballistic missiles by range.
The next treaty was START-1, signed by the USSR and the United States on July 31, 1991 in Moscow. It came into force after the collapse of the Soviet Union - on December 5, 1994. The new agreement was designed for 15 years. The terms of the signed agreement prohibited each party from having more than 1,600 units of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, strategic bombers) on combat duty. The maximum number of nuclear warheads themselves was limited to 6,000. On December 6, 2001, it was announced that the countries had fully complied with their obligations under this treaty.
The START-2 treaty, signed back in 1993, was initially unable to be ratified for a long time, and then it was simply abandoned. The next agreement in force was the agreement on reducing the offensive potential of the START, which limited the maximum number of warheads by another three times: from 1,700 to 2,200 units (compared to START-1). At the same time, the composition and structure of the arms to be reduced were determined by the states independently; this point was not regulated in any way in the treaty. The agreement came into force on June 1, 2003.
START-3 and its results
The Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-3) entered into force on February 5, 2011. It replaced the START I Treaty and abolished the 2002 START Treaty. The treaty provided for further large-scale reductions in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States. According to the terms of the agreement, by February 5, 2018 and thereafter, the total number of weapons did not exceed 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic missile-carrying bombers, 1,550 charges on these missiles, as well as 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers (TB) . It was in the START-3 treaty that the concept of “non-deployed” delivery vehicles and launchers, that is, not in combat readiness, was first introduced. They can be used for training or testing and do not have warheads. The treaty also separately stipulated a ban on the basing of strategic offensive weapons outside the national territories of the two states.
The START-3 Treaty, in addition to directly limiting nuclear weapons, implies a bilateral exchange of telemetry data that was obtained during test launches. The exchange of telemetric information on missile launches is carried out by mutual agreement and on a parity basis for no more than five launches per year. At the same time, the parties are required to exchange information on the number of delivery vehicles and warheads twice a year. Inspection activities were also prescribed separately; up to 300 people can take part in the inspection, whose candidacies are agreed upon within a month, after which they are issued visas for two years. At the same time, the inspectors themselves, members of inspection delegations and flight crews, as well as their aircraft, enjoy complete immunity during inspections on the territory of the two countries.
The START III treaty is expected to be extended in 2018, as it expires only in 2021. As US Ambassador to Russia Jon Huntsman noted in January 2018, trust between states on the issue of arms reduction has not been lost at present - Washington and Moscow are successfully working on the implementation of START-3. “We are working in a positive direction regarding START-3, I call it a “moment of inspiration”, after February 5 the work will not stop, the work will be more intense. The fact that we are approaching this date for achieving the goals inspires confidence,” the ambassador noted.
As TASS notes, as of September 1, 2017, the Russian Federation had 501 deployed nuclear weapons carriers, 1,561 nuclear warheads and 790 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy missiles. The United States had 660 deployed delivery vehicles, 1,393 warheads, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. From the published data it followed that for Russia, in order to fit into the START-3 limit, it was necessary to reduce 11 warheads.
Nuclear arsenal of Russia and the USA
Today, the basis of modern strategic weapons continues to be nuclear weapons. In some cases, it also includes precision weapons with conventional warheads, which can be used to destroy strategically important enemy targets. According to their purpose, they are divided into offensive (strike) and defensive weapons. Strategic offensive weapons (START) include all ground-based ICBM systems (both silo-based and mobile), strategic nuclear missile submarines (ARS), as well as strategic (heavy) bombers, which can act as carriers of air-to-air strategic cruise missiles. surface" and atomic bombs.
Topol M mobile version
Russia
Under the START-3 treaty as part of the Missile Forces strategic purpose(Strategic Missile Forces) the following ICBMs fall: RS-12M “Topol”; RS-12M2 "Topol-M"; RS-18 (according to NATO codification - “Stiletto”), RS-20 “Dnepr” (according to NATO codification “Satan”), R-36M UTTH and R-36M2 “Voevoda”; RS-24 "Yars". According to TASS, the Russian Strategic Missile Forces group currently includes about 400 ICBMs with warheads various types and different powers. Thus, more than 60 percent of the weapons and warheads of strategic nuclear forces are concentrated here Russian Federation. A noticeable difference from the United States is the presence of the ground-based components of the nuclear triad - mobile complexes. If in the USA ICBMs are located exclusively in stationary silo installations, then in the Strategic Missile Forces, along with silo-based installations, mobile ground-based ones are also used. missile systems based on the MZKT-79221 multi-axle chassis.
In 2017, the Strategic Missile Forces were replenished with 21 new ballistic missiles. Future plans include decommissioning the Topol ICBMs and replacing them with more modern and advanced Yars ICBMs. At the same time, Moscow expects to extend the service life of the heaviest R-36M2 Voevoda ICBMs in service with the Strategic Missile Forces until at least 2027.
The maritime component of the Russian nuclear triad is represented, as of March 1, 2017, by 13 nuclear submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles on board. The basis consists of 6 submarine missile carriers of Project 667BDRM "Dolphin", which are armed with ballistic missiles R-29RMU2 "Sineva" and their modification "Liner". Also in service are still three nuclear submarines of the earlier project 667BDR “Squid” and one boat of project 941UM “Akula” - “Dmitry Donskoy”. It is also the largest submarine in the world. It was on the Dmitry Donskoy that the first tests of the new Russian ICBM, falling under the START-3 treaty, is the R-30 Bulava missile, which is produced in Votkinsk. In addition to the listed submarines, three nuclear submarines of the new Project 955 “Borey”, armed with “Bulava”, are currently on combat watch; these are the boats: K-535 “Yuri Dolgoruky”, K-550 “Alexander Nevsky” and K-551 “Vladimir Monomakh” " Each of these submarines carries up to 16 ICBMs. Also, according to the modernized Borei-A project, 5 more such missile carriers are being built in Russia.
Project 955 Borei nuclear submarine
The basis of the air part of the nuclear triad in Russia consists of two strategic bombers that fall under the scope of the START-3 treaty. These are the supersonic strategic bomber-missile carrier with variable sweep wings Tu-160 (16 units) and an honorary veteran - turboprop strategic bomber-missile carrier Tu-95MS (about 40 deployed). According to experts, these turboprop aircraft can be successfully used until 2040.
The current US nuclear arsenal consists of silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs (there are 399 deployed ICBM launchers and 55 non-deployed), Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (212 deployed and 68 non-deployed), as well as nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and aircraft bombs. which are carried by strategic bombers. The Minuteman III missile has long been the mainstay of America's nuclear deterrent, having been in service since 1970 and the only land-based ICBM in service with the US Army. All this time, the missiles were constantly modernized: replacement of warheads, power plants, control and guidance systems.
Test launch of Minuteman-III ICBM
The carriers of Trident II ICBMs are Ohio-class nuclear submarines, each of which carries on board 24 such missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (no more than 8 warheads per missile). A total of 18 such submarines were built in the United States. Moreover, 4 of them have already been converted into carriers of cruise missiles; the modernization of the missile silos has made it possible to place up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles on them, 7 per silo. 22 shafts have been converted, two more are used as airlocks for docking mini-submarines or special modules for the exit of combat swimmers. Since 1997, this is the only type of American SSBN in service. Their main armament is the Trident II D-5 ICBM. According to American experts, this missile is the most reliable weapon in the US strategic arsenal.
The Pentagon also included 49 strategic bombers in the number of deployed strategic bombers, including 11 stealthy Northrop B-2A Spirit strategic bombers and 38 “old boys” Boeing B-52H, another 9 B-2A and 8 B-52H are listed as non-deployed. Both bombers can be used as cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, as well as free-fall atomic bombs and guided aerial bombs. Another American strategic bomber, the B-1B, developed in the 1970s specifically for attacking missile strikes across the territory of the Soviet Union, since the 1990s it has been converted into a carrier of conventional weapons. By the time START III expires, the US Army does not plan to use it as a carrier of nuclear weapons. As of 2017, the US Air Force operated 63 B-1B Lancer bombers.
Northrop B-2A Spirit stealth strategic bomber
Mutual claims of the parties
US Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan explained what condition must be met for the United States to comply with the Treaty on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of START (we are talking about the START-3 Treaty) and the INF Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles. According to Sullivan, the United States “wants to comply with arms control agreements, but for this to happen, their ‘interlocutors’ must be ‘minded in the same way,’” the Interfax agency reports his words. It is worth noting that in January 2018, the State Department confirmed Russia’s compliance with the terms of the START III treaty signed in 2010, but the United States still continues to accuse Russia of violating the INF Treaty. In particular, in Washington they believe that a new cruise missile ground-based - a land modification of the famous "Caliber". The Russian Foreign Ministry, in turn, notes that the 9M729 ground-based cruise missile cited as an example complies with the terms of the treaty.
At the same time, according to the chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Defense, Vladimir Shamanov, Moscow has serious doubts about Washington’s fulfillment of its obligations under START-3. Shamanov noted that Russia has not received confirmation of the conversion of Trident II missile launchers and B-52M heavy bombers. The main questions of the Russian side concern the re-equipment of some of the American strategic offensive weapons. As Vladimir Putin noted during a meeting with the heads of leading Russian media on January 11, 2018, the United States must verify the changes being made so that Russia can be convinced that there is no return potential for some media. Moscow's lack of such evidence is cause for concern. According to Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov, dialogue continues with the American side on this issue.
Information sources:
http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4925548
https://vz.ru/news/2018/1/18/904051.html
http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/file/chto_takoe_snv-3
Open source materials
On May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT). In connection with the anniversary of this event, the newspaper Le Figaro offers you an overview of the main Russian-American bilateral agreements.
Disarmament or limiting the buildup of strategic weapons? The nuclear deterrence policy of the Cold War led to a frantic arms race between the two superpowers that could have led to disaster. That is why 45 years ago the United States and the USSR signed the first strategic arms reduction treaty.
Treaty 1: The first bilateral arms reduction agreement
On May 26, 1972, US President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev signed an agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons. The signing took place in front of television cameras in the Vladimir Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. This event was the result of negotiations that began in November 1969.
The treaty limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers, their location and composition. An addition to the 1974 treaty reduced the number of missile defense areas deployed by each side to one. However, one of the clauses of the contract allowed the parties to terminate the contract unilaterally. This is exactly what the United States did in 2001 to begin deploying a missile defense system on its territory after 2004-2005. The date for the final withdrawal of the United States from this agreement was June 13, 2002.
The 1972 treaty includes a 20-year temporary agreement that bans the production of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and limits submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers. Also, according to this agreement, the parties undertake to continue active and comprehensive negotiations.
This “historic” agreement was especially intended to help restore the balance of deterrence. And this does not apply to the production of offensive weapons and restrictions on the number of warheads and strategic bombers. The striking forces of both countries are still very large. First and foremost, this treaty allows both countries to moderate costs while maintaining the capability of mass destruction. This prompted André Frossard to write in the newspaper on May 29, 1972: “To be able to arrange approximately 27 ends of the world - exact figure I don't know - gives them a sufficient sense of security and allows them to spare us many additional methods of destruction. For this we have their kind hearts to thank.”
Treaty 2: Easing tensions between the two countries
After 6 years of negotiations new agreement between the USSR and the USA on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons was signed by American President Jimmy Carter and Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. This complex document includes 19 articles, 43 pages of definitions, 3 pages listing the military arsenals of the two countries, 3 pages of protocol that will enter into force in 1981 and, finally, a declaration of principles that will form the basis of the SALT III negotiations. .
The treaty limited the number of strategic nuclear weapons of both countries. After the treaty was signed, Jimmy Carter said in a speech: “These negotiations, which have been going on continuously for ten years, give rise to the feeling that nuclear competition, if not limited, general rules and restrictions can only lead to disaster.” At the same time, the American president clarified that “this agreement does not take away the need for both countries to maintain their military power.” But this treaty was never ratified by the United States due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
On December 8, 1987, in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan signed the permanent Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which entered into force in May 1988. This “historic” treaty for the first time provided for the elimination of weapons. We were talking about medium- and short-range missiles with a range from 500 to 5.5 thousand km. They represented 3 to 4% of the total arsenal. In accordance with the agreement, the parties, within three years from the moment it came into force, all medium and short-range missiles were to be destroyed. The agreement also provided for procedures for mutual “on-site” inspections.
At the signing of the treaty, Reagan emphasized: “For the first time in history, we have moved from a discussion of arms control to a discussion of arms reduction.” Both presidents specifically pushed for a reduction of 50% of their strategic arsenals. They were guided by the future START treaty, the signing of which was originally scheduled for the spring of 1988.
START I: the beginning of real disarmament
On July 31, 1991, US President George W. Bush and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. This agreement marked the first real reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers. According to its terms, countries were to reduce the number of the most dangerous species weapons: intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles.
The number of warheads was supposed to be reduced to 7 thousand for the USSR and 9 thousand for the USA. A privileged position in the new arsenal was given to bombers: the number of bombs was supposed to increase from 2.5 to 4 thousand for the USA and from 450 to 2.2 thousand for the USSR. In addition, the treaty provided for various control measures, and it finally came into force in 1994. According to Gorbachev, it was a blow to the “infrastructure of fear.”
New START: radical cuts
On January 3, 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his American counterpart George W. Bush signed the START II treaty in Moscow. It was a big deal because it called for a two-thirds reduction in nuclear arsenals. After the agreement entered into force in 2003, American stocks were supposed to decrease from 9 thousand 986 warheads to 3.5 thousand, and Russian ones - from 10 thousand 237 to 3 thousand 027. That is, to the level of 1974 for Russia and 1960 for America .
The agreement also included another important point: the elimination of missiles with multiple warheads. Russia abandoned the precision-guided weapons that formed the basis of its deterrent, while the United States removed half of its submarine-mounted missiles (virtually undetectable). New START was ratified by the United States in 1996 and Russia in 2000.
Boris Yeltsin saw it as a source of hope, and George W. Bush considered it a symbol of “the end of the Cold War” and “a better future free from fear for our parents and children.” Be that as it may, the reality remains less idyllic: both countries can still destroy the entire planet several times over.
SNP: a point in the Cold War
On May 24, 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) in the Kremlin. The talk was about reducing arsenals by two-thirds in ten years.
However, this small bilateral agreement (five short articles) was not precise and did not contain verification measures. Its role from the point of view of the parties’ image was more important than its content: this was not the first time that reduction was discussed. Be that as it may, it nevertheless became a turning point, the end of military-strategic parity: not having the necessary economic capabilities, Russia abandoned its claims to superpower status. Moreover, the treaty opened the door to a “new era” because it was accompanied by a statement of a “new strategic partnership.” The United States relied on conventional military forces and understood the uselessness of most of its nuclear arsenal. Bush noted that the signing of the agreement allows one to get rid of the “legacy of the Cold War” and hostility between the two countries.
START-3: protection national interests
On April 8, 2010, US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev signed another agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms (START-3) in the Spanish drawing room of the Prague castle. It was intended to fill the legal vacuum that arose after the expiration of START I in December 2009. According to it, a new ceiling was established for the nuclear arsenals of the two countries: a reduction in nuclear warheads to 1.55 thousand units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers - to 700 units.
The agreement also calls for a review of the figures by a joint team of inspectors seven years after it enters into force. It is worth noting here that the established levels are not too different from those specified in 2002. It also does not talk about tactical nuclear weapons, thousands of deactivated warheads in warehouses and strategic bombs. The US Senate ratified it in 2010.
START-3 was the last Russian-American agreement in the field of nuclear weapons control. A few days after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump said he would offer Vladimir Putin the lifting of sanctions on Russia (imposed in response to the annexation of Crimea) in exchange for a nuclear weapons reduction treaty. According to the latest data from the US State Department, the US has 1,367 warheads (bombers and missiles), while the Russian arsenal reaches 1,096.
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The final figures were achieved by the United States not only thanks to real arms reductions, but also due to the re-equipment of some Trident-II SLBM launchers and B-52N heavy bombers, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated in a statement. The Russian department clarifies that it cannot confirm that these strategic weapons are rendered unusable as provided for in the treaty.
How many charges are left
— 527 units for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers;
— 1,444 units of warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;
— 779 units for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.
The United States, according to the State Department, as of September 1 last year, had:
— 660 units for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers;
— 1,393 units of warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;
— 800 units for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.
Invitation to negotiations
State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert, in a statement on the implementation of the New START treaty, noted that “implementation of New START enhances the security of the United States and its allies, makes the strategic relationship between the United States and Russia more stable,<...>critical at a time when trust in relationships has declined and the threat of misunderstandings and miscalculations has increased.” The United States, Nauert said, will continue to fully implement New START. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its statement also confirmed its commitment to the agreement.
However, politicians and experts point out that it is time to start discussing the future of the treaty. “We must now decide what to do with the agreement,<...>it seems to end soon. We must think about how to extend it, what to do there,” Russian President Vladimir Putin noted on January 30 of this year at a meeting with trusted officials. There was no direct answer from US President Donald Trump to this question.
The current START expires in 2021; by agreement of the parties, as indicated in the text, it can be extended for five years. If the contract is not extended or is not concluded instead new document, the United States and Russia will lose a unique instrument of mutual control, American experts point out. According to the State Department, since the beginning of the treaty, the parties have exchanged 14.6 thousand documents on the location and movement of weapons, conducted 252 on-site inspections, and 14 meetings within the framework of the treaty commission.
In order to extend START III for another five years, as the text of the agreement implies, Moscow and Washington only need to exchange diplomatic notes. Chairman of the PIR Center Council, Lieutenant General Reserve Yevgeny Buzhinsky, told RBC that due to the current political disagreements between Russia and the United States, it will be extremely difficult for the parties to agree on a fundamentally new agreement, so the extension of START-3 for five years looks much more possible option developments of events.
Preparation of a new agreement is a realistic and even desirable option if there is political will in Moscow and Washington, but if it is not there, the parties will agree to extend the current version, says Alexey Arbatov, head of the Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS.
What to negotiate
Russia and the United States have been reducing strategic weapons for three decades, but compliance with the terms of the START treaty will most likely put an end to the process of reducing nuclear arsenals, writes The New York Times. The priorities for the development of nuclear weapons and the creation of new low-yield nuclear warheads specified in the US Nuclear Forces Review adopted on February 2 will lead to a new nuclear arms race, but countries will now compete not by their number, but by tactical and technical characteristics, writes the publication.
The new American nuclear doctrine proclaims the concept of selective nuclear strikes and the introduction of systems with reduced explosive power and high precision, which potentially sets the stage for the escalation of a nuclear conflict, Arbatov warns. That is why, the expert believes, a new, comprehensive agreement is needed that would address the problems of developing high-precision non-nuclear systems.
Even during the preparation of the current treaty, experts from both sides pointed out that the treaty base between Russia and the United States needs to be expanded to non-strategic nuclear weapons, missile defense and other sensitive issues.
Still in charge of arms reduction issues at the State Department with the rank of acting. Assistant Secretary of State Anna Friedt said back in 2014 that the United States, together with NATO, should, in the future, when political conditions allow, develop and offer Russia its position on non-strategic nuclear weapons. Non-strategic (tactical) weapons are characterized by low power, such weapons include aerial bombs, tactical missiles, shells, mines and other ammunition with a local range.
For Russia, the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons is as fundamental as the issue of missile defense for the United States, notes Buzhinsky. “There are mutual taboos here, and none of them is ready to concede in areas where one of the parties has an advantage. Therefore, in the foreseeable future we can only talk about further quantitative reduction. Discussion of the qualitative characteristics of weapons in the negotiation process is a long-standing proposal, but in the current conditions it borders on fantasy,” he says.
Former US Defense Secretary William Perry told RBC that the next START treaty should introduce restrictions on all types of nuclear weapons - not only strategic, but also tactical: “When people talk about what the nuclear arsenal is today, they mean about 5,000 warheads in service, which is already bad enough. But in the USA we have a couple of thousand more nuclear shells in warehouses that can also be used. And such shells are available not only in the USA, but also in Russia, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons.”
Expanding the number of parties involved in reducing nuclear arsenals, according to Buzhinsky, is unlikely, since other nuclear powers - Great Britain, France, China - will logically demand that Moscow and Washington first reduce the number of warheads to their level before entering into any agreements .
The new agreement, according to Arbatov, should take into account topics that the drafters of START III ignored. First of all, these are missile defense systems and the development of high-precision long-range non-nuclear systems. “Three years are enough for diplomats to prepare a new agreement on the basis of the existing one: START-3 was agreed upon in a year, START-1 was signed in 1991 after three years of work practically from scratch,” Arbatov sums up.
